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THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF SELECTED VILLAGES IN THE MARVDASHT PLAIN, FARS PROVINCE, SOUTHERN IRAN

Ph.D. Thesis 1981

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ABSTRACT

The population of the Marvdasht plain form the subject matter of this thesis. The plain is located in central Fars province, north of the provincial capital of Shiraz. The population is diverse in origin reflecting the heterogeneous character of regional society, with its complex mix of sedentary and nomadic elements. Until the execution of a supposedly radical land reform programme in the 1960s much of the plain was under the control of absentee landlords. In the thesis attention is focused on a particular part of the plain, the Ayub valley, and in particular on the village of Chamanj, a newly settled village containing Persian, Luri, and Turki speakers. Parallel to this the activities of both landlords and villagers are traced out from the village into the region in which they are contextualised, and features of other villages in the plain are also emphasised.

The first three chapters serve to set the scene. After an introductory description of the provincial environment and of major features in the social organisation of the province, attention is directed to an examination of the inter-relationship between nomadism and sedentarism, because a large proportion of villagers were former pastoral nomads and still maintain significant relationships with the nomadic sector. It is hypothesised that, rather than looking at nomadism and sedentarism as separate types of social organisation, it is perhaps more useful to regard them as variations on a small number of themes. Chapter III elaborates this point, through an examination of tribal organisation which has often been equated with nomadism, and which is still used as a means of identifying and labelling certain groups of people.
Rather than separate nomadic from sedentary or tribal from non-tribal it is suggested that the social organisation of the Marvdasht plain may be more adequately interpreted through an analysis of the changing patterns of land use and control over time. Thus, after a brief overview of the Marvdasht plain, the historical development of relations of production are outlined with special attention being given to the period before land reform. This is intended to put the land reform programme into an historical context and thereby facilitate an interpretation of it and of the different sorts of relationships that have been constructed between landlords and peasants in the plain.

Chapters VII and VIII examine the varied nature of local production, using the village of Chamani as a base. An attempt is made to confront some of the established stereo-types through which village organisation in Iran have been interpreted.

The final four chapters investigate the ways in which alliances have been constructed, and the changing relationships of inequality and authority that have resulted from the differential incorporation of people into changing forms of production; the results of an extended and variable association with western capitalism. Beginning with relationships within the household, the analysis is extended out to finally examine the changing nature of relationships between the state and villagers.

Throughout the thesis emphasis is placed on the continuity of social organisation over time. Despite the execution of a major land reform programme and its association with the 'white revolution of the shah and the people', it is maintained that 'familial' networks of control, and 'tribal' associations are still important in the regulation of action and
interaction, and that the supposed transition from non-capitalist to capitalist is an extremely complex process which neat categorisations into 'traditional' and 'modern' do little to illuminate.
تاریخ ا이며 گزارش‌آسی و در حال

"History is a mirror of the past
and a lesson for the present"
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PREFACE

The fieldwork on which this thesis is based was carried out during 1970 and 1971. It does however reflect work carried out in Iran since that time which I believe has broadened and deepened my understanding of social organisation in the Marvdasht Plain. Inevitably the conceptual framework with which I initially began work has changed considerably; the results of the field experience itself, as well as involvement in different intellectual traditions since then. In addition circumstances in Iran have changed dramatically since my last visit there in 1977.

This work does not attempt, except in the most cursory manner, to deal with the changing relationships between the Muslim clergy and the state (as well as the changing nature of both). For the Shi'a clergy to assume control of the state apparatus is in itself unique as traditional Shi'a Islam has eschewed involvement in secular government.

Scattered reports from Fars since the revolution would appear to indicate that the flexibility which was such a feature of much socio-economic and political organisation, in terms of the maintenance of the 'agro-pastoral combine' and the 'web' system of political organisation, remain as major foci for action. Leaders of the Qashqai tribe for example have returned from exile and obtained places in the new Iranian parliament. But, without reliable information it is impossible to construct anything but hypothetical accounts of the effects of these changes on the Marvdasht plain. Those
who had placed their reliance on a single specialised interest, or job were likely to be most affected, while those who could command a wide variety of resources probably fared less badly.

---

My research in the Marvdasht plain was financed by a research studentship received from the Social Science Research Council. If they had demanded production at the end of the three year period of the award this thesis would have taken on a very different form. It was because of their attitude that, not only was I able to reflect on my work of that period but also to extend and, I feel, enrich my experience and my research. At the end of that three-year period I was hardly in a position to synthesise my material. The tradition which assumes that one goes into the field to test already worked-out hypotheses gives little room and little time for changes in those hypotheses. And yet pressures do necessitate a compromise and a definition of one's work in ways which, if it is to reach written form, remain only partially satisfactory.

The public language of a preface invites the somewhat invidious listing of those who have figured most prominently in the construction of the work to which it is pre-faced. This has the inevitable result of excluding many who remain unmentioned. To those who remain hidden I extend my warmest thanks. To the people of the Ayub valley, the 'objects' of my
study I am also indebted. By the very nature of this type of research they are not in a position to respond to my interpretations of their activities. This inevitably increases the subjectivity of these interpretations. The research worker is in an analogous position to a photographer, in that villagers who object to photographs because, they argue, the camera captures their 'soul', are justifiably apprehensive of the research worker who tries to 'capture' their lives. The trust that they extend must therefore be handled with great caution lest it be used as a manipulatory tool against them.

Initially my research work was supervised by Professor Philip Mayer who was responsible for its inception and, in a number of penetrating ways, through his own work on tribesmen and townsmen in southern Africa, provided one of the foundations from which I worked. Professor Eric Sunderland has taken an active interest since stimulating, first, my interest in anthropology, and secondly my interest in Iran through his own work on the human geography of that country.

Parallel to them my thanks go to my supervisor, David Brooks, and his wife, Marianne who have, over the years supported the various stages through which this work and my thoughts have developed. Research of this nature is a very solitary affair and, much more than others, they have been sympathetic to the problems of working in Iran as well as to the nuances of interpretation of very complex data. They have both been extremely tolerant of my many demands on their time and patience.
The Department of National Development and Sociology of what was Pahlavi University in Shiraz provided a basis for my studies in Fars and to the staff, in particular Ismail 'Ajami, and the students I owe a great deal. Of many friends and colleagues in Shiraz who helped me in my research I would like to single out Jalal Sadeghi and his wife, Ann Betteridge, Habib Ghavami, Ali Shushtari, Hosein Khan Farsi Madan, Manuchehr Shiva, Feridun Darreshuri, and Shahbaz Khān Kashkuli.

While in Iran I was fortunate to have the support and encouragement of a number of foreign scholars themselves wrestling with interpretations of the Iranian scene. Bruce Livingstone, Bill Royce, Richard Salzer, Bill Sumner, Lois and Sam Beck, Judy Goldstein, Nico Kielstra, Grant Farr, Mary-Ellen Page, Charlotte Albright, Bill Beeman, Shirley Jarman and Brian Beeley were of particular importance. I must also thank the British Institute of Persian Studies, and its director, David Stronach, for their support and for providing a haven of the 'known' in the middle of the unknown. Throughout my stay in Iran the Institute provided a welcome source of intellectual stimulation and friendship.

The Centre for Development Studies at the University College of Swansea has, over the past four years, supported and encouraged my interests and indeed contributed substantially to the final form that this thesis has taken. Colleagues in Swansea have allowed me to bounce my ideas off them and have also given me time to devote to the completion of this thesis in the face of very demanding teaching schedules. I would
like to thank in particular Gavin Kitching, Chris Gerry and Charlie Gore. Thanks finally to Anthea Thomas who at a particularly busy period was able to type my manuscript and deal with my last minute alterations.
Explanatory notes

Transliteration: In transliterating Persian I have followed the system utilized by Lambton (1953, pp.x-xii), which is based on that adopted by the Royal Asiatic Society. This is not, however, rigorously followed and for proper names and place names the most common English form is used. I have adopted the following system.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{ā} & \text{b} & \text{p} & \text{t} & \text{th} & \text{j} \\
\text{a} & \text{b} & \text{p} & \text{t} & \text{th} & \text{j} \\
\text{s} & \text{z} & \text{t} & \text{z} & \text{gh} & \text{gh} \\
\text{ch} & \text{f} & \text{q} & \text{k} & \text{g} & \text{l} \\
\text{kh} & \text{d} & \text{dh} & \text{r} & \text{m} & \text{n} \\
\text{d} & \text{dh} & \text{r} & \text{m} & \text{n} & \text{v} \\
\text{s} & \text{z} & \text{sh} & \text{h} & \text{y} & \text{y} \\
\end{array}
\]

(vowel sound 'ou') (vowel sound 'i')
Chronology: Iran uses the Muslim calendar which dates from the flight (hejra) of the prophet Mohamad from Mecca to Medin in A.D. 622. For civil purposes a solar calendar is used. This begins on 1st Farvardin, the spring equinox. Thus the year 1349 corresponds to the year running from 21st March 1970 to 20th March 1971. In the middle of the 1970s the shah tried to introduce a new calendar which dated from the foundation of the Achamenian dynasty, 2,500 years before the coronation of Reza shah in 1925. Thus the year 2545 corresponded to the year running from 21st March 1970 to 20th March 1971. This was abandoned in 1979 with the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Currency: The official unit of currency is the rial. In the early 1970s there was considerable fluctuation in its value as against foreign currencies. In 1969 the exchange rate stood at 180 rials to £1 sterling. This had fallen by 1975 to 120 rials to £1 sterling. A more common form of reckoning was in tomans: one toman equals 10 rials.

Weights and measures: While officially weights and measures were metric, the mann was commonly used. This unit of weight varied from place to place, but the mann-e-marvdashti was used as equivalent to 3.2 kilogrammes.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Most of the intensive research for this thesis was undertaken in and around the village of Chamani in the Marvdasht plain, north of the regional capital of Shiraz, in the southern Iranian province of Fars. It is from this base that interpretations of the complexities of social organisation in the Marvdasht plain have been constructed.

As an inexperienced post-graduate student, inspired by the work of such people as Barth and English, my initial aim was to undertake a traditional piece of anthropological field-work concentrating on problems of social change which were accompanying a rapid modernisation programme in Iran in the late '60s. I arrived in Shiraz in the late spring of 1969 with some rather general questions as to the nature of city/village inter-relationships and nomad/peasant inter-action. The next few months were occupied with attempts to focus my study. In the early summer I spent several weeks in the rather unusual village of Ghalat, north west of the city of Shiraz, half way between that city and Ardakan. I was the guest of the resident medic and of the small Anglican community which had established a small church in the village (the only one of its kind in Fars, and used by the missionary community in Shiraz as a summer retreat). While there, learning Persian,

2. English, P.W. (1966), City and Village in Iran, Madison, Wisc
I concentrated my work on a study of the *giveh* (cloth-shoe) industry that was very important in the village economy. Because of their wide trade links with other parts of the province, this seemed a good place to start an analysis of regional networks. It became very obvious, however, after only a short stay that, not only did Ghalāt appear as unrepresentative, but my association with the Anglican community would not aid in my attempts to live as a 'neutral' observer in a 'representative' community.

I returned to Shiraz and embarked on a survey of one of the food-processing factories in Shiraz with the aim of building up a picture of the networks constructed by migrant workers employed there. My aim throughout was, however, to find a village which would be suitable for my as yet only half-formulated hypotheses. I travelled extensively in the Marvdasht plain and in central Fars province at this stage, looking for the 'right' village. Retrospectively this 'right' village was characterised by criteria which were extremely subjective - not too distant from the major urban centre of Shiraz, and yet isolated enough not to have been irreparably altered by recent changes. With a conceptual framework which put 'tribes' on the margins and urban areas at the 'centre', 'my' village was to be halfway between, reflecting and interacting with both.

The reason for concentration on a settled community rather than a nomadic one at this stage was conditioned by the prevailing difficulties that foreign scholars were having in the late '60s in obtaining permission to travel and work in tribal...
areas. Pragmatically I could not afford to spend several months in Tehran waiting around for that permission to be granted. I was anxious to get out into the 'field' and start work. Both Tehran and Shiraz were not perceived as having anything to do with this 'field'. I managed to circumvent the necessity of obtaining formal permission by attaching myself to the Department of National Development and Sociology at what was then the Pahlavi University in Shiraz. In return for minimal contributions to their teaching programme I was able to obtain an identity card which allowed me to travel relatively unhindered in central Fars. At that time I was unable to visit except informally many of the more isolated 'tribal' areas of the province. The Department had a field centre just outside Marvdasht at which I was a frequent visitor and from which I was able to visit many villages in the Marvdasht plain, over several years.

In the autumn of 1969 I was introduced to a landowner in the Marvdasht plain who was prepared to let me work from one of his villages in return for helping him to speak English. This landowner was Mustafa Abdulahi, who figures prominently in this thesis, and the village was Chamani. He took me with him on a variety of occasions to his other estates in central Fars and allowed me to live in his courtyard in Chamani. Between the early spring of 1970 and the late summer of 1971 most of my work was focused on this village and the villages around. My major aim was to analyse the impact of land reform in the Marvdasht plain and this has remained the core of my
research work. I spent several weeks at a time in Chamani, and while in town, where I retained a base with my wife, spent much time with Abdulahi, as well as helping with the research work of students in the Department of National Development, in rural development projects and in the study of shanty towns in and around the city.

After a year in England I returned to Fars in the late summer of 1972 to take up a post as lecturer in the Department of National Development and Sociology. In addition to my teaching I was involved in research among pastoral nomads, more particularly both the Farsi Madan section of the Qashqai, and also the Kurushi camel herders who were attached to the Qashqai. While occasionally visiting Chamani I did no more concentrated work there. The reasons for this were various. Firstly, I felt that my association with the landlord (Abdulahi) had compromised my associations with the villagers and that the information that I had obtained from there was biased because of that. Secondly because of the nature of the population of Chamani it seemed important to look at other facets of the regional population. I wanted to redress the imbalance that I felt my work in Chamani had created in my understanding of the situation in Fars; I wanted to work with 'ordinary' people without being necessarily compromised in their eyes through associations with urban-based landlords and agents of the State whose interests oftened seemed contrary to those of villagers.
Between 1972 and 1975 I travelled widely throughout the whole of Fars, and over a period of eight months in 1973 worked intensively with one group of the Farsi Madan. This provided me with important comparative data, but led me away from the initial foundations on which my research had been based - Chamani. Again, retrospectively it appeared as an attempt to find the 'true' 'field' where my anthropological analysis would be uncompromised by associations with urban-based, westernised Iranians. It was not until I was able to see both Shiraz and Abdulahi as part of that 'field' that the material I had collected began to make any sense.

Despite its physically distinct appearance, the village boundaries of Chamani did not circumscribe the activities of its inhabitants in ways in which functional accounts of middle eastern villages suggested as they concentrated on notions of 'peasant' society. Questions were very soon raised in my mind as to the nature of the commitment of villagers to their place of residence as well as to a search for other criteria which might help explain their varied activities and the boundaries of social control operative within the village. One aspect of Chamani's distinctiveness was its division into two discrete parts, one occupied by the landlord, the other by the majority of the inhabitants of the village. This posed questions about the reasons for and the nature of, the separation of the interests of the large landowner and the majority of the villagers,
and led into an analysis of the organisation of production in the village.

Chamani also seemed to be divided along 'ethnic' lines involving the coexistence in one place of three different groups speaking three different languages (Turki, Luri, and Persian). This posed questions as to how people were identified with particular places and as to the mobility of populations in the plain. It also raised questions about the boundaries that villagers themselves used in the organisation of their lives, and in their reactions to forces that impinged on their lives.

Such perceived distinctions within Chamani led to an examination of features in the wider environment, both in neighbouring villages and in the regional environment; the nature of tenurial relationships and their change over time, and the nature of ethnic identity within southern Iran. This in turn implied an acquaintance with the social history of the area and an investigation of the inter-relationships between nomadic and sedentary communities which was such a visible feature of the Marvdasht plain. In moving along such a path however, I was taken further from the empirical basis on which the thesis was constructed; the Ayub valley. Further problems were posed as to the interpretation of social organisation and the premises on which such interpretations were built.

The boundaries of the analysis extended as the boundaries of the community were also extended, and it became increasingly wide-ranging. A point was reached when epistemological questions about the construction of 'reality' associated with
the supposed collection of 'objective' 'facts', became more important than an examination of the actual data collected in the villages in the Marvdasht plain. As Ennew has pointed out:

"even apparent empirical knowledge of the world is theoretical, constructed in concepts and language that are themselves thought objects and not concrete objects."

(Ennew 1976, p.44)

The search for interpretative schema, to 'explain' activity in the Marvdasht plain involved a critique of the analytical boundaries used to isolate supposedly distinct groups such as 'villagers' or 'tribes', and led to an examination of the intellectual premises which scholars had used in constructing such categories. Firstly there were those premises, a critique of which finally became an intellectual exercise within a western philosophical tradition - the fact that the object of analysis was a middle eastern society was of little consequence. Secondly there were the premises that the villagers and others used in their construction of organisational forms rooted in the socio-historical and physical conditions of existence in which they were obliged to operate.

Ultimately the scholar's perception of reality remains, importantly, rooted in his/her environment and in the intellectual traditions which have formed his/her analytical premises. Comments and interpretations of the actions of others are necessarily coloured by this. Nevertheless meaning is given to the world through interpretation of that world and the construction of viable categories that help in its manipulation.
The theoretical premises that one adopts, explicitly or implicitly, colour not only the conclusions which one formulates, but also the very nature of the facts that one collects in the pursuit of a particular hypothesis. These in turn are coloured by the nature of one's exposure to 'reality' in the 'field'. The results of a particular piece of research are then the encapsulated energies of the actors involved, both researcher and researched; a defined record of a transient moment in time. As such, any piece of research abstracts from a very complex reality and transposes the 'facts' out of the history in which they are contextualised.

Chamani is a relatively newly settled village and as such exhibits features that distinguish it from older villages in the plain. The fact that the village is divided between the interests of the large landowners and the villagers, and that the inhabitants of the village exhibit heterogenous characteristics, provide the starting points for the analysis.

A major feature of the Marvdasht plain is the juxtaposition of a nomadic population with permanently settled villages. Traditional interpretations have tended to perceive the two as discrete, in social, economic and political terms. But closer analysis suggests that such discreteness is not necessarily reproduced in actual organisation within the plain. Such interpretations appear to be predicated on an evolutionary scheme which perceives change in terms of progression from a 'tribal' to a more sophisticated organisational form, so that 'tribes' were perceived as residual and archaic social
forms. More functionalist interpretations tended to see the relationships between 'tribe' and 'villager' as a product of specialisation, and stressed the symbiotic nature of the interactions between them. The former has been considerably altered, not only because of the more obvious features of its ethnocentric bias, but also because the evolutionary path, associated with 'modernisation' was by no means as straightforward as 'modernisation' theorists might have imagined. The latter has also been revised because it tends to avoid history and select abstract features out of that history.

The pivot of land reform provides the perspective from which to look at the process of change characterised by the expansion of capitalism; the individuation of property rights, and the active 'marginalisation' or 'peripheralisation' of so-called 'pre-capitalist' or 'non-capitalist' elements, both physically and intellectually. This process involves the expansion of a developing state structure and an analysis of the often prescriptive categories by which that state dealt with the problems and aspirations of villagers.

In examining change in the Marvdasht plain then, one must situate it in a broader context; the village is only one part of a very complex equation. The diverse origins of the villagers, as well as the nature of control over productive resources take one outside the narrow confines of the village. Initially it is necessary to situate the plain in the physical context of southern Iran. This is the object of Chapter II which looks at the different physical regimes which make up
this ecologically varied region. This is essential for an understanding of the movement of people between areas and thus for an understanding of the various types of agricultural and nomadic regimes that are to be found in the region. Through such it is hoped to present a framework in which some of the features that are to be found in the Marvdasht plain may be more comprehensively evaluated. The physical environment serves as a basis from which to analyse the social environment and the nature of interaction between urban, rural and nomadic populations, all of which are represented in the plain.

Such an introductory overview provides a framework for an examination in Chapters IV and V of changing tenurial relationships as well as changes in the distribution of power. The central theme in this examination is the continuing importance of a form of delegation of authority in which political office was combined with control over land. It is paralleled by a discussion of changes associated with the expansion of capitalist relations of production and the changing character of state control.

The land reform of the 1960s was hailed as a major break with tradition. Closer inspection suggests that it served the interests of those already established in power. It had the effect of polarising the interests of the large landowners from those of the majority of the peasant cultivators, and aided in the expansion of individual, commercialised agricultural production. The forms of cultivation after the reform
are analysed in Chapter VII. This is followed by an examination of occupational differentiation within the village of Chamani. It is emphasised there that changes in occupation cannot necessarily be viewed as indicators of more comprehensive changes, but may reflect the intellectual categories that observers have brought to the analysis of rural production.

A major aim of the thesis is to examine the nature and characteristics of changes that have been felt in the Marvdasht plain both preceding land reform and following, in order to put the reform programme into its historical context, as the necessary accompaniment of a trend whose effects were being felt long before.

Parallel to such an analysis is an examination of the inter-relationships between villagers and others in a changing environment; the nature of the alliances they construct in the pursuit of their different goals. Proceeding from an examination of the household economy (Chapter IX) through an investigation of the nature of marital alliances, attention is then focused on the alliances constructed between households, in what has been termed the 'agro-pastoral combine'. Finally, attention is focused on the changing patterns of inequality and authority, firstly through an investigation of the nature of Abdulahi's alliances and then to those constructed between villagers and the state.
CHAPTER II
ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Physical environment

The Marvdasht plain is located in the province of Fars. This province straddles the southern section of the Zagros mountain chain in south-western Iran; from the coastal plains of the Persian Gulf to the plateau areas bordering the inland deserts. A great variety of environmental conditions are to be found, and this variety provides the backdrop for many different forms of social organisation.

The main lie of the Zagros mountains in this area is NW-SE, and there is a gradual reduction in elevation as one moves southwards and eastwards:

"towards the south the ridges become more widely spaced almost as fingers of upland within a plateau rather than serried ranks of ridges and valleys."

(Fisher, 1968, p.27)

The higher, more inaccessible areas are to be found in the north and west, where Mount Dena, the highest peak in the southern Zagros range, rises to an impressive 4,276 metres (see Fig.1).

As one travels westwards from the provincial capital of Shiraz towards the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr one descends

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1. The present provincial boundaries of Fars are the results of relatively recent administrative reforms. The province covers an area of 133,298 sq.kms. and is one of 14 such provincial divisions within Iran. It is bordered on the north by the province of Esfahan, on the west by the Governorate (Farmāndarikol) of Kuh-Giluyah and the province of Khuzestān and, since its creation in the late sixties by the coastal province including all the coastal areas on the northern side of the Gulf from Khuzestān in the north to Sistān and Baluchistān in the south east. Fars province is administered from the provincial capital of Shiraz.
Fig. 1. General topography of Fars province
dramatically from the Iranian plateau in a number of distinct physical steps, to the shores of the Gulf; alternating steep drops and broad plains take one through a series of very different climatic regimes and through some of the most difficult terrain in Iran. As one moves from higher to lower altitudes rainfall gradually decreases and temperatures gradually increase (see Fig.2). In July and August, the hottest months, the average temperatures in Shiraz are 36°C, at a height of 1490 metres, whereas in Kazerun, at a height of 737 metres above sea level they are about 7°C. hotter at 43°C. Further north and west of Shiraz summers are cooler, but reliable information is not readily available from these more isolated areas. On the other hand winters at lower altitudes are much warmer than at higher ones. Average January temperatures in Kazerun are about 10°C. higher than corresponding temperatures in Shiraz.

On the basis of these broad topographic and climatic variations the region may be roughly divided into three zones. These zones represent broad ecological divisions where the physical environment offers very different opportunities for the pursuit of diverse economic activities.

The first zone, known as the garmsir, or warm zone, comprises the lower lying areas towards the Gulf.¹ Here summers

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¹ The term garmsir refers to any warm area but was also used as the proper name for that area south of Shiraz, west of Larestân and east of Tangestân and Dashtestân. Tangestan was located between Kazerun and the Gulf port of Bushehr, and Dashtestan was located between Bushire and Arabestân at the head of the Gulf. Perry refers to Garmsir as 'the lowlands of the Persian Gulf littoral between Bushire and Bandar 'Abbās' (1979, p.331), and separates it from Fars (ibid., p.86).
Fig. 2. Climatic characteristics of selected stations in Fars province.

Temperature

Shiraz (1490')

Kazerun (737')

Bushire (4')

Rainfall

Total - 385mm

Total - 153mm

Total - 260mm
are very hot. Climate restricts settlement and agriculture and much of the terrain is barren and uninhabitable except for a few months of the winter and early spring when it can support large flocks of sheep and goats that are seasonally pastured in the area. Where irrigation water is available rice and wheat are grown and citrus fruits and dates are the major tree crops. Wheat and barley are also dry farmed in places. Many of the long-range pastoral nomads who are to be found in the region spend their winter months in this area. There is a small permanent population living in isolated villages and cultivating the small areas of surrounding farm land.

The second zone, known as the sarhad, or cool zone, comprises the mountain areas of the upper reaches of the Zagros. Here winters are very cold and the higher valleys may be cut off by snow for up to five months in the year. Summers, however, are relatively cool and the area provides summer pastures for large flocks of sheep and goats. As in the garmsir there is a small permanent population which derives a livelihood from the cultivation of hardier cereals and tree crops such as walnuts and apples. Summer cereals are also dry-farmed. Many long range pastoral nomads spend their summer months in this zone.

The third zone delimits the more continuously fertile areas of the province in which climatic conditions are not as severe as in the garmsir or the sarhad and in which
relatively large plains with sophisticated irrigation networks support a large proportion of the regional population and provide much of the agricultural surplus necessary to support the major urban centres. The major centres for agricultural production in this zone are around the provincial capital of Shiraz and the regional centres of Firuzābād, Kāzerun, Neiriz, Dārāb, Jahrom, Fasā and Estahbānāt (see fig. 1).

**Nomadism and sedentarism**

The cultivation of cereal crops and the raising of sheep and goats provide, together, the basic means of gaining a livelihood for the majority of the population of the region, despite recent expansions in commercial and industrial enterprises and the growth of urban centres. Agricultural and pastoral activities are everywhere combined in varying proportions, although locally either one or the other may be dominant, and certain areas of the provinces are more suited to the provision of extensive grazing. At the local level it would appear that the co-operative interests of the extended family which bridge the pastoral and agricultural sectors still provide the desired combination of resources and flexibility of response in attempts to deal with variable physical and socio-political conditions.

This combination of agricultural and pastoral interests gives rise to a wide variety of organizational adaptations to very different ecological conditions. Because of the

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1. The division between khāki (people of the soil) and bādi (people of the wind) reflects this dual interest in the composition of tribal groups.
unpredictability of rainfall from year to year, month to month, and place to place, the availability of pasture lands and the yields from dry farming remain uncertain in most areas (see Fig. 3). Thus a combination of agriculture and pastoralism appear to have provided the most viable opportunity for minimizing risks and securing the basic means of livelihood within the traditional economic structure. In recent years the availability of wage labour in industry and the urban centres has provided an additional source of income and it is not unusual to find families in which some members are sedentary agriculturalists, others are pastoralists and others are industrial wage labourers.

The census figures for 1966 do not record the actual numbers of pastoral nomads although 144,735 individuals were classified as 'unsettled'. This represents under 10 per cent of the total population of Fars province. Because of the nature of movement in the region it is difficult to isolate those who move from those who do not, and this 10 per cent probably represents a conservative estimate.

A major feature of the region is the complex movement of people and animals over widely scattered geographical areas. At one extreme there are the long range pastoral nomads who take advantage of widely separated summer and winter quarters and move as much as 500 kilometres in their twice yearly migrations. At the other extreme there are very local movements of village flocks of sheep and goats to higher ground adjacent to the village in the summer months. The broad macro
Fig. 3. **Average yearly rainfall characteristics for Shiraz.** (in millimetres)

(Dotted line indicates limits of unirrigated wheat)

A = years 1330 - 1340
B = years 1341 - 1350

(The year 1343 corresponds to the year running from 21 March 1964 to 20 March 1965, and the year 1350 corresponds to March 1971 to March 1972.)

**Sources:**
division of the province into garmsir and sarhad is reproduced at the micro-level where movements of people and animals take advantage of local ecological variations and the seasonal availability of local pastures.

This movement of different types of pastoralists often involves multiple access to pasture land, and areas that are used by village flocks may well be used by different sorts of nomads at various other times of the year.¹ Many of the long range pastoral nomads have to pass through areas that are now largely devoted to intensive agriculture in the more fertile plains and find grazing land along the route. They take advantage of areas that are grazed by village flocks in the spring on their upward migration and of village stubble in the autumn on their downward migration. Similarly areas that are dry farmed in one year may revert to grazing in subsequent years. The overall picture is one of considerable complexity and any neat division of the region into pastoral and agricultural zones ignores this complementarity between agricultural and pastoral activities, and is in danger of producing discrete, timeless, divisions between nomads and sedentarists. It ignores the fact that pastoralism and agriculture are types of productive activity rather than the bases for different types of society and disguises the actual social relations of production by which surpluses have been traditionally extracted.

¹. For a discussion of multiple access to pastures see Barth 1960.
from both types of activity to support a predominantly urban elite. ¹

At both the local and regional levels the divisions of labour between those engaged in animal husbandry and those tilling the soil often give the appearance of separated interests. At the local level shepherds may be away from the 'parent' settlement for several months of the year. Village animals may often be entrusted to long range pastoral nomads under a variety of circumstances, ranging from close, mutually supportive kinship links, to more formal contractual arrangements. ² Many of the animals over which the nomads have control are not their own. The long range pastoral nomads for their part retain agricultural interests in summer and/or winter quarters where land that they have control over may be cultivated by sedentary agriculturalists in those areas. Similarly

¹ For an important discussion of the relationships between 'pastoral nomads' and 'sedentarists' see Asad 1978. Asad criticises the creation of a separate 'nomadic mode of production' by such people as Anderson(1974). Here a similar argument is put forward; i.e. that nomadic activities take place within a complex unity of social action which includes sedentary activities. Without entering into the 'mode of production' debate it is maintained that a mode of production cannot necessarily be delineated by the nature of activities themselves but rather by the processes which legitimate and facilitate the transfer of resources; these are the social relations which govern production and which are legitimated by religious, kinship and state ideologies.

² For a discussion of animal ownership and shepherding contracts among the Qashqai see Beck 1980.
they establish various sorts of relationships with people in the areas through which they move; for access to grazing land, the provision of commodities which they themselves do not produce, and contracts for the shepherding of village animals. This involves a very complex inter-relationship between urban, rural and nomadic sectors of the population within a closely knit regional economic structure. It is much more than merely the construction of 'links' between supposedly isolated sectors.

At the regional level this separation of interests is more visible because migration routes of the long range pastoral nomads take them through the heavily populated and intensively irrigated central plains.¹ This is where 'opposition' between 'nomad' and 'peasant' gains its perceptual clarity and conflicts over land and between different groups are at their most intense. It is perhaps under such circumstances that the myths of the warlike pastoral nomad, threatening the interests of the 'civilized' world are perpetuated and the ideas of a separate nomadic society, different from the stratified agricultural society begin to take shape. This reified separation of nomadic and agrarian societies involves the isolation of characteristics that are supposed to be restricted to each type of society. Nomadic societies are supposedly characterised by a tribal structure, a kinship idiom to express inter-relationships between groups and an essential egalitarianism.

¹. The most prominent migration routes are illustrated in fig. 4 p. 58.
Agrarian societies are supposedly characterised by submission to a hierarchically organised, urban dominated, state structure which is essentially inegalitarian. But such a separation ignores the fact that both nomadic and agrarian populations share many common cultural features, from common languages to common religion, and are engaged in the same overarching political framework which incorporates all groups within a regional polity.

One way of dealing with the separation between nomadic and sedentary life styles has been to concentrate on the different techniques involved in animal husbandry and sedentary agriculture and to suggest that it is on the basis of human adaptation to the environmental demands of both animals and plants that organisational forms are predicated. As such it is not movement or settlement that is of crucial importance but rather the differences in what Barth has termed the 'systems of production' of pastoral and agricultural regimes. He suggests that there are special features about both agricultural and pastoral regimes reflected in the different management inputs and investment decisions that are required for either plants or animals. He goes on to state that agriculture is labour intensive while pastoralism is capital intensive and that:

"the time required to extract value from land is great in agriculture, so control of land is essential, while the time required by grazing is minimal, so control may well be precarious and ad hoc."

( Ibid., p. 13)

It may well be the case that pastoral and agricultural regimes require different sorts of management, investment and labour inputs. But surely this is more a product of the specific forms of production than the requirements of either plants or animals; under certain circumstances agriculture too may be capital intensive and pastoralism may be labour intensive. People make decisions in response to particular perceptions of what they consider optimal, and these change over time. In addition different sorts of inputs required by both 'productive regimes' may very often be provided by a single productive-unit - the extended family group.

Rather than focus analysis on their presumed separation it is perhaps more useful to concentrate on those relations of domination under which both productive systems are subsumed and which have been undergoing considerable change as a result of the spread of a western economic rationale. The different techniques involved in the adaptation of populations to the different environmental demands of plants and animals may be reflected in different management and investment decisions, as Barth has suggested, but this does not take us very far in an analysis of the political conditions under which such decisions might be made nor in an understanding of the distribution of power within local and regional contexts.
Thus rather than make movement or settlement the object of attention and set up what may be an unarranted dichotomy between peasant and nomad, it is necessary to look at the ways in which resources can be transferred between pastoral and agricultural activities, through what Black has termed 'agro-pastoral combines' and also at the ways in which they are systematically transferred out of the hands of both into those of an urban elite. The shifts in emphasis, from pastoral to agricultural interests at both local and regional levels, which Barth sees in terms of some timeless oscillation 'long term pulsations ... between pastoral and agricultural roles' and which have involved significant sedentarisation in recent decades represent changing relations of production and changing patterns of control.

The style of analysis which presupposes an undifferentiated population making investment decisions in response to unchanging and essentially ahistorical circumstances produces an ideal typology and cannot countenance structural change. It ignores the particular circumstances under which groups gain their identities and their associations with particular activities. Asad has pointed out that:

"The important economic point about nomads, surely is not that they move about in order to care for their animals, or that animal husbandry is subject to a range of biological and environmental constraints, but that their political and economic organisation may be based on production for subsistence."

(Asad 1978, p.58)

It also ignores the internal differentiations within populations whereby wealth is accumulated in the hands of some. Irregardless of whether wealth is accumulated from pastoralism or from agriculture those with power are parts of a single urban-based elite. Barth seems eventually to recognize this when, after the construction of a relatively elaborate analysis of the nature of nomad-sedentary relations and of what amounts to an ideal typology, he states, at the very end of his article:

"it should be noted that the modernization of a regional economy through full monetization of the factors of production, and the introduction of new investment alternatives, so changes the picture as to completely eliminate the patterns that have dominated the Middle East till now, and that have been the focus of this exploratory analysis." (emphasis added)

(Barth, ibid., pp.20-21)

This raises questions about the whole nature of this sort of analysis which does not take sufficient account of the political and economic history of the region and which presumes a complete break with the past. The reality is much more complex. While the processes of modernization have involved changes in the ways in which both pastoral and agricultural activities have been perceived, it is analytically unacceptable to suggest that one type of organization has been completely eliminated through the substitution of another. It is on such bases that the divisions between nomadic and sedentary societies, between 'non-capitalist' and 'capitalist' 'social formations', and between tribe and state, are erected. It is not only the nature of the 'transition' from one to the other
which it is important to investigate, but also the naming process which identifies one set of cultural characteristics as being 'before' and another as being 'after'.

It is not merely the fact that some of the more physically isolated and environmentally poor parts of the region are incapable of supporting little but production for subsistence, but also that both peasants and nomads are actively impoverished under certain conditions of production. One of the results of the recent land reform programme for example, has been effectively to push villagers onto lands, which exclude them from participation in some agricultural enterprises except as wage labourers.

As control has been increasingly centralized under a strong national government, supporting the expansion of commercial agricultural production, nomadism as a type of productive activity has been pushed into the more physically isolated parts of the region. Former pasture lands have been taken over for the cultivation of crops as populations and settlements have expanded, and as private control over land has increasingly restricted access. Much land in the central areas that once could only be dry farmed or used as pasture land, has now been irrigated through the installation of motor pumps tapping the groundwater. Pasture land particularly in and around the central plains has been progressively restricted to more long range pastoral nomads as pressure on land has intensified.
Increased use of the more marginal pastures in both the sarhad and the garmsir has led to considerable over-grazing. The long range nomads are increasingly confined to what Barth refers to as the 'Il rah' or migration route which, rather than being a stretch of territory through which they move at particular times of the year, and whose boundaries were ill-defined, is now confined to major roads or very narrow bands of countryside through which they are allowed to move, usually in haste. It is as if the nomads were being squeezed out of the central areas and into the more remote areas: as if recent developments were in fact creating longer-range pastoral nomadism. Their 'traditional' rights to use of land in the central areas are being contested by landowners with changing attitudes to ownership and control, backed by a government which has associated nomadism with dissidence. During the 1970s, prior to the revolution in 1979, large areas were taken by the Ministry of the Environment to be devoted to national parks and conservation areas, and the government nationalisation of pasture land began to be enforced.

1. In a study of the Farsi Madan section of the Qashqai carried out under the auspices of the Plan organisation in 1973-4 it was calculated that approximately 20% of traditional grazing ground had been lost to the inroads of urban and village agriculturalists (see Ajami et.al 1974).

2. Trucks were increasingly used in the early 1970s to transport animals from garmsir to sarhad.

3. The nationalisation of pasture lands was one of the original provisions of the 'White Revolution of the Shah and the People' initiated in 1963. Beck in her recent article suggested that prior to 1979 there was an increasing restriction on use of land which involved payment for pastures which had traditionally been used by nomads and increased corruption as bribes for use became more common (ibid., p.342).
Population and Administration

According to the 1966 census Fars province was inhabited by slightly more than 1.5 million people. 60.2 per cent of the population was classified as rural (living in places of less than 5,000 inhabitants). Of the urban population of 630,646, 35.7 per cent (225,159) lived in twenty settlements of between 5 and 25,000; 17.8 per cent (112,265) lived in three places of between 25,000 and 100,000. The remaining 46.5 per cent (293,222) lived in the city of Shiraz. According to the two censuses of 1956 and 1966 there was an increase in population of 58 per cent. Estimates of rural/urban ratios suggest that, although population in the countryside has not significantly declined the proportion is 50/50 rather than 60/40 as it was in the 1966 census. In 1974 it was estimated that the population of Shiraz had grown to approximately 400,000.

Despite the rapid growth of Tehran and the Central province associated with the rapid changes in the late fifties and sixties Fars province ranked fourth in terms of modernization in 1966. Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase in the growth of all urban centres. But figures seem to indicate that the majority of migrants to the larger cities have not come from predominantly rural areas, but rather from other urban centres. Of the 27% of the population of Shiraz that

was classified as migrant in 1966 almost three-quarters were from other urban areas, and half of these were from urban areas outside the province.

Traditional forms of migration, as practised by pastoral nomads within the province, who occupy an important minority position in the provincial population, cannot be dealt with by formal census techniques. Thus no definite figures are recorded in either Iranian census. Estimates suggest that perhaps 10% of this provincial population is predominantly nomadic. Paydarfar estimates that there are "more than 200,000 primarily nomadic tribesmen living in the tribal territory". But the division of society into tribal, rural and urban is problematic.

Significant sectoral interests and movements of people transcend the administrative boundaries erected by the state. Demographic data recorded in the 1956 and 1966 censuses tended to reinforce a static picture of provincial activities, by failing to record movement within and between local and provincial administrative boundaries. The administrative divisions prior to the revolution in 1979 emerged during Reza Shah's regime in attempts to rationalise national administration. Fars province (ostān) broadly corresponded to that area, traditionally administered from Shiraz and known in the 19th century as mamlekat-e-Fārs. Regional administration was under the control of the ostāndār (governor-general). The ostāndār was directly appointed by the Shah. Under strong central

1. Paydarfar, op.cit., p.6.
government there was a tendency to rotate the persons holding this office in order that they might not build up local support which might challenge the centre. During the 19th century it was usual for the Shah to appoint a close relative to the position.1

It is however misleading to use the present administrative boundary of the province to identify the area. It was not called ostān during the 19th century and the context of a unified nation state in which the term is embedded does not provide the most informative framework with which to deal with an historical development of administration.2 Fasā'i talks of 'ayālat' in reference to the government of the area. Haim translates this as 'state', as in United States of America.3

The ayālat is described in terms of the person appointed to 'state' government. Thus Fasā'i speaks of the ayālat of Hāji Ebrāhim Khān who was appointed to rule Fars in 1791, under the sultānat of Khāghān Fath Ali Shāh Qājār.4

Haim translates khāghān as a Turkish word, referring to 'Emperor of China or of Chinese Turkestan'.5

1. For a detailed account of provincial government in the 19th century see Fasā'i 1895, the first part of which now exists in translation as Busse 1972.

2. de Groot (1977) for example in her study of 19th century Kirman suggests that it is misleading to regard the various parts of Iran as being integrated into a modern nation state at this time, and that a more useful form of analysis should take a regional perspective with variable relationships with the national polity.

3. Haim, 1975, p.64.


A term no longer used, it can perhaps be assumed that it referred to a central Asian political hierarchy representing an administrative structure of the steppes. Subsequently the Qajar rulers are referred to as soltan (cf. Soltan Mohamed Sha Qajar, Fasā'i 1895, vol.1, p.290). Throughout the nineteenth century, terms, which reflect the mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian origins, are employed involving different attitudes to the nature of government, and illustrating the very diverse influences that the populations of the Iranian plateau have been subjected to.

Of 18 who held the ayālat-e-Fārs between 1795 and 1881, 12 were either the sons or brothers of the soltan (cf. Busse, 1972, p.422). It was never given to a local person. Parallel to this appointment was that of the vazir who appears to have been appointed by the grand vazir (loosely translated as prime minister) and was primarily entrusted with day-to-day administration and the collection of taxes. Between 1795 and 1881

1. The terms ayālat, velāyat and mamlekat reflect Ottoman administrative divisions and the close associations between Iran and the Moslem world further west.

2. The office of vazir no longer exists but the duality between the office of ostāndar (governor general) and the provincial administrative bureaucracy remained until the revolution of 1979. Each ministry maintained a provincial office which was answerable only to Tehran and knew little of what the other offices were doing even in related fields. Each was under the individual leadership of an appointee of the shah.
there were 24 holders of this office, according to Fasa'i, most of whom were not natives of the area but proteges of the grand vazir or of the princes who governed the mamlekat-e-Fārs and who usually brought numbers of retainers with them, including their own armies. In Fars the major exceptions to this are Mohamad Ali Moshir-ul-Molk and his son Abu‘l Hasan Moshir‘ul’Molk who together served nine terms in this office between 1828 and 1876 (ibid., p.423). 1

Local administration seems to have been based on the urban centres where the kalāntar (chief civil administrator) was in charge of the various districts (nahieh or mahallah) of the city, each with their own Kadkhodā or 'ward leader'. 2 In the countryside the various districts (bolukāt) were under the control of a zabēt, an Arabic term, which Haim translates as bailiff, executive officer. 3

1. During the early Qajār period the Moshir ul-Molk’s family was able to build up considerable local power, (allied to the royal family of the governor through marriage) which was transferred from father to son. This inherent tendency to institutionalise personal control with office was apparently regarded as normal by Fasa'i who stated:

"Mirsa Mohamad 'Ali Moshir ul-Molk died at the age of more than eighty years (1846). Hosein Khan Sāhab Ekhteyār (then governor) transferred the title Moshir ul-Molk and the vizierate of Fars to Mirza Mohamad 'Ali's son Mirza Abu‘l Hasan Khan, in accordance with the laws of inheritance and merit; he was to administrate this office for no less than thirty years."

(Busse 1972, p.276)

2. Lambton translates the term kalāntar as "overseer of the wards of a city (obs.); overseer of the trade guilds (especially in Isfahan; Safavid to Qajār periods); head of a tribal sub-group (larger than that under a kadkhoda)" (Lambton 1953,p.431). It is in this latter context that it has been used by anthropologists in recent years. For more information on the office of kalāntar see Lambton 1965. Kadkhoda is translated as "village headman; head of a clan or tribal sub-group; head of a craft guild; (obs.) head of a mahalleh or ward of a town" (ibid., p.430).

3. Cf. Haim 1972, p.466. Also see below, pp. 140-145
Fasā'ī seems to indicate that the boluk was controlled from a ghesbeh or central village and that the boluk contained a number of gharieh (villages) (Fasā'ī 1895, ii, 214).

There also seems to have been a separate administrative structure created for the various ilāt. The ilāt, governed by khāns or chiefs, perhaps reflected the special position of these groups which were predominantly nomadic and provided military support to the provincial and national rulers. It is perhaps possible to talk of an ecological niche occupied by a previously military elite which reflected the Turkish organisational hierarchies established in central Asia and reimposed through the Turkish migration in to Fars.

The distribution of offices and the nature of the hierarchy of control has been subject to complex changes over time in response to changing conditions and perceptions of the nature of government, reflecting the complex movement of different peoples over the long history of Iran. Without a

1. Ilāt (the plural of il) is usually translated as 'tribes'.

2. See below, Chapter 3. It would appear that the title 'khān' was bestowed by the Qājār monarchs on provincial leaders. Fasā'ī comments that Haji Ebrāhīm was given the title of khān by Agha Mohamad Shāh in 1791. Haji Ebrahim was an urban merchant who had been lord mayor of Shiraz until the fall of the Zands. He was head of the Qavam family. It is more usual to restrict the term khān to tribal leader but it cannot be so easily restricted, involving, especially in the nineteenth century a particular relationship to government as interpreted by the Turkish Qājār rulers.
detailed historical analysis of the ways in which various terms are used and their relationships to these changing ideas of government it is difficult to do more than hint at the development of the formal administration of the area. But the point to be made is that the present administrative divisions are a very recent phenomenon, reflecting a particular perception of government. They cannot be considered apart from their historical context and, as will hopefully become apparent, despite changes in the forms of administration, the nature of the regulation of relationships between governor and governed, still appears to reflect the personal nature of delegated authority characteristic of a 'tax farming' system and a 'tribal' system which was perhaps reflected in the nature of the last Shah's regime.  

Under the regime of the former Shah, the governor-general of the province appointed the various farmandārs (governors) for each of the shahrestāns of the province. Authority

1. Despite the disbanding of a separate administrative structure for the 'tribes' under Reza Shah and attempts to incorporate them into the emerging nation state, under Mohamad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) there was a separate Tribal Affairs Department of government and an emerging Tribal Education office. Tribal levies were abolished under Reza Shah as a regular army was established but the tribes were treated separately, and the Tribal Education office in particular was concerned, not just with the provision of mobile schools but with more general welfare and administrative affairs. From trying to completely destroy the tribes, the Pahlayi regime eventually adopted a policy which attempted to isolate them as cultural minorities, by reifying their cultural distinctiveness.

2. Shahrestān is here translated as meaning that administrative area around a town. There are 11 shahrestāns in the province of Fars viz: Shirāz, Ābādeh, Lār, Kāzerun, Mamasani, Jahrom, Fasā, Darāb, Piruzābād, Neiriz, Estahbānāt.
over these various urban centres appears to have fluctuated over time, reflecting the strength or weakness of the provincial government and, in the 19th century in particular, the powers of the government in Tehran. Being in the gift of the governor of Fars these offices were often given to relations of this person. At other times those who held de facto control were confirmed in their offices so that during most of the 19th century the governships of such a centre as Firuzabad, which came to be known as the Qashqai winter capital, was in the hands of the Qashqai Il Khans and Darāb and Fasā, in those of the Qavām family.

With the rise of the nationalist government of the Pahlavis supporters of that regime were rewarded with provincial office. Attempts appear to have been made to professionalise each provincial administration through the creation of a 'neutral' civil service but the appointees to office in Fars appear to have been those personally loyal to the Shah who gained their position through association with him.

The shahrestans are divided into bakhs. The Shirāz shahrestān for example has five such bakhs. The baksh

1. Farman Farmā, governor of Fars in the 1820s and son of Fath 'Ali Shāh, managed, for example, to place his sons as governors of Darāb, Mamasani and Kuh Giluyeh and his nephew as governor of Fasā and many other relatives in provincial administrative posts.

2. These local governorships were still in the gift of the provincial governors and the length of the appointments of people to these offices reflected the political fortunes of their appointers.

3. Bakhsh or nahieh, is translated as 'department'.

4. These are: Ardakān, Shirāz, Mamdasht, Kherāmeh and Sarvestān.
is under the control of the bakhshdar, who is appointed by
the farmandar in consultation with the ostandar. According to
Bill they have traditionally been uneducated and corrupt and
the office has usually been filled by incompetents and locally
influential landowners. Recent attempts have been made to
fill the office with specially trained professionals but for
a variety of reasons entrenched local interest groups have
successfully resisted this (see below, p. 421).

The duties of the bakhshdar were mainly associated with
the execution of development programmes and civic functions
in the areas under their jurisdiction. The various ministries
have usually circumvented the bakhshdar in their dealings
with the local inhabitants.

The bakhsh is further sub-divided into dehestans. 2
The dehestan consists of a set of villages irrigated by the
same system or occupying a physically distinct area. There
are for example eight dehestans in the bakhsh of Marvdasht,
of which Ramjerd is one (together with Morghab, Kamin, Ponirjan,
Khafrak-e-Olia, Abarej, Humeye-Marvdasht). The dehestan is
not under the administration of a single officer but the
villagers supposedly select representatives to a dehestan
council which channels development programmes and acts as a

2. Dehestan is translated as 'district' and appears to be roughly equivalent to the Qajar administrative division of boluk or 'valley'.
consultative assembly. In Ramjerd however the council rarely met and during the time of fieldwork the council did not meet at all and was never mentioned as being of any importance.

The interests of the national government were formally channelled into individual villages through the village headman (kadkhodā) who together with a council of elders (or rish sefidān, lit.: 'white beards') dealt with the day-to-day activities of the village, collection of taxes, conscription to the army, minor disputes, relationships with the gendarmery and administration of development programmes. Since the land reform programme of the 1960s this office has been replaced by a more formal anjuman with a leader and officials formally elected by landowning villagers.

**Linguistic diversity**

A variety of languages are spoken in the region. Persian as a lingua franca is now spoken everywhere. The urban centres and the older settled villages in the central areas are predominantly Persian speakers. But towards the Gulf, at lower altitudes, many people speak a variety of Arabic. The so-called 'Arab' tribes in the east of the province, around Jahrom Lār and Lake Neiriz also speak a variety of Arabic. In the higher regions of the Kuh-Giluyeh area there are Luri speakers and throughout the region there are Turkish speakers, who speak a variety of Azerbaijani Turkish. They have been traditionally associated with the nomadic populations of the
province and some are presumably the descendents of those Turks who came into Fars in the 13-15th centuries A.D. It would be unrealistic to identify any linguistic group with any exclusive occupational division as all four are to be found throughout the region. The Qashqai tribe, one of the most important tribal groups in Fars, for example, have been described as being Turkish but this disguises the Luri, Persian and Arabic elements within this 'tribe'. Similarly the Khamseh tribe, another important tribal grouping, have been classified as Arab speakers but the important Turkish speaking Ainallu and Baharlu were from the foundation of this 'tribal confederacy', integral parts. So were the Persian speaking Basseri. The construction of ethnic categories on the basis of linguistic criteria is extremely problematic and it is necessary to examine in detail the circumstances under which the various languages entered the region. This implies an understanding of the nature of political developments over the course of Iranian history, from the early invasions of Persian speakers, to the Arab conquest and the Turkish invasions of the area.

1. The Qashqai have been the subject of a number of Iranian and foreign studies. The Persian studies by Peyman 1968 and Bahmanbegi 1945 are relatively general although the former does contain a large amount of statistical material. A major part of the latter is reproduced in Monteil 1959. For anthropological studies of some of the groups which constitute the Qashqai see: Beck 1977 (Darmeshuri), Salzer 1974 (Kashkuli, Kuchek), 'Ajami, Sadeghian and Marsden 1974 (Farsi Madan). For a general account of the Qashqai see Marsden 1974. The history of the Qashqai is dealt with in detail in Oberling 1974.

2. For a seminal account of the Basseri see Barth 1964. No anthropological studies of other groups within the Khamseh appear to have been made.
Religion

One of the major unifying features of the region is religion and with the revolution in 1979 the religious hierarchy has emerged as the major formative political group in the country as a whole. Most inhabitants of the region are Shi'a Muslims and the organisation of religious life has had very important effects on the nature of social organisation in the region. Because of the nature of Islam it is very difficult to separate religion from secular activities. Fundamental features of law and political authority are all imbued with religious connotations. This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the importance of Islam, especially in providing legitimation for secular authority, and also channeling the expression of political hierarchy; the relationships between subjects and rulers. Such a discussion is extremely complex and problematic. According to Scarcia it is the clergy which has provided the "still fresh national voice of Persian Islam" (quoted in Algar, 1969, p.21). According to recent observers and to advocates of the late Shah's policies on the other hand the clergy have been, together with the tribal aristocracy, one of the major reasons for the lack of progress in Iran's modernisation. Many studies of Iranian society in the '50s and '60s tended to treat the clergy as residual, ignoring the overriding importance of Islamic traditions in the activities of much of the population.¹

The growth of the state and of secular nationalism implied a separation between state and clergy. Bill mentions the split as having been widened and formalised during the Safavid era (1500-1732) in which Shi'a Islam became much more widespread. The opposition between the sadr and the mujtahidin appears to have continued down to the present with the state appointed sadr gaining increased importance. The title Sadr was replaced by the office of Imām-e Jume'eh but the content of the office appears to have remained the same, presumably until the revolution against the Shah. It is tempting to speak of Shi'a Islam as being adopted as a state religion but this is to oversimplify and distort. The precepts of Shi'a Islam became entrenched in the legitimation of authority in formal chains of command (selseleh) and in the legal system and were to influence considerably developments under the Qājārs and the Pahlavis. The spiritual chains of command which linked disciples to religious masters and ultimately to the imāms and god were mirrored in the secular chains of command (selseleh) which joined the ra'iyat to the arbāb and ultimately the sultān.

1. According to Bill the sadr was the leading member of the group which included the "sayyid, ulamā, mudarris, shaikh-ul-Islam, pish-namāz, qadi, mutavalli hafiz" (ibid., p.21). He uses Minorsky's Tadhkirat al-Muluk in his account of Safa id religious offices (cf. Minorsky 1943).

2. The ra'iyat (or subject) was bound to the arbāb (or lord) in the same way that the latter received authority and power from the sultān or shah.
The split became apparent within the religious community when the Safavids (1500-1732) adopted Shi'ism as a national religion:

"During the Safavi period, lines of tension were drawn between two groups in the religious system who were represented by the sadr and the mullabashi (chief mujtahid).... (The sadr) was the chief religious figure bound within the administration and he wielded important power in the area of secular law and endowments. The mujtahids on the other hand, were theoretically the most important group in Shi'i society in the sense that they had the right to interpret the shari'at. They were considered by all believers to be the closest to the hidden Imām."

(Bill, 1972, p.21)

Ithna'ashari Shi'ism as practised in Iran today by the vast majority of its population, has as its most dominant theme the concept of the Imāmate:

"an institution of a succession of charismatic figures who dispense true guidance in comprehending the esoteric sense of prophetic revelation."

(Algar, 1969, p.5)

There were twelve such charismatic figures, the first of which was 'Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet, and the last disappeared as a young boy in AD.874. The imāms were human intermediaries between man and god, and when the twelfth imām disappeared the chain of intermediaries was halted until such time as he shall return to earth as the Mahdi, to issue in the dawn of a new era. The disappearance of the imām marked the beginning of a passivist position in which, although legitimacy was denied to secular authority, the existing regime was seen as a necessary evil to be endured until such time as the Mahdi would return and present a legitimate alternative. The
adoption of Shi'ism as the religion of the Safavids was a turning point and it is only then that one sees the emergence of a body of administrative clerics. But the necessary and inescapable illegitimacy of the secular state was a constant belief, even though temporarily obscured in Safavid times and again in Pahlavi times. Shi'ism gave birth to:

"something like an official clergy, exclusively concerned with legality and jurisprudence, to such a point that original Shi'ism in its essence gnostic and theosophic, has, so to speak, to hide itself."

(Corbin, 1960, p.69 - in Algar 1969, p.5)

In that the clerics fulfilled a practical function for the community they commanded significant authority. In that they were the beneficiaries of charitable endowments they joined the ranks of the large landed proprietors.

In the absence of the hidden Imam the religious body of clerics, lead by the mujtahidin, and known as the 'ulama, became the intermediaries between man and god. The mujtahidin were chosen from among the religious community through rigid selection criteria, and these provided:

"a living source of reference and leadership for the Shi'i community.... The mujtahidin came to personify the leadership of the community and this was one of their chief sources of political and social influence in Qajar Iran."

(Algar, 1969, p.6)

The mujtahidin provided guidance in all affairs, and it was obligatory to follow the directions of an individual mujtahid.

The mujtahidin were entrusted with such things as the estates of minors, orphans, the certification of legal deeds and with the collection and distribution of alms. They were
also administers of religious endowments (ouqaf). But perhaps more importantly they were involved in the administration of justice in that they were the interpreters of the large body of religious law or shar'. Common law ('urf) during much of the Qajar period was not codified and appears to have been administered rather arbitrarily. The two quite frequently overlapped and the shar' court quite often became a court of appeal. The religious courts were radically divested of much of their authority in the Pahlavi era, as the state arrogated that authority to itself.

During the nineteenth century there was a growing tradition of inherited clerical prominence which resulted in a great increase in the wealth of the 'ulamā, acquired over generations. As the shar' courts gained in importance and institutionalization within the secular administrative system a more formal clerical hierarchy appears to have emerged. Theoretically there was a lack of hierarchical stratification within the religious community but the increase in inherited prominence led at times to the emergence of powerful clerical leaders who could command their own private armies.¹

An Imām-e Jum'eh was appointed to lead the Friday prayers in the main mosque of the urban community. And a Shaykh ol-Islam was appointed to head the Shar' court. Below these two were a host of mullāhs or ākhunds, lesser members of the

¹ For a discussion of the power of the 'ulamā in 19th century Iran see Algar op.cit.
religious classes who, in a period when education of any formal nature was religious education, held great influence over the masses. In more general terms the title mullah or ākhund was applied to anyone who was learned or even literate. The mullahs were involved in numerous administrative and teaching functions at the local level. In addition there was a large number of sayyids, descendents of the prophet, who thereby gained a certain amount of legitimacy for the local authority they often held.

The religious learning 'ladder' was a major way for an ordinary individual to gain legitimate authority, because of the former's monopoly of the existing educational institutions. Parallel to this was the elaborate pilgrimage system to important Shi'i shrines, the most important being those at Mecca and Karbala, and the tomb of the eighth imām at Mashhad. Persons having visited these places were traditionally accorded respect which was always important in legitimizing claims to authority and status, translated in terms of titles such as Hāji (one who had made the hāj), Kerbalā'i (one who had visited the sacred shrines in Kerbalā), and Mashdi (one who had visited the shrine of Imām Rezā in Mashad).

The Pahlavi regime attempted to wipe out the power of the mujtahidin as leaders of the community, but the religious leaders retained considerable influence. This is illustrated by Bill when he quotes from an interview with one religious leader in 1967:
"The people accept this struggle as inevitable - as dunya versus din (the secular versus the religious). What becomes unacceptable to them is when one side tries to destroy the other side... In Land Reform for example, the mujtahidin were not even consulted nor was the Islamic method ever considered. Thus the opposition of mujtahidin was not to the idea of Land Reform, but rather to the manner in which it was implemented.

(Bill, 1972, p.24)

The mosque (masjid) and the local shrine (imamzadeh) provide important foci for religious activity throughout the region. They are visited as often as possible and at major religious festivals. Local shrines attract pilgrims from widely scattered areas. Some, such as the shrine to Shah Cherogh, in Shiraz, command more importance in the religious table of merit, than others and are nationally important. The building of mosques and bath-houses (hammam) are popular means of gaining such merit and appear high on the 'developmental shopping list'. Others, such as the Imamzadeh Ayub in the Ayub valley, while attracting significant numbers, remain only locally important.

Prestige and status are derived both from religious practice and the exercise of secular power, but not in isolation. Religious observances, pious acts and charitable works are however more easily undertaken by those with more resources than others and provide one of the legitimating stamps for the control of some by others. Until the formal separation of secular office from religious office with the emergence of a nationalistic state administration religious merit and official office were very closely interwoven. Pilgrimages
could be translated into honorific titles as could religious learning or descent from the prophet. The terms haji, mashdi, kerbalai are all used to denote religious standing achieved through pilgrimage. The terms mullah and sheikh denote religious learning and are also used as honorific titles by some in positions of authority. The seyyid because of his claimed descent from the prophet also possessed religious merit.

In the major urban centres Jewish, Armenian, Zoroastrian and Baha'i religious minorities are to be found. In the south of Fars there are also significant numbers of Sunni Moslems. Despite the formal separation of religion from administration and secular power, the two remain very closely interrelated and the most recent events in Iran testify to the remaining importance of Islam as a mobilizing force.
CHAPTER III
TRIBAL ORGANISATION IN FARS: AN OVERVIEW

The Marvdasht plain lies on the edge of the summer quarters of a number of nomadic pastoral groups. The river Kor forms a major divide between the intensively cultivated areas of the plain and the largely dry-farmed pasture lands to the north and west. The old bridges at Jashniān and Pol-e-No were major channels for the twice yearly migrations of these nomads, and for contacts along the summer routes to the north. The juxtaposition of nomadic and sedentary populations provides one of the distinctive features of the area and, at times when centralised sedentary authority was minimal, much of the plain was used as both summer and winter quarters by pastoral nomads.

As pointed out in Chapter II the division of the provincial population into those who are nomadic and those who are settled agriculturalists is problematic. Everywhere animal husbandry and agriculture are combined. This is also the case in the Marvdasht plain. But this division has also given rise to the parallel division of the population into those who are supposedly tribally organised, using a kinship idiom of patrilineal descent to express political relationships between groups and maintaining an essentially egalitarian ethos, and those who are subordinated to a complex hierarchy which is exercised by a centralised state operating from the urban centre.

Given the doubts expressed about the separation of these two forms of organisation, it is necessary to investigate both that form of activity which is normally acknowledged as tribal
as well as that which is not. This involves, not only an analysis of the ways in which tribes have been characterised both by the indigenous population, as well as by foreign scholars interpreting events in this part of Iran, but also an attempt to root present divisions of the population in the historical development of the region. This is taken up in Chapters V and VI. The purpose of such an exercise is to attempt to provide a unifying framework for an analysis of social organisation in Fars province, and to relate the development of the Marvdasht plain to the wider environment in which it is contextualised and which it has helped to shape. It is here suggested that the isolation of one particular form of social organisation ('tribalism'), disguises the fact that it is only defined in terms of the non-tribal context in which it is situated, and that recourse to tribal affiliation was a form of political organisation which was available to many sections of the regional population, and arguably still is. Tribal affiliation still appears to be important in Fars province as a means of organising people. The separation of tribe from state according to the different forms of production associated with nomadism and sedentarism prevents an understanding of why recourse is made to tribal affiliations at particular times.

The variety of activities and people found in the Marvdasht plain provides an important starting point. The population reflects the flux of personnel within the province. It contains large numbers of former nomadic pastoralists. It is still extensively used as pasture land by pastoral nomads among others.
Many of the inhabitants still maintain tribal affiliations, i.e. claim membership in some wider tribal framework. Many of the villages in the plain, especially the newly settled ones, contain significant numbers of Turki speakers who have traditionally been associated with the Qashqai confederacy of tribes. A distinction is frequently made between these Turks, and the 'native' Persian-speaking population; between Turk and Tajik. This distinction has given rise to a classification of villages into those predominantly occupied by 'peasants' and those occupied by 'tribes'.

This distinction between 'peasant' and 'tribe' is confusing and misleading. Many villages in the Marvdasht plain contain mixtures of both Persian and Turkish speakers, as well as Luri and Arab speakers, and although the linguistic differences between people are readily apparent, the social differences are less obvious. It is argued in Chapter VIII that many of the villages represent more the interests of the large landlords and do not automatically figure as prominently in the indigenous categories used by village dwellers themselves. In the villages which are more recently settled this discontinuity between place of residence and organisational affiliation appears more evident. People do not necessarily feel as though they belong to a particular 'community', expressed in terms of place, but perhaps to a 'community' expressed in terms of kinship affiliations.
It would be convenient to utilize a 'modernisation' approach which stressed the evolution of one form of organisation ('tribal') into another form ('peasant') as a movement along the path from traditionalism to modernity to explain the distinctions that supposedly exist between 'tribes' and 'peasants'. Such an explanation has, however, only limited validity. It does not account for the selective recourse that is often made to 'tribal' identity in the modern world. Nor does it realistically see the two forms of organisation as two sides of a single coin. Tribal organisation in southern Iran has been traditionally associated with nomadism. But it is not sufficient to root explanations in appeal to some traditional 'tribal' structure represented by groups that are still nomadic and then subsequently try and demonstrate how such a structure has been mystically transformed into one involving peasant agriculture as populations have been settled (or 'detribalised'). The distinction between 'tribe' and 'peasant' ignores the fundamental unity which underlies the many culturally diverse manifestations of social organisation in the region. It ignores the fact that one is dealing with social relations of production which appear to be similar in both the nomadic and sedentary contexts and which point to a unified mode of production rather than the existence of isolable and separate 'nomadic' and 'sedentary' modes. Some of the more recent literature on the transformation of modes of production, associated with the expansion of western capitalism, may offer more suitable tools with which to analyse this complex inter-
relationship, but they are also fraught with difficulties.

In some contexts it might be said that tribal organisation has become stronger, not weaker, as a result of modernisation, and the loosening of the hold of the landlord on village production, especially after land reform. A recent article by a Japanese anthropologist working in the village of Kheyrābād in the Marvdasht plain sets out to demonstrate just that. Lashāni tribesmen were induced to settle in Kheyrābād by the landlord but, after land reform, when 'its villagers were liberated from the mālek-ra'iyyat system ... the Lashāni did not lose time in unanimously electing their khān as kadkhudā, thus preparing for adventurous post-reform days'. But this analysis also seems to be based on a priori category presumptions about the nature of tribalism within the Marvdasht plain. In the village of Chamani, within the Ayub valley, where most detailed analysis for this thesis was undertaken, a significant proportion of the population is Turkish speaking, the descendants of former pastoral nomads who consider themselves to be members of the same family (oulad) (see below, Chapter XI). To all

1. Ono 1968, p.461. The Lashānis were, according to Oberling's informants, one of the Lek tribes that had formed the Praetorian Guard of the Zand rulers. They had subsequently been dispersed and absorbed by the Qashqai confederacy. Fasa'i divides them into two groups, one of which was sedentary, living in Khafrak. They were notorious for their raiding activities along the summer route north to Isfahan. Sykes calls them 'the most notorious robbers in Southern Persia' (Sykes 1951, Vol.2, p.482). Oberling states: 'Though the Lashānis are still regarded as being somewhat intractable, they have apparently lost all cohesiveness and tribal organisation. Most of them have turned from agriculture and have a reputation for being wretchedly poor' (Oberling 1960, p.112).

Does Ono's account thus indicate 're-tribalisation'?
intents and purposes they are no different from many other families within the plain. They do possess certain distinctive features, such as their near monopoly over the production of carpets within the village, their use of Turkish as a first language, and their ability to resort to a rich tribal history that immediately connects them to a regional tribal framework as members of the Gera'i sub-section (tireh) of the Baharlu tribe (taifeh) which was traditionally part of the Khamseh confederacy of tribes. But is this distinctiveness anything more than the superimposition of a particular view of reality on to the local scene by the visiting anthropologist, and various observers over time?¹

One way of explaining this distinctiveness between 'tribal' groupings and others is to resort to the heuristic device of a 'structure in reserve', as Salzman does;² that is, a whole set

¹ The Turks in Chamani saw their ancestors as 'Qashqai' in a situation where 'Qashqai' had become synonymous with 'Turk'. The Baharlu tribe, however, traditionally has been affiliated with the Khamseh (see Oberling op. cit., pp.123-133). Prior to the establishment of the Khamseh, they had been 'loosely affiliated to the Qashqai Confederation' (ibid., p.127). Their origins are obscure but it would appear that they came from N.W. Persia where they were members of the powerful Qara Qoyunlu Confederation (ibid., p.123). Accounts of their sub-divisions vary from the 11 recorded by Bahmanbegi (1953, p.55) to the 41 recorded by Field (1939, p.216). Pelly writing in the middle of the nineteenth century comments that the Baharlus 'are very mischievous and a set of robbers, who by killing each other have put an end to themselves and their ketkhodas, and all that remains of them are some horsemen who wander about plundering everyone that comes in their way (Pelly 1865, p.183 - quoted in Oberling, op.cit., p.131).

² Salzman, P., 1978, "Lineage ideology is, during times of stability, a social structure in reserve". (p.627)
of cultural categories that can be re-activated when and if the time is right. Such an explanation is again predicated in an assumption that this framework is something that is a relic from the past, preserved in the minds of the population. As may be apparent the 'tribal' organisation of such groups as the Lashānis and the Gera'i Turks is part of their cultural repertoire for dealing with the situation now, and there is no reason to believe that this is somehow aberrant, or contrary to the ways in which they normally express themselves and their inter-relationships; their 'tribal' distinctiveness is their distinctiveness, not something they have rigged up for anthropological tourists.

Another explanatory tool is provided by Gellner when he speaks of change from a 'traditional segmentary structure' to a 'patronage network'.¹ The terms must be interpreted extremely cautiously, and appeals to a Weberian rationality will tend to take us out of history again and into the realms of idealism and a priorism, in favour of a narrow circumscription of reality behind inhibitive boundaries. Gellner maintains however, that the concept of segmentary lineage systems has been downgraded and misplaced and that it can indeed be of value in interpreting societies in the middle east. As Bourdieu has

¹. Gellner states that: 'The theory of the mechanics of a segmentary society hinges on the fact that there is no center at which the means of cohesion are concentrated and which can impose its will on other groups"(1973, p.4), and also that: "An anthropologist who receives his informants in a villa in a town will note that they talk segmentation but fail to practise it; they act patronage (ibid., p.6).
maintained, predicing analysis in terms of the isolation of tribal 'groupings' involves a danger of allowing the group to define the agents and their interests rather than allowing the agents themselves, the actual social actors, to define groups in terms of their own interests.¹

An analysis in terms of groups already presumed to exist imposes an order on to the ethnographic material that may not be warranted. An analysis of the actual behaviour of what Bourdieu terms 'agents' may provide very different results and demonstrate how and when recourse to kinship inter-relationships, which are presumed to be of central importance in tribal social organisation, are made. As Leach has pointed out:

"if anthropologists come to look on kinship as a parameter which can be studied in isolation they will always be led, by a series of logical steps, to think of human society as composed of equilibrium systems structured according to legal rules. Economic activities come to appear of minor significance and the study of social adaptation to changing circumstances is made impossible."

(1961, p.8)

The methodological holism used to define tribal groups, (or, for that matter, village 'communities') might be replaced by a methodological individualism that traces individual networks into the wider society.² This has the advantage of

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¹ Bourdieu 1977, p.32.

² Alavi comments: "A transition in social anthropology to methodological individualism, which is the polar opposite of structural-functionalist holism has come about with a shift in the focus of interest from 'simple', 'primitive' societies to 'complex' societies such as peasant societies or urban situations" And, "In comparison with the approach of structural functionalism, methodological individualism falls into the opposite trap, in focusing on individual action outside the matrix of the social whole. Instead of defining social roles, attention is directed to the actual behaviour of individuals in society. The methodological tradition of Durkheim yields to that of Weber and Spencer" (Alavi 1973, pp.40-41).
increasing awareness of 'outside' contacts and inter-relationships, and of breaking down the functionalist perspective which isolates small communities, and regards them as integrated through relationships of balanced reciprocity. But it suffers from the fact that it gives rise to a fragmented approach which concentrates on social transactions, rather than examining their contextual place within the overall social and historical environment.

Tribal Organisation

Godelier has pointed out that the use of the term 'tribe' is distinctly problematic, and has demonstrated that it cannot necessarily or conveniently be used to refer to an 'earlier stage' of human evolution.¹ Neither can it be used to refer to some unified group which is based on common cultural or linguistic criteria. The boundaries by which tribes have been isolated are more projections based on particular intellectual and political traditions. It is as such that they are perceived as discrete units rather than as expressions of particular historical processes. As already indicated, the terms

1. "It seems that the concept of 'tribal society' covers a group of external features found in the functioning of many 'primitive' societies, the 'segmentary' character of elementary socioeconomic units, the real or apparent nature of 'kinship groups' in these socioeconomic units and the 'multifunctional' nature of these kinship relations. The vagueness of these criteria is such that we could apply this concept to a vast number of primitive societies juxtaposed in large congeries without clear boundaries" (Godelier 1977, p.89).
'tribe' and 'nomad' are often used interchangeably and the simplistic dichotomies between 'tribe' and 'state' between the 'desert' and the 'sown' or between 'periphery' and 'centre' are erected on which have hung many of the myths that have bedevilled research in this part of Iran and which veil an understanding of the history of the various forms of social organisation in the area.

Divisions of regional society into distinct groups which are, for example, enshrined on the map which displays the territorial distribution of various nomadic pastoral tribes (fig. 4), disguise the conditions under which such divisions arose and preclude an historical understanding of the reasons for their isolation. It is paradoxically very informative that the areas which are the foci for political power are conveniently left blank as the isolation of the 'tribes' is enhanced.

The increasing control exercised by a central government committed to modernisation and claiming a monopoly of legitimate authority has served to strengthen a dualistic interpretation of regional society in which tribe and state appear as two opposing categories. It is, however, often forgotten that the most important tribal chiefs have always been members of an urban elite. The tribes are often characterised as 'archaic' forms of society, no longer particularly relevant to the interests of economic advancement. Just as nomadism appears to have been pushed out of the central areas, so 'tribalism' might be said to have been pushed out of the central political space.
A Tribal Map of Fars Province
Adapted from: Ostandari of Fars Khordad 1346
Tribal Development Office
David J Marsden March 1974
that it supposedly traditionally occupied. But, with the 1979 revolution, the Qashqai chiefs, for example, leaders of what was the most powerful tribal confederacy in Fars, have quickly come back from exile abroad to reestablish their control over the Qashqai, whose members appear to have also expanded considerably. A report in 1980 put their numbers at 400,000\(^1\) as opposed to Beck, who put their numbers at 250,000 in the early 1970s.\(^2\)

It is not the purpose of this thesis to enter into a detailed discussion of the historical evolution of the various social organisational forms which have been 'found' in the region and identified as 'tribes'. But it is necessary to briefly discuss the features that have been selected, both by central government and foreign scholars to characterise these as 'tribal societies'. This is important to an understanding of the principles which have guided the construction of the map and official attitudes towards tribal populations, as well as in terms of explaining the supposedly different social organisations 'found' in 'non-tribal' areas, such as the Marvdasht plain.

It has already been pointed out that it is indeed difficult to support any categorical distinction between nomadism and sedentarism. But it is frequently stated that:

"The basis of tribally organised society in Iran was pastoral nomadism".

(Tapper 1976, p.38)


Once such a position is adopted one runs into the endless dilemma of the exception and the rule and into the problems of 'totalising' often very different forms of social organisation. Endless discussions about what 'pure' nomadism is are countered with claims that most tribes have settled components and some indeed may be totally sedentary. Similarly, once the basis of tribalism is rooted in pastoralism it is but a short step to examining the reasons why pastoral nomadism has given rise to particular forms of society. Tapper, following Barth, has argued that:

"The basic corporate interests of nomads ... lead to certain forms of social and political organisation". (ibid., p.21)

This can be seen as a variety of environmental determinism and one only has to point to sheep ranchers elsewhere in Iran to show that very different forms of social and political organisation are possible.¹

It is thus problematic to talk of 'nomadic societies' perceived as being 'encapsulated' (Fazel 1973), or 'enclosed' (Rawton, 1974), and to conflate nomadism and tribalism. Although descriptively useful, the various different sorts of movement that have been isolated ('vertical', 'horizontal',

¹. Asad makes a similar point: "An undue concern with rehearsing the biological and environmental constraints of animal husbandry ... gives the misleading impression that technique in the narrow sense is an independent variable, always determining and never determined by social relations in the development of social formations" (1978, p.58).
'transhumant' nomadism (Johnson, 1969), or the 'constricted oscillatory nomadism', which Salzer uses to describe the Qashqai (Salzer 1974), can hardly be used as explanatory tools.

An environmental determinism which isolates the 'natural' habitat, its remoteness from centres of civilisation and the specific characteristics of nomadism is, as Tapper suggests, superficial and oversimplified.

It is supposedly because of mobility and the poverty of natural resources in a pastoral habitat that the so-called 'tribal problem' has been generated, both are seen to encourage raiding. Such an explanation does not address the fact that nomads have not always been restricted to these poor habitats, nor that it is from so-called nomads that many of the dynasties in the region have emerged. It could also be suggested that, while ecological conditions within the region have formed the basic foundation for different sorts of movement, political circumstances have been at least as important in defining that movement.

Because of the close association between tribalism and nomadism which has been built up in the literature, it is often also implied that sedentarisation of nomads has led to detribalisation. In a comprehensive article which accumulates and attempts to synthesise much available evidence about tribes in Iran, Tapper suggests that:

1. Tapper, op.cit., p.20
"Where nomads settled as landless individuals in peasant villages, they very quickly lost their tribal identity."
(1976, p.37)

He does, however, recognise that the 'detribalisation' process is more complex than this. But the legacy of Barth's sedentarisation model, constructed for the Basseri, still retains a strong hold.

An insistence on the inter-relationship between tribalism and nomadism gives rise to often very complex discussions of the reasons why nomadism has produced particular types of society. For example, an 'explanation' for why nomads have a military tradition is rooted in 'the vulnerability of nomadic dwellings and animal property'. An 'explanation' for the emergence of supposedly distinct cooperative groups is rooted in the need for 'efficient herding'. An 'explanation' for constant sedentarisation of certain nomads is rooted in the instability of the pastoral economy and in the healthier lifestyle of nomads which results in the constant shedding of 'surplus population'. It is also rooted in the supposed 'critical' size of flocks needed to support an independent lifestyle.

All these 'causes' for a separate nomadic society can be countered. Village dwellings and land have been equally vul-

1. Ibid., p.21.
2. Ibid., p.21.
3. Ibid., p.25.
nerable to the depredations of others. Efficient herding, like efficient farming, may or may not require cooperative labour; it depends on the prevailing nature of production. The 'instability' of the so-called 'pastoral economy' would appear to be as much a product of the prevailing political conditions which oblige pastoral nomads to move into more marginal areas to exploit land in which risks of failure are greatly increased. To state that nomadism is healthier ignores the fact that it is usually the rich in both nomadic and sedentary contexts who enjoy the best health. The 'true nomad' is likely to be a poor nomad and because of poverty is likely to suffer disproportionately from the diseases associated with poverty. Rather than revealing the instability of a pastoral economy, the necessity of shedding a 'surplus population' surely points towards the success of a pastoral life style if it can be said to point anywhere. Arguments about 'critical' size of flocks, below which nomads lose their independence, do not necessarily imply sedentarisation, but often appear to have increased dependence within both nomadic and sedentary environments, as persons with minimal resources are obliged to enter into 'cooperative' relationships with others.

The point is that all the features which have been isolated for 'nomadic societies' are just as applicable for 'sedentary societies'. They are based on the abstraction of particular features. As Godelier maintains, this sort of analysis produces:
"'abstract' concepts made up of descriptive resumes of traits abstracted from the whole to which they belong." (1977, p.90)

The ascription of causal importance to environmental factors in the generation of 'tribal nomadic' societies is paralleled by emphases on different principles of incorporation which separate nomadic from sedentary societies. Kinship provides a basis for explaining the difference. Van Bruinessen's generalisation about the Kurdish tribe is applicable to many other interpretations that have been made of Iranian tribes:

"The Kurdish tribe is a socio-political and generally also territorial (and therefore economical) unit based on descent and kinship, real or putative, with a characteristic internal structure. It is naturally divided into a number of sub-tribes, each in turn again divided into smaller units, etc." (1978, p.40)

Sahlins has isolated several characteristics of 'tribal' societies. Firstly he recognizes that in tribal societies all elementary social units are multifamilial groups which collectively exploit an area of common resources and form a residential unit for most, if not all, of the year. These are the 'primary segments' of what comes to be known as the 'segmentary tribe' or the 'segmentary, acephalous tribe'. Secondly, he isolated the multifunctional characteristics of kinship relations which operate with economic, political and ideological relations and mean that kinship relations, rather than functioning as ideological features of the superstructure, cannot be separated from the economic infrastructure and the mode of production. Thirdly he maintains the 'structural equivalence'
of the primary segments, i.e. they are functionally equivalent and relatively autonomous.\(^1\)

From these characteristics emerges a generalised model of the segmentary tribe used to underpin discussions of tribal organisation in which, not only the emergence of the primary segments, but also the legitimacy of leadership is 'explained'. This, as Godelier suggests, leads to the characterisation of any primitive society as tribal and lumps together many different forms of social organisation. The model may be conveniently represented as below:

**Fig. 5 Segmentary lineage structure**

\(^1\) Sahlins, 1968.
As Van Bruinessen maintains, it may be used in at least two different ways. Both of which in the final analysis are divorced from actual historical circumstances. Firstly, the model may be interpreted as a temporal representation of spatial inter-relationships, in the way in which Bohannan utilizes it to justify relationships among the Tiv. The groups at the lowest end of the 'tree' represent structurally equivalent segments, descended from a common ancestor and occupying distinct territories. Secondly, the model can be used to represent levels of organisation within a tribal polity. The first interpretation supports the second.¹

But authors such as Barth have noticed the discontinuity between the 'lower levels' of tribal society and the higher levels of leadership.² Salzer in his work on the Kashkuli section of the Qashqai speaks of two classes; the ruling chiefs (khāns) together with the tribal aristocracy, as opposed to the broader mass of tribal subjects (ra'iyā).³ Van Bruinessen has

1. Bourdieu comments: "The genealogical tree constructed by the anthropologist, a spatial diagram that can be taken in at a glance, uno intuitu, and scanned indifferently from any point in any direction, causes the complete network of kinship relations over several generations to exist as only theoretical objects exist, that is, tota simul, as a totality present in simultaneity." (Bourdieu, op.cit., p.38).

2. Barth, 1964, p.49.

commented that the role of kinship is more obvious at the bottom level than at the top, and that there are little or no kinship links between the tribal leaders and their followers. The 'structural equivalence' of sections of the tribe is not supported by the existence of this separate 'tribal aristocracy'.

In addition to this discontinuity between model and reality, there is also a great deal of confusion about what the various levels within this 'segmentary' structure are. Such confusion might be blamed on an inadequate understanding of society, but there is also considerable confusion within indigenous interpretations. This perhaps suggests that people do not know to what groups they belong or the actual functions of these groups, which is an untenable conclusion. Rather, it would seem that an historical analysis of the ways in which categories have been employed is required in order to get behind the veil that the categories themselves produce, and while not necessarily dissolving them at least place them in a more relative context.

There are various often confusing interpretations of not only what the tribes are, but what their sub-divisions consist of. Tapper states that it was 'often convenient' for the chief of an Iranian tribe to recognise sections of his tribe and to appoint headmen. He states that the tribe was the basic political group and distinguishes this from 'the pasture holding groups' which were 'usually based on descent from a common paternal ancestor'. He also makes a distinction between what

2. Tapper, op.cit., p.23.
3. Ibid., p.22.
he terms 'moral communities'. The first of these 'communities' is identified as the main camp group and by implication does not appear to be political. The second community 'coincides with a political group under some kind of leader'. He hypothesises that these 'two kinds of moral community may have been the basic constants of tribal nomadic society in Iran'. Leadership was sanctioned by 'moral ties' which legitimated the leader's authority and these moral communities were held together by 'group feelings'. This suggests that the tribe has a sense of common commitment and of common purpose with the tribal leaders, which is often belied by available evidence. Tapper himself suggests that:

"A chief had duties to both government and his followers, and his position was close to that of a feudal lord."

(Ibid., p.29)

The nature of this 'group feeling' and of the 'moral ties' which legitimated control by tribal chiefs over their followers and which maintained the myth of equality among tribal members, cannot be taken for granted. The traditional relations which existed between chief and follower were tempered by the former's ability to extract surplus production from the latter. If the relationship became recognisably exploitative, then the chief lost his followers. As Tapper points out, if the chief

1. Ibid., p.23.
2. Ibid., p.23.
could not adequately reward his followers,

"they might abandon him and support a rival, even
the chief of another tribe".  

(Ibid., p.28)

So much for 'group feeling' and 'moral ties' and cultural identity!

Production for livelihood by both the nomad and the peasant involves the production of a surplus for use by leaders. This may be perfectly compatible with an ideology which stresses the continuance of 'independent' small-scale production and of a broad-based egalitarian and communal ideology. Such an ideology can be manipulated to legitimise relationships which, in fact, involve domination and the transfer of resources from small producers to others. As always, such legitimization minimizes, or even makes redundant, the use of force to facilitate such a transfer. In the domestic environment for example both women and children produce goods over which they have little control. Similarly, the various taxes offered up to the 'natural' leader are seen in terms of bonds of mutual support; wealth produced by 'tribal' subjects (ra'iyā) whether nomad or peasant is systematically transferred into the hands of a privileged elite. Tribal relations at this level appear as extensions of kinship relations and are used to justify the control of some by others. Black in his study of Luristan has shown how an ideology of freedom, independence and equality disguises the actual relations of domination in which 'the rich stay rich and the poor inherit the poverty of their
He states that such an ideology was 'at the very best' fostered by British Anthropologists but this does not allow for the fact that it is also fostered by Luri social ideals which maintain that spatial mobility and a nomadic life offer freedom from the tyranny of sedentary landlords (who may be tribal chiefs) and that life is superior to that enjoyed by the peasant.

Asad makes the point that:

"The notion that spatial mobility of nomads ... makes them relatively immune to being exploited is thus merely the outcome of a confusion between economic exploitation and political incorporation. It is clear that states and empires can exploit autonomous populations without having to incorporate them politically."

(1978, p.61)

As long as the myth of autonomy, and relatedly, of voluntary co-operation between equals can be maintained, the actual relations of domination remain disguised. Such a myth is enshrined in Barth's model of the sedentarisation process in which only the poor and the rich settle. This supposedly leaves a nomadic population of similar socio-economic status and conveniently ignores the fact that nomadic populations are still controlled by chiefs who possess disproportionate amounts of resources and that not only are there very poor shepherds within a nomadic context but that those poor nomads who do settle usually appear to remain closely involved either directly or indirectly with nomadic activities.

The changing nature of production associated with the spread of capitalism does however appear to involve changes in the nature and types of exploitation, and consequent changes in political relations. Such changes take place initially in terms of established relations of production, so they are perceived as extensions of these relations and as such are accepted. Centralised tribal power and increasing control over resources evolve within the traditional framework. But such extensions have the effect of revealing the objective nature of exploitation, as the social distance between direct producer and privileged elite increases and as more and more intermediaries or 'middlemen' are interposed between them. The traditional 'primordial loyalties' which are rooted in kinship begin to disintegrate. Godelier states:

"beyond a certain limit, kinship relations no longer correspond to new social conditions. They evolve up to the point where, outside of kinship, new social relations are built, which in the long term will play the dominant role once held by kinship relations."

(1977, p.123)

Lambton in her analysis of tribal areas, makes parallel points:

"The influence and power of the tribal khans depends largely on the personal element."

(Lambton 1953, p.267)

Many were confirmed in their position by central government, or gained their recognition through opposition to that government. To speak of 'hereditary' leaders is to confuse the ideological justifications for the establishment and maintenance of authority with the actual nature of economic and political domination. Leadership appears to have been invariably
contested. It would appear that with the spread of trade and the expansion of western influence certain individuals became entrenched in their positions, which were translated into hereditary grooves by their increasing ability to manipulate resources. Lambton comments:

"Where the tribe is semi-nomadic and tribal organisation is relatively strong the khans enjoy very considerable powers. Tribal affairs are directly administered, and since the personal position of the khans depends largely on the support they receive from their followers the extortion they practice is limited by the need to retain the loyalty of their followers. Where, however, the tribes are settled or partly settled, the tribesmen have little possibility of attaching themselves to a rival leader if they are dissatisfied with their own leader ... the khans ... take on more the character of large landed proprietors."

(Ibid., pp.288-9)

Surely this points towards constructing an analysis which incorporates 'tribal khans' and large landed proprietors into a unified framework and to an analysis which examines why such 'tribal' divisions have been perpetuated.

The question of land ownership has similar sorts of connotations to the questions posed by the nature of leadership and the two are by no means unconnected. The possession of particular stretches of land often did become traditionally associated with particular families. But these were always subject to negotiation. To talk about traditional 'rights' of usage is problematic. Lambton maintains that:

"In the Qashqai different sections and individuals of the tribe appear to have traditional rights in the pasture lands owned by the tribal leaders or khans. These rights are not registered or absolute although they are sometimes based on documents going back 200
years or so. The practice is for the khan to allot these pastures to his followers every year. In fact the same person is usually given the same pasture, but the formality of allotment is carried out every year in order to prevent the tribesmen acquiring an indisputed title and so that the holder can be turned out if he commits some act of insubordination."

(Ibid., pp.284-5)

The ability to maintain possession of pastures or of land was ultimately in the gift of the ruler but continuity through generations is perhaps more the ability to negotiate from previously accumulated strength rather than through claims to a public language of hereditary ownership. Succession was nowhere automatic and the partible inheritance laws of Islam ensured a continuing struggle for status and power.

'Rights' to land, particularly pasture land, are often said to be 'communal', but 'communal' property ownership only exists in contradiction to 'private' property ownership. If it is appreciated that to call any property 'communal' property supports an ideology of egalitarian access to resources and disguises great inequalities of wealth. Ability to defend a particular stretch of territory while giving de facto control did not confirm de jure title. Even where de jure title was obtained through recourse to state or religious legitimation, it was never indefinite and always personal. It is the process by which de facto control is translated into de jure title that is important to investigate.

1. This yearly formal ceremony of allegiance is paralleled by similar ceremonies carried out at New Year by the imperial salaams held under the former shah - a tradition rooted in particular relationships of authority analysed in chapters V and VI below.
As property has become increasingly individuated, people have either been excluded from participation in certain sorts of activities or from use of land over which they had 'traditional' access, negotiated through time, or they have been increasingly subordinated to the dictates of the owners of the land.

To talk in terms of private property or 'traditional communal' rights ignores the fact that relationships between direct producers and those who appropriated the surplus from that production were always negotiable and the 'exploitation of both peasants and nomads was always relative to the individual bargaining abilities of parties to the negotiations.

Such a negotiation is also to be seen in discussions of what constitutes a tribe. Attempts have been made to fit the tribal groups in Fars into the convenient divisions offered by the model of the segmentary tribe. Several major tribal groups with some sort of ethnic/cultural identity associated with particular areas and whose sub-divisions represent relatively stable named groups with particular allegiances binding leaders to followers in some sort of moral community, are identified in Fars. And these are considered as separate from 'sedentary societies'.

The terms which are used in Fars to describe 'tribal' groups differ little from terms used in other parts of Iran. The most common terms employed are 'ghabileh', 'ashāyer', 'il', 'tā-ifeh' and 'tireh'. These have been used at different times and under different circumstances to identify different divisions
and groups of people. The terms themselves appear to have a very complex history which itself demands a detailed analysis. 'Ashāyer', 'ghabileh' and 'taifeh' are Arabic in origin. 'Iī' is a Turkish word. Only 'tireh' appears as a Persian word. Without going into the etymology of the different words and when they entered into common usage, certain differences in usage immediately emerge to confound attempts to functionally circumscribe them. It would indeed be convenient if the terms could be made to fit the categories of 'tribe', 'clan' and 'lineage' and postulate some model of tribal society in which they all interlock in a pyramid of unified action and reaction based on the processes of fission and fusion. Their different linguistic origins surely point to their employment as different interpretations of reality at different times and by different people.

Studies of tribes in Fars, by both foreign scholars and Iranians have attempted to limit and make explicit their use. Thus Barth, in his study of the Basseri has little difficulty in identifying tireh as meaning 'descent' group. He recognises one other level above that of the tireh which he called 'tribe' (iī) and which encompassed the whole of the Basseri. He also states that:

"An intermediate level of segment often referred to as Taife which is found among the Arab tribes of the area does not exist among the Basseri, who regard the term Taife as an uncommon synonym for Tire.'

(Barth 1964, p.50)

Fazel on the other hand, reporting on the Boyr Ahmad, a 'nomadic society' in the Kuh Giluyeh area of north-western
"Structurally, the Boyr Ahmad are divided into six major sections or sub tribes (tireh) each made up of a number of sub-sections (taifeh)."

(1972, p.12)

Presumably implying that the Boyr Ahmad are a tribe, although he never provides us with an indigenous term. Peyman in his study of the important Qashqai tribe in Fars, identifies them as an 'il', divided into various 'taifehs', which are further divided into tirehs, bonkuhs and khānevādehs.1 Salzer, in his study of the Kashkuli kuchek, while recognising problems associated with the use of the term 'tribe', nevertheless states that the term 'il' is 'Generally used for a tribal group larger than the taifeh, as in il-e-Qashqai'.2 He defines the term 'taifeh' as "tribe, group, clan, family", which "Usually refers to a smaller tribal group than an il",3 and identifies the Kashkuli Kuchek as a 'taifeh' which he equates with 'tribe'. The Qashqai for example is "a tribal confederacy of which the Kashkuli Kuchek tribe is a part".4 Bahmanbegi, in his post-war description of the 'ashayer' of Fars, describes the Qashqai as an il, together with others 'ilat', such as il-e-Ma masani,5 il-e-Khamseh. But, in a compilation of the various groups by the Tribal Education Office, over which he had control, in the early 1970s the Qashqai are described as 'ashayer' and such groups as the Kashkuli Kuchek, Darreshuri Farsi Madān are described as 'ils', sub-sections of the ashāyer-e-Qashqai, divided into various 'taifehs' and 'tirehs'.6

1. Peyman, 1347.
3. Ibid., p.240.
4. Ibid., p.239.
5. Bahmanbegi 1953, p.56.
Fasa'i, in his late-nineteenth century history of Fars, refers to the Qashqai as an il and recognises at least 19 other divisions of the population by that name.¹ His description of these ilat indicate that they were divided into named tirehs. The Qashqai il was divided into 66 tirehs of which the Darreshuri, Farsi Madân and Kashkuli are but three. This description is preceded by a lengthy account of the various bolukat of Fars. These are localised areas, such as the boluk of Ramjerd, which seem to have been units for administrative purposes. The term is translated as 'district' by Lambton.² She states that it is now no longer used as an official term but 'corresponds broadly to the modern dihistan'. Peyman on the other hand, in his extended analysis of the il-e-Qashqai, uses the term boluk to indicate a group of people who work together and live together. He uses boluk and obeh synonymously.³

Fasa'i constructs a separate section in his account in which he explicitly uses the term 'taifeh',⁴ but it is not clear whether this refers to particularly constituted groups or merely to vaguely identified groups outside the more formal boundaries of regional administration, and it is worthwhile translating the Farsi text at this point because of the use of a number of terms to identify specific groups in later works.

4. Fasa'i, op.cit., vol.2, pp.330 ff., entitled "scattered taifehs of Fars". (This is preceded by a separate section entitled Sahrah-haye Mamlekat-e-Fars.)
"Taifeh ghabileh rā guyand ke az tireh-hāye ilāt nabāshad va dar yek boluk tughāf namāyand khavah dar chādour-e-sīāh va khavah dar dehāt zendegāni konand."

(p. 330)

which loosely translated reads:

"The Taifeh is called ghabileh which is not from the tirehs of the ilat and which is settled in one boluk and lives either in black tents or in villages."

It would seem here that taifeh and ghabileh, both Arabic terms, are separated from tireh and il (Persian and Turkish words respectively).

The term il presumably entered the region with the immigration of Turks from Central Asia and reflected central Asian organisational interpretations of relationships between leaders and followers elaborated under very different ecological and historical circumstances to those in Fars. Both terms are now deemed to be officially obsolete. In the nineteenth century when troops were provided from tribal levies and one could still speak of a military tribal aristocracy, then the ilāt appear to have been dealt with in a different way from other sectors of the regional population.

'Tribal' entities appear then to be the products of particular historical circumstances, and not given organizational forms in some external empiricist-constructed world. It is perhaps important to give a brief historical account of the Qashqai, one of the most important tribes in Fars, to illustrate this process.
The Qasqa'i; a brief history

According to Fasa'i, the first mention of the name Qashqai was as a personal, family name. Amir Ghazi Shahilu Qashqai, a supposed relative of Ismail Shah (1501-24) helped the latter establish the Shi'i sect as the official religion of Iran. He was buried in Semirum in the north-west of Fars province, where the Qashqai family had their 'ancestral' lands. A descendant of Amir Ghazi, Jani Agha Qashqai, served as a lieutenant to the later Safavid monarch, Shah-Abbas (1581-1629). He was given responsibilities in Fars by the latter, but it is not clear what these were. It may perhaps be assumed that he was charged with the collection of taxes and the recruitment of soldiers in the expanding political framework of the Safavids.

Fasa'i states that Jani Agha's son, Ismail Khan, fought against the Afghans when they invaded Fars in 1724, and also took an active part in Nadir Shah's invasion of India in 1738. But he apparently ran foul of Nadir Shah, the family and its followers being exiled to Khorasan. With the ascendancy of the Zand monarchs the Qashqai were reinstated in their lands around Semirum. Fars province became politically much more important when the Zands moved the court to Shiraz from Isfahan. The Qashqai family seems to have consolidated its position during this period (1750-95) and Ismail Khan apparently held an important position at the court of Karim Khan Zand (1750-79) - but this may only be conjecture.

The Zands were ultimately defeated by the Qajars. Many of the followers of the Zands, who had moved into Fars from north-west Iran, were incorporated into the local population, and some seem to have fallen under the general control of the Qashqai family.¹ It is only in the nineteenth century that the name Qashqai begins to appear in western literature.² In 1818 Jani Khan, Esmail Khan's son, was invested with the title Ilkhani, a title reflecting central Asian nomadic hierarchies, but, according to Fasa'i until that date: "Nobody in Fars had been called by the title 'ilkhani'".³ This would appear to be a revival of the term because Fasa'i adds: "The heads of the tribes of Khorasan used to be called 'ilkhani'" (my emphasis).⁴ From Jani Khan's time, until it was abolished in 1956, there were eight other holders of the title.

The development of the Qashqai should be seen in the context of the development of Iran during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the increased penetration of Western powers, the rise of nationalism, and the attempts by the Qajar monarchs to consolidate and maintain national power.

British interests became entrenched in the south during the nineteenth century, but their presence had been increasing

¹. Ibid., p.211.
². The first mention of the name, according to Oberling, was that made by Dupre in 1819 (cf. Dupre 1819, vol.2, p.463).
⁴. Ibid., p.160.
from at least Safavid times, as had the influence of merchant families. During the reign of the Zands the Qavām family was important in the civil administration of the city, and Hāji Ebrahim Qavāmi was made Kalāntar-e-Mamlekat-e-Fars, or 'Chief civil magistrate of Fars', by Ja'far Khān Zand (1785-89). 1

He was highly instrumental in the ultimate downfall of the Zand monarchy, and in turning Shiraz over to Agha Mohamad Khan Qajar, the first of the Qajar monarchs (see below, Chapter V). Such a move was perceived by observers as a defeat for 'tribal' power upon which the Zands relied. 2 Hāji Ebrahim was rewarded by being given the post of 'prime minister'. The Qavām family maintained its influence at court until Agha Mohamad died. His successor, distrusting the power wielded by the family, had all the males but one killed or blinded. The one remaining male heir, however, prospered, and by 1811 he had become kalāntar (chief civil administrator) of Fars, and by 1840 was made beglārbegi of Fars. 3

The nineteenth century was characterized by the polarisation of the conflict between the Qashqais and the Qāvams. This can only be considered a simplistic abstraction, given the complexity of forces operating in southern Iran to shape historical

3. The exact meaning of the term beglārbegi is obscure. Lambtor translates the term as "title held by provincial governors or governors general (Safavid period; kind of chief police officer or military governor (Qajar period) (Lambton, 1953, p.424).
development. It appeared initially as a confrontation between different 'tribal' confederacies (Qashqai/Khamseh), but eventually seems to have been transformed into a confrontation between 'tribe' and 'state', with the former being increasingly treated as a marginal phenomenon as the latter's hegemony increased.

In 1862 the Khamseh confederacy of 'tribes' was created under the institutionalized leadership of the Qavām family, to specifically counterbalance the increasing power of the Qashqai. It consisted of an amalgamation of Farsi, Arabic and Turki speaking groups who had previously been affiliated to the Qashqai, presumably in the latter's capacity as Il khans of Fars.\(^1\) The Khamseh has sometimes been treated as if it was an indigenous product of physical and social environmental circumstances. But it is much more realistic to consider it as the historical result of political developments in southern Iran which preceded its foundation, in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Over the years there have often been different reports of the groups affiliated to the Qashqai confederacy. It has already been noted that Fasa'i lists 66 named tirehs; Bahmanbegi, the former head of the Tribal Education Office, lists five major groups with eight minor ones which he calls taifeh.\(^2\) Oberling lists nine. The most recent 'definition', from the census

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2. Bahmanbegi, op. cit.
conducted by the Tribal Education Office in 1972, identified only six major divisions (jils): the Kashkuli Bozorg, the Sheshboluki, the Kashkuli Kuchek, the Farsi Madan, the Darreshuri, and the 'Amaleh'.

Studies of 'tribal' populations are still couched in terms of their discreteness and separation from the rest of regional society. Shafi'i for example states that: "The Qashqai tribe live in tents and depend mainly on the pastoral income based on livestock husbandry, and supplemented by occasional cultivation of wheat and barley" (1977: 152). Additionally, Paydarfar maintains that: "in addition to the urban and rural populations located in Iran, it is estimated that between 2 and 3 million Iranians are pastoral and live in tribal societies" (Paydarfar 1974, p.15).

The present 'tribal' framework is the product of a very distinct historical process which has, especially in the past 50 years, reified a particular positivist view of the nature of 'tribes', and in doing so has helped to push particular groups of people into pre-established moulds, and polarise society into the three groups that Paydarfar, for example, thinks he sees. After a brief geographical introduction, the next chapter examines the historical process in terms of the changes that have occurred in the Marvdasht plain with the aim of providing a foundation on which present social organisation might be interpreted. Rather than there being a break with the past as Barth argued, it is hoped that the continuity that exists between the present and the past will be emphasised.
CHAPTER IV
THE MARVDASHT PLAIN

General Characteristics

It is in this general context that the Marvdasht plain is situated. Located in the central zone it lies at approximately 1,500 metres above sea level, and about 45 kilometres north of the provincial capital of Shiraz. The plain covers an area of approximately 140,000 hectares and is drained by two rivers, the Kor which enters the plain from the north west, and the smaller Sivand, which enters from the north. Both eventually flow into the inland drainage basin of Lake Bakhtegān, but not before their waters have been used to intensively irrigate a large proportion of the plain.

The plain extends from the recently completed Dariush Kabir dam, near the village of Dorudzan, above the village of Shahrak, to Lake Bakhtegān (see fig. 6). The river Kor is incised into the plain to a depth of about 50 metres but, until the completion of the Dorudzan dam, periodic flooding of the surrounding plain did occur; the last such occasion was in the winter of 1968/69. Except where bridges have been constructed, communication between north and south banks of the river is extremely difficult. The fact that the river is incised has necessitated the construction of a series of barrages over time, and the extraction of water from points far removed from those of consumption. Most feeder canals between Marvdasht and Dorudzan have their origins at extraction points within the district (dehestān) of Kamfīruz, behind the
Fig. 6 The Marvdasht plain

1700m contour after Kortum

20 km
modern dam. The barrages at Band-e-Amir and Band-e-Feizabad, south-east of Marvdasht provide water for areas downstream between there and lake Bakhtegān. Today the supply of irrigation water for the whole plain is under the control of the dam authorities, who have built a much more modern network of feeder canals to replace the former, but still largely operational system, of slow-moving, winding irrigation channels.¹

The riverine deposits of clay and clay loams provide the basis for an increasingly intensive agricultural exploitation, which has not however been totally beneficial, as witnessed by the rather large salt flats recently forming in various parts of the plain. Most agriculture is now supported by irrigation, but a significant portion of the plain which is above the level of the irrigation water is still dry farmed and/or used for pasture. As in most other parts of the region the major staple crops are wheat and barley, the latter usually being dry farmed. Where water is plentiful rice is cultivated. In recent years there has been an increased tendency to produce cash crops, of which sugar beet, cotton, opium, melons (jāliz), sesame seed, corn and alfalfa are the most important. A number of small orchards are to be found scattered throughout the plain, but more especially on the southern facing northern foothills, especially in the district of Khafrak, where walnuts, apples, grapes, pomegranates,

¹ For a description of irrigation in the plain see Kortum 1976.
quince and peaches are grown. (Further south and at lower elevations citrus fruits and dates are the most common tree crops.) Because of its relative closeness to the provincial capital, the Marvdasht plain has been the object of considerable attention at the hands of large landowners and merchant capitalists interested in increasing agricultural production through the employment of progressive agricultural techniques which are now everywhere evident, side by side the more traditional farming techniques. With the building of the dam at Dorudzan it has also attracted a great deal of attention from government agricultural offices.

The plain's administrative centre is the rapidly expanding town of Marvdasht, a place that has grown from a small number of dwellings around the newly completed sugar-beet refinery some 35 years ago, to a settlement of over 30,000 (census figures for 1966 indicate a population of 25,498). Most of the service functions once provided by Band-e-Amir and Zarghān have now been transferred to Marvdasht. There are no other centres of comparable size in the plain. Other settlements are rather large, specialized villages or smaller agricultural settlements and hamlets. It is difficult to calculate the exact number of settlements but it is estimated that there are between 300 and 400, ranging in size from fewer than 30 inhabitants to villages with a population in excess of 1,000. According to the 1966 census the average size of settlement is about 250 persons.
The dehestān of Ramjerd

To the north and west of the town of Marvdasht lies the dehestān of Ramjerd (see fig. 7), bounded to the north by the river Kor which was formerly bridged at Jeshniān and Pol-e-No. These bridges were in use until the beginning of this century when they were destroyed by villagers to increase their isolation from marauding tribesmen. Prior to this time and the construction of the modern metalled road which bridged the Kor at Pol-e-Khān just south of Marvdasht, the summer route to Isfahān was carried by these bridges before climbing into the mountainous sarhad. The dehestān of Ramjerd comprises some 59 settlements and according to the 1966 census had a population of 13,722, which implies that the average settlement size was about 229, but this hides considerable variation as can be seen from figure 8. Settlements range in size from under 10 persons to over 1,000. (The census isolates individual households, but very small settlements are usually attached administratively to larger, adjacent ones. If these former are combined with their 'mother' settlements, the average size of settlement increases to 263.) The average household size was 5.24, slightly larger than the average recorded for the whole of Iran in 1966.  

1. The census defines a household as: 'a group of individuals who share living quarters and their principle meals'. A sample survey of household heads was carried out in Ramjerd in 1968 quite independently of this research by an Iranian investigator (cf. Paydarfar 1974). Although much of the information is of limited value some characteristics identified by that survey may be illustrative.

... cont. overleaf...
Fig. 7. The dehestān of Ramjerd

[Image of a map showing the dehestān of Ramjerd with various places marked, such as Dorudzan, Abarej, Ramjerdi, Jeshniān, Fatuābād, Jahanābād, Ismail Abād, Junāki, Rasmanjān, Ouangān, Barezābād, Kushkāk, Shahijān, Mādi Banān, Zarereh, Zargānān, Zargarān, Doulatābād, Falunak, Ab Garm, Esfadrān, Pol-e-No, Domafshān, Burāki, Mīān Ghāleh, Miān Bārak, Ghaleh Q, Kūh Sabz, Zargarān, Uzundareh, Marvdasht, and other locations labeled with their heights in metres.]
Utilizing information gleaned from the 1966 census, the dehestān covers 37,211 hectares, or approximately one quarter of the total area of the plain. 91% of this is cultivable land, and the amount under cultivation in 1966 was 15,635 hectares or 46%, leaving 45% fallow. The major crops are similar to those cultivated throughout the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land under irrigated wheat</th>
<th>9,562 hectares</th>
<th>71% of all cultivated land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land under dry wheat</td>
<td>1,593 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land under irrigated barley</td>
<td>1,617 hectares</td>
<td>17% of all cultivated land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land under dry barley</td>
<td>1,012 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land under irrigated rice</td>
<td>329 hectares</td>
<td>2% of all cultivated land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land under other crops</td>
<td>1,393 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallow land</td>
<td>18,249 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated wasteland</td>
<td>1,420 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-cultivable wasteland</td>
<td>1,745 hectares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rice was only cultivated in 14 of the 59 settlements and the main crops other than wheat, barley and rice, were cotton, sugar-beet and melons. The majority of the inhabitants practice mixed farming and the census figures indicate that

Note 1 cont. from previous page:

53% of the sampled population was 15 years of age & under 85.2% of all households sampled consisted of nuclear families 31.2% of the sampled population had not been born in the dehestān 65.9% of the sampled population were farmer owners/operators 79% of the sampled population was completely illiterate 40% of the sampled population owned radios 61% of the sampled population used kerosene for lighting 49% of the sampled population used animal dung for heating

Much more statistical information, including such things as the number of beds per household, as well as reactions to children's misbehaviour is given in this study, where an attempt is made to compare urban, rural, and tribal conditions, under the assumption that there is a continuum between them and that place of residence is of major import in determining the effects of exposure to change. The issues involved are much more complex than Paydarfar assumes and the hypotheses under which he was working serve to mystify social organisation rather than clarify it.
the villagers owned 26,534 sheep and goats, as well as 2,070 horses and donkeys and 4,315 cows. On average this means something like 440 animals per settlement. Some villages appear to have over 1,500 sheep and goats and only those small isolated settlements of a family or two around a pump or a coffee house were without. These figures do not include the large herds of the absentee landlords, nor those of pastoral nomads who periodically use the plain. Unfortunately comparable figures from earlier years are not available to allow detailed comparison and to hint at processes of change. Even the 1966 figures should be treated with caution, and serve as guides rather than quantitative statements. Although a national census was taken in 1956 figures at the village level are not available. ¹

Limited figures are available from 1950², when the number of inhabitants of the dehestān was calculated at 6,392 distributed among 43 settlements. The average size of settlement was then only 149. If these figures can be believed there has been a 53% increase in population between 1950 and 1966 involving a 35% increase in the overall size of settlement, as well as an absolute increase in the number of settlements from 43 to 59. Only four settlements (Uanjān, Chamani, Ramjerdi and Shahiān) have experienced decline in population over this fifteen year period, whereas others such

¹. See fig. 8 for the size of settlements in the dehestān of Ramjerdi.

Fig. 8. Size of settlements in the dehestān of Ramjerd


(based on 1966 National Census of Population and housing.)
as Esfardrān have more than trebled. Fasai records 35 settlements in the 'boluk' of Ramjerd towards the end of the nineteenth century.¹

Razmārā mentions that in 1950, four of the settlements were inhabited by Turki-speakers and one by Luri-speakers, the remainder being Farsi speakers. These figures considerably under-estimate the mixture of languages and supposed ethnic distinctions among the inhabitants of the dehestān. In addition to these more permanent occupants there are seasonally resident groups of pastoral nomads and wandering gypsies and tinker groups (ghorbat and āhangar respectively) taking advantage of the available pasture and practising their specialist skills. Villagers also move about the dehestān and into other parts of the province on a seasonal basis. Thus far from being homogeneous, the area presents an amalgam of groups, occupations and interests that bind it to the rest of the plain and to the whole southern Zagros region.

Within the past 20 years considerable investment in food-processing industries, requiring unskilled labour, has provided additional employment for villagers. The sugar-beet refinery at Marvdasht, a chemical fertilizer factory, road and dam-building projects, the construction of a large meat-marketing complex and a biscuit factory have all contributed to the diversification of the economy of the area and to the opportunities available to villagers. Urban expansion,

particularly in Marvdasht and Shiraz has increased demands for building labourers, and large numbers of people temporarily leave their villages to take up these opportunities.

The Ayub valley

The Ayub valley is relatively isolated from the main asphalted road that now links the Dorudzan dam with the main Shirāz-Isfahān highway at Pol-e-Khān. Although not necessarily typical, the villages in the valley do provide a comprehensive cross-section of activities and interests. Buraki and Esfardrān and Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg are old villages and were recorded by Fasa'i in the late nineteenth century. Chamani, Domafshān and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek are of more recent origin. Physical form varies quite considerably. Older established villages tend to be fortified and of the gha'leh type such as Chamani and Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg, with strong retainer walls and a series of alleys connecting the buildings inside.¹ More open settlements such as Domafshān and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek appear as series of half-open courtyards (see Figs. 9 & 10).

The Ayub valley contains seven relatively small villages whose occupants are engaged in a variety of activities from cereal cultivation to animal husbandry and carpet production. They are closely tied into the nomadic pastoral and the urban sectors of provincial society. A great deal of land in the

¹. For a discussion of settlement types in Iran see de Planhol 1958 and 1968.
Fig. 9a. The Ayub valley (showing irrigation channels)
valley is not cultivated by the villagers themselves, but is owned by large absentee landowners who have managed to escape the execution of a supposedly radical land reform programme. Both the landowners of Chamani and Esfardrān are engaged in animal husbandry on a fairly intensive scale, each owning upwards of 2,500 animals which are seasonally to be found in the valley. The interests of these large landowners bring them into contact with many other parts of the plain and of the province, where they own or administer other stretches of land.

Types of settlement

The most common form of settlement in the Marvdasht plain is the fortified village or gha'leh. This consists of a high mud brick, usually square enclosure with towers at each corner and one main gate. Within the enclosure the courtyards of the villagers take up most of the space although a central open area is often to be found. Under the gateway the village shop is normally to be found and above it the store of the landlord. The individual courtyards consist of an open space surrounded by a series of rooms in which the individual families live. Many of these gha'lehān were built during Safavid times on the foundations of earlier villages and were constructed to provide defensive facilities during times of insecurity. Their size varies considerably and they tend now to be the larger villages in the plain with anything from 200 to 1,000 inhabitants. Until recently there was very little settlement
outside the walls. These villages tend to be dominated by Persian speakers although recent increases in population mean that others, such as Arab, Turki and Luri speakers are frequently found in them.

In the last 50 years, as political security has been increased, there has been considerable expansion outside the walls of the gha'leh. Public buildings such as mosques, bath houses, schools and community buildings have largely been erected just outside the walls. Members of the village have also constructed houses outside the walls, and increasing pressure on space within the gha'leh has prompted others, especially newly-married couples to build outside. Chamani, despite its modern construction, illustrates this traditional design. Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg illustrates in addition the expansion of building outside the gha'leh (see fig. 10).

Some of the new settlements built between the 1920s and 1940s were based on the traditional gha'leh type, but more commonly they are open in plan. They consist of a series of inter-connected courtyards (see the plans of Domafshān and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek). The need for the construction of elaborate defensive settlements diminished considerably during this period. Such settlements are usually smaller than the gha'lehs and are located, either on the more marginal land in the plain or on the talus slopes of the surrounding hills. Many contain substantial numbers of former pastoral nomads, obliged to settle in the plain during Reza Shah's sedentarisation programme.
Fig. 10. Settlement plans for five villages in the Aynab Valley

Pol-e-No-e Bozorg

Chamani

Pol-e-No-e Kuchek

Domafshān

Buraki
In addition to these two dominant forms of settlement there are also scattered semi-subterranean stone enclosures, now largely abandoned, which formed the foundations for the seasonal dwellings of pastoral nomads who used the plain during the winter. In the summer numbers of black goat hair tents are scattered throughout the plain and the surrounding hills, occupied by pastoral nomads or village shepherds.

As security has improved and commercial production expanded there has also been an increase in the numbers of individual dwellings away from established villages. Here motor pumps have been employed to irrigate land which could not otherwise be reached by river water networks. A small stretch of land is irrigated by these pumps and provides the basis for the construction of a family courtyard and the intensive cultivation of vegetable crops. These are frequently enclosed by mud retainer walls.
CHAPTER V

CHANGING PATTERNS OF LAND USE AND CONTROL

History of land use and settlement

Since pre-historic times the Marvdasht plain has occupied a central position in the history of southern Iran. The Elamite city of Anshan was recently located in the neighbouring dehestān of Beizā, adjacent to the modern village of Maliān. ¹ The ruins of Persepolis, the centre for Achamenid

¹ During the early 1970s an archeological team from Pennsylvania State University under the directorship of Dr. W. Sumner was excavating the site.
rule (550-330BC) are located on the northern foothills of the plain. From here the Achamenid rulers commanded an empire which stretched from the Nile to the Indus. 2

Little is known about the pattern of land use and settlement in this early period, but numerous pre-historic mounds from both this period and much earlier bear witness to one of the lengthiest occupations in the history of the civilized world. Prior to the Achamenids, who derived their power from control of land, Lambton notes that:

"the people were grouped in tribes and the village of a clan formed the model according to which the new settlements were arranged and settled."

(1963, p.10)

By Achamenid times a land-holding aristocracy had emerged which was in control of agricultural production. ...

The pattern of control achieved by them was developed by the Parthians who succeeded them (250BC-224AD) and Lambton notes that:

"They were invested with large landed property ... Between them and the peasantry was an intermediary class holding sub-fiefs."

(Ibid., p.12)

It was continued under the Sassanids whose empire was also centred in what is now Fars province, 3 and who ruled from

2. A great deal of archeological work has been undertaken in the plain. See in particular Hansman, J. (1972), Herzfeld (1968), Nicol, M.B. (1970), Stein, A. (1940), Wilber, D.N. (1969).

3. Major Sassanid ruins are to be found outside the provincial towns of Firuzabād and Kāzerun.
226AD to 651AD. The large landlords were the representatives of the government vis-à-vis the peasantry. The latter were obliged to perform labour services and were subject to recruitment into the army of the rulers. Taxes, which seem to have formerly been assessed in produce were re-assessed on the basis of land. This re-assessment formed the basis for taxation in the later Arab period. This had important implications for the nature of control of the land and for the forms of exploitation of the peasantry.

Throughout its extended history the plain has been subject to major fluctuations in its fortunes. As a basis for irrigated agriculture it has been at the centre of many power struggles. As central government has weakened, the conditions under which the land could be effectively irrigated were also weakened. Insecurity reduced the amount that was cultivated presumably because of the peasants' justified fears that it would not be harvested by the same people who

1. Lambton 1953, p.15.

2. The concept 'exploitation' is highly problematic. It is here used to mean that process whereby resources are transferred out of the hands of the direct producers, and thus also includes the ideological mechanisms which are employed to legitimate this transfer. As such it may not necessarily be consciously perceived as exploitation. Lorrain has pointed out in a recent work The Concept of Ideology (1979) that ideology hides 'the true relationship between classes by explaining away the relations of domination and subordination. Thus, social relations appear harmonious and individuals carry out their reproductive practices without disruption"(p.47). Godelier speaks of 'forms of appropriation' (1977, p.17), the ways in which the products of nature are appropriated and monopolised by a minority.
had ploughed it. Much land would seem to have reverted to pasture land at these periods and was used by the large numbers of pastoral nomads in the area. It may be that some of these pastoral nomads extended their control from the mountainous areas into the plain but it is also highly likely that those peasants who abandoned cultivation themselves invested more resources in sheep and goats. The irrigation networks contracted, expanded or fell into complete disrepair according to the general level of authority exercised by central government.

"The just ruler maintains himself and the state by means of the army, which in turn is maintained by regular revenue, which is derived from a prosperous economy from contented subjects, a goal which can only be secured by justice"

(Ibn Balkhi quoted in Perry, p.227)

but as will be emphasised, the very nature of this rule seems to have prevented such a state of affairs from surviving for very long, because of the inbuilt contradictions associated with the forms of remuneration for government servants and the tendency for these servants to exercise an independence from that same government.

Four barrages on the Kor river provided the irrigation water for the whole of the Marvdasht plain. All of these appear to pre-date the Arab conquest in the 7th century AD. And all but one were in use in the early 1970s. The one which is not now in use has been replaced by the much larger Dariush Kabir dam which was built during the 1960s. It stands on the site of the former Band-e-Mujjarād, adjacent to the
modern village of Dorudzan and at a spot in the river which can be successfully forded.\(^1\) Water from this barrage originally supported agriculture around Persepolis and traces of an Achamenid irrigation network run along the northern edge of the plain. Much of the land in the dehestān of Ramjerd was irrigated by water from this barrage. The second barrage is located at Band-e-Amir, south-east of Marvdasht (see fig. 6), where the former major winter road north from Shirāz crossed the Kor. The other two, Band-e-Feizābād and Band-e-Māvur, irrigate lands in the dehestān of Korbāl.

The Arab conquest does not appear to mark a major break in the nature of control of the plain although the introduction of Islamic practice seems to have considerably changed the prevailing attitudes towards authority.\(^2\) However, it would seem that between the 7th and the 10th centuries security gradually worsened and cultivation declined considerably.\(^3\)

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1. This ford was the centre for large concentrations of pastoral nomads, especially in the spring, on their way up to summer pastures.

2. See Lambton, op.cit., p.16, who maintains that although the Arab conquest marked the evolution of a new theory of the state the changes in local administration were less marked. She states that:

"Fars which had under the Sassanians been in the hands of the landed aristocracy preserved its 'feudal' character into Islamic times. As late as the fourth/tenth century it appears that the greater part of the province was still in the hands of the old landed proprietors" (op.cit., p.33).

3. Lambton states: "In areas where the caliphs control was weaker and campaigning between rival governors and local leaders was a frequent occurrence, the tendency was for the population to be subject to frequent levies and much extortion" (op.cit., p.47).
The Arab practice of recruiting mercenaries to their armies, to cater for their rapidly expanding commitments, created considerable problems. At first soldiers were assigned the rents from land but as payment became irregular they were increasingly granted or took usufruct of the land itself. This led to increased extortion of the actual cultivators. Soldiers were not the only ones who were demanding payment, an expanding administrative group were also increasingly paid off in this way.

During the 10th century AD the Buyid rulers in Fārs which was now controlled from the major urban centre of Shirāz, made considerable efforts to increase the area under irrigation. Azud-ud-Dowleh:

"cleaned out blocked up canals, built mills on them, mended holes in the dams, and settled bedouin from Fars and Kerman in dead lands".  

(Ibn Miskaiwah, in Lambton op.cit.p.51)

Writing of the fertility of the plain at that time Petroshevsky notes:

"The district of Kurbal (below the barrage) considered one of the most fertile, watered by canals from the river Kur ... yielded about 700,000 kharvārs (ass loads) of grain under the Buyid Azud ud Dowleh (947-983AD)."¹

(1968, p.491)

¹. Kharvār: a unit of measurement equivalent to an ass-load. This was standardised in 1926 as equivalent to 300 kilogrammes or 100 mann (see Lambton, op.cit., pp.406-7).
From being members of the mercenary armies of the Arabs the Seljuq Turks eventually succeeded them as rulers (1066-1287AD). They were responsible for repairs to all four of the barrages in the Marvdasht plain. Using the account of the historian Ibn Balkhi, Le Strange notes that the Band-e-Mujjarād was repaired by Fakhr ud Dowleh Chauli in the beginning of the 12th century and the district of Ramjerd was apparently very productive. A problem for the Seljuqs at this time was the incorporation of the primarily pastoral groups of Turks who had moved into Iran from central Asia. But in Fars at least it would appear that it was in the subsequent period of the Mongols that large numbers of Turks entered Fars to form a permanent feature of the provincial population from that time. They now figure prominently in the villages of the plain, and many of the pastoral nomadic tribes are Turki-speaking. Minorsky claims that the division between Turk and non-Turk (or Tajik) is 'one of the basic

1. Lambton states: "The work of the Seljuqs is of importance because it decided the main lines along which the system was to develop, and the system lasted in its essentials through the Middle Ages down to the twentieth century". (Ibid., p.53)


facts in the social and political organisation of Iran.\textsuperscript{1} The distinction is still maintained in the plain where, because of its association with tribalism and pastoral nomadism, 'turk' is imbued with ideas of dissidence and freedom from central control. 'Tajik' on the other hand (a term that villagers would never use of themselves), implies servility and subjection to authority.\textsuperscript{2}

Fars province was spared the initial devastation of the Mongol invasions by the timely payment of tribute.\textsuperscript{3} But throughout the early Mongol period production appears to have steadily declined once more.\textsuperscript{4} These nomads brought with them a tribal organisation based on the conditions of the Steppe in which nomadism and pastoralism were the most important activities. Land was perceived as being primarily for sheep

\begin{enumerate}
\item Minorsky 1943, p.187. Lambton notes that: "There were ... two major problems which the Seljuqs had to solve, both of which closely affected land tenure and land revenue administration; first, how to incorporate into the structure of their empire a large nomadic ... element.... and secondly, how to pay their military forces" (op.cit., p.56-7).

The reason that Lambton advances to explain why the Seljuqs did not enter Fars until the Mongol period was that the region was already populated by semi-nomadic groups (op.cit., p.57).

\item Lambton suggests that the military were mainly Turks and the civil administration probably mainly non-Turks (op.cit., p.59).

\item Op.cit., p.77.

\item Op.cit., p.77.
\end{enumerate}
and goats. Much land was initially confiscated and made over to the rulers who at least in the early years of their rule seem to have maintained a nomadic life style. Petroshesvsky notes the decline in productivity when the rulers in Shiraz had become vassals of the Il Khans:

"under the atabeg Sa'id b. Abu Bakr, a vassal of the Il Khans, the annual harvest about the year 1260 fell to 300,000 khavars and before the reforms of Ghazan fell even further, and the Kharaj (land tax) of Kurbal consisted of only 42,000 khavars of grain".

(1968, p.491)

1. Like the Seljuqs before them the Mongols looked upon the conquered lands as "the yurt of the Mongol ruling family in which their flocks and those of their followers grazed; the conquered population was not regarded as having any rights vis-à-vis the Mongols. It does not appear, however, that in the early period the Mongols regarded themselves as the proprietary owners of the soil".

(Lambton, op. cit., p.77)

and

"The Seljuq leaders were the leaders of their people but not originally territorial sovereigns. They conceived of their rule in all probability, as extending wherever their people roamed, and not, at first, in any case, as being tied to, or confined to, any given area. In the steppe each tribe had its own grazing ground or yurt, over which the leader of the group, as the representative of the tribe, exercised dominion, probably allotting, in the case of the large tribes, specific pastures in it to the various sub-groups.... The kingdom was conceived of as the personal estate of the ruling khān, held by him on behalf of his people, although he could dispose of it within certain limits as he wished. It became the established practice for him to assign different parts of the kingdom to minor members of his family, sons, brothers, and others."

These assignments did not carry with them any permanent rights:

"the malik merely held the area ... at the will of the sultān who could, and frequently did, revoke the assignments. To what extent the malik had jurisdiction over his iqṭā' to the exclusion of the sultān is not clear."

(op. cit., p.60)
During the Mongol period (1260-1500AD), the Turkish migration into Fars continued. Fasa'i mentions that the Ainallu and the Baharlu tribes entered Fars at this time. In the late nineteenth century he records that their summer pastures were in the districts of Ramjerd and Marvdasht.  

Similarly the leaders of the Qashqai confederacy of tribes claim that they came into Fars during this period.

From the Arab conquest of the 7th century and the introduction of the caliphate and Islam, through the Seljuq and Mongol periods and the introduction of the khānate, to the establishment of the absolutist state of the Safavids and Shi'a Islam as the official religion of that state, there developed a system of land tenure which has influenced the nature of the rural social organisation until the 20th century. This is the iqta', the forerunner of what became known as tuyul under the Safavids. Its developments and its major features provide the framework for an analysis of prevailing relationships of authority within Iranian society; the relationships that have governed the extraction of surpluses from the direct producers. Present perceptions of power and authority in Iran have their origins in the development of the iqta' system.

2. Oberling, 1960, p.175.
3. The iqta' or land assignment system should be separated from the feudalism which developed in western Europe: "the element of mutual obligation inherent in the nexus of feudal tenure in western Europe is notably absent" (Lambton, op.cit., p.54).
Iqta' and tuyul are terms which are no longer used in referring to land tenure arrangements in the Iranian countryside. They refer to systems of tax farming and land assignments which appear to have been first developed from the demands of the Arab conquerors for increased funds. Grants on the revenue of land were given to servants of the state in lieu of salary. As conditions worsened these grants on revenue seem to have developed into grants on the land itself. Land which was not already owned but had either been abandoned or confiscated was made over to soldiers in payment for services to the government. Administrative officials instead of receiving a salary were given rights to secure the revenue from land. These were theoretically servants of the rulers rather than of the public. To secure official office meant control over land and it was expected that those who held official position would attempt to enrich themselves from their office. Offices were held up for auction to raise money for the state, and the result was, not only the development of a system of administrative control, but also one which tended towards the increasing exploitation of the peasantry. Authority was delegated from the ruler, rather than held in trust from the people.

Frequent military conquests coupled with the partible nature of Islamic inheritance laws did not encourage the emergence of a landed aristocracy, but those who were granted land tended to usurp personal rights over it when and if they
could, and convert it into 'individuated' property. The result was often the ruin of the land, especially when those given control of it did not consider it to be a permanent investment over which they would have permanent control. In addition the granting of land to the military and to administrators often meant that in times of weak central government they were able to exercise semi-autonomous rule over the areas under their jurisdiction and employ private armies for their own use. They were thus also able to refuse to support or defend the central government that had initially given them control over that land.

The development of the land tenure system is, of course, much more complex than this brief overview implies. Different sorts of grants on land and its revenue emerged, but the essential features seem to have been the association of land grants with the administration of the country. Grantees formed with their supporters the government of the areas they controlled. There was thus a constant tension between the centrifugal tendencies which were necessitated by the need to pay officials and delegate control, and the centripetal tendencies which, at least theoretically, tied the holders of official posts to the central government.

The Mongol period (1260-1500AD) was, according to Lambton, one in which there was:

"an increase in large landholdings, and, on the whole, a decline in productivity. The hostility between the peasantry and the ruling classes was heightened and the gulf between them widened."

(Lambton, 1953, p.99)
But the patterns of land tenure and rural organisation seem to have continued. Minorsky remarks on the persistence of administrative traditions from the 14th to the 17th centuries (quoted in Lambton 1953, p.101).

The system of repaying service to the state through tax farming and land grants was continued under the Safavide (1500-1722).

"The old institutions moulded by Islamic practice in the early centuries, and modified by the practice of the Steppe were infused with new drive by the absolutism of Shi'ism. The conception of the Safavid monarch differed from both that of the caliph and that of the ruling khan."

(Ibid., p.105)

Under the Safavids the theory of the state implied that the Safavid rulers claimed sole ownership of the land for the state, but in practice land tended to become private property in many areas as in earlier periods.1 Much land came under the control of religious institutions or was made over as endowments (ouqāf) which ensured a certain continuity of control over land as the possessors, as mutavallis, were able to secure the products from the land for themselves and their descendents.2 At least some land in the Marvdasht plain was

1. "Politically (the rise of the Safavids) sees the emergence of Persia as a nation state in the modern sense of the term" (Lambton 1953, p.105). And Perry notes: "Iran today is essentially the creation of the Safavid shahs" (Perry 1979, p.1.).

2. Vaqf (pl. ouqāf) is land immobilised for charitable or other purposes. Two kinds may be recognised; these are: 1) vaqfi 'āmm or charitable vaqf, and 2) vaqfi khāss or personal vaqf, such as property placed in trust for the settler's descendents. The former was used for example to support the building and maintenance of a religious institution such as a mosque (masjid) or a religious college (madrasseh). The vaqf were administered by a mutavalli who was usually chosen from the family of the settler (see Lambton 1953, Chapter II).
vaqf land at this time.\textsuperscript{1} As in earlier times the increasing expenses incurred by the central government meant that payments to both administrators and the military, in the form of land grants continued under a system known as tuyul.\textsuperscript{2} In late Safavid times this meant increasing autonomy from central government, as the power of the latter decreased.

It was during the Safavid era that the first major contacts with western merchant capitalists occurred, first the Portuguese and then the Dutch, French and British. These established trading bases on the Persian gulf, the most important of which was at Bandar 'Abbās. The Safavid era is characterised by increased commerce and relative stability especially in the early years. Roads, caravanserais and bridges were constructed. The bridges at Jashniān and Pol-e-No, in the dehestān of Ramjerd, now abandoned, were built during this period. Another bridge at Pol-e-Khān was also established to carry the winter road north to the capital from Shirāz.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Lambton 1953, ff. p.131.
\item \textsuperscript{2} The term tuyul is here translated as 'land assignment' but this disguises the various types which were in existence. For further information see Lambton, op.cit.
\item \textsuperscript{3} This latter bridge has now been replaced by an iron bridge just south of the present town of Marvdasht which carries the only metalled road north to Isfahan. The metalled road follows largely the old winter route to the Safavid capital. The summer route was through the present district (dehestān) of Abarj and into the Sarhad-e-Chāhār-Dāngi. This is now only used by certain groups of pastoral nomads in their twice yearly migrations.
\end{itemize}
Little is known about the conditions of the peasantry, but a large number of walled villages which are still occupied appear to date from this time so it can perhaps be assumed that cultivation expanded rapidly.

Following the fall of the Safavids a period of insecurity prevailed, alleviated for a short time by the establishment of the Zand regency which controlled western Iran from its centre in Shirāz. The Zands originally came from the vicinity of Malāyer and are variously described as Kurds or Lurs. They brought with them to Fars other tribal groups as parts of their military following, and ruled for most of the second half of the 18th century. According to Perry the roads were secured and trade expanded considerably. Although little information is directly available from the Marvdasht plain at this time it can perhaps be assumed that settlement and cultivation prospered. Merchants and artisans were attracted to Shirāz by the ruler, and his tribal army was settled in and around the city. In 1763 the British concluded an agreement to set up a trading post at Bushehr and the Bushehr-Kazerun-Shirāz highway provided the most important artery for their trade with the interior. It was the politics associated with the control of

1. For an excellent account of the Zand regency see Perry, J.R. 'Karim Khan Zand', Chicago, 1979. In discussing the origins of the Zands, Perry states that the Zand tribe were:
   "a minor pastoral people of the Zagros foothills centered on the villages of Pari and Kasnazan in the vicinity of Malayer" (op.cit., p.17) and that in the early 18th century Mahdi Khan Zand was a local bandit (op.cit., p.18). The Zand tribe had been transported by Nāder Shah to Khorasān and it was only after Nāder's death that they returned to their home area.
this road, and the trade which it carried, which were to
determine much of the course of 19th and early 20th century
regional affairs, as western capitalism expanded and social
organisations were transformed.¹

¹ The road from Bushehr to Shirāz was often precarious for
traders and the journey took from one to three weeks, depend-
ing on the safety of the roads (op.cit., p.257). Armed tribes-
men exacted levies (rāḥdārī) from the passing caravans in
return for providing them with safe conduct over that stretch
of road over which they exercised control/were given respon-
sibility. These levies were relatively standardised during
periods of effective central government. At other times many
local tribesmen exacted their own levies. Certain tribal groups
were considerably enriched through exacting such levies and it
would appear that those who received benefit from them were
better able to expand their power and influence. The road ran
through the winter quarters of some of the Qashqai tribes,
particularly the Kashkuli and the migration routes of several
groups crossed the road, at various points. Chick in a Memorandum
to the British Consul in Bushire (Sir Percy Cox) in 1912
(Memo. N°279) saw the rāḥdārī question as of fundamental impor-
tance. He pointed out that prior to 1900 few tribesmen were
armed but since the turn of the century weapons began to filter
in from Muscat on the other side of the Gulf. The right to
exact levies appears to have been put up for auction to the
highest bidder in the same way as public offices and land
assignments were. As trade expanded during the 19th and early
20th centuries the road acquired an increasingly important
role as tribal chiefs vied for control of a share of the con-
siderable profits that could be made from the levies.

Chick reports that:

In March 1909 Soulat-ud-Dowleh ( İl kān of the Qashqai)
undertook from certain Persian merchants in Shirāz and
the government of Fars to guarantee the safety of
merchandise sent via Firuzābād and his own tribal
country for a monthly payment of 1,000 tomans.

This would appear to considerably underestimate the amounts
that were to be made from levies along the road. 1,000 tomans
represented a levy of only 2½ krans per mule. (The krān or
girān is sometimes used as equivalent to the riāl, 10 riāls =
1 toman, cf. Lambton 1953, pp.409-10.)
The period of insecurity which both preceded and followed the consolidation of power by the Zands was marked by continuous campaigning by rival contenders for power. This seriously disrupted village production. Troops fed off the countryside through which they passed. Scorched earth tactics destroyed crops. Large numbers of people were killed. In August 1754, 4,000 local men were massacred by Afghan troops near Persepolis in the Marvdasht plain. Contingents of soldiers, often far removed from their homelands, and disgruntled because of long service and poor pay, ravaged the countryside. The effects of these insecure periods were to enhance the movement of people as peasants fled their homes, merchants migrated and soldiers from widely scattered areas moved around the countryside.

1. Azad Khan Afghan invaded Fars in 1754 in an attempt to defeat Karim Khan Zand. *"He met resistance in the neighbourhood of Persepolis from some two thousand men of the Lashami, Mal-e-Ahmadlu, and Korbal tribes under the leadership of 'Abd ul-Mottaleb Korbai; but they were enticed out of their fortress and heavily defeated on the Marvdasht plain. The Afghans allegedly massacred four thousand people in their now poorly defended stronghold."* (Perry, op.cit., p.58)

Nineteenth century conditions

By the end of the eighteenth century the strength of the merchants in Shirāz appears to have expanded considerably, partially as a result of increasing security during the reign of Karim Khan Zand; and partially as a result of expanding trade with agents of western companies. Powerful merchant families, such as the Qavāms and the Moshiris, were able to translate their wealth into control of public office and of large stretches of territory within the province.¹ As governors of various districts, representatives of central government, and large landed proprietors in their own rights, they exercised considerable influence throughout the course of the nineteenth century.²

This increasing power of the merchants, led in the late eighteenth century by Hāji Ibrahim Qavām, 'lord mayor' (kalāntar) of Shirāz appears to have been decisive in the defeat of the Zand dynasty. It was Hāji Ibrahim who denied Jafar Khān Zand, the last of the Zand rulers, access to Shirāz, his capital, and delivered it up Aghā Mohamad Qājār, the first of the Qājār monarchs.³ The decisive battle in this final campaign of the Zands was fought on the Marvdasht plain in

¹ For a brief history of the Qavām family see Oberling, op. cit., pp.216-219. The activities of this family are also dealt with in Fasa'i, op.cit.; vol.2, pp.47-49.
³ See Perry, op. cit., p.300.
July 1791.\(^1\)

The presence of both the Qājār and Zand armies in Fars exacerbated the deteriorating conditions in the countryside. Fasā'ī notes:

"in the last three or four years (1789-92) the locust plague was spread in Fars and the farmers were reduced to misery by the coming and going of the Zand and Qājār armies."

(Bussé 1972, p.51)

The rise of the Qājārs and the consolidation of their hegemony over the greater part of Iran was not however accompanied by a rapid regeneration of agriculture in the plain. British travellers who visited the Marvdasht plain in the first quarter of the nineteenth century were struck by evidence of depopulation. Portier, writing in 1821 notes:

"The number of villages we passed in over a day's march is hardly credible. In some we found inhabitants, but most of them were entirely deserted, yet, wherever the trace of human dwellings presented itself, the evidence of past agriculture was also discernable in the shape of kanoughts."

(Portier 1821, p.685)

And Morier, writing in 1818 notes:

"The fact that depopulation is its greatest evil. At very distant intervals the sameness of the view is broken by a field of corn. A soil which in other countries would be a delight of the agriculturalists here lies waste."

(Morier 1818, p.83)

Plague and famine seem to have been regular occurrences in Fars throughout the nineteenth century. Fasā'ī records locust plagues in 1805 and other plagues in 1857 and 1869. He also records widespread famine in 1822, 1866 and 1872.

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1. See Bussé, op.cit., p.52.
According to Lambton:

"The Qajar period sees in some respects a return to the Seljuq practice of government by the ruling khān and his family."

(1953, p.135)

But the increasing influence of the western powers, Russia in the north and Great Britain in the south, was instrumental in transforming an essentially tribal form of government into an absolute monarchy which was more reminiscent of the earlier Safavid rule in the powers which it claimed for itself. Administration and local government were largely in the hands of absentee land owners who, together with their supporters, maintained control over the various districts (bolukāt). They had responsibility for tax collection and recruitment to the army. They also administered crown land (khaliseh). Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, as the expenses of the Qājār court rose, these crown lands were increasingly offered for sale and converted into private property. Many of the buyers belonged to the expanding merchant classes.¹

As a result of depopulation much land in the plain remained uncultivated and was used as pasture land by nomadic and village flocks of sheep and goats.² Much land was owned by large absentee landowners who employed bailiffs (mobāshirs)


2. A customary way of defusing opposition was to move the more truculent tribes to distant corners of the country. Oberling reports that on the victory of Aghā Mohamad he moved 2,000 Qashqāi families to the territory of the Chahār Langs (Bakhtiāri) and 5,000 more to the Verāmin region and to Mazanderān (1960, p.210). The various tribes who came with the Zands from Luristan were scattered throughout Fars (*op.cit.*, p.211). For an account of these various movements in the 17th and 18th centuries see Perry 1975.
to administer their holdings, and visited them perhaps once a year at harvest time, accompanied by their own troops, to collect taxes and supervise the distribution of the harvest. Both the Qavāms and the Moshiris controlled large sections of the plain. The latter converted much of their holdings into a personal vaqf (vaqf-e-khāss) of which they remained the administrators and thus the prime beneficiaries. The Qavāms retained significant holdings in the plain throughout the twentieth century.

The overall result of developments in the nineteenth century seems to have been the entrenchment of those who held provincial and local power in their positions. Keddie comments:

"The traditional ruling classes generally increased their local power as well as their economic position in the nineteenth century. There was an end to an earlier relative division of functions between land-ownership and the administration of law and taxes. Local administration and judicial processes increasingly became the monopoly of the same men who owned villages and received feudal dues." (1972, pp.368-9)

This increasing control appears to have resulted in an increase in the claims made on the peasantry. Both Keddie and Lambton suggest that the standards of living of the peasantry declined during this period.  

1. This vaqf was known as Vaqf-e-Moshir-ol-Soltaneh and was administered in the twentieth century by the Mo'addel family (see below, p. ).

The system of tax farming and land grants was continued in essence under the Qājārs, but with important qualitative changes as western influence favoured the development of modern private property. Whereas previously an inherent instability, associated with constant oscillations in government fortunes and the partible inheritance laws of Islam, implied frequent transfers of control (and interminable disputes between rival claimants about rights to control), the changing nature of government associated with the rise of the nation state, and the support received by the Qājārs from foreign powers, meant that those already in power were able to commandeer increased resources for themselves and thereby entrench their position. But this change of emphasis, from tribal khān to hereditary shah involved the emergence of major contradictions between traditional autocratic, personal control legitimated through a tribal ideology, and changing expectations and perceptions of state control which accompanied the rise of a bourgeois rationality. During the nineteenth century two major families increasingly dominated provincial politics in Fars, the one, the Qashqai family, with its support drawn from largely Turkic speaking nomadic tribes in the province and organised into the powerful Qashqai confederacy of tribes, the other the Qavāms, who controlled large stretches of land in the central parts of the province and maintained throughout much of the nineteenth century administrative control of the provincial capital. The latter also became
leaders of the Khamseh confederacy of tribes on its foundation in 1862 as a counter-balance to the increasing power of the Qashqais.¹

Relations between those who actually worked the land and those who controlled the land did change considerably, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century.² The development of notions about private property, far from replacing various forms of 'feudal tenure', as Keddie maintains, seem rather to have enhanced the control of landlords over peasants.³ Large landed proprietors increased their holdings but an inevitable result of this was also an increase in the numbers of officials interposed between them and the actual cultivators; social and economic distance between rich and poor widened considerably. This increasing polarisation facilitated greater exploitation as the various officials attempted to derive as much as they could from village production.⁴

There was little expansion of settlement in the plain until after the first World War.

1. See Oberling, op. cit., part 6 for a history of the Qashqa'i and Khamseh confederations.
2. "In Marvdasht, the Shiraz and Kavar plains, and Firuzabad, the cultivators are mostly tenants of large non-resident arba'īs. The pay two-thirds of the crop, or its equivalent in money" (Stack 1882, ii, p.253).
3. Lambton notes that the: "tendency to extend the jurisdiction of the local landowner and tuyuldār and to concentrate all power in their hands continued in Qajar times" (op. cit., p.176).
4. "The governors also recruited lower officials on the basis of promised monetary returns. Since officials at all levels retained a profit from collected taxes, the peasants were forced to support an increasingly oppressive official hierarchy, whose main duty, in turn was to fleece them." Keddie, op.cit., pp.366-67.
In addition to the large landed proprietors who were increasingly divorced from production, there were also smaller landowners who largely owed their position to their relationships with the 

**arbābs** or large landed proprietors. Subordinate officers were given villages in lieu of salary or for services rendered, or they were given rights to the revenue of particular villages. There do not appear to have been many small independent owners of land in the plain. Continuity of ownership over time seems to have been exceptional. Partible inheritance rules and prevailing political insecurity ensured the continuous division of estates while also ensuring a continuous struggle for control of land. The situation at the close of the nineteenth century was one of considerable confusion as political instability reduced the amount of land under cultivation in the plain and allowed local leaders to exercise de facto control.

**The Twentieth century**

The constitutional revolution of 1906-11 marks a significant change in the course of Iranian history, together with the eventual overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and the rise to national power of Reza Shah (1921-41). But it did not mark any immediate changes in conditions in Fars. One of the first provisions of the new constitution was to recognise the
sanctity of private property\(^1\) and to abolish the practice of tuyuls.\(^2\) It marked the formulation of a new relationship between landlords and tenants, but it did not address itself to major changes in that relationship.\(^3\)

The supporters of the constitution came from a wide cross-section of the population, not just merchants and intellectuals desirous of promoting western style economic and political changes, but also from tribal and religious leaders jealous of their privileges which were being eroded by the expanding nation state.\(^4\) As such the constitution appears to have embodied the contradictions, which were to remain important features of Iranian social history, between the modernising groups and the traditional ruling classes. Until the coup d'état of 1921 which brought Reza Khan to power local leaders were able to maintain their relative autonomy and the provisions of the constitution remained unfulfilled:

1. Lambton, op.cit., p.178.
2. Ibid., p.194.
3. Ibid., p.209.
"Power ... continued to be for the most part in the hands of large landowners and the tribal khâns who were able to devote a considerable proportion of the proceeds of their estates to the maintenance of irregular troops, and when necessary to defy the government."

(Lambton, 1953, p.179)

Reza Shah, like Atatürk, was intent on modernising Iran and during his regime significant changes occurred within the Marvdasht plain. Kortum reckons that the number of settlements in the plain increased from 211 to 353 between 1900 and 1966.1 Many of these were established during the period 1921-41. During this period land which had fallen into disuse was brought back into cultivation. Villages expanded and new villages were created as the old irrigation networks were extended. Many of the new cultivators leased unused land from the old arbâbs, or usurped rights to land over which title was unknown or subject to dispute, and employed nomads who had been obliged to settle as a result of the sedentarisation programme of Reza Shah.2 In addition there was a considerable

2. Reza Shah believed that the root of Iran's problems lay in the 'tribal problem' and that in order to create a national consciousness he had to get rid of these alien cultures. He regarded them as traditional and the only solution was to disband and settle them, (see Oberling, op.cit., p.320). Garrod comments that the sedentarisation policy was:

"barbarous, ruthless and shortsighted" (Garrod 1946,p.298). The shah's sedentarisation programme was perhaps more acutely felt in Fars because many of the migration routes brought the tribal nomads through the central areas, unlike for example the Bakhtiari.
influx of migrants especially from the more marginal areas to the north-west of the plain. This particular form of expansion utilised existing relations of production in the main. It was not until the advent of widespread mechanisation and the installation of motor pumps however that the most rapid expansion occurred and relations of production were significantly transformed.

Reza Shah created for the first time a relatively efficient national army, instead of relying on irregular, largely tribal levies. He suppressed opposition to his regime through a series of punitive expeditions against various tribes, whom he considered to be the cause of much of the unrest in Iran. The expansion of communications and the strengthening of the rural gendarmery enabled him to considerably extend the control of the central government. He attempted to reform the land revenue system and regularise ownership of land by requiring owners to register their interests. Conflicting claims were resolved in favour of the de facto controllers. The land registration laws of 1928/9 gave de jure ownership to those powerful enough to have their claims registered. Taxes

1. By 'existing relations of production' is meant that production was extended using traditional contractual relationships between landlords and peasants whereby each party entered into an agreement and received a share of the harvest.

2. Although Oberling notes that in the early years of Reza Shah's reign Qashqai levies were still used against recalcitrant elements in Fars (Oberling, op.cit., p.324).

which had long been withheld were collected and gradually
local administrative reforms accompanied by the expansion of
a state bureaucracy regularised control of administration in
the hands of state employed officials.

Lambton comments:

"The general trend of events since the grant of the
Constitution in 1906, beginning with the abolition
of tuyul and continuing with changes in the admin-
istration, has been in fact to alter the status of
the large landed proprietor from that of a petty
territorial prince to that of an ordinary landowner."

(1953, p.260)

But, while opposition from these 'territorial princes' was
largely removed, as the state arrogated to itself a monopoly
of political authority, the relationship between the actual
cultivators and the landowners was not drastically changed.
In fact many of the reforms of the '20s and '30s codified for
the first time the rights that landlords had over peasants
engaged in the cultivation of their lands.

"Tenants were legally liable for keeping harvests at
a certain level and for carrying out the terms of
share-cropping agreements, regardless of obstacles."

(Keddie, 1972, p.372)

And village headmen (kadkhodās) became legally the 'represent-
tative of the landowner ... responsible for the execution of
laws and regulations referred to him by government' as the
result of a law passed in 1935.¹ Informal tradition that had
guaranteed the peasant a certain degree of flexibility in the
face of the arbitrary exercise of personal authority was

¹. Lambton, op.cit, p.190.
formalised through such laws and bound the peasant even more to the landowner who became the government's representative in the village. Reza Shah himself became the largest landlord in Iran by the end of his reign,¹ and much of his support came from the urban and semi-urban middle class.

It is difficult to unravel the complexities of landownership in the plain during this period, partly because of a reticence to discuss questions of ownership at the time of fieldwork, and partly because of the confusion between ownership and control.² Much of the land in the plain was registered as the property of the large landed proprietors, but they were rarely involved directly in production. They dealt with their properties in a variety of ways. Some were directly administered by bailiffs (mobāshirs) and some were rented out, normally to urban rentees (mustajers). As pressure on land increased, the result of settlement of former pastoral nomads, immigration from other areas, and from merchants for access to land, areas which had remained uncultivated were either rented

1. Lambton comments: "In certain cases, notably in Fārs, there appears to have been some difficulty in deciding ownership, owing to the fact that several people exercised rights over a property concurrently.... there were estates in which the holders reaped the crops and exercised certain rights of ownership, disposing of the property in various ways while at the same time paying a fixed sum according to agreement or local custom to the real owners, who, while confirming the above-mentioned powers on the occupants, received their ownership dues." (Ibid., p.186).

out, or more normally, because of the expenses incurred in bringing them back into cultivation, partly sold. Much land which remained unirrigable had to wait until the widespread introduction of motor pumps in the 1950s before it could be brought into use and large areas of the plain were left uncultivated. Bailiffs and rentees among others were able in some instances to have their claims to title of disputed land upheld by the land registration laws, because of the confusing pattern of possession of land and appropriation of rents.

The removal of much land from the gift of a patronage network controlled by 'territorial princes' widened the numbers of people who could invest in it.¹ Security of tenure was guaranteed by the state and investment in land was thereby encouraged. In addition to the large landowners who were increasingly divorced from agricultural production there were small landowners; owners of single villages or parts of villages, who had gained ownership through purchase, inheritance or gift. Many were city dwellers who entrusted the administration of their holdings to others. Some were rich peasants who worked for larger landowners. Others were relations of the larger arbâbs.

The actual organisation of production was largely divorced from land ownership although as absolute property rights were

¹. The Qavâms, for example, as important territorial rulers, divested themselves of much land in the plain by transferring 'ownership' to others, notably relations, while still retaining residual over-lordship.
increasingly exercised the pressures on the peasantry who actually cultivated the land increased, and their 'traditional rights' were ignored, as landowners pushed for increased production. Because ownership of the land was still largely tied up with the traditional village production system the owners were limited in the ways in which they could use the village lands. It was not until the widespread use of mechanisation and of motor pumps that new land could be individually opened up and cultivation rapidly expanded. And it was not until the land reform programme of the 1960s that attempts were made to rationalise agricultural production and release the landlords completely from their residual obligations to support the peasants.

Despite the complexity of formal ownership and the frequent dispersal of holding over several villages, the organisation of the production process remained remarkably uniform; the so-called 'mālek-ra'iyat' system, or that system which controlled the extraction of surpluses by the landlords (mālekin) from the peasants (ra'iya') was the same throughout the plain although crop-sharing agreements varied slightly.

The period between 1921 and 1941 does not appear to have helped the peasantry. It is even suggested that conditions were worse at the end of Reza Shah's reign than they were at the beginning:
"By the time of the outbreak of World War II, the economic position of the average Iranian was considerably and chronically worse than it had been in 1925."

(Cooke 1952, p.238 - quoted in Keddie 1972, p.375)

His support for the landlords and the consequent entrenchment of their position tied the peasantry increasingly to village production as dictated by the landowners.

The disturbances occasioned by the second world war, the abdication of Reza Shah and the invasion of the country by the British and the Russians, threw the nation into the same sort of confusion as was experienced during the first world war. Post-war reconstruction involved the tighter control over internal affairs by neo-colonial powers competing for the country's large oil reserves. The struggle between the U.S. and Great Britain resulted in the defeat of the latter and the emergence of the former, backing a conservative government sympathetic to the west and supporting the growth of commercial production. Until at least the middle '50s there does not appear to have been much expansion of agriculture and a great deal of under-employment is reported in the rural areas. 1 Drives for mechanisation in the '50s, while bringing new land into cultivation and increasingly involving urban merchants, bureaucrats and army officers as land owners, had the effect of further alienating the peasantry. This was more noticeable on unused land where capital intensive cultivation techniques could be employed without seriously

disrupting traditional agricultural production. Land which had formerly been dry farmed by the peasantry or used as pasture land by nomadic and village flocks of sheep and goats was alienated from their use. Commercial production also expanded on village lands as landlords attempted to consolidate their individual estates, but this process remained limited until the land reforms of the 1960s. Many landlords, especially in the older settled villages where traditional relations of production restrained the development of commercial agriculture, remained little concerned with investment in agricultural machinery, being content to extract as much as they could under traditional crop-sharing agreements.

Developments in the first half of the 20th century continued the formalisation of relationships between landlords and peasants as the former were sanctioned in their control of village production by state legislation which made them the legal representatives of the government in the villages. Traditional, relatively autonomous village production was subject to varying control from urban landlords. Because of the system of tax-farming and land grants there rarely developed a unity of interest between landlord and peasant. But with increased interest in the control of production, especially by urban merchants, a closer involvement in agricultural production gradually emerged. Villagers became increasingly tied to agricultural production both as legislation tied them to
the land and the interests of the landlord, and as attempts were made to increase the production of cash crops. Reza Shah's regime saw the formal separation of tax collection from rent collection with the expansion of an administrative bureaucracy of civil servants, but it was the landlords, confirmed in their control of villages and in their support for the regime, who were used to ensure collection and obedience. In this respect little had changed for the village cultivators, apart from the fact that control was regularised and reinforced by state officials who usually worked for or on behalf of the landlords, and attempts were made to increase production on village lands. Such attempts do not appear to have primarily benefitted the village cultivators.

While the forms of tenure have changed considerably over the years two major features might be observed. Firstly the method of administration, characterised by land grants and tax farms has changed little; forms of control still very reminiscent of those exercised by governments in earlier years. The form of government by decree involving the personal and often arbitrary exercise of power remained. Secondly western influence, the 'individuation' of property ownership, and the expansion of commercial production have served to increase the gap between landlord and peasant. If we examine the nature of developments within the Ayub valley, a small section of the Mardasht plain, these two conflicting features will be highlighted. While 'modern' productive techniques are
employed and juridical weight is thrown behind the modernisation of agriculture 'traditional' forms of control continue to be exercised. The contradictions inherent in these two tendencies remain to be resolved, as the ideological superstructure which legitimates the state and legal apparatus are called into question as a result of changing forms of production over a considerable length of time.
CHAPTER VI

LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE MARVDASHT PLAIN

A history of land ownership in the valley is almost impossible to construct, because of the problems of separating de facto control from de jure title. At the time of fieldwork (soon after the execution of the land reform programme in the plain) there was considerable reticence to discuss questions of ownership because some land was still subject to dispute. Similarly, frequent changes of title in a period of considerable change, made a detailed discussion of ownership very confusing, and perhaps in the final analysis unimportant. Such a discussion is largely divorced from the actual organisation of production within the village, and disguises an

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1. One of the first public offices to be destroyed after the revolution in 1979 was apparently the land reform office in Shiráz, in which records of ownership and title were kept. Public access to these records was limited and permission to consult them was never obtained.
underlying uniformity in that organisation which seems to have been rigidified by the reforms of Rezā Shāh. This uniformity has been described under the heading of the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' or the arbābi system.1 Under these reforms attempts were made to regularise the relationships that governed those who had rights to extract products from agricultural production, through their control of land and water (the mālekin), and the actual agricultural producers (ra'iyā).

Distinctions between large landed proprietors ('umdeh mālekin) and small landowners (khordeh mālekin) have been made in the literature on land tenure in Iran, which tend to take the category of land ownership and see the distinction between the two primarily in terms of the separate problems associated with the ownership of different amounts of land. It ignores the complex history of control of land and conveniently conflates ownership with control, assuming that the type of ownership has somehow remained constant over an extended period of time. The terms mālek and arbāb are conflated as representative of some 'traditional' or 'feudal' regime, and the 'mālek-ra'iyat/arbāb-ra'iyat system' is seen to characterise this regime.2

1. See 'Ajami (1970) Sheshdāngi: pajuheshi dar zamin-e jam'e shenāsi rustā'i, Pahlavi University Press, 1970, pp.67-71. 'Ajami isolates four production systems (vis. the mechanised system, the arbābi system, the dehghan system, and the tulumbeh-kār system), all operating within the confines of the one village (Sheshdāngi). This village is located immediately to the north of the Marvdasht. Sheshdāngi is a fictitious name.

2. Both Lambton (1953, p.267) and Keddie (1972, p.380) stress the fact that the terms are confusing and that distinctions in terms of ownership of land which are then used to refer to different social strata must be treated with some caution.
The practice of tax farming (tuyul) was formally abolished with the promulgation of the new constitution at the beginning of the 20th century. 'Full property rights' involving individual ownership of land were increasingly exercised. Lambton maintains that large landlords were shorn of many of their functions as 'territorial princes' during the reign of Reza Shah, as the power of the state increased. But it should be emphasised that in many instances these 'territorial princes' were supporters of the national government, and maintained their indirect control over land and resources, under the auspices of the expanding nation state. The Qavām family, for example, who controlled much land in the Marvdasht plain, formally divested themselves of much of that land in the first part of the century by transferring title to relatives and supporters, by renting more land to others, and by selling yet more. It was unusual for them to sell whole villages, but rather parts of those villages to people who would manage the remainder for them. Despite this distancing from direct involvement in the control of land, they still maintained their position within the regional hierarchy. Ahmad Qavām was head of the national government in 1947. 

1. Lambton, op. cit., p.260. "The general trend of events since the grant of the Constitution in 1906 ... has been in fact to alter the status of the large landed proprietor from that of a territorial prince to that of an ordinary landowner."

2. Ibid., p.209.
Moshiri vaqf, with considerable holdings in the Marvdasht plain, was a deputy to the national assembly in the 1950s.\(^1\)

The large landed proprietors do not, as Lambton intimates, appear to have been transformed into 'ordinary landowners'. Rather they have transferred their interests elsewhere, to investment in urban and industrial fields. The 'ordinary landowners' are to a large extent the former's proteges and appointees. The categories 'umdeh mālekin' and khordeh mālekin, by concentrating on land ownership tend to take attention away from the history of the process whereby a large number of 'territorial princes' have managed to gain control over the instruments of national government. Rather than losing their control over land they would appear to have consolidated that control at another level. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate this exceedingly complex process which implies an analysis of the emergence of the modern nation state, but it would appear that the public language of state control serves to disguise the actual nature of domination, and to veil the continuing power exercised by the former 'arbābs' in the wider system.\(^2\) It also points towards an understanding of how the 'government' could successfully promulgate a land reform programme, based on abolishing the

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power of the 'feudal landlord' because these 'feudal landlords' were no longer dependent only on the direct control of land for their power. Lambton maintained in 1953 that:

"there are still many rich men (who own land), but their fortunes do not, as a whole, unless they are supplemented from other sources, compare favourably with the fortunes made by contractors and big merchants in recent years."

(1953, p.264)

Thus, in the Ayub valley, for example, prior to land reform, in the middle '60s there were a number of different landed proprietors with interests in the land. They illustrate the major changes that had been taking place in relationships towards land over the preceding half century or so. Until about 50 years ago large tracts of the valley remained uncultivated and were used as pasture for the flocks of villagers and pastoral nomads. According to Fasā'i there were only three settlements in the valley at the end of the nineteenth century (viz. Pol-e-No, next to the Safavid bridge, Esfardān and Buraki).

At the time when Fasā'i was writing the 'centre' (ghasbeh) of the 'district' (boluk) of Ramjerd was in Jashniān, near the Safavid bridge which carried the main summer route north from Shirāz to Isfahan. But it had not always been there.

1. I.e. the power bases of these former 'feudal landlords' had shifted and the political opposition to a land reform programme could be successfully contained.

2. Fasā'i does not actually mention Buraki in his account, but refers to Chamani as the third settlement. Buraki; however, is much older than the modern village which is now known as Chamani. There are very close associations between the two villages, and it can perhaps be assumed that the name was transferred from the old village to the new village because the compound which housed the landlord's representative was located next to the latter.
On the transfer of control to Haji Safar Khan Ramjerdi the centre was moved to the village of Ramjerd, from the village of Zargharān. Fasā'ī's account is revealing for the light it throws on the nature of control over the district. He states:


(Fasā'ī, Vol. ii, p. 214)

This, roughly translated means:

"the most important village in which the controller (zābet-neshin) resided was, during the time when control was in the hands of (be-selseleh-ye) Hāji Mahmud Khan, the village (gharieh) of Zargharān. But when control fell into the hands of (be-selseleh ... rasid) Háji Safar Khan Ramjerdi the most important village (ghasbeh) was said to be the settlement (ābādeh) of Ramjerd. The houses of these two lines of controllers (selseleh) were in these two villages (gharieh). It is now several years since the control (zābeti) has moved out of (az ahle) Ramjerd. The village (gharieh) of Jashnīan became the centre for control, (i.e. the seat of the zābet)."

Control was received (rasid) by the bailiff (zābet), from whom we are not told. This control (zābeti) was perceived as being in the hands of (dar-selseleh-ye) not one person. The term 'selseleh' is translated by Haim as meaning 'chain, series, dynasty, or hierarchical order'. Van Bruinessen in his study of the Kurds uses the term to indicate 'spiritual pedigree';


it was the chain of transmission of the **tarīgha** (mystical path). 'A Sufi master's silsila thus is the spiritual pedigree linking him to the founder of his particular pedigree'.

Perhaps in terms of the control of the district it is more appropriate then to speak of the 'chain of command' of the bailiff (zābet) with those below and above him. Lambton translates 'zābet' as 'revenue collector; controller, bailiff'.

These terms cannot be simply translated because they imply particular perceptions of what places are and what was involved in relationships of authority. The labels used to identify them have their own historical positions within the context of relations of control. To move beyond their apparent meaning and a naive translation, it is thus necessary to examine them within this context. This is of course very difficult given the paucity of written sources. They are taken as read by Fasā'i who is much more interested in the physical distances between places and in the history of the province in terms of its 'big men', than in the mundane interactions between villagers and officials. Only a minimal reconstruction of the nature of this inter-relationship can be attempted. Further investigation of Islamic legal codes might provide further insights.

2. Lambton, 1953, p.443.
Thus *gharieh*, an Arabic word, is translated by Haim as 'village' and as equivalent to the Persian term 'deh'.

Why then did Fasā'i not use the latter term? Perhaps the conception of the role and place of the village has changed? The term *ghasbeh*, also Arabic, is translated by Haim as 'borough, small town'; two different conceptions one indicating function, the other indicating size.

In terms of Fasā'i's account it is the function that appears to be important, but a translation of this term as 'borough' hides and distorts the role of this 'central place' within the boluk, which apparently served as the base for the revenue collector. It can perhaps be assumed that within the boluk the zābet, while acting as a revenue collector over the district, also had closer ties with certain lands in the same boluk.

The relationship that the various bailiffs had with the places from where they exercised control is not however clear, nor is the reason for the movement of the central place in the district from Zargharān, to Ramjerd, to Jashniān. But it can perhaps be assumed that the change was associated with the varying fortunes of the families involved. Rather than 'central place' it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of 'central persons' as there would appear to have been little to differentiate between the villages in the district. Fasā'i's account is predicated in terms of the 'big men' of the district,

but he gives no indication of where they came from or for whom they were bailiffs: They had responsibility for the collection of taxes (māliāt) within the district. They were responsible for maintaining the irrigation networks, and Fasā'ī mentions that every year a proportion of the melāk (revenue) and several thousand 'amaleh (servants) from the ra'iyyā worked to repair the system and partition the land for cultivation.¹

Prior to land reform there were two major landholding families in the Ayub valley, neither of which were directly involved in agricultural production. The Dehghan family owned the village of Jashniān, the former ghasbeh of the boluk of Ramjerd. The family was of some importance in Shirāz. In the early 1970s one brother sat on the city council, and another owned land in the centre of the city, as well as two cinemas. The Moadell family was the other important landholding family in the valley. As administrators of the Moshiri vaqf they held land in other parts of Fars, including the district of Korbāl in the eastern part of the Marvdasht plain (see fig. 6). As with the Dehghan family they employed overseers (mobāshirs) to administer their holdings.

It is tempting to suggest that the zābet-neshin (revenue-collectors, bailiffs, controllers of agricultural production) transformed their association with the land in Ramjerd into personal ownership of parts of it, and that the Dehghan family are the descendents of those former bailiffs who controlled the

district from Jashniān. This is reinforced by Lambton’s definition of the term 'dehghān': "head of a village who held certain lands by hereditary right and acted as government tax collector".¹

At the beginning of the twentieth century one Ali Hāji Nasrollah Khān Estakhri constructed the ghāleh of Chamani; which now houses the headquarters of one of the larger landowners in the valley, Mustafa Abdulāhi. At that time the new village of Chamani had not yet been built. It was eventually located alongside this ghā’leh.² It is not known who Istakhri was, whether he actually owned land or rented land in the valley, or whether he was merely the overseer (mobāshir) for the vaqf of the Moshir family, or indeed all three. The expansion of settlement in the 1930s was partly in response to government legislation,³ which obliged owners of land to ensure its cultivation or risk dispossession, and both the Dehghān family and the Moadell family sponsored the building of the new villages of Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Chamani.

In the early 1950s the Moadell family employed Mostafa Abdulāhi to manage their estates in the Ayub valley and in the district of Korbāl. Abdulāhi is from a family of Shirazi merchants. His grandfather was a lambskin trader with Russia who invested his accumulated wealth in the purchase of the

¹. Lambton, 1953, p.426.

². The village of Chamani thus now consists of two separate ghā’leh, see fig. 14.

³. A law passed in November 1937 stated that owners of land were bound to bring them into cultivation (see Lambton, op.cit.,
large village of Bardej in the district of Korbāl, to the east of Shirāz. Initially employed as an overseer (mobāshir), Abdulāhi managed to purchase land in both Ramjerd and Korbāl. He had emerged in the 1970s as the most important controller of agricultural production in both the Ayub valley and in the area around Mohamadābād in Korbāl (see fig. 6).

Much of the land which he now controls was 'dead land' (mavāt) prior to his employment. Through the installation of motor pumps he brought a significant proportion of land in the Ayub valley under cultivation again. Parts of this land were under the control of the Dehghān family. The position of 'dead land' is somewhat complicated.1 It would seem that a person who reclaimed dead land, either by marking that land (tahjir) or irrigating it, gained thereby a claim to cultivation and de facto ownership. Abdulāhi employed pumps to irrigate some 300 hectares outside the cultivated areas of the villages of Chamani, Buraki and Pol-e-No. On this land he employed wage labourers recruited from a variety of sources.

In addition to his de facto ownership of this land Abdulāhi bought part of Pol-e-No from the Moadelī family and, until land reform was the mālek of that village. He also had effective control of the village of Chamani, but he rented this from the Dehghān family and from one Mohamad Joukār, a small bazaar merchant in Shiraz, who became his own brother-in-law. In lieu of rent to the Dehghān family Abdulāhi managed

1. Lambton, op.cit., p.204.
Agricultural production in the former's village of Futuābād, adjacent to the village of Jashnīān.

Abdulāhi had landed interests elsewhere. Through purchase of land in the Mohamadābād valley (Korbāl) from the Moadell family and the installation of motor pumps in that area he has managed to bring a considerable amount of that valley under cultivation. Personnel from this area have been transferred to work on his estates in the Ayūb valley. He has sub-rented other parts of the Mohamadābād valley to tulumbeh kārān who have themselves installed pumps to irrigate smaller areas of land. Abdulāhi owns a variety of agricultural machinery which is used both in Ramjerd and in Korbāl. Both places are linked into a network of personal control over land and people which combine into a considerable personal enterprise. Abdulāhi himself was a prominent member of the Iran Novin party which was the party in power and he sat, like Dehghan, on the Shiraz city council. His brother was governor (farmāndar) of the important provincial town of Kāzerun. Another brother controlled reclaimed land on the Kāzerun road just to the west of Shiraz, adjacent to the gendarme post of Deh Sheikh.

In addition to Abdulāhi there were other landed proprietors in the Ayūb valley. Buraki was owned by a retired army

1. Much land in the Mohamadābād valley, apart from that around the established villages, could not be irrigated, being away from the waters of the river Kor. It was used by Basseri and Kurd Shuli pastoral nomads as pasture land.

2. This gendarme post now disused, was established as one of the outer defences of the provincial capital and is located next to a settlement known as Sakhtemān-e-Joukar, and owned by Abdulāhi's brother-in-law of the same name. The gendarme station controlled the Shiraz end of the Shiraz-Bushire road and was the object of frequent attacks by dissident tribal groups.
colonel, who entrusted the management of that village to a resident. Esfardrán, the largest village in the valley was owned by three urban-based landlords, one of whom was an agricultural engineer. The other two were urban merchants.

The 'mālek-ra'iyat system'

A discussion of landownership in the valley gives few clues as to the local organisation of production, or of the evolution of that organisation which extracts surplus from the peasant cultivators. It is easy to 'cumulate' the changing complexes of rights and obligations which have bound the peasant cultivator (ra'iyat) to the landlord/landowner (mālek) into, what has been called the 'mālek-ra'iyat system', and attempt to describe the system as a functioning whole, by abstracting its central and common characteristics. Such a procedure does, however, take the changing relationships out of their historical context. Not only does it ignore the complexities within the category 'mālek', and thus the struggle for power within the region over time, but also, by assuming that all 'ra'iya' share the same problems, ignores the complexities within village organisation. The difficulties of exploring the question of ownership of land in the valley and elsewhere are not only associated with the very complex inter-relationships between land and political power, but also with the categories employed to investigate forms of ownership and the evolution of control of land, whereby political control
and land grants, tax farming and the receipt of legitimacy from above through a 'chain of command', have significantly coloured the nature of exploitation, and involved a very complex association between control of land and control of political office.

The 'mālek-ra'iyat system', rather than being some timeless contractual relationship between a category of producers and a category of owners, appears in this light to be based on attempts, especially during the reign of Rezā Shāh, to rationalise agricultural production and government control over the rural areas, and seems to have been institutionalised at that time to characterise village production.

Lambton maintains that the 'dominant type of settlement was the village' and that this dominant type has maintained its dominance for millenia. She justifies this by pointing out that corporate settlement ensured labour for communal projects and for defence against invaders. In addition 'it was easier to deal with the village as a unit than with individuals', and government policy encouraged group settlement. The village with its supply of labour for 'communal' production was used as the unit for assessment, and as the lowest unit in the administrative hierarchy. This has had important implications for the ways in which government control has been exercised and society has been organised.

Fields within the village boundaries were normally cultivated in common by cooperative groups of villagers. Most

villages seem to contain a core, or cores, of extended family groups which form the basis for the production teams and village organisation. Agricultural activity within the village was managed by the most powerful males; a group of elders (rish sefidān) under the control of a headman (kadkhodā). The nature of control over such agricultural production units has varied over time, and, until relatively recently, always appears to have been subject to negotiation between the various parties involved. As indicated in the section on land use and settlement, there was never any rigid separation between the tax farmer and the landholder/owner, despite the tendency for land to fall under the de facto control of particular families. Until the expansion of cash-crop farming during the nineteenth century those in charge of the collection of taxes appear to have been little interested in what was produced, visiting the areas under their control at infrequent intervals. The amounts that these landlord/administrators were able to extract from the agricultural cultivators varied according to the nature of their control. Sometimes they were obliged to tour their districts with escorts of armed retainers to secure taxes from the cultivators. It cannot be assumed that the peasant cultivator readily gave up a proportion of the harvest out of a sense of moral obligation to the mālek. The rate of extraction was, however, obviously subject to some maximal constraints and the need to at least provide the conditions under which labour could be reproduced.
With increased interest in commercial production, the relationships between the landlord/administrator and the agricultural producers were subject to increased circumscription, as the former arrogated rights of individual ownership to himself, and the latter was increasingly subjected to external control over the form of agricultural production. Legislation enacted during the 1930s formalised what Lambton terms a 'customary' relationship into a legal contractual relationship backed by state control. A law for the individual registration of property was passed in 1922. In 1926 a law establishing a uniform land tax was established. From 1929 the government played an increasingly active role in the development of the economy.¹ Government monopolies for the purchase of many staple crops, such as opium and wheat, were created. Rights of ownership were further reinforced by legislation concerning dispossession of property in 1930.²

In terms of local administration, major changes were also made during this period. In 1935 a law was passed which made the kadkhodā the legal representative of the landlord in the village, and responsible for maintaining cultivation. He became thereby a government representative within the village.³

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2. Ibid., p.188.
3. Prior to its formalisation in terms of village headman, the term kadkhodā was used to refer to the head of a craft guild, or to the head of a quarter in a town. In tribal studies the term is used as the head of a tribal sub-group (tireh) (see Lambton 1953, p.430).
Legislation appears to have been generally aimed at increasing agricultural production. Owners of land which was not under cultivation were required, by a law of 1937, to bring such land into cultivation. The peasant cultivators became legally bound to cultivate for the landlord who now had the increased authority of the state to enforce his wishes. The result was to increasingly subordinate the peasantry to the control of the landowner and decrease its ability to act independently on the land now owned by the landlord.

This new legislation attempted to place the relationship between mâlek and ra'iyā into a contractual mould. It was formulated in terms of the ra'iyat leasing land from the landowner for a fixed share of the crop. This was divided according to the provision of the five traditional factors of production (land, water, seed, animal labour, and human labour). The provider of each was entitled then to one fifth of the crop on irrigated land. In the Ayub valley the landowner provided land, water and seed, and thus received three-fifths of the crop.

In addition to their 'contractual' obligations as sharecroppers, the villagers were also legally bound to perform other tasks, especially those which supported agricultural production - the cleaning and maintenance of irrigation canals and the repair of village roads. The 'contractual' obligations of the landowners were to provide a minimum of support for the villagers through the provision of loans to offset natural and social disasters and help villagers in neg-
The relationship which appears to have existed between the controllers of land and agricultural producers prior to this legislation also involved additional 'obligations' and 'duties' for the villagers. To talk of these as 'customary' is to ignore the fact that they appear to have varied considerably and to have been subject to considerable negotiation. The public language of the 'good faith' economy\(^1\) which attempts to gloss over the often arbitrary exercise of power speaks of generous exchanges, of paternalistic authority, and mutual 'rights' and 'obligations' whereas, as Ono has maintained, the relationships between mālek and ra'iyā were often very hostile.

"the mālek exploits the peasants, his ra'iyats with the sheer purpose of getting labour out of them and to squeeze land rent out of them, and his means of controlling the deh is attuned unscrupulously rather than directly to meet this purpose." There is also a "deep rooted sense of mistrust between a mālek and his ra'iyat."\(^1\)


"The man of good faith would not think of selling certain fresh food products ... to another peasant, but always distributes them among friends and neighbours. He practises no exchanges involving money and all his relations are based on total confidence; unlike the shady dealer, he has recourse to none of the guarantees (witnesses, written documents, etc.) with which commercial transactions are surrounded. The general law of exchanges means that the closer the individuals or groups are in the genealogy, the easier it is to make agreements, the more frequent they are, and the more completely they are entrusted to good faith. Conversely, as the relationship becomes more impersonal, i.e. as one moves out from the relationship between brothers to that between virtual strangers ... or even complete strangers, so a transaction is less likely to occur at all, but it can become and increasingly does become purely "economic" in character, i.e. closer to its economic reality, and the interested calculation which is never absent even from the most generous exchange ... can be more and more openly revealed (ibid., p.173)."
While Ono's observations were made at a time when control over the peasantry by the landlord had been reinforced by government legislation there is no reason to suppose a basic communal unity of interests at an earlier time. Cooperation and support were bought rather than inherited. The relationship between a mālek and his ra'iyat involved relationships of inequality rather than specific contractual relationships between a landowner and a tenant supposedly rooted in the equally valuable assets that each brought to the agricultural process. It is not sufficient to describe the mālek purely in terms of ownership of agricultural land, as it is not sufficient to describe the ra'iyat as only an agricultural share-cropper.

These are relationships of inequality and have their parallels in the context of the evolution of the relationships between people whether in the rural, urban or tribal environments. To isolate the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' as an organising concept for the analysis of the 'traditional agrarian structure' as 'Ajami does deflects analysis from examining the nature of domination and the institutionalisation of inequality. It also ignores the reasons for its formulation as a means of characterising the rural situation as 'problematic' at a particular point in time; it is the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' itself which is seen in the late '50s and early '60s as the major obstacle to reform in the rural

1. The term ra'iyat is generally translated as 'subject'.
areas. Lambton, in her two very detailed works on Iranian land tenure never mentions the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' once. She does, however, attempt to accumulate a great deal of evidence, and to synthesise this into a generalised formulation of the relationships between landlord and peasant in Persia. This may in fact itself be one of the reasons why the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' was isolated by Iranian scholars in their attempts to come to terms with agricultural production in Iran at that time. It was translated into Persian and provided a ready peg on which Iranian students of land tenure could hang their interpretations of current events. Mālek is defined by her, not in terms of landlordship, but very definitely in terms of land ownership, and she gives no other reading of the term in her 1953 publication. In her 1969 publication, on the other hand, she appends to the definition of landowner the meaning given it by the Land Reform law of 1962: 'one who owns the land but is not personally involved in cultivation'. The term 'arbāb', while retaining associations with landownership is imbued with the ideas of masterhood and landlordship. It cannot be used as a synonym for mālek in the Marvdasht plain. The arbāb is the landlord, removed from agricultural production; people like Dehghan and Moadeel in the Ayub valley and the Qavāms elsewhere in the plain. The mālek is more of the landowner, although the term still implies a relationship of authority - people like Abdulāhi were called mālek.

1. This is in contrast to the situation during the '30s when the mālekin were considered to be the major forces for modernisation.
3. Ibid., p.367.
The Land Reform programme

In terms of the evolution of the relationships between landlords and peasants briefly outlined above, the land reform programme was more the consolidation of an emerging trend in the agricultural development of Iran, rather than a radical, 'revolutionary' movement. It had the effect of:

1. removing the non-productive landowners from production;
2. transforming the labour force into wage-labourers, and marginalizing the majority of former sharecroppers on unproductive enterprises;
3. increasing the economic 'rationalization' of agricultural production.

Its supposed effects were the abolition of 'feudalism' in order to give the peasants control over their own destinies so that they could take part in the economic and social reconstruction of the country; the government and its agencies were to cooperate with the peasant in confronting the oppressive 'mālek-ra'īyat system'.

In the spring of 1971 the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives was merged into the much wider ranging Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs. The work of the

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2. In November 1976 the work of this ministry was taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thus resolving the rivalry that had existed between the two ministries. The latter represented Iran's more successful commercial agricultural enterprises and agri-businesses with U.S. backing, whereas the former tended to ally itself with the small farmer and rural cooperative, c.f. Weinbaum 1978.
former Ministry was presumed to have been completed. A small article appeared in a September edition of one of the leading national newspapers indicating that the last of the land to be transferred under the terms of the land reform laws had been transferred. In May 1973 it was estimated that approximately 75% of all farming households, or 1.8 million tenants had received land.  

The basic aim of the land reform programme was to divest the large absentee landowners of their large land holdings, and thereby reduce their ability to act independently of the central government. Monies received by the landowners from the expropriation of their lands would, it was hoped, fuel other sectors of the economy, to the overall benefit of the drive for industrialization. In addition it would appear that the Shah was attracted by a peasantry firm in its allegiance to him and combining with him in opposition to the regime of 'slavery' exercised by the 'feudal landlord' (Shah's address to members of rural cooperatives in 1962).

As early as 1907 the National Consultative Assembly abolished the system of land assignments and tax farming (tuyul), whereby estates were farmed out in recognition of services rendered to the reigning monarch. But this only went a small way in alleviating the lot of the peasant. In 1947 a bill was introduced into the National Consultative Assembly aimed at

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1. Halliday 1979, p.112.
increasing the peasants' share of the harvest by 15%, but the provisions of the bill seem to have been largely ignored.¹

In October 1952 Prime Minister Mussadeq issued two decrees aimed at directing capital received by the large landowners from the peasant share-croppers into a fund for agricultural and rural development. Village councils were to be set up combining the interests of both landowners and share-croppers. Certain services, considered demeaning, but formerly provided by the villagers to the landowner or his representative, were to be abolished.² In August of the following year Mussadeq was overthrown and all his decrees were abrogated, but the idea of village councils was retained in subsequent legislation.

Many factors combined to make the execution of land reform programmes difficult in the early '60's, one of which was the absence of any cadastral survey. This was circumvented by legislation which recognized the de facto cultivation rights of both the peasants and the landowners; land was transferred to those peasants who were actually cultivating at the time of the reform, the layout of the village lands was not therefore upset.

The land reform law delimited the size of the maximum holding that could be legitimately held by one landlord to one village, but this was very easily and very quickly circumvented. Membership of a cooperative society was a prerequisite

¹ Lambton 1969, p.37.

² Ibid., p.38. The responsibilities of the various rural councils were outlined. Dues to landlords and labour services were also abolished. But these were reimposed in some areas after Mossadeq's overthrow.
for the receipt of land. The various provisions of the land reform law of January 1962 subsequently became known as the 'first stage' of land reform.¹

The additional articles to the law, passed in January 1963, and subsequently known as the 'second stage' of the reform, reversed some of the obvious inadequacies of the first stage and ushered in modifications, the results of a recognition of the political realities of the country.² The limitations on holdings to one village meant that a landowner could retain ownership of one village in toto, or a maximum of 6 dangs³ distributed over a number of villages. But legislation of August 1963 and February 1964 provided that members of a landowner's family could hold land up to the limited maximum. Land which had been mechanized prior to January 1962, that is land worked by machinery and/or by wage labour, was not subject to division.⁴ This latter clause exempted from re-distribution large amounts of land on the most fertile soils - land that was devoted to commercialised agriculture. Much land in the Ayub valley, and elsewhere in the plain, fell under this provision. The aim throughout was to minimise the dislocation of production and maintain and perhaps improve agricultural productivity.

2. Halliday comments: "A second stage of land reform came into effect in January 1963, but it was considered too radical and was watered down in a number of ways in 1964" (op. cit., p.111).
3. Real estate was divided into 6 parts or dangs.
4. Lambton comments: "as long as the landowner observed good farming practice there was no limit to the amount of mechanised land he could retain in his possession" (Lambton 1969, p.196).
The initial implementation was fraught with difficulties, especially in Fars province. Many anomalies came to light, and it was with the expressed intention of correcting such that the additional five articles became law in January 1963, although not implemented until much later. They were aimed at reducing the dichotomy that had arisen between those villagers who had received land, and those in 'chosen' villages who were not eligible,¹ and those villages owned by small landowners not subject to reform. As the effects of the reforms became more apparent, the opposition to them also became more vehement and resulted in a subversion of their aims. The supplementary articles of 1963, subsequently entitled the 'second stage' of land reform, were decidedly conservative. They covered the large majority of villages not dealt with under the first stage. The landowners were allowed to keep a maximum of 30-150 hectares of non-mechanised land, depending on the area. But they were obliged to dispose of the remainder according to five choices presented to them:

1. They could lease their lands to the share-croppers. The rent would be decided upon according to average income from it over the previous three years, and would be subject to periodic review.

¹ Under the provisions of the land reform law of January 1962 a landowner could select a 'chosen' village (deh-e-entekhabi), the maximum holding he was allowed under the provisions of the reform. This could be a single village or a number of shares in different villages which together did not exceed six dangs.
2. They could divide the land according to existing share-cropping agreements.

3. They could sell the land to the peasants at prices mutually agreed upon, but subject to the additional agreement of the Ministry of Land Reform.

4. They could sell the land to the government on terms equal to those of the first stage.

5. They could set up a joint-stock company with both parties receiving shares according to former share-cropping arrangements.

Rather than viewed as a measure to appease the landowners, which to a certain extent it was, it could also be seen as a means of preventing the emergence of a strong independent peasantry. As Lambton has pointed out:

"As the efforts of those who aimed at the creation of an independent self-reliant peasantry were attended by an increasing measure of success, those holding the reins of power began to realise that the emergence of an independent peasantry might constitute a new factor in the political situation and threaten their own power."

(Lambton 1969, p.215)

This second stage was not implemented until 1965, and was declared completed in January of 1967.

The third and final stage of the reform programme took the form of a more general and all embracing format for increasing agricultural productivity. Having supposedly reformed tenurial conditions it was now deemed necessary to make a concerted effort to bring the 'backward' agricultural
sector into line with the burgeoning industrial sector to foster a self-reliant and growth-oriented economy. The third stage stressed the amalgamation of uneconomic holdings and a strengthening of rural cooperatives, with the attendant promotion of mechanization. This has had the specific effect of undermining the security of tenure achieved by the peasant proprietor under the first and second stages, by obliging him to put his land at the disposal of external agents; the agents of government appeared to usurp the position of the former mālekin. Emphasis was placed on agro-business and what were known as 'farm corporations' (sherekat-hā-ye sahāmi-ye-zerā'i). In such corporations villagers provide labour and land in return for shares in the corporations and the government provides management, machinery and capital.

1. "In theory, a cooperative society was to have been set up wherever land was transferred to the peasants. In practice, this was not possible, and the setting up of cooperatives lagged behind the distribution and settlement of the land." (Lambton 1971, p.37)

2. "Phase three ... was aimed above all to consolidate rural holdings. The new policy either encourages farmers to participate in new state-run farming corporations, or displaces them through the private agricultural firms in which Iranian and foreign business interests are collaborating to apply capital-intensive techniques to the countryside." (Halliday, op.cit., p.113). These farm corporations were managed by skilled engineers appointed by the Ministry of land reform and Rural Cooperatives. 'Ajami comments: "By May 1973, a total of 43 farm corporations covering about 196,863 hectares in 327 villages and annexed farms with a membership of 15,250 shareholders had been set up" ('Ajami 1973, pp.37-8). 'Ajami states that although these farm corporations appear to have succeeded in raising agricultural productivity they have done this only with the application of considerable capital inputs, and there were significant problems with both village and management commitment to them. A model farm corporation was established at the foot of the Persepolis platform in the Marvdasht plain and was included on the itinerary of most visiting dignitaries.
It is envisaged that all land irrigated through the new Dariush Kabir dam, which involves most of the dehestān of Ramjerd and substantial parts of the remainder of the Marvdasht plain, would come under the unified control of government through a number of production cooperatives. By 1974 four of these had already been set up. Unfortunately information is not available from the production cooperative in which the whole of the Ayub valley is now incorporated and the regime is not anxious to reveal performance statistics.

It is difficult to draw conclusions about the land reform programme because official figures tend to obscure more than they reveal and because it cannot really be conceived as separate from its immediate past nor, from the trends towards the commercialisation of agriculture of which it now appears to be an integral part. Data from 1972 reveal that 16,300 villages were distributed whole or in part through the first stage. The total number of villages in Iran is variously estimated at between 48,000 and 54,000. On these figures only approximately 30% of villages were involved. It was initially

1. Or 'sherekat-hā-ye ta'āvuni'; these differed from the farm corporations in that they were more a middle road strategy in which the farmers retained their individual rights to land while working in groups. The aims were to amalgamate small uneconomic holdings with the agreement of the majority of the villagers involved, provide financial and technical assistance in agricultural production. These production cooperatives were under the control of a supervisor who was appointed by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs (the successor to the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives) (see 'Ajami 1973, p.42).

estimated that of all villages considered to be eligible only 37% were whole villages,¹ which means that perhaps 8 or 9% of all villages were released from their former landlord, who would still however retain his share of village lands. This does not of course include that significant element of the rural population who had no rights to land anyway, variously estimated as between 40 and 50% of the village population.²

Public figures for the results of the second stage are not available, but according to Keddie:

"A generous estimation can be made that ... of the 60 to 70% of villagers affected by the second phase, under one tenth of these (6 to 7%) received any land."

(Keddie 1972, p.384)

Katouzian estimates that of all peasants with cultivation rights less than one third

"received or privately bought land, or acquired shares in agricultural corporations, about 40% were given tenancies and around 28% still cultivate under the old system."

(Katouzian 1974, p.231)

Even liberal estimates would claim that only perhaps 5% of the total rural population became actual land owners and 10% became lease holders or share holders.³ Although a minority of peasants were able to improve their position, and join the movement for modernisation, the major results of the reforms appear to have been:

2. For a discussion of the position of these people within the village see below, p. 246.
1. The entrenchment of the interests of the large landowners, through a clarification of their position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy;

2. The division of interests of the former mālek and ra'iyat and the commercialisation of the former's land at the expense of the latter.

Modern agriculture has concentrated on capital rather than labour-intensive operations and the larger landowners have been in a superior position to avail themselves of the funds and expertise available for that. The peasant proprietor has been reduced in many instances to the cultivation of an uneconomic holding employing primitive equipment, and it has been suggested that unemployment and urban migration have been fostered thereby.¹

Lambton notes that landowners in Fars tended to live more exclusively off the land than in other parts of the country.² The province heads the list of villages bought in part by the government, which suggests that the landowners tended to remain in more villages. Social and political influence was still derived from land, probably to a greater extent than elsewhere. In November 1962 a land reform official was killed near Firuzābād. Martial law was declared in Fars and the man was made a martyr. The 'feudal landlords'

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¹. Halliday, op.cit., p.130.
². Lambton 1969, p.102.
of Fars were considered to be the cause of resistance and blame for the killing was put on the Qashqai khāns, whose estates were specifically confiscated under Art. 35 of the 1962 land reform law.¹

Land reform in the Ayub valley

The land reform programme did not reach the Ayub valley until the summer of 1965. That year was a bad year climatically, and resistance to the reforms was quite strong among the village inhabitants. Harvests were down and many villagers felt that they would be worse off than before as a result of the division of land. The question of the boundaries isolated by the land reform officials in that year, not only those between landlord and village cultivator, but also those between villages remained a source of conflict in the ensuing years. But the power of the large landlords served to override any major opposition from the villagers. The land reform officials and the rural gendarmerie supported the landlords’ interpretation of their entitlements.

A considerable proportion of land in the Ayub valley was already cultivated by mechanised means, having been brought into cultivation by people like Abdulāhi in Chamani, and Takhızādeh in Esfardarān, in the 1950s and was thus not subject to reform. This was external to that area worked by the

villagers. Cultivation on this land did not involve very many villagers. Abdulahi employed his own workers, often bringing them into the valley from elsewhere, and paying them in cash on a formal contractual basis.

In Chamani the village was divided between the former share-croppers and the landowners, represented by Abdulahi, according to the existing share-cropping agreements. The village cultivators received 300 hectares and the landowners 450 hectares. Abdulahi was able to retain the best land by dictating the nature of the division. He combined it with the 300 hectares of land which he had brought into cultivation between Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Chamani. The 300 hectares received by the village cultivators in Chamani was divided between 38 former share-croppers, 22 of whom lived in Chamani, and 16 in neighbouring Buraki. This gave each share-cropper a notional amount of just under 8 hectares per person. 1

In Pol-e-No the 21 former share-croppers received 300 hectares of land, and the landowners, again represented by Abdulahi, retained control of approximately 450 hectares. When added to the land in Chamani and the 300 pump-irrigated hectares, Abdulahi was able to consolidate a unified estate of 1200 hectares and retain significant interests in three villages (both Pol-e-Nos and Chamani) and maintain considerable control over the activities of villagers in those places.

1. This remained a notional amount because individual land holdings were never isolated.
Prior to the reforms, Buraki was owned by a retired army colonel who lived in Shiraz. He employed an overseer (mobashir) to manage his affairs. The landowners retained 80 hectares, while 16 villagers received title to 120 hectares with land reform. Buraki residents claimed 15 hectares of land adjacent to the more recently established village of Chamani which was above the general irrigated level of the plain but had once been served by a short ghanāt,¹ now long abandoned. This land had been reclaimed by Abdulāhi who had installed a pump at one of the old ghanāt outlets. Buraki residents claimed that this was their land and, like the land devoted to rice (see below p. 179) had been traditionally cultivated by them.

In Esfardrān, the largest village in the valley, ownership was divided between three landlords prior to the reform. The largest of these, Takhizādeh, had mechanised some land which was excluded from redistribution. 58 village cultivators received 420 hectares. Takhizādeh retained 750 hectares and the other two landowners (Dehghān and Basiri, the first the large landlord in Jashniān, the second an urban merchant) retained 240 and 158 hectares respectively.

Domafshān was a settlement created by former pastoral nomads on the side of the Ayub mountain, and above the general level of irrigated land. Much land in this village was devoted to dry farming and many of the inhabitants were still involved very considerably in pastoral nomadism. 18 villagers received ownership of 80 hectares.

¹ Underground irrigation channel, more common in areas away from major riverine irrigation systems.
The division of land within the valley has accentuated a division between the large landowners and the village cultivators, and has fostered a dualistic interpretation of village social organisation, as being divided into at least two 'production systems', one employing 'traditional' agricultural methods, and labour intensive techniques, the other employing modern agricultural methods and wage labour; scratch ploughs exist side by side with tractors in all villages in the valley. It is often maintained that the two are perceptually distinct and it was convenient for the central government to regard them as such. But they are fundamentally related as two sides of the same coin.

In addition to these two 'production systems', two other 'systems have been recognised. These are the 'remnants of the former 'mālek-ra'iyat system' or 'arbāb-ra'iyat system', and the 'tulumbeh kār system'. Such an atomisation of village production ignores the complex inter-relationships that exist between them as well as the history of their emergence as separate spheres of production. It takes the methods of production, the techniques involved, without examining the relations of production which provide clues as to the reasons for their separate evolution.

The next chapter analyses the organisation of local production in the Ayub valley in order to bring out the complexities which were characteristic of such production, and the different sorts of relationships which were constructed between villagers and between villagers and landowners. This is done to demonstrate the problems associated with any neat characterisations of local production which separate the large landowners from the villagers.
CHAPTER VII

THE ORGANISATION OF LOCAL AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL PRODUCTION

It is in the organisation of local production that patterns of alignment between personnel within the plain are articulated. The emphasis so far has been on providing a regional and historical framework in which social organisation within the Marvdasht plain can be appreciated. This is vital if we are not to fall into some of the traps set by a priori reasoning about the nature of rural society, which ignore the context in which such rural organisation is set, and which tend to isolate discrete organisational forms and ignore their intimate inter-relationships with the wider regional framework in which they are contextualised, as well as the fact that they are also the historical products of such inter-relationships.

A major problem is the successful conceptualisation of those living in villages as parts of a larger social, political and economic whole. The available terminology which talks of 'peasant' or 'agrarian' communities is itself part of the problem. The social processes which affect villagers cannot be explained simply by recourse to local inter-

1. Much recent social analysis has focused on attempts to isolate a separate 'peasant mode of production' or 'peasant society', which tends to concentrate on the internal characteristics of the peasant household or village community, to the detriment of other features which are consigned to the 'outside'. See for example the works of Chayanov (1966), Wolf (1966), Shanin(1972), and Sahlins (1974). For an interesting critique of these attempts see Ennew et al. (1977) and Bernstein (1979) Silverman (1979) examines the use of the concept of 'peasant' in anthropology from its early use by people such as Redfield, Firth, Kroeber, Mintz (1973) provides an important counter-balance to the suggested in Redfield's work.
action. Because of their involvement in social contexts which necessarily include non-villagers, it is essentially misleading to distinguish them from others who are fundamentally members of the same social milieu. Thus the dichotomies rural/urban, landlord/peasant, tribe/state gain their perceptual clarity as a result of the complex negotiations between those competing for control of resources and the emergence of a public language which legitimates the division, under particular historical circumstances.

It is proposed in this section to analyse the nature of production within the Ayub valley, concentrating on the village of Chamani, in order to highlight the different processes involved in village production, and to show the different types of production to be found within one particular area in order to demonstrate the problems of treating places separately. This involves a description of different activities and their associations with different people as well as an attempt to question some of the assumptions which have hindered an interpretation of Iranian village organisation. It is initially focused on particular types of products because it is through such a focus, rather than on 'village production' generally that the associations which bind the production in the village to the wider region can be readily emphasised.

1. For a relatively early attempt to examine Iranian society from a regional perspective see English (1966), and De Groot (1977) uses a regional perspective in her historical analysis of the same area of Iran.
The major crops grown in the Ayub valley are shown in fig. 11 together with the schedule of their cultivation.

Certain features of the Ayub valley should perhaps be emphasised at this point. Firstly, because a great deal of land has recently come under the plough, the relationships established between landlord and peasant were not subject to the same restrictions as those in older-settled villages. Chamani, Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Domafshān were constructed at a time when pressure to increase productivity was increasing (in the inter-war period) and those responsible for their construction were able to impose their own criteria on production to a greater extent than in those villages where landlords 'received' an already developed village organisation. The former were not only able to select who would settle but also what would be cultivated. At a later date, when new land was brought into cultivation with machinery, it was possible to ignore the labour intensive nature of village production to a greater extent, as small numbers of wage labourers, confirmed in their personal allegiances to the landlord could be employed. This land could be legitimately divorced from incorporation into the village production system. Secondly, but relatedly, because of their recent establishment, these new villages were inhabited by people with considerable interests external to the village itself. Their interests were obviously more diverse than those of other, older villages and not as firmly rooted in village agriculture as in these older villages.
While numbers of settlements rose and population in the valley increased considerably this did not necessarily imply increasing living standards. Many of the new settlers were former pastoral nomads who were either seasonally resident in the valley anyway or were migrants from areas outside the plain. The period in question (the inter-war and immediate post-war era) was one of considerable change which served to strengthen the control of a few and weaken the position of many through a process of 'marginalisation' associated with increased individual production of cash crops, and the effective removal of villagers from land through changes in tenurial conditions.

Until land reform there were very few small independent peasant proprietors in the plain and those that did exist were normally engaged in the cultivation of such things as fruit trees. It is doubtful, however, whether the concept 'small, independent peasant proprietor' is a valuable one to isolate in either pre-reform or post-reform days. A classification according to such criteria tends to ignore the dynamic processes that have been and continue to operate in the plain.

1. Statistical evidence from Paydarfar's study of Ramjerd in the late '60s indicates that of the sampled population approximately 31% were not native to the villages in which they were questioned (cf. Paydarfar 1974, p.58).

2. With the introduction of motor pumps in the '20s and '30s there was a gradual increase in the number of villagers who managed to rent or buy formally uncultivable land in the plain. But it is doubtful whether these can be called 'independent, peasant proprietors' because their families usually retained interests in land in the adjacent villages, in which they continued to hold share-cropping rights.
As indicated earlier there are a host of relationships that individuals might construct which mean that they may be seen as peasant proprietor, small landlord, bailiff, as well as perhaps a wage worker at the same time. Rather than try to isolate individuals in these terms it is perhaps more important to analyse the processes whereby particular roles are explicitly isolated at particular periods of time. In some places these processes are more 'advanced' than in others and therefore embody different forms of relationships. In many ways it might be said that the situation in the Ayub valley is more 'advanced' than elsewhere, despite the fact (or perhaps because of it) that the villages in the valley figure as relatively undeveloped villages in Ramjerd according to the criteria adopted by Paydarfar in his 1974 survey.¹

For the great majority of the population of the Marvdasht plain, production of agricultural goods with a minimum of surplus, and without the benefits of mechanisation, is still the major means of gaining a livelihood. This is traditionally supplemented by animal husbandry and by the sale of carpets woven by many of the women in the villages. Wage labour from both agricultural and non-agricultural sources supplements, and in an increasing number of cases, has become more important than, the meagre income from the land. Such a statement obviously disguises wide variations within and between villages, not

¹. Ibid., p.26. Paydarfar gives various scores to different criteria found within the villages surveyed on the assumption that the level of societal development of a village may be measured by the presence or absence of a number of indicators. Items, such as radios, with the highest frequency were given the lowest ranking score. On this basis Buraki emerged as the 'most developed' of the villages in the valley, followed by Poi-e-No and Domafshan, with Chamani the lowest.
only in personal incomes but also in types of interest.

Cultivation by villagers in Chamani

In Chamani the villagers cultivate wheat, barley and a small amount of 'kisen', a fodder crop, on their own, as well as raising significant numbers of sheep and goats. Rice is also cultivated on the village lands by a small number of villagers resident in Chamani and a larger number of Buraki residents, in cooperation with Abdulâhi, the large landowner in the valley. The village of Chamani is bordered on the north by Uanjan, on the west by Nasrâbâd, and on the south by Buraki (see map, p. 89). It comprises some 750 hectares of land most of which, apart from that on the foothills of the Ayub mountain, and that bordering the river Kor, is irrigable. Irrigation water comes from a canal which has its origin beyond the site of the dam at Dorudzan, in the dehestân of Kamfiruz. This particular irrigation canal also provides water for areas further downstream - Buraki, Domafshân, Pol-e-No, Esfarâdān and Mehrbâd.

The irrigation canals were maintained by the villagers who contributed labour to periodically clear them. In the case of jointly used canals labour from the villages receiving water was employed. The responsibility for their upkeep rested with the landlord, until the nationalisation of water in 1967, when responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Water and Power. The construction of a modern irrigation network based on the recently completed Dariush Kabir dam, replaced the
old system in 1973. (The following year the whole of the valley was incorporated into a large state managed cooperative.)

Prior to land reform the villagers were employed as either share-croppers or as agricultural labourers on the fields of the large landlords. Part-time specialists were to be found in supportive activities to the agricultural processes. A distinction has often been made between those villagers with share-cropping rights (nasaq-dār) and those with none (khwush-neshin). However in practice distinctions between the two were minimal; the landlord was able to exercise considerable choice in who would be involved in cultivation.\footnote{The nasaq-dār was that person selected by the landlord to formally take charge of the cultivation of a part of the village land. The village lands were divided into ploughlands which were cultivated by work-teams in which all the instruments for production, including animals and tools, were present. Attached to those nasaq-dārs given responsibility for cultivation were others, brothers, sons of the actual nasaq-dār, who helped out at peak periods. In subsequent years these latter might themselves become nasaq-dārs. As Keddie points out: "Sharecropping contracts were nearly always verbal, unclear, and designed to keep the tenant from accumulating any surplus" (1972, p.373). There was no direct association between individual village share-croppers and particular stretches of land.}

It is not unusual for villagers resident in one village to have interests in land in a neighbouring village. In all, 16 adult males from Buraki had traditionally cultivated land in Chamani and in addition to rice they were involved in the cultivation of wheat. As a result of land reform the 750 hectares of village land in Chamani was divided according to existing share-cropping agreements - the landlord maintained control.
of 3/5ths of the land, or 450 hectares, and the villagers acquired control of the remainder. In addition to the 16 people from Buraki there were a further 22 villagers resident in Chamani who became landowners. (In addition to the 750 hectares there are approximately 100 hectares of pastureland, bordering the river and the village of Uanjan. This land was also used by the villagers together with the access to limited pastureland on the Ayub mountain.) The land that was allocated to the villagers was the worst in the village and subject to increasing salinity. In any one year prior to reform about 300 hectares would normally be left fallow. In effect land reform doubled the pressure on land by confining the recipients of land to the cultivation of much less. Lack of adequate resources and much more intensive use had considerably reduced the amount of land that could be left fallow, and resulted in the dry farming of much land which formerly was not considered cultivable.

Each village was divided into a number of herasehs for purposes of production. These cooperating groups provided the majority of skills necessary for the cultivation of a variety of crops. They were composed of close kin and allied families who provided the flexibility required for maintaining an adequate means of livelihood. Both those with cultivation rights and those without were members. As increased emphasis was placed on the production of cash crops and as agricultural production within the village was increasingly dominated by the dictates of the landlord, the kinship-based nature of the
herāseh seems to have declined in importance as a unit of agricultural organisation as individual control by the landlord intensified.

The herāseh was under the leadership of the most powerful male in the group who supervised agricultural labour, provided resources for cleaning of irrigation ditches and paid the rent to the landlord. Each herāseh was apportioned land in various parts of the village allowing it to cultivate different crops. The heads of the various herāsehs were under the supervision of the village headman (kadkhodā) who, after 1935, became the landlord's representative in the village (see above, p. ).

The herāseh was not normally associated with a particular stretch of village land. The way in which it articulated with village production seems to have varied according to the nature of the influence of the landlord. When the latter's influence was weak the various herāsehs were able to take more control over the management of the various facets of general agricultural production. As the landlord became increasingly interested in commercial production, and the village itself became more the unit of production rather than merely an administrative unit for the collection of rents and taxes, the herāseh appears to have become less independent.

1. For a discussion of these traditional work groupings see Safi Nejad 1972. In other parts of Iran they are referred to as bonehs or sahrās. In the Ayub valley the term sahrā refers to the uncultivated land, used as pasture land. This was under the supervision of the head of the sahrā who apportioned pasture to the various owners of animals in the village.
The herāseh was divided into a number of ploughlands or khish. The khish was the amount of land that would normally be worked by a yoke of oxen. Each herāseh would have one or more ploughlands in the various parts of the village land. So that the village wheat, barley and rice fields, for example, would each have a number of khish from the various herāsehs which made up the village population.

It has been suggested that periodic, often yearly redistribution of land meant that de facto ownership by villagers of particular stretches of land was circumvented. But the herāseh was not primarily organised in terms of the control of particular stretches of land and thus, although in periods of strong landlord control, entrenchment on particular stretches of land might be avoided this would not appear to have been a major reason for reallocation. Rather the nature of agricultural production and the relationship of villagers to land pre-supposed control of scattered sections of village land, to provide the necessary resources for the cultivation of a variety of crops.

Rice Cultivation

Of the 750 hectares in Chamani, about 15 hectares were devoted to the cultivation of rice. Before the establishment of Chamani, an area adjacent to the main irrigation canal was traditionally cultivated with rice by residents of Buraki, in

cooperation with the representatives of the landlord of the then largely wasteland area of Chamani. This tradition has been continued, despite pressures on irrigation water. In other parts of the plain rice cultivation has declined, particularly since the nationalisation of water in 1966, and subsequent restrictions on its use. Rice was the only crop still subject to cultivation under tradition share-cropping agreements associated with the 'mālek-ra'iyat system'. The landlord (Abdulāhi) provided the land, the seed and the water and the villagers provided animal labour and human labour; the distribution was thus three parts to the landlord and two parts to the villagers.

The land was prepared in the autumn, for planting at the beginning of April. Transplanting took place in July and the crop was harvested at the end of October/beginning of November. Rice was a particularly prized crop, not only because of its yields but also because of its value in the diet of the villagers.

Twelve cooperating groups (khish) were involved in the production consisting of between 2 and 4 individuals per khish, and involving in all about 30 people, although this number expanded at harvest time. Each group entered into a yearly contract with the landlord for the cultivation of about two

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1. In 1970 the Ministry of Water and Power formally restricted the use of water from the river Kor to 40 days during the spring. Extractions by pump in areas above Marvdasht were restricting the amounts of water entering the irrigation networks in areas further downstream - in korbāl and towards lake Bakhtegān.
hectares of land. Labour was shared in the ploughing and in the irrigation and manual harvesting of the crop. The landlord employed a specialist irrigator from the village of Shahrak, up towards the dam, where considerable expertise in rice cultivation existed and from where many irrigators migrated for about 6 months of the year to work on similar contracts in various parts of the plain. The landlord provided this man with a room in the village and payment was in the form of a share of the harvest on the threshing floor.¹

Ploughing was traditionally done with the oxen brought to the fields by the head of the khish. Rice, requiring more labour intensive methods than other crops, still retained a significant labour input; perhaps the major reason why it was still produced under traditional share-cropping agreements. The cost of employing outside help was borne by the khish and not by the landlord.

Sugar beet, another summer crop, was intensively cultivated in Chamani prior to the land reform programme but was subsequently abandoned. The villagers stated that the reasons for its abandonment were that the land on which it was formerly grown had been taken over by the landlord and they no longer had the land on which to cultivate it. It is however still grown in Buraki and Esfardrán, and in other parts of the

¹. In Chamani this man lived with his sisters who were married to two landowners in the village (nos. 1 and 2 - see appendix 2 ).
The composition of cooperating groups in the rice fields seems to have varied from year to year and, because the large landowner retained control of the land, it would appear that it was ultimately his choice which in the end was important. Bearing in mind that traditionally certain Buraki families and 4 Chamani families had been involved in cultivation on rice land within Chamani, he selected the heads of the various khish according to his own criteria, which included expertise as well as individual attachment to him. These sar-e-khish would themselves collect others around them to help in cultivation. Normally these were close relatives, but some were more loosely joined together. For example Abdulahi’s kadkhoda, himself a Buraki resident, worked together with the landless, but comparatively rich, shopkeeper from Buraki, and one brother not

1. The history of the development of sugar beet is informative. The town of Marvdasht grew around the sugar beet refinery which was constructed there in the 1930s. The government invested a great deal to ensure the cultivation of sugar beet in the Marvdasht plain. They provided financial and technical assistance to would-be producers with which to install motor-pumps on land being brought into cultivation and they also provided elaborate extension services. They guaranteed to buy the harvested crop at pre-determined prices. Under such circumstances many landlords invested in sugar beet production. This employed considerable amounts of village labour, under traditional share-cropping agreements. After land reform many of the large landlords appear to have abandoned production because of the demands on labour, and most sugar beet is now cultivated by peasant proprietors on land retained by them, in cooperation with the sugar beet refinery. Villagers themselves are responsible for ensuring that the crop reaches the refinery. They are not however in control of prices and some villagers are now obliged to transport their crop to the other sugar beet refinery in Kavār because of over-production in the Marvdasht plain.
normally resident in the area, being engaged primarily in pastoral nomadism, came down from the sarhad specifically to participate in the harvest.

As noted earlier there were 12 cooperative groups involved in rice cultivation. These were represented by 12 separately accumulated piles on the threshing floor (sar-e-kharman) where the various debts incurred during cultivation were repaid. Throughout the harvest period the landlord's representative (mubasher) was present in the village to supervise the distribution. No rice was distributed except when this person was present, and to ensure that no one was able to take from the various piles in his absence the various piles were raked over and stamped with a large wooden stamp on which were cut the words 'Ya 'Ali'. The kadkhodā for the landlord did the counting with the help of portable scales and the irrigator together with the heads of the various groups put the weighed measures of the landowner and the various individual members of the cooperating groups into their individual piles. One typical distribution involved five piles, one for the landlord amounting to about 270 mann (1 mann Marvdashti = 3.2 kgs.) and 4 individual piles of 42 mann each. This implies a total harvest of approximately 5,280 mann or 16,700 kgs., of which the landlord took 3,000 mann for sale on the urban market, and the 12 cooperating groups received about 2,000 mann. With no more than 4 people in any one of the cooperating groups this meant that each individual received at least 42 mann. The irrigator's share was 105 mann, or approximately 2% of the crop. A similar
A percentage was taken to support the village development fund, and supervised by the village development council. The villagers' shares were used for personal consumption and did not enter the market.

Only the irrigation of the rice was subject to the employment of a specialist irrigator (abiær) brought in from outside. A fellow villager of his was also employed on the landlord's lands in Fûtuâbâd which were given over to rice. And the landlord's representative, resident during the harvest in Chamani, spent time there supervising distribution and removal in the landlord's own truck. Arrangements for the cultivation of rice in that village seem to have been similar to those adopted in Chamani.

**Wheat cultivation**

Approximately 200 hectares of land in Chamani cultivated by the villagers were given over to wheat and in any one year approximately 120 hectares were planted. These 120 hectares were divided into two for purposes of supervising cultivation, each involving the cooperation of a number of khish under the control of the most important adult male. The 16 Buraki landowners were divided into 6 khish and together formed one heraseh, the head of which was one Mashd Baber who sat on the Chamani village council. The 9 Chamani landowners involved in the cultivation of wheat, under Yadollah Baneshi (No.1) were similarly

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1. This was stored in one of the store-rooms (ambârs) attached to the courtyard of the head of the village council (ra'is-e-anjuman).
divided into 4 khish of Luri and Persian families. There were no Rusta Turks involved directly in the cultivation of wheat.¹

The land to be planted with 'roshan' wheat, the local variety, was ploughed, disced, and built into beds (takht) ready for the distribution by hand of the seed at the beginning of autumn. Little use was made of chemical fertilizer in Chamani as it was in other more prosperous villages, but animal manure was collected from those individually owned animals and distributed prior to ploughing. The two herasehs took it in turns to irrigate their wheat with one group working from sunrise to sunset and the other from sunset to sunrise. Approximately 10-15 mann of seed per hectare were sown. The beds were specially built to take the irrigation water and measured approximately 100x20 metres. The first irrigation (and one full irrigation took approximately one week), was around the beginning of Aban (see fig. 11), one month after planting. This was known as the khāk āb, or 'water for the ground'. The second irrigation was around the end of Azar or one month following the first and was known as the pei-āb, or the 'water for the root'. The third irrigation, known as the sāgh-āb, or 'water for the stalk', was applied about 10 days after No-Ruz, the Persian New Year, i.e. the end of March. The fourth irrigation, known as gol-āb', or 'water for the flower' was applied one month later in Ordibehesht, followed by the final

¹. The population of Chamani consisted of Luri, Persian and Turkish speaking people. See below, chapter XI.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Sugar Beet</th>
<th>Land Prep.n.</th>
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- **Mexican Wheat**: Spring crops
- **Wheat**: Summer crops
- **Barley**: Fall crops
- **Rice**: Winter crops
- **Cotton**: Spring crops
- **Sugar Beet**: Summer crops
- **Land Prep.n.**: Winter crops

**Fig. 1:** Agricultural cycle of major crops in Arak valley.
irrigation in Khordad one month later and known as dāneh-āb, or 'water for the seed'. In a dry year another irrigation was often necessary.

Each cultivator gave 500 rials per year to the local office of the Ministry of Water and Power since nationalisation, for the use of the water. Other than the use of a tractor for ploughing and discing, little other mechanised means were employed. Each khish harvested the crop by hand, as with the rice harvest. Combine harvesters were not used by the villagers in Chamani, although they were extensively used elsewhere in the plain. Costs for the employment of tractors varied according to the type of land but in Chamani were between 200 and 300 rials per hectare, the lower figure for discing, the higher one for ploughing. This was paid in cash by the head of each herāseh to the tractor owner.

Yields on the villagers' land in Chamani were low, partly because of the poor quality of the soil and partly because the villagers did not have the facilities or the reserves to make efficient use of mechanisation or of available chemical fertilizers. At the harvest a 2% levy was made which went into the village development fund. The remainder was primarily used by the villagers for subsistence and only secondarily did it enter into the market, usually through sale to the landlord or to individuals in the village who had relations with corn merchants in Marvdasht, or in exchange for goods bought in the village shop. In a good year yields might reach 1,000 kgs.
per hectare, but more normally they were much lower (on wheat fields on which chemical fertilizer has been applied, yields reach 1,500 kgs. in other villages in the plain). Thus, if an individual was involved in the cultivation of approximately 4.5 hectares, then he might expect to product up to 4,000 kgs. or 1,200 mann of wheat in a good year. With a sale price in the early '70s of 10-14 rials per kilo, this suggests an income from wheat of about 4,000 tomans or approximately £270 at 1970-1 prices.¹ (It was locally assumed that approximately 200 mann was needed per person per year for consumption.) Seed for the subsequent year could be retained in a good year.

Barley cultivation

The only other crop of significance grown jointly by the villagers was barley. Most of this was dry-farmed (daim) on the unirrigable area bordering the river, the remainder was grown on irrigable land bordering this. In all approximately 100 hectares were devoted to irrigated barley, grown primarily as a fodder crop and only secondarily for sale. In any one year about 60-70 hectares of this would be under cultivation. It was the primary crop cultivated by the Rusta Turks in Chamani. 13 adult males formed one herāseh for the cooperative production of this crop, divided into khish and under the overall control of the kadkhodā of the Turks, Javād (No.7), who was

¹. In the early 1970's £1 = 150 rials (10 rials = 1 toman).
also head of the village council. Barley has a shorter growing season than wheat and only one or two irrigations are necessary. Yields are, however, considerably lower and obviously the amounts harvested by the villagers could hardly support them. They used a great deal of the barley as fodder for their comparatively large numbers of animals.

**Kisen**

In addition to barley the villagers devote half a hectare per person for the cultivation of another fodder crop, *kisen*. All villagers participated in this, which occupied about 10 hectares of land.

Chamani appeared to be distinct from many other villages in the plain where a majority of the villagers obtained at least a major proportion of their income from the cultivation of village lands, especially if the villagers were also involved in the cultivation of summer crops, such as cotton, opium, or sugar beet. Within the valley, in the larger village of Esfardran, the villagers were involved in more intensive cultivation of cash crops and there there would appear to have been much more concerted action by the 58 villagers, who obtained 420 hectares of land for their personal use with land reform. They financed the installation of a pump to obtain

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1. Opium was cultivated under strict government control in a selected number of villages in the plain, including the recently established farm corporation. It was an extremely profitable crop but much of the profit went to the government. It was however grown surreptitiously in many of the more isolated parts of the province.
water from the river, to supplement the supply coming by canal from behind the dam, and with the help of the sugar beet refinery embarked on large scale production of sugar beet. They employed mechanised means to cultivate their land and made considerable use of chemical fertilizers.

**Pastoral interests**

In addition to the wide variety of agricultural activities in which people in most parts of the Marvdasht plain are engaged there was a significant interest in livestock, particularly sheep and goats. These would seem to have always been a part of the sedentary village economy, but they were more important in some villages than in others. A variety of arrangements were utilized for pastoral activities, ranging from the small herds of 5 or 10 animals taken out by the small son of the household to graze on pasture within the village lands and housed in the family compound at night, to the long range nomadism which utilized the full ecological range of the southern Zagros and involves thousands of animals, specialist camping groups and coordination of access to pastures. The reasons for concentration on pastoralism or on agriculture are many and varied, depending not only on physical environmental conditions, but also on socio-historical circumstances of individuals and groups. In the Ayub valley, for example, former nomadic pastoralists who were obliged to settle under
the enforced sedentarisation programme of Reza Shah have never given up their interests in sheep and goats.

For some villagers the raising of sheep and goats was a major source of income, especially for those who had their roots in pastoral nomadism. In Chamani for example, the villagers owned some 750 sheep and goats. These were separated into five flocks, each under the control of an individual shepherd who took the animals out from the house compounds in the morning to find grazing and brought them back in the evening. 23 heads of households owned some animals; from the 8 owned by those with the smallest numbers to the 100-plus animals owned by two of the four Rusta Turk brothers. The Rusta Turks in Chamani owned about two thirds of all the animals in the village. All the shepherds were Turks and, apart from Ziad, were the sons of major animal owners. For looking after the animals of others the shepherds received 5 rials per head per month.

Javad, the kadkhodā of the Rusta Turks, and head of the village council was responsible for the allocation of grazing rights within the village area. He was commonly referred to by the villagers as 'rais-e-sahrā' which might be loosely translated as that person in charge of the 'open country' (i.e. that land not under agricultural production). He himself had 100 animals, as did his brother Ziad. A third brother, Azad, had 90, and their father's brother, Kamar Khan, had 80. These were the largest animal owners in Chamani. (It is interesting to note that in work done among the nomadic Farsi Madan section...
of the Qashqai confederacy of tribes that average household
ownership of sheep and goats was reported as only 36, and 25%
of all nomadic households did not own any animals at all!

The major pasture lands for the village of Chamani were
those along the banks of the river Kor, and on land devoted
to barley adjacent to this and cultivated by the Rusta Turks.
The five flocks were shepherded separately, feeding on the
green barley in the spring before moving to higher ground, on
the Ayub mountain, and across the river to Abarej and Khafrak
in the high summer. They returned to the vicinity of the
village after the harvest when they were allowed to feed on
the stubble. There was never enough grazing in the area
immediately around the village, and what there was was subject
to increasing restrictions, through expansion in agricultural
production and increasing numbers of animals.

Different types of relationships were therefore constructed
with shepherds and others to exploit pasture land outside the
village and in many instances outside the plain. With increas-
ing agricultural production, animal husbandry was being
squeezed out of this part of the plain and pushed into a long-
range nomadic 'straight jacket' which was characterised by
movements between largely separate summer and winter quarters;
flock owners were obliged to move further and further afield
in order to secure adequate access to grazing facilities in
more marginal parts of the province. The Rusta Turks in

1. 'Ajami et al., 1974.
Chamani, for example, had made arrangements with the Turks in Uanj and Junaki for the joint exploitation of the area adjacent to the river in which all three villages had contiguous stretches of territory. Arrangements of a different sort were made to move animals further afield. Contracts were made with those nomads, some of whom were relatives anyway, who passed through the area in the spring and autumn. Javad, among the Rusta Turks of Chamani, contracted with some of these nomads to take his animals with them. The most formal type of contract was a yearly one known as nimeh kār, whereby the shepherd took the products of the animals entrusted to him, as well as half the number of offspring, in return for looking after the animals. But many different and more informal contracts appear to have been constructed, some only involving a period of months when the shepherds took the village animals up to the sarhad in the summer, or down to the garmsir in the winter.  

Distinctions between nomadic and sedentary ways of life begin to blur, as do distinctions which separate pastoral from agricultural populations, when one begins to try and unravel the complexities of their inter-relationships within the Marvdasht plain. A distinction was locally made between khāki and bādi, 2 between sedentary and nomadic, in reference to

1. For a recent discussion of herding contracts see Beck, L., 'Herd owners and hired shepherds; the Qashqai of Iran', Ethnology, vol. 19, No: 3, July 1980.

2. Literally 'people of the soil' (peasants) and 'people of the wind' (nomads).
different facets of a group's activities. Thus the Rusta Turks in the valley maintained constant inter-connections with their nomadic cousins, uniting them under a loose framework for the joint exploitation of agricultural and pastoral resources. To call this framework 'tribal' is fraught with complexities about the definition and use of the term 'tribe'. The distinction between tribe and non-tribe is indeed difficult to make, but it cannot be so easily correlated with the distinction nomadic/sedentary or pastoral/agricultural, as has often been maintained. As in the case of animals in the valley one is dealing with pastoral activities that are classified as tribal and non-tribal and which are not necessarily nomadic.¹

Chamani was one of a significant number of villages in the plain, like Pol-e-No and Domafshān in the valley, where pastoral activities, as evidenced by relatively large numbers of animals, were still important. Most of the older villages had smaller flocks which were shepherded together on the village lands and which did not figure as prominently in the village economy. Competition for pasture among these flocks was not as intense, because they were seldom taken off the village lands.

The Rusta Turks in Chamani were not directly engaged in very much agricultural production, being associated primarily with the production of barley, and animal husbandry formed quite a significant proportion of their income. As conditions

¹. See above, chapter III
of production in the valley and in the plain generally changed their ability to maintain their interests in this form is called into question. Unlike the large landlord they did not have the capital to invest in buildings or fodder to improve their flocks, or to make them less dependent on a traditional form of pastoralism. The circumscription of pasture lands associated with their decreased availability meant that they were being pushed into taking different sorts of employment outside the traditional agricultural/pastoral context in which they were rooted. In these central areas large scale pastoral activities have become the virtual monopoly of the large landlords as 'traditional' pastoralism, like 'traditional' agriculture is pushed into the more marginal areas of the village and of the province.

Other agricultural production

Despite occupying the attention of the majority of villagers in the valley, their agricultural activities were marginal to overall agricultural production which was dominated, as elsewhere in the plain, by large, urban-based landowners and renters of land who were increasingly interested in this land as a means of producing profitable cash crops. The nature of the control of these landowners and renters of land varied according to the nature of their holdings, and the extent of their involvement in production. Land was still a major means of acquiring status, and therefore ownership and control of it was imbued with considerations of power and
authority both at the local and regional level. In examining
the nature of agricultural activity engaged in by these urban-
based personnel it is not sufficient simply to describe their
economic involvement as this cannot realistically be separated
from their involvement in the regional polity and their per-
ceptions of their places in that polity. This becomes immedi-
ately evident when we look at the interests of the largest
agricultural producer in the Ayub valley, Abdulahi.

In concentrating on land alone, one ignores the actual
relations of production which are rooted in associations with
land but not necessarily in formal legal title to land.
Abdulahi for example, although not the owner of all the land
that he cultivated, had managed to weld it into a unified
estate which transcended the village boundaries of Chamani,
Buraki, and Pol-e-No. He is now the most important political
and economic personality in the valley. His estate stands in
apparently marked contrast to the adjacent fields now cultiva-
ted separately by the villagers (except of course for the small
amount of rice cultivated by the villagers on Abdulahi's terms).
On his estate Abdulahi employed wage labourers recruited from
adjacent villages, but more often from elsewhere in the region.
Investment in sophisticated farm machinery and in chemical
fertilizers, as well as in the services of expert extension
workers from government offices, presents a picture of modern,
efficient, cash-crop farming, in contradiction to the labour
intensive and comparatively unproductive work of the villagers. This picture of economic efficiency and economic rational governing interest and investment in agriculture disguises much that is 'traditional' in Abdulāhi's activities and leads us into a static appreciation of a dual economic structure and away from the processes that bind all sections of the local population together.

This estate in the Ayub valley was only one of a wide variety of activities in which Abdulāhi was involved. To represent him as a progressive farmer solely interested in increasing productivity and profitability is to ignore the context in which he acted and the multi-faceted nature of his concerns which governed the nature of his inter-relationships with others, both in the Ayub valley and in the wider provincial framework and which had major effects on the population in the Ayub valley. It might indeed be argued that any attempt to analyse events and relationships within the valley could not proceed without an analysis of his interests and the context in which he was situated; from this point of view the Ayub valley serves as one locus of interest in a province-wide network (again one of the traps that the anthropologist can fall into by concentrating on places rather than on people). Besides being a member of the Shiraz City council, having land in Shiraz and gardens on the outskirts, Abdulāhi had significant landed interests in the area around Kushk-e-Mollāh in the district of Korbāl. 1 His brother administered land along the

1. The winter quarters of the Basseri were in Korbāl Kavār and Sarvestan (Bamber 1953, p. 159).
Kazerun road, where the family has made significant investments in livestock. Abdulahi also managed land for Dehgan in the latter's village of Futuabdd in the district of Ramjerd. Abdulahi's father was the major landowner of the large village of Bardej with a population of 7,000, south-east of Shiraz, and Abdulahi had significant interests there after the former's death in 1971. 1 Seen from Abdulahi's perspective these disparate interests combine into a loosely centred 'empire' controlled from his residence in Shiraz, and personnel employed in one area might be freely transferred to another, as indeed they had been in the past.

1. It is interesting to note a report written by T. Marinos in 1962 on a 'field trip to the regions of Esfahan and Fars'. Mr. Marinos was adviser to the social affairs section in the economic division of the Plan Organisation with special interest in community development, and the only 2 villages he visited in Fars were Bardej and Tarbor. He describes Bardej as an 'extremely backward village' which belonged to 'a most uncooperative and mean landlord who lived in Shiraz' who was very influential politically (p.15). 'The landlord's influence over most government services was too strong to ignore. In the past, some villagers who had the courage to move independently in support of changes affecting their way of life ... not only were they faced with complete failure but also were branded as subversive elements by the security police of the Ostan.'(p.16-17) According to his informant: 'up to 3-4 generations ago, all the land in the area was of public domain and then it was bought by the ancestors of the present day inhabitants of the village. The man did not know how the land became the property of their landlord'(p.17). 'The village of Bardej is a typical example of the existing feudal system in the area' (p.17). Tarbor, the other village that Marinos visited is just north of Abdulahi's own settlement of Mohamadabad and he was responsible for the collection of rents in that village. Tarbor is described in the report as a very different village in which the villagers owned half the land and which 'gave the impression of a modern clean village built on properly designed plan' (p.18).
In the Ayub valley Abdulahi was engaged in the cultivation of wheat, barley and rice (see above), as well as melons and cotton. He also used the valley as grazing grounds for his not inconsiderable flocks of sheep and goats during the summer months of the year. In partial payment for land rented to him by Dehghan in the valley he supervised cultivation of some of the latter's land in the village of Futuābād as well as renting land there to cultivate rice, wheat and cotton. His interests in the valley were controlled from his base in Chamani. This consisted of a 15-roomed courtyard which occupied perhaps one-third of the area of the village (see fig.14).

It was built before the actual foundation of the village for the use of the representative (mubāsher) of the Mushir vaqf. During most of the year Abdulahi visited the valley at least once every month, and during the critical pre-harvest season was there for a number of days at a time. Since the purchase of motorised transport it was only two hours journey from Shiraz and with the building of a passable connecting road to the major tarmaced dam road, he was able to bring his town car with him.\(^1\) The day-to-day administration of his lands in the valley was in the hands of two people, both known as kadkhodās, one resident in Buraki and responsible for land in Chamani (Rais Asad), the other resident in Pol-e-No and responsible for land there. Above them was an

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1. When work was begun on the Dariush Kabir dam a tarmaced road was built from the main Shiraz-Esfahan road at Pol-e-Khān to the dam site. When the canal construction company took Chamani as the centre for their operations they levelled and widened the existing track from that road at Kushkak (see fig. 7).
overall manager for the valley more or less permanently resident in the house in Chamani (Mashd Ali Khan, mubāsher), who was not a resident of the village but had come from Abdulāhi's interests in the district of Kurbal, where he left a family. Above them was an overall general secretary (nāyeb), who was resident in Chamani at critical periods but who otherwise looked after Abdulāhi's office in Shiraz, which was attached to his residence. This latter person owned a house in Shiraz where his family lived.

These landed interests in several parts of central Fars provided Abdulāhi and his family with the basis of a not inconsiderable income, maintaining a rather wealthy urban family with rising expectations but with considerable traditional affiliations, attached as it was to other bazaar merchant families and the older administrative hierarchy. His position in the regional political scene, and the implications this had for residents of the Ayub valley are dealt with later.

It is, however, necessary to reiterate that any understanding of events in the Ayub valley must remain incomplete unless they take account of this man's varied yet important influences and interests.

As a result of land reform Abdulāhi controlled 450 hectares within the village of Chamani and 450 hectares within the village of Pol-e-No. In addition, the 300 hectares brought under his personal control was claimed by him prior to land reform through his installation of 3 motor pumps to extract water from the river. Together some 1,200 hectares of irrigable
land were under his unified control. This does not include the land devoted to rice in Chamani, or the land used for the cultivation of cotton in a cooperative venture with the villagers of Pol-e-No. He pays about 200,000 Ts. per year (¥12,000) in rent for the land he does not personally own. The 300 hectares adjacent to the river and irrigated by pumps was excluded from the reform and was from the time of its reclamation (1953/5) worked by wage labourers. The relations of production under which this land was cultivated were extended to land in Chamani and Pol-e-No after land reform in 1964. The early '50s was the time when Abdulahi was beginning to carve out an independent career for himself. He wanted to get away from his father's overriding influence in Korbāl and preferred to start in Ramjerd, where he was asked by Moadell, the administrator of the Mushir vaqf, to work as a mubāsher. Abdulahi gained control of the 300 hectares by installing motor pumps, and subsequently rented land from Moadell rather than administer it.

Wheat

The water from the pumps was supplemented by that from the older irrigation channel to irrigate 600 hectares of wheat. 240 hectares were given over to the cultivation of a newly-introduced high yielding variety from Mexico, which Abdulahi grew for the second time in 1970. This variety was smaller and more wind resistant and required a shorter growing season, but more irrigation (see fig. 11). For his efforts with this
new seed Abdulahi had been awarded the title of most progressive farmer in Fars for the year 1969. The remaining 360 hectares in the valley devoted to wheat were sown with local Roshan and Inia varieties. Because of his experiments with Mexican wheat Abdulahi was given considerable financial and technical support by the local agricultural office in Shiraz which provided subsidized fertilizers as well as extension services. The major task of the sepah-tarvij (extension corpsman) seconded to the village in 1969 as seen by Abdulahi was to look after the new wheat, rather than to be of service in the general agricultural education of the villagers as was more generally intended and as the sepah himself saw his job.

In addition to the two representatives in Chamani and Pol-e-No who also had land of their own, and to the two administrators, the mubasher and the nayeb, Abdulahi employed a variety of personnel to help in cultivation. Some of these were more like personal servants, others had the status of wage labourers and were employed on a daily or a monthly basis depending on the needs at the time. Some tended to be more permanent than others, but at any one time perhaps 15 people

1. One of the major provisions of the White Revolution was the setting up of various revolutionary corps which would form the front line in the modernisation drive. These included Literary Corpsmen, Extension corpsmen and Health corpsmen. These corpsmen were recruited from senior school graduates and as part of their national service were given a short training before being seconded to the rural areas.
were working on Abdulahi's fields in the Ayub valley. Apart from the seasonally employed wage labourers all Abdulahi's workers could be moved around from one of his interests to the other depending on requirements. So that the housekeeper/cook in the house in Chamani might be moved to help in Shiraz or in Mohamadabad, the house built by Abdulahi in his garden in Korbāl. Similarly permanently employed tractor drivers worked land both in Ramjerd and in Korbāl. Abdulahi personally owned a wide variety of agricultural machinery in addition to the three tractors, but he did not own any combine harvesters. In recent years the numbers of privately owned combines had increased considerably and subsequently the cost of rental had been reduced. For many large landlords it worked out cheaper to rent rather than own. The same was, to a lesser extent, true for tractors, although their increased flexibility made them more useful for a greater proportion of the agricultural year. Abdulahi also owned a large truck which he used for transporting grain and fertilizer to and from Shiraz, and he employed a permanent driver for this. When the truck was not required for village work it was hired out to a transport company in Shiraz.

Unlike the majority of village cultivators Abdulahi was in a position to store his wheat harvest until prices were high, and in 1971, one of the worst years for some years, when 20% of his wheat and barley crop was burnt by the sun and lack of water he was not unduly worried because the price rose by more than 20% on the national market to compensate for the losses incurred.
Barley

Barley was grown by Abdulāhi on the unirrigable land next to the river and on that land behind the village of Chamani which was above the general level of the plain. Arrangements for its cultivation and its harvesting were flexible and it was not given the same amount of attention as the wheat; it was not grown as a cash crop, but rather as a fodder crop and to provide pasture for Abdulāhi's herds of sheep and goats, as well as the two horses he owned. The land was prepared by Abdulāhi's workers using his tractors. On the fields adjacent to the river harvesting was done by villagers by hand, because of the unevenness of the ground. For the privilege of being allowed to harvest the crop they could take one quarter of it. On the area behind the village of Chamani those permanently-resident workers of his did the preparatory work in their own time. They were provided with the land and the seed by Abdulāhi and were then entitled to receive half of the harvest under a nimeh kār contract.

Cotton

Cotton has been grown in parts of Ramjerd since the nineteenth century. Abdulāhi devoted some 30 hectares within Chamani to its cultivation. The land was prepared with the help of machinery, and the irrigation 'beds' (takht) were prepared by wage labourers employed by Abdulāhi. Small amounts

of chemical fertilizer were applied, but apart from irrigation little further attention was given to it. In 1970 the cotton harvest realised some 8 tons with a sale value of 1,500 tomans per ton. The cotton was harvested by any of the villagers, old and young who had the time to do so, and they were remunerated at 6 rials per mann collected. The cotton was initially stored in the landlord's house in Chamani before removal to the ginning factory in Shiraz. In the spring of 1971 however, Abdulahi decided to invest more attention to the systematic cultivation of cotton and enlisted the services of the agricultural office in Shiraz who sent out an engineer with special machinery to contour-farm the land and sow the seed evenly. This was the only machine of its kind in Fars at the time and again Abdulahi was seen to be in the forefront of agricultural innovation in the province. Still the harvest in that year was collected by the villagers who were remunerated as before.

Jāliz Kār

Also in 1971 Abdulahi began an experiment with the cultivation of melons and cucumbers (jāliz) on land subject to dispute with the villagers of Buraki near the gha'leh of Chamani, and irrigated by a small pump installed the year before by him and capable of irrigating 30-35 hectares. Such an experiment reflected an increasingly popular form of cultivation being practised in other parts of the plain. It differed more markedly from any of the other cultivation techniques in practice, in that it did not involve directly any local labour. In
Chamani 6 specialists from the northern Iranian city of Ghom, where melon and cucumber production was traditionally important, were contracted by Abdulāhi to cultivate 15-20 hectares. Water from the motor pump and land were placed at their disposal by Abdulāhi, together with 50% of the fertilizer and seed required. The remainder was provided by the 6-man team on a nimeh kār contract. The land was leased for 9 months and the profit from the crop was divided equally between the cultivators, who obtained half, and Abdulāhi. The head of the team was responsible for the payment of the workers. Other less permanent workers were frequently to be found on the melon field having come down from Ghom to help their colleagues/relatives. After subtracting transportation costs and the price charged by the urban middle man through whom sales on the urban market were processed, the head of the team took 5% from the total sales in payment for his fee. The remainder was divided equally between this man and Abdulāhi. Before paying other members of the team the price of seed and fertilizer provided by the head was deducted. These members were paid on a daily basis, their wages being deducted from the remainder of the income before the bonus was paid. The bonus depended on the profitability of the crop and was the equal split between all the workers of the remaining monies after all deductions.

The melon cultivators were semi-permanent residents of Chamani during their time there, but lived in isolation from the rest of the villagers in rooms provided by Abdulāhi in his
courtyard. For the two cold months in the spring they lived indoors but when the weather became more suitable they erected a hut in the middle of the field and ate and slept there for the remaining cultivation period. They did not rely on the village for anything, obtaining their supplies of food from Marvdasht and from Shiraz. All living expenses were shared and costs were deducted from their bonuses at the end of the season. Production tended to be high and techniques used relatively sophisticated. Although figures for productivity are not available from Chamani, Ajami has calculated that for the village of Sheshdangi, where a similar operation was being undertaken, near Marvdasht, each member of the team realised some 4,300 tomans for their work in the year 1966/67.

Thus in the Ayub valley alone Abdulāhi was engaged in a number of very different enterprises, some, such as rice cultivation, involving very 'traditional' cooperative relationships between himself and a group of share croppers; others, such as melon cultivation, totally excluding local inhabitants from the production process. In this latter case we have the complete divorce of villagers from agricultural production on part of the village land. In Shashdangi 'Ajami talks of the emergence of four separate production systems (viz. the remnants of the old arbāb-ra'iyat system, the large mechanised estate, the peasant proprietor system, and the tulumbeh kār system), as if they involved separate personnel and were carried out independently of each other.¹ In the Ayub valley

¹ Ajami, op.cit.
this separation is not so evident and indeed according to 'Ajami's criteria for distinction Abdulahi is personally engaged in all four. In the Ayub valley at least it is not possible to disaggregate in the way in which 'Ajami does and in fact such a disaggregation obscures the basic ties which bind all the 'systems' into one in the context of village agriculture in the plain. Arbitrary divisions based primarily on types of production give little information about the actual relations of production that are operative. Nevertheless distinctions in the methods employed for cultivation of the land give some clues as to the nature of various landowners and farmers in the plain and thus to the different socio-political groups at the regional and local levels. In many circumstances Abdulahi might be classified as a 'progressive' farmer, and that is the mould in which he has been cast by regional administration, but in many other circumstances, particularly when one analyses the nature of his relationships with those who work for him, his actions reveal a very 'traditional' approach to both personnel and cultivation (see below, Chapter XII).

Pastoral interests

In addition to his interests in agriculture, Abdulahi, like many of the villagers, had invested considerable capital in sheep and goats. In the early 1970's he had approximately 2,500 animals, as did Takhizadeh, one of the landowners in Esfardran. These animals were divided into 8 flocks of approximately 300 animals, each looked after by one shepherd. The
animals were separated according to age, and in the early summer according to sex. Abdulahi employed 6 shepherd households to look after his animals. They all had yearly renewable 'contracts', and had in the early '70s, in the majority of cases been working for Abdulahi for a number of years. In the winter months, from November through to March, they were based in and around Mohamadabad in southern Korbāl. In early spring and autumn they spent some time around Deh Sheikh on the Kazerun road, on land controlled by Abdulahi's brother, and in the summer they were based in the Ayub valley. In all three places Abdulahi had built extensive shippens to house them, when grazing, or weather conditions were bad. The distance between summer and winter quarters was approximately 80-100 kilometres which was quite an extensive migration through central Fars but was short in comparison with some of the long range migrations made by some of the tribal-nomadic groups. Conditions in Mohamadābad are comparatively warmer than those in the Ayub valley and, in addition to the shippens within the Mohamadābad compound, stone foundations, similar to the now abandoned semi-subterranean winter dwellings of the Rusta Turks in Chamani, had been laid in various parts of the valley, to house both flocks and shepherd families at times during the winter months, to serve as local bases for grazing. In the spring the flocks were brought up to Ramjerd to graze on the green wheat and barley in the Ayub valley and in Futuābād prior
to being taken to higher ground in Kamfiruz,\(^1\) behind the dam for some weeks. When the harvest had been gathered in in the Ayub valley the sheep returned to feed on the stubble before returning, via Deh Sheikh, to Mohamadābād for the winter.

Competition for use of pasture lands had become increasingly intense in central Fars. Despite a decrease in the late sixties and early seventies in the power of tribal nomadism the numbers of animals on the land would seem to have increased. Competition was from a variety of sources, the animals of villagers as well as of long range pastoral nomads, and significant numbers of animals were brought down from Isfahan during the winter months to take advantage of grazing facilities in central Fars. In addition, expansion in the area under cultivation had significantly reduced the amount of land available to pastoralists. This is put as high as 20\% in the sarhad-e-kuchek to the west of Shiraz.\(^2\) Many areas that were once

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1. Much of the dehestān of Kamfiruz is now submerged under the lake built up behind the dam. At the time of field work many villagers had already been relocated in parts of Ramjerd as well as elsewhere. The ownership of the land was not clear as the Ministry of Water and Power had issued compulsory purchase orders for land affected by the dam. Kamfiruz was traditionally used by sections of the Qashqai as their summer grazing area (sarhad). It was also famous for rice production (see Fasa'i vol. ii, p.313).

2. See 'Ajami et al., 1974. A distinction was made within the Qashqai between sarhad-e-kuchek (lit: small cool area) and sarhad-e-bozorg (lit: large cool area). The former was located to the west of Shiraz between Kazerun and Shiraz in which much recent settlement had occurred. The latter related to the higher, more remote areas of the upper Zagros region.
freely available to pastoral nomads have now been restricted, for a variety of reasons; the association in the mind of the central government of dissidence and tribal nomadic organisations; the de facto take-over of land by members of the urban middle classes; and the expansion of village agricultural activity.

Abdulahi had built up his interests in Ramjerd and Mohamadabad in the last 30 years, not without the influence of the various agents of the central government with whom he was associated. Together he and his father were responsible for ensuring the completion of the various gendarme stations on this part of the Shiraz-Fasa road and the extension of central authority was paralleled by an extension of their authority and influence into an area that had previously been under the influence of the Basseri khans, members of whose taifehs extensively used the Mohamadabad valley prior to Abdulahi's emergence. Abdulahi united with the forces of central government and law and order to defeat the 'tribal/feudal rebels'. Until some thirty or forty years ago much of the valley was unattractive to agricultural investment because of the lack of surface water and there was consequently little pressure on the pastoral nomads who were using it. Since then Abdulahi has been in more or less constant conflict with Mohamad Khan Basseri, until the latter's eventual imprisonment, and many threats were made on the former's life. Similar conflicts were increasingly evident in the Marvdasht plain as the migration routes of the long range pastoralists were restricted. Access to pasture-
lands was exceedingly complex, and was made more so rather than less by the government's nationalisation of all pasture land as a national resource. Rather than preserving rapidly denuded areas of the environment this has served to exacerbate the fact that those who held power had better access to resources. So it was not surprising that when Abdulahi wished to restrict the flocks of Darreshuri pastoralists passing through the area around Futuabād he was very easily able to obtain a document signed by the head of the tribal gendarmerie to restrict access in favour of his own herds, (when previously the Darreshuri had used the area). Similarly it was hardly surprising that Abdulahi was able to obtain access to grazing land in Kamfiruz, above the dam, when others, in a particularly dry year, could not. A letter of authorisation served to stem the anger of the villagers in the area who were in serious need of the limited pasture available for their own animals.

Abdulahi's shepherds had been recruited from a variety of sources. His chief shepherd, Ali Āghā, came from Beiza, where he had been recruited through Luri acquaintances in Chamani. Other shepherds had abandoned long range nomadic life among the Basseri and the Arab tribes to work for him, and one Turki-speaking shepherd had formerly lived in Nasrābād adjacent to Chamani. Contracts were renewed at No Ruz, the Persian new

1. In this Abdulahi was supported by the gendarmes stationed at Kushkak. They presented the heads of the various encampments with this document in the spring of 1971 and the latter, who were intent on staying in the area for a number of days because reports indicated that spring was late in opening up their summer pastures, were obliged to move on under threat of use of force and arrest.
year. Each shepherd received a yearly cash income of 200 tomans together with 40 mann of wheat, 10 kilos of wool at shearing, a felt shepherd's coat (namad), tea, sugar, cigarettes and cloth shoes (giveh). If this proved insufficient to meet subsistence requirements, it was supplemented when necessary, and occasional gifts of cash were given, at the whim of the flock owner. The head shepherd was remunerated in a different way and instead of a yearly cash payment received a monthly income of 150 tomans. Each shepherd family was allowed to retain a small personal flock of sheep and goats and these varied in size from 20-50. No other animals were allowed by Abdulahi, and the shepherds' animals were not allowed to mix with the main flocks but were grazed separately, on land allotted by Abdulahi. The wool that the families received at shearing was used to make carpets, by the women.

Because of the very dry conditions prevalent in southern Iran during the summer of 1971 it was suggested by the shepherds that the flocks be allowed to move to higher ground where pastures were more extensive. Abdulahi did not follow up this suggestion. He was less dependent on natural pastures than other nomadic pastoralists and could purchase tufala (sugar beet pulp) to see him over the worst periods of drought. He was also in a position to call in the resources of the most modern veterinary facilities available. Takhizadeh, the other large flock owner in the Ayub valley did however take his animals up to higher ground and obtained grazing rights for that year in Sarhad-e-Chahārdāngi, in the summer quarters of some
of the long range pastoral nomads. On that occasion his own shepherds accompanied the flocks, but it would appear that in other cases animal owners contracted with these nomads to take their animals up to the summer quarters and down to the winter quarters on various sorts of shepherding contracts.

During the spring and summer months, when milk was more readily available, the women in the shepherd encampments prepared cheese, butter, kashk (dried curds), yoghurt, and butter milk which was syphoned off by Abdulahi for his family's use in Shiraz. Sufficient was however retained for the personal use of the shepherds' families and Abdulahi's retainers in Chamani and a considerable amount of kashk was stored for food in the winter. Although the shepherds contracted to provide a certain amount of produce from the animals in their charge it would appear that Abdulahi could take off products if and when he required. The shepherds were offered a little help in their work at peak periods of lambing and shearing by village labour temporarily contracted by Abdulahi from among villagers who normally worked for him as wage labourers. The separated flock of lambs was looked after by one of the older members of the Rusta Turks in Chamani (Avolfat) who was paid cash for the month or so that he was employed. Regular agricultural workers from Chamani were seconded from their irrigation work to help in the shearing for which they received no additional payment but were provided with free meals and a kilo of sweets; willingness to help at this time built credit later for those involved.
Shearing was supervised by the landlord's representative in the Ayub valley. The wool was immediately sold, largely to wool merchants in the Marvdasht and Shiraz bazaars, but also small amounts were bought by villagers for use in carpet production.

Each year Abdulahi sold about 300-350 head to merchants in Shiraz. Individual animals brought in between 200 and 250 tomans when sold in the autumn of 1971, representing a cash sale price of as much as 87,500 tomans or about $6,000. These were sold on the hoof and driven into Shiraz from Mohamadābād. Additional animals would be bought during the year when the opportunity presented itself, either from villagers or from pastoral nomads and his whole stock had been derived from such sources. In future years, with increased opportunities within the Ayub valley afforded by the construction of a meat processing plant, Abdulāhi was proposing to bring in more systematic techniques for pastoral production, placing more emphasis on artificial feed and the introduction of better strains of animals. He had already invested considerable capital in erecting out-houses to house his flocks, outside Chamani.¹

There was very little to distinguish Abdulāhi's shepherds from others engaged in pastoralism in the three areas in which they were found; the black tents which they occupy are no

¹. This meat processing plant was ostensibly being constructed as part of a package of measures to rationalise pastoral nomadism. It was envisaged that a chain of these would be built along the major migration routes. Unfortunately the pastoral nomads who moved through this part of the plain were not geared to selling their animals at that particular time. It would appear that the plant favoured the activities of people like Abdulāhi rather than pastoral nomads.
different from those used by the pastoral nomads who are seasonally to be found in the Marvdasht plain, or from those used by villagers who camp temporarily with their flocks in areas removed from their permanent place of residence. Former pastoral nomads in Pol-e-No, for example, would unwrap their goat hair tents each summer and take their flocks on to the mountains across the river. But despite the similarities in organisation, the control of personnel and of production were fundamentally different and the contrasts in the operations of Abdulāhi and villagers is revealed in the ways in which the former was able to call on very different sorts of help in his pastoral activities.

The compound built by the Abdulāhi family in Deh Sheikh on the Kazerun road has been carved out, at the foot of a gendarme station, from former open country used by Qashqai nomadic pastoralists who now compete for use of the land with Abdulāhi's herds at various peak times of the year. Conflicts over access are frequent but those with access to sources of power in the urban centres invariably prevail. The strong in this case are not the tribally organised any longer.

Landlords and Landowners

The Ayub valley thus contains a variety of large landowners who view their associations with the land in very different ways. It may be because the landowner in Sheshdāngī

1. This is in the sarhad-e-kuchek of some of the Qashqai pastoral nomads.
2. 'Aiami. op.cit.
for example, was himself an agricultural engineer, that the
distinction between cultivation techniques on his land and
those on the land of the villagers, were more evident, but
one cannot deduce from this what the relations between the
landowner and those employed by him were. Certainly the
'marginalisation' of much of village agriculture as a result of
the land reform programme has given scope for sometimes radical
intervention, as a result of the removal of certain constraints
on action but everywhere landowners are constrained by the
socio-historical legacy with which they approach agricultural
production.

Takhizādeh, for example, one of the major landowners in
the village of Esfardrān runs his estate on primarily com­mer­cial
grounds. He personally supervises the cultivation of
cash crops utilising the most sophisticated machinery and
employing wage labourers on a formal contractual basis. He
has little control over village activities and maintains that he
does not want any. Because of his ownership of land within
the village boundaries he does however sit on the village coun­cil
and is involved in village-wide development projects. He
is unusual in the plain in that he classifies himself as a.
farmer and gains most of his income from his farming activities.
Unlike Abdulāhi, and other landlords, he would frequently be
found driving his own tractor.

Esfardrān is the only village in which Takhizādeh has
land. He owns, like Abdulāhi, a variety of agricultural machin­ery
and has made extensive use of available extension services
provided by the agricultural office and foreign German aid missions. In the early '70s he was primarily engaged in the cultivation of wheat (260 hectares) and in the raising of sheep. He was interested in increasing concentration on alfalfa, of which he then had 17 hectares, to provide fodder for his animals, and was intent on ploughing back profits in wheat into the relatively expensive scraping of land (at 2,000 tomans per hectare), with the ultimate aim of putting 500 hectares under alfalfa. He had already built a complex of buildings to house 900 animals during the winter and hoped to extend these to house the 2,500 animals which he then owned and ultimately concentrate almost exclusively on meat production. The nearness of the sugar beet refinery provided a ready source of 'tufala' (sugar beet residue) for his animals. The proposed large meat processing plant to be constructed outside the neighbouring village of Fakhrābād, would absorb much of his produce. The ten or so people he employed were all on regular contracts and under the supervision of two men resident in Esfardrān. Takhizādeh lived in Shiraz but with the increased availability of transport he was able to commute between his home and his farm. He also maintained a job as an agricultural engineer having received extensive training in the United States.

It might be said that Takhizādeh's interests give credibility to 'Ajami's claims for a number of separate production systems operative within one village. Closer inspection reveals a very complex inter-relationship between his interests and
those of others in the village; illustrated by joint rights to water and joint responsibility for the clearing of irrigation ditches, by the joint construction of roads out of the village, by reliance on others for access to pastureland, both in the valley and elsewhere. Together these make discussion of his enterprise in isolation extremely problematic. He was much more the farmer than the mālek which had important implications for his role in village affairs and for the ability of the villagers to act independently. As noted earlier Esfardrān is an old established village, unlike Chamani, and its villagers had been involved in considerable independent improvements to their land since land reform. His position both locally and regionally was very different from that occupied by Abdulāhi.

Dehghān, on the other hand, one of the largest absentee landlords in the dehestān, was not involved at all in agricultural production. Most of his land was rented out to people like Abdulāhi and he only visited his holdings on a tour of inspection perhaps once a year. He took little interest in increasing efficiency of production and was much more the benevolent master or squire (arbāb) who used his land, in conjunction with his urban investments to support his political and social ambitions in Shiraz. His income was largely derived from rents collected by his representatives; people such as Abdulāhi.

In between the capitalist farmer and the rentier was Abdulāhi. In many respects he was at the forefront of agricul-
tural innovation, but, unlike Takhizādeh, he knew little about agricultural production, visiting his estates perhaps twice a month. His operations in the Ayub valley were intensive and he invested large amounts in improving agricultural production. In Korbāl, however, he remained the rentier. Unlike Takhizādeh he exerted considerable personal influence over a wide variety of activities in the valley. The contradictions which are to be found in his activities and the dilemmas implicit in his position are in many ways the dilemmas which characterise the modernisation of agriculture in the plain and indeed of modernisation in general in Fars. He still operates according to a personalistic and paternalistic rationale in a situation where the forces of modernisation and change increasingly imply the rational pursuit of commercial interests and the exercise of bureaucratic and 'neutral' forms of authority.

Takhizādeh and Abdulāhi were personally involved in cultivation, other landowners such as Dehghān were not and had delegated the use of their land to others, either other urban residents, or villagers, producing very different configurations of personnel and production characteristics in the various villages of the district. For example, in neighbouring Rasmanjān a small landlord who lived in some style in a house that he personally constructed outside the village walls and which was modelled on much lower middle class housing in Shiraz, owned one dang of the village (one sixth). He managed the whole of the village agriculture for the remaining five landowners, one of whom was the brother of Abdulāhi's secretary (nāyeb). Little mechanisation had been introduced and agriculture remained
at a relatively unproductive level. To call this man a *khordeh mālek* is to deny the fact that he was also a *mubasher* and a *mustajer*. In addition to his interests in land, he had also set up the only flour mill in the immediate vicinity to which villagers from Chamani and Buraki took their wheat to be ground. Nasrābād and neighbouring Uanjān, in which many of the Rusta Turks of Chamani had relatives, were owned by the Behbahani family, an old-established Shirazi family who in the early '70s, because of the peculiarities of the first land reform laws, were not obliged to distribute any land in Uanjān, which remained their 'chosen village' (*deh entekhābi*) and which was all cultivated under traditional share-cropping agreements.

Abdulāhi himself had constructed very different sorts of relationships with the inhabitants in and around his land in Korbāl. The nature of agricultural activity found in this area was very different from that found in Ramjerd, a result of the lack of surface water in the former place. As in the Marvdasht plain recent years had seen a rapid expansion in the numbers of pumps installed to tap ground water, and irrigate numerous 10-hectare stretches of land. This part of southern Korbāl was beyond the reach of irrigation water from the river Kor. Administratively it remained part of the Marvdasht plain but was more easily approached from Shiraz via the south-easterly Fasā-Darāb road (see map p. 85). The valley was dominated by the relatively large and very old villages of Dariyan and Kushke Mollah. Of the other 6 major settlements in the valley three were established within the present century and were
relatively small. Additionally some small settlements had been abandoned in the last fifty years, some a direct result of the depredations of nomadic tribesmen. The older established settlements were irrigated by ghanāts which were maintained at considerable communal expense. The additional settlement of Mohamadābād was, rather, one large walled garden in the middle of which Abdulāhi built a large urban-style house and swimming pool attached to which were extensive outhouses and shippens. This complex dates from the late '50s and was named after Abdulāhi's eldest son. The valley still contained extensive pastures on which Abdulāhi's flocks grazed during the winter months. These pasturelands once provided extensive grazing facilities for tribal groups of Basseri and Kurd Shuli nomads who migrated through the area. Their presence on this land was problematic and Abdulāhi had been engaged in a protracted struggle with them for control of the land. With the help of the gendarmerie he had managed to restrict their access to a few days during the spring.

The total population of this part of Korbāl was about 20,000. They were primarily engaged in the cultivation of wheat and barley, most of which was dry-farmed because of the absence of water. Where water was available around the pumps, considerable attention was given to the market-gardening of vegetables for sale on the urban market. Unlike Ramjerd there had been a great increase in the numbers of what 'Ajami has called 'tulumbeh kārān' (lit. those who work with pumps) and recognises as a separate production system and as the most 'progressive'. The landowner makes over his rights to land to
individual peasants in return for 10% of total crops as rent. All other costs of production are borne by the peasants themselves. It is perhaps the most similar of the cultivation techniques to that employed on what has become known as the 'family farm'; cultivation is under the direction of the head of the household and labour power is provided by other members of that household. The owner of the land has no influence over what is cultivated on the land. Cultivation tends to be relatively intense and there is a concentration on summer crops (saifi) but overall income would appear to be considerably larger than that obtainable by villagers working as in Chamani. Mechanisation tends to be limited, as a result of the relatively small size of the holdings, but the availability of machinery to rent ensures that they have access to such if required, and productivity appears to be comparable with that obtained on the larger mechanised estates. Abdulahi's establishment at Mohamadabad can be classified as a 'tulumbeh kar' enterprise, because, in spite of the fact that it is situated on the mother well of an abandoned ghanat, cultivation in the garden is totally supported by pumped water. The overall expansion of the cultivated area facilitated by the installation of motor pumps is to be seen as part of a much greater expansion around the older established settlements in Fars which had considerably reduced the amount of land available as pasture land for the large nomadic flocks that passed through this central area on their twice yearly migrations, and had resulted in considerable degradation of the natural environ-
ment as well as in considerable conflict between nomadic and sedentary sectors of the population.

After the harvests in late autumn Abdulahi spent some time at his residence in Mohamadābād collecting the rents due from the various cultivators. He personally owned one dāng of the whole area (excluding Dariyan) which covered about 5,000 hectares. The total value of all rent for the valley was reckoned at 420,000 tomans of which Abduldhi was entitled to 70,000 Ts. (c. $5,000). Two forms of collection seemed to be operative. On land cultivated by villages jointly the kadkhoda was responsible for payment of the rent which was assessed on a per hectare basis by Abdulahi, but was subject to negotiation. For Tabor it was calculated at 80 Ts. per hectare whereas the kadkhoda was insisting on 75 Ts.; the total amount due was calculated at 20,000 Ts. For the individual 'family farms' of the tulumbeh kārān each head of household was responsible. Two dāngs (2/6ths) of the valley was owned by the Mushir vaqf (administered by the Moadell family as in Ramjerd) and rents were collected for this by Abdulahi. The remainder was owned by large numbers of small landowners (about 70 in all) who also asked Abdulahi to collect their rents for them.

It is unrealistic to talk of separate production systems and separate the activities of the large landowners from those of the small landowners who received land with the execution of the land reform programme. One factor which emerges very clearly is the diversification in the types of activities in
which both large landowners and villagers are engaged, in order to secure a means of livelihood and as a means of accumulating wealth. As will become more obvious in the section which deals with occupational specialisation, this is not merely confined to agricultural and pastoral interests. The herāseh, for example, is not to be interpreted just as a cooperative group for the cultivation of the village fields. Production by villagers is not just confined to village lands. Rather, the herāseh emerges as an association of closely related people for the joint exploitation of agricultural and pastoral resources. It is the association of land with the interests of a group of people rather than the association of people with a particular stretch of land which is important. The subordination of production to the interests of the landlord and its increased confinement within the boundaries of the village served to disguise this as increased emphasis was placed on cash crops. Under such circumstances it was not so much what was grown as whether the crop/s would provide sufficient cash income to maintain an adequate standard of living. But, as can be seen from both Abdulāhi's interests and those of villagers in Chamani, the concentration on those crops or activities which will maximise income is far from complete. Unlike Takhizādeh or villagers in Esfarārān who had invested a larger proportion of their resources in producing a limited number of cash crops they were not as vulnerable to changes in market forces. Nevertheless, the 'agro-pastoral' combine remained the most important organisational means for both villagers
and landlords to insure the maintenance of their interests. Because of the varied nature of their interests both landlords and villagers were obliged to enter into 'cooperative' relationships with others to secure the labour required for the maintenance of their enterprises. Such 'cooperation' was enhanced by the codified legal bonds established between landlord and peasant during Reza Shah's reign, which formulated their relationship into formal contractual obligations. But the increased use of machinery and of individually contracted wage labour has served to decrease the extent of the dependency of large landlords on the availability of village labour articulated through the 'herāseh. It has also served to break up the cooperative alliances between villagers. Firstly because the increased use of money allows for more independent production and secondly because the changes in tenurial conditions within village agriculture have obliged villagers to look elsewhere for alternative sources of employment.
CHAPTER VIII

OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

The preceding discussion of agriculture and animal husbandry has attempted to demonstrate the ways in which these activities transcend the boundaries of the village, thereby setting the stage for an analysis of what the village is and of how it is appreciated by those who are obliged to live and work with it and in it. The production of foodstuffs and of animals represents only one aspect of the lives of the villagers. The continuance of what might be termed 'traditional' relations of production has ensured the retention of some occupations which are rooted in an interpretation of the village as a 'community' enterprise. At the same time changes in the ways in which production is conceived associated with the large scale changes of recent decades have increased opportunities, particularly in wage labour of various sorts, in places far removed from original places of residence. As a result of such changes, as well as changes in social organisation, it is by no means self-evident that one can use the 'village' as the basic unit for analysis. Neither is it necessarily obvious what the term implies, because it would seem that it has very different connotations for the actors involved—both those resident in the village and those perceiving it and acting on it from outside. Attempts to question the use of the term 'village' are not merely sterile attempts to 'totalize' or 'cumulate' all available interpretations in order to construct
some 'meta-village' concept, and thereby take the place's reality out of its history and thus 'domesticate' a particular village through the use of pre-determined, and often unreflexively applied categories. Rather an attempt is made to explore the dynamics of different interpretations for the clues they offer for a richer understanding of social organisation in the plain. Not only are there different interpretations of what the village means, but those interpretations have changed over time.¹

The village 'community'

The problems attendant upon initiating such an analysis, as well as their initial recognition are, perhaps predictably and unavoidably, rooted in the particular circumstances surrounding the process of field work. Because of the comparatively recent settlement of villages such as Chamani, the existence of a community of interest, circumscribed by the village, could not be taken for granted as it perhaps could be, and was, in many middle eastern ethnographies which concentrated on older-settled villages. Immediately, an analysis of socio-economic activities takes one outside the village confines because it is not necessarily the only focus for the activities of villagers nor even the prime focus for the major landlord who has such an important effect on the lives of villagers.

What is the village then? And in what terms can we talk of village institutions? Is there such a thing as a 'village

¹ See chapter V above, where an attempt is made to provide some historical background to these problems.
community' or a 'village economy' and how do these make themselves manifest? In exploring such questions one might be better equipped to interpret how the category is used as a basis for action by both 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

Social analyses of villages in Iran have suggested that its internal structure is undergoing radical change; and the land reform programme has been used as a symbol for such change. Such interpretations are predicated on the assumption, usually implicit, that there was a 'traditional village' which was characterised by such things as a relatively self-sufficient economy in which cohesion was maintained through established 'village' institutions, defined in terms of the village itself. The processes of 'individualisation', whereby extended households are broken up, and 'agriculturalisation', whereby more 'efficient' agriculture displaces certain members of the village and results in increased divisions of labour, are seen to be the dominant forces in a progressive modernisation. (The concept of progress is surrounded with moral implications of goodness and badness rather than seen simply as a progression.)

Also underlying these analyses is the concept of a 'village community', which is both ahistorical and moralistic, and which assumes the a priori existence of some, implicitly less dynamic, organisation in the past.

Consequent upon such an interpretation, villagers have often been assumed to be backward and conservative in their adoption of innovations, and different in fundamental ways to
their urban counterparts on the assumption that urban centres are the foci for change and that they have a prerogative on 'correct' interpretation and on an unambiguous interpretation of phenomena. Thus correlations are made between different forms of economic differentiation within the village, and the adoption of new forms of technology. Abdulahi for example, in Chamani, is described as 'most progressive farmer in Fars', despite the many 'traditional' features of his operations (see below, Ch. XII). 'Ajami, also, in his analysis of villages elsewhere in the Marvdasht plain correlates literacy, standards of living and levels of mechanisation with different 'classes', because he never reflexively examines interpretations of these phenomena, both as they are appreciated locally and regionally.

1. Modernisation theory in particular, with its assumptions that all societies must pass through a series of stages on their road to development, has looked for obstacles and facilitating mechanisms which might explain the reasons why some societies develop in different ways to others. Obstacles have tended to be predicated in terms of the backwardness of the peasantry (cf. in particular Foster 1945). Facilitating mechanisms have been sought in research into entrepreneurial activity and the function of mediators between the modern and the traditional.

2. Activities in these centres were deemed to be more civilized than those at the periphery. In some twist of the evolutionary perspective, those at the periphery were seen to be lower on the evolutionary ladder, and the tribal nomads were consigned to one of the lowest rungs. This was regarded as self-evident by their occupation of the more marginal areas (cf. Paydarfar 1974). Arising from this particular concatenation of perceived relationships and assumed superiority comes the conception of the tradition-bound, conservative villager, resistant and hostile to change and the outside world, governed by fatalism and narrow bigotry.

3. 'Ajami 1971.
A 'correct' interpretation of their meaning remains implicit and is not specifically related to the context in which it is articulated at a particular time in a particular place. More blatant in its assumptions is Paydarfar's study of social change in southern Iran where explanations are rooted in the reified concepts urban, rural, and tribal, formulated in terms of a continuum which correlates urban with good and tribal with bad in many popular myths.

Attempts to overcome the problems of analysis which are implicitly rooted in such reified categories have been a feature of much middle eastern ethnography. Rosenfeld, for example, has suggested that a structural dichotomy between urban and rural in middle eastern terms, or between respectively associated features of openness to change and conservatism, or resistance to change, is a mistake:

"the peasant exists in both structures at once; they are one and the same to him." (1972, p.50)

He criticises the work of Stirling, Antoun and Gulik because, although they acknowledge the importance of inter-relationships between urban and rural, they fail to integrate the two and transcend the limitations of the category boundaries in that they:

"place the structures and roles of the broader system on one side (the centralised government, industry, policeman, soldier and construction gang foreman) and those of the village system on the other (village heads and council, agriculture, fellahs and migrant worker." (1972, p.49)
As Bourdieu maintains:

"the systematic picture of interlocking units (in this case urban, rural and tribal) ignores the unceasing dynamism of units that are constantly forming and reforming, and the fuzziness which is an integral part of native notions inasmuch as it is at once the precondition and the product of their functioning."

(1977, p.109 - my underlining)

The concepts urban, rural and tribal, and associated town, village and tribe, as well as citizen, peasant and tribesman, cannot be taken for granted but must be looked at in terms of the particular people being investigated. Already a confusion has been introduced in that both 'town' and 'village' relate to places, whereas 'tribe' relates to a group of people. Similarly in English the concept 'citizen' has attached to it implications of political rights. The labels that people put on events, personalities or institutions have their own historical rationale, and attempts to distil universal characteristics from specific instances lead one into gross over-generalisations, and out of a discussion of actual configurations of personnel. Löffler sums up the problem neatly in his discussion of social organisation among the Boyr Ahmad in a physically more marginal area of Fars:

"one could attempt to call Mahmud a semi-peasant, partially tribal partially peasant, or semi-urban, or another such term, and assert that the case is irrelevant for the study of the peasant. To this one could rejoin in pointing out Mahmud's peasantness, his origin, his basic cultural orientation, his dominant concern, and his being regarded as 'one of us' by his fellow villagers."

(1971, p.1088)
In attempting to escape from the intellectual constraints imposed by the adoption of specific labels, such as 'peasant' or 'tribe', Loeffler is obliged to go back to the actual historical circumstances in which Mahmud is rooted, rather than work with the a priori constructions of other social investigators, or of those in power in the regional and national centres who, perhaps unwittingly, wish to impose their cultural interpretation on a reality only partially perceived. It is in the context in which they are used that such terms as 'peasant' and 'tribe' gain their definition. To try and abstract from that context endangers the historical validity of the concept and ossifies meaning into forms which have lost their dynamism.

The anthropologist, like others, is in constant danger of such abstractions through attempts to construct 'the whole'/the 'meta-concept', rather than concentrate on processes. In many instances this 'whole' is taken for granted, as in the studies of 'Ajami and Paydarfar. The use of a term implies the adoption of a stance in an ongoing process of 'structuration' and its meaning must be unravelled from the context, together with the pre-conceived notions of that meaning as they enter into its use within that context.\footnote{Giddens states: "Structures must not be conceptualised as simply placing constraints on human agency, but as enabling. This is what I call the duality of structure. Structures can always in principle be examined in terms of their structuration as a series of reproduced practices. To enquire into the structuration of social practices is to seek to explain how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally"(p.161). "To study structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions which govern the continuity and dissolution of structures or types of structure"(ibid.,p.120). See also Giddens 1977 pp.129-34 (Notes on the theory of structuration').}
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Thus the notion of 'village' (deh) needs to be examined as it is used to describe social organisation within the Ayub valley, and elsewhere in the plain, before any understanding of its use as a category of understanding as well as its importance as a point of reference can be made. This is particularly evident in the case of newly-settled villages (although similar interpretations of the village from a regional point of view do not necessarily mean that older-settled villages are not perceived from the same or similar perspectives).

Lambton maintains that:

"there seems little doubt ... that from the earliest times that we have records the dominant type of settlement was the 'village" (1953, p.2)

and that this was in response initially to a need for collective defence. She goes on to state that:

"the tribal nature of society in early times determined that the village made up of a clan should be the model settlement". (ibid., p.2)

Subsequently the need for defence was supplemented by the need for cooperative labour to maintain irrigation networks and by the preference of government for dealing with groups in one place, rather than dealing with scattered individuals. So that:

"there was a tendency to treat the village as a corporate unit from early Islamic times down to the twentieth century."

( ibid., p.4)

Lambton also maintains that the form of ownership prior to the land reform programme (characterised by what is termed the mâlek-ra'iyat system) developed from a communal form of settle-
ment. The history of the settlement of land and its control in Iran is indeed a complex one which has been relatively well documented by Lambton among others. Terms used to express relationships in and through land have changed over time and have accumulated around them a complex history of interpretation. During the land reform programme for example attempts to define what a village was often proved problematic. Attempts were made by the state to constrain, by explicit definition and circumscription, and according to a rationale which was not necessarily that of those involved; implicit processes incorporating specific sorts of inter-relationships which, because they remained implicit provided a flexibility of action. According to the land reform law of January 1962 a village (deh) was defined as: 'a centre of population and the place of residence and work of a number of families who were engaged in agricultural operations in the village lands and which was by custom recognized locally as a village' (Art.1, para.10). In January of the following year the land reform council attempted to provide further criteria which were intended to avoid the confusion arising from earlier attempts. Throughout it would appear that an attempt was being made to circumscribe a process which varied from place to place, and translate this into a legislative form, or legal formalism, which would be 'objectively true' for the whole of the country.
Place of residence was increasingly used by central government as a means of situating, 'understanding', and thereby 'domesticating' individuals. The values attached to such concepts as 'village' are concretised through the implementation of policies which reflect them. Such values not only incorporate ideas about what a village is, but also relatedly, about what a village should be, so that a holistic and functional model provides the backdrop for government interference in village affairs. Government agencies, for example, presume a 'community of interest' within the village which is evidenced in the legislation for the creation of village councils, the accumulation of a village development fund, and the establishment of houses of equity (khâneh ensâf) and of culture (khâneh farhang) under centrally-inspired development programmes.

The appreciation of what villages should be and the facilities that should be available to them has led to the formulation of a policy aimed at completely restructuring rural space and of concentrating populations into small towns (shahrak) in which basic amenities could be efficiently provided. Because of their small size many of the villages in the Marvdasht plain were ignored by government development programmes which concentrated on the larger, older settlements and those near existing communication channels.

1. The term 'domestication' is used here and elsewhere in the thesis to refer to that process whereby people accept certain relationships which involve inequality between parties to a transaction. It is used in terms of marriage transactions to indicate the process whereby a daughter becomes a bride and is incorporated into the household of her husband. It implies a process in which relationships of domination or subordination are 'taken for granted' (cf. Goody, J., The domestication of the Savage Mind, 1977).
Such a 'community of interest' cannot, however, be taken for granted, founded as it is on a consen sus model of the functioning of society. The 'traditional village' (deh) was perceived as self-contained and relatively autonomous, presided over by the village council (majlis) of elders (rish sefidān), the head of which, the kadkhodā, acts as interpreter of village affairs to the outside world. A number of village specialists, such as carpenters, bath-house attendants and night watchmen, complete the picture of an integrated and cooperative enterprise. But once one begins to investigate this apparent simplicity many problems emerge. There are a number of terms that can be used to express the term 'villager' (viz. dehāti, deh-neshin, dehghān, zār'eh, rustā, and ra'iyat) and these, rather than describing individuals, point to types of inter-relationships. Dehāti, for example, is never used by villagers, but rather by urban dwellers in reference to the 'uncivilized peasant'. Deh-neshin refers to someone who has merely settled down in a village. Dehghān has been translated as 'peasant' or 'farmer', and Ono uses it to mean 'villager'. Lambton on the other hand defines it as meaning 'peasant' or 'peasant attached to a ploughland' with a former meaning of 'landed proprietor or head of a village who held certain lands by hereditary right and acted as the government tax collector'. 1 'Ajami restricts the term to those peasants who received land through the land reform and translates the term as 'peasant

proprietor'. Zār'eh is translated as 'crop-sharing peasant',
attached to a 'farm' (mazrā'eh) in which he is engaged in cul-
tivation (zerā'at). Rustā is translated as 'peasant' and
would appear to be equivalent to our 'rustic'. Ra'iyat,
although more commonly used as a term which indicates a 'crop-
sharing peasant', has a much wider connotation and is trans-
lated as 'subject'. The terms dehghān, zār'eh, and rustā, as
well as keshāvarz (lit. 'engaged in agriculture') in addition
to representing relationships to the land, are used by people
in the Ayub valley as surnames.

With changes in official attitudes accompanied by increas-
ing central control certain of these terms have been discred-
ted and officially replaced. We have already mentioned that
the term 'kadkhodā' has undergone considerable changes as a
result of its increasing association with official representa-
tion in the village through the mālek. Because of the assault,
through the land reform programme on the 'feudal landlords'
(the mālekin) it has been officially replaced by ra'is, meaning
more generally headman. Traditionally however it would seem
that it was used to refer to the head of a kinship group, and
is still used in this way in the official tribal hierarchies
of such groups as the Qashqai. Similarly the term 'raiyat'
(or 'subject') indicating a quasi-feudal relationship between
'landlord' and 'peasant', enshrined in what is generally referred
to as the 'mālek-ra'iyat system', has also been 'de-graded'.
Official translations now speak of 'peasant proprietors'
(dehghān) and of 'large landowners' rather than 'landlords', although the conflation of landownership and landlordship still remains and it is difficult to effectively replace the term mālek. It would seem that a suitable term which separates landownership from landlordship, i.e. formal landownership from the exercise of a certain type of authority, has not been found (and people like Abdulāhi cannot be referred to as farmers). By using the term dehghān however, the position of the former ra'iyat' has been nominally raised. 'Ajami for example finds it easy to talk of the 'remnants of the 'arbāb-ra'iyat system' and treat it disparagingly as unproductive, but in referring to the interest of what he calls 'the former mālek', he identifies it as the 'mechanised estate' without introducing any analysis of the relations of production obtaining on that estate (which use of the term mālek-ra'iyat implicitly did). As with the 'tolombeh-kār system' it is defined in terms of technology. One can speak of 'tolombeh-kārān' (i.e. those who work with motor pumps) but there is no such term for those who work on the mechanised estate ('mechanizeh-kārān'?). Perhaps this sort of landowner would like to be known as a 'farmer' but 'mālek' remains as the only viable term by which one can refer to this sort of 'farmer'.

Terms which emphasised traditional relations of production are replaced in favour of what are perceived as more value-neutral terms; terms reflecting a changing emphasis as well as indicating changes in the relations of production - changes which in many respects were more apparent than real.
So that officially one cannot speak of the interests of the 'mālek, except in a negative sense, but rather of the 'mechanised estates of the former mālek', as though the personalities and the contexts in which the mālek operated have been somehow mythically transformed. Associated with this confusing plethora of interpretation are value loaded interpretations of the nature of social organisation at the village level. To examine these terms as indicators of particular functioning groups is to ignore the fact that they receive their definition in an ongoing practice which incorporates definite relations of production. There is a danger of accepting the terms as representative of particular forms, both in the separation of occupations and their association with particular personnel, and relatedly, in status differentiation which is often translated into actual 'class divisions within society.

Dehghān and Khwushneshin

In attempting therefore to analyse occupation differentiation within the village one is in danger of separating individual people from the 'totalising' role that the label represents. In Chamani for example, and in other villages, to use the term dehghān to describe those villagers who received land under land reform is to make an artificial distinction between them and other villagers, and to presume that this label somehow describes their distinctiveness. As we have seen, for some of these so-called 'peasant proprietors', income
from agricultural activity may not be of major importance, and to make a division between those who do and those who do not have land is to create an artificial distinction between villagers. Those who do not have rights to land have been recently lumped together under the label 'khushneshin' which has gained the more specific meaning of 'landless labourer' in the work of some interpreters. Lambton translates the term as those who do not have rights to land. In some of the older-settled villages these share-cropping rights might have tended to become hereditary, but in Chamani, as in other newly settled villages, it was first and foremost the mâlek who decided who would and who would not have access to land and, who was in the position to change his mind when and if he wished. The land reform laws, which translated these rights into formal ownership, rigidified an association which had not necessarily any continuity. It was a shifting arrangement controlled by the mâlek to provide workers for the cultivation of his land.

Having occurred, this accident of legislation has been subsequently imposed upon pre-reform history to provide an accepted, timeless interpretation of social organisation within village Iran. The problems of the khushneshin seem to have been first isolated, however, by Iranian social scientists in

1. Lambton 1969, p.370: "inhabitant of a village who is neither landowner, peasant, nor agricultural labourer". In these terms khushneshin does not include landless labourers. But see Hooglund (1973): "The overwhelming majority of khushneshin, however do not have any work. These are the agricultural labourers." (p.236).
the late '60s, and the category has come to be regarded by some as one of the chief means through which social differences within the village are interpreted. 'Ajami thus states that the khwushneshin have been effectively excluded from participating in village affairs, and this exclusion has produced 'bitter class consciousness':

"There is a sense of isolation and lack of belonging to the village community among the khwushneshin families. They rarely participate in community development projects."

('Ajami 1969, p.65)

It is true that the government legislation for the creation of village councils did exclude non-landowners from representation on that body, but to use the term as a means of differentiating within the village between significant social groups is a major distortion of reality in the Ayub valley.

The term khwushneshin is an indistinct one, used in some areas to identify those villagers who, although based in one village, gain their livelihood other than by continuous cultivation of that village's lands, i.e. they may be involved in taking the village's animals to find grazing, or in moving around from one harvest to another helping when required. It is defined by Haim as meaning 'colonizer, new settler', from neshin meaning 'settled' and 'khwush' meaning 'happy, gay, well, pleasant, good, lucky, prosperous', with the presumed

implication that such people were without ties,¹ and Khosrovi translates the term khwush as 'free'. ² Thus khwushneshin is distinguished from dehneshin (village dweller), shahrneshin (city dweller) and chadorneshin (tent dweller). There is no justification for saying that the khwushneshin are defined as a group by the fact that they had no cultivation rights; neither did any of the women.³

According to 'Ajami it is the khwushneshin who suffer 'relative deprivation', and it is they who are the major 'achievers' in the village.⁴ He puts forward data from villages in the Marvdasht plain to justify this claim. It is they who are motivated to look for new opportunities. The khwushneshin appear to have been defined in a negative way and focused on for analysis because of the supposed importance attached to gaining land during the land reform programme. Thus Miller asserts that:

"A feeling of discontent is growing among the khoshneshin (who comprise 40% of this village)."

(1964, p.594)

The distribution of land in the Ayub valley has not particularly enhanced the economic position of the majority of villagers, and thus the distinction between dehghān and khwushneshin has even less relevance. To state, as 'Ajami does, that

¹. Haim, op.cit.; p.282.
³. Hooglund revealingly states that: it should be pointed out that neither peasants, nor khwushneshin necessarily recognise the validity of this, or any other, classification system (ibid., p.231).
perhaps half the population in the plain falls within this category is in fact to underestimate their numbers if they are defined as those without rights to land. They might in fact be expected to incorporate upwards of 90% of the population. Can the so-called 'problem of the khwushneshin' then mean anything? What does it in fact mean to try and identify this 'group' as the potentially 'revolutionary class in the Iranian countryside'? Much more relevant to explore is the process which, on the one hand 'traditionalises' the agricultural work of those who did receive land, and on the other obliges a much larger group of people to seek alternative employment on the labour market.

The category 'khwushneshin' includes the auxiliary labour available within the village; from those who work for others in the fields on a semi-permanent basis, to those who wander from village to village to work at peak periods. It also includes itinerant as well as settled merchants, public servants employed within the village, such as field watchmen (dashtebān), bath-house attendants (hammāmi), barbers (salmāni), and carpenters (najār). In the 'traditional' village the position of these persons was just as secure as any other group, and to say that their 'residential rights' are far from secure, as Ono does, is to ignore their integral participation in the process of village affairs; the result again perhaps of taking the village as the unit of analysis rather than looking

1. Ono, op.cit., p.460.
beyond it. Many 'residential rights' are now in jeopardy, not because the villagers do not or cannot exercise them, but because, firstly they are not necessarily formulated in such rigid terms, and secondly present economic conditions do not provide, if they ever did, sufficient resources within the village framework. In Chamani such 'residential rights' were not given a great deal of attention, because of the ability of the landlord to evict villagers who did not conform, and also because of the extra-village interests that have been a normal part of 'village life'.

The opposition that has been generated between dehghan and khwushneshin serves to disguise, as the land reform which was partially responsible for the creation of the opposition also serves to disguise, a more fundamental process. As Halliday maintains, perhaps the only rationale for land reform was:

"the alteration of landownership by the state in order to encourage the growth of a home market and a capitalist class structure in the Iranian countryside."

(1979, p.105)

Lenin defined the spread of capitalism as being associated with three processes; the spread of commodity relations through which land and labour become separated from each other and become objects of exchange, to be bought and sold on the market, and through which the agricultural product becomes a commodity in a situation in which money becomes the major medium of exchange; the growth of a home market, and the growth of a capitalist class structure in which the term 'peasant' no longer indicates membership in a particular class, since it
covers both those who own land and those who have only their labour to sell.¹

The categories which have been used to describe the activities of individuals, 'landless labourers', 'wage labourers', 'landowners', begin to break down once one begins to look at the particular configurations of the activities within the context in which they are set. Similarly with the categories 'merchant' or 'trader'. It is even more confusing when it is understood that the actors are not representative of individuals acting alone, but are constituent parts of households and larger cooperative organisations such as the herāseh.

Thus Hooglund's classification of Khwushneshin into three categories (viz. the rural bourgeoisie, the non-agricultural worker, and the agricultural labourer)² disguises the fact that all three may be found in any one family and that any individual might be engaged at different times in several activities. Agricultural labourers and non-agricultural workers might also be landowners in their own right.

This is perhaps more of a problem associated with the circumscription of particular units of analysis, and the separation that such a process involves for, in this case, the various occupational divisions, and their integration, not only within the wider social fabric from which they cannot ultimately be divorced, but also from the domestic context in which

1. Lenin, V., The development of capitalism in Russia, Moscow 1956, quoted in Halliday, 1979, p.104.
they are embedded. Attempts to hierarchise rural social organisation according to such occupational divisions, and the construction of a stratified model of rural society, tend to perpetuate divisions which are never so discrete. It is necessary therefore to utilize different units of analysis in attempts to characterise social organisation in the Marvdasht plain in order to reveal the multi-faceted nature of the processes involved in change and in order to circumvent the rigidifying tendencies associated with the concentration on particular perceived forms.

This concentration on form, to the detriment of an understanding of the processes involved, is based on an idea of 'systems' and 'structures' in which pattern is observed through the arrangement of the parts in some wider anatomical or morphological whole. But, as Giddens has pointed out:

"there is no 'pattern' in human social life apart from the regularities involved in systems of interaction...
In the theory of structuration, 'structure' is conceptualised as generative rules and resources drawn upon by actors in the production and reproduction of systems of interaction."

(Giddens 1977, p.14)

The 'form' produced then is little more than the Aristotelian shadow projected onto the cave wall; a transient projection which encapsulates a particular configuration of events and inter-actions. Such an encapsulation is often reified, in the functionalist tradition, to produce substantive and supposedly substantial forms - strata in society which can be objectively
discerned, or configurations of personnel which are given some objective unity, such as an occupational division (khwushneshin), or the household, or even the tribe.

One such projection is that derived from the characterisation of interactions in terms of kinship, where kinship is used as an ideological tool for the 'explanation' of interactions and is seen as the basis of the construction of most inter-relationships (i.e. the ideological pre-suppositions by which people 'explain' the nature of their involvement with others is in terms of kinship). Kinship still serves as a very important means by which villagers, and others involved in village production, explain their interaction with others, not just in the realms of 'household production', but also through the legitimisation of what Alavi terms 'primordial loyalties' in kinship terms.\(^1\) An attempt is made in subsequent chapters to analyse the importance that is placed on kinship connections, by moving 'out' from the domestic organisation of production to the wider organisations that are predicated in kinship terms and their importance for villagers in the Ayub valley in their struggle to come to terms with changing politico-economic circumstances.

Such an analysis is also associated with attempts to move beyond the concept of 'peasant' which, either fail to specify the internal differentiations that are to be found within peasant societies by treating them as 'communities' and stressing

\(^1\) Alavi, op.cit.
the unity which pervades such 'societies', or which, through a concentration of the 'functioning' inter-relationship of parts within this empiricist form fails to appreciate its formation in terms of the 'outside' of which it is both part and from which it cannot be ultimately isolated. The 'process of 'peasantisation' which stresses the creation of a 'peasantry' stresses the part that this 'outside' plays in the formation of a type of inter-relationship with the wider environment, and focuses on the processes involved in the creation of separate forms.

1. See for example Stavenhagen who, following Shanin, uses four characteristics to describe peasantry as a general type of rural population: 1) the peasant family farm as the basic unit of multi-dimensional social organisation; 2) land husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly providing the major part of consumption needs; 3) specific traditional culture related to the way of life of small communities; and 4) the underdog position - the domination of peasantry by outsiders" (Stavenhagen 1975, p.66). See also Shanin 1971 and 1972.

2. Recently significant attempts have been made to overcome the problems associated with using the concept of 'peasantry'. In particular see Ennew et al. 1977, Bernstein 1979 and Friedmann 1980. Friedmann maintains, for example, that 'peasant' is not a concept, "but it cannot simply be replaced with existing concepts because it does not refer to a unique set of production relations ... 'peasants' with specific class relations, such as sharecroppers and immobile landless labourers, require specifications distinct from each other and from households in full possession of the means of production. The term 'peasant' must give way to analytical specification of forms of production based on internal characteristics of the unit and external characteristics of the social formation"(Friedmann 1980, p.160). And Bernstein points out that:

"Rural cultivators that we descriptively term 'peasants' have existed in very different types of societies and in different historical epochs - for example, European and Japanese feudalism, the pre-capitalist agrarian empires of India and China, or in the many countries of the Third World today where colonialism has been a major historical force in creating peasantries with specific characteristics. It follows that such a general definition of peasants is ahistorical, and at best has only a descriptive utility" (Bernstein, 1979, p.423).
The stratification of villagers according to occupations must thus be approached with caution. Various opportunities were open to individuals and their families at various times of the year and these have been expanded by the increased availability of wage labour away from more permanent places of residence.

Cooperation for the provision of basic goods and services within the village obviously does involve specialisation but this does not necessarily imply specialisation between families rather specialisation within families where the family attempts to provide all the necessary resources for the maintenance of its independence. In the larger, older settlements this would seem to be less easy as the demands on specialist services, such as the carpenter or the blacksmith, increase and such occupations tend to occupy a majority of the time of practitioners. But even this should not be divorced from the familial context in which most such production was supported. Similarly certain villages might specialise in the production of particular goods, such as pots, or shoes, or the provision of irrigators, but again this seems to have been supplementary to family provision of other essential goods and services.

The 'village community' cannot be identified as some undifferentiated entity. There are a whole host of specialisations and diversifications of labour which link one village to another and which link the village to the city and the wider environment. Members of rural settlements are still apparently committed to a degree of self-sufficiency supported by the
cooperation of kin and close allies but are also committed to a whole host of inter-connections within and between settlements, which make the idea of self-sufficiency more a myth than a reality, and which ultimately disguise the nature of domination by people who are seen as 'outside' the 'community' and thus distanced from its internal dynamics.

Village specialists

Within the village a number of relatively distinct specialisations are apparent. In the smaller villages in the Marvdasht plain, however, these cannot be assumed to separate individuals from the familial context in which production is embedded. As a result of the conceptualisation of the village as a 'community' and of legislative attempts to reinforce such a view particularly during the reign of Reza Shah, it is tempting to see these specialists as serving a community. As will hopefully become apparent their activities cannot be divorced from the context in which they are undertaken. Many combine these interests with other occupations and are but one facet of a multi-faceted familial organisation of production.

Dashtebân (Village Watchman)

In most villages a person was employed to make sure that the village animals did not stray on to the cultivated fields. He was normally employed by the village and received, from the kadkhodâ a portion of the harvest reserved for communal expenses. His job was not highly regarded and the dashtebâns made up the
lowest strata of the agricultural population. In Chamani there were two watchmen, one Hosein Khān (No. 30) was in Abdulāhi's payment, the other Karim Marzebān (No. 26) was employed by the villagers themselves. Hosein Khān, whose family lived elsewhere in the plain and who belonged to the once nomadic Nafar tribe, came to the village with his marriage to the sister of Hosein Dadkhā (No. 23). A man of limited intelligence Hosein Khān was regarded as the village idiot. He had no connections with his paternal kin. His marriage was the only uxorilocal marriage recorded in the village. He lived with his wife and one small daughter in one room in the courtyard in which his brother-in-law lived.

His duties as dashtebān were not particularly onerous, but they were regarded as of very low status and much of his work was described as 'kār-e-zanān' (women's work). He was responsible for fetching water every day from the spring at Imamzādeh Ayub (the only source of drinking water for the village) to supply the landlord's house. He also looked after the landlord's cows which were housed in pens adjoining the landlord's house. He also had other menial tasks to perform when necessary, like cleaning the house or feeding the horses. For his work he did not receive a cash income, being remunerated in a similar sort of way to the shepherds employed by Abdulāhi. He received 500 mann of grain per year which was deposited in the village shop from which he obtained virtually all his provisions for the support of himself and his family. The landlord occasionally provided him with changes of clothing and
cloth shoes (giveh) as well as with surplus food from the landlord's table. In addition he received small amounts of cash from the landlord at New Year and from such things as the sale of landlord's cows. But cash did not figure prominently in his income. He was tied to Chamani and the landlord's employment and rarely managed to get out of the village. He was in an analogous position to many of the women in the village, being in a situation of complete dependence on others.

Hosein Khan was not, however, the only dashtebān in the village. The villagers themselves employed Karim to take care of the herd of cows and donkeys which were taken out to pasture every day. He was in a very different position, however, from that of Hosein Khan. He, together with his brother with whom he shares a courtyard in the village came to Chamani from Marvdasht. They were both landowners in the village and were attached to the heraseh of the Baneshi Lurs. Prior to Abdulahi's involvement in Chamani Karim was the housekeeper of what is now Abdulahi's house.

A totalising conception of the nature of the dashtebān is in danger of ignoring the very different associations that these two people have to the production process. One completely dependent on the landlord, the other a landowner whose identification as dashtebān is only part of a wider involvement, with his brother, in agriculture within the village.
The Hammāmi (bath-house keeper)

The bath-house (hammām) is a feature of many villages in the plain. As a result of recent development programmes many villages, especially the larger ones, have opted for the construction of a hammām as a priority in their community development programmes. These range from the large bath-houses staffed by full-time specialists in the larger villages to the one-room makeshift establishments in smaller villages such as Buraki and Chamani. In these former villages the hammāmi belongs to a particular occupational group, members of which are to be found in several villages. Because of the nature of their occupations they are regarded as religiously unclean and of very low status. Marriages between them and other members of the village were restricted. However, because of the large numbers of hammāms recently constructed in several villages in the plain their services were in demand and they were able to secure higher payments than the ordinary agricultural labourer.

In the smaller villages the separation of bath-house keeper from other sections of the village population was not as distinct. In Chamani, for example, it was Keyar, the son of Kamar Khan Rusta (No.18), one of the larger herd owners in the village who constructed a crude, one-room hammām. This was fired by oil which heated the two water-filled oil drums placed on the roof. It was provided to other villagers at a small cost. In Buraki a similar construction had been built by Mashd Baber, a member of the village council. Both Keyar and Mashd Baber were landowners and the former was also engaged by
Abdulahi as a builder. They did not regard the provision of the bath house as a community facility. Its construction earned them merit but did not occupy much of their time and was open to select groups of people rather than to the public generally.

The Salmani (barber)

Specialist barbers were also to be found in many villages. Again the older, larger villages contained barbers who came from specialist families. Again in the smaller villages this separation was not as apparent. In Chamani, the barber was Rahim, the son of Mahd Taghi (No. 23). He was a small landowner and his activities did not take up a great deal of his time. He was paid 10 rials per hair cut by some and given a small, but variable proportion of the harvest by others in return for his services. In addition to cutting hair and shaving he was also brought in for circumcisions, but villagers increasingly resorted to urban clinics for such operations.

The Najjar (carpenter)

Again in the larger villages a specialist carpenter was to be found who made and repaired agricultural equipment. In the smaller villages the carpenter, resident in one village often supplied the requirements of several neighbouring villages. Thus in Chamani, Agha Jan (No. 12) a person allied to the Rusta Turks and married to Mashd Mehvi, the foremost carpet maker in the village, was the carpenter. He served the villages
of Buraki, Pol-e-No and Uanjan as well as Chamani. He main-
tained a small garden in Buraki from which he obtained some
of his timber. He provided these villages with wooden ploughs
and replaced worn out parts, as well as wooden beams for roof
construction and pitch forks and ridge-makers. He also rep-
aired other wooden articles. For this service he received
500 mann of wheat and barley from each village, every year.
Agha Jān was also a landowner. In the more isolated villages
of the plain the carpenter was also responsible for the wooden
threshing sledge, now increasingly replaced by the tractor.
More specialist services, provided in Marvdasht and Shiraz, have
considerably reduced the work that such village-based
carpenters do.

The Bannā (builder)

There are a number of builders to be found in the villages
but, not until recently has this been classified as a special-
ist occupation. As more villagers have taken up work on urban
construction sites in Marvdasht and Shiraz certain individuals
have gained an increased expertise and modern houses, outside
the main gha'leh reflect the introduction of urban designs and
building techniques. Not one person derived their sole income
from building and most villagers were able to carry out their
own repairs. Certain individuals were noted for their plaster-
ing abilities. Mutual help seems to have been flexibly reward-
ed according to the relationship between the parties involved
but as cash transactions became increasingly common, contracts
of a more formal nature, especially in Chamani for work for the large landowner, were negotiated, and work on village projects was remunerated in cash.

In addition to these specialists identified in terms of the so-called 'traditional' organisation of village production, there are also others such as musicians, tinkers and itinerant peddlars as well as religious specialists, who visit the village from time to time. The tinker and the lamp mender were temporarily resident outside the village, setting up their black tents and staying for perhaps one week during the year, mending pots and pans, sharpening knives and mending lamps. After which they move on. The musicians were employed at weddings, and came from the urban centres.

The smaller villages were not able to support a resident mullah and many of them did not have mosques. But itinerant mullahs and sayyids were frequent visitors, especially at harvest time when they would be given gifts of cash and food in return for services rendered. These religious functionaries provided charms and amulets against infertility, various illnesses and the evil eye, as well as legitimating marriage services and settling disputes between villagers.

The growth of Marvdasht

Many of the goods and services which were once either provided within the village or by specialists within other villages have now been concentrated in Marvdasht which has grown into a major servicing and marketing centre for the plain. The increased
availability of cheap motorised transport means that the town is within easy reach of most of the many villages in the plain. Most iron goods for example are now produced and sold in Marvdasht and much of the former work of carpenters, especially in the provision of personal items of furniture (beds and storage boxes) are produced there. The work of the village carpenter is increasingly confined to minor repairs. Itinerant merchants and peddlars are seasonally based in the town and travel out with their goods on the backs of motor-cycles to the villages of the plain selling plastic goods, cotton cloth and haberdashery.

Marvdasht is also important as the administrative centre of the plain. Here are the local courts, the secondary schools and the social welfare facilities which are not available in most villages. Many villagers have relations and friends in this rapidly expanding town with whom they can stay and some have bought land and houses in the town which they use as bases during their visits there. Much of the agricultural surplus from the villages are channelled through merchants in the bazaar there and large numbers of shops provide a wide variety of consumer goods and specialist services. Wool is brought into the town for dyeing and much wool is available for sale. In addition to shops there are a number of mosques and hammâms used by the villagers, as well as private doctors.

Villagers and village shopkeepers have constructed specialties with particular shops or particular parts of the bazaar. These shops are often owned by relatives of villagers and serve
as foci for particular villages in the town. Sectors of the town also serve as centres for the rural population of particular areas. The shops as well as the houses of relations in Marvdasht serve as storage points for goods in transit to the villages and as postal addresses for the village. Thus a small number of shops on the main street of Marvdasht, selling a variety of goods from cotton cloth to meat, dyed wool and general supplies serves the whole of north Ramjerd. They were linked to these villages through the frequent visits of villagers as well as by a land rover which called at least once per day and transported both people and goods. This land rover brought such things as meat, vegetables and paraffin on demand from the town, goods not normally available in the village shop. Most goods were obtained from the small number of closely interlinked shops on the main street, which was the 'bus stop' as well as the 'post office' for north Ramjerd.¹

The whole plain is criss-crossed by such services and networks of alliances which integrate diverse parts of the plain through Marvdasht and serve to stress the interdependence of settlements. Many of the smaller landowners had residences in Marvdasht and many of the town dwellers were from villages in the area.

1. The land rover driver, Ghasem Ali, came from the village of Ghasemabad in southern Ramjerd (see fig. 7). He owned land in that village which was cultivated by relatives who remained in the village.
In addition to its place as a service centre, Marvdasht was also a major production centre. The sugar beet refinery employed, on a seasonal basis, large numbers of villagers. Construction work and machine repair shops and small productive enterprises also absorbed labour from the surrounding villages. Marvdasht has grown very rapidly, from being merely a small, temporary settlement around the newly completed sugar beet refinery to its present population of about 30,000 in the course of just over a generation. The population is derived chiefly from the villages of the plain.

Migration and Wage Labour

As the Marvdasht plain has been increasingly utilised for commercial crop production the local economy of the area has become increasingly diversified. The numbers of those engaged primarily in agriculture have decreased and the numbers of small-scale entrepreneurs have increased. These appear to survive in the face of modern capitalist development by a readiness to undertake the less profitable types of production and services. Such entrepreneurs have provided the basis for the expansion of the town of Marvdasht as the small trader, or transporter seeks to sell or obtain products in areas which are relatively isolated.

The more successful rural entrepreneurs have apparently left many of the villages and established themselves in Marvdasht. The most successful and the better educated represent those groups which are most 'free' to undertake this movement
from village to town. Their labour in the village has been compensated by hiring others to do their work, or relying on others within the household group to cultivate their land. In the first instance it would appear that the skilled and prosperous are the first to migrate, rather than the poor or those who did not receive rights to the land (the khwushneshin).

It is the women, the very old, and the very young who are left behind in the village as a result of occupational diversification. As a result of the land reform programme and mechanisation fewer workers are required on the village land. Machinery decreases the labour intensive demands of traditional agriculture and the reduction of land available to the villager for production increases pressure to diversify. The richer members of the village can employ others to do their work. Labourers are attracted from poorer more isolated areas and employed as wage labourers by those who move out or move into different occupations.

Activities external to the village have undoubtedly increased in recent years as a result of changes in tenurial conditions and associated loss of opportunities in village agriculture, and with increased opportunities available outside the village. But the importance of extra village connections before land reform should not be under-estimated. The 'traditional' picture of itinerant workers and merchants moving from village to village in search of work and markets has its 'modern' analogue in migrant wage labour and the seasonal move-
ment of men and machines over wide stretches of the countryside. In Chamani, Hasanjan Baneshi (No.4), the village shop-keeper, himself a small landowner had bought, with 'Abbas Hoseini, the representative of the landlord in Buraki, a combine harvester. This was garaged in Chamani and driven by Karim Zahreh (No.28). In spring it was taken down to the plains of Khuzestan and followed the harvests up from the coast into the higher reaches of the southern Zagros. This was not an isolated example. Large numbers of combines could be seen at this time on the move towards the harvests.¹

Similarly Javad Rusta (No.7) had invested in a tractor, again with Rusta Turks from Junaki. This was employed in various places throughout the year. The rates charged for these machines varied according to the nature of the land and, in the case of the tractor, the nature of the work. The combine owner was remunerated in terms of a proportion of the harvest, which was however increasingly translated into cash terms. The tractor owner was remunerated in cash according to the amount and type of land involved. Agricultural labourers still travelled from village to village at peak times but their place was being increasingly taken by the seemingly more efficient machines. The hiring on a short term basis of such facilities was within the financial reach of those with insufficient land

¹ A proportion of Hasanjan Baneshi's time away from the village was spent negotiating contracts for the utilization of his combine harvester.
to justify the purchase of one themselves. And it was often cheaper for those with sufficient land to hire-in these facilities than to invest in them themselves. Combine harvesters had become so widespread in recent years that, unless one was willing to spend considerable time and energy on their maintenance and in moving them from harvest to harvest, they were not considered profitable investments. In the early '60s informants maintained that a combine owner could virtually guarantee 20% of the harvest. In the early '70s this had been reduced to about 8% and necessitated their deployment over wide areas to make them yield returns.

A discussion of occupational differentiation which focuses on differences between villagers according to the different occupations of those villagers not only disguises the fact that any one person may be associated with different types of work at different times, and that households may employ their available labour resources in different ways. It also disguises the many extra village activities and personnel that are vital to an understanding of social organisation in the plain. It also, and perhaps most importantly, disguises the relations of domination between those identified as holding different occupations and the ways in which such inequalities are established and maintained. In this way the village is perceived as a homogeneous whole and the inequalities which are evident within the village and between villages as well as those between large landlord and peasant remain unexplainable.
It is difficult to make rigid distinctions between those who do and those who do not earn their livings from wage labour as the nature of interdependence in the local economy ensures their integration within a productive enterprise based on the family group. No one in the villages in the Ayub valley was totally reliant on wage income for maintenance of livelihood. In Chamani the only people who were remunerated with a regular wage were those permanently employed by Abdulahi but this was not considered by them to be their only source of income and their relationships with Abdulahi were those of personal servants rather than wage labourers.

The expansion of opportunities within the plain and in Shiraz took a variety of forms. In a small minority of cases it involved the more or less permanent movement of people from the village to the town where they obtained permanent employment or set up in business on their own. In the great majority of cases it seems to have involved seasonal movements from the village to obtain work in the city, while retaining significant interests in the village.

Wage labour was perceived as a supplement to family income which was still based in the agro-pastoral combine. Several families in Chamani had members who were away from the village, some for short periods, others for more extended periods. In areas of the plain towards Lake Bakhtegan in the east, and in areas further south towards the gulf it was not unusual to find villages in which a majority of the able-bodied males were away working in the oil-fields. Some had been away for a
number of years but sent regular remittances back to support their families in the village. Some had managed to establish successful businesses in places like Bahrein or Kuwait, others were on short term labour contracts. Savings from such migrant work were invested in a number of things, ranging from the purchase of consumer durables, to investment in new housing and in the education of children. In addition villagers, through a complex kinship network, invested in service facilities in the urban areas (taxi cabs, shops, street vendors' stalls).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s much work was available for village labourers at the dam or in the construction of canals from the dam. The Ordibehesht company, with its base in Chamani employed about 50% of the able-bodied male population of the valley and contracted for the use of machinery and transport which villagers had available in the form of tractors and mini-buses. Daily wages for these workers were no more than those earned as agricultural labourers (about 80 rials per day). There were gross fluctuations in the numbers employed as well as in the people who sought employment at any one time. The permanent employees of the company were city dwellers. Villagers only worked when they felt like it; there was no regular commitment to the companies and many contracts were very short term. A minority of villagers were employed on monthly contracts and these received, in addition to a slightly higher wage, free insurance which entitled them to free medical services and contributed towards a state pension. The majority, however, were signed on on a daily basis.
For the majority of villagers the diverse interests of their families, provided the independence necessary to maintain an adequate livelihood. Few were obliged to move permanently away from the village and join the ranks of the urban unemployed as is frequently reported in studies of agrarian change. Those who did move tended to be the most able entrepreneurs and those with the greatest resources. They rarely gave up their interests in the village. In Buraki for example the landlord's representative had sent his son to Shiraz to receive a higher education and there he lived with a brother who had moved out of the village some 20 years previously to buy land in the city and start his own retail business. Most villagers had relations of one sort or another in the urban centres and these were used as bases for frequent visits. Most villagers made seasonal visits to Shiraz to visit the shrine of Shah Cherogh, an important Shi'a pilgrim centre and to consult the doctor. The able-bodied men were often away from the village for extended periods of time. It is not primarily the poor who have enjoyed increased mobility as a result of economic differentiation, but rather the rich or comparatively rich within the village population who have been able to avail themselves of new opportunities.

In Chamani the criterion of land-ownership then seems to have little correlation with the overall nature of employment opportunities. Perhaps because of the nature of the village, the full-time, discrete, specialists that are found in the larger villages are not found. The divisions of families
according to occupational types is minimal, although at any one time a variety of opportunities are exploited by each household. The ownership of land at this level does not in itself indicate increased access to material resources and indeed some of the poorest families in Chamani are to be found among the so-called 'dehghāniān'. A picture emerges of a village population that has always been involved with 'the outside' and which has been obliged to elaborate the nature of these ties through restrictions on village land use. This is represented, not only in the relationships that the inhabitants of the village themselves have constructed, but also in the scattered nature of the interests of people like Abdulāhi and the scattered origins of the people he employs.

Any separation between agricultural and non-agricultural work, or between those employed and those unemployed produces an arbitrary division based on a particular perception of reality which does not match the divisions imposed by the villagers themselves. Recent changes in tenurial conditions have required a certain re-orientation for villagers, but it is not adequate to say that those who have been denied access to land have been pushed out of the village and joined the ranks of the migrant wage labourers. Unless one analyses the context in which the changes have been taking place, and the historical organisation of production, one is in danger of atomistically isolating the individual as the locus of decision-making and seeing him as divorced from the complex links that bind him to networks of kin and associates; of imposing a particular pattern
of reality which ignores the fact that occupational specialisation may be conceived of very differently in the strategies that households use in their attempts to maintain a livelihood. The optimizing logic of the formal economist ignores the multifaceted nature of what might be described as the larger, 'informal' economic sphere, where optimization methodology may involve the accumulation of such things as 'symbolic capital', by the deployment of strategies that would not necessarily be described as economic in any narrow sense.¹

The sexual division of labour

Little so far has been said about the work of women or their role within rural production. With increased occupational differentiation among the male population it is the women who appear to be much more immobile. In villages where many men-folk are away as migrants the women keep the household together, sometimes supervise agricultural production and, in the absence of others, either male relations or hired labourers, may work in the fields at peak periods. It would appear that under normal circumstances the women are not involved in cultivation and that it is only the poorer households, where labour is scarce do women help with such work.

¹. Bourdieu uses this term in his analyses of the interrelationships between good-faith economies and bad faith economies. "The only way to escape from the ethnocentric naiveties of economism, without falling into populist exaltation of the generous naivety of earlier forms of society, is to carry out in full what economism does only partially, and to extend economic calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation" (Bourdieu 1977, pp.177-8). And "symbolic capital, which in the form of the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name is readily convertible back into economic capital, is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in a society in which the
Their role in the domestic economy is however much greater. Formal cultivation does not require large amounts of labour except at peak periods and commentators have remarked on under-employment among men in the traditional agricultural sector, when they might have little to do on the fields themselves for several months of the year. This is not the case with women who are primarily involved in processing rural products, whether using dairy products to produce yogurt, cheese, curds or butter, spinning and weaving the wool into carpets or other woollen goods, or milling grain and baking bread. These tasks are central to the maintenance of the rural household, although they are less publicised and involve the women in much more continuous work for longer periods of time. This is in addition to their role of managing the domestic budget, looking after the children of the household, and fetching drinking water. Despite the existence of electric-powered flour mills in many settlements much grinding was done by hand. Similarly spun and dyed wool was available for purchase in the bazaar in Marvdasht but most women spun the wool themselves although all the wool was now dyed commercially in the town.

Being largely carried out within the family courtyard, many of women's activities remained partially concealed and such concealment has tended to underestimate their contribution to the family economy. In the Ayub valley the production of woven woollen goods was an important occupation and provided a

Note 1 from previous page cont.

severity of the climate ... and the limited technical resources demand collective labour" (ibid., p.179).
considerable source of cash income to the household. In Chamani 23 of the 34 households had women who produced carpets. Chamani was locally renowned for the quality of its small rugs, woven to a tribal design typical of the Turks in the area. The carpets acknowledged to be the best and worth most on the market, were those woven by the Turks in the village. Patterns are learned by heart and transmitted from mother to daughter. It is unusual for a woman to work on a carpet alone and she is normally accompanied by another female member of the family, or perhaps by an 'apprentice'. Carpet production is primarily a winter activity and a separate room in the house compound accommodates the loom. Learners were attached to older, skilled workers, both in the village and elsewhere, so that the daughter of Mashd Rahman (No.19) worked with and learned from Mashd Mehri, the wife of the village carpenter and the foremost carpet producer in the village, whereas the daughter of Mashd Hajali (No.27) was sent to work with her father's sister in Beiza. While Chamani was renowned for its rugs, Buraki specialised in the production of jajims (coarse, woven blankets used to cover seats or wrap bedding in). Together with these, produced virtually exclusively for sale, and as parts of a bride's dowry, very coarse saddle bags (khorjin) were also woven for everyday use in transportation and storage.

The rugs produced in Chamani in the early 1970s retailed for about 800 tomans on average and, given that each household produced between two and three carpets per year, this represented a cash income of between £100 and £200. Wool is provided
by individual flocks when available, otherwise it is bought locally, or in Marvdasht. It is spun and combed by hand before being sent to the various dyeing establishments in Marvdasht. All the dyes used are chemical. Approximately 6 mann, or 18 kilos of wool are required for each carpet and two women weaving steadily can complete one in about two months. One mann of wool cost approximately 45 tomans in 1971, but this was subject to very rapid increases in the following years. Returns for labour are, of course, minimal, but if there are any full-time specialists in the village it must surely be these carpet makers; many of the daylight hours of the winter months are spent in their production under often badly lit and cramped conditions.

The organisation of the carpet industry is in the hands of the men of the village and one or two have built up specialist interest as middlemen. In Chamani the person recognized as the most able in this respect was Hasanjan Baneshi (No.4), who was also the village shopkeeper. Others, such as Javād (No.7) and Akram Rusta (No.10), perhaps because of their ownership of animals as well as because of their standing in the village were also involved, but could not command the resources, in terms of contacts rather than capital, that Hasanjan could. He provided a variety of credit facilities for those who could not afford the initial capital outlay, or finance the whole production, and purchased the finished product for half its retail price. Although he himself, unlike Javād and Akram, had no animals in the Ayub valley he did have sheep with rela-
atives in Beiza and he obtained much of his wool from there. He had built up special relationships with one of the dyeing establishments and a small number of the carpet dealers in Marvdasht. Not only did Hasanjān deal with much of the carpet production in Chamani but with that of other villages in the valley. He was recognised for his bargaining skills and was called in to help in the sale of carpets produced by the villagers independently, to outsiders. Thus he was called in by Ali Naghi (No.21) Abdulāhi's housekeeper, when the former wished to sell the product of his wife's labour to the latter's brother.

Occasionally carpet buyers would visit the village, as Hasanjān visited other villages, and buy, or contract to buy, a certain number of finished items. Individual villagers who had themselves considerable interest in sheep and goats might also send the carpets to dealers in Marvdasht and Shiraz bazaars.

The role of carpets in the economy of the village should not be under-estimated. The cash income from them, controlled by the head of the household, paralleled the income from agricultural production and the sale of animals. As village agriculture and the agro-pastoral combine have been obliged to diversify it has also had to intensify as pressure on resources has increased. One means of intensifying production has been to increase carpet production and all carpets in Chamani for example now appear to be produced for commercial sale. This has involved an increase in the amount of time that the women are obliged to spend in making carpets.
With the rapidly increasing price of wool and carpets in the late '60s and early '70s, the income for all engaged in their production rose considerably. Carpets did not lose their value under the circumstances which were responsible for rapid increases in inflation during that time. Proportionally the income derived from their production increased as the price of wheat declined in the face of foreign imports. It might therefore be suggested that, rather than being a supplementary 'craft' industry which was marginal to basic agricultural production, carpet production provided the major source of cash income for those closely tied to village production.

**Merchants and traders in the village**

The expanding facilities and services provided by both Marvdasht and Shiraz, coupled with increased mobility, had served to centralize the production of certain sorts of goods in these places and to undermine the traditional work of village-based craftsmen. In the same way, whereas formerly villagers relied on the village shop for the provision of goods, not produced in the village, such goods were increasingly provided by retail outlets in the town where prices were cheaper, and choice greater.

Certain sorts of goods continued to be provided by village retail outlets which occupied an important position in the village economy. In the larger villages there were more formal retail institutions which specialised in specific sorts of goods. One development in recent years was the establishment of a
cooperative shop in the larger villages where a consumer cooperative paralleled the production cooperative which was set up with the establishment of the village councils and village development funds. Such shops provided agricultural produce, fertilizers, and heating fuel to village members as well as other types of household goods. The aim was to ensure the collective provision of essential goods while cutting out the excessive profits often taken by middlemen. The larger villages also often contained their own tea-houses (chai-khāneh) and butchers' shops.¹

In the smaller villages such specialist establishments were not to be found. A room in someone's house served to store such goods. These were relatively informal establishments with no opening hours and were usually operated by the women of the household. In Chamani, Hasanjān Baneshi (No.4) operated such a shop. In it he stocked a few consumer durables, such as kerosene lamps and bales of cloth, and other non-perishable commodities such as tea, sugar, soap, pens, cigarettes and tobacco, paper, salt, plastic shoes and sewing equipment. He also on occasion stocked kitchen utensils and children's clothes. He had different fruits and vegetables which were seasonally available. Anything that a villager wanted Hasanjān would obtain on demand in his frequent visits into town.²

¹ It would appear that those individuals who were already in charge of retail outlets within the village gained control of the new cooperative institutions.
² In addition to people using him for his bargaining skills and knowledge of the carpet industry they also valued his ability to negotiate the complexities of the urban bazaars.
Many of the transactions within the shop were in kind rather than in cash, as opposed to the shops in Marvdasht where transactions were predominantly in cash. The shop served as a centre for the collection and distribution of various village produce such as grain, eggs and wool. Much of these latter were exchanged for produce on sale in the shop. Stocks of grain and wool accumulated in the shop. Village specialists who received payment in kind deposited their grain with Hasanjan to provide the resources for future purchases from the shop. Hasanjan extended credit to villagers, repayable at harvest time in grain or wool. Prices paid in this shop were slightly higher than those paid in town.

The relationships built up between the shop-keeper and other villagers was complex. He not only helped with the financing, of carpet production in particular, but also acted as buyer for some villagers in the urban market because of his supposedly greater knowledge of commercial activities and seller of village products to outsiders.

This was the only formal retail establishment in Chamani. There were similar shops in the other villages in the plain. They were all controlled by relatively prosperous members of the village population. But shop-keeping only involved a portion of their energies and all were involved, either in village agriculture or other occupations outside the village. Hasanjan Baneshi for example was also a landowner although he left
cultivation of his land to others. The shop-keeper in Buraki was involved in rice production and, like Hasanjān, financed carpet production in that village. The shop-keeper in Pol-e-No was the head of the village council.

Other, usually much poorer individuals, were also periodically involved in certain retail activities. On occasional visits to town villagers bought excess quantities of such things as tobacco or chewing gum or toys which, because of their unperishable nature could be sold later when demanded. Others bought stocks of vegetables such as potatoes and tomatoes, not grown in the villages and hawked them among the villagers. One or two specialist traders travelled to the more physically isolated villages selling such produce for cash or for other products, such as grapes, that could be resold. Traders also bought such things as brushes from the town and traded these for cash or other goods.

Like the cultivation of more marginal land under nimeh kār contract by those who did not receive land under land reform, these trading activities seem to have expanded in recent years. Some traders spent days away hawking a donkey-load of potatoes where the effort required to realise even a small return was considerable. They served the more remote areas where the established retail traders in the city were unwilling to invest much time and energy because of the low profits to be gained thereby.
CHAPTER IX
THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

As long as attention is focused on village production and on differences in access to land, or on different sorts of occupations available to villagers, it remains very difficult to focus on the organisation of domestic production and on that framework which articulates the various activities of individuals into a coherent synthesis and provides the basis for the organisation of social life. In this chapter I want to shift attention to an analysis of the organisation of the household and household production, and look at the various strategies applied in attempts to deal with a changing social environment.

Although the 'household' is 'officialised' by the practice of policy-makers as well as social scientists, it forms the basic unit by which the available census material is constructed; like the village it is a tool for analysis rather than some isolable unit divorced from its social context. It may be the minimal unit 'for the organisation of the labour process', but it is not the only unit. It is necessary to examine the basic features of the 'household economy' as they are perceived by the villagers themselves, if that is possible,

through the analysis of particular families, and look at the relations of production which link households through relationships of increasing social distance. It is necessary to look at the nature of the relationships between different sorts of 'employers', the activities of cultural and economic brokers, and the work of state employees, as they affect village life and maintain relationships of domination which subordinate many villagers to the interests of others. If we maintain a distinction between, say, the state, the landlord, and the head of the household, it becomes difficult to examine the processes of subordination and the ways in which the more powerful are able to maintain their positions within society. In many ways the means by which the head of the household manipulates household resources has its parallels with the ways in which the landlord manipulates his resources, and the state is used to justify control over both people and resources.

Considerable attention has been given in recent years to what has been termed 'the domestic mode of production', based on the work of people like Chayanov and Sahlins. One of the major problems associated with the use of this concept as an analytical tool is the tendency for it to be seen as a formal entity, and in so doing, ignore, or 'externalise' other features of what become the 'outside', such as the landlord, or the tribal chief, or the state. Sahlins maintains however:

"clearly the DMP can only be a 'disarray lurking in the background' always present and never happening. It never really happens that the household by itself manages the economy, for, by itself the domestic stranglehold on production could only arrange for the expiration of society."

(1972, p.101)

Despite problems with its use and the identification of particular configurations of personnel, Sahlins identifies four major characteristics which give some definition to the way in which it may be appreciated, and give credibility to its use as an heuristic device. First of all there is the nature of the division of labour by sex whereby 'the normal activities of any adult man, taken in conjunction with the normal activities of any adult woman, practically exhaust the customary works of society'.\(^1\) Secondly there is the relationship between household groups and the tools that they use such that they can normally handle within the group all the tools necessary for their maintenance. Thirdly, production is for use rather than for exchange - for livelihood rather than for profit. From which the fourth characteristic emerges, which Sahlins terms 'Chayanov's rule': 'in the community of domestic producing units, the greater the relative working capacity of the household the less its members work'.\(^2\)

This domestic mode of production is then primarily geared to the production of livelihood and not to that of

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1. Sahlins, *op.cit.*, p.79
surplus. The major characteristics identified do provide a basis from which to approach domestic production in the Ayub valley, but they must be used with caution. It is worthwhile highlighting some of the problems associated with it at this point. Firstly, production and consumption have been so separated in the domestic economy that the independence of the man and the woman is no more than an ideal, perhaps an ideal perpetuated by villagers and others in their attempts to maintain independence. Independence is, however, largely illusory. The spread of different sorts of commodities means that the household employs items which are not, and cannot be produced by themselves or by other specialists within the village. It is only the poorest inhabitants, unable to afford some such commodities, who are more reliant on personal production than others, and such poverty does not necessarily qualify them for categorisation as independent because of the ways in which they are subordinated to richer members of society. The separation of production for livelihood from production for profit is also problematic, not only under circum-

1. Production for 'livelihood' is hypothetically separated from production for 'subsistence' in this case. It is presumed that production for subsistence involves conditions of production that have already resulted in the subordination of villagers to the 'exploitation' of a privileged minority. Production for livelihood, on the other hand, implies production geared to fulfilling needs. It is a theoretical distinction of orientation rather than an actual difference in the amounts produced.

2. As such it is related to the 'myth of equality' which was perceived to characterise Luri ideals of individual independence (see Black, 1972).
stances in which capitalist ideals have expanded to influence the nature of production, but also under so-called 'traditional' circumstances. The notion of livelihood and of profit presume two different sorts of society - the former based on egalitarian principles, the latter recognising inequalities associated with individual production. Again it is possible to suggest that such a separation is idealistic given the traditional control over resources exercised by a minority of, usually urban-resident, personnel. Thirdly, to suggest that the greater the working capacity of the household, the less its members work, and that this is any different from other forms of production (where those with control over resources invariably translate that control into increased access to leisure) is also idealistic. Some members may be able to translate the greater working capacity of the household into increased leisure, others, notably the women, are rarely in such a position. It might be maintained that under changing forms of production some are able to enjoy more leisure while others are obliged to increase the amounts of time devoted to work.

The idea of the 'domestic mode of production' parallels what Bordieu identifies as the 'good-faith economy', in that through the pooling of household resources a generalised system of reciprocity is set up and the formal calculation of exchange rates is abandoned (or 'domesticated'/'naturalised'). Pooling is then seen as a 'within' relationship whereas
reciprocity is a 'between' relationship. This then becomes something that is not necessarily specific to particular configurations of personnel identified in the field and formally circumscribed as separate households, but can also be used to circumscribe any 'within' or 'between' relationship, and thus include the 'within' relationships that supposedly characterise kinship groups, and by extension, tribal groups. Similarly it might also be used to characterise relationships between members of the state, for the general good. The concept of the 'domestic economy' is thus capable of disguising the 'domestication' process whereby prevailing relations of inequality appear as 'natural'.

An uncritical use of the terms 'household', 'family', and 'domestic unit', as if they were interchangeable and as if they could be divorced from the context in which they are situated, disguises the different processes involved in their construction and also the various approaches which underlie...

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1. C.f. Sahlins, *op.cit.*, p.188. "On a very general view, the array of economic transactions in the ethnographic record may be resolved into two types. First, those 'vice-versa' movements between two parties known familiarly as 'reciprocity' (A ↔ B). The second centralised movements; collection from members of a group, often under one hand, and redivision within this group.... This is 'pooling' or 'redistribution'. On an even more general view these two types merge. For pooling is an organisation of reciprocities, a system of reciprocities.... True, pooling and reciprocity may occur in the same social contexts - the same close kinsmen who pool their resources in household commensality, for instance, also as individuals share things with one another - but the precise social relations of pooling are not the same."
definitions in certain forms. Lineton, in his discussion of household organisation in southern Greece, looks at households as 'bundles of rights' which are not necessarily associated with common residence. But this does not really go far enough and is still rooted in an attempt to isolate the household as a 'formal' entity. As Sahlins has maintained, the household economy exists in the totalising schema of the observers, and it is perhaps only in confrontation with extra-ordinary events (including the confrontation with foreign anthropologists) that the solidarity of the domestic group is revealed. Numerous studies talk of the discontinuities between the 'ideal' household and the empirical reality. Ethnographers have, perhaps unreflexively, sometimes taken this ideal concept as a statement about the nature of an organisational form. While stressing the fluidity of household composition they have preferred to unquestioningly accept a meta-conception which is never perhaps explicitly formulated in the minds of so-called 'members' of such 'units'. In doing this there is a tendency to atomise social organisation and give discreet and separate existence to a unit which does not necessarily merit such distinction. Thus Barth can say of Basseri:

"(The) independence and self-sufficiency of the nomad household, whereby it can survive in economic relation with an external market, but in complete isolation from all fellow nomads, is a very striking and fundamental feature of Basseri social organisation." (1963, p.21)

And Van Nieuvenhuijze also states that:

"it (the household) is the baseline for traditional social organisation. The traditional authority in the middle east, along with the traditional social structure, pivots around the kinship principle."

(1971, p.388)

As with the identification of occupational divisions one is in danger of substituting an analysis of process with an analysis of form. This is not simply a question of ignoring constant changes in the composition of domestic groups, nor of differentiating between what people have identified as an 'economic unit' (the household) from a kinship unit (the family).¹ It is also in another context failure to recognize institutionalised under-production ('Chayanov's rule') and the fact that some households fail to reproduce autonomously, and are therefore subsumed for their existence in some wider productive organisation.

Without resorting to the atomistic tendencies of such authors as Barth, or completely dissolving the category,² analysis can be focused on the domestic unit through the marriage arrangements that are deemed to bring it into existence. In the Ayub valley marriage is seen as the initiation of a process of reproduction based on the probability of the emergence of a discrete economically viable unit. In response to the 'formalising' enquiries of urban questioners (and foreign social scientists) villagers have little problem in identifying

2. Goodell in her analysis of Khuzistan villages seems to do this when she maintains that: "In the village culture and practice there is no concept of parents or of the collectivity of children within the family." (1975).
these discrete units, and these have been incorporated into
census compilations as the basic building blocks of the social
structure. It should perhaps be stressed at this point that
when questions were asked about the composition of households
in Chamani, they were directed to male informants, and the
'units' thereby identified were in terms of adult males.

The 'domestic unit' exists therefore as one of a series
of conceptual foci and as a framework for the organisation of
activity within the village. Social boundaries between indi-
viduals and groups obviously change over time, as well as
changing in terms of expressions of relationships between
social actors at any one time. The anthropologist's picture
of reality is in danger of encapsulating and thereby reifying
a particular moment in that change (however extended). In
this he/she is likely to be aided by the physical boundaries
found within the village, between courtyards for example,
which reflect the social boundaries encapsulated in their con-
struction, as well as by the particular temporal configuration
of personnel which reflect perhaps temporary alliances. In
the older settlements it is likely that there will be a dis-
continuity between physical and social form, as old walls are
breached and new ones erected, reflecting changing patterns of
alignment. Many walled villages give the appearance of con-
siderable spacial disorder, and lack of space obliges differ-
ent generations to utilise that space in different ways. Per-
haps Barth's understanding of the autonomy of the nomadic house-
hold of the Basseri was at least partially influenced by the
physical discreteness of the apparently autonomous black tent. Such discreteness is not so obvious in the confines of the village gha'leh.

As Davis has maintained, 'the mainspring of the domestic cycle is marriage', and the identification of discrete domestic units by villagers seemed to reflect the very close association that was deemed to exist between marriage and independent status. The 'hearth' (khāneh) is the very basis of the unit, the very heart of the 'home' (khāneh) and the home cannot be constructed without the presence of a woman. Khāneh can also be translated as 'household' when the household coincides with the domestic unit. But a more frequent translation of household is khānevādeh, which does not necessarily indicate common residence or even close physical proximity, but rather proximity of kinship. Khānevādeh implies, not only the concept of 'family', but also of 'tribe'. Similarly another term for family is oulad which implies patrilineal descent rather than common residence. The khāneh is called after the male head (i.e. khāneh-ye-fulān, the house of so-and-so). The khānevādeh is called after the family name (i.e. khānevādeh-ye-Rusta in reference to the Turki speaking population of Chamani (see below, Ch. XI ).

3. Wright, S. (1978) comments for the Mamasani, "While oulad refers to the sons of a man who is still alive or who has only recently died, the word oulad can also be used for the male descendants of a man who was alive two or three generations ago.
It is possible therefore to make an analytical distinction between physical proximity (implied in the use of the term khāneh) and kinship proximity (implied in the use of the term khānevādeh). But in practice such a distinction is not often made explicit. It implies an attempt to separate behaviour emergent in different spheres of activity. Goody sees the difference between household and family as being in the spheres of production and reproduction respectively.¹ Salzer sees the difference in the spheres of economics and kinship.² Neither division is satisfactory because the analytical separation is not evident either in the activities of the villagers themselves or in the complementary activities of production and reproduction, or economics and kinship.

Thus, while bearing in mind the problems of isolating particular forms, such as the household and the family, in order to inform appreciations of social organisation in the valley, one must be wary of conforming to the totalising conceptions of others, both scholars such as Goody, and villagers themselves. One is engaged in re-forming the concept in the light of all available evidence from the village. This is much more than merely conforming to their perceptions; it is also comparing the differences between what villagers say they do and what they actually do; between the public world of community cooperation and 'good faith', and the private world of self-interest and individual gain. It is through the public world,

and the tools used to create order and understanding in that world that an appreciation of the private world is made available. It is not so much what is made available for public knowledge, but why it is made available and other things are not that is important.

The household characteristics of Chamani

Male informants in Chamani identified 34 separate domestic units (khāneh) through the names of the adult males who were their heads. The composition of these 34 units is given in Appendix 1. Their isolation as will be seen is not necessarily a recognition of their independence or autonomy. The large majority of them (21) were elementary families of husbands and their wives and unmarried children. Seven extended families were isolated which consisted of husbands and their wives together with married sons and their wives and children. Of the remaining six families, three were elementary families with an additional ageing parent or widowed sister-in-law of the head of the household, and three were couples, with children who had set up house separately or, in only one case, a newly married man and his wife. Fig. 12 gives the numbers of different household forms. (The numbers in brackets refer to the specific numbers given to each household for easy identification and are reproduced in Appendix 2, together with the names of the adult heads of households to whom they refer.)

The size of the domestic unit varied from those with only two people, to that unit which contained 12 people (No. 18).
Fig. 12. Composition and size of domestic units in Chamani.

Composition:

Hu. & Wi. (3) 6,34,23
Hu. & Wi. + Children. (21) 1,3,4,5,7,12,14,15,17,19,20
Hu. & Wi. + Sons & Wis (6) 2,8,9,10,11,13.
Hu. & Wi. + Sons & Wis + Chi. (1) 18
Hu. & Wi. + Chi + Hu Mo (2) 25,32
Hu. & Wi. + Chi + Bro's Wi. (1) 16

Total 34

(Numbers to right refer to those given to each domestic unit for identification - see Appendix 2.)

Size:

(Numbers of persons in household)
Informants maintained that the ideal household consisted of the male head, his wife and their children together with adult sons and their young families. Residence was predominantly patri-local and it was deemed important for the son to set up his house next to or near that of his father. The oulads or patrilineally organised close kin grouping was considered to be the basic unit for obtaining and maintaining independence together with the females who were attached to it. It provided the necessary political and economic security for the exploitation of available opportunities. The extended family was considered to be the 'natural' grouping which would provide the necessary cooperative labour for undertaking diverse economic activities. Such an ideal was only realised by seven households within Chamani at the time of fieldwork.

The most common family form, the elementary family, did not exist in isolation from other families. Close kinship ties connected most villagers to each other in a network of interrelationships. It is misleading to look at such groups as representing independent activity. The need for cooperation between domestic groups was ensured by the requirements of both rich and poor; the former in need of cooperative labour to work their varied enterprises, the latter in need of employment to ensure their livelihood and provide hope for future autonomy.

The ideal of household autonomy, often reproduced as a fundamental feature of middle eastern societies in which the household represents, in an atomistic form, the smallest segment of the lineage system, is supported by informants' emphasis on
the equivalence and equality of separate households. Independence can be achieved through the individual efforts of the head of the household and the cooperation of his close agnates. The model to which every informant seemed to aspire was the independent control of a variety of resources which assured him and his dependents of sufficient income to aspire to positions of wealth and influence. The contradictions within such an ideal are relatively obvious; only by obtaining control over the labour of others can such an 'independent' position be obtained. Certain relationships of control are perceived as 'naturally' legitimate - the control over a wife's labour or of the labour of children, for example.

The formal myth of the equivalence of households and of mutual cooperation between households serves to disguise actual relations of inequality. The ranking system within households in which women and female children rank below men and male children is reproduced between households, where increased age is supposedly correlated with increased control over resources and higher prestige. The richest, oldest member is the highest on this ranking system. But many of the older men in the village were not the richest or the most powerful.

Within the framework of a patrilineal kinship ideology there is the constant dichotomy between keeping the patrimony together and the fissive tendencies associated with the independent aims of sons. The composition of individual domestic groups at any one time is much more than a reflection of their 'position' within the domestic cycle; it is also a reflection
of the particular progress of the struggle between the fission and fusion of kinship groupings. The ideals of patriarchy, age and wealth, disguise the actual alignments of individuals, and differential access to resources. 'Cooperation' is rooted in the 'natural' framework of the extended patrilineal family; in the 'natural' authority of the father and the supposed 'cooperation' between brothers.

This familial framework provides the basis for the orientation of more extensive organisations for cooperation and interaction, through the extended family, the 'clan' grouping and the tribal framework, where 'kings' or 'chiefs' are perceived as primarily superior kinsmen, to paraphrase Sahlins. It is through the extension of this kinship ideology that cooperative relationships between households are cemented, and through the extension of the 'good faith' economy that others are 'domesticated'. The division of labour within the household, whereby sons work for fathers and wives work for husbands is reproduced in the division of labour between households whereby some men construct relationships of dependency with others and relationships of inequality are perpetuated. As Sahlins points out, in relationship to the kinship base of chieftainship and leadership, the relationship between leaders and followers

"is conceived in terms of balance, a 'mutual helpfulness', a 'continual reciprocity'. But in strict material terms the relationship cannot be both 'reciprocal' and 'generous', the exchange at once equivalent and more so .... The ideological ambiguity (the inequality in a society of amicability) is functional. On the one hand, the ethic of chiefly generosity blesses the inequality; on the other, the ideal of reciprocity denies that it makes any difference."

(Sahlins 1972, pp.134-5)
Much of the remainder of this thesis is devoted to an exploration of the ever widening ramifications of this 'ideological ambiguity'. First through an analysis of relationships within the household. Secondly, through an analysis of marriage, the institution which underlies the creation of households. Thirdly, through a concentration on the wider kinship relationships which, while publicly isolating the bride and the groom also serve to legitimate wider cooperative alliances. And fourthly through a focus on the ways in which the kinship idiom, in being centralised under a ruling 'chief' becomes politicised. As Sahlins maintains:

"the issue is between a chronic tendency to divide and disperse the community, and, on the other side, the development of political controls which would check this fission and effect an economic dynamic more appropriate to the society's technical capacity."

( ibid., p.131 )

The dichotomies attendant upon the fission and fusion of kinship groupings are reproduced at a more general level where the kinship idiom is extended to ensure greater control over production in the wider socio-political environment.

While maintaining an ideal of independence, the village population is increasingly differentiated in terms of control over resources. The picture of an homogeneous village population in which all are engaged in the cooperative cultivation of crops, ignores the many extra-village relationships and networks constructed by villagers, and the positions of the larger absentee landowners and their representatives. Are these to be classified as members of the village? Certainly their influ-
ence within the village is important and their control of much village production, directly and indirectly, means that they are integral to the economic and political life of the village. But their domestic groups are located within the city or in other villages and because of that there is a tendency to regard them as separate.

The village of Chamani consists of two distinct parts (see fig. 15); the ghalleh in which the majority of the inhabitants live, and the landlord's courtyard, in which are found the various store rooms and living quarters used by the latter and his representatives when resident in the village. Above this, towards the Ayub mountain are two recently built courtyards together with other courtyards which were under construction in the early 1970s. In addition to these buildings there is now a compound which contains the two-roomed school house, and three recently constructed houses which contain the headquarters of the Ordibehesht company, engaged in constructing the irrigation canals from the modern dam.

In a dualistic interpretation of the organisation of village life in which the landlord's interests are separated from those of the villagers, it is tempting to treat the landlord's courtyard as separate from the rest of the village and talk of the ghalleh, in which the majority of the population lived, as equivalent to the village. The other buildings are treated as external to village production. In reality it is perhaps more useful to consider the landlord's courtyard as part of a
larger domestic unit, with its centre in Shiraz. It does have its own kitchen and is related through the personnel employed by Abdülahi to other households in the village who live within the gha'leh.

From the vantage point of the Imamzadeh Ayub, above the village (the source for fresh water for the village and a place of local pilgrimage), the gha'leh of Chamani appears to be physically very regular in its construction. It is divided into 8 separate courtyards (hayāts) transected by two lanes (kuchehs). These 8 courtyards are surrounded by single-storeyed rooms which open up on to the central area and which house the majority of the village population. Each courtyard (hayāt) contains approximately four domestic units and provides the focus for much daily activity. Physical location within particular courtyards reflects greater social proximity between domestic units, and cooperation between such units serves to complicate recognition of them as separate units. Demographic changes, fission over time of domestic groups and the incorporation of different types of people have also influenced the location and alignment of interests and groups. Until land reform accommodation within the gha'leh was provided by the landlord who legally owned the village and was, together with his representatives, in charge of local administration. Villagers who did not conform to his wishes were not only removed from production as share-croppers on the village land, but were evicted from the village itself. Some of these took up residence in neighbouring Buraki. Thus, while encapsulating the major inter-relationships between domestic groups, the
actual physical location of people in the ghalleh also reflects the influence of the landlord. Each domestic unit was originally allocated two rooms, excluding store-rooms and animal sheds, and the upper rooms that a number of villagers have subsequently constructed.

It was suggested by informants that recent courtyard construction outside the walls of the ghalleh was in response to population pressure. This would only appear to be part of the reason, for, while some courtyards were obviously overcrowded (B in particular), others had vacant space within them (H in particular). Other reasons must be sought, in the nature of relationships between domestic groups and their evolution over time, and in the prevailing security at the end of the '60s beginning of the '70s which made the necessity of living behind the defensive walls of the ghalleh largely redundant.

The model of courtyard living presumed that those with whom one shared the courtyard were close agnatic kin. In other parts of Fars, especially in the less densely populated areas, it was also assumed that there was a correlation between the extended patrilineal group and the ghalleh, so that physical residence and kinship proximity coincided; the village approximated to the clan settlement. While such an association was acknowledged by informants, the nature of settlement in the Marvdasht plain, as well as its evolution, and the forms of control exercised over land, meant that the model was rarely achieved. Firstly, many of the villages in the plain had a relatively mobile population; migrants came and went, additional
populations were brought into villages by landowners. Secondly
the head of the extended patrilineal group was rarely the con-
troller of land in the Marvdasht plain, as he might have been
in more isolated parts of the region. With the increasing con-
trol of the landlord over village production and village
affairs, it was not in the latter's interest to encourage the
development of a supposedly unified patrilineal grouping with-
in the village.

In some of the more recent settlements where a gha'leh
has not been constructed, as in Domafshān and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek
the physical pattern of settlement is one of rather haphazard
arrangement of individual courtyards (see fig. 10). These
two settlements are smaller than the other settlements in the
valley and their population appears to be much more closely
associated with a dominant kinship grouping. Both settle-
ments contain a majority of former pastoral nomads.

In all the newly constructed courtyards design seems to
incorporate considerable room for expansion; with the apparent
assumption that it will contain more than just the elementary
family, and that as time passes and interests expand, it will
ultimately house various relatives and their offspring. They
are relatively large areas surrounded by strong retainer walls,
which provided space for domestic animals as well as for the
construction of additional rooms around all sides of the court-
year when/if occasion demanded.
One of the factors which undoubtedly influenced the isolation of independent domestic groups was the availability of space within the courtyards. Three of the extended families for example (Nos. 9, 10 and 18) had moved in the early '60s into newly constructed courtyards above Abdulâhi's compound and had built into their construction considerable potential for household expansion. This undoubtedly delayed the separation of the married sons. On the other hand pressure on space within the gha'leh was obliging expanding family groups to split at an earlier date than might have been expected. No. 34, for example, the son of No. 13, was the only case of a son who had apparently left the courtyard of his father to take up residence in another part of the gha’leh before the birth of children, and this may be partially explained by pressure on space within that courtyard (G), in which there were already two extended families and six married couples. Similarly in courtyard C there were also six married couples, and one of the sons of No. 2 was intent on constructing a new courtyard above the village.

The centrifugal tendencies associated with the establishment of an independent domestic unit are thus at odds with the centripetal ideals of patrilineal solidarity. The forms which the domestic units take reflect the various partial solutions to this dichotomy in the particular histories of family fission and fusion. There would appear to be two ways in which separate domestic units might be established; either at the death of the father, or prior to that time, through the partial
separation of the interests of father and married son. This latter may of course take place as a result of re-settlement in different places, the result of migration out of the village. In Chamani only in four cases has division and settlement within Chamani preceded the death of the father and it is clear in all these cases that separation is far from complete. In all four cases (Nos.5,22,24 and 34) the sons have either established families or independent occupations. All but No. 22 who was Abdulahi's housekeeper, had received land with the land reform programme because they were at that time established share-croppers. In three of the cases (Nos.5, 22 and 24) the sons live next door to their ageing parents and within the same courtyard.

Changing economic circumstances associated with changes in tenurial conditions and changing opportunities imply changes in the types of strategies used to secure the productive and reproductive capacities of the domestic unit. It is an acknowledged aim of every adult male to marry and establish his own domestic unit. The selection of a bride is merely the initiation of such a process. The ability to achieve separation is not always realised and it might be argued that recent circumstances have seemed to delay the process of fission among some families by obliging members to pool resources in response to declining opportunities within the village and to encourage it among others. It would appear that this process, rather than leading to the destruction of the so-called 'extended family' will lead to its entrenchment in some cir-
cumstances. This is in apparent contradiction to the idea of accelerated fission and the destruction of community often assumed to be a corollary of increases in migrant labour opportunities and the attendant labour mobility that that is assumed to entail.

If one adopts the assumption that within the presumable autonomous domestic unit factors of production will consistently be combined in such proportions as to secure independence and that there is therefore an 'optimal family size', then the processes associated with delaying or accelerating fission do indeed appear to be mutually contradictory. If on the other hand one accepts the fact that individual domestic units may fail to reproduce themselves autonomously, and that the nature of this 'unit' may change over time, then no such contradiction necessarily emerges. It is not unusual in the eastern parts of the Marvdasht plain, and in villages towards the gulf, to find settlements in which there are few able-bodied males; they are away on migrant labour contracts of one sort or another. In such cases their wives and dependent children tend to live under the protection of the older male residents in the courtyards of their fathers-in-law. The nature of their independence is questionable as they are not even separate commensal units. Similarly in analyses of nomadic pastoral groups within Fars, evidence would seem to indicate that while one sector of the group migrates with the animals others are often engaged in agriculture in either summer or winter quarters, while still others work as wage labourers.
in the cities. The products of all labour are pooled to promote the joint security of all contributors to the enterprise.

It may be argued that changes in tenurial conditions within the Marvdasht plain have resulted in a decline in the importance of land as a means of obtaining a relatively secure base from which to establish an independent domestic unit for the majority of the population. Sufficient time had not yet elapsed since the land reform to indicate whether the land obtained by villagers would be sub-divided among their offspring on their deaths, or would be accumulated in the hands of a smaller number of people through purchase. The distribution of land in the middle '60s precluded its sale, but there is reason to suspect that control, if not de jure ownership, had passed out of the hands of some of the original beneficiaries of the land reform programme, as villagers moved out in search of wage labour contracts and entrusted the cultivation of their land to relations. In any case the amalgamation of much land within the Ayub valley and the dehestān of Ramjerd into agricultural cooperatives would seem to have forestalled such a process by villagers. The diversity of traditional occupations, together with a flexibility of movement and response, and an insecurity of tenure, only temporarily alleviated by the land reform, all added up to the need for the acquisition of a diversified series of resources from which to build independence.

According to informants, independence is achieved through a series of stages. Such stages ideally mark the progress of
a man through life and his acquisition of the resources necessary to maintain that independence. From dependence on others to control over the means of production is still an ideal, despite changes in the relationships between the village population and the means of production, which would appear to have blocked some forms of mobility and opened up others. Land reform has changed the relationships that villagers have to land and increased wage-labour opportunities have changed the basis on which household viability might be maintained.

In theory the domestic unit is the basic unit for the coordination of productive activity and for consumption. Its members are bound together by co-residence, commensality and the organisational leadership of the male head, who is responsible for decision-making and for the welfare of members. In practice such independence is rarely visible because of the large numbers of joint responsibilities and activities which link households. Again theoretically all a man needs to set up his own domestic unit is a wife and a relatively secure means of gaining a livelihood. In practice the relatively secure basis from which domestic units and households could develop is not derived from a single source (i.e. land), if it ever was. Other opportunities must be explored. But uncertainty and flexibility seem to have been the predominant features in the Ayub valley. Strategies seem to have always focused on diversification of interests, with different members of the household occupied in different activities, organised into what
Black has referred to as 'agro-pastoral' combines.¹

The size of domestic groups varies as does the space they occupy. But size and allocated space are not directly cor-
relable; some large domestic groups have only one room, while smaller ones have up to four, with an additional upper room (bolo-khāneh) for entertaining. When Chamani was being built each domestic group was allocated two rooms by the landlord. These two basic rooms were a living/sleeping room and an adjacent kitchen, which sometimes doubled as an additional sleeping room, both looking out on to the courtyard. Eleven of the thirty-three domestic groups identified in Chamani by male informants only occupied one room. This is not considered to be adequate by villagers as a separate kitchen is considered to be essential for autonomous domestic arrangements. Thus those who only have one room are more or less dependent on others with kitchen facilities. These are always close relatives. The widespread use of paraffin stoves as well as the outside location of fireplaces on which bread can be made every day does mean however that even with one room a certain inde-
pendence can be achieved.

In six of these eleven cases one is dealing with emergent domestic groups; married sons and their wives and young off-
spring who have been allocated a separate room in the same courtyard as their parents, but who continue to share the same

¹ Black, op.cit., p.620. He refers to this as a 'contract-
ually defined association for mutual profit', and uses the Persian term sherkat to translate it. This tends to divorce it from its ideological foundation within the kinship system which eschews the notions of formal contract and of profit.
sofreh (table-cloth). On the basis of such a division it is difficult to distinguish between these and sons not given independent status. The young wives help the older women with the various domestic tasks (c.f. sons of numbers 2, 5, 10, 11 and 13). In three other cases (nos. 6, 21 and 24) one is dealing with older couples whose children have established their own domestic groups and the balance of authority has shifted from the former because of advanced age. The kitchen is seen to be organised more by the younger wives. A common sofreh is spread and food is cooked in common although the older couple may eat separately. In another case this involved the emergent domestic group of a younger brother whose other brothers both had two rooms. The widowed mother lived with the eldest brother (c.f. 31, 32 and 33). Hosein Khan (no. 30) was the landlord's dashtebān and one of the poorest men in the village who, with his wife and young daughter live in a room adjacent to her brother. Again the kitchen was shared.

In the newly built courtyards space does not seem to be at such a premium as in the gha'leh. The courtyard, in addition to providing space for the fire on which the bread is baked, may contain a small vegetable plot enclosed by low mud-brick walls to keep the animals out, in which one or two fruit trees might also be grown. In summer months wooden bedsteads are placed in the courtyard if not on the roofs, and the carpet frame is placed outside, shaded by a makeshift shelter of brushwood or woven goat-hair. Additional rooms around the
court yard house the donkeys and other animals as well as stored goods. The furniture of the living/sleeping room is minimal. A locally produced carpet or two provides floor covering and during the day the individual bed-rolls are stacked along the back wall. A tin chest or two contains the small number of valuables as well as clothing and such items as cigarettes and tea. Shelves built into the walls provide space for storing crockery in frequent use and for photographs and lamps. The keys to the chest are normally kept around the woman's waist. The kitchen houses the pots and pans used in cooking. Storage bags containing flour and rice are kept here and raised stands provide room for the goatskin water containers. It is not usual for the kitchen to be carpeted.

Division of Labour within the household.

Despite the varied activities in which each domestic group is engaged there is a basic division of labour between the sexes, and the deemed autonomy of the group is rooted in the 'cooperative' relationship that exists between a man and his wife. The domestic tasks in and around the home are carried out by the women. This is seen as their prerogative and they are in charge of the food-stores of the group. They prepare food, wash and mend clothes, prepare the wool for the production of carpets and make the carpets. They also fetch drinking water from the spring at the imamzadeh. They are also responsible for keeping the house clean. When the sheep and goats are giving milk it is their responsibility to milk them
and prepare butter, cheese and yogurt. A major responsibility is the daily production of bread - wafer-thin rounds prepared on a concave copper griddle over an open fire. This is often done communally when three or four women take it in turns to produce a few days supply on the same fire. Flour for the bread is normally taken for grinding in the neighbouring village of Rasmanjān, where the flour mill caters for most of the requirements of the valley. Flour can also be purchased in small quantities from the village shop. Together with the children the women make frequent excursions into the fields to collect greens and herbs. Throughout the day they are constantly occupied.

Children do give some help and as they grow older they are expected to take on more household responsibilities. Girls help their mothers in most tasks, both girls and boys look after the animals, leading them out to pasture in the morning and perhaps staying with them throughout the day. With the opening of the village school many of the boys were unavailable for most of the day, but when they had time they also collected fuel for the fire; wood from the mountain as well as animal dung.

Most of a woman's time is spent in and around the house, busy with domestic chores or caring for infants. The times when she is not so engaged may be spent visiting female relatives in adjacent courtyards or adjacent villages, but she is never away for more than a few hours if there is no one to help her with the cooking and when she is away she usually helps with the carpet or other task that her female relative is
I engaged in. She is expected to be at home to provide tea and food for her husband and any guests he may bring home. It is taken for granted that women will do all these things - they are the domesticated (or naturalised) centre of the domestic group.

Marriage involves the transference of the bride from the domestic group of her parents to that of her husband's parents, where she comes under the authority of her mother-in-law. She may not be a stranger to her husband's household because her natal group may live in an adjacent courtyard, but her new roles of wife and daughter-in-law subordinate her, at least initially, to her mother-in-law, the khanom (mistress) of the house. Her activity comes under constant scrutiny and she is obliged to help the khanom with all the domestic chores as well as with the production of carpets. She is in effect the latter's servant. Relationships with all adult males in the household will initially be reserved. As time passes the wife gradually takes on the responsibilities once shouldered by her mother-in-law.

Men's work is largely outside the home, apart from structural repairs to the fabric of the house. The area around the hearth is not the place for them to linger during the day. The door of the gha'leh serves as a place where men informally congregate when there is nothing specifically to do. Their daytime activities are virtually completely separate from those of the women whom they ignore if they appear on the street on their
way to fetch water or wash clothes. The agricultural cycle provides the basic rhythm for their work, regulating the execution of agricultural tasks, as well as the periods when they can take employment outside the village. Most adult males have some direct involvement in the production of crops and/or in animal husbandry. Agricultural work is only onerous at certain critical times of the year giving the impression that men have a great deal of spare or leisure time. Such an impression is predicated on a distinction between work and leisure not necessarily shared among villagers. If the villager is seen as only producing to fulfil the perceived requirements of the domestic group of which he is a member, then once those requirements have been met there is no necessity to do more.

At times when males are absent for short or long periods from the village, women are expected to perform some if not all of their work. This would depend obviously on the material resources of the household and frequently labour was hired in. The reverse is not the case however. If by chance a woman should have any free time then there is always work on the latest carpet, either her own or that of another. Judging by the frequent numbers of males to be found outside the village gate there is little shortage of male labour for extensive periods of the year.

The 'cooperative' efforts of a husband and wife and their offspring are supposed to provide sufficient resources to ensure adequate consumption for the domestic group and to ensure its reproduction. An important source of income for all families
apart perhaps from those directly supported as parts of Abdulahi's domestic establishment, is the product from agricultural labour. This is supplemented by the products of animal husbandry, primarily sheep wool and goat hair. Additionally cash is obtained from the sale of livestock and increasingly importantly, of carpets and from wage labour. The agricultural harvest is rarely large enough to be sold but small amounts of cash are obtained by a few from the collection of liquorish plants which are transported by donkey to a collection point in Marvdasht. Where cash crops are grown by villagers, as in Pol-e-No (cotton) and Esfardran (sugar beet) then cash becomes an important part of income. A few of the richer villagers obtain incomes from hiring out machinery, from renting property they have acquired in town and from small-scale investments in urban enterprises such as taxis.

Consumer expenses which cannot be provided from household production and which are usually bought for cash in the urban bazaar, or in cash or grain from the village shop, include clothing, tea, tobacco, sugar, soap, salt and animal fat, as well as occasional purchases of meat and vegetables, and fruits such as dates which can be stored and which figure quite prominently in the diets of the villagers. Dyeing expenses for wool are a small but regular item in household expenditure.

The head of the household has control over the cash resources of the group, including those of his unmarried sons. Reserves are required especially to pay for marriage expenses. There are also occasional purchases of gold jewellery.
CHAPTER X

MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALLIANCES

The pivot on which individual household construction turns is that institution which transforms relationships legitimated through agnation into those legitimated through affinity, i.e. marriage, or the transformation of a daughter into a wife and of a son into a husband. As Bourdieu maintains: "the choice between fission and fusion, the inside and the outside, security and adventure, is posed anew with each marriage".¹ The marriage ceremony itself is one of the most colourful rituals in which people in the Marvdasht plain participate. On no other occasion in the calendar does one find such display and conspicuous consumption. On no other occasion is one confronted with such a formal and public differentiation of personnel into the kin groups of the bride and groom. This conspicuousness in marriage ceremonies has often supported the notion that marriage par excellence is the way in which ties between agnatic groups, in a society adhering to a patrilineal ideology, are cemented. Indeed it is often on the basis of just such ceremonies that the discrete construction of descent groupings is predicated.

And yet as will hopefully be pointed out in the next chapter, the construction of formal agnatic descent groups often proves problematic. If this is indeed the case then marriage

¹ Bourdieu 1977, p.57.
seen as a 'link' between such groups might prove to be just as problematic. There can be no doubt that the marriage ceremony, which often lasts for several days, and is expressly aimed at attracting large numbers of guests to bear witness to the legitimation and the transformation, is perceived as an important event. It might be seen as the legitimation for the 'domestication' of the 'outside', represented by the 'stranger/bride' in the creation of a new domestic unit, and as an elaborate means of naturalising and thereby normalising the relations of 'domination' that are imposed on the bride, and thus resolving the contradictions associated with the fission of one agnatic group and the potential emergence of another. But such a perception ignores the fact that the bride remains a daughter and the husband remains a son.

Marriage provides the link between discussions of domestic groups and wider associations based on kinship; between individual self-interest and collective concerns, and between what Bourdieu terms 'practical' kin and 'official' kin ("it is practical kin who make marriages; it is official kin who celebrate them"). It is a means by which the 'inside' is turned 'outside' and the 'outside' turned 'inside' and as such has analogies with more formal economic transactions where the 'outside' is 'domesticated' through the imposition of features of the 'good faith' economy and the dissimulation of self-interest (see below, chapter XII). By clothing marriage in

1. Ibid., p.34.
elaborate colours (it is an occasion for women to dress in their finest clothes) the 'true' colours associated with the play of naked self-interest can be disguised. The often prolonged and delicate negotiations which precede the actual ceremony, where practical considerations of economics and status differences are weighed and evaluated, are very often conducted, at least initially, in private, by women. In the public, male-dominated, ceremony such considerations take second place to the officialising strategies which re-state egalitarian principles of cooperation and harmony, and provide occasions for the public display of collective interest.

Scholars such as Barth and Irons working in other parts of Iran have commented on what they see as the limited social significance of marriages. For example, Irons states:

"Among the Yomut, the ties created by marriage have little social significance beyond the range of two closely related groups of households."

(1975, p.127)

and Barth similarly comments:

"no larger kin group than the 'tent', i.e. the elementary family, is normally made relevant to the marriage transaction."

(1964, p.32)

in reference to marriage among the Basser. If one takes as one's units of analysis, either the economically and socially independent households, or genealogically defined and supposedly discrete agnatic groups, then indeed the nature of their inter-relationship becomes problematic because, rather than being treated as models for reality, they become objects of attention themselves; reified objects which are treated as if
they were real. Barth, in his later discussions about ethnic groups and boundaries pointed towards using the analytical focus provided by the boundary itself, rather than focusing on particular forms of social organisation which are the relative products of particular historical and environmental circumstances. In both Barth's earlier work and in Iron's analysis of the Yomut Turkmen the social form, the household, is implicitly accepted as a valuable analytical tool and their generalisation (or formalisations) emerge from that basis. Antoun also, in his study of an Arab village in Jordan, implicitly accepts the concrete existence of such groups as 'the household', 'the luzum', 'the lineage' and 'the clan', with which he structures his analysis, but is puzzled by the question of a young informant who, in response to questions about affinal relationships in grandparental and previous generations asks, 'with an air of wonderment and slight impatience .... Why inquire about such things, when it is well known that we are all related in some way or another?'. Unfortunately Antoun seems to dismiss this query and states that the 'some way or another' is important to both the villager and the ethnographer, 'in the assessment of the structural cohesiveness of the village community'. This is of course assuming that this 'structural cohesiveness' and 'community' of interests

3. Ibid., p.134.
4. Ibid., p.134.
that he presumes exist within the village are more than the a priori imposition of an order already established in the analytical schema of the researcher. If the analytical units abstracted from the reality (the household ... clan, etc.) were important to the villager in terms under which Antoun conducted his enquiry, then surely the villager would not have reacted with 'wonderment' and slight 'impatience'? Antoun elsewhere in the same work seems to realise the problems of making concepts fit forms when he states:

"The household has no necessary relation to any particular type of dwelling unit. Moreover there are no ready indices of its existence such as separate entrances or granaries or ritual shrines. Indeed the demarcation of a household by dwelling unit may be quite erroneous."

(1972, p.55)

Information on marriage alliances for groups in Chamani is given in the discussion of wider kinship associations in the next chapter. This is partially analysed in terms of where individuals obtained spouses from, and in terms of presumed genealogical proximity. These are however only two descriptive criteria. There are a whole host of more mundane criteria which imply a detailed understanding of the life histories of the individuals and households involved. The combination of previous circumstances associated with already established kinship and neighbourhood networks provide the backdrop for a pragmatic evaluation of both social and economic costs and benefits implied in the construction of new alliances. The 'pattern' of alliances or the synthesis which the anthropologist (and the villager) might offer, may be nothing more than
the post facto rationalisation and justification which emphasises those elements of the 'good faith' economy without publicly revealing the very important strategic and selfish implications associated with the transfer of women. 1

A distinction needs therefore to be made between public rationalisation and private motives in any discussion of marriage alliances. The spectacular marriages which unite very separate groups of people serve only to push into insignificance the more mundane alliances which unite practical kin in everyday activity. The private questions concerning the negotiations which precede marriage, the economic evaluation of the parties involved, the status of the wife in the husband's home, the relationships with the husband's mother, are very difficult to publicly and honestly answer. Firstly because the public negotiation of value is at pains to disguise the workings of self-interest, and secondly because the 'undercover' negotiations are usually the concern of women and are well advanced before they publicly emerge; any irreconcilable differences mean that negotiations can be called off before the public is alerted.

1. As Sahlins maintains: "it does sometimes miss the point, however, to view marital exchange as perfectly balanced prestation. The transactions of marriage, and perhaps contingent future affinal exchange as well, are often not exactly equal .... For unequal benefit sustains the alliance as perfect balance could not". He explains: "The exchange that is symmetrical or unequivocally equal carries some disadvantage from the point of view of alliance; it cancels debts and thus opens the possibility of contracting out. If neither side is 'owing' then the bond between them is comparatively fragile. But if accounts are not squared, then the relationship is maintained by virtue of the 'shadow of indebtedness', and there will have to be further occasions of association, perhaps as occasions of further payment." (Ibid., p.222)
Publicly there are a number of formal procedures and preferences that are acknowledged. It is, for example, the responsibility of the senior males of the households to select the bride for the son or to give the daughter to an acceptable groom. Formal negotiations about bridewealth payments are conducted through them. This does not imply that in the less formal world the potential spouses do not get a limited amount of choice. Certain preferences are also publicly acknowledged. It is for example preferred if an alliance can be constructed between parallel cousins, the sons and daughters of brothers, failing that between relations traced through either the father or the mother, because 'if marriage is within the family then one at least knows what is happening to the money'. Such preferences indicate a desire to construct alliances between people from the same or neighbouring villages and thereby facilitate post-marital interaction between members of the groups so joined. The desirability of parallel cousin marriage is publicly justified in terms of maintaining lineage solidarity and the patrimony. It is also seen as a convenient means of reducing the amounts that need to be formally transferred; the closer the two families the less elaborate need the preparations.

1. Much work in recent years has been devoted to the problems associated with parallel cousin marriage which appear to challenge the rules of exogamy and the ideas of separate lineages. As Bourdieu has pointed out: 'it challenges the whole notion of unilineal descent as well as the theory of marriage as an exchange of one woman against another, which assumes an incest taboo, i.e. the absolute necessity of exchange' (p.30). In his discussion of parallel cousin marriage Barth puts forward the rationale that such marriages are a means of strengthening lineage solidarity (Barth 1953). Subsequent analysis dwelt on the differences between this theory and actual statistical practice. But as Bourdieu points out, "We can immediately see what is
There are obvious pragmatic advantages in marrying into known families, but these may not always be publicly defensible, and although publicly brothers are expected to put up a united front and cooperate, in practice this relationship may be the one most fraught with tension. The fact that large numbers of villagers are related to each other in one form or another means that pragmatic opportunism can be dressed in terms of lineage solidarity even when it may in fact mean the reverse; (the marriage of a son into the family of another village not only means an extension or re-affirmation of kinship links but it also denies the brother resident in the same village the opportunity of obtaining a son-in-law).

Of 64 marriages recorded in Chamani for example, at least 42 were constructed between partners who acknowledged kinship links between them, and this figure is likely to have been higher if more detailed genealogical knowledge through the women had been available for those who had married into families from their places of birth. Of these 64 marriages only 22, or approximately one third, were constructed between villagers resident at the time of marriage, in Chamani itself and includes the original settlers who brought their wives with

Note 1 from previous page cont.:
strange about the idea of calculating rates of endogamy when ... it is the very notion of the endogamous group, and therefore the basis of calculation, which is in question (ibid., p.33).

Defining parallel cousin marriage in terms of the wider 'group' which it is supposed to sustain ignores the fact that the group itself is a product more than just of genealogical relationships which link its members and as such its justification in such terms may be merely the post facto public description which legitimates much more pragmatic considerations.
them. Because of recent mobility in this village as in many other villages in the plain, there are many connections between villages often far removed from the valley, which makes it difficult to correlate physical distance with social distance. If, however, one uses the category of social distance as a tool for analysis then increasing social distance between partners to a marriage (which as Irons and Barth, among others, have noted is not just an alliance between individuals, but one between households), it appears to involve increasing formality and publicity, being accompanied with more formal negotiations and greater attendant risks.

**Marriage negotiations**

Proposals for marriage and negotiations of bridewealth, like other more formal economic negotiations, are conducted through mediators. Publicly these include senior agnates representing the fathers of the prospective bride and groom and the more senior the agnates the more formal importance attached to the negotiations (and vice versa). Privately and informally the ground-work to these negotiations has already been completed by women mediators, in the case of marriages over considerable social distances, and by women relatives in the two households where such relatives exist. In cases where social distance is minimal these informal negotiations may be the major preludes to the public announcement of a marriage. Formal negotiations may often be protracted and involve several preparatory visits by the negotiating team representing the
father of the groom. The negotiation of familiarity is a delicate task hedged with inherent dangers, especially loss of face (āberu) and of honour and status (ehterām). As noted later in terms of the negotiation of economic contracts, the amount of time expended increases as social distance increases; the more time spent the greater the deemed social proximity and the less the likelihood that the family giving the bride will feel undervalued. This negotiation of worth is also the negotiation of merit. It is not simply the negotiation of the value of a commodity, the bride, by two parties who see the object of negotiation as something apart from themselves. For the 'wife-giver', as well as for the 'wife taker', these negotiations are to determine the value or standing of the household. Only secondarily are they about the value of the lost labour of a daughter. The constant paradox involves the need to marry off daughters on the one hand, with the need not to be seen to be 'selling cheaply' on the other and formalisations in terms of buying and selling are assiduously avoided.

Bride price consists of two main parts. Shirbaha represents a gift to the wife's mother for rearing the girl. This bride- or milk-price is normally payable before the wedding ceremony and is used by the future bride's household to help equip her with clothing and other domestic articles necessary to bring to the new home. The nature of shirbahā varies. Sugar, sweets, tea, clothes and utensils form traditional parts of the payment but it would seem that general practice now involves the giving of cash. Additional gifts to the future
bride and her household may also form a part of the protracted negotiations.

The more substantial part of the marriage payment is the mahr or mahrieh which in the Marvdasht plain seemed to involve settlements of between 3,000 and 4,000 Ts. but these were subject to variation and to the general inflation rate. Part of the payment was in cash and part in animals. Land did not figure at that time in the majority of negotiations between villagers. The mahr might, in addition to cash and animals, include jewellery but it was basically seen as a guarantee against divorce in that a substantial part of it remains under the control of the bride's father despite the fact that it is the woman's part of the future household's resources.

The actual price of the mahr will vary according to the social distance of the respective parties involved and the analysis of their respective resources, but an accepted social minimum seems to be generally obtainable. In cases of close kin, or neighbours, public figures may be stated but the actual amounts transferred varied according to the nature of the domestic control exercised by the senior males of the households involved; the formal transfer of ownership of animals for example may not involve their physical separation from one jointly administered herd whose control remains in the hands of the animal giver.

In the case of a divorced man marrying a second time, to a virgin, then it is stated that the price of the mahr would double, to overcome the disadvantages of such an alliance to
the bride's family. Relative age figures prominently in negotiations so that the marriage of a virgin to an older man substantially increases the amount paid. Conversely, the marriage of a young man to an older woman, whether a widow or not, substantially decreases the amount paid. Physical and social disability are also reflected in marriage agreements and in the size of weddings, and public display seems to be directly correlated with size of bridal payments. In cases where families exchange daughters there may be no payment of bridewealth although a token amount is invariably transferred.

With the more formal negotiations, agreement on payment, and the transfer of gifts from the groom's household to that of the bride's, is sealed through a formal engagement, and the use of the term nāmzād indicates that names have been pledged. In this period the two households exchange hospitalities and the future groom visits his future wife's household periodically where he is treated with respect and courtesy. In the more common cases involving less formal negotiations, between close kin or neighbours, children may be pledged to each other from an early age, to perhaps ensure cooperation between families. Such pledges may or may not be honoured depending on the changed circumstances later in life.

The marriage ceremony

In the less formal cases the actual date on which the formal wedding contract (aghd) is signed in the presence of a religious functionary (mullāh or ākhund) may not be formalised
until the actual arrival of that religious functionary in the village. In the more formal cases the date is arranged well in advance. The aghd marks the formal beginning of the wedding and the marriage is usually consummated soon after. Celebrations are initiated by the groom's household. A flag is raised on the top of his house at this time. A flag may similarly be raised over the bride's house if she lives in the same village. The head of the groom's household hires musicians and perhaps players, and food to feed the guests is prepared by his kinswomen. Large pots to cater for large numbers are normally hired together with stoves, from dealers in Marvdasht. Celebrations take place in the groom's courtyard, or if that is not large enough, in that of a close relative. The bride remains veiled and secluded in her own home until she is brought to the room especially reserved for the new couple in her new household, where she remains in seclusion attended by her kinswomen. The senior males of the groom's household are publicly in charge of the celebrations which revolve around the dancing of the women and the stick game (chub bāzi) of the men. This latter was said to be an occasion in which rivalries between different groups of men might be exorcised.¹

During the festivities the marriage contract involving the mahr settlement is formally read out, agreed to and signed in front of witnesses. In larger, more formal weddings, two

¹ An increasingly common item in many weddings is the engagement of a group of urban player/musicians who not only provide continuous music but also dancers and actors. For a description of their involvement in a village wedding see Appendix I.
religious representatives may be called in to represent each side of the contract. They are entertained at the expense of the groom's household. The bride and groom are brought together to pledge themselves to each other on the Qo'ran and sign the contract before separating for the resumption of festivities. Prior to the signing of the aghd both the man and the woman have been taken to the bath and this is repeated before the eventual consummation of the marriage that same evening. This is accompanied with great publicity; girls dance before the bride who is ritually escorted to the bath and back to her place of retirement. Similarly the groom is bathed and publicly shaved by the village barber. After this a large metal bowl is placed in front of him and the guests file past dropping their contributions into it. Each gift is announced by a literate relative of the groom's household who registers the name and the amount at the same time. Important guests obviously give more and may in fact publicly pay for part of the entertainment - the musicians or the players.

The transfer of the bride to the home of her new parents-in-law marks the formal transformation of her status, regardless of the closeness of ties which link the households. The close male agnates of the groom go to the bride's home on the day of the aghd to fetch her. Here they are fed by the bride's parents before they take her, often against the public will of the household, on horse-back or by landrover to the groom's house. Formal authority and responsibility pass from the father to the father-in-law.
But transformation and separation are never as discrete as they are publicly claimed. The new wife may constantly visit her own parents and the emergent household does not appear to be normally separable until the birth of the first child. Practice does of course vary depending on the personal histories of the two families and their closeness. In one case from Chamani where a young man, the son of Akram (No.10) married a substantially older woman than himself from Uanjan, there was a bare minimum of ceremony and the bride continued to live with her parents in Uanjan and the son with his. No restriction was however placed on mutual visiting. The son's brother had formerly married the wife's sister and it was expected that she would eventually move to Chamani. The reasons for the marriage were jokingly proclaimed as being associated with the sexual precociousness of the young man and the elderly (and therefore potentially unmarriageable) status of the woman. In another case, that of Hosein Khan (No.30), the landlord's dashtešān, here was a slightly dim-witted individual with no immediate family in the area, married to the only sister of one of the villagers. She was regarded as being unmarriageable because of her temper and he came to live in a room with her, next to her brother. There was no marriage celebration and no bridewealth was given. These were however exceptional settlements and the vast majority of women moved to their groom's courtyard.
Public rationalisation and private motives

Despite the public nature marking many of the marriage transactions in the valley, and the accompanying statements stressing cooperation and solidarity between the households of affines, and often between larger lineages, the political capital derived from such marriages does not appear to correlate with the public announcements in practice. One major reason for this is perhaps to be located in the public vocabulary that is often accepted as the 'truth' by the males who proclaim it. In this public language the males speak of alliances between families (oulad) which are defined in terms of the male members. A contradiction necessarily arises if we take this language as an indication of actual practice in that it is very evident that marriages in the Ayub valley are not just governed by obvious status differences between the families involved; rich families marry into poorer ones and vice versa. This could be explained by the common interests of members of the same oulad. But as Barth has commented in relationship to his work among the Swat Pathan:

"Affinal relationships are ideally relationships of friendship and support; but the relation of connubium by itself does not create significant bonds of common interest ... affinal ties may be charged with political meaning through the addition of other contractual relationships."

(1965, p.40)

Construction of family ties through marriage does not necessarily help in the pursuit of self-interest, i.e. marriages are not necessarily to be explained in terms of economic cooperation between households so united, other factors not explained by
reference to the implications of the formal strategies, are involved.

These formal strategies ignore those strategies which women adopt, and through their patrifocal lenses hide the tactical advantages pursued by women through marriages. As indicated previously, information for the construction of genealogies was based on male informants. The construction of female alliances, and attempts to discern in detail the ways in which women perceive marriages must remain therefore imprecise and tentative. The bias of the male researcher interpreting material received predominantly from male informants is indeed difficult to correct. Nevertheless it would appear that in many respects the marriage negotiations are just as crucial to the women who are gaining daughters-in-law and the mothers who are losing daughters.

The separation of the predominantly domestic lives of women from the predominantly public life of men, and the models of separate 'worlds' or 'spheres' of activity which have been constructed on that basis ignores the fact that both sexes are intimately involved in both. The 'public' and the 'private' cannot be separated through appeals to a dualism which fails to look reflexively at the ways in which they structure each other. Again marriage, through its colourful ritual, is the pivot through which the 'private', 'inside' world, inhabited by women, is made public, for the purpose of extracting a member from one group and re-inserting her into another, through a public, outside world inhabited by men.
It was often stated by informants that daughters were a liability because they were raised for so many years only to be given to someone else in marriage, and their subsequent labour lost. The birth of a son was acclaimed, that of a daughter regretted; and yet there was no denial that a good wife who worked well and produced many children was essential for the creation of a viable household. The substitution of a trained daughter for an untrained daughter-in-law cannot be greeted with much enthusiasm by the senior woman of a household. The patrilineal ideology which upholds the unity of the lineage grouping, publicly acclaims the importance of men and denies the importance of women. To assert such implies the constant 'horizontal' movement of women through 'vertically' aligned groups of men. And yet the close relationships that often exist between members of households mean that women as well as men are often closely related. Unfortunately this is not necessarily revealed in the genealogies collected. The separation that Bourdieu makes between 'official' and 'practical' kin means that the more pragmatic implications associated with marriage agreements are made amenable to analysis; but the systematic construction of a model of the 'matrilineage' which 'shadows' that of the patrilineage is not made. Perhaps such a model should not be constructed, as it formalises something that is not so formalised in the minds of the social actors. And yet, as an heuristic device it does allow one to confront the perceptual bias associated with the conception of the patrilineage. Bourdieu states:
"The male, that is to say, the dominant reading... represses the other possible pathway, albeit sometimes more direct and often more convenient practically, which would reckon through the women."

(1977, p.42)

Unfortunately, systematic evidence is unavailable for the construction of such a 'matrilineage' for villages in the Ayub valley, but tentative suggestions might be forwarded where there appear to be 'gaps' in the official explanations of inter-relationships. Explanations for these 'gaps' in terms of female strategies may not be sufficient but they do point beyond the 'official' explanations into an examination of lineage endogamy and the importance of practical kin. If we examine the genealogical inter-relationships which link the Baneshi Lurs, we find that the wives of two of the prominent male members of this group are sisters who came from Shahrak. Their brother is the rice irrigator and lives in Chamani for part of the year. They live in adjacent houses in the same compound. The wife of Iadollah (No.2) is his second. His first one came with him from Amirābād in Beizā. Four of their children have married (3 sons and 1 daughter). The daughter was married to a person from Shahrak. Masih, their oldest son, was married to a girl from Amirābād, the original place of residence of his father and mother. The two younger sons, Rahman and Mansur, were respectively married to Iadullah's second wife's sister's daughter (daughter of No.1) who lives in the same compound, and to the daughter of his wife's sister's husband's sister. This

1. For more detail, see following Chapter.
latter person is married to Ghobad, one of two brothers who also came from Amirābād and now live in Buraki, having been thrown out of Chamani by Abdulāhi (see fig. 13). The second brother has married the daughter of Kaka Khan (No. 6), who was raised in Futuābād but whose wife also comes from Amirābād.

Both sisters (the wives of 1 and 2) have managed to see their daughters married to presumed matrilateral kinsmen in their original place of residence (Shahrak). Masih took a presumed kinswoman from his father and mother's original place of residence. These sisters have also ensured that their own offspring have intermarried. In theory, and presumably for public purposes, Rahman has married his preferred parallel cousins (i.e. his father's brother's son's daughter). In practice it would appear to be easier to look at this marriage, and others like it, as that of the children of sisters.

Ghobad and Hosein also come from Amirābād. Ghobad married Goljan, Malek's sister and Hosein married the daughter of a woman from that place. Official interpretations which tend to exclude women, as well as demonstrating a relatively shallow genealogical knowledge, conspire against the detailed reconstruction of matrilateral connections but it would appear that the women in the Baneshi households are indeed closely interrelated.

If we take the much more complex Rusta genealogy we are confronted with similar difficulties. The core of this genealogy is four brothers who have developed separate interests. Javad and Azad (Nos. 7 and 8) still live in the gha'leh of
Fig. 13. Marital inter-relationships among the Baneshi Lurs

Place names (in brackets) indicate places of origin.
Numbers (in brackets) indicate household heads (see appendix 2)
Chamani, but the other two Ziad and Akram (Nos. 9 and 10) have moved out of the gha'leh (see figs. 15 & 16). The wives of 7 and 8 are both daughters of Rusta settlers in Chamani, whereas those of both 9 and 10 have been brought to Chamani from Hasanābād. Little is known about the actual matrilateral inter-connections between most of the women, but the very fact that 23 of the 30 recorded marriages for the Rusta Turks are between people who live in Chamani or Buraki seems to indicate close interconnection. In the cases of two of the separate households identified as part of this group their attachment is specifically through women (see Nos. 14 and 17).

Connections with the villages of Hasanābād and Uanajān in particular are not just to be interpreted in terms of patrilineal connections uniting members of the Gera'i tireh, but must also be reckoned in terms of the connections through women that have been renewed, through marriage, in the case of Ziad (9), and in the cases of daughters given to people in Uanajān by Nos. 8, 13 and 15, and sons receiving daughters from there by No. 10. Two sisters of the four brothers were married to men in Junaki which (despite the fact that that link has not been reciprocated through the alliances of their respective offspring) provides an important channel for the construction of business ventures between No. 7 and his brother-in-law there. Some marriages between Rusta Turks in Chamani itself appear rather odd at first glance. Why should Javad (7), the most powerful member and head of the village council, give his daughter to Mina's son (11) for example, and obtain his wife
from Avolfat (13)? Neither alliance would appear to serve his political or economic interests. Both Mina and Avolfat are relatively poor villagers and their sons are not involved in any of Javad's enterprises. But they do represent senior members of the lineage in the village and they have wide connections through their women with other villages.¹

In the selection of marriage partners several criteria are thus involved; not only the interests expressed by the males in terms of maintaining lineage solidarity and maintaining and improving their social position through strategic alliances, but also the interests of the women in ensuring that their daughters stay near them, and that they obtain reliable help with the domestic chores. These criteria in practice are influenced by the demographic availability of suitable spouses, but each alliance will attempt to obtain the best possible configuration of these criteria. The interests of the women may however be in contradiction to those of the men. This is dramatically revealed in the case of divorce, or separation, where public interests and private concerns polarise the two sexes and pit families against families in the public arena:

Safar Baneshi, a landowner in Chamani who had come to settle there, had married the sister of Rezali, the head of the Tajiks in Chamani.² This latter's family was an old respected family from Buraki. He had negotiated what he thought was a strategic alliance between his eldest daughter, Manijeh, and Eskandar, the son of Mashd Akbar Keshavarz, one of the richest people in Buraki and the brother of the head of the Buraki council. They had been married for two years without the

1. Some of the implications of this are discussed in the following chapter.
2. The Tajiks in the village had their own leader, known as kadkhoda, as did the Lurs and the Turks. For the implications of these divisions within the village see following chapter.
appearance of children. Manijeh accused Eskandar of continuously hitting her and accused her mother-in-law of victimising her. She fled her husband's house in Buraki and sought refuge with her mother in Chamani. The latter supported her daughter against the combined weight of Safar, Eskandar and other males from Buraki. A senior male agnate, a kadkhodā of a village in Beiza, was brought in to try and sort the situation out without success. Manijeh wanted a divorce. She accused her husband of being a 'woman', and she received the support of her close female relatives. Finally the case was referred to the gendarmery and Abdulāhi offered to sit down to dinner with the two parties after entreaties from Safar and the extension corpsman resident in the village at the time. It was suggested that they choose a neutral place such as Domafshan in which to resume co-residence. Eventually a temporary resolution was gained when Manijeh decided to return to her husband's home.

In public terms then society is composed of discrete agnatic groups united through common cooperative interests and a common patrimony. Friction and discord within and between groups is deemed to be caused by women who cannot be trusted and must therefore be strictly controlled. Part of the reason for this is that women transgress the divisions between families; a married woman is a member of two families, one by birth, the other by marriage. The women then are the strongest as well as seemingly paradoxically the weakest links in the chains which connect patrilineally organised families, and are thus in an ambivalent position and potentially dangerous. They have intimate knowledge of the activities of both families in ways in which the men cannot.

The women are the receptacles in which the honour of the males is placed. Because of their ambivalent position this must be constantly guarded. Women, because of their unreliability are capable of bringing shame on the males. A person
of good repute has honour and shame as it resides in his women-folk, but the women are basically ignorant of the nature of family honour.¹ Honour, like power, resides with men, who participate in the good-faith economy, where trust and good-faith are at a premium, and it is associated with the virility, manliness and courage of the men. To call these into question, as Manijeh did, not only brings the man's honour into disrepute, but by implication that of the whole family. In most cases women occupy positions without public responsibility. Their area of control is limited to the domestic hearth and the sexual division of labour, described above, characterises this. In their domestic work women come into constant contact with other women and during the day the gha'leh is essentially theirs, when the men are out working.

¹ The play performed at the village wedding and described in Appendix 1 indicates some commonly held assumptions.
CHAPTER XI
EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS OF KINSHIP, NEIGHBOURHOOD AND CONTRACT

In the preceding two chapters emphasis was placed, firstly on the nature of household identity, and secondly on marriage which was presumed to bring households into existence. It was, however, suggested that, despite the ideal of household autonomy, most, if not all, households were dependent on others, not only for the provision of work opportunities, but also for the provision of labourers. Such dependence took a variety of forms, varying from close associations of kinship, linking people through obligations to what might be termed a 'moral community', to more formal contractual arrangements based on wage labour. Reference was made in Chapter IX to Sahlins's distinction between 'within' relationships, and 'between' relationships; the one designated as a pooling relationship, the other as a reciprocal one. Pooling in that context involved the relationships that existed within a household, for example, where products were pooled and redistributed among members according to the criteria of the head of the household.

Sahlins makes an analytical separation between pooling and reciprocal relationships which he admits is somewhat arbitrary. The distinction is difficult to maintain in practice, for it may well be that 'within' relationships are emergent in 'between' relationships, and vice versa. Do we interpret parallel cousin

1. See Sahlins 1972, p.188.
marriage for example as being a relationship within the patri- 
lineal descent group, or as between brothers? It is demonstrably 
both. Similarly the cooperative activities of villagers engaged 
in cultivation, identified earlier as the herāseh, or the khish 
are to be interpreted as being both between supposedly auto-
 nous household heads, as well as within a 'moral community'. 
The two relationships are inseparable in action.

As this implies, close relationships of pooling and recip-
rocity can be extended out from the household to include de-
scriptions of relationships between households. It must be borne 
in mind that Sahline was particularly interested in 'tribal' 
societies, and as such he assumes that tribal political rela-
tionships are to be explained in terms of extensions of kinship 
links (using the segmentary lineage system as a model). As 
such the situation in the Marvdasht plain appears as much more 
complex, in that there are both 'tribal' and 'non-tribal' rela-
tionships within and between villages, in the ways in which 
Sahlins appears to use the term 'tribe'. For present purposes 
it would appear to be more useful to appreciate kinship rela-
tionships in terms of public statements about preferred action, 
rather than as statements of actual inter-relationships, and so, 
following Bourdieu make a distinction between public and private 
languages. A public language of good faith and trust, rooted 
in a kinship idiom is opposed to a private language which ex-
presses the instrumental aspects of transactions.

In this respect it is possible to use Sahlin's model for 
the analysis of reciprocity within and between tribal societies. 
Reciprocity is perceived as varying along a continuum which con-
tains at one end 'generalised reciprocity' (identified here with features of the good faith economy) and at the other, 'negative reciprocity' (identified here with features of the bad faith economy). As one moves away from the household one moves from a close network of kinship alliances into an arena where trust and good faith are at a minimum, and where reciprocity is governed by formal, instrumental contracts. This model is schematically reproduced below.

Fig. 14 Reciprocity and kinship residential sectors
(Reproduced from Sahlins, 1972, p. 199)
As an heuristic device it can perhaps be extended to 'non-tribal' situations, especially if it is accepted that the divisions which separate tribal from non-tribal are problematic (see above, Chapter III), and is quite useful as a starting point in our analysis of the different forms of alliance constructed within the village. But it does have serious deficiencies. It presumes that the public language of kinship and the private language of self-interest are mutually exclusive, i.e. the further one moves from the household, the greater the social and physical distance. While this may be generally true, it builds into the model an unreflexive quality, starting as it does from the supposed isolation of the already established independent household. Similarly the mutual trust and support publicly acknowledged between brothers for example may in fact disguise acute sources of tension. The model is thus of limited value in explaining the dynamic postulated in the previous chapter which is expressed through marriage, in which the 'outside' is domesticated/naturalised and transformed into close associations of kinship, and in resolving the dilemma that is inherent in the fission and fusion of households. As a public statement about the boundaries of the 'moral community' it retains some value in serving as a foundation for the analysis of cooperative alliances within a unified framework which includes those alliances constructed between villagers and those constructed with the large landlord and agents of the state. This allows them to be considered within one social universe, rather than treated as separate.
The public language of kinship still provides an important medium for the construction of relationships between households. As suggested in Chapter XII, it might be seen as disguising the actual relationships of inequality, through a process of domestication and naturalisation. Those who exercise authority are confirmed in that authority as their 'rights' over resources are moved beyond question. In kinship terms this involves the legitimation of their control by their position within the kinship structure. In other terms it is their position within the state hierarchy and their individual control over property legitimated through state legislation.

As this process of domestication occurs the 'myth of equality', which Black maintains operates in Luristan, is encouraged. 1 The instrumental transactions between individuals are translated into relationships of cooperation and trust — they are publicly seen as 'within' relationships, between people engaged in cooperative alliances. The public language of the 'good faith' economy has been entrenched in many studies of middle eastern societies, especially those which have focused on tribal groups in the more marginal areas of the countries in which they are located. Emphasis has been placed on an egalitarian ethos, where the segmentary lineage system offers institutionalised checks and balances to the entrenchment of a powerful elite. This egalitarian ideal is often rooted in a

staunch individualism which stresses personal achievement and a commitment to independent action, seen in the freedom associated particularly with a nomadic existence, or in the freedom from the restrictions imposed by the central government.

This 'myth' helps to reinforce a dualistic interpretation of society in which a small group of leaders are separated, and considered separately from the larger groups over which they have control. Barth, for example, in his analysis of the Basseri makes a very important distinction between political relations which operate at a corporate, or tribal, level, and economic relations where:

"each Basseri household stands entirely alone and must deal with the agents of an impersonal fluctuating world market."

(1959, p.100)

This leads him to an analysis which more or less completely separates the world of the tribal chiefs from that of the ordinary tribesman. Similarly Irons in his analysis of residence groups among the Turkmen states:

"Residence groups are contractual in nature, their composition being a matter of mutual consent.... Cooperation and mutual assistance among members of the same camp in economic and domestic labours are extensive. In terms of political affairs such groups are of little importance."

(1975, p.46) - emphasis added

The chief is the source of tribal power in this scheme. He is the major arbiter in inter-tribal disputes and operates autocratically; 'power is conceived as emanating from him rather than delegated to him by his subjects'.

from the relationships that existed between landlords and peasants described in Chapter VI?

But changing conditions of production, associated with mechanisation, changes in tenurial arrangements and increasing independence of individual production, have served to decrease the extent to which people are directly dependent on the cooperation of others. This is most obviously the case with the large landowners who are in a position to buy-in village labour on a contractual basis. But it is also the case with wage labourers who, through their individual wage-earning capacity, are able to operate in an increasingly independent way. The growing importance of the state has facilitated this development through technical and financial assistance to 'progressive' individual farmers, and through its position as 'mediator' between landowners and villagers.

As the circumstances under which production is undertaken have changed, so have the bases on which cooperative alliances might be constructed. Godelier maintains that:

"(in primitive societies) kinship relations function as relations of production, political relations, and as current ideologies. Here kinship is therefore superstructure and infrastructure." and "The question of passing from class societies to the State may, therefore, be partially reduced to a knowledge of the circumstances wherein kinship relations cease to play the dominant role unifying all the functions of social life."

(1977, p.123)

Changing relations of production have served to transform the political functions of kinship, traditionally expressed in tribal terms, and legitimated through a parilineal kinship
ideology. The expansion in the productive forces associated with such changes has resulted in an increase in both the social and physical distance that separates the direct producers from those who control the means of production (i.e. land). But such a transformation is by no means complete or straightforward. The kinship idiom, if not actual kinship relations is still used to legitimate control over villagers and in the construction of cooperative alliances.

In the Marvdasht plain, and in the Ayub valley in particular, the public language of both villagers and large landowners stresses the fact that mutual support and cooperation underline the basic equality of people. Villagers are at pains to insist that they are free to do what they like and to construct alliances with whomsoever they like. But from what has already been described it is obvious that such freedom is limited and that there are distinct differences in wealth, not only between the large landowners and the villagers, but also within villages.

In trying to come to grips with this question of social differentiation there are considerable problems, firstly about the indices which are taken for social stratification of the population, and secondly about the position of different groups within the village. Indices of social stratification such as the possession of material goods, such as tractors or radios, may be merely the random results of differential vulnerability, and perhaps in the villagers' terms, the results of individual initiative. They may be specific to individual household histories and explainable in terms of sources of income from out-
side the family and numbers of workers in the household, for example. These are largely reflections of the positions of discrete households in the domestic cycle rather than statements about their relationships to the means of production. Social groupings within the village likewise may only be ideological justifications for the ways in which certain individuals are able to maintain control over production. The ownership of a tractor does not necessarily mean anything in itself but must be related to the context in which it was obtained. Where did the resources come from? If the tractor owner spends time working with that tractor under what conditions do others work his land for him? Is the tractor perceived as a 'communal' resource, or are formal contractual arrangements made for its use within the village?

As Bernstein maintains:

"Differentiation in the materialist sense is tied to the conditions in which wealth becomes capital when it is not consumed individually but productively through investment in the means of production. It is this which gives content to the classification of 'poor', 'middle' and 'rich' peasants in terms of the relations of production."

(Bernstein 1979, p.430)

The 'primordial loyalties' that Alavi speaks about, based in kinship relationships and a public language of good faith and trust allow some individuals to appropriate the labour of others and free themselves for engagement in more profitable enterprises, thereby reinforcing their superior position. Wolf speaks in similar terms of the 'many stranded dyadic vertical

coalitions' that cut across the class interests of both landlord and peasant and perpetuate relationships of inequality.¹

In this chapter an attempt is made to look at the ways in which personnel are separated from each other and labelled as being members of particular isolated groups in which relationships of inequality are authorised, and perceived as parts of the natural social order. It is through this process of authorisation and legitimation that relationships of inequality are formalised and particular informal clusters of individuals are recognised as groups. But one must be careful to make sure that the names used in the separation of interests do not hide the processes associated with the differentiation which are rooted in a particular history and in a process of structuration involving constant change and compromise.

If we look at the circumstances in which recourse is made to kinship in a changing environment we find that it is used in a variety of ways and that it is not sufficient to assume that as a means of organising production it is now increasingly redundant. As Bourdieu maintains:

"The generalised law of exchange means that the closer the individuals or groups are in the genealogy, the easier it is to make agreements, the more frequent they are, and the more completely they are entrusted to good faith."

(1977, p.173)

¹. Wolf, 1966.
This is not only to be interpreted as a statement of fact, supported by Sahlins' propositions about the nature of reciprocity, but also as a statement of intent. If agreements between parties to an exchange can be dressed in the language of kinship then the easier it is for them to be transacted without recourse to formal, legal contract.

As a starting point, both for the examination of the various forms of cooperative alliances constructed between villagers, as well as in an examination of the changing nature of the 'agro-pastoral combine', that latter institution provided both the different labour skills as well as access to different resources to ensure the livelihood of its members. The agro-pastoral combine implied the possession of both land and animals by an extended patrilineal family. In this it was an extension of the individual/household. The head of the extended family deployed the labour of its members into both pastoral and agricultural activities.

Emphasis in the agro-pastoral combine was placed on the production of livelihood in the absence of commercial cash-crop farming. As such it might be perceived as a model for organisation under non-capitalist conditions. With the expansion of capitalist relations of production and the spread of a money economy, emphasis shifted to production of particular goods on a particular stretch of land, the surplus from which could be sold to meet other needs. There was a change in emphasis, the culmination of which was the individual association of people with particular stretches of land. This shift in
emphasis had important consequences for socio-political organisation, described in Chapter XII below.

Firstly, through the formalisation of relationships between the landlord and the peasant, the agricultural activities of the latter were increasingly confined to production for the landlord on village lands. And secondly, through the individualisation of property rights, of which the land reform programme might be seen as an expression, there was a decrease in the ways in which people were dependent on others as they were able to exchange their production for goods available on the market.

The various configurations of personnel now resident in Chamani provide the basis for an understanding of these very complex processes, some of which have already been emphasised in previous chapters. If we look at the history of this particular village, it might bring them more into focus. Prior to the actual construction of the gha'leh in which the majority of the residents of Chamani now live, a proportion of what are now the village lands were cultivated by residents of Buraki. As indicated in Chapter VII, there are still 16 Buraki residents with rights to land in Chamani. They form, together with three households now resident in Chamani, one heraseh. At the time of the foundation of the gha'leh a group of nomadic Turks who used the area around Chamani as their winter quarters were invited by the landlord to settle in the village. They were obliged to settle under Reza Shah's sedentarisation programme.
They were members of the Gerai tireh of the Baharlu taifeh, which was formerly allied to the Khamseh confederacy of tribes. Other members of the same nomadic group settled in other villages in the plain, most notably in neighbouring Uanjan and Junaki, as well as in Miân Ghâleh across the river from Chamani. The present descendants of these original settlers still retain significant connections with these villages. They also comprise one heraseh within the village and in the early 1970s consisted of 13 households, and have taken on the family name of Rusta (see fig. 15).

At the time of the construction of the village another group of settlers, migrants from Beiza, the neighbouring dehestan, were also given land in Chamani. These now also comprise a separate heraseh consisting of six households. They have taken on the family name of Baneshi, after the village in Beiza from which they came. It would seem that one of the reasons for their migration from Beiza was their relationship with some of the residents in Buraki, with whom they retained significant contacts.

These three sets of people, the Buraki residents, the Rusta Turks, and the Baneshi Lurs, formed the three herasehs which cultivated the village lands of Chamani. Each heraseh had its own leader who was called a kadkhodâ, who was responsible to the kadkhodâ of the landlord for deciding what would be cultivated and for supervising cultivation. They retained significant interests outside the village itself even before the land reform programme which effectively reduced the amount
of land they were able to control from 750 hectares to 300 hectares (see Chapter VI). With this reduced control over agricultural production in the village, the external connections which had always been maintained became more important as channels for future opportunities. In addition to these three herasehs was the overarching control of the landlord who, until land reform, not only controlled all agricultural activity in the village, but in addition owned land independently outside the village boundaries which, with the help of motor pumps and wage labour, he had brought into cultivation. This was considered separately from village agriculture although some villagers were employed as wage labourers.

The Rusta Turks:

The Rusta sector of the village population identified itself with the tribal system and was immediately thereby connected to a regional tribal framework. Visitors from the nomadic sector of the Baharlu taifeh were entertained at twice yearly intervals as they passed through the area on their migrations, and individual relatives helped out at harvest times. Contracts for the care of sheep and goats were constructed between sedentary and nomadic relatives. They were perhaps the most distinct group within the village, because they spoke Turkish and because their women claimed a virtual monopoly over village carpet production. This distinction appeared to be breaking down somewhat as the younger generation spoke Persian and as others learned to make carpets. All 13 heads of households
gained land with the land reform programme.

The Rusta Turks claimed descent from a common stock. Eight of the 13 male heads shared a common known ancestor only two generations removed from them (see fig. 15). Three of the remaining five adults are the immediate descendents of brothers and the other two are connected by marriage to the core patriline. These statements are, however, more interesting for what they do not reveal rather than for what they do. Fig. 15 is a public statement which partially justifies their present inter-connections. First of all it does not take us very far historically into the patriline of the group. Bagh Mirza, the grandfather of the present leader of the Rusta Turks (Rais Javad (No.7)) is the only person from that generation who was identified. Secondly this genealogy tells us little about the nature of inter-relationships with other members of the Geraitireh. Thirdly it gives us little information about the alliances that have been built up through the women. Fig. 15 does show some of the marital inter-relationships, but, unless they have been contracted with women in Chamani itself, exact genealogical connections between parties to the marriage are not available. Information for the construction of this genealogy is based on information gained from at least three people (Nos.7, 11 and 14) and it is therefore perhaps surprising that more extended knowledge which pushes back the genealogical boundaries is not available. Two reasons for this might be put forward. Firstly there was a genuine lack of knowledge, and secondly the assumptions underlying the responses to the
enquirer may have skewed those responses. The skews occur as a result of informant bias as to what he thought the purpose of the enquiry was, and also, relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, because of what the informant thought it was important to reveal.

The information presented in fig. 15 incorporates 29 marriages and presents a rather diverse picture, made less amenable to analysis because it tends to be 'place focused' rather than 'people focused' (based predominantly on ego-centres network techniques to elicit information). If we try and break these figures down it will be observed that of those marriages 11 were constructed with people who were themselves Rusta Turks living in Chamani. Another seven were constructed with Rusta Turks living in Uanjan. The remaining 11 were constructed with people in Hasanabad/Marvdasht (4), neighbouring Buraki (4), Zargānāk (1) on the other side of the Ayub mountain, or with non-Turks in Chamani itself (2). Perhaps significantly there were no alliances between the Rusta Turks and the Baneshi Lurs.

The core of this group was the four brothers, Javad(7), Azad(8), Ziad(9) and Akram(10). Javad was the acknowledged head of the Rusta herāseh and was, in the early 1970S, the head of the village council, representing 13 of the 22 village households who received land with the land reform programme. The father of these four brothers was Agha Mirza who was himself one of five brothers, all of whom, except for Kamar Khan (No.18) were in 1971 dead. Little was known as to where these five
brothers obtained their wives from, but it is likely that all of them were married before they came to live in Chamani. It is known that one of their sisters was married to a resident of Uanjan, and that Agha Mirza's wife's sister married a Qashqai tribesman from Sarhad-e-Chahr-dangi. Apart from that there is no information on either the sisters of the five brothers, or on those of the four brothers who now form the core of the Rusta Turks, except that two sisters are married to residents in Junaki.

The other households attached to the Rusta Turks are either the direct descendants of the five brothers (Nos. 14, 15 and 16) or affiliated to them through marriage. Mina and Avolfat (Nos. 11 and 13) are older members of the village who were related (exactly how is not known) to Javad's family and members of the same tireh. They were themselves the sons of brothers, and Avolfat has two brothers who are residents of Uanjan. Complex bilateral ties connect the Rusta Turks to many villages in the surrounding area, and the available genealogical record is only a partial map of these ties.

A notable feature of this collection of related individuals is that their unity, if that is what it may be called, is only evident in terms of their attachment to the village lands within the confines of a single heraseh, and their representation through this on the village council. Apart from that and their collective presence at marriage ceremonies, there are few occasions when they might be seen as a corporate group. Indeed, despite recognised closeness both socially and physically, a
major feature is the independent action of household heads, especially since land reform has obliged them to turn their attention from village agriculture. Their 'unity' as a group was perhaps more a feature of their inter-action with/opposition to Abdulahi, in terms of village government and administration, and thus with agents of the national government.

Nevertheless, kinship links were still important for the construction of joint economic activities both within the village, and, especially since land reform, between villages. The 13 landowning households were divided into four khishs for agricultural production on village land. These were close kin alliances between people who usually lived in the same courtyard. Income from the land was, especially for the Rusta Turks, only a small proportion of their income. It will be remembered that they were only involved in the cultivation of barley. With the reduction in the amount of land under their control it might be said that the khish was under-worked. This had two effects, both of which served as a spur to increased differentiation within the village. Firstly some individuals were able to expand their external interests through existing kinship networks. Secondly other individuals were entrusted with the cultivation of the formers' land. Individual differentiation, reflected in control over such means of production as agricultural machinery was achieved through cooperative alliances with poorer relatives; 'primordial loyalties' were assisting in the creation of a class of rich peasants.
The four brothers who formed the core of the Rusta Turks were engaged in very different types of activities. They formed the basis of two khishs and the enterprises in which they were engaged and which extended beyond their individual households were noticeably different. The lines of cooperation were not with immediate kin as the public language of kinship might have suggested. The four brothers lived in two courtyards in very separate parts of the village (see courtyards E and I, fig. 16). Akram(10) and Ziad(9) had built a separate courtyard above that of Abdulahi's, whereas Javad(7) and Azad (8) lived in an older courtyard in the gha'leh.

In the early 1970s Javad was a man in his late '40s and probably the richest man in the village, owning part shares in a tractor and in a mini-bus, in addition to his land in Chamani and his 100 sheep and goats. He lived with his wife and five children. In all he had seven children, four sons and three daughters. Two of his daughters were married, one to Ali Vez, the son of Mina(11), and the other to Mashd Akbar Keshavarz, a member of one of the more powerful families in Buraki. His wife Khadijeh was the daughter of Avolfat. He had two sisters who were married to residents of Junaki.

Rais Javad was given the title of rais-e-sahra (lit. "head of those lands which were not cultivated"). This presumably reflected his own significant interests in sheep and goats and his authority to allocate pastures in the village among those who have animals. He also had four cows and two donkeys which were herded with the village herd by the village dashtebān,
Fig. 15: Stylised structure plan of the 'leh of Charminar, showing approximate location of domestic groups.

Notes:

- Numbers 7, 20, 22, 28, and the son of 2 were in the process of building courts.
- Above the village.
Karim Marzeban(26). His 100 sheep and goats represented a significant investment, and it is likely that he in fact owned more than that because of the contracts constructed between himself and his nomadic cousins. Barth states that for the Basseri nomads such numbers can sustain a 'satisfactory lifestyle' (1964, p.16). Javad did not herd the animals himself and those that were grazed in and around the village were kept in his courtyard, separated from a similar sized herd that his brother, Azad, owned. His oldest son helped with the animals on occasion, but they were normally herded, together with those of Azad's by the latter's son, Niaz. Barley grown on the village lands helped to support these animals, but in the summer they were moved further afield into areas to the north and west, and, as intimated earlier, both brothers contracted with their nomadic relatives to take them up to the sarhad in addition to buying wool and animals from the latter.

Javad's wife was a skilled carpet maker, and his sheep provided more than enough wool for the two carpets she produced on average every year with the help of her daughters, the ones who were married as well as the ones still at home. Some of Javad's time was spent in the carpet business, buying and selling wool and trading in carpets on the Marvdasht and Shiraz bazaars.

Most of the spring months saw him supervising the work of his tractor, which was taken to various parts of the plain to work the lands of different villages. He owned the tractor with Mohamad Ali, the kadkhoda from Pol-e-No, and it was used
in that village as well as in Chamani, Junaki, Uanjan and Fakhrābād. The contacts for such contracts came through the kinship network with relatives of both Mohamad Ali in Fakhrābād and Javad among the Rusta Turks in Uanjan and Junaki. It was reported that remuneration from tractors was high, and some informants suggested that it was as high as one third of the harvest. Payment did however vary according to the nature of the land and the terms of the individual relationships constructed; it was paid in either cash or a share of the harvest. Javad did not drive the tractor most of the time although it was garaged in Chamani. The chief driver was Mohamad Ali's son who was also a mechanic.

With the increase in activity just outside Chamani occasioned by the establishment of the canal construction company, there was an increased demand for transport to and from the village to Marvdasht and Shiraz. Javad, together with a partner from Junaki, had bought a mini-bus. This was also available for general use by villagers. It was driven by the son of his partner in Junaki. Javad himself did not work for the construction company. This company had constructed a series of buildings and had installed an electricity generator. In anticipation of electricity eventually being provided to the village, Javad was the first person in Chamani (apart from Abdulāhi) to have his house wired. The company had also, despite considerable local protests, piped water from the spring at Ayub, to a point just outside the village, and Javad, as head of the village council was negotiating with the company engineers to
bring piped water into the village. His varied activities meant that he was frequently absent from the village.

Much of his time was taken up with various interests, but he was also the head of the village council which involved him in frequent dealings with urban-based authorities - the gendarmerie and various government agencies. He also acted as official host for those who came to the village, and mediator in disputes between villages and the landlord and government. He was repaid from the 2% development fund which his council controlled. He also provided loans for individual allied Turks in the village. On major religious feast days, such as Eid-e-Ghorbān, it was he who slaughtered an animal and distributed it to members of the Rusta Turks, and who entertained visiting nomadic relatives at Ayub.

His agricultural land was worked by his brother Azad and the latter's brother-in-law, MashdAyaz. Azad was married to the daughter of one of the five original brothers. They had eight children, five sons and three daughters. Two of the daughters had married, one to a Rusta Turk in Uanjan and the other to someone resident in Marvdasht. His wife was also a carpet maker. Azad was much more closely involved with village agriculture and had few outside interests. MashdAyaz, his wife's sister was a younger man whose wife was the daughter of Akram(10). He helped his brother-in-law with the agricultural work, but was also employed as a wage labourer by the canal construction company. He lived with his wife and seven young children in courtyard A.
It is difficult to separate the activities of these three households. Together they are joined in a loose cooperative alliance within Chamani. The labour provided in particular by Azad and his sons forms the basis on which Javad is able to move out of agricultural production. But it is not just the cooperative labour of these people, but a wide variety of others, both within the village and elsewhere. For example, both Mina and Avolfat (11 and 13) work on occasions with Javad. Mina's son is married to Javad's daughter, but there is a great difference in wealth between the two families. Avolfat's daughter is married to Javad, and the former's family provides the basis for a wide series of contacts throughout villages in the plain.

The families of both Sahreh Khan (15) and Haji (16), both of whom are landowners, were also loosely allied to this cooperative group. In addition to their own agricultural work these two, the sons of two of the original five brothers, also helped with the cultivation of Javad's land, for which they were remunerated with a share of the harvest. Sahreh Khan's wife came from Buraki, his one married daughter was living in Uanjan. Haji's wife came from Chamani. Together with their children they formed two separate households in courtyard F, which they shared with the village carpenter Agha Jan. Haji supported his deceased brother's wife. Neither had any animals and they were dependent on the land and their occasional cash income from wage labour and carpet production for a livelihood.

Akram (10) and his brother Ziad (9) shared one of the newer courtyards in the village. He lived in three rooms with his
wife, two unmarried daughters, one unmarried son, and a recently married son and his wife. Two other daughters had married and left the household. One had married Ali Khan(31) a member of a family which was based in Buraki. Ali Khan and his brother Kaka Khan(32) were not landowners, working as agricultural labourers on both the lands of the Rusta Turks and the Buraki residents. The other daughter had married MashdAyaz(14), a close ally of Javad's. Akram's eldest son, Nezam, was married to a Rusta Turk from Uanjan and lived in two rooms in the same courtyard. The recently married son had married Nezam's wife's sister, and were given one room in the courtyard. Nezam and his brother had not yet formed independent households. Neither of them had received land with the land reform programme. Nezam himself had been drafted into the army.

Bread and most meals were cooked in common, and the women shared in the production of carpets.

Both brothers obtained wives from around Hasanabad, between Mian Ghaleh and Marvdasht on the other side of the river. One of Ziad's daughters had been given in marriage to a resident of Hasanabad. Another daughter had been married to someone in Uanjan. One of his sons had married the daughter of the village carpenter, Agha Jan(12).

Akram owned 30 sheep and goats which were herded together with the 100 animals that Ziad owned, by the latter. Ziad was much more involved with caring for the animals while his brother and his sons were more involved with agricultural production, and took charge of Ziad's land. The sons of both brothers, in
addition to their agricultural work, were also occasional wage labourers with the canal construction company. Akram and Ziad used their relatives in Hasanabad to provide grazing for their animals in the summer. Akram, rather than Ziad, was also involved, like his brother Javad in trading in wool and carpets.

The alliances that these two constructed were very different from those constructed by Javad and Azad. This is partly a reflection of the amount of domestic labour available to them, but also their external associations seemed to be more oriented to Hasanabad where their wives came from. Again the cooperative labour of these two domestic groups, which formed one khish, of seven adult males, provided the basis for a wide variety of activities, rooted in ownership of both land and animals.

Another khish which was part of the Rusta Turk heraseh was that headed by Kamar khan(18), the only surviving brother of the five who originally settled in Chamani. This was the largest domestic group in the village. Kamar khan lived, with his wife in a courtyard above that of his nephews (courtyard J), together with the family of Namaki(20). (Namaki was originally brought to the village from Bardej in Korbal by Abdulahi to work on the latter's land, his daughter married Kamar khan's son and moved out of the rooms provided for him by Abdulahi in the gha'leh, after helping Kamar khan with the construction of his relatively new courtyard.)

Together with his wife there was one unmarried daughter and two unmarried sons. Attached to him were his two married sons, Felomars and Keyomars with their wives and children.
Kamar khan did not himself own land because he was not directly involved with agricultural production at the time of the land reform programme. His son, Keyomars, was, however, a landowner. Kamar khan owned 80 sheep and goats which were herded by Sohrab, his younger son. In addition his four cows were taken out with the village herd.

This extended household had constructed very different types of alliances to those of the other two Rusta Turk groups already described. Kamar Khan did not marry a Turk, but the daughter of Mahd Taghi Nazari(23). The Nazari family had moved into Chamani as landless labourers soon after its establishment, and one half was now allied to the Rusta Turks, while the other half was allied to Abdulahi. His three married sons have all married non-Rusta Turks. Keyomars had married Numaki's daughter. Felomars had married a girl from Falumak. The youngest married son, who was away in the army, had also taken a wife from a village just south of Falunak. All three wives lived in Kamar Khan's courtyard. Two daughters had also been married. One to Avolfat's son, Darbish(34), and the other to a former tractor driver of Abdulahi's who lived in Zarghanak.

Domestic arrangements still revolved around a single hearth, but with the increasing age of Kamar Khan, Keyomars was beginning to take on some of the responsibilities of the head of the household. He and his wife occupied two separate rooms in the courtyard and did not share all meals with Kamar Khan. Namaki and his household operated independently within the courtyard. Keyomars was the bath-house keeper in Chamani and had just
begun to build a new courtyard behind that of his father's on land purchased from Abdulahi, together with Ali Naghi(21). Keyomars was an agricultural worker together with his mother's brother's son. On occasion he also worked as a wage labourer on village construction sites and for the canal construction company. But he was never away from the village for any extended period of time, unlike his two married brothers, one of whom was in the army, while the other worked for most of the summer on construction sites in Shiraz, returning to the village at weekends. Keyomars' wife, unlike her mother-in-law, was a carpet maker, and she was helped in this by her two sisters-in-law.

The remaining khish affiliated to the heraseh of the Rusta Turks was that led by Avolfat(13) and Mina(11) who shared a common courtyard (G). They were the sons of two brothers and came to Chamani on its foundation. They formed together with Mina's son-in-law, Mahd Agha(17) one cultivating group. Avolfat's household consisted of his wife, five sons, three of whom were married and one unmarried daughter. Like Mina and Kamar Khan, Avolfat was an elderly man, and a nomad until he settled in Chamani. One of his other daughters was married to Javad(7) and the other to a resident of Uanjan, where he still had two brothers. Avolfat occupied two rooms in the courtyard and his married sons both had two separate rooms. Darblish, his eldest son(34) had recently moved with his wife to rooms in courtyard A because of pressure on space in courtyard G. His sons had married girls from Uanjan and Buraki.
The extended household involved three married couples with their unmarried children. Although all lived in the same courtyard, all domestic chores were not shared. Each had a separate hearth on which separate meals were cooked. The bread was, however, baked in common and the wives pooled some food resources and helped each other with carpet production. Two sons helped out with agricultural work with their father. One son was in the army. Both Darbish and Avolfat were landowners. Darbish also worked as a wage labourer with the canal construction company and sometimes as a day labourer up at the dam. He also on occasion worked for Abdulahi as an irrigator on a daily basis. During 1971 he was engaged in helping his brother-in-law, Keyomars with the construction of his new courtyard which he hoped to be able to eventually move into. Avaz, his other son, was also a tractor driver for someone in Uanjan, from where his wife came. His work took him all over the plain and away from the village for extended periods.

In addition to their small interests in land, both Darbish and Avolfat had interests in animals. The former had 20 sheep and goats as well as three cows. The latter had 10 sheep and goats and two donkeys. The cows were herded with the village herd. Darbish’s sheep were herded by Niaz, Azad’s son, while those of Avolfat were herded by Kamar Khan’s son. Avolfat also owned a house in Marvdasht which he leased to relatives living there. He was frequently out of the village visiting relatives in the surrounding area. Because of his age he had partially withdrawn from agricultural production, but he was hired as a
part-time shepherd by Abdulahi to look after his flock of lambs during the spring and early summer months, for which he was paid in cash.

Mina, the other household head in courtyard G lived, together with his wife and three unmarried children, two sons and one daughter, in two rooms. Another son, Ali Vez had married Javad's daughter, and a daughter had married Mahd Agha(17) who lived with them in courtyard G. They comprised three married couples with their children. Ali Vez, Mina's eldest son was a wage labourer and worked regularly as an irrigator for Abdulahi. Mina himself was also on occasion hired to help. Mina's household was one of the poorest in the village. He had few external interests and was dependent on others, such as Javad and Abdulahi, to provide him with work opportunities.

The four khishs reflect very different configurations of people combined in a variety of cooperative alliances, partially reflecting their positions within the domestic cycle. Kinship ties were still very important in securing cooperation based on mutual trust and support.

The Baneshi Lurs

As previously noted a major feature of many settlements within the plain was the extent of relatively recent immigration. Significant among the immigrants in Ramjerd were the so-called 'Luri' groups who spoke a dialect of Persian and originated in areas to the north and west of the plain. They
were not related to the Lurs of Luristan, except in so far as they occupied the more physically marginal areas of the southern Zagros. Such Luri groups, migrants from these higher areas, not only figured prominently in populations within villages in the Marvdasht plain, but also as tirehs among the Qashqai nomadic tribes. Luri families figure in both the populations of Chamani and Buraki within the Ayub valley and in Shahrak, Zarghanak and Futuabad within the dehestan. It is likely they are to be found in many other villages as well. Significant relationships are retained between these villages and the places from which they came in the dehestan of Beiza, to the west of Ramjerd – Banesh, Amirabad, Sarglan, Takht-e-Sang and Kushk-e-Beiza.

Beiza has traditionally been part of the sarhad (Fasa'i ii.183), like Kamfiruz, above the dam. Both border the areas of the Kuh Giluyeh, occupied by such tribal groups as the Boyr Ahmad and the Mamasani Lurs (see Loeffler, Fazel, Afshar Naderi). Pastoralism figured prominently in the economy of this area, but unlike the more visible long range nomadism of groups such as the Qashqai, migrations 'take place almost entirely within tribal territory'(Fazel 1972, p.9).

The Lurs who migrated from Beiza into Ramjerd were not nomadic pastoralists like the Rusta Turks appear to have been, but villagers with significant interests in sheep in goats. In the Kuh Giluyeh areas one does not apparently encounter the elaborate political hierarchies of such groups as the Qashqai, with which the Rusta Turks can so readily identify. The whole
area was apparently organised into distinct tribal territories with small chiefs and settlements corresponding to the divisions of the tribe (Afshar Naderi). This would seem to be very similar to those political relationships which operated to wield the boluk, in the nineteenth century into a political force under one landlord. For example, it was noted in Chapter IV that one of the groups which resisted the Afghans was the Korbali tribes.

Explanations for the movement of the Lurs from the higher areas into places like Ramjerd have focused on political ex n-sion associated with population growth (Fazel) but this appears more as post facto justification rather than explanation. It would appear that in the Marvdasht plain at least expansion of agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s offered considerable opportunities to new settlers, and the conditions created under Reza Shah offered a stability which encouraged such expansion. In more recent years there has been a second exodus as villagers from behind the dam in Kamîruz moved to escape the rising waters of the lake.

The Lurs in Chamani are isolated because they formed a single heraseh for agricultural production consisting of six domestic groups. But they were very closely connected with other in-migrants who had settled in Buraki. They claim no allegiance to a larger tribal framework in which they saw themselves encapsulated. Lack of detailed socio-historical information on them limits the nature of the interpretation of their precise kinship links, some of which are given in fig. 13.
But it would appear that when land in Chamani was opened up the landlord drew on people from Buraki and on relations of those people looking for land.

They gain their identity as a group in terms of their association with land in Chamani, but this is, like the Rusta Turks, only one of their interests. The nature of patrilineal kinship ties which connect them to each other are much more tenuous, and hardly acknowledged by them. They say they are a group of cooperating kin (ghom-o-khish) connected through bilateral kinship ties. In many anthropological studies of economic and political organization, kinship is seen as important in the construction of corporate kin groups, with duly constituted authority by which their external and internal affairs are regulated and thus economic and political roles appear in the form of kinship roles. By trying to examine the form of grouping in these terms one is in danger of ignoring, not only the social space available to individuals in their struggles to survive in a changing world, but also the importance of the prevailing social relations of production in actually constituting these groups. An examination of the Rusta Turks has attempted to show how and when specific kinship associations are used. The Baneshi Lurs display even greater lack of 'genealogical cohesion' in their public statements about their 'corporateness'. Rather than referring to themselves as a distinct tireh, expressed in terms of a patrilineal idiom, they point to their former place of residence and to the bilateral ties which connect them.
The known marriage alliances constructed among the Baneshi Lurs number 16, twelve of which are mapped on fig. 13. (p.322a) In addition to these were the alliances constructed by Safar (3) and Hasanjan (4). None were with Rusta Turks, most being from the area from which they had come. The Baneshi Lurs were divided into three khishs for purposes of agricultural production. Two brothers (Ghobad and Hosein) who came from Amirabad with Iadollah (2) and Malek (1) were resident in Buraki having been evicted from the village by the landlord prior to the land reform programme.

The leader of the Baneshi Lurs was Iadollah, who represented them on the village council. Prior to the land reform programme he was also Abdulahi's representative (kadkhoda) in the village. Together with his brother's son and their immediate families they formed one khish consisting of five adult males. They lived together in one courtyard (C). As indicated in Chapter X, their wives were sisters and many household activities were carried out together. Iadollah had three married sons and one married daughter. The three sons, together with their wives and small children, lived in the same courtyard. One son was married to Malek's daughter, another had obtained a wife from Amirabad in Beiza, and the other from Buraki, where he married Malek's sister's daughter. Iadollah's married daughter lived in Shahrak, from where her mother and aunt had come.

Only Iadollah and Malek were landowners, their sons were landless labourers. Two of Iadollah's sons worked the land for
their father, as well as working as wage labourers on construction sites in the plain. The other son, Mansur, worked on a regular basis (until his dismissal) for Abdulahi as an irrigator. Iadollah owned 20 sheep and goats and Malek owned 60. In addition both Mansur and his brother Masih owned 10 and 20 animals respectively. These were herded normally by Kaka Khan's son, Ali (see below). During the summer months they were taken up to Amirabad in Beiza to utilize the summer pastures at higher altitudes made available by relatives in that area. The wives of Iadollah and Malek, as well as those of Mansur and his brother Masih were also carpet makers. Their products were sold through Hasanjan (4), the major carpet trader in the village, and realised a not insubstantial cash income for the extended family.

The second khish allied to the Baneshi Lurs was headed by Hasanjan and comprised his household, together with those of Mashd Hajali (27) and his brother Mashd Karim (28), both of whom did not gain title to land during the land reform programme.

Hasanjan was the village shopkeeper. He also owned a part share in a combine harvester with Mashd Seifollah, a man who lived in Shiraz, but whose brother, a native of Beiza, lived in Buraki and was the landlord's overseer in that village (mobasher). Hasanjan was one of the richest villagers in Chamani and of all villagers had perhaps the widest network of contacts outside the village. He did not maintain close relationships of either kinship or friendship with many others in the village. He did, however, sit on the village council as
secretary, and his position as shopkeeper made him an important source of credit for many villagers.

Hasanjan lived with his wife and six children in a separated part of courtyard C (also occupied by Iadollah and Malek). His sister was married to Mashd Hajali (27), who, in addition to working for Hasanjan, was also Abdulahi's pump attendant in Pol-e-No. Both Mashd Hajali and his brother were in-migrants from Beiza. The only one of Hasanjan's daughters to have married had moved to Buraki as the wife of Rais Mahmud's son. Rais Mahmud was a member of a prominent Turki-speaking family in Buraki and his brother was Abdulahi's kadkhoda in Chamani.

For two to three months in the late spring and early summer Hasanjan was away from the village working with his combine harvester in Khuzestan. He employed his brother-in-law, Mashd Karim as driver and he accompanied him. In later months he spent considerable time negotiating contracts for his combine in the sarhad. At other times he was away from the village collecting supplies for the carpet industry or in trading in wool and supplies for his shop. He normally worked between Beiza and Marvdasht. In Beiza he maintained contact with relatives, buying large amounts of wool which he transported for sale in Marvdasht. He acted as middleman in a variety of activities, and with a variety of personnel, buying such things as shirts for villagers and selling such things as sheep and carpets on behalf of the villagers, both in the Ayub valley and in Beiza.
Hasanjan did not have any animals himself in Chamani. He did own three cows which were herded with the village herd. It is likely that he did own animals in Beiza that were shepherded by others, but this was never confirmed. His shop stocked most of the requirements that villagers would normally have bought in Marvdasht or Shiraz. He accepted payment in both grain and wool as well as cash, and although his prices were marginally higher than those in town, he was convenient and did provide credit. His wife and son normally looked after the shop. His eldest son was the only child in Chamani who had progressed beyond sixth grade in school and was at high-school in Shiraz, where he stayed with the family of Mashd Seifollah (the combine owner). Hasanjan had little to do with direct agricultural production, entrusting it to his brothers-in-law who were remunerated in kind for this with a half share of the harvest. Like Javad, Hasanjan was intent on building a new courtyard outside the gha'leh.

In addition to his important role on the village council and in providing credit facilities to villagers, he also entertained more important visitors; village leaders and religious dignitaries from Beiza were publicly entertained by him at his own expense when they occasionally visited the area. Such visitors were entertained in his upper room. He was visibly in competition with Javad, the official leader of the village council, for prestige in the village political hierarchy. He did not command the 'given' tireh associations that Javad had through kinship connections within the village itself, but
seemed to try to compensate for this by public displays of generosity extended to all villagers, and through his friendship with government agents involved in village affairs, such as the local teacher and extension agent.

The other khish within the Baneshi Lur heraseh was that composed of the households of Kaka Khan (6), his son Hatam (5) and Safar (3). Both Safar and Kaka Khan were landowners. They lived in the same courtyard. Hatam had set up a separate household in that he occupied independent rooms with his wife, whom he had obtained from Futuabad, and his six unmarried children. He did not own land but worked his father's with Safar. Kaka Khan saw his relationships with the other Baneshi Lurs in terms of their 'having come down from the sarhad together'. His wife was from Banesh. Hatam's brother, Ali, was unmarried and looked after the animals owned by his brother and father. The latter owned 50, the former owned 30. These were herded together and Ali acted as shepherd for the flocks of Iadollah and Malek and were taken up to Beiza by Ali during the summer months. Hatam's sister lived in Buraki and was married to Hosein, a former resident of Chamani and brother-in-law of Malek.

Safar lived with his wife, the sister of Karim Rezali Marzeban (25 & 26) and their five small children as a separate household in courtyard A. One daughter had married into a prominent household in Buraki (see above, Ch.X). Both the wives of Safar and Hatam were carpet makers. Apart from their interests in land and animals they were engaged in few other
enterprises. They did not regularly seek out wage labour, or work for Abdulahi.

The Baneshi Lurs are, like the Rusta Turks, characterised by their divergent interests implying very different sorts of alliances. Their identity as a 'group' was forged through Iadollah, Abdulahi's kadkhoda in pre-reform days and was only important in terms of their cultivation of village lands as a single heraseh, entitling them to representation on the village council. Their interrelationships are rooted in associations with areas of Beiza from which they came.

The ex-Buraki residents

A small group of Chamani residents formed a single khish which, while tied to cultivation on village lands, had much closer associations with Buraki. For cultivation of wheat they were part of the heraseh headed by Iadollah Baneshi. For rice cultivation, in which they were also involved, they were part of the heraseh headed by Mashd Baber of Buraki residents with cultivation rights in Chamani. Their representative on the Chamani village council was Mashd Baber, himself a resident of Buraki.

The core of this group in Chamani was the two brothers Rezali and Karim (25 & 26) who lived together with their wives and six children and their widowed mother in courtyard D. Rezali (25), who was called the 'head of the tajiks' by the Rusta Turks, had brought his wife from Kushk-e-Beiza. His
sister had married Safar Baneshi (3). Karim, his younger brother, had married a girl from Marvdasht. Both brothers were landowners and despite maintaining separate residences, much domestic activity was carried out in common under the household authority of Rezali. Karim had 30 sheep and goats and two cows, the latter used for ploughing, like many of the other cattle in the village.

The two brothers came to Chamani with their father from Buraki. Prior to Abdulahil's arrival in the village Karim was housekeeper to the landlord's representative who occupied Abdulahil's compound. He was in the early 1970s village dashtebān, taking the village herd out to graze every day, for which he was remunerated through the village council at harvest time. Neither brother was involved in the search for wage labour and seemed to have few outside interests, being able, apparently, to sustain a livelihood from agricultural production of wheat and rice and from their animals. Neither of their wives produced carpets and they were amongs the poorest inhabitants of the village.

They were joined in agricultural production by Hosein Dadkha (29), who also gained land under the land reform programme. He lived with his wife and three children in two rooms in the very crowded courtyard B. His sister and her husband, Hosein Khan (30), lived in one very small room next door, together with their one small child. Hosein Khan was Abdulahil's dashtebān and to all intents and purposes was part of Hosein Dadhka's household. Hosein Dadkha's other brothers were landowners who
lived in Buraki. It was not clear why he himself moved to Chamani. Neither his wife nor his sister were carpet makers, nor did Hosein Dadkha own any animals.

Living in the same courtyard as Karim and Rezali (25 & 26) was one extended household consisting of three brothers who were all landless labourers. They were recognized as independent households because of their divergent individual activities, but it would seem that there was much inter-dependence because of the precariousness of their position. While they managed to produce some income through working for the heraseh of the Buraki residents in Chamani, they also on occasion worked for Rusta Turks, Baneshi Lurs and in Pol-e-No. They were the sons of Imam Gholi who, when alive, was 'caretaker' (negahbān) of the Imamzadeh Ayub. Since his death that work had fallen into the hands of his younger brother's family, which was resident in Buraki. One of the three brothers, Kaka Khan(31) was the acknowledged head of the group and had married into a family from Pol-e-No. He had four young children. His other brothers were relatively young; Ali Khan(32), with whom their widowed mother lived, was married to the daughter of Akram(10), and Ali Reza(33) had married a Lur from Kushk-e-Beiza. A fourth brother lived with his wife in Kushk-e-Beiza. Their wives did not make carpets, nor did they have any animals. They were constantly searching for work as wage labourers.

This account has attempted to illustrate the variety of alliances constructed within a relatively small village between
households which vary from those in which kinship links are of prime importance, to more formal relationships of contract. It has proceeded through an analysis of most of the cooperative alliances to be found in one village and pointed out some of the internal social differentiations that are an inherent feature in most alliances, depending partially on the associations between kin at particular stages in the development of domestic groups. However, it has not included perhaps the most important alliance to be found within the village, which, in some senses, incorporates the whole village, and that is Abdulahii's enterprise, and the relationships that he has constructed between villagers and others. Nor has it addressed the problems directly associated with the separation of those alliances based on kinship from those based on contract. Some of the complexities of this issue were addressed in the chapter on marriage, where emphasis was placed on the differences between a public language of good faith and cooperative trust, and the private language of individual self-interest.

In reality it might be argued that Abdulahii's enterprise, of which Chamani is but a small part, cannot be treated separately and is just another cooperative arrangement built with the same principles that villagers use; the tools used and the values expressed by Abdulahii are, it is maintained, similar to the ones used by villagers. But his enterprise does provide an intellectual bridge to a concluding discussion of the relationships that have been constructed between the state and the village and point backwards as well as forwards to an wholistic
analysis within a regional context. Pointing towards the variations on a small number of structural themes rather than to discontinuities in social organisation, the results of particular perceptions of supposedly discrete social organisational forms. It points backwards to the continuity with the past in terms of the similarities of relationships outlined in earlier chapters.
CHAPTER XII

CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS OF INEQUALITY AND AUTHORITY

Abdulahi and the negotiation and extension of 'familial' control

The last chapter attempted to describe the types of relationships constructed between households within Chamani. This excluded the relationships constructed by perhaps the most powerful household within Chamani, that of Abdulahi, the large landowner. This chapter aims to describe the features of that household and, by extension, the continuing 'familial' control exercised by Abdulahi over village affairs. In addition, some of the conflicts and the contradictions that have arisen between this type of control and an increasingly centralized nation state are also explored to demonstrate the continuity with the past as well as the problems posed for future development.

A description of Abdulahi's household at this point is aimed at showing the similarities between it and those of the villagers in Chamani. It is also aimed at elaborating the features of kinship and contract which provide the bases for the construction of alliances between households. It is very different from any household within the Ayub valley in terms of size and range of interests but the underlying premises on which it is constructed remain the same. It might be said that his household includes all those 'domesticated' by him.

He lived in a relatively large house in Shiraz constructed in one of the older sections of the city. His immediate family consisted of his wife and four unmarried children, two sons and
two daughters. His younger brother, Mortessa, lived in a similar but smaller house about 100 yards down the street. A third brother was governor (shahrdār) of the provincial town of Kāzerun and lived in a very new house on the outskirts of the city. Both brothers were younger than Abdulahi. In addition to his own house, Abdulahi had built a new house for the use of his elder son on one of the most prestigious boulevards of the city. Outside Shiraz, Abdulahi had his 'country residence' in Mohamadābād, a large detached house with its own swimming pool in the middle of his garden. Less imposing compounds, such as that in Chamani, were available to him in all the villages in which he had interests as well as in the two gardens he rented in the suburbs of Shiraz.

Each of these establishments had its own complement of staff but these were interchangeable as and when the need arose. His wife was in charge of domestic arrangements in his main house in Shiraz and rarely left it. To help her she had several resident maids and a cook, as well as male helpers. Meals were normally cooked to cater for 20 people. Abdulahi, when in town, normally ate separately from the rest of the household, except on the occasions when there were family guests. He had his own personal valet/chauffeur, Sadrollah, a man from Bardej, Abdulahi's father's village. Sadrollah was the maternal cousin of the two brothers Namaki and Mashd Rahman in Chamani (Nos. 19 and 20). He catered for his smallest personal needs and supervised the preparation of his food both in Shiraz and when he was away from the city. He also drove
him around in one of the three personal vehicles that Abdulahi owned. For village and family use he had a land rover and a small car. Of all people Sadrollah was perhaps the closest to Abdulahi.

Many of the products used in the kitchen came from his own land and animals. In addition to grain and meat he also obtained fruit and vegetables in season as well as various dairy products from his flocks. So did the households of his two brothers and his wife's sisters. He would not drink the piped municipal water, preferring to have water brought in in goat skins from Ayub. Most bread was cooked in the courtyard over an open griddle as in the village.

Abdulahi's work proceeded at his pace, apart from the occasions when he was obliged to attend public functions. The mornings when he was in the city were taken up with farming and business interests conducted in the office adjacent to the street at the bottom of the courtyard, or in his private room on the first floor of the house. Here he received a constant stream of petitioners from both the city and the various villages in which he has interests. After lunch he retired to rest until late afternoon when visitors again began to arrive. Usually his formal engagements were at this time of day. There were weekly council meetings as well as the numerous official functions at which his presence was required. His wife rarely accompanied him to official functions in the evenings, and he preferred to take a younger female companion, often his daughter, or niece. His wife led a very different and separate life to
him, moving only short distances from the house. He was caught between the demands of a public and westernised lifestyle, while his wife was closeted behind the veil (chador) in a very conservative family environment.

On the many occasions when he was out of Shiraz, he would spend days at a time in the various villages in which he had interests, receiving representations, collecting rents, delegating various tasks as well as entertaining local officials and leaders. Wherever he went he normally took most of the provisions he would personally need. This was assiduously bought by his valet prior to the trip in shops with which he maintained a personal account. On the occasions when he went to the capital, Tehran, for pleasure and business, he stayed with friends, leaving his personal staff in Shiraz. He also made private, yearly excursions to the tourist centres of Europe for pleasure as well as to obtain his yearly medical check-up. All his clothes were bought in Europe.

As the oldest brother, he took personal control of many of the family's activities and over-rode many of the decisions made by his brother, Mortessa, who was nominally in charge of the family's interest in Deh Sheikh, as well as those made by his eldest son. Because of his position in the formal political hierarchy of the city he also managed many of the interests of his wife's family, which was an old bazaar merchant family. His son had no particular occupation and no particular interests. He was totally maintained by his father, who also appointed a personal valet, also from Bardej, to cater for him. His
son spent most of his time hunting, riding and generally entertaining himself. He occasionally supervised agricultural work for his father, but was given little responsibility, despite the fact that he was approaching his middle twenties.

At any one time one could expect to find between 15 and 20 people in residence in Abdulahi's house in Shiraz, not only those formally employed by him but female relatives and their children as well as less formal helpers. His business contacts were extensive and to try and separate them from his kinship connections is indeed a difficult, if not impossible task. They varied from the very traditional clergy and bazaar merchants such as his brother-in-law, Joukar, from whom he rented land in Chamani, through a wide variety of middle-class professionals associated both with the city administration as well as with some of the larger industrial establishments (such as the canal construction company in Ramjerd), to the higher echelons of regional authority, such as the governor general's office and the interests of the Mo'addel family.

The comparatively large number of people attached to Abdulahi's enterprise ranged from those who were permanent retainers to those with whom formal contractual arrangements were constructed such as the melon cultivators in Chamani and the irrigators who were paid a daily wage. His ability to manipulate a wide variety of resources and personnel was of the same type as that associated with the agro-pastoral combine utilized as a basis for the maintenance of livelihood by both nomadic and sedentary populations in the Marvdasht plain.
Changing social relations of production and the associated increase in control by the state have seemed to change the nature of the relationships between himself and those who work for him. The political functions of kinship alliances rooted in a 'tribal' idiom have been publicly abandoned as appeals to national unity and 'neutral' state control have been espoused. But the kinship idiom, if not actual kinship links, still provide the bases for the construction of cooperative alliances under changing social and economic conditions, as indicated in the previous chapter.

These changing conditions of production, associated with mechanisation, changes in tenurial arrangements and increasing independence of production have served to change the ways in which people are dependent on the cooperation of others. Large landowners are decreasingly dependent on village labour and villagers are able to act in seemingly more independent ways. The growing importance of the state has facilitated this development through technical and financial assistance to 'progressive' farmers and through its emerging position as 'mediator' between large landowners and villagers in some instances and in others as supporter of the large landowners.

In some respects the state may be said to have taken over some of the responsibilities that were formerly seen as the obligations of the malekin. In so doing the nature of the relationship has changed as the distance between villager and state official has increased. Through the formal separation of their interests with land reform the malekin have also been able to
distance themselves, or have been publicly distanced from the activities of villagers. But the state, rather than being the 'neutral arbiter' that it is publicly made out to be, is administered and controlled by some of the former "umdeh malekin' and their supporters.

As the distance between the villager and the state apparently increases, so does the ability to attribute blame to a supposedly impersonal entity, and deny, or distance oneself from individual responsibility. Beteille comments:

"people in power seem to enjoy the most respect when they are furthest removed from the ultimate source of power which is physical compulsion."

(1977, p.18)

This physical compulsion lies in the power of such people as the gendarmery and the courts. The individual interests of the powerful can be disguised behind the veil of mutual support and trust, where private interests are converted into public good through processes which naturalise the actual relations of domination. Dehghan, the large absentee landowner in Jashniān and Futuabād commented:

"Only a few years ago sickness and death was very common in the villages. Many died of malaria. I felt a great responsibility for the villagers on my land. Because there was no other source of help I was obliged to provide medicine and pay their hospital fees. I couldn't see anyone die when I knew I could do something about it. With land reform however and the transference of the villagers' welfare maintenance into the hands of the central government a great burden has been lifted from my shoulders. I no longer feel obliged to look after my villagers."

(personal interview, May 1971)
Dehghan, like others, considered that the state had taken on the role formerly occupied by the malekin. It was the state's duty and the duty of the villagers themselves to ensure their own means of livelihood, and the new language of democracy and participation in the development of communities through cooperatives became enshrined in the rhetoric of the white revolution.

Responsibility for development and for maintenance of control was removed from the personal relationships which connected landlords to villagers; they were no longer required to exercise direct political authority and were thereby given an opportunity to operate much more independently. And yet they were still dependent on the labour of villagers to help with production and as such they were obliged to secure their cooperation and support. An increased social distance separated the actual holders of power from the villagers, coupled with the interposition of a supposedly separate group of 'neutral' arbiters (state officials and the police), the large landowners were allowed to distance themselves from the direct exercise of authority. In so doing they were, seemingly paradoxically, able to maintain relationships based supposedly on good faith and trust. Relationships of inequality were thereby naturalised as people like Dehghan maintained a distant paternalistic watch over 'his villagers' and no questions were asked about his rights to control over land. There were, in addition, 'objective guarantees' which legitimated these unequal divisions through the authorised distribution of recognised offices. These took the form of titles and honours which were confirmed
by a body supposedly removed from the circumstances in which the relationships of inequality were established (i.e. the church and the state).

In chapter X it was suggested that marriage might be seen as the 'domestication' of the 'wild' 'outside' represented by the stranger/bride in the creation of a new domestic unit. With the interposition of a supposedly 'neutral' body in charge of law and order many of the relationships of the larger landowners might be interpreted in similar ways. So that many of Abdulahi's contacts and contracts with others were based on attempts to place these relationships on to a much more personal and informal footing and to incorporate people into his domestic establishment - his 'big, happy, family'. The successful installation of a motor pump for example was accompanied by a sacrifice of a lamb whose meat was generously distributed among both the engineers and Abdulahi's workers in Chamani. The sale of a few cows was accompanied by an insistence that the buyer should give a gift to Hosein Khan, the dashtebân (No. 30), who was looking after them. What might be interpreted as an instrumental transaction was transformed into a generous exchange among friends.

The successful negotiation of a contract for grazing ground for his sheep, on the other side of the river Kor, was informally sealed with a large meal and the provision of opium to the landowner (an opium addict). The landowner was brought out to Chamani as Abdulahi's guest, was purposefully deprived of opium until after the meal, when the two got down to business. No
witnesses signed any formal contracts, no documents changed hands. The deal was concluded as if the two were the closest of friends and an atmosphere of mutual trust was encouraged. The eventual limits of Abdulahi's rights to the grazing ground remained however unspecified, providing opportunity for their continued reinterpretation according to circumstances, and for the continual negotiation of their content. The language of the 'good faith' economy transposed an unequal relationship into a generous exchange and legitimated differential control over resources. It binds people together through ties of mutual support and trust and perpetuates what Alavi has termed 'primordial loyalties'; the relationship between patron and client is seen as the exchange of equally valuable assets.

The contracts that Abdulahi traditionally constructed with those who worked for him were also largely informal. They were couched in mutually supportive terms and involved the distribution of periodic gifts. The treatment of his shepherds is illustrative on this score (see above, Chapter VII). He often brought extra food with him and items of clothing when he came from Shiraz to the Ayub valley which were distributed among his workers. He turned a blind eye to their use of his resources for personal consumption and kept them and their households supplied with flour. At New Year he would distribute new banknotes, and at major festivals he provided the meat for sacrifice. His workers in return were expected to give him personal loyalty and provided presents of food at particular family gatherings such as weddings and funerals.
In Chamani several households were associated with Abdulahi's work in one form or another. Reference was made in Chapter X to those who worked as wage labourers. In Chapter VI reference was also made to the wider involvement of villagers in barley, rice and cotton cultivation. But a number of people were permanently dependent with their families on his continued support. Most important of these were Ali Naghi (21) and his father Abdul Khalogh(22), Mashd Rahman(19) and his brother Namaki(20). In addition, Hosein Khan(30) and Mashd Hajali(27) were also directly employed by him.

Ali Naghi lived, together with his wife and three small children in courtyard B, one of the most congested courtyards within the gha'leh of Chamani in which five other domestic groups were located. Immediately adjacent to his two rooms was the room in which his ageing parents lived. Ali Naghi's wife shared the domestic chores with her ageing mother-in-law. She was the daughter of Rais Asad, Abdulahi's kadkhoda in Chamani and a resident of Buraki. Ali Naghi had two sisters, both married, one to the son of Rais Asad's brother, Rais Mahmud, also a resident of Buraki, the other to Khan Mirza, one of Abdulahi's tractor drivers who lived in Pol-e-No. Ali Naghi was the effective head of the household. His father Abdul Khalogh had come to Chamani with the latter's brother, Mahd Taghi(23) shortly after the foundation of Chamani as agricultural labourers, having moved from the village of Garmābād near Marvdasht. The two brothers no longer spoke to each other and the associated households were located at opposite ends of
the ghalleh and had constructed very different sorts of alliances. Mahd Taghi and his sons were loosely affiliated to the Rusta Turks whereas Ali Naghi was firmly in Abdulahi's camp and allied through marriage to the latter's representative in the village. Ali Naghi's mother, an Arab, from the Arab Jabbareh section of the former Khamseh confederacy of tribes, had a sister in Shiraz and her house served as a centre for members of the family when visiting Shiraz. The land rover driver who visited the village twice daily was also Ali Naghi's cousin, which also connected him with a wide range of contacts in Marvdasht.

Ali Naghi worked as Abdulahi's housekeeper in Chamani. He cooked for Abdulahi's employees when temporarily resident in the village. For this work he received a salary of 150 Tomans per month. He had the keys to the various store-rooms in Abdulahi's courtyard and he was in charge of the domestic stores. Ali was a relatively young man who had learned to cook in the army, where he also learned to drive. As part of Abdulahi's domestic establishment he was occasionally called away from the village, either to help in the kitchens at Abdulahi's house in Shiraz, or to work in his house in Mohamadābād. His work was not specific, however, and he was called on by Abdulahi to do a variety of things, such as driving the tractor or the land rover. But, because most of his work was associated with domestic chores, he was looked on disparagingly by others.

Ali, like his father, had no rights to land, but he did have a number of animals which were herded by Kamar Khan's son, for which he paid a monthly fee. He also owned four cows which
were taken out with the village herd and housed in Abdulahi's cowsheds, together with the latter's. His job with Abdulahi opened up certain privileges. He was able to use the latter's well to obtain water for domestic purposes, and was able to help himself to grain and flour stored in the compound. When Abdulahi was in residence in Chamani Ali was expected to stay in the former's courtyard, despite the fact that his wife and children were only minutes away and he might not see them for days on end. From his cash income he had been able to put money into a small-scale haulage business in Shiraz controlled by his mother's sister's family.

After an argument with Mashd Ali Khan, who controlled Abdulahi's production in Chamani after Rais Asad had resigned in 1972 (see below, p.405), Ali Naghi left his job in Chamani and took up paid hotel work in Shiraz. This only lasted for a short time and he was soon back in Chamani. Unlike other villagers who had interests in land and/or animals he was in a somewhat precarious position, being dependent on Abdulahi for employment. On returning, although he did not obtain an increased salary, one of the causes of the argument, he was given land above the village on which to build and was able to use Abdulahi's machinery to transport building materials from the mountain to the site. He was also allowed to harvest some of Abdulahi's barley with Mashd Rahman, another of Abdulahi's employees. He had a vested interest in making sure that villagers' animals did not stray on to Abdulahi's lands and fiercely defended the latter's interests in the village.
Ali Naghi's wife was a carpet maker and had a loom in the courtyard. This provided an additional source of cash. The whole household was brought into Abdulahi's establishment in one form or another. His wife baked the bread for the Abdulahi house in Chamani and occasionally also cooked. His father looked after Abdulahi's cows and his mother washed the clothes for the single men who were resident in the courtyard. His brother sometimes worked as an irrigator on Abdulahi's fields. Ali Naghi was much more a personal servant of Abdulahi's than merely a wage labourer. Similarly Mashd Rahman and Namaki were very dependent on Abdulahi's patronage, although the latter had gained a certain amount of independence.

Mashd Rahman(19) and his brother(20) had no rights to land in the village. They were brought to the village from Bardej to help in the cultivation of Abdulahi's land. Both their wives came from Korbal too. Namaki was employed as an irrigator on Abdulahi's wheat and Mashd Rahman as a pump attendant. Mashd Rahman continued to work for Abdulahi for which he was remunerated in the same way as Ali Naghi. Like the latter, he was obliged to do more or less what Abdulahi required and his movements away from the village were subject to Abdulahi's approval. Thus, in addition to his tasks associated with the pump near the village, he also supervised the weighing of the cotton crop and the payment of villagers, acted as cook and housekeeper in Ali Naghi's absence and helped out in the fields when required. In addition Mashd Rahman invested some cash in things like small cooking utensils, plastic children's toys
and chewing gum, boxes of which he occasionally picked up on his infrequent visits to the city - non-perishable goods that could be stored and sold individually later for a small profit. His wife owned the only sewing machine in the village and was able to supplement the household income through taking in repairs. Prior to Mashd Rahman's migration to Chamani he was not married and Abdulahi secured a bride for him. The marriage was celebrated in Abdulahi's house in Shiraz. The bride was very reluctant to leave her home village of Bardej.

Namaki had managed to transfer many of his obligations to Abdulahi on to his son, Ahmad, who worked as a wage labourer irrigating Abdulahi's fields. Namaki supported himself as an itinerant merchant, hawking products with a low value and of a perishable nature around the villages in the area. He moved out from the village with his two laden donkeys in the morning and often did not return for a number of days. He sold such things as fruit and vegetables, as well as household items like brushes. Some items, like potatoes were bought in Shiraz for 15 rials per mann, for example, and sold for 20-25 rials per mann. Other items were obtained through barter in the villages that he visited, so that he might return with a supply of grapes for sale to villagers, for example.

Having initially been allocated two rooms in the gha'leh of Chamani by Abdulahi, Namaki helped Kamar Khan(18) build a separate courtyard (J) to which he subsequently moved. There he occupied three rooms together with his wife, six unmarried sons and one daughter. Another daughter had married Kamar
Khan's son. Despite his separation from Abdulahi through the substitution of his son's labour, he was called out to work for the latter at peak times. He also contracted with Abdulahi to dry-farm a small area of land above the village on which he grew barley on a nim-kar contract. He used his four donkeys as draught animals, the landlord provided land and seed, and the harvest was divided equally between them.

Namaki owned five cows in addition to his donkeys. The cows were herded with those of the village. The donkeys provided transport for his itinerant business interests. His wife did not make carpets and the household was reliant on his income from trading and his son's wages from Abdulahi for any available cash that came into the household. Namaki, like Javad and Hasanjan did not appear to have much time to linger in front of the village gates with those villagers not working, being preoccupied with his own interests. He did not have relatives to stay with on his frequent excursions away from Chamani and relied on his trading contacts if he was away over night. He visited relations in Bardej very infrequently, as did his brother, perhaps once a year.

At least Ali Naghi and Mashd Rahman, as the ones most dependent on Abdulahi, had a few outside interests, but people like Hosein Khan, the watchman (dashtebān) for Abdulahi, received no cash. He was charged with the most menial tasks and was paid in a similar way to Abdulahi's shepherds. He received 500 mann of grain per year which was deposited with the village shopkeeper who provided him with most of his require-
ments. Abdulahi occasionally provided him with a change of clothes and giveh (cloth shoes) as well as with surplus food from the landlord's table. In addition he received small amount of cash from the landlord at New Year and from the sale of the landlord's livestock. But money did not figure prominently in his income. He was tied to Chamani and rarely managed to leave. He was a personal servant of Abdulahi's.

Others of Abdulahi's employees received negotiated wages for particular jobs but their association with Abdulahi always appeared to involve more than their specific tasks required, and relationships of kinship tied them together in a loose enterprise with Abdulahi. The links which connected Mashd Rahman with Abdulahi's valet have already been mentioned, as have the links connecting Ali Naghi with Abdulahi's kadkhodâ in the village. Similarly, Mashd Ali Khan, the man who succeeded Rais Asad as Abdulahi's village representative in 1972, was the cousin of one of Abdulahi's tractor drivers, both of whom, together with the head of Abdulahi's shepherds, were connected through marriage to distant kinsmen of Abdulahi in Bardej.

As changes have taken place in the ways in which land was perceived there would appear to have been an increase in more formal types of control. This was perhaps more evident in the case of newly settled villages in the plain as land was brought into cultivation for more explicitly independent commercial production. But the expectations of both employer and employee seem to have been firmly rooted in the traditional social relations of production; the status hierarchies of the
old order were still considerably important as control of land was, until land reform, explicitly associated with political authority. As an indicator of the continuity with the past Abdulahi, his brothers and his sons were still addressed as khan by many of the villagers and his enterprise was analoguous to those of the 'tribal' khavanin. The oulad-e-khavanin or close family of the khan, supported by a group of 'amaleh (servants) around which were the various groups (tireh) over which the khan maintained differing degrees of authority. The main difference between Abdulahi's enterprise and the 'tribal' organisation of the khavanin was not so much in the nature of his authority as in his ability to wield such disparate client groups into a unified political force given the overarching control exercised by the central government, and the physically disparate nature of his interests.

When trust and good faith are deemed to be at a maximum, in the household, where it is 'naturally' expected that sons and wives will support fathers and husbands, then the time spent on the negotiation of 'good faith' relationships can be minimised. Relationships of inequality within the household, based on age and sex become an integral part of the natural moral order. This naturalisation or domestication process attempts to ensure the domination of a particular moral order and the cultural reproduction of its form. It is extended out from the household to the 'taming' of the 'wild' outside into a known and manipulated social universe through means of extending familiarity, and the relationships found within the household reflect those obtaining in the wider environment.
The institution of this domesticated order allowed those who were the domesticators to 'take liberties' (i.e. restrict freedoms) with (or from) those thereby domesticated. Abdulahi maintained an office at the bottom of the courtyard of his house in Shiraz, next to the main gate on to the street. This office, in which he was never found, served as a filter for those who had business with him. It was staffed by his 'secretary' (nayeb) when the latter was not supervising cultivation in the Ayub valley or engaged on other of Abdulahi's business. There were no formal office hours, which meant that in many instances people had to wait around for hours at a time to see either the nayeb or Abdulahi himself. Those who were parts of the domestic (or domesticated) establishment; family, close relatives and servants, by-passed the office and went straight into the house. Others, such as his agricultural supervisors, would be shown into Abdulahi's personal quarters on the first floor of the house, away from both the family rooms and the servants' rooms. Those considered socially equal or superior would be ushered into the elaborately furnished guest room, to be lavishly entertained by his servants. These latter would never come uninvited. Those who use the office have thereby established an interpretation of their standing with Abdulahi; it is the value that they place on the particular transaction that is subject to negotiation. The longer they were prepared to wait the more value they were seen to be placing on the transaction. This was complemented by Abdulahi's reaction - by taking their time and giving none of his the difference in status
was publicised and perhaps re-assessed. For example, Javad, the head of the village council in Chamani, came to engage Abdulahi's help in the negotiation of a loan from the agricultural bank. He was kept waiting for two days being fed and housed in the servants' quarters where he was asked to help out in the kitchen.

To obtain even small amounts of Abdulahi's time might therefore involve the considerable expenditure of one's own. On visits to the village Abdulahi was often followed by between ten and twenty individuals all waiting to talk with him about one thing or another. They would wait outside the house until such time as he felt willing to see them. During their waiting periods they were often asked to perform small tasks, such as helping with the tea or washing dishes. Others, such as gendarme officers might be more privileged and be allowed to sit in the room with him, but he invariably dictated what would be spoken about. As in the bazaar often lengthy periods would elapse before the actual nature of the transaction which had brought the two people together in the first place would be broached. In the bazaar a striking feature of much activity was the length of time it took to establish the price of many but the most mundane of goods. The establishment of a formal price seemed to mark the end of a process usually preceded by often prolonged attempts to establish mutual trust, and the transformation of an instrumental interest into something much more lasting. Numerous cups of tea and seemingly endless conversation avoided and even repelled for as long as possible
discussion of the object of their mutual interest. The value of the good does not just lie in the price negotiated, but also in the accumulation of symbolic capital and in the relationships thus established. One of the fears of villagers visiting the town was that they would be cheated and they thus invariably tried to incorporate the merchant and the official into their own familiar social universe and create regular channels that could be trusted.

The landlord provided a focus for much village activity in the city and many villagers came to his house in order to obtain his help in negotiating the bureaucracy of the city.

While formal control remained largely in the hands of the landowners of the villages, the institution of this domesticated order remained largely unthreatened. With changing forms of production and social relations of production which involved increased involvement of government officials in village affairs, expectations and attitudes were also changing. Abdulahi attempted to bring these 'external' agents under his control. His father and he, for example, were responsible for the provision of capital and labour for the construction of a number of gendarme stations on the road between Shiraz and Korbal. The public aim of this project was to increase control over the unruly Basseri and Kurd Shuli tribes who used this land as pasture land and made travel hazardous. The actual result was to consolidate his interests in Korbal and encourage the opening up of this unirrigated land, as well as gain pasture land for his own animals. He regularly enter-
tained the gendarme officers at his house in Mohamadābād and indeed whenever he passed the station nearest Mohamadābād a gendarme was sent down to the house to see if he required anything. He also provided the station with periodic gifts of food. He was also in close touch with the gendarme headquarters in Shiraz and was able to use them to support his own interests in, for example, restricting access to grazing ground in both Korbal and Ramjerd. He was at pains to point out that they were an independent body and that they maintained the law laid down by the state. He could thus distance himself from involvement in their affairs and from their often arrogant exercise of force, by playing the role of benevolent patron and acting as a mediator between these 'impersonal' agents of the state and the villagers. They were not hired by him to physically assault villagers who allowed their animals to stray on his land!

In a case in which the village cows from Buraki were found to be trespassing on his spring wheat, his secretary (nayeb) in the village at that time, Mahmudzadeh, had them rounded up by Abdulahi's workers and impounded in the nearby gendarme station at Kushkak. The owners of the animals had to go to the gendarme station to plead for their release. But there was no further judicial apparatus to which the case could be forwarded, the gendarmerie were authorised to settle such cases. They informally interpreted what they thought were Mahmudzadeh's wishes and imposed a very heavy fine (the cows had been allowed to stray on a number of occasions previously). It was to Abdulah:
that the owners came, on his visit to the village the next day, to petition for his intercession and a reduction of the imposed fine. Abdulahi made it clear that he was reticent to intervene and that he wanted the law to take its course, but on his way back to town called in at the gendarme station and managed to get the fine reduced. In other cases involving conflict between his workers and others he used other agents of the central government as representatives of a supposedly neutral body to hear the cases. When two of his shepherds were involved in a dispute over access to water for their animals in Pol-e-No he called in the resident literacy corpsman (sepāh dānesh) to listen to the case with him in the village school. He saw both shepherds, one of whom had physically assaulted the other, and requested to the corpsman to administer corporal punishment to the assaulter.

Despite the foundation of local government in the form of the village council and the public election by landholding villagers of formal representatives, Abdulahi continued to control many of the activities of villagers. His connections in the regional political arena, his position on the city council and in the then ruling Iran Novin party, enabled him to maintain contacts through the city with those in charge of the plain's administration and industry. He entertained the local bakhshdar and other government officers in Marvdasht, in Chamani. He maintained close connections with both the managers of the dam construction company and the canal construction company. The manager of the former, with personal con-
nections in the ministry of water and power, managed to secure pasture land for him behind the dam. The manager of the latter, like Abdulahi, was a member of the Shiraz Lions Club and also a major landowner in the plain. He was able to secure the employment of a poorer urban relative as personnel officer to the company in their headquarters outside Chamani. This gave Abdulahi indirect influence over who was to be employed and villagers came to him to secure employment with the company.

He was also able to use their heavy equipment and their labourers on occasion for work on his own projects, including re-roofing his house in Chamani, installing electricity and constructing a large earth dam to collect rain water from the mountain. In exchange he allowed them to use the land above the village for their buildings. Again the contract was informal and gave Abdulahi considerable personal control over certain sorts of activities and people in the company.

With the increased importance being attached to mechanised agricultural production in government development schemes, Abdulahi was quick to take advantage of the various extension facilities being provided and managed to move in familial terms with various agricultural engineers in the agricultural office in Shiraz. One of these was Dehghan's son who had recently returned from Germany. With the creation of the agricultural cooperatives in the valley in 1974 he very readily cooperated with the technicians who were employed through the agricultural office to administer them. The headquarters of the cooperative that included the valley was established in Chamani in the
buildings abandoned on the completion of the canals for the
dam. Abdulahi maintained his interests and his position as a
major share-holder.

He was still seen as the major mediator between the vill-
agers and the central government, and his incorporation of those
agents of the state and of industry into a familial network
encouraged the maintenance of this perception. Villagers brought
a variety of problems to him, either in the village or in town;
from interceding with the gendarmery in the case of the
enlistment of villagers into the army, to settling marital
problems, from help in obtaining hospital treatment, to help in
negotiating ways through government offices. His informal
intercessions on behalf of the villagers, always predicated in
terms of the personal favour he was doing them, oiled the wheels
of a still important personally manipulated patronage network.
The acceptance of his authority by most villagers maintained
his continued control over many village activities.

This control was however beginning to break down. In
Chamani at least, the Rusta Turks had traditionally little
involvement with his activities, except that until land reform
they were formally subject to his authority and that of his
representatives in the village. The case of the sepāh tarvij
(agricultural extension corpsman) resident in the village during
fieldwork serves as an illustration. Abdulahi had applied to
the headquarters in Shiraz to obtain someone to look after his
Mexican wheat. A high-school graduate who had undergone six
months training as part of his national service was seconded to
the valley where he lived, firstly in the village school in Pol-e-No and subsequently in the school in Chamani. Abdulahi's representatives in Chamani, both Mahmudzadeh and Mashd Ali Khan saw this young man as one of Abdulahi's workers and tried to treat him as such. The sepāh saw his work in a much wider context, as part of the government's development effort. His first task was to clear the village of animal manure and spray with DDT. He was very quickly seen as an alternative intermediary between the government and the villagers in their dealings with the gendarmery and Abdulahi's establishment. He was also brought in to settle marital disputes and the school above the village became a centre for village affairs. On many nights the room was occupied by important villagers talking with him. He became a close personal friend of Javad's. Abdulahi's representatives tolerated this man but felt that his presence was undermining their authority. Mahmudzadeh refused to deal with him directly and the two became very visibly hostile: Abdulahi remained above the conflict.

Direct supervision of Abdulahi's estates was in the hands of these representatives. Mahmudzadeh, his 'secretary' or nayeb did not live in the village but travelled out from the city, where he was in charge of Abdulahi's office. He had had a similar job previously with the Ghavam family on their land elsewhere in the plain. His brother was one of a number of small landowners in the neighbouring village of Uanjan. He had no familial links with Abdulahi and was treated by the latter as an employee. Mahmudzadeh's relationships with the
villagers was rather high-handed, and he was not liked. He felt that authority for village control lay in the hands of the landlord, and in the absence of Abdulahi considered himself in control. At harvest time he would watch the distribution of the crop, ordering the villagers to carry the landlord's share up first, refusing to deal with most villagers, for whom he showed little respect and always took the best portion of meat sacrificed. He did not apparently approve of the building of the village school and maintained that Abdulahi himself had become a foreigner. He left Abdulahi's employment in 1972 and went into the bazaar as a corn merchant.

The man brought in to replace him was a very different sort of person. Mashd Ali Khan was recruited from Abdulahi's estates in Korbal. He lived in Abdulahi's compound in Chamani, being looked after by Abdulahi's cook. With the resignation of Abdulahi's kadkhoda in Chamani, Rais Asad, Mashd Ali Khan took over the supervision of labour. He too exercised an autocratic control, 'considering that he had taken over the mantle of the former nayeb, but unlike him, he was a villager. The resignation of Rais Asad marked a change in emphasis in the ways in which Abdulahi's estates were run. He was a Turki-speaking villager, resident in Buraki with land in both Chamani and Buraki. His family was traditionally an important family in that village and his brother once ran a shop in Chamani. His son was on the Buraki village council. He had traditionally supervised cultivation for Abdulahi on those lands which were mechanised before the land reform. His daughter was married
to Ali Naghi, and his brother's son was married to Ali Naghi's sister. Until land reform and the establishment of the village council, he was officially responsible through Abdulahi to the government agents. With his resignation the links which joined the people to Abdulahi's land through traditional relations of production were formally broken. From then on Abdulahi relied on outsiders to supervise his interests.

In Korbal on the other hand, because Abdulahi was not directly engaged in major cultivation, except in his garden at Mohamadabad, he still worked through the kadkhodas of the various villages in that valley, who had all been elected as heads of village councils after land reform. They were responsible for the collection of rent from the villagers. He had little direct involvement in village activities in these villages.

Things appeared to come to a head in the spring of 1972 when the villagers of Buraki, who had land in Chamani, stopped Abdulahi's tractor driver from ploughing a stretch of land adjacent to the village on which Abdulahi had installed a motor pump. The Buraki residents led by Rais Asad and armed with pitch forks, claimed that Abdulahi had illegally taken this stretch of land. The gendarmes and the land reform officials were brought in, but the villagers were eventually overruled. Rais Asad resigned and the rift between landlord and villagers widened.

Abdulahi's reaction was to employ more outside labourers rather than use 'unreliable' and 'disloyal' villagers. He already contracted with outside workers for the cultivation of
his melon fields and relationships between some of his lab-
ourers were becoming much more formal. There were no organised
labour associations at the time and because of the ready avail-
ability of wage labourers, employers could pay more or less
what they wanted. Conflicts over wage rates became more fre-
quent as more and more individuals were alienated from their
traditional means of subsistence, and as the relationship
between landowner and labourer entered a much more formal phase.
Even among his own retainers Abdulahi was obliged to give
land for house-building above the village in lieu of a wage
increase to both Ali Naghi and Mashd Rahman.

The personal power which he was still able to manipulate
was sufficient to ensure acquiescence to his authority at that
time, but an example from Chamani indicates the growing aware-
ness of villagers who no longer necessarily considered them-
selves to be the clients of a generous patron.

"In the same month as the conflict with the Buraki
residents, Abdulahi's nayeb in Chamani, resident in
the village at that time, was confronted by three of
his regular irrigators, the sons of Namaki(20),
Iadullah(2), and Mina(10), who went on strike. They
said they were overworked and underpaid for the day
and night work they were doing in the fields at that
time. They said that workers at the canal construct-
ion company were getting more than they were. The nayeb's
reaction was to immediately and rather impatiently
sack them, saying they were bad workers anyway. He
sent for three replacements from Buraki but after a few
hours work these too became dissatisfied with the con-
ditions of work and went back to Buraki. The follow-
ing day Abdulahi came out to the village on one of his
regular visits, and the three sacked workers came to
the house dressed in their best clothes. They com-
plained of the harsh treatment they had been given.
Ahmad, the son of Namaki, remained in the background
and did no talking, but left Mansur, the son of Iadullah
to be the spokesman. Abdulahi rebuked Mansur for being
foolish, identified him as the ring leader and commented disparagingly on the fact that he was a Lur. He said that he would support his nayeb. Mansur replied that they did not have to work for Abdulahi as there was plenty of work elsewhere, but he thought they had been treated unfairly. The three were summarily and impatiently dismissed from Abdulahi's presence. But Ahmad was 'obliged' to remain and continue working. The three were sacked in the middle of the week and were being paid on a weekly basis. Both Mansur and Ali Vez, Mina's son came the next day for their outstanding wages but these were denied them and an argument followed with the nayeb. The two eventually left empty-handed. Mina later tried to intercede, but to no avail. Ali Vez eventually returned to work with Ahmad but Mansur never worked for Abdulahi again."

Such a conflict points to a growing recognition by some villagers of their changing position vis-à-vis the landlord and the polarisation of their separate interests. This would seem to suggest the destruction of the 'primordial loyalties' associated with the patronage networks of the traditional relations of production. But this again is too simple and points towards a unilineal picture of development. As indicated earlier, the affiliations of both the Luri group and the Turki group in Chamani were not traditionally focused on the villages.

Public rhetoric and personal power

The public language of land reform, together with the various other measures which were subsumed under 'The White
Revolution of the Shah and the People' were aimed at dragging Iran out of its 'traditional lethargy' through a programme of rapid expansion and modernisation into the twentieth century. (The White Revolution was so called because it was supposed to be a peaceful revolution - from the top down rather than from the bottom up. It incorporated programmes to nationalise forests and pasture lands, encourage profit sharing in industry, create universal suffrage, establish various development corps within the villages, nationalise water resources, facilitate urban development and reorganise government.)

To do this the aim was to cut through the factional clusters built up through the 'mālek-ra'iyat system' and the 'feudal' organisation of production, and secure the independent loyalty of the peasantry. In this way the personal forms of power exercised by the mālekin and the tribal khāvānin would be destroyed and a rational basis for the development of the country's resources would be built, with a peasantry secure in its loyalty to the state.

The public rhetoric of the revolution however disguised the personal power struggles which still appeared to be predicated in factional terms. The government, under the leadership of the shah, was intent on breaking what Alavi terms

1. For an account of the White Revolution written by the former shah see The White Revolution, Imperial Pahalvi Library, Tehran 1967.

2. 'Factional clusters' is used here in the same way as it is used by Alavi; he states that "political cleavages in peasant societies are often vertical cleavages, which run across class lines, rather than horizontal cleavages of class conflict" (Alavi 1973, p.44).
'primordial loyalties',¹ which appeared to tie people together on other than national terms; personal service, tribal affiliation, regional autonomy. And yet the nature of the national regime was still apparently dominated by similar sorts of loyalties and a complex web of personal networks, now, however, transformed into a state ideology.² The nature of the shah's rule provided the framework in which authority and control were to be exercised; the autocratic and often arbitrary nature of government regulated by individuals whose authority was delegated from the top. Features reminiscent of earlier forms of control and legitimation appeared to have been maintained.³

Bill sees the 'revolution' as merely an attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of threats from what he terms the new class of 'professional bureaucratic intelligentsia'.⁴ Although this threat may have contributed to the form that the 'revolution' took, other reasons might be pointed to. These are complex and varied and rooted in the nature of the regime's authority and in its relationship with the international system. It is, for example, not unimportant, that the timing of the land reform programme was coincidental with other, similar programmes executed elsewhere in the world at that particular

1. Ibid., p.29
2. For a discussion of this 'web' system, see Bill 1972 and 1973.
3. i.e. despite a change in form there were many features of control which remained rooted in the traditions established through the delegation of authority under the now defunct tax farming system.
time and supported by U.S. foreign policy. Emphasis in the latter was on social development and on redistributivist justice in general development programmes. The U.S. disbursed large sums of aid to help the Iranian development programme.¹

It is not sufficient to see the 'revolution' as a total package. The retrospective inclusion of the land reform programme,² for example, into the 'White Revolution' seems to indicate at least two distinct phases, representing different evaluations of the power of various groups by the regime. Katouzian and Halliday see the 'revolution' primarily in terms of speeding up capitalist penetration of the Iranian countryside.³ The problems with attributing causes and evaluating effects is that they tend to remove particular features being analysed out of their historical contexts. At one level the land reform programme was merely a rationalisation and extension of earlier developments.

The first stage of this process, in which land was alienated from 'traditional' 'communal' access, through a process

1. In addition to the large amounts of funds devoted to building up the armed forces, Iran was the recipient of much U.S. aid devoted to social development programmes. Iran was one of the major examples of the international community development programme and provided the basis for UNESCO's experiments in the World Literacy Programme (see UNESCO 1973).

2. The original, 'first stage' of the reform was initiated in January 1962, but the White Revolution was not proclaimed until January of the following year.

of increasing 'individuation' of property rights, was formalised under Rezā Shāh. The second stage, whereby the landowners were freed from their moral ties with village-based production, was facilitated by the land reform programme. Although this formalisation of rights to land and thus of changes in the forms of production were legislated for, it cannot be assumed that relations of production changed as rapidly. This 'gap' between, say landownership and landlordship, is reflected in the continuing individualistic control of the mālek over the villages in which he owns land; in the continuing association between control of land and the control of public office.

The contradictions between personal forms of control, and the supposed 'neutrality' of the bureaucracy of the nation state became increasingly evident. The personal forms of authority exercised by the shah stood in increasingly marked contrast to the supposedly democratically elected national assembly. At the regional level this opposition was reproduced between the provincial governor and the local, municipal assemblies. And at the local level between the landowner and the village councils.

Changes in the relationships between landowners and villagers have been associated with the transition from 'feudalism' to 'capitalism', or from 'traditional' to 'modern',

1. Lambton makes frequent reference to the disparity between the public language which legislated reform and the private reality which remained unaffected. "The legislative power of the present day (early '50s) is ... divorced from reality in that it tends to consider the putting on paper of a form of words to be an end in itself, while utterly disregarding the instruments by which the law is to be put into practice and the conditions under which it is to be implemented." (Lambton 1953,p.1

2. Perhaps a third stage in this development might also be recognised, that is the re-combination of land and control in the hands of the state.
accompanied by an increased individualism, the breakdown of the extended family, the generalisation of monetary exchange, the expansion of commodity production and of much more formal and impersonal types of authority. This spread of a rational economic logic, linked to western capitalism, is associated with the struggle between what are perceived as 'reactionary', 'backward' forces and the 'progressive' forces of modernisation embodied in the expanding state structure. Modernisation theory maintains that development moves through the disintegration of the old, traditional forms of organisation and a reintegration of elements of society in changed forms at a higher level.\(^1\) Parsons' pattern variables supposedly isolate the 'ideal types' of particularistic and universalistic features of 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of organisation.\(^2\) Critiques of this theory of modernisation point to the complications of measuring the so-called 'transition', and dependency theory in particular has helped in focusing attention on the active 'underdevelopment' or 'marginalisation', by the 'centre' of the 'periphery', and has thus focused attention on the particular historical circumstances in which change occurs, and on the particular characteristics of the parties to the 'transition'.\(^3\)

According to Bourdieu, the 'market place', where buyer meets seller in an openly and selfishly competitive arena,

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1. For a discussion of the nature of this 'transition', see Roxborough 1979.
replaces the mutually supportive 'traditional' or 'archaic' economy, and naked self-interest replaces cooperative and familial partnerships. He talks of this change as a movement from a 'good faith' economy to a 'bad faith' economy. In the latter, few attempts are seen to be made to disguise the play of self-interest, and most transactions are seen as instrumental. In such a change, the relationships between buyer and seller, or between farmer and agricultural labourer become formalised and impersonal and governed by contract.

Such a movement from a 'good faith' economy to a 'bad faith' economy cannot however be interpreted as merely an historical evolution associated perhaps with the spread of capitalism. That is too simplistic. It implies, in an idealist sense that all that is 'traditional' is good and all that is 'modern' is bad. This is not only the opposite of what the government has maintained in its castigation of 'traditional' as 'feudal' and 'backward', but it also denies that villagers, for example, in the nineteenth century were so committed to their landlords through moral ties and community obligations, as to ignore the self-interest and 'bad faith' which many of the landlords exercised.

Bourdieu comments:

"the generalisation of monetary exchange, which expresses the objective workings of the economy, also brings to light the institutional mechanisms proper to the archaic economy, which have the function of limiting and disguising the play of economic interest and calculation."

(Ibid., p.172)

The private instrumental ends of individuals are made more explicit as the layers are removed from the public language of the 'good faith' economy which stresses cooperation and mutual support. The movement is then a demystification of the established order.

The demystification of this public language has always been one of the major tasks of social anthropology, the child of western rationalism, as the spread of capitalism has involved the demystification of the relations of domination in pre-capitalist societies. But the terms in which a new order is established also imply the emergence of a new public language which in its turn disguises the new relationships of inequality.

Two processes would appear to be at work to disguise these changing relationships of inequality and authority and convert private interest into public good. The one disguises self-interest by clothing it in the garb of familiarity and trust, and approximates to those ideals of unity and cooperation supposedly rooted in the closest of ties - those found within the family, and those legitimated by appeals to the Islamic community in religious terms. Under such circumstances the mālek, or the khān legitimates his control over the ra'iyā, his subjects, through paternalistic appeals to moral authority and relations of descent. The other disguises self-interest by the imposition of a supposedly 'neutral' body, the state, which employs functionaries to arbitrate and legitimate the exercise of power. In Engels words: 'arisen out of society but
placing itself above it', the state appears as neutral. ¹
Those in power enjoy respect and authority in so far as they
are seen to be distanced from the ultimate source of power
- physical coercion.

The need for a public language of cooperation and trust
both between landlord and villager, and between villagers
themselves, would appear to be correlated with the degree of
mutual interdependence. As that interdependence takes on new
forms through, for example, the mechanisation of agricultural
production, and the individuation of property ownership, the
forms of cooperation and mutual support change. The state
takes on more of the role of 'mediator', maintaining order
and alleviating conflict in the name of national harmony.

The myth of the 'good faith' economy can thus be inter-
preted as an ideological tool in the hands of the powerful
used to transpose instrumental transactions into what might
be termed generous exchanges, and thereby maintain relations
of inequality.

It is tempting to treat the activities of landlords and
peasants as separate because many of their activities occur in
different social arenas. (The landlords in the Ayub valley,
like most of the larger landlords in the plain, are urban
residents.) But in so doing those who effectively control the
organisation of production both directly and indirectly, those

¹  Engels, F., 'The origins of the Family, Private Property,
and the State' (p.576), in Marx and Engels, Selected Works,
London 1968.
who have been removed from village society by virtue of their superior status can only be brought in both by analysts and by villagers as some 'deus ex machina'. There is no recognition and thus no analysis of the fact that they are both the representatives and the products of the established order, and it is in their interests that the status quo is maintained and the law is interpreted. The formal division of interests between large landowner and villager as a result of the land reform programme conveniently emphasises their separation, but a concentration on this separation leads to a dualistic interpretation of society. Barth, for example, in his work on the Bässeri, has stressed the 'different worlds' inhabited by the 'chiefs', and the 'indians'. ¹ Black, on the other hand, in his work on the Lurs, while maintaining the division between upper and lower strata of society, stresses their interdependence and emphasises their occupation of the same social universe. ²

The public language of the 'good faith' economy where stress is placed on cooperative interdependence between individuals and groups, seems to be predicated on an ideal of staunch individualism. This stresses personal achievement and a commitment to freedom of action such as that supposedly embodied in the freedom attached to a nomadic existence. Villagers in the Ayub valley frequently upheld the superiority of nomadic existence and resented the restrictions on their

freedom associated with sedentary life. The ability to enter into cooperative alliances with government or with landlords or villagers presumes this freedom of action while disguising the difficulties and restrictions often associated with actual ability to act independently.

Through the myth that achievement and success are the results of individual initiative (and there are always examples to demonstrate this), the fact that those who are already privileged still appropriate the bulk of benefits, and that opportunities for independent action are being eroded through changing relationships to land is disguised. The distribution of credit, educational opportunities, agricultural extension, access to markets and government officials as well as pastures, the benefits of agricultural research and of land reform all appear to be biased against those who do not initially have the resources to take advantage of them. It is the wealthier members of society who could afford the time to invest in new opportunities and new avenues of advancement.

Changes in the forms of production associated with mechanisation have decreased the dependence of some landlords on the labour of villagers, and have subsequently resulted in a change in the types of appeals to cooperation and mutual support which ensure the latter's participation. It should not however be assumed that all those with privilege saw the changes in land tenure associated with the land reform programme, and consequent changes in relations of production, as being necessarily in their interests. Many were opposed to the redistri-
bution of land for the same reasons that they resented the increasing interference by agents of the state.

The inhabitants of villages like Hasanābād and Shul, north of Marvdasht, and west of Persepolis, for example, visited by Lambton shortly after the execution of the reforms, apparently grasped the opportunities presented to them with land reform and began a vigorous cooperative enterprise to modernise village agriculture. In these villages and other older villages in the plain where there had been little modernisation of agriculture prior to the reforms, and few attempts had been made to increase productivity, the 'traditional' relationship between ṭāleī and ra'īyat was still largely governed by a concern to extract rents rather than increase production. It was in such villages that the landlords were seen by both villagers and land reform officials as the major obstacles to reform. Because of their continuing influence over agents of government control, such as the gendarmerie, they posed a major threat.

Thus the processes associated with the changing nature of production affected villagers and landowners differently. The land reform programme appeared to encourage a re-alignment of interests in favour of those prepared to adopt or expand new agricultural techniques. In villages like Hasanābād and Shul it was the landlords who were the major opponents of reform. In the villages of Chamani and Pol-e-No, on the other hand, it was the villagers. The land reform office, together

with the regional office of the ministry of agriculture, and
the newly established agricultural bank, were interested in
focusing on those engaged in the development of modern agri-
culture, and in encouraging the development of cash crop farm-
ing. The new forms of production served to increase differen-
tiation both between and within villages and between landlords.
It was those landlords who had made no efforts to develop modern
agriculture who appeared to suffer. The interests of govern-
ment, represented by the land reform office (which was charged
with the settlement of tenurial disputes), were represented as
cutting across so-called 'traditional vertical factions' and
thus helping to eliminate the control of the mâlek over the
ra'iyat, itself largely a product of 1930s legislation, and
helping to polarise production into that which was regarded as
'progressive' and that which was 'backward'. In some cases
this meant support for the villagers, in others it meant support
for the landlords. The interests of those agencies of govern-
ment, or of employees within those agencies cannot be seen as
unified. The land reform office and the ministry of the inter-
ior, the major agencies involved, were often in opposition to
the more 'conservative' elements in the government regional
offices, and other ministries, as well as in their own offices.¹

¹ Bill maintains that this should be seen in terms of the
opposition between the emerging 'professional-bureaucratic' class
and the traditional political elite (Bill 1972, p.151), and
because the White Revolution was intent on 'system preservation'
the latter could not rely on the support of the former, and the
only answer they had was to attempt to buy them off (ibid.,
p.149).
The public emphasis of the reforms was on the modernisation of peasant agriculture and the ministry of land reform and rural cooperatives (later transformed into the ministry of cooperatives and rural development) was seen to champion the interests of the villagers. But it was, however, the larger landowners, with their superior resources and their greater flexibility in response to changing circumstances, who eventually emerged as the major beneficiaries. The ministry of cooperatives and rural development encouraged village-based agricultural production and supported general social welfare programmes and rural industrialisation programmes. The ministry of agriculture and natural resources, however, which advocated larger commercial enterprises and agri-business increased its domination when it incorporated the former ministry into its operations in 1976. The incorporation of the Ayub valley, and indeed a great part of the plain into large 'mechanised cooperatives' in 1974 on completion of the irrigation canals and the new Dariush Kabir dam, under the management of state-employed technocrats, illustrates the consolidation of this domination. Villagers became little more than wage labourers, and the larger landlords gained seats on the cooperative boards.

There was a growing recognition by some villagers of their changing position vis-à-vis the landlord, and a recognition of their separate interests. This would seem to suggest the destruction of 'primordial loyalties' associated with the patronage networks of the traditional relations governing production and the control of surpluses. But this again is too simple and
points towards a unilineal picture of development, and to a close association between the interests of the mâlek and the ra'iyat. As Ono has implied for Kheyrābād, another village in the Marvdasht plain, in which former nomads had settled, one of the reactions to land reform was to increase the intensity of transactions along 'tribal' networks.¹

Where the landlords were the major opponents of reform, there seems to have been a greater enthusiasm on the part of villagers for government-inspired initiatives with development projects. This would appear to be partly the result of the perceived need to construct political alliances to counteract the opposition of the former landlords. These villages became the focii for various social welfare programmes and for government aid. It is in such places that the 'houses of equity' (khāneh ensāf) and 'houses of culture' (khāneh farhang)² were established. Adult education, involving extension and literacy programmes were promoted by revolutionary corpsmen who were deployed in strength in these villages. Village cooperatives were developed and the agricultural bank provided loans for seed, fertilizer, and machinery. Shul, for example, became the centre for a chicken-breeding scheme and initiated an electrification programme. It became an important stopping point on the itinerary of development experts being shown

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1. Ono 1968.

2. These were features included in the provisions for the White Revolution and were aimed at increasing village involvement in the administration of justice and providing bases for increased community participation in the life of the village and the nation.
round nearby Persepolis. Villagers from these 'favoured' places were recruited to peasant organisations and were active in formal local government.

Under such circumstances the villagers' major allies were the young, educated employees who were filling the expanding numbers of posts being offered in the ministries of land reform, agriculture, and the interior, as well as those being created through the expansion of the regional offices of the plan and budget organisation. Many of these, together with the various revolutionary corpsmen, were specifically employed at the grass roots level to help carry out the various reforms initiated under the 'white revolution', and hasten the approach of what was termed 'the great civilization'. Work with rural development projects was seen by the political elite as a useful means of relieving a potentially serious unemployment problem, and of redirecting the energies of this group. In 1964, for example, a new programme for the training of bakhshdârs was initiated. The bakhshdâr was the local administrative officer in charge of the bakhsh or district. Until the formal separation of administration from landownership the post was normally filled through the patronage network of the locally powerful, and Bill states:

"the position has been a kind of 'booby prize' to incompetent and local influentials".

(Bill 1972, p.113)

With the new programme however, the ministry of the interior was intent on filling these posts with young graduates who had passed special courses and who achieved their positions through
merit rather than influence, i.e. were loyal to the regime rather than to local political factions. In the middle '60s a 25 year old bakhshdār who had graduated from this course was allocated to Marvdasht, and Bill, who travelled with him notes that between 1965 and 1967:

"he initiated 177 development programmes including the construction of 63 schools, 20 baths, and 10 bridges: the repair of 14 schools and 25 baths; the construction of 63 kilometres of road; and the installation of 3 electrical generators and 3 water systems."

(ibid., p.116)

Bill also adds that:

"In all these projects, he managed to secure the financial and physical participation of the villagers who for the first time believed a government official was on their side."

(ibid., p.116)

The bakhshdār, together with the revolutionary corpsmen and the agents of some other government institutions concerned with rural development were strangers to the plain and often to the region. Consequently they had little influence with the political elite of the region. They were limited therefore in their fields of activities to those areas which were not considered threatening to this latter group. This included the families of the larger landowners in the plain. They focused their attentions on the larger villages closer to Marvdasht in which one large landowner did not have overall control and where the landlord's major interests in the land were the collection of rents. But by the late '60s the bakhshdār programme had run into serious problems as the state
employees, fired with enthusiasm and idealism, confronted what Bill has termed the old 'web' system of traditional control.

The major effects of their work and of the reforms generally has been to enhance the interests of those committed to modernisation of agriculture and reduce the influence of those still entrenched in 'feudal' relations of production. They have encouraged both villagers and landlords in this process. Larger farms which were in operation before the reforms and which were already mechanised, were allowed, of course, to remain intact. The small stretches of land received by the peasantry following the reforms have often proved too small for personal support and have been taken over by wealthier villagers. Land that was not formerly intensively cultivated has been rented to tulumbeh kār operators. Evidence from the plain generally suggests that participation in development projects by villagers was far from total and was often a way of pursuing instrumental and individual ends. Such 'participation' was often governed by the more powerful villagers and/or the landlords.

The public language of participation, community enterprise and village development, often disguised the self-interest of the parties involved. The decisions to build schools or bath houses in villages by landowners or rich villagers were more often aimed at increasing personal status in an arena that was much wider than the particular village. This new language of the 'good faith' economy, rooted in the rhetoric of the 'white revolution' and liberal democracy, disguised the progressive
alienation of many villagers from the traditional means of livelihood. They became thereby increasingly dependent on others for the provision of wage labour contracts. The more formal nature of these contracts, as well as the associated increase in distance between those who owned the land and those who worked it, helped to reveal the separation of the interests of the landowners from those of the peasantry. The new peasant proprietors soon discovered that it was not they who controlled the prices of the crops they produced on the urban markets. It was not long before many of them were obliged to give up their newly-won titles to land in return for shares in the 'cooperative' and participate in a reinstated 'communal' production system over which they had little control. The traditional 'cooperative' system is being resurrected to provide the basis for this new cooperative production system.\(^1\)

Thus to summarise, changing relations of production associated with the spread of a western economic rationale, have served to polarise the interests of those engaged in agricultural production. The land reform programme and the associated 'white revolution' were instrumental in this process. They seemed to differentiate between those landlords who were primarily interested in commercial farming from those who only saw the land as a source of rent. This process of differen-

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1. See 'Ajami 1974 and Safi Nejad 1972 in which they state that the 'traditional' 'communal' work teams (boneh, heraseh) should be resurrected to provide the basis for the new cooperative agriculture. But it should be pointed out that the relationships constructed by the villagers with the managers of the production cooperatives are very different from those implied in the original land reform programme in which villagers would retain individual ownership of land.
tiation was far from complete in the early '70s, and landlords were engaged in a variety of different activities with different relationships to the land. The reforms also served to differentiate between the peasantry, not primarily between those given land and those not, but between those who were confined to production on marginal sections of village land, and those who were able to take advantage of new opportunities, such as the tulumbah karān.
APPENDIX 1

A moral statement as given by a troupe of players at a village wedding, Tabor, Kushk-e-mullah, Fars, April 1971.

It is unusual to find a troupe of town performers involved in village weddings on a professional basis. The troupe consisted of some nine people brought into the village by the headman (kadkhoda) of the village for his son's wedding and also, quite importantly, for the benefit of the landlord, who had said that he would come to the village, with guests, especially to see the wedding. The troupe initially sang and played their musical instruments; the instruments too were not the ones usually associated with village music, being more reminiscent, as was the troupe, of a low-class urban night club. The instruments included a set of drums, a clarinet and a violin; microphone's and loud-speakers were set up by the performers, carpets were also laid down where they could dance and sing. The opening item of their performance was in itself very splendid, one of the two female members of the troupe, dressed in full village/tribal dress danced on the carpets to the accompaniment of the other musicians, and surrounded by a circle of villagers. She was later joined by another dancer of inferior calibre. The songs were followed by induced applause; induced by the leader of the troupe. Applause had to be induced, not so much because the audience were reticent to do so, but rather because the villagers were not used to responding in such a fashion.

After an interval of some five or ten minutes, in which the musicians continued to play their instruments, one of the young ladies came back on to the 'stage' (the circle formed by the villagers), but had abandoned her 'traditional' garb in favour of a very provocative mini-skirt, short even by Shirazi standards. She proceeded to dance as before, interspersing her dancing with songs. In the songs she was joined by other members of the troupe. This was followed by a similar performance, by the other girl in the troupe. The whole of this performance was met by the villagers with apparent dis-interest; they continued chattering and talking among themselves. This was the first part of the performance, the second part involved the staging of a play by the troupe.

All the troupe, apart from the drummer, left the stage, and the plot of the drama gradually unfolds. We are in the house of a lower, middle-class town dweller. The actor who takes the role of the head of the household (and who is also head of the troupe) is, according to a village informant, a Teherani, a man in his early thirties. His accent is not Shirazi and his mode of expression is extremely formal. The man's wife is the same girl who sang and danced. She is a girl of about twenty-three, and liberally dressed, within the con-
fines of the 'house', she is wearing a mini-skirt. The third member of the household is the comic servant, dressed in a red one-piece overall, with his face and hands painted black. He has two hats during the course of the drama, one an 'astrakan', the other a black, very battered looking cap. His gestures are exaggerated, and his smile gives us a glimpse of a row of gold teeth; he is a little hard of hearing, and this provides a major cue for his humour during the course of the drama, in that he misinterpretes a great deal of what is said. Approximating in appearance and in activity to 'Haji Firuz', this comic has never entered the scene before, not being involved with the introductory musical performance. In the first part of the drama, the clown occupies quite a central position, and is the main source of attraction for the audience; he is involved with an interaction with his master over the question of who should obey who, and how much servility is expected of a servant by the master. The master continually informs the comic that the latter is in charge of the security of the wife when the husband goes out of the house; no one was to be allowed near her, whoever it may be. There is also an exchange of dialogue between the husband and wife in which the master states how much he trusts her and how she must stay in the house, thereby subjecting no one to temptation.

There is a knock on the door, the comic answers, gets the name of the caller wrong, providing amusement for the audience, but eventually lets him in. The caller has come to talk with the master about buying and selling cars. This man appears to be in his thirties, typifying a person who regularly inhabits the city tea houses (chai khaneh) or may be a taxi driver. All things considered, he does not look too reliable; this is the villain of the piece. It is immediately obvious to at least some of the audience that his intentions may not be honourable. It turns out that he came on honest business but was side-tracked by the appearance of such a beautiful woman in the form of the master's wife. (The drama comes to a temporary halt while encroaching children are cleared from the 'stage' and the chattering audience has been quietened.) The 'villain' leaves, the master remembers that he has forgotten something and goes out in search of him, not before leaving explicit instructions with the comic to let no one in. The comic promises to uphold the master's wishes. The onus appears to be on the comic for protecting the wife rather than any necessary defensive action that the wife herself is able to offer. She has remained passive throughout the proceedings so far.

The 'villain' returns, furtively, and by using the ruse that he must leave a message for the husband, manages to get in to see the wife, while the comic's back is turned. None of the comic's entreaties will get the villain away from the woman, he therefore resolves to watch their inter-action very closely. He pushes himself in between them when the 'villain' attempts to steal a kiss from the woman; he continually inter-
rupts their conversation, much to the annoyance of the 'villain'. The woman does not really enter into the dialogue at all at this stage, again she is the one who is being acted upon rather than initiating action herself. Gradually the 'villain' manages to seduce the woman and persuades her to come out on a picnic with him; the comic has been deceived into leaving the room. The comic returns, finds the room empty, becomes extremely distraught, with great sadness, and with the fear of the consequences upon his master's return, he resolves to set out in pursuit of the couple.

The scene shifts to a place in the countryside, the picnic spot, another comic provides relief from the rather heavy plot; he appears to be a country 'yokel', a servant in charge of the 'chai khaneh' associated with the picnic spot. His manner is uncouth, he does not appear to be able to speak properly. The cuckold and his 'prize' enter, he lays a rug down for the woman to sit down on, he produces a bottle of vodka and obtains a bowl of yogurt from the servant. The cuckold pretends that the vodka is something other than the intoxicating drink it is, and the woman, being unfamiliar with the taste of vodka, drinks quite a considerable amount from the bottle. She complains about the bitterness of the drink, and the cuckold gives her yogurt with the aim of taking away that bitter flavour. Very soon she becomes drunk and falls into a stupour, much to the cuckold's delight. He picks her up and carries her away from the picnic area.

The scene does not shift, but we remain at the picnic spot, the comic enters in search of his mistress (master's wife). He meets the country servant and a 'slap-stick' comedy scene follows in which both enjoy the remains the vodka and the yogurt. The vodka appears as a new phenomenon to them both and they very quickly become drunk. This scene is wound up when both of them become unconscious. The scene changes back to the master's house. The comic enters having found the woman, the master has not yet returned home. Both are highly distraught and have no suggestions to make as to how they should inform the master, on his return, of the proceedings of the last few hours. The master returns and the story of the seduction is given very abruptly by the comic. The master responds with a lengthy tirade on the gullibility of women, and their ability to be so easily corrupted, on the irresponsibility of the servant and on the fickleness of friends. The outcome being that he throws his wife out of the house, dismisses the servant, and vows to take vengeance on the villain. The wife is told that if she wishes to take up her relationship with the man she is at liberty to do so. (The wife is no longer wearing a mini-skirt, but has donned a pair of trousers which are worn underneath the skirt; this may have been the result of a pinch she received by one of the villagers when she was making an exit, but it appears more to emphasise a change in her nature.) Both the servant and the woman leave the house greatly upset by the punishment inflicted upon them.
Another scene change occurs, this time we are inside a cafe, which the villain has apparently hired for some sort of engagement ceremony. In this last part of the drama all the troupe of players are involved, and there is a great deal of improvisation in the dialogue. Relief is afforded in the person of the comic who enters the cafe as a travelling priest (mullah). The mullah is capable of telling fortunes by reading peoples' palms. His activities serve as comic relief rather than adding any new factors to the conclusion of the plot. He drinks the revellers' beer surreptitiously and tries to flirt with one of the girls present (one presumes that this may be the villain's intended bride, but this is not clear, the shamed woman is not present). The master enters the cafe in disguise, he too is a mullah with a long beard and an ankle-length brown robe; he approaches the table but does not say very much. He moves away from the table, where the guests and the villain are seated, and there is some conversation among the guests. Suddenly the villain falls down, apparently poisoned. His friends carry him from the stage, and the 'master' is left on his own to sum up for the audience. This final speech is given in very formal language, and the fact that he is in a mullah's garb adds more formality to the situation. He talks about the evil of drink and the weakness of women, in his capacity as mullah rather than as the master. The whole play has thoroughly entertained the audience, apart from one or two incidents, the pinching and the continual encroachment of the children onto the stage. The more traditional musicians take up the entertainment, with their drums and reed pipe and the wedding takes on a more traditional form; the men take up their sticks for chub bazi and the women run off to dance another guest into the village.
Appendix 2.

Composition of households in Chamani.

Baneshi Lurs

1. Malek

2. Iadollah

3. Safar

4. Hasanjan

5. Hatam

6. Kaka Khan
Rusta Turks

7. Javad

8. Azad

9. Ziad

10. Akram

11. Mina

12. Agha Jan
Rusta Turks (contd.)

13. Avolfat

14. Mashd Ayaz

15. Sahreh Khan

16. Haji

17. Mahd Agha

18. Kamar Khan
Safshekan

19. Namaki

20. Mashd Rahman

Nazari

21. Abdul Khalogh

22. Ali Naghi

23. Mahd Taghi

24. Rahim
Ex-Buraki Residents

25. Rezali

26. Karim

27. Mashd Hajali

28. Mashd Karim

29. Hosein

30. Hosein Khan


32. Ali Khan

33. Ali Reza
Appendix 3

Village kinship terminology
Kinship terminology 2. (Turkish terms in common use are in brackets)
GLOSSARY OF PERSIAN TERMS

äbädeh : settlement
äberu : face (as in 'to lose face')
abi : irrigated farming
abiär : irrigator
'a ghhd : wedding contract
âhángar : tinker
âkhund : religious cleric
'amaleh : servant (also noukâr)
ambär : store room
anjuman : council
arbâb : lord, 'squire'
'ashâyer : 'tribal'
ayâlat : district, province, (no longer in use)

bädi : nomad, 'people of the wind'
bakhsh : department
bakhshdâr : local administrative officer in charge of a bakhsh
bannâ : builder
bolo-khâneh : upper room
boluk : district, corresponding to dehestân (no longer used)
(pl. bolukat)
boneh : traditional cooperative group for cultivation of village lands. See also heraseh, sahra, khish.

daim : irrigated farming
dang : one sixth part of any piece of real estate
dashtebân : village watchman
deh : village
dehâti : 'of the countryside', 'peasant', (derogatory)
dehestân : district
dehghân : peasant proprietor, head of a village who held lands and acted as tax collector
(pl. dehghâniân)
deh neshin : village resident
ehterâm : honour, standing, reputation

farmandâr : governor of shahrestân
garmsir : 'warm area', winter quarters (Turkish qishlaq)
ghabileh : tribe
gha'leh : fortified settlement
ghanât : underground irrigation channel
gharireh : village (19th century)
ghesbeh : borough, small town, central village of boluk, administrative centre
ghorbat : gypsy
haji : one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
hayât : courtyard
heraseh : cooperative group working several khish, ploughlands

il (pl. ilät) : tribe
Il khân : leader of tribe, formal title
imamzâdeh : local shrine to saint
iqta' : land assignment, see also tuyul

jajim : coarse woven blanket
jâliz : cucumbers and melons

dakkhodâ : village headman, head of a tireh
kalântar : overseer of city ward, head of tribal sub-group (taifeh), lord mayor
kerbalâ'i : one who has made a pilgrimage to Kerbalâ in Iraq
khâghân : title given to first Qajar monarch; Turkish: emperor of China or of Chinese Turkestan
khâl : 'people of the earth', sedentarists
khâlis : crown land
khan : chief
(khanān)
khâneh : house, household, home
khâneh ensâf : house of equity
khâneh farhang : house of culture
khânevâdeh : household, family, tribe
khish : ploughland
khordeh mâlek : small landowner
khurjin : saddle bag
khwushneshin : person without rights to land
kucheh : narrow lane

madrasseh : school, now more definitively religious school
mahallah : quarter (of a settlement)
mahr/mahrieh : marriage payment
majlis : council
mâlek : landowner/landlord
(pl. mâlekān)
mâliät : taxes
mamlekat : country, area, as in mamlekat-e-Fars
mann : weight (approx. 3 kilos)
mashdi : one who has made the pilgrimage to the shrine of the 6th Imam, Imam Rezâ at Mashad in N.E. Iran

masjid : mosque
mavât : dead lands
mazra'eh : farm (land)
melk : landed property
mobashir : bailiff
mujtahed : religious leader
(pl. mujtahidān)
mullah : religious cleric, see ākhund
mustajer : rentier
mutavalli : administrator of a vaqf

najār : carpenter
nāmzad : engaged (to be married)
nasāq-dār : one who holds cultivation rights
nāyeb : deputy, assistant
nimēh kār : crop/animal-sharing agreement in which parties to agreement receive one and a half shares

ostān : modern province
ostāndār : provincial governor, governor-general
oulād : family, counted through males

ra'is : head, leader
ra'iyyat : subject, peasant
(pl. ra'iya')
rish sefīd : elder, lit. 'grey heard'
(pl. rish sefīdān)
rustā : rustic, peasant

sahrā : open-country
saifi : summer crops
salmāni : barber
sarahad : cool area, summer quarters (Turkish yeylaq)
sayyid : descendant of the prophet
selseleh : chain of command
sepāh behdosht : health corpsman
sepāh-dānesh : literacy corpsman
sepāh-tarvij : extension corpsman
shahrak : small town
shahrāt : district governed from a town (shahr)
shar' : religious law
shatvi : winter crops
sheikh : leader (of a religious order)
shirbāhā : bride price; lit. 'milk money'
sofreh : spread, table cloth
soltan : ruler (obs.)
soltānāt : that area ruled by a sultān - country

tahjir : marking out dead land prior to claiming it
taifeh : group, tribe, larger than tireh
tarigha : mystical path
tireh : group, under leadership of kadkhodā
tulumbeh-kār : one who cultivates with water from a pump (tulumbeh)
tuyul : land assignment, see 'īqta
ulama : those learned in religious sciences
'umdeh mâlek : large landowner
'urf : common law

vaqf : religious endowment
(pl. ouqaf)
vaqfi 'āmm : charitable vaqf
vaqfi khāss : personal vaqf
vazir : minister

zābet : revenue collector, controller, bailiff
zar'eh : peasant cultivator
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