Tragedy of Confusion: The Political Economy of Truth in the modern history of Iran (A novel framework for the analysis of the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran)

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Tragedy of Confusion: The Political Economy of Truth in the modern history of Iran

(A novel framework for the analysis of the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran)

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A dissertation submitted to the University of Durham in accordance with the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA).

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Abstract

This study entails a theoretical reading of the Iranian modern history and follows an interdisciplinary agenda at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and politics and intends to offer a novel framework for the analysis of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran in the modern era. A brief review of Iranian modern history from the constitutional revolution, to the oil nationalization movement, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the recent Reformist and Green movements demonstrates that Iranian people travelled full circle. This historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment revolving around the bitter question of “why are we backward?” and its manifestation in perpetual socio-political instability and violence is the subject matter of this study. Foucault’s conceived relation between the production of truth and production of wealth captures the essence of hypothesis offered in this study. Michel Foucault (1980: 93–4) maintains that “In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place”. Based on a hybrid methodology combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this study proposes that the failure to produce wealth has had particular roots in the failure in the production of truth. At the heart of the proposed theoretical model is the following formula: The Iranian dasein’s confused preference structure culminates in the formation of unstable coalitions which in turn leads to institutional failure, creating a chaotic social order and a turbulent history as experienced by the Iranian nation in the modern era. The following set of interrelated propositions elaborate further on the core formula of the model: Each and every Iranian person and her subjectivity and preference structure is the site of three distinct warring regimes of truth and identity choice sets (identity markers) related to the ancient Persian empire (Persianism), Islam, and modernity. These three historical a priori and regimes of truth act as conditions of possibility for social interactions, and are unities in multiplicities. They, in their perpetual state of tension and conflict, constitute the mutually exclusive, contradictory, and confused dimensions of the prism of the Iranian dasein. The confused preference structure prevents Iranian people from organizing themselves in stable coalitions required for collective action to achieve the desired socio-economic change. The complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness makes it impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work, and language to achieve the desired social transformations, turning Iran into a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels. This in turn leads to failure in the construction of stable institutions (a social order based on rule of law or any other stable institutional structure becomes impossible) due to perpetual tension between alternative regimes of truth manifested in warring discursive formations, relations of power, and techniques of subjectification and their associated economies of affectivity. This in turn culminates in relations of power in all micro, meso, and macro levels to become discretionary, atomic, and unpredictable, producing perpetual tensions and social violence in almost all sites of social interactions, and generating small and large social earthquakes (crises, movements, and revolutions) as experienced by the Iranian people in their modern history. As such, the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social assemblages and their affiliated hybrid forms of regimes of truth in the springs of freedom and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. Each time, after the experience of chaos, the order is restored based on the emergence of a final arbiter (Iranian leviathan) as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution. This highly volatile truth cycle produces the experience of socio-economic backwardness. The explanatory power of the theoretical framework offered in the study exploring the relation between the production of truth, trust and wealth is tested on three strong events of Iranian modern history: the Constitutional Revolution, the Oil-Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution. The significant policy implications of the model are explored.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Honesty, I prefer to be a bird with two wings rather than a tree with deep roots. Sahar Bayani (2014)

"Are we [puppets] made of wax ([aya] ma ra az mum sakhta-and)?" he asked with a strain of self-contempt. “In this world there are no human beings like us”. Nasir-al-Din Shah (Amanat, 1997: 252)

1.1. BACKGROUND

A brief review of the Iranian modern history demonstrates that at least three strong events (the constitutional revolution, the oil-nationalization movement, the Islamic revolution) shaped the trend and pattern of socio-economic development and were associated with large scale confrontation between the forces inside and outside the country, creating a history of instability, upheaval and social violence alongside generating large-scale restructuring of socio-economic institutions and unstoppable waves of migration.

Many commentators and observers are puzzled by the seemingly unending and unpredictable waves of incessant turbulence in the Iranian society, never settling down in the form of a steady social order based on the establishment of a set of stable institutional arrangements and steady and predictable positions in terms of internal socio-economic policies and external foreign policies. The Iranian society seems to be in a state of perpetual flux and permanent turmoil. The sense of disillusionment and bewilderment is equally shared between the Iranians and non-Iranians alike.

1.2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This study aims to explore, explicate and critically analyse the enigma of experience of socio-economic (under)development in modern history of Iran. In other words, this work purports to conduct a case study on the violent experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran by offering a novel model for the analysis of the Iranian enigma based on an interdisciplinary approach at the intersection of philosophy, economics and politics. The study basically aims to develop a theoretical model through grounded theory to be tailored to the social reality of the modern history of Iran and to be specifically applied to three strong events in the Iranian
history in order to demonstrate its potency in explicating the root causes of the historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment.

In fulfilling these aims, the following objectives are developed:

(i) A hybrid methodological approach is constructed based on cross-fertilization of three approaches of reductionism, complexity science, and psychoanalysis to combine three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability in the analysis of social phenomena including the historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment.

(ii) A theoretical framework for the analysis of the historical experience of underdevelopment in Iran is constructed based on the two notions of inbetweenness and belatedness.

(iii) Based on the methodological insights and the theoretical framework, three strong events of the modern history of Iran are explicated to unravel the underlying patterns and trends at work in the reproduction of the bitter experience of socio-economic underdevelopment and its associated cycles of violence.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS

Within the identified aims and objectives, the main research question is: “what are the root-causes of the experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran?” Or simply put: “why does Iran remain a backward country?”.

For more than a century the house of Iran has been on fire and I have been directly experiencing and watching its effects on the repeated waves of social and individual meltdown. I have been determined to search for the root-causes and to avoid easy answers and sound-bite solutions. In my quest for the answers I noticed that the three aforementioned strong events of the modern Iranian history demonstrate various failed attempts made by the Iranian people to achieve socio-economic development and to incorporate modernity.

Why have these attempts been so consistently unsuccessful (or at least perceived to be unsuccessful)? What was the set of discourses in currency and in circulation in these three situations on the issue of what the roots of Iranian socio-economic
backwardness are and what was deemed to be the way forward? What was the interplay of texts and contexts in the sense that which texts and in what exact forms were evoked to analyse the roots of the social malaise and how they were used to entice actions and to inform policies?

Do these three movements and revolutions represent a linear progression towards achieving a sustainable level of socio-economic development or do they manifest a chaotic history with no social destination and as such manifesting a cyclical voyage? How can we make judgement? What were the achievements and shortcomings of these three strong events? Can they tell us something about the patterns and trends repeating themselves throughout the modern history of Iran or are we facing different issues at different times and consequently have to acknowledge that there are no unifying themes connecting them together? Is Iranian society learning from its past mistakes and failures? Is there any accumulation of knowledge on the past experiences or are the same experiences being reproduced in different shapes and forms?

Many commentators maintain that our questions and problems are basically the same as what they had been at the age of the Constitutional Revolution (see Malek-Ahmadi, 2003; Ajoodani, 2003, for example); does this mean that we are moving in a circular fashion and have travelled full circle during a century of bitter and violent social experiments? If we define socio-economic development in terms of sustainability, i.e. the activated capacity of a society to repair and modernize itself in the face of cultural, social, and economic crises and shocks, and in its ability to establish stable institutions of conflict resolution away from perpetual violence; does Iranian experience meet these criteria or not?

This research, hence, aims to develop and propose a theoretical model constituting persuasive responses for these research questions.

1.4. CONCEPTUALISING THE PROBLEM: THE PROPOSED MODEL

At the core of the proposed model is the notion of tragedy of confusion emanating from the state of belated inbetweenness with its associated confused preference structure. Iranians have been captivated by three rival regimes of truth and identity markers of Islam, Persianism (the idea of pre-Islamic Iran), and Western modernity. In the context of belatedness (being late to modernity), these three regimes of truth
were deployed to design three projects of reverse social engineering, namely Persianization (bastan-geraei), Islamization (Islam-geraei or Islami kardan), and modernization. These three projects of reverse social engineering have been adopted intermittently in different periods of Iranian modern history to achieve social transformation. Thus, the state of belatedness prompts the translation of three regimes of truth into three projects of reverse social engineering.

In the complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness it is impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work and language to achieve the desired social transformations, which leads to Situational Impossibility Theorem. This implies that the Iranian confused preference structure leads to the emergence of Iran as a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels; which in turn leads to persistent experience of institutional failure, which can be defined as the inability to construct stable and functional institutions such as modern nation-state, or market economy based on property rights or any other stable forms of institutional arrangements. Consequently, Iran is turned into the country of institutional dysfunctions and deformities. The outcome, therefore, is the chaotic order, through which the experience of tragedy of confusion with its associated unstable coalitions and institutional dysfunctionalities frequently leads to the emergence of widespread sense of discontent and disillusionment.

This in turn triggers the emergence of large- and small-scale social movements and revolutions culminating in the experience of constant waves of socio-political instability, where the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social assemblages in the springs of freedom and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. In every round of the truth cycle the order is restored based on the emergence of final arbiter (Iranian leviathan in coordination or in conflict with the international leviathans) as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution. The end result in each of these projects of reverse social engineerings, hence, has been socio-economic underdevelopment and stagnation.
1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Attempting to understand the experience of (under)development in Iran led this study to an interdisciplinary approach involving different strands of literature at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and politics, organized in the form of political economy of truth, in order to make the hyper-complexity of the Iranian social reality intelligible.

This interdisciplinary model was inspired by Williamson’s (2000) work in situating the experience of underdevelopment in four levels of analysis starting from prices and moving to governance, institutions and mind. Exploring the mind and its preference structure, leads us to viewing social phenomena as Deleuzian social assemblages whose evolution are governed by three principles of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability. These social assemblages need to be studied through developing a hybrid methodology incorporating causational analysis (Cartesian cogito), complexity-system analysis, and articulation of worlds of signification (Heideggerian dasein).

Based on this combined approach, the subject matter of the study, the question of Iranian socio-economic backwardness, needs to be located in the wider context of the Iranian social order and its evolution in time. The characteristics of Iranian social order and its strong and weak events alongside its social phenomena like poverty, inflation or political violence and how they correlate and co-evolve to generate Iranian experience of socio-economic underdevelopment needs to be identified based on the general characteristics of social assemblages and how they come to take a particular shape.

Social assemblages are immersed in the interplay between finitude and infinitude, and are characterized, in this study, using the Lacanian-Zizekian formulation where each social order is a hybrid phenomenon, and constituted of three orders of ‘real’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’. The negating dimensions of symbolic order are characterized using the Lakanian-Zizekian notions of repression, disavowal, and foreclosure.

The affirmative dimension of ‘symbolic’ is characterized using the Focauldian trinity of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Foucault, 1980, 2003; Flynn, 2005). The affirmative dimensions of ‘imaginary’ are characterized using Castoriadis’s (1987)
theory of imagination, while the affirmative dimensions of the ‘real’ are characterized using Deleuzian theory of differential philosophy. The Deleuzian theory (Hallward, 2006; Parr, 2010) shows how the vertical and horizontal movements of ‘real’ are organized in corporeal and virtual forms through the process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. The negating facets of ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ are characterized using the Lacanian-Zizekian notions of ‘ideology and phantasy’ and ‘disruption’. The movement in life, work and language is organized in the assembled wholes called world of signification or regimes of truth through the territorialized and de-territorialized movements in the real, symbolic and imaginary dimensions of social assemblages. As such social assemblages are constituted of a ‘symbolic-imaginary’ regime of truth alongside an indefinable real at its heart.

In effect, social assemblages are known by their identifiable regime of truth and unknowable dimension of real. To know a social assemblage (an event, an experience, a text, or units such as individuals, organizations or societies), we have to know the emergence and evolution of its organizing force of regime of truth and how it is frequently destabilized by the movement of real beyond its reach of control and intelligibility.

After completing the structure of theoretical model deployed for the study, the analysis of modern history of Iran has to be entered upon. The experience of rebuilding a civilization as late as Safavid era (1501-1723) demonstrates that the Iranian social order possessed the ability to adapt to its historical situation up to that point of time (see Newman, 2006 for example). However, something seems to have gone seriously wrong from the point of encounter with modernity in the early half of 19th century.

The Iranian social order in its more than two millennia of history had gone through the frequent processes of decline and revival whose general characteristics described by Ibn-e Khaldun (Polk, 2009: 58-63; Ashfaq, 2009). However, this time the context seems to be entirely different. In this study, the essence of new context is captured in the Malinowskian notions of context of culture and context of situation (see: Robins, 1971: 44). The notion of context of culture was designed to capture the nature of historical embeddedness of a social assemblage while the notion of context of situation refers to the topological space of neighbourhood of social assemblages interacting with each other and vying for overcoming multiple forms of finitude.
(developing coping strategies to overcome despotisms of nature over man, man over man, and the terror of death).

The new situation troubling Iranian social order, in contradistinction with all other historical experiences of decline and revival in the past, is captured through the study of interplay between the context of culture as manifested in the notion of inbetweenness and context of situation as encapsulated in the notion of belatedness. The notion of inbetweenness refers to the state where Iranians have been equally attracted and repelled by the three regimes of truth (Islam, the West and Persianism) constituting their historical embeddedness.

The state of inbetweenness, thus, represents the context in which alternative regimes of truth battle for Iranians’ allegiance and affiliation, and their love, commitment and passion. These warring regimes of truth possess their own abundances and lacks, and their own black and white books of records. Each offers something special to the Iranian *dasein* while lacking in other dimensions of Iranian *dasein*’s desires and preferences. While modernity has offered elements of communicative and emancipative rationalities in its truth package, its true speciality is deemed to be largely in the realm of instrumental rationality (overcoming the finitude of nature). Islam’s speciality has been largely focused on emancipative rationality (liberation from the terror of death) while Persianism’s strong point has been in offering the space for communicative rationality (common linguistic and non-linguistic heritage engendering the sense of bonding and belonging to a community). As such Iranians cannot afford to commit themselves to one package of truth at the expense of alienating the alternatives. They desire to have them all in a harmonious whole.

The task of synchronizing and harmonizing these seemingly incommensurable and mutually exclusive sets of truth packages is a monumental task of cosmic proportion. Iranian subjectivity and social order, as a result, have fallen victim to the heaviness of the burden of judgement and its associated tragedy of confusion, and as such suffer from discursive homelessness.

In the context of situation, Iranians have found themselves trapped in the state of belatedness and catch-up model of development, emanating from the global, universal and totalizing nature of modernity. The global triumph of modernity endowed the pioneer countries with a sense of supremacy (happy consciousness or happy slave) and the rest of the globe with the sense of backwardness and its
associated emotional economy of the sense of inferiority (unhappy consciousness or unhappy slave). This puts almost all belated communities in the position to embark on the act of reverse social engineering to fill the gap in the level of progress.

Modernity with its discourse of progress has defined the terms and space of interaction between alternative social assemblages with their associated regimes of truth. As history attests every dominant regime of truth forces its rivals to play in its own game. Modernity establishes the game of progress and calls for other producers of truth about the world to demonstrate their competence in terms of achieving progress. Modernity, for instance, globalized the ‘Olympic Games’ (see Roche, 2000; Ruprecht, 2002; Preuss & Liese, 2011) to achieve physical and mental excellence; if Islam had become the global dominant regime of truth it would have globalized the game of pilgrimage to Mecca (and other holy places), for instance, to achieve moral and spiritual excellence. The challenging regimes of truth, in response, try to establish their own games and incorporate the games of the incumbent force inside their own world of signification.

Modernity with its universalism, and attempts to reshape the whole world and even universe in its own image alongside the need for achieving liberation from the state of belatedness prompted the prevalence of a Cartesian conception of social phenomena as the object of intelligent design rather than the outcome of evolutionary processes of chaotic synchronization, where wheels (technological progress, democracies, development, human rights, etc.) are reinvented in new and different historical backgrounds. This turned the transformation of social orders into a case of being subjected to different forms of projects of social engineering.

Taqizadeh’s (in)famous call for wholesale Westernization of society (Tavakoli-Targhi, 2002: 22) fully captures the spirit of the state of belatedness; almost all movements and programs of different persuasions have been “set out to change the fabric of social life in Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 20). In summary, while the state of inbetweenness created the tragedy of confusion for the Iranian dasein the state of belatedness subjected it to brutal experiences of reverse social engineering of different ideological brands.

In effect, based on the experience of the state of inbetweenness and the historical presence of the three regimes of truth, as mentioned above, three projects of social transformation has emerged in Iran in order to cure the ailments associated with the
state of belatedness. The three large projects of social engineering constituted of modernization, Persianization, and Islamization, where each project has attempted to assimilate the elements of the alternative projects under its own appellation, producing nine forms of subprojects.

The Iranian modern history has been a site of the rise and fall and re-emergence of these three regimes of truth and their associated projects and subprojects of social engineering. This study demonstrates that in the compound state of belated inbetweenness, the social order is the outcome of the interplay of forces, voices and faces, where the three forces (regimes of truth) combine through application of the operations of addition and subtraction to engender hybrid voices, in turn, inhabiting faces. Voices, as a collection of memes, go viral and frequently migrate from one face to another.

This study, thus, formulates the dynamism of their rise to prominence and eventual fall only to remerge in new forms and how their interactions have shaped the Iranian experience of instability and underdevelopment using four phases of tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, the emergence of dysfunctionalities and deformities in the social order due to the experience of institutional failure, and the ultimate emergence of a chaotic order.

The forces, voices, and faces operating in each period associated with each strong event of Iranian history is analysed in this study based on the accounts of the historical actors, deploying the three processes and principles at work in the emergence and evolution of social phenomena (namely, embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability) and the cartography of the constitutive registers of social assemblages and their affirmative and negative axes.

The reflexive methodology adopted in this research is based on careful blend of ‘hermeneutics of understanding’ and ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ to achieve the understanding of alternative regimes of truth, their associated projects and subprojects of reverse social transformation and their associated hybrid voices and their inhabited faces, and how they all combine to give rise to strong and weak events of the Iranian modern history. This approach strives to avoid the cardinal sin of counter-transference and achieve non-combative understanding of the radical others operative at the heart of the Iranian self and her grid of intelligibility through exercising the art of listening, suspension of disbelief and being devil’s advocate in
order to understand the complex nature of Iranian subjectivity and its selfhood embedded in the warring worlds of signification and their associated structures of power and knowledge. This study sets out to understand how the Iranianness is configured and transformed in the modern history of Iran in the dynamic interaction between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness, ultimately producing the state of backwardness frequently experienced in the modern history of Iran.

This study explores the Iranian situation where we are faced with a series of daunting questions in the interface between Islam, modernity and Persianism. The Iranian *dasein* is struck with the Kierkegardian question of “how can we become Christian (Muslim) in a Christendom (Muslim order)?” (the question of religious reformation; how can we feel content and fulfilled with being a Muslim in the sense of living in the discursive land of Islam despite all the dark sides of the social experiences associated with living in the Muslim order selling itself as the republic of virtue?)

We also encounter the question of “How can we become Persians in a Persian order?” (the question of reconstruction of communal bonding in how we can become at ease with our Persian identity despite all the dark sides associated with the historical experience of being a Persian?) We simultaneously face the question of “How can we become modern in a modern order (with all its dark sides)?”

This latter question refers to the question of how we can justify ourselves in adopting the modern identity, discursive and non-discursive practices, institutional arrangements, and life styles despite all the demonic experiences associated with modernity. In a sense, the overall question revolves around “how can we find redemption in our Islamic, Persian, and modern identities while each is under severe and sustained attacks from the alternative camps?” Here we are faced with debilitating arrays of internal and external conflicts in all sites of social interactions.

Each regimes of truth and its associated project and subprojects of reverse social transformation attempts to attain monopolistic position in production of truth about life, work, and language. As such, each regime of truth resorts to demonization of the other and glorification of the self. The process of idealization of one identity marker and demonization of the others is deeply unsettling and disconcerting for the Iranian *dasein* caring for all sides of the truth divide.

Here, the claim is that we are not faced only with the need for religious reformation but reformations in Persian identity and in modern identity as well alongside the
daunting task of achieving a dynamical harmony among them. This means that we cannot treat any of these three regimes of truth as a benchmark and ask the other two to adapt and adjust to its basic standards of truth, goodness and beauty; instead what is needed is a complex realignment of each and every one to the other in an evolutionary dance of chaotic synchronization. Iranians strive to synchronize the alternative rationalities offering liberation from despotisms of nature, man, and death. In this ‘context’, the Iranian *dasein* suffers from discursive homelessness, as there is no legitimate combined regime of truth available to satisfy all of her truth needs.

It should be noted that confusion in the mind and chaos in the situation mutually reproduce and reinforce each other. As such, this work is an attempt in cultural psychoanalysis of Iranian social order, as Shayegan (2012a) encourages us to conduct (see also Rashkin 2008 and Ross 1995 on the notion of cultural psychoanalysis). The cardinal sin of any form of psychoanalysis, including the cultural one, is committing counter-transference in projecting the analyst’s grid of intelligibility, and analyst’s relation of power and emotional economy on the social agents, their actions and emotions and their associated worlds of signification and their affiliated regimes of truth and accompanied dictionaries of denotations and connotations, and how they all unintentionally combine to produce tragic and traumatic episodes of the Iranian modern history.

This study, thus, has been set out to achieve a non-combative, compassionate, and loyal understanding of the radical others inhabiting the landscape of the Iranian selfhood, and how they come to combine to form different phases and events of the Iranian modern history. It is a voyage of self-discovery, paradoxically requiring faithful understanding of a set of radical others as one needs to know the radical other to be able to know oneself, especially in the state of belated inbetweenness.

### 1.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The main contribution of the model proposed by this study is to offer a new indepth, integrative and interdisciplinary understanding of the developments in Iranian political economic history. In doing this, however, this study avoids relying on out-of-shelf theories and devises its own theoretical framework to fit the social realities of Iranian modern history. Ashraf (2007), Katouzian (2010), and Rajaee (2007),
amongst others, call for the new theoretical understanding of the familiar events of the Iranian history. This study, thus, strives to ‘think outside the box’, ‘push thought to extreme’ (Althusser, as cited in Chakrabarty, 1992), ‘think the unthinkable’ and ‘de-familiarize the familiar’ by breaking away from the traditional approaches to the analysis of Iranian history.

It is expected that a potential objection may be raised to the broad nature of the research questions identified by this study and the proposed model; the rationales behind such a broad approach are detailed through the contributions made by this study as follows:

(i) **Inevitable Generalizations alongside Offering A Novel Conceptual Framework:**

In the current climate of war against terrorism and various divides between good and evil there are already so many unexamined generalizations floating around about Iran with possible devastating implications on the lives of the Iranian people, the Middle East and the whole world (see some of these generalizations, for example, in the following collections of essays on Iran, Gheissari, 2009; Atabaki, 2009, 2012; Katouzian and Shahidi, 2007; Jahanbegloo, 2004; Foran, 1994, among others). What this research aspires to do is to put these generalizations to the test of a very scrupulous and thorough analysis based on the reservoir of theoretical and historical resources.

Some of these generalizations, in random order, are as follow: Iranian people are ready for an irreversible move toward democracy and market economy and a big push from outside can act as a catalyst and remove the irrational obstacles; Iranian people are deeply religious and will never succumb to the outside pressure and will never lose their Islamic identity; the change in Iran is imminent and only a minority of powerful groups with deeply-entrenched vested interests are preventing the change; the powerful outside forces always prevented Iran from achieving socio-economic development; we are heading towards a gradual and evolutionary but irreversible transformation in the Iranian nation and all the encouraging signs are there and this process will bring its fruits if only the powerful outside forces could abstain from interfering in the internal evolution of Iranian social order; the geographical position of Iran in a region with explosive combination of God, gun
and oil is at the root of our problem; the root of our problems is the historical tyranny and despotism experienced by the Iranian people generations after generations and has been deeply enshrined in all aspects of Iranian lives; we are suffering from an understanding of Islam deeply out-dated and obsolete and the only way forward is to modernize the language and traditions of religious teachings and practices.

The main themes emerging in these discourses are as follow: the emphasis is placed on the detrimental and conspiratorial role of the powerful outsiders, which strives to send the message ‘leave us alone and we will develop’; we ourselves are to blame with our addiction to despotism and our lack of democracy and rule of law; our region and neighbourhood is at the root of our historical malaise; we are suffering from lack of religious reformation and as such the traditional religion is at the root of our problems.

In the novel framework of this study, a systematic study of Iranian modern history is attempted to form an examined judgement on the enigma of the Iranian experience of violence and underdevelopment; it is used to vigorously probe the validity, potency, and relevance of the aforementioned claims and counter claims. This will help to deepen and enrich the plane of understanding of the Iranian enigma inside and outside Iran and to form a set of more informed and consensual judgements on both sides of the Iranian border in order to achieve steady progress towards a stable and fulfilled society at ease with itself and at peace with others.

The understanding offered in this study, although deeply engaged with the pressing issues of the time, has adequate detachment to be able to analyse the issues involved by developing an interdisciplinary approach and by drawing on the interplay of texts and contexts in the framework of a historical perspective in order to find stable solutions for the perpetual violence of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran. It is hoped that this analysis will trigger a paradigm shift in the understanding of what causes Iranian socio-economic underdevelopment and Iran’s history of social violence.

The research question posed here is the mother of all questions and demands serious attention. It is said that in South Africa Apartheid was the only problem and mother of all problems; similarly in contemporary Iran the question of experience of socio-economic backwardness, despite having the experience of civilization-building in the
form of Persian Empire or the Islamic civilization, is deeply puzzling for all people and is at the root of all questions.

In a sense the point is that generalizations about the Iranian socio-economic experience are facts of life in all circles and walks of life whether academic or non-academic, everyone smuggles their unexamined assumptions about the nature of Iranian society and its macro-level trends and directions into analysis of any particular issue; let us put these inevitable and unavoidable generalizations under the microscopic gaze of a historically-informed interdisciplinary analysis and see how much of the current unexamined opinions will survive the test.

All social assemblages re-examine their foundations and embark on soul-searching and take a journey of self-discovery when they experience breakdowns (see Heidegger, 1962: 63-4 for his famous ‘hammer and door knob examples’ and how the invisible background becomes visible in the breakdown experience) and encounter crises as in the example of the recent financial crisis in the West where the axioms of the economic system are being questioned and re-examined. Iran has been suffering from such civilizational crisis for more than a century and it is a natural reaction to examine the foundations of Iranianness under the rubric of the questions emanating from the state of belatedness.

(ii) Comparative Study

My next reaction to the question of why we need to take the whole modern history of Iran with its three strong events as the subject-matter of the study is that we need to take stock of the literature on these three events and see whether we may gain novel insights into the inner workings of the Iranian society by conducting a comparative analysis of these strong events in the framework of a logic of intertextuality and intercontextuality. Using a philosophically-empirical and empirically-philosophical analysis of the history of the present in the spirit of Foucault and Deleuze may help us to free ourselves from addiction to reductionism endemic in the traditional analysis inside specific disciplines or academic traditions.

Pluralism in theory and in historical experiences may enable us to broaden our minds and discursive repertoire to allow us to construct a suitable conceptual framework through the process of cross-fertilization in order to address the pressing questions of our time. The cross-fertilization and criss-crossing prevalent at the level of ‘real’
needs to be mimicked at the level of ‘symbolic’, in a Deleuzian-inspired slogan of “conceptualize as you go” (see: Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).

The hyper-complexity of our ‘situation’ may put pressure on us to say farewell to the principle of simplicity and parsimony (the principles which served us well in the framework of traditional reductionist sciences but now even in the modern physics and biology are under question and there is a burgeoning demand for introducing complexity in the social analysis) and develop more hybrid forms of models encompassing “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) for understanding our increasingly complex social reality. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach allows us to avoid the hazards of grand theories as well as the pitfalls of reductionism resulting from scientism.

(iii) The Examination Of The Discourse Of Change

As Ajodani (2008) points out, for so many times in their history, Iranians said to themselves that this time it is different, and it was not. The promise of a sustainable change has been with us for so long but no radical change, no irreversible breaking of the barriers of socio-economic underdevelopment, seems to have happened. Iranians seems to have embraced, resisted, ridiculed, and subverted all forms of social orders and experimented with all types of blueprints for change, but were never settled into any of them, waiting for the blueprint-to-come. They migrated from one discursive land to another in an endless process of nomadic movements (yeelagh-gheshlagh). They welcomed and rejected the old and the new, the left and the right, the secular and the religious, the liberal and the authoritarian, the nationalist and the internationalist. Adoption of historical perspective may help us to shatter this unexamined axiom of change by putting together the missing parts of historical jigsaw and providing a cognitive mapping of Iranianness, followed by putting forward a whole set of prerequisites for a sustainable transformation to occur.

1.7. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The implications of the study are as follows:

(i) Refinement of the Conceptual and Theoretical Landscape

One of the possible important implications of the study may involve an invitation to set aside or downgrade a whole set of conceptual dichotomies frequently used for the analysis of the Iranian issues; concepts such as tyranny/freedom, despotism/liberty,
Mafia rules/accountability, rent-seeking/competitive markets, totalitarianism/liberalism, fascism/democracy, fundamentalism/toleration, populism/civil society, among others.

This research attempts to offer a new set of concepts such as tragedy of confusion, inbetweenness, belatedness, ambiguity, projects and subprojects of social engineering, tension, regimes of truth, logrolling, idealization of the self and demonization of the other, zombie categories and zombie institutions, dysfunctionalities and deformities, truth cycle, innocent brutality, final arbiter, among others. This is to practice what Deleuze preaches on the art of conceptualization or movement in thought mimicking the movement in real. Furthermore, the study endeavours to demonstrate the inadequacy of many of the current theories invoked in the analysis of the Iranian problems and to probe deficiencies endemic to their suggested policies and solutions.

(ii) National and Personal Reconciliation

The study purports to pave the ground for national reconciliation and emergence of a society of non-violence. Establishing a society of non-violence in the context of Iranian social order requires persuasion in order to stop the process of idealization of the self and demonization of the other. Through the proposed model, this study approaches the modern history of Iran not as the war of good against evil (which has meaning and functionality inside a homogenous order with a dominant regime of truth) or truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, or forces of progress versus forces of darkness, or forces of modernity versus forces of tradition but as a history of confusion and warring sets of partial truth permeating Iranian embeddedness (historical a priori) and Iranian historically-constructed consciousness.

This study may also seriously challenge the value of studies relying on the notion of ‘transition’ from tradition to modernity. The logical implication of this model may involve viewing almost all sides of the historical divisions in Iran on an equal footing, and avoiding value judgements about them, and finding them rational in their own terms and their own specific frame of reference and paying attention to how and why they resonate for the Iranian dasein. The study purports to offer a science of singularity, which combines generality with particularity. The proposed model attempts to pave the way for a social search for the theoretical reconciliation.
of Islam, Iran, and the Western modernity and aims to set aside the epistemic and linguistic violence as well as the physical one. The main step in the process of construction of an Iranian model of reconciliation is the reconciliation with the self and its contradictions, and the realization that we have a hyper-complex task in producing adequately-rich discursive homeland for our subjectivities to be able to reside in peace and in the spirit of cooperation and reciprocity. This may call for the beginning of the end of intermittent feelings of self-infatuation or self-hatred felt by the Iranians in different periods of their history.

This study hopes to provide a potent and powerful theoretical support for the attempts made by figures like Nategh-e Nuri and Jahanbeglo, among others, to achieve national reconciliation. It may provide philosophical and theoretical support for the late Ezzatollah Sahabi’s call for “removal of hatred” (keeneh-zodaei) from the Iranian social space (see his last interview before his death) as the condition of possibility of sustainable development and collective fulfilment.

(iii) Towards Colonization of High Theory and Constant Engagement with History

One of the implications of the model, in its spanning of the landscape of historical experiences and the landscape of theoretical frameworks, is to give us courage to embark on the colonization of the landscape of high theory. The sense of inferiority in the realm of theory construction and its application to the real issues (see Fanon, 1961; Mahbubani, 1998; Mignolo, 2011; Dabashi. 2013) is one of the serious obstacles to a sustainable socio-economic development; a society which does not have adequate confidence in itself to produce theories fitting its own historical situation is bound to imitate the theoretical movements and policies designed for different contexts of culture and situation, like following the Marxist theories and theories of post-colonialism and imperialism at one time and blindly adopting the neoliberal theories of privatization and liberalization at another.

The interdisciplinary approach adopted in this study represents an attempt in creating a sense of ownership in the landscape of high theory and demonstrate how imaginative adoption of these global theories can be tamed for localization to shed light on our own hyper-complex and singular situation; here we strive to reconcile globalization trends in theory with the urgent need for the localization of theory. We achieve globalization in terms of mastery of the language of high theory in philosophy, economics, or politics but reconstruct them to fit the local complexities.
of a social order with a unique history; in the process we achieve “convergent divergence” (Gourevitch, 2003: 325). This allows simultaneous engagement with abstract thoughts and concrete realities of our history of the present.

(iv) The Question Of Binaries

One of the implications of this study is the downgrading of the importance of the set of dichotomous concepts such as the binary of revolution/evolution, majority/minority, left/right, secular/religious, as Ayatollah Khomeini used to stress, but for different reasons. In addition, this study hopes to establish two points: the hyper-complexity of Iranian situation defies the application of any one theory in any one discipline and requires a combined approach and secondly, we need to colonize the high theories of philosophy, economics and politics to address ‘our’ own special problems.

I do not sustain any special allegiance to any theory, set of theories, or disciplines; I am fully committed to making the subject matter of the research intelligible rather than attempting to establish a specific disciplinary identity, allegiance, or professionalism. Colonization of the landscape of high theory gives us courage to begin to break the monopoly of the West in the production and application of high theory. The prominence in the production of high theory gives the West undisputed dominance in the realm of knowledge with devastating effects in the distribution of power and in the design of policies to achieve socio-economic development.

I further hope to disrupt the duality of inside/outside, self/other, and indigenous/alien and demonstrate that they are not rich enough to be able to shed light on our situation and mind-set. We will progress further in understanding and solving our problems by tapping into the trend of the new and burgeoning tradition of interdisciplinary approach matching the trend of globalization where alongside the gradual disappearance of national borders the disciplinary boundaries are progressively vanishing and new and exciting horizons are emerging to match in theory the hyper complexity of an increasingly globalized-localized reality (convergent divergence). This study, thus, aims to apply the Deleuzian commandment of creative thinking where thinking follows the movement of real and creates new concepts in its road journey of singularities, ‘haecceity’, ‘thisness’, and ‘indexicality’ of social assemblages (social phenomena, events, and orders).

(v) To Establish a Logic of Non-combative Mutual Understanding
One of the implications of the model proposed in this study is the attempt to establish a logic of compassionate mutual understanding rather than pursuing currently-detrimental logic of critique. It claims that in the state of inbetweenness what we need is mutual understanding entailing understanding the radical other. Deployment of critical approaches is a kind of counter-transference and involves the projection of set of pre-defined categories of thought on the action, emotion and intention of social actors and their unintended consequences. In the state of belated inbetweenness we lack common grounds and common set of standards of rationality and as such we need hermeneutics of understanding much more than hermeneutics of suspicion.

1.8. AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The study constitutes of a theoretical framework, a methodological analysis and three case studies aiming to test the explanatory power of the theoretical model devised to make sense of Iranian history of experience of underdevelopment. Chapter 2 offers the methodological debates relating to the nature of social phenomena and social enquiry and develops a methodological structure fit for the purpose of understanding the Iranian experience of underdevelopment. Chapter 3 develops the study model and the theoretical framework supporting it.

Chapter 4 applies the theoretical framework and its associated methodological insights to the experiences and events associated with the Constitutional Revolution, while Chapter 5 applies the model to the Oil-Nationalization Movement. Furthermore, Chapter 6 applies the model to the Islamic Revolution. It should be noted that all three large case study chapters are organized around four stages of the evolution of social order through tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order.

Chapter 7 concludes the study.
CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

The whole of science is nothing more than an extension of everyday thinking.
Albert Einstein (quoted in Jaccard and Jacoby, 2010: 6)

The word should be the wind itself; the word should be the rain itself (vazheh bayad khode bad vazheh bayad khod-e baran bashad). Sohrab Sepehri

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to produce the necessary insights and tools for the analysis of the empirical data covering the three strong events of modern history of Iran. This chapter delves into deep philosophical waters of ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations and presuppositions of empirical investigations in order to tailor the methodology of the research to the particular requirements of the empirical research. It strives to produce novel insights into the nature of social inquiry in general and international political economy, the experience of development, Iranian history, society, economy and polity in particular.

2.2. WHAT METHODOLOGY FITS THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA? - (TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF SINGULARITY)

The chief question in the study of development is why some countries develop and others do not. This profound question preoccupies minds and affects lives at academic and non-academic levels, policy circles, and everyday existence. To address the question, academic scholars, policy makers and ordinary people follow, subliminally or consciously, a mode of reasoning in order to construct a valid argument, which deploys a research method or a combination of research methods to explore the roots of historical episodes of developmental failures and successes.

1 The Iranian contemporary poet; see Daniel & Mahdi (2006: 86-7) on Sepehri.
In this section, hence, we aim to explore the characteristics, relevance, effectiveness, and scope of applicability of different research methods and methodologies available in the market for ideas and to evaluate their ontological and epistemological presuppositions and their ethical underpinnings and public policy implications. The ultimate aim of this section is to develop a novel approach to the study of social phenomena in general and socio-economic development in Iran in particular.

It should be noted that the issue of underdevelopment is the subject of everyday experience. People of developing countries feel the pains and bitterness associated with it in their everyday experiences in all spheres of life, in the states of their social policies, public services (health, education, public utilities), in their transportation system (in roads, railroads, and air travel), in their economy (unemployment, inflation, inequality and economic growth), in their chaotic politics, in their art and science, in their social relations, and generally in their status and prestige in the league of nations. The separate realms of experience in arts and sciences, polity, economy and family echo a general state of affairs in their countries, a malaise called ‘socio-economic underdevelopment or backwardness’.

This bitter experience of underdevelopment becomes part of individual and national psyche and trickles down into everyday discursive and non-discursive practices, conversations and small talks at micro level and public discourse at the macro level. Consequently, this feeling of backwardness breeds the emotions of discontent, disillusionment, frustration, and depression, and triggers a set of responses ranging from a theoretical search for answers to migration to the developed lands, and to social and political movements for change and their ensuing upheavals. Bodies curl themselves into question marks. Why? Why are we so backward?

The critical analysis in this study revolves around the questions and the answers related to the central problematic of ‘Why are we backward?’ with a range of reactions from voting with hands (direct attempts for change, either through democratic procedures like elections or via resort to direct actions, instigating social movements, revolutions, and the like) to voting with feet (physical migration, ideological migration through conversion to alternative philosophical and ideological camps and their manifestations in changing names, dress codes, etc.), all enshrined in a set of discursive and non-discursive responses to this profound question in the modern history of Iran.
It should be noted that the theorisation of such a bitter everyday experience of failure to achieve sustainable development at a collective level is the subject matter of this study; as Whitehead maintains: “[the] elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought” (cited in Griffin, 2008: 6). Thus, this study aims to peel the multiple layers of any form of experiences, including the experience of underdevelopment. Experience is the archaeological site of knowledge and the genealogical ground of power, all fused in the affectivity of subjectivity. This study, hence, attempts to specify a particular methodology that allows locating this complexity and determining how it can be used to understand the experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran.

In doing so, this study aims to establish the uniqueness and singularity of social phenomena and social orders alongside the prevalence of family resemblances between them by supplying a methodology of understanding the radical other and applying it to the experience of underdevelopment in Iran in order to demonstrate that it can reveal much of the hyper-complexity of human life in its singularity and uniqueness. This research, thus, demonstrates that in order to understand social phenomena we need to ground our analysis in the three principles of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability.

Within the identified research aims of this study, this chapter attempts to address the following questions indicating the methodological foundations of this study: ‘How do we think about the social issues such as socio-economic underdevelopment?’, or ‘How do we conduct social inquiry and social reasoning at academic and non-academic levels?’; ‘What logics do we follow when we begin to problematize issues and when we strive to formulate an analysis of the problematized issues?”; ‘How problems are disclosed as problems?; ‘What makes us see a state of being as problematic?’; ‘What is thought?’; ‘What is reasoning and making judgement and making decisions?’.

These are immensely important set of questions as they direct us towards the condition of possibility of our mode of thinking and analysis, centring on the question of ‘Why do we think and reason the way we do?’

We do not start from research questions but from the issue of condition of possibility of problematization or the grid of intelligibility un-concealing things as problems, in the sense that we try to understand the understanding and question the questioning,
on how things introduce themselves and are counted as ‘something or another’ and are ‘disclosed’ as problems and how the research questions are produced. This level of analysis, thus, questions the act of questioning. This demonstrates that the chief question in the study of development is not self-evident and obvious, but it is rooted in a specific and contingent grid of intelligibility, which makes us identify something as problem and ignore others.

‘How can we question our questions and our method and style of questioning?’

Embarking on the analysis of Althusser’s conception of the alleged reversal of Hegel by Marx, Lechte (1994: 41) reminds us that,

a problematic marks out a horizon of thought: it is the ‘form in which problems must be posed’; it limits the language and concepts which are available for thought at a particular historical conjuncture; finally, the problematic constitutes the ‘absolute and definite condition of possibility’ of a ‘definite theoretical structure’.

We draw upon a wide variety of intellectual resources in order “to break with forms of knowledge which, to be validated, relied on the ‘obviousness’ of immediate experience” (Lechte, 1994: 41). In this sense we do not take the question of ‘Why are we backward?’ as self-evident and obvious, rather, we question the condition of possibility of such a question arising in the first place.

The implications of searching for the condition of possibility of problematization manifest themselves in our attempt to understand how we formulate the research questions and how we operationalize and measure them. We could problematize a state of being across incommensurable set of measures, for instance: according to spiritual or moral status of a nation or its state of happiness; or the number of good deeds, good talks and good thoughts produced in a an average day; the number of smiles directed towards complete strangers; the number of minutes walked in the wilderness, the number of times God’s name was praised in grace; the number of times hearts filled with excitement and exuberance of discovery or love; the number of stable friendship per person; the amount of joy and delight (utility) gained out of shopping and consumption; the number of times radical experience of fullness have occurred for a person in a life time; the amount of time spent in the state of calmness and contemplation in a day; the level of wisdom accumulated in a life time and the mechanism of transferring them to the next generation; the quality of
intergenerational relations in a nation (just to name a few); and devise a set of research questions and indicators to measure them.

In a sense, all these measures – however plausible or implausible they might seem, depending on our addicted grid of intelligibility- are related to at least three realms of instrumental rationality, communicative rationality and emancipative rationality and how they are prioritized and how a specific grid of intelligibility problematizes issues and self-organizes forms of life. The transcendental level of analysis (at the level of condition of possibility) addresses the multiplicity of modes of thoughts and ways of approaching subject matters of social enquiry and explores how social issues are problematized, presented as a problem, demanding our attention and articulation. It also deals with how theories and explanations are constructed or fashioned, and how the processes and procedures of persuasion, acceptance, rejection, resistance or refinement are formed.

The methodological research in this chapter also addresses questions like the following: ‘Is social inquiry rule-governed or arbitrary?’ and ‘How do we need to select or combine different logics of inquiry to best fit the nature of our subject matter?’

The time of breakdown and crisis, the bitter time of underdevelopment, prompts the disclosure of the holistic nature of thought, human existence, and social phenomena. This is what Derrida (1983: 19) alludes to as the time of reflection and meta-reflection:

The time for reflection is also the chance for turning back on the very conditions of reflection, in all the senses of that word, as if with the help of a new optical device one could finally see sight, could not only view the natural landscape, the city, the bridge and the abyss, but could view viewing. As if through an acoustical device one could hear hearing, in other words, seize the inaudible in a sort of poetic telephony. Then the time of reflection is also another time, it is heterogeneous with what it reflects and perhaps gives time for what calls for and is called thought.

Rorty (1979: xiii) puts it in a more succinct phrase:

a ‘philosophical problem’ was a product of the unconscious adoption of a set of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem was stated - assumptions which were to be questioned before the problem itself was taken seriously.
We have to ask why we ask about socio-economic underdevelopment; what are the conditions of possibility of its turning into a devastating and life-changing problem? This is a call for the problematization of the problem. Deleuze, as reported by Colebrook (2009: 9), guides us in the same direction when he states:

[O]ne ought not to accept any already given and actualised form but should ask how such a form emerged, what that emergence can tell us about the life from which any actuality has taken shape, and how such a life – beyond its already created possibilities – might yield other potentials. History, then, should not take the terms already given, such as man, subjectivity, the polis, the speaking subject or the family, as its point of departure. Rather, history needs to account for the genesis of the subject.

Taking the transcendental inquiry to its logical conclusion, as Surin (2010: 161) reports, we arrive at Deleuze’s plane of immanence:

Deleuze is emphatic that abstractions explain nothing, but rather are themselves in need of explanation. So the new philosophy that will experiment with the real, will eschew such abstractions as universals, unities, subjects, objects, multiples, and put in their place the processes that culminate in the production of the abstractions in question. So in place of universals we have processes of universalisation; in place of subjects and objects we have subjectification and objectification; in place of unities we have unification; in place of the multiple we have multiplication; and so on. These processes take place on the plane of immanence, since experimentation can only take place immanently.

The question of why we think and behave the way we do takes us far back to the plane of immanence. In a sense, as Zizek (2011) puts it “the way we perceive the problem can be itself part of the problem. … There are not only wrong answers there are also wrong questions”. Chakrabarty (2000: 93) gives us the sense of enormity of the task of questioning our addicted modern scheme of conceptualization in the study of experience of different countries like India:

It is not enough to historicize “history,” the discipline, for that only uncritically keeps in place the very understanding of time that enables us to historicize in the first place. The point is to ask how this seemingly imperious, all-pervasive code might be deployed or thought about so that we have at least a glimpse of its own finitude, a glimpse of what might constitute an outside to it. To hold history, the discipline, and other forms of memory together so that they can
help in the interrogation of each other, to work out the ways these immiscible forms of recalling the past are juxtaposed in our negotiations of modern institutions, to question the narrative strategies in academic history that allow its secular temporality the appearance of successfully assimilating to itself memories that are, strictly speaking, unassimilable—these are the tasks that subaltern histories are suited to accomplish in a country such as India.

Here we see that the unassimilable other is the key for seeing our seeing. It seems that the only possible platform or standpoint available for imagining otherwise is the one from the radical other whether a contemporary or a historical one (over time or across space). In the case of Iran, we frequently encounter the questioning of the questions as the product of political economy of truth in the state of in-betweenness where each Iranian is a collection of radical others. The radical other is the way to see the seeing, as Griffin (2008: 104) maintains:

“reality is indescribably, probably infinitely, complex, whether one is discussing reality as a whole or any particular thing, such as the human body or even a single living cell. But our minds, our cognitive processes, are thoroughly finite and fallible, prone to invincible ignorance, sinful distortions, and simple mistakes of numerous sorts. Part of our finitude and fallibility is that we necessarily perceive and think about the world in terms of the perspective or framework that we inherit from a particular tradition. As Paul Knitter says, this conclusion leads to what David Lochhead calls the “dialogical imperative,” because it is through dialogue with members of other religious traditions that “we can expand or correct the truth that we have,” thereby overcoming the “limitations of our own viewpoint.” Through such dialogue we can partly overcome the mismatch between the infinite complexity of reality and our limited perspectives”.

The Iranian state of in-betweenness provides the inevitable encounter with the radical other (due to the processes taking place on the plane of immanence), constitutive of the self in the urgent situation of the state of belatedness (being late to the process of development).

2.3 TWO WAYS OF ANALYZING SOCIAL PHENOMENA

The basic questions we face in any methodological argument about social phenomena are as follows: What are social phenomena and how can we analyse them? Are they objects or texts or a combination of the two and in each case how can we know them?
Considering that our ontology defines our methodology, this study strives to establish that social phenomena, like the bitter experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran, are both objects and texts, and as such are embedded, emergent, and incommensurable assemblages composed of forms and contents. Their forms are universal and composed of the three orders of symbolic, imaginary, and real with their affirmative and negating dimensions, and their contents are particular and manifested in various instantiations of regimes of truth. Both their forms and contents, as objects and things of this world, are subject to the forces of the principle of embeddedness and emergence, and as such their formation and transformation should be studied using the tools and resources of hermeneutics of suspicion including process ontology, complexity science and reductionism. Due to the emergence of meaning (whose features we investigate in the following sections of this chapter) in the chain of being, the contents of social phenomena cannot be accessed from an external point of view (the principle of incommensurability) and can only be accessed from inside a particular regime of truth using the resources and tools of hermeneutics of understanding including the psychoanalytic method of free association. In this study, the final hybrid methodology selectively incorporates the elements of Foucauldian approach consisting of archaeology of knowledge, genealogy of power and problematization of subjectivity, possessing elements of both hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of understanding. The combination of universal form and particular content defines the shared singularity of each social phenomenon. The particular hybrid of hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, therefore, defines our science of singularity and forms the core of our methodology of social analysis. The following sections of this chapter strive to develop these themes step by step.

At the most general level, there are two ways of analysing human phenomena: explanation (causal: search for causes) and understanding (teleological: search for inner meanings and narratives; explication) or formalism and hermeneutics as Foucault puts it (see Flynn, 2005) or hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of understanding as Ricoeur formulates them (see Leiter, 2004; Davis, 2010). There are fundamental ontological differences between these two approaches. In the process of explaining social phenomena (actions, speeches, emotions, experiences, activities, events, individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, communities, nations, and international order) they are treated as objects, subject to the forces of causation and
complexity systems. In contrast, in the process of understanding (hermeneutics) them, they are treated as texts pregnant with meanings, requiring interpretation. As Von Wright (1992: viii) puts it

The ‘causalist’ and the ‘actionist’, … knit differently the conceptual web against whose background they see the world—and they therefore see the world differently. When set in a historical perspective their world views become linked with the two traditions of thought.

Explanation, in its most common form, is represented by positivism, characterized by “emphasis on the unity of scientific method, on mathematical exactitude as an ideal of perfection, and on the subjection of phenomena to general laws” (Von Wright, 1992: xi).

Explanation is predominantly organized based on a reductionist approach. The reductionist approach is either based on providing law-like explanations or explanations based on complexity science. It is worth noting that ‘complexity theory’ can be used reductively or non-reductively (see Sawyer, 2005; see also Connolly 2011 and the notion of global resonance machine).

This study, hence, attempts to demonstrate that both reductionist and complexity approaches, if they are adopted as the main and dominant modes of analysis, have fundamental flaws essentially, because the human phenomena emerge as meaningful entities, embedded in forces and fields, forces of symbolic orders and fields of signification. To understand the problematic of underdevelopment in the symbolic order of particular history of a nation we have to position our analysis in a method of articulation employing hermeneutics of understanding in combination with hermeneutics of suspicion.

In responding to current shortcomings and inadequacies in the realm of social inquiry, a coherent framework is to be developed in this chapter based on the works of Heidegger, Foucault, Taylor, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Isiah Berlin’s history of ideas, complexity science and Williamson’s transaction cost economics in order to incorporate explanation into explication, leading to the construction of a combined and hybrid approach to social phenomena. This research, drawing upon such contributions, demonstrates that the emergence of meaning drastically changes the dynamics of formation and transformation of social phenomena and subsumes their
complexity and reductionist properties under the holistic phenomenon of world of signification or regimes of truth.

We start with Heidegger’s existential phenomenology (Dreyfus’s version of Heideggerian phenomenology), which establishes the nature of *dasein* (human existence) as being-in-the-world. To characterize *dasein* as a compound being we deploy Lacan’s triad (imaginary and symbolic orders intertwined with the order of real) and characterize them using Foucault’s positivity (historical a priori or positive unconscious) based on three axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity, complemented by Deleuz’s process ontology and Lacanian-Zizekian negativity (foreclosure, repression, and disavowal alongside negating dimensions of imaginary order and order of real). We will elaborate on the fact that each social phenomenon is a social assemblage (whether experience, event, or social entities such as individuals, organizations, institutions, nations, or community of nations). Through such processes, this study establishes that social assemblages possess shared forms and unique contents, as social assemblages are embedded, emergent, and incommensurable phenomena and their form can be characterized by the Lacanian three orders and their negating and affirmative dimensions.

This study, furthermore, utilises, Foucault, Deleuze, and Corbin and Castoriadis, amongst others, to characterize the negating and affirmative dimensions of social assemblages. After characterizing the common form of social assemblages, this study embarks on gaining access to their unique content through tailoring the psychoanalytic method of free association to the features of social assemblages.

In summary and in reflection, at the most basic level, we need to know why things are the way they are; in our case why socio-economic development and wealth of nations have been achieved for some and not for others (the enigma of the origin of the wealth of nations). We are faced with the long history of this research question ranging from Smith, to Landes (1998, 2003), Olson (1982), and modern development economics (see Besley and Persson, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, among others) and development studies. To address this question we need to combine hermeneutics of understanding, where we treat social phenomena as texts and pay detailed attention to the accounts of the historical actors, with hermeneutics of suspicion, where we treat social phenomena as objects and unravel their
unintended consequences. We need to combine “thick” and “thin” descriptions to fully map a social phenomenon.

It should be noted that the nature of this research is a problem-oriented inquiry (see Glynos and Howarth, 2007) into the enigma of underdevelopment in Iran. Almost all problem-oriented researches follow social crises or dilemmas. Problem-oriented research is prompted when a nation or an individual is stuck with the sense that something fundamentally has gone wrong with its/her way of life and is forced to ask difficult questions on its/her identity and roots of its/her problems, prompting the emergence of a set of basic wh-questions on why, how, what, when and where of the lived experiences of being-in-the-world.

We identified three research programs of reductionism, complexity science, and hermeneutics as alternative methods of analysis of social phenomena and declared that this study is a way to combine them in order to reveal the uniqueness of social phenomena, drawing on the resources offered by three principles of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability. Ultimately, this study aims to show how, the particular and the universal, the causal link and the complexity connection and the relation of meaning are enshrined in each instant of singularity of social phenomena, where the hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion are deployed to reveal its multi-layered form and content of dynamic being/becoming. The detailed investigation of the two broad philosophical approaches underpinning the ontological and methodological arguments on the nature of social phenomena was not included in this work due to word limitations.

2.4 CHARACTERIZATION OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

The preceding discussions in this chapter initiated the methodological analysis with problematization of the issue of underdevelopment in Iran and asked about the most appropriate analytical approach for exploring and illuminating the issue of underdevelopment in Iran and for investigating the reason why such a question is asked in the first place. The question was positioned in the binary space of ‘understanding’ versus ‘explanation’ (dasein versus cogito). Following this line of argument, This chapter explores the notion of ‘dasein’ describing our compound existence as a being-in-the-world (worldhood), and the concept of ‘cogito’ reducing
the art of understanding social phenomena into a subject-object relation. The following sections of this methodological chapter develop the ‘dasein/cogito’ binary opposition more extensively in order to come up with an effective methodology of social analysis.

In the following sections, this chapter introduces and develops three notions of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability in order to explore the generic features of ‘dasein’ and being-in-the-world with the objective of producing an analytic of ‘dasein’. These three principles establish the singularity of social phenomena in their embeddedness in diverse regimes of truth and in their features as emergent events pregnant with meaning, which makes them incommensurable to each other and, as a result, unsuitable candidates for the application of the reductionist method of ‘compare and contrast’. Each social phenomenon—whether crime, unemployment, migration, violence, or socio-economic development—emerges in a ‘world’ with specific characteristics (like specific plants growing in specific types of soil in regions with specific climates).

In this, the notion of embeddedness is meant to capture this feature of social phenomena, i.e. their being rooted in the specificity of spatiotemporal worldhoods. The notion of emergence is deemed to take into account the nature of social phenomena as unintended consequences of interaction of multiplicity of historical forces immanent to the specificity of the spatiotemporal worlds and beings-in-the-world.

The notion of emergence furthermore grasps the dynamics of change in these forms of spatiotemporal embeddedness. Emergent social phenomenon gets sedimented to the riverbed of embeddedness and changes its nature in an unintended and irreversible fashion. Embeddedness hints to the fact that each phenomenon emerges in the middle and no mortal thing acts as origin of things. Everything starts from the middle and everything is rooted in something else and originates from and is located

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2 As Bass (2006; 39) suggests “Subject and object are metaphysical illusions synonymous with the privilege of consciousness”. Bass (2006; 78) maintains that dasein “is not a subject which is then brought into relation with objects but only exists as being-with”. Dasein is always outside itself while cogito is self-contained and sovereign. The “motherbaby matrix” (Bass, 2006: 112) or agent-environment interaction in situated robotics (Sawyer, 2005: 50) are powerful images of the networked and assembled nature of dasein.

3 The principle of incommensurability (Isaiah Berlin; 1990; Bhabha (1990b: 209); Chang 1997 and Crowder 2002) describes a default position in which singularities cannot be compared and contrasted according to a set of common or universal measures.
in a larger whole; the notion of embeddedness captures the holistic characteristics of this state of ‘being-always-already-in-the-middle’ and this larger whole in which and from which every phenomenon arises.

On the other hand, the notion of emergence alludes to how embedded forces give rise to new phenomena and how these new phenomena in turn produce the dynamics of change in this embeddedness and in this larger whole. In a sense, embeddedness gives rise to emergence and emergence changes embeddedness. The notion of embeddedness discerns the ‘thisness’ (haecceity) (see Bates 2010), the belonging and the rootedness of social phenomena while emergence points to the nature of social phenomena as ‘events’. The movement of embedded forces produce emergent events and the latter, in turn, add new layers to the configuration and constellation of embedded forces. This interplay of embeddedness and emergence produces social orders, which are singular and incommensurable and cannot be understood through approaches employing universalist and essentialist notions, methods and tool kits.

The three features of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability, hence, turn social phenomena into social assemblages. Social phenomena (from experiences to events, and social entities such as individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and nations) as things of this world are emergent, meaningful and embedded compounds, which are unintended consequences of interaction of forces.

The task of a productive methodology, then, turns into constructing multitude of bridges between the incommensurable plates of singularities out of the materials available in our being-in-the-world. Here the constitutive image of singularities is a set of partitioned islands in need of elaborate bridges to overcome the initial situation of separation and disconnectedness. This analogy is, however, not entirely fruitful, as singularities, as opposed to islands, come into contact with each other, intermingle, trade with or invade each other, cooperate or clash with each other, form symbiotic

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4 Empedocles (cited in Tom Holland (2005: xxx)) alludes to this fact in the following terms:
Listen now to a further point: no mortal thing
Has a beginning, nor does it end in death and obliteration;
There is only a mixing and then a separating of what was mixed,
But by mortal men these processes are named ‘beginnings’.

5 The notion of “thisness” implies that we do not encounter social phenomena in general categories of “violence”, “development”, “poverty”, “love” or “inflation”. What we are faced with are “violences”, “developments”, “poverties”, “loves” or “inflations”; in this sense what we have is “this violence”, “this development”, “this poverty”, “this love” or “this inflation” emerging in “this” local regime of power-knowledge-subjectivity and out of “this” local spatiotemporal trajectory of events. This is highly significant point in our methodological expedition; we will explore the notion of indexicality (rather than universality) at the heart of social concepts a great deal more later on in this chapter.
relation with or hostile antagonism against each other; but despite all of these various forms of encounters and exchanges, they remain isolated and separated in the walls of their own symbolic orders. In a sense, they are ‘gated communities and ghettos’ (see, for example, the notion of ‘parochial mental ghettos’ in Zerubavel (2006: 38-9).

The default position for each social assemblage is what Sartre (1989: 45) famously stated in the form of ‘hell is other people’. As Burt (2004: 351) suggests “The defining features of the social structure are clusters of dense connection linked by occasional bridge relations between clusters”. In this study, thus, the art of overcoming incommensurabilities through understanding of the radical other in her own terms alongside exploring how social assemblages in their interactions give rise to emergent ‘events’ is called- following Highmore (2006) and Karpik (2010) – ‘the science of singularities’.

2.5 THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

This section embarks on a voyage of discovery to explore “what Keith Ansell-Pearson aptly calls an ‘ethology of assemblages’”(Mark Hansen; 2000: paragraph 6) or an ethology of beings-in-the-world6 (Martin Heidegger,1962) which means the study of assemblages in their natural environments (in the context of everyday life).

To study social assemblages, we require three notions of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability.

The concept of embeddedness has emerged to account for the notion that social phenomena are assemblages and compounds which are always already located in a bigger order. This is inspired by the works of Deleuze and Guattari, where they “prefer to consider things not as substances but as assemblages or multiplicities, focusing on things in terms of unfolding forces - bodies and their powers to affect and be affected- rather than static essence” (Tamsin Lorraine; 2010: 147; added emphasis).

The concept of emergence is embedded in an attempt to capture the notion that social phenomena are not the product of intelligent design and voluntary construction (Cartesian notion of construction as Hayek [1967: 85, 92-4] formulated it) rather unintended consequences of a series of complex interactions, and evolutionary and

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6 Or the ethology of worldhoods in the language of subaltern literature.
rhizomatic processes. Here, the argument of this study departs from the common notion of causation. Spinks (2010: 183) notes:

As Nietzsche argues we do not need to relate actions back to a subject or ‘doer’, nor do we need to see events as effects or as having a pre-existing cause. These ideas provided Deleuze with a way of developing a philosophy of immanence and an understanding of being as univocity.

At this stage, the notion of immanence (or emergence or spontaneity) replaces the common notion of causality (we will develop this point more extensively later in this study).

The principle of emergence (having family resemblance to the notion of immanence in Deleuze’s vocabulary) has a Nietzschean spirit to it where: “For Nietzsche, phenomena, organisms, societies and States are nothing other than the expression of particular configurations of forces” (Spinks, 2010: 184). Alan Bass (2006; xii) alludes to the same notion where he states that:

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1983) Deleuze emphasizes Nietzsche’s much misunderstood notion of will to power. He makes it clear that will to power is not about any individual’s attempt to exert domination over another. Rather, it is a way of understanding *all* phenomena in terms of conflicts between nonconscious differentials of force.

In reflecting on all these conceptual issues, the concept of event (and phenomena being the expression of a particular configuration of non-conscious forces) is one of the main methodological insights we deploy in understanding the socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran. We distance ourselves from the common conceptions of causation, reason and agency in their widespread circulation and instead describe the negative and affirmative dimensions of continuum of consciousness/unconsciousness in line with Nietzsche’s active and reactive forces and will come up with two types of agencies, type 1 and type 2.

In type 1 agency, the individual or doer is the agent of a force or a configuration of forces in the sense that forces act through him/her, while in type 2 agency the individual (or any other forms of social assemblage) cultivates and achieves agency by turning herself into a force. In this framework, embeddedness and emergence
create a plane of immanence where causes and reasons operate. The notion of rhizome is at the heart of emergence. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987; 21) put it:

In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial—that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of ‘becomings’.

The notion of incommensurability alludes to the point that social orders are worlds of significations and cannot be ordered and ranked in terms of common and universal set of scales and measures (Berlin, 1990). As Bhabha (1990b: 209, original italic) reminds us:

The difference of cultures cannot be something that can be accommodated within a universalist framework. Different cultures, the difference between cultural practices, the difference in the construction of cultures within different groups, very often set up among and between themselves an incommensurability. However rational you are, or 'rationalist' you are (because rationalism is an ideology, not just a way of being sensible), it is actually very difficult, even impossible and counterproductive, to try and fit together different forms of culture and to pretend that they can easily coexist. The assumption that at some level all forms of cultural diversity may be understood on the basis of a particular universal concept, whether it be 'human being', 'class' or 'race', can be both very dangerous and very limiting in trying to understand the ways in which cultural practices construct their own systems of meaning and social organisation”.

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7 This is a philosophical understanding which has family resemblances with the Hayek’s notion of “unintended consequences”, and “spontaneous order”, Smith’s notion of “invisible hand”, Dawkin’s notion of “blind watch maker”, or the notion of self-organization in complexity sciences. The philosophical foundation of emergence is Deleuze’s rhizomatics; what we have is a dynamic process of emergence and embeddedness (sedimentation) which can, at times, generate dysfunctionalities and dissonances enshrined and captured in the art form of tragedy (and hence the notion of tragedy as one of the main concepts in this study) and inherent randomness of life (Bernard Williams; 1983; on the role of randomness), which becomes extremely pertinent to our understanding of the enigma of underdevelopment in Iran.

8 As Mark Ridley (2010) said, in a simplified and non-philosophical version, this point refers to “when ideas have sex”; when ways of being have sex through unconscious imitation and learning; through the power to affect and be affected.
Incommensurability is the outcome of the other two principles, which produce multitude of topologies and ecologies of neighbouring assemblages, differing in their worlds of signification and in their regimes of truth.

These three principles are deemed to establish the uniqueness and singularity of each and every social assemblage which is rooted in difference-in-itself as the default ontological principle, while the related Wittgensteinian (1953/2009: 67-77) notion of ‘family resemblance’ explores the connectivity and distinctiveness of every instantiation of creation through repetition; what stays the same and repeats itself in every instant of creation is novelty and difference (the Deleuzian conception of the famous Nietzschean notion of ‘the return of the same’). In this framework, methodology becomes all about how to overcome the default position of incommensurability through the principle of free association (the logic of rhizomatics) and thick descriptions to take a voyage of discovery in the wonderland of the other. This is ultimately a journey into the bizarre realm of everyday life and how it is the site of the interface between order and disorder (chaos). This is as strange as our voyage of exploration into the realms of very large (the universe) and very small (the atoms).

2.6 METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND FLOW IN THIS STUDY

Based on the preceding discussion so far, briefly the methodological structure of the argument that constitutes the framework for this study proceeds as follows (see Diagram 1 in Appendix 1):

(i) The subject matter of the study is the bitter historical experience of underdevelopment in Iran with all its ramifications. The question is ‘How can we analyse it?’.

(ii) The two large philosophical candidates (modes of thinking) for the analysis of social phenomena are Heidegger’s existential phenomenology (explicated in Dreyfus (1991)) as opposed to Descartes’ subject-object relation (‘dasein’ versus cogito or understanding versus explanation).

9 We will elaborate on these notions more extensively later on in this chapter.
10 Thick description is a term coined by the renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, Chapter 1). Here I take it to mean deploying the principles of embeddedness and emergence to map out the singularity and uniqueness of each and every social order through extensive and detailed descriptions of its history and biography, and showing how individual is the name of the collective; and demonstrating that what is central to the understanding of social phenomena is not the binary opposition between centre and margin, or individual and society (as in methodological individualism), rather, order versus disorder and ultimately between finitude and infinitude (analytic of finitude).
(iii) These two philosophical positions are rooted in two contrasting philosophical traditions going back to Aristotle's metaphysics of substance (as Nietzsche would put it) serving as the genealogy of the Cartesian cogito and Heraclitus' philosophy of process-relation as the ancestry of Heidegger’s ‘dasein’. There are also important connections with Islamic philosophy and Eastern philosophy.

(iv) This study suggests that each social phenomenon (as manifestations of dasein) be studied based on three notions of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability.

(v) Embeddedness is formulated based on Heidegger's being-in-the-world and the notion of emergence is mapped drawing upon the intellectual resources from Deleuzian process and differential philosophy, the invisible-hand tradition in classical political economy, Mises and Hayek and New-Austrians, and complexity sciences. The notion of incommensurability will be developed mainly by drawing from Isaiah Berlin (1990) and the associated literature.

(vi) Ultimately we see social phenomena as assemblages, and social assemblages are characterized by Lacan’s three registers of symbolic, imaginary and real. The symbolic is characterized in its affirmative facets (positive unconscious in Foucault's term) by resorting to Foucault’s three axes of genealogy of power, archaeology of knowledge and problematization of subjectivity (Flynn, 2005). Lacan’s and Zizek’s notions of repression, foreclosure, and disavowal are utilized to characterize the negative (lack or negative unconscious) dimension of the symbolic order. Alongside these two characterizations, the place of two orders of imaginary and real with their own affirmative and negating facets will be extensively investigated. The interaction between the orders of symbolic (and its associated imaginary) and real is conceptualized based on the interplay of finitude and infinitude.

(vii) After fully developing the Heideggerian existential framework as embeddedness, the insights from the Deleuzian process philosophy, invisible-hand tradition (especially the burgeoning tradition of complexity sciences; see Harrison, 2006) related to emergence (co-evolution as one of the central concepts in the emergence of emergence) is integrated into this framework and are added to the insights from the Cartesian reductionist tradition. This hybrid framework
gives rise to the methodology of critical hermeneutics based on the method of ‘free association’ (drawing on the two notions of metaphor and metonymy) in psychoanalysis.

(viii) This framework and methodology should be filled with thick descriptions originating from the logic of free association which tracks down the historical and imaginal links, connections and trajectories made through social formation and transformation of social assemblages at all levels. This process endows each social assemblage with a regime of truth.

(ix) The promises offered by this hybrid and multidisciplinary methodology will be investigated through its application to a few examples; its effectiveness and productivity in understanding the hyper-complexity and singularity of the experience of underdevelopment in Iran will be demonstrated through the application of the notion of regime of truth.

(x) This study begins with the binary opposition of ‘dasein-cogito’ (which in its rigidity possesses an imaginary nature) and then moves to a set of trinities (which has a symbolic nature in its multitudes of divisions and segmentarities and their fuzziness) and end up with a hybrid methodology (which follows the rhizomatic and arborescent logic of movement and creation). As such it strives to mimic the structure of all assemblages and is an assemblage itself.

2.7 THE STRUCTURE?¹¹ OF SOCIAL ASSEMBLAGE: ARTICULATING THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This section of the analysis constitutes mapping out the internal structure of the assemblage, as part of the methodology of this research, and its being-in-the-world through deploying philosophies and theories which can pave the way for developing a deeper understanding of the hyper-complexity of social reality and human existence in its being (structuration or territorialisation) and becoming (de-structuration or de-territorialisation). In a sense, it is an attempt to understand ‘what

¹¹ Placing question mark on and in some words like structure is part of the Deleuzian tradition where it attempts to highlight the paradoxes associated with using words such as structure in indicating a kind of fixity and constancy where the whole analysis is trying to show movement and change. This technique, alongside the Derridian technique of erasure, is meant to demonstrate the inevitability of the use of these terms alongside the need for transgressing them. The use of compound concepts by Heidegger alongside Derrida’s erasure and Deleuze’s question mark are ploys deployed to break the grip of highly addictive universalist and essentialist way of thinking; they are attempts to break our intuitive habits of thinking and driving us to think counter-intuitively.
being a human means’ and ‘what being a thing means’ (Dreyfus, 2001, 2011) in relation to this research; in other words it is a commentary on human condition. We aim to understand the generic properties of social assemblages (Connolly, 2008b) irrespective of their sizes and scales (micro=experience, event, individual, meso=organization, group, macro=communities, nations or empires) or their contents. The ultimate target of the analysis in this research is the perpetual question of highest significance in everyday life and in academia: ‘How can we understand social phenomena (including our specific research question: ‘Why are we backward’; ‘the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran’)’.

In preceding analysis so far, we maintained that every social phenomenon, whether crime or development, individual or community, war or love is an embedded event, in the sense that social phenomena, human existence, and experiences are always processes which are already part of larger orders (worldhood) immanently evolved within alternative histories. This philosophical understanding has been reinforced by “the recent consensus in cognitive science (including AI) that behaviour can only be understood when viewed systemically, i.e., as a component in a larger system or assemblage” (Mark Hansen; 2000: paragraph 6).

We may ask: What does embeddedness precisely mean and what are its main components? The notion of embeddedness lays the ground for exploring the pre-ontological and pre-individual forces constituting ‘the world’ we were born in, which constitutes the condition of possibility and historical a priori of human experiences in all their forms (seeing, believing, and behaving). ‘Belonging’ and ‘rootedness’ acts as the condition of possibility for any manifestations of being and becoming (see Guignon, 1993). Our mapping of the notion of embeddedness (= being-in the-world= social assemblage) will proceed as follows: we will demonstrate that beings-in-the-world or social assemblages are composed of three registers of ‘symbolic’ (or positive unconscious, the term used by Foucault [1989; xi]), ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’. Each one of these registers possesses negating and affirmative dimensions. The affirmative dimension of the order of symbolic consists of knowledge, power and subjectivity (Flynn, 2005); a trinity which is one in three and three in one; you start with any one and almost always end up with the other two.

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12 The positive and affirmative facet of symbolic order was mapped by Foucault on three axes of knowledge, power and subjectivity based on three modes of thought called archaeology, genealogy and problematization (Flynn; 2005). Each is embedded in the other and embedding the other in a dynamics of multiplicity and unity reminiscent of Christian trinity. Foucault demonstrates that from
Knowledge, in turn, is composed of statements, discourses, discursive formations, archives and episteme, all organized inside narratives and dialogues with small and big others. On the other hand, power consists of actions, practices, observations, examinations, mechanisms of reward and punishment, and techniques of inclusion/exclusion, all organized around tactics and strategies. Subjectivity is the embodied instantiation of relations of power and knowledge and is formed through the techniques of subjectification including scaffolding, memorization, narrativization (a process where we turn traumas and triumphs into narratives retroactively), and moral economy of self-control through creation of an emotional economy of motivations and emotions (anger, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, shame, guilt, and surprise). The negating dimension of ‘symbolic’ includes repression, foreclosure and disavowal. The negating dimension of ‘imaginary’ consists of ideology, fantasy, and consciousness (Nietzsche’s conception of consciousness as a reactionary force and Zizek’s notion of interpassivity [2007; xxxi]), culminating in demonization of the other and glorification of the self, elevating ‘our way of life’ into sacredness, narcissism and sovereignty, seeing the other as lack and as ensemble of negations).

The affirmative dimension of ‘imaginary’ includes positive unconscious or embodied and tacit knowledge, which is a source of economy of mind through the formation of habits and a landscape of creativity, innovation and novelty. This aspect is called ‘imagination’, which is the site where thinking happens in the absence of the subject ‘I’. ‘Affirmative consciousness’ or subjectivization reveals itself in the form of becoming receptive to the forces of creative imagination, radical other and negative and affirmative real. The negating dimension of real, on the other hand, manifests itself in disruptive traumas and unexpected events and eventualities causing de-territorialisation (tearing apart the walls of territories), while the

wherever the analysis starts it would end up encompassing the other two; these three are three in one and one in three; unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in the oneness; all part of regime of truth. It does not matter from where you start; if you follow the internal links you will end up with the other two; whether you start with desire, or with power or with discourse.

13 Where emotions are basically an internalized mechanism of reward and punishment (the psycho-social assemblage called individual is subjectified mainly through the internal mechanism of reward and punishment).
14 “Bourdieu’s (1977: 188-9) notion of social silence, active forgetting, saying and not doing, and doing and not saying” are examples of disavowal. It was said that: “Sufism was once a reality without a name, and now it has become a name without a reality,” (John Renard, 2005; 2) Two compound notions of “a-reality-without-a-name” and “a-name-without-a-reality” are at work here which will be related to the notion of disavowal and deployed in the analysis of social orders.
‘affirmative dimension of real’ is divided into content and expression, each having vertical and horizontal movements; creating territorialisation and re-territorialisation in their rhizomatic and arborescent (tree-like) movements. This completes the panoramic map of social assemblage in its embeddedness.

We commence probing the structure of embeddedness by acknowledging the fact that human existence (dasein) is always a type of ‘being-in-the-world’: ‘being-in-the-world’ is a compound, a multiplicity, a relationality, a process and an assemblage. This assemblage (a Deleuzian term), according to Lacan, is composed of the orders of symbolic, real and imaginary; they are one in three and three in one; once you start with one you almost always end up with the other two. As Stavrakakis (1999: 6) puts it

the orders of ‘imaginary’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘real’ are the three most important categories, or registers, through which Lacan maps human experience.

This is a kind of trinity which is three in one and one in three and can transform and re-form into each other, and move, convert and transgress the boundaries and frontiers of each other. Furthermore, as Zizek (2001) maintains, each one of these three orders, in turn, can be subdivided into their own three orders of symbolic, real and imaginary, which produces nine categories of orders.

Our being and becoming is housed in a web, as Wrong (1994:45) maintains,

a web of social relations that is constantly being spun, broken, and spun again, invariably (unlike a spider’s web) in slightly different form.

This web of social relations constitutes what we call the symbolic order. In a sense, symbolic order is a web of webs; each experience, event, or individual\textsuperscript{15} is a social web which is housed in a home, while the home itself being a complex social web housing a family, itself being located in a street which is another social web with a complex set of written and unwritten scripts, rules, and regulations. Then we move to another scale in organizations (groups, firms, clubs, businesses, social groups, religious denominations), and from there to the society at large, organized around the

\textsuperscript{15} In the section on subjectivity we will elaborate further on how “individual is the name of the collective”.

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compounds of village, town or city, and from there into a larger assemblage of nationhood and from there to international order organizing the relation between nations; all being housed in a cosmic\textsuperscript{16} order of planetary bodies. These set of orders form a plethora of nested abodes, each embedding the smaller one in scale and being embedded in larger one in scale (for the notion of nested systems see Harrison with Singer, 2006: 26). The relation can be manifested in a set of nested parentheses:

\[(\text{cosmic order (international order (nation (province (city (district (village (street (home\textsuperscript{17})-businesses (individual (event (experience))))))))))).\]

As Hanneman and Riddle (2005; 6) argue “Most networkers think of individual persons as being embedded in networks that are embedded in networks that are embedded in networks”. This nested house of houses, network of networks-symbolic order as the web of webs or house of being- is carved on the plane of immanence in space-time and is mapped on the field of geography-history.

We, as desiring machines, are plugged in a social grid which is made of materials of this world, whether corporeal or virtual\textsuperscript{18} (sounds, images, information, ideas, bricks, wood and concrete). Symbolic orders are assembled out of linguistic and/or non-linguistic components, discursive and non-discursive practices. It is exactly to this phenomenon that Markell (2003; 40) alludes when he maintains that “Each of us, Taylor (1992; 30-1) suggests, has an “authentic” identity—“my own particular way of being,” as he puts it—and so, too, do the cultures and nations to which we belong”. As Evans (1996: 203; added emphasis) suggests

Lacan makes it clear that his concept of the symbolic order owes much to the anthropological work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (from whom the phrase

\textsuperscript{16}To realize the importance of cosmic order in everyday life of individuals and communities we need just to think about the threat of comets colliding with the earth or the disruption in earth atmosphere due to solar radiations, among many others. Global warming can be conceived either as an element of this cosmic order or as a component of international order or both.

\textsuperscript{17}Home (family) can be conceptualized as a business focused on the productions of care and love manifested in the production of children, sexual pleasure and sense of informality (for this see the economics of family). With this conceptualization we can remove the duality of home-businesses and use business as a more general concept. Business in its meaning of “busy-ness” can serve as an umbrella concept to incorporate all forms of organized activities whether in home, church, state, market, or civil society.

\textsuperscript{18}The counterpart of virtual in modern science is the concept of information which alongside matter-energy constitutes the world and cannot disappear. What is information? A description, a code of “01s” which describes something; this descriptions are as much part of this world as the things themselves. See the book on information (Hans Christian von Baeyer, 2004).
‘symbolic function’ is taken ...). In particular, Lacan takes from Lévi-Strauss the idea that the social world is structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relations and the exchange of gifts (see also Mauss, 1923). The concept of the gift, and that of a circuit of exchange, are thus fundamental to Lacan’s concept of the symbolic... Since the most basic form of exchange is communication itself (the exchange of words, the gift of speech...), and since the concepts of law and of structure are unthinkable without language, the symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. Any aspect of the psychoanalytic experience which has a linguistic structure thus pertains to the symbolic order. However, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic order with language. On the contrary, language involves imaginary and real dimensions in addition to its symbolic dimension. The symbolic dimension of language is that of the signifier; a dimension in which elements have no positive existence but which are constituted purely by virtue of their mutual differences.

Symbolic order is what Castoriadis (1987: 359) pertinently calls “a world of significations”:

Society brings into being a world of significations and itself exists in reference to such a world... And it is only in correlation with this world of significations as it is instituted in each case that we can reflect on the question raised: what is the ‘unity’ and the ‘identity’, that is to say the ecceity of a society, what is it that holds a society together? What holds a society together is the holding-together of its world of significations.

Here we need to note that symbolic orders emerge in different forms and scales; an individual, or a piece of experience like eating fruit or drinking alcohol is as much a world of significations as a society. The same verdict applies to symbolic orders of medium scales from communities and teams to groups and organizations. With regard to symbolic orders, size (micro, meso, and macro) does not matter. Each symbolic order is an instantiation of being, functioning as the “house of being”, as Heidegger (1958: 20, 26) put it.

Alongside each and every symbolic order there is a force which threatens to break it down, to tear its fabric; a force which manages to generate holes in the house of being and that disruptive force is the order of real. The symbolic orders are constantly tormented by the black holes of finitude at their heart. This finitude

19 As beautifully put by the Iranian thirteenth century great poet Sa’di (see Homa Katousian; 2004) “Saydya gar fakand syele fana khane omr” (O’ Sa’di, if the flood of demise breaks the house of life) here the flood of demise is real and the house of life is the symbolic.
always echoes the sounds of death and destruction, while death is the limit of the symbolic orders and their condition of possibility. Faced with the threats and realization of degeneration and collapse, the order of imaginary was evolved as a coping strategy to bestow an illusion of fullness, oneness, and closure to the symbolic. Its main mission is to make the symbolic look solid and impenetrable. This order with its ideologies and fantasies attempts to cover the lack (finitude) at the heart of the symbolic.

Finitude hints to the lack at the heart of any symbolic order; as Alan Bass (2006; 108; original emphasis) put it “That which is missing something is finite”. In a sense, the register of symbolic (world of significations) is ultimately about achieving control (whether cognitively or non-cognitively, discursively or non-discursively, linguistically or non-linguistically) through ordering and organizing the things of this world, while the register of imaginary (world of imagination), in its original Lacanian formulation at least, is about achieving closure and completeness, a state of fullness and impenetrability, where it declares “everything is under control”20.

In a sense, while the symbolic organizes life and rescues it from a state of chaos and indeterminacy, the imaginary elevates it to the level of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence; it aims to achieve the status of divinity, God’s presence and God’s fullness and solidity21. The register of real, again in its Lacanian conception, is what generates destructive pulses into the symbolic and shakes and disrupts the web of symbolic and its protective belt of imaginary through traumatic and unexpected events, big or small, which creates holes, cracks and ruptures in the entire architecture. This function of real is captured in the vulgar proverb ‘shit happens’ or ‘whatever can go wrong will go wrong’, or as Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 504) put it “there is no social system that does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight”22.

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20 Conspiracy theories are symptoms of this obsession with total control. See “Everything is under control” (Robert Anton Wilson, 1998)
21 Cartesian cogito is an instantiation of this register of ‘imaginary’ where the “I” through “thinking” achieves the status of God’s eye view, where it gives rise to the emergence of subject-object relation; in this sense subject-object-relation is basically an illusionary relation. We will explore the affirmative dimension of cogito later in our study.
22 This proposition applies to Deleuze’s thought and to this study as well. That is why the methodology of social inquiry is supposed to hedge against this structural lack by being open to the concrete radicality of the radical other.
Any social order or social assemblage is basically a whole of holes and everyday life is a hall of wholes of holes\textsuperscript{23}.

It should be noted that this conceptual framework gives rise to a set of cluster concepts such as experience, event, and truth (which we will explore more extensively later on). Each of these social phenomena is a social assemblage and possesses three dimensions of symbolic, imaginary and real. Event, in its dimension of real, for instance, serves as the intrusion of real into symbolic and truth manifests itself as symbolization of the event (\textit{see} Hallward, 2003). The unexpected arrival of the new reverberates into the whole architecture of social order, consequently, nothing stays the same afterwards; like the reverberations and ripples generated by a plane crash, a tornado, a volcano overflowing clouds of ashes into the atmosphere and disrupting the normal order of things, an earthquake or a tsunami. It is the elements of surprise in the events of the real which lays bare the contingency and mutability of the symbolic and its protective belt. The event, in its dimension of real, shatters the dream of invincibility of the architecture of any social order (such as: the attack on twin towers, credit crunch, tsunami in Indonesia, a piece of bone stuck in a throat, sudden call of nature in the middle of an important meeting, or any occurrences indicating the sudden loss of control at any level or scale). It occurs in all forms of social orders at any scale, in subjectivity, in family (like sudden suicide in the family), state, and army or in language; it strikes one or one stumbles into something new. It is associated with the emergence of something new and shocking\textsuperscript{24}, such as love, trauma, cancer, crises, and revolutions\textsuperscript{25}, beyond the calculation and anticipation of the symbolic-imaginary order.

Lacan identifies four discourses emerging in the encounter with the event in the attempt to symbolize the event. They are the discourses of hysteric, master, pervert, and mystic (Zizek, 2000: 164-5). As Zizek (2007: xxx) puts it “the Lacanian Real-the Thing- is not so much the inert presence which “curves” the symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies) but, rather, the effects of these gaps and

\textsuperscript{23}See Burt (2004) for the notion of “structural holes”.

\textsuperscript{24}A prevalent Persian saying goes like this: \textit{chee mee-khasteem chee shod} (what we wanted and how it turned out) or \textit{chee fekr mikardim chee shod} (what we were thinking and how it turned out). The first phrase was recently used by Ayt. Khamanie in Friday sermon (4\textsuperscript{th} of Feb 2011) to indicate what the West wanted to achieve in Iran and in the Middle East and how they turned out to be. This invokes the principle of emergence (which is closely related to the register of real), which we will elaborate further later on.

\textsuperscript{25}Revolutions unexpectedly emerge out of the actions and interactions of many; there is no production line for revolutions or for love. They follow the rhizomatic logic of real.
inconsistencies”. As such real is our symbolic naming of those gaps and inconsistencies.

It can be argued that while symbolic is an organizing force, imaginary is a totalizing one and real is a disrupting one. In other words, symbolic is a bubble, imaginary is a shield (a dream), and real is a needle. In this, symbolic bubbles with their protective phantasmic and ideological shields frequently burst in their encounters with the needle of real. Thus, every human experience, every event, every social entity, every thing of this world (a political act like voting or an economic behaviour like saving) is an assemblage of all of these three dimensions, which make up the starting point of our characterization of the notion of embeddedness. As maintained by Lechte (1994: 217):

Any political act (an exemplar of contingency) only takes place in relation to a set of ‘sedimented’ practices. The sedimented practices are the element of necessity without which social life would collapse into pure contingency, that is, into indeterminacy. Politics changes social practices, but in order that there be any politics there must also be relatively unchanging sedimented practices – those bequeathed by history or tradition.

Embeddedness is the outcome of differential speed of change and movement in different layers of social reality, which allows some layers to serve as the sedimented background or riverbed for other layers characterized by higher rate of change.

2.8 ON AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION: ANOTHER LEG OF THE METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

It can be stated that all forms of orders involve affirmation and negation due to the ‘analytic of finitude’ (Howarth, 2010: 21). We will, therefore, characterise the assemblage of ‘being-in-the-world’ with its three registers through their affirmative and negating dimensions (the genealogy of the three orders of real, symbolic and imaginary was explored but not included in the study due to word limitations). In other words, an assemblage has two sets of movements, in ‘expression’ and in ‘content’ (Patton, 2000: 44). The expressive movements lead to the emergence of symbolic and imaginary orders, while move in content is based on a rhizomatic logic creating novelty, variation and difference in the realm of real. We need to note that as expressive movements possess its own dimension of real, the logic of rhizomatics

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26 We encounter the notion of bubble in economic literature. This analysis extends it to the symbolic orders as well.
works at that level as well. Due to the arborescent and rhizomatic movements, both the dimension of content and the dimension of expression are under the constant forces of territorialisation (self-organization or fusion) and de-territorialisation (creative destruction or fission).

The notions of affirmation (‘what social assemblages affirm’) and negation (‘what they negate’) are two productive concepts for exploring the structure of social assemblages. Looking from a different angle, what we are doing here is an attempt to characterize ‘being-in-the-world’ with two levels of unconsciousness and consciousness with their positive and negative dimensions at work in any social order. This is to show how one level acts as the condition of possibility and sedimented riverbed for the other and how these two general levels interact and how things travel from one realm to another, for instance, from affirmative conscious (as an openness to emerging ways of handling a new situation) into affirmative unconscious in the process of habit formation and in the process of instituting embodied skills and tacit knowledge when the situation becomes familiar and routine (the process of routinization) in order to free the energy and resources of conscious intelligence for upcoming novel challenges (see Kahneman, 2011).

Following Foucault (1970: xi) who called it ‘positive unconscious’, the affirmative dimension of the register of symbolic, is divided into power, knowledge and subjectivity. Knowledge refers to a set of discourses (Howarth, 2000) at circulation in a social order constituting its world of significations while power points to the hierarchical relations ordering and organizing the production of actions and interaction in a social assemblage. Subjectivity hints to the embodiment and institutionalization of relations of power and knowledge and their linkage through the glue of affectivity and its pleasures and jouissance and emotional economy. These three axes enshrine the productive and affirmative dimension of the symbolic, which is elaborated more extensively on these three axes later in this chapter.

The negative dimension of the symbolic is partitioned into foreclosure, repression, and disavowal. This shows the presence of elements of psychosis, neurosis, and perversion in any social order (see Zizek, 2012; Stavrakakis, 2007). These negative dimensions work at all levels of social assemblages from experience to events and individual (micro), to organization (meso) and society (macro). These three negating
dimensions of the symbolic order were explored extensively but were not included in this work due to word limitations.

2.8.1 The Affirmative Dimension of Social Assemblages as Unit of Analysis

The main question in the study of social orders and social phenomena revolves around the unit of analysis. In this study, therefore, we take social assemblages as our unit of analysis. Social assemblages are compounds of different (sometimes contradictory) synchronized components. The specific structural relation between different components defines the unique character of each social assemblage (Bryant, 2011).

Social assemblages entail a wide range of phenomena from experience to events, individuals, organization, societies, and regimes of truth. As process ontology implies, all social assemblages are events and processes. Experiences and entities are two types of events formed based on differential speed of change. The difference between various forms of events is in difference in the rate of change (see Lechte, 1994).

Structurally, social assemblages are nested phenomena in the sense that social reality is composed of nested cascades of social phenomena from smallest level of experience to largest one of regimes of truth. Experiences are embedded in individuals and individuals are embedded in families, groups, or organizations, which in turn are embedded in societies, which are embedded in regimes of truth and international order.

The social assemblages are messy, dynamical, and emergent phenomena and are events and are constantly in the state of flux and cover a range, in terms of the differential speed of change, form ephemeral and transient phenomena such as experiences and more stable phenomena such as individuals, organizations, societies or regimes of truth. It is essential to emphasize that social assemblages are messy, rather than seamless and coherent compounds; their messiness stems from the rhizomatic and topological movement of real (based on the ‘power to affect and be affected’), alongside typological movement of symbolic (the typological process of signification) and axiomatic movement of imaginary (the axiomatic process of unification and totalization, bestowing the transient sense of closure and completeness to the social assemblages). Social assemblages, hence, are the product
of ad-hoc coming together of components from diverse origins, which will go through the process of symbolic synchronization and imaginary harmonization. As Kogler (1996: 301) observes:

logical contradictions or certain symbolic incoherencies can form an essential part of the internal rationality of a symbolic order. One must therefore be able to explain why these do not play a role, or how they are symbolically integrated into the ‘system’.

In terms of nature, social assemblages can be virtual or corporeal or a combination of the two. The topological space populated by various forms of social assemblages constitutes the network or ecology of social assemblages. The ecology of social assemblages corresponds to Malinowskian notion of context of situation (see Manganaro, 2002: 145). The interactions between and within social assemblages, hence, create different forms of experiences and events. The conception of social phenomena as social assemblages frees us from the traps of methodological and ontological individualism or collectivism (Sawyer, 2005: 49, 53; Kaneko, 198) as individuals, groups, and societies are different forms of social assemblages composed of virtual or/and corporeal components.

Social assemblages- experiences, events, and entities- are composed of form and content (or form and force as Laclau puts it; see Stavrakakis, 2007: 86). While the form social assemblages take seems to be universal their contents are particular. Each symbolic order is analogous to the other in its formal structure in the sense that each is constituted out of the three orders of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their corresponding negating and affirmative dimensions. The content of these forms differ with each social assemblage (see Kogler, 1996: 172 on the similarity of forms and difference in content). For example, the existence of power and its manifestation in panoptical observation and surveillance (as institutionalized in gaze), alongside examination, exclusion and deployment of systems of reward and punishment are almost universal forms power takes in all social assemblages of various size and scale. What acts as power is unique to each social assemblage with its unique genealogical trajectory. As McHoul (2006: 205) reminds us:

Power is considered as a set of relations of force. Because these relations are local and historically contingent, they cannot be ‘predicted’ by a general theory. Only particular investigations – what the early Foucault calls
‘archaeological’ investigations, investigations of a specific ‘archive’ – can specify them.

This of course does not mean that forms cannot change, as in the ‘process ontology’ everything is subject to change, but the change in forms seems to take place at much slower pace. The differential rate of change may be at the heart of the binary opposition of form and content; otherwise in the extreme long term everything is content and subject to change.

Contents themselves can show relative stability as in the case of regimes of truth; Foucault refers to this feature of relative stability of contents as historical or regional a prioris, as Flynn (2005: 112; original emphasis) attests:

Though Foucault is careful to distance himself from deductivist or formalist approaches, his archaeological method brings to our attention the necessities that these relationships produce. The relations are a priori, albeit ‘historical’ or regional a prioris.

With this caveat in mind we embark on describing the forms social assemblages may take. Every social assemblage possesses real, symbolic and imaginary dimensions. This corresponds to the topological, typological and axiomatic movements, elaborated by Foucault (Flynn, 2005; Tizro, 2011). Each one of these registers subdivides into the three registers which produces nine forms of sub-registers (Zizek, 2001). Each of these three registers demonstrates negating and affirmative facets (see Stavrakakis, 2007). The negating dimension of real reveals itself in disruption and destruction of the elaborate discursive and non-discursive webs of symbolic and imaginary orders. The affirmative dimension of real was formulated by Deleuze in the creative and rhizomatic power of ‘real’ in its power to affect and be affected. In this, the horizontal and vertical movement of real create new forms and forces in the process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. Every thing of this world (following Foucault’s [1980: 131] famous phrase of “truth is a thing of this world”), whether corporeal or virtual, is subject to the creative and rhizomatic power of real. This applies to discursive and non-discursive phenomena as well as images and extra-discursive material and non-material things of this world.

27 See Acemoglu et. al. (2008) on Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies for an example of axiomatization.
It should be noted that the negating dimension of symbolic entails repression, disavowal, and foreclosure (Zizek, 2012: 859-60). The affirmative dimension of the symbolic includes axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity. The emergence of symbolic order marks the end of unity with the undifferentiated abundance and infinitude of the real. While the symbolic is the realm of differentiation and lack the real is the undifferentiated realm of “lack of lack” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 74; Fink, 1997: 177) or abundance (see Connolly, 2008a: 133; Tønder and Thomassen, 2006). The emergence of the symbolic is, thus, equivalent to the event of Fall from unconscious attachment and blissful unity with the realm of real and separation from unity with the mother. Due to the nature of the act of signification, the symbolic brings an abyssal gap and a sense of incompleteness and lack, which is filled by the negative and positive dimensions of the imaginary.

The negative facet of the imaginary includes ideology and fantasy (Zizek, 2012: 475, 685, 689-90), which “as a kind of illusory screen” bestows an illusionary sense of completeness, solidity, fullness, and closure to the social assemblage. The negating power of the imaginary negates the ‘not-all’, ‘not-whole’ character of the symbolic. In a sense the negative force of the imaginary steals the infinitude of the real and attributes it to the symbolic. The fantasy in its Janus-like character also serves as a symptom demonstrating the irresistible urge to overcome finitude and embrace infinitude and experience of fullness (Zizek, 2012: 689-90, 696). As such, fantasy and ideology are the sites of impossibility inherent to human condition. Fantasy serves as a bridge from the finitude of the symbolic to the infinitude of real. In this sense, symbolic order requires the fantasy for its consistency and as such fantasy and ideology are indispensable to the social reality. As Zizek (2012: 995-6) maintains:

Even if reality is "more real" than fantasy, it still needs fantasy to retain its consistency: if we subtract fantasy, the fantasmatic frame, from reality, reality itself loses its consistency and disintegrates.

The affirmative dimension of the imaginary entails the creative power of imagination in accessing pieces of real through the power of cultivated imagination in different realms of life, work, and language from music to art, science, and business. The creative role of entrepreneurs in the Austrian school, for example, is an example of the power of imagination in partial filling of the gaps in the symbolic. The creative power of imagination in poetry and science and the affiliation between science and poetry in the Romanticism (Berlin, 2002) is another example of appreciation of the
creative power of imaginary order (see Barbour, 1998, on the role of creative imagination in science in the ‘context of discovery’). As Einstein maintains, “Logic will take you from A to B. Imagination will take you everywhere” (Barrett, 2011: 144). The notion of ‘imaginal’ in Henry Corbin’s thought (see Wasserstrom, 2001: 57) is another ontological manifestation of the acknowledgement of cultivated imagination in accessing the unexplored regions and pieces of real in the realm of religious and mystical experience.

It is, however, important to differentiate between two forms of creativity. The differentiation should be made between creativity in the realm of real which is immanent and spontaneous, and occurs based on the power to affect and be affected and happens rhizomatically in the realm of extra-discursive (even on symbolic and imaginary phenomena from the point of view of their being a thing of this world, in their dimension as being a piece of real as symbolic real or imaginary real) and creativity in the realm of imaginary which requires training and cultivation in a symbolic order in order to prepare the imagination for leaping into the realm of unknowns. Without a cultivated musical sensitivity, creativity in the realm of musical imagination is highly improbable. The creative flashing or lightening, as Freud (Chaitin. 1996: 2) had put it, from the realm of imaginal, as Corbin had put it (see Hallward, 2001: 219; Cheetham, 2005: xiii), needs to be symbolized in order to enter into the realm of affirmative symbolic. The process of symbolization of initial subject-less inspirations from the realm of imaginary is a creative process itself.

As such, the social assemblage is the site of interplay between the modalities of infinitude and abundance of real alongside its state of disorder and chaos and finitude of symbolic and imaginary and their associated state of order and harmony. The stability of all and every form of combination of symbolic and imaginary is disturbed by the creatively destructive power of real. As such, the form of each experience, each event, and each entity- as different forms of transient and stable events- are constructed out of stabilizing, structuring, and territorializing powers of affirmative and negating dimensions of symbolic and imaginary (world of signification and regimes of truth) alongside the destabilizing, de-structuring and de-territorializing power of real alongside its rhizomatic creative power in engendering new compounds and novel mutational combinations.
In terms of structure, the content of each social assemblage is unique and depends on its particular life history. What acts as regimes of truth and as ideology or fantasy as well as what particular forms the negative and positive dimensions of symbolic and imaginary would take alongside how the real is encountered are different for different social assemblages. As Lerude (2005: 1454) suggests:

when the framework of the imaginary wavers and speech is lacking, when reality is no longer organized and pacified by the fantasy screen, the experience of the real emerges in a way that is unique for each person [social assemblage].

As such understanding each experience- or collection of experiences or events, such as the experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran with its associated strong and weak events in the framework of the social assemblage of Iranian nation- requires combining the analyses of universal forms and particular contents via identifying how the forces of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their negating and affirmative facets interacted to form the experience of Iranianness as well as the bitter experiences of socio-economic underdevelopment and its associated strong and weak events in the forms of revolutions, social movements, quasi civil wars, external wars and small and big social crises.

It should be noted that, in terms of nature social assemblages are embedded, emergent, and meaningful (incommensurable) phenomena. As such three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability can capture the singularity of each social phenomenon, as social phenomena are almost always embedded in a social order with its real, symbolic and imaginary dimensions. The regimes of truth, as social assemblages with their three dimensions and affirmative and negating facets, determine the truth about goodness (ethics), beauty (aesthetics) and truth (ontology) and act as house of being giving a place of residence to all social assemblages. As Foucault (1980: 93) observes: regimes of truth form their own “economy of discourses of truth” engaging in “the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse”. Foucault (1980: 94) elaborates on the productive power of regimes of truth with their affirmative dimensions of power and knowledge in the following terms:
we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.

Social assemblages are emergent phenomena in being the unintended product of the interaction between other forms of social assemblages, which are inscribed with meaning, and their world of signification is unique as it is the unique unintended product of the historical trajectory of their arborescent (tree-like) and rhizomatic evolution. As such each social assemblage - experience, event or entity - possesses its own unique dictionary with its own unique denotations and connotations despite sharing common regimes of truth or world of signification. Here Berlin’s notion of incommensurability, indicating the lack of universal measure of signification, comes into play. After the emergence of language (and more generally the sign systems), the nature of evolution of things of this world changed irreversibly forever: things have become invested and pregnant with meaning and meanings formed wholes in the form of world of signification and as evolution of things of this world is governed by two principles of embeddedness and emergence, which creates differentiated and unique forms of being; worlds of significations have become unique and differentiated for each social assemblage despite sharing common components.

The Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance, for example, helps to establish the fundamental uniqueness of social assemblages despite sharing common components. Social assemblages may have common ingredients in their trajectories but the architecture and prominence of these components almost always differ due to the uniqueness of the trajectory of evolution of each social assemblage. The interplay between embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability turns social phenomena into the products of logics of causality, complex systems and free associations. This implies that to understand social phenomena in their uniqueness we need to understand them through the deployment of psychoanalytic of free association alongside the deployment of the logic of non-linear criticality (butterfly effect, path dependency) and adaptive self-organization from complexity system and causality from reductionism. Each social assemblage is bestowed with its own logic of causality and complexity system, in the sense that causality and complexity system work inside its unique world of signification (see Bryant, 2011: 286 for the notion of
‘system-specific causality’) alongside the fact that the rhizomatic movement of real introduces unexpected emergent novelties inside each regime of truth and world of signification via the interaction between and within regimes of truth (in the intersection between context of culture and context of situation).

2.8.2 Regimes of Truth as Houses of Being

Symbolic orders through their productive facet generate systems of knowledge, and relations of power in which social entities from individuals to organizations and societies are subjectified into functional social beings. They are, hence, constituted of discursive packages of knowledge, such as on beauty, goodness, and truth, invested into subjectivity through relations of power. The internal compositions of the three affirmative components of symbolic order (covering the issues such as what is discourse, what is meaning, what is power, and what is passive and active agency) were extensively explored but were not included in this work due to word limitations.

2.8.3 The Art of Understanding

Based on the highly complex nature of social phenomena (their embedded, emergent, and incommensurable nature in their enveloping and encompassing presence of incommensurable world of meaning in each social assemblage alongside the non-meaning facet of them as things of this world) we need to investigate how the analyst or any other social actor can have access to the web of meaning and understand them in their singularity and uniqueness. As such, the dilemmas we encounter in the analysis of social phenomena (social assemblages) of all kinds, from experiences, to events (contemporary or historical events), individuals, groups, organizations, or nations with their three registers and their affirmative and negating dimensions seem to be fully captured in the Rumi’s (translated by Nicholson, the Mathnawi, Book I) poems28.

28Listen to the reed how it tells a tale, complaining of separations
Saying, “Ever since I was parted from the reed-bed, my lament hath caused man and woman to moan.
I want a bosom torn by severance, that I may unfold (to such a one) the pain of love-desire.
Every one who is left far from his source wishes back the time when he was united with it.
In every company I uttered my wailful notes, I consorted with the unhappy and with them that rejoice.
Every one became my friend from his own opinion; none sought out my secrets from within me.
My secret is not far from my plaint, but ear and eye lack the light (whereby it should be apprehended).
Body is not veiled from soul, nor soul from body, yet to [many ears and eyes this fact is not revealed]
[this is the translation from Erkan Turkmen which was preferred to the translation by Nicholson].
The nature of human condition is captured via Rumi’s and Lacan’s notions of separation and longing. In the ‘journey of life’ from the state of unity with the real, to moving into the state of separation in the order of symbolic and its associated fantasy, different social assemblages develop different coping strategies to handle the pains of separation and the striving towards return to the state of unity with the real and the experience of fullness and total *jouissance*. The attempt to liberate oneself (the social assemblage) from the horrors of finitude is manifested in the formation of instrumental rationality (with the aim of liberation from the despotism of nature), communicative rationality (the liberation from loneliness and the despotism of man, what separates man from man, and what creates the sense of belonging to a larger ‘we’, in overcoming the despotisms and inequalities and achieving the sense of solidarity with equality), and emancipative rationality (freedom from the terror of death and existential finitude; symbolic death, the experience of rejection, the fear of loss of control, and fear of failure, and fear of invisibility and striving for recognition). This forms the analytic of finitude on how to overcome the manifestations of finitude in encounter with nature, with man, and with existence itself.

The social assemblage, hence, originates from infinitude of the real and floats in it even in the state of separation and strives to return to it in search of the experience of lost *jouissance*. This process of separation, longing and searching for return forms each social assemblage (from any fleeting experience, to events, to more stable entities like individual, groups, organizations, institutions, and nations) in a unique fashion. The phenomenon of non-linear criticality (butterfly effect) and path-dependency makes each social phenomenon a unique assemblage of the three dimensions of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their affirmative and negating dimensions. To analyse them we need to understand them in their embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability through thick descriptions. As embedded phenomena, they are rooted in a regime of truth, but as things of this world, they are subject to the principle of emergence and the work of process ontology (on the rhizomatic movement of real in things possessing the power to affect and be affected), the work of causation, the work of complexity systems and Markov processes. Being subject to the effects of principle of emergence turns social phenomena into unique social assemblages in terms of their content.
As such social phenomena are universal in terms of their forms (being constituted of the dimensions of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their affirmative and negating dimensions and being subject to the work of three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability), while unique in terms of their content (what functions as their regimes of truth with its symbolic and imaginary dimensions, and as such incommensurable to alternative regimes of truth). If this is the case, then, for understanding the symbolic-imaginary (meaningful) and real (non-meaning) dimensions of social phenomena, we need to combine the hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion. This means that we need to understand the meaning invested in each social phenomenon from inside the regime of truth constituting that particular social phenomenon and combine it with analysing how the rhizomatic movement (as explained through the principles of process ontology, causation, and complexity science) affects that particular social phenomenon in its interaction with other phenomena. This means that analysing social phenomena requires combining understanding of the world of meaning with understanding the interaction between social phenomena as objects and things of this world (as Ricouer maintains).

As a result, if we ask why social phenomena are characterized by incommensurability and uniqueness, this study’s reply would centre on the horizontal and vertical movements (in terms of symbolic, and imaginary and the rhizomatic movement of the real), making each phenomenon unique in terms of its meaning and non-meaning composition. The butterfly effect and the path dependency make each social assemblage a kind of its own and subjects of Markov processes. Although things of this world have family resemblance with other things of this world in form and content, they are, essentially, unique in their architecture of how the three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary are actualized. It should be noted that what make things unique is largely the structural relation between components and not the components themselves (see Bryant, 2011). This implies that to analyse each social phenomenon (experience, event, individual, groups, organization, institutions, nations), we cannot understand it under a general law but we have to deploy archaeological and genealogical approach to study each social phenomenon as a monument and as a unique work of art; as social phenomena and social assemblages are considered to be works of art (see Dreyfus and Spinoza, 1997, for example). Each social phenomenon, as a result, is both imbued with meaning and
at the same is the product of interaction of forces, and itself acts as a new force forming connections with other forces of the world, creating new experiences, events and entities.

As a result, we need to deploy the logic of causality, complexity science and process ontology and incorporate it in the narratives entailing thick descriptions of the world of meaning associated with each social phenomenon (see Elliott, 2005: Chapter 6). The emergence of diseases, or the geographical position of countries may add or reduce elements to their regimes of truth, first through rhizomatic movement of ideas through war and trade and then through the process of symbolization, the new elements are synchronized with the old (through accommodation, repression or a mixture of the two) and produce a new regime of truth. The introduction of Christianity, for instance, into the Western world through the military adventures of Roman Empire added a new layer to the sedeminted layers of Greek and Roman lifeworlds and created a unique mixture distinct from any other.

In addition, war, which was justified through the Roman regime of truth, produced unintended consequences through the exposition to the new cult of Christianity, which in turn transformed Rome itself and created a new hybrid regime of truth. In this way, meaning and non-meaning layers of the real interacted to form social assemblages. Consequently, to understand each social phenomenon we need to combine the hermeneutics of understanding with the hermeneutics of suspicion, as social phenomena almost always stem from particular embeddedness and are subject to the forces of emergence and are characterized by incommensurability. As Nietzsche conceived, with regard to social phenomena we are faced with the phenomenon of the return of the same. What is the same is difference (see Letche, 1994). Each time we encounter new instantiation of difference and all the time we encounter the same as social phenomena seem to be the same in their forms and unique in their content.

**2.8.4 Hermeneutics of Understanding**

How can we come out of our uniqueness to understand the uniqueness of each social assemblage; for example, a death, a car crash, a war, a marriage, a revolution, a smile, a nation bewildered by the question ‘Why are we backward?’, another individual, organization or international order.
It should be noted that in axiological and ontological terms, the researcher in a research process is considered as a social assemblage with its own regime of truth and its particular grid of intelligibility and its own particular categorization of the world in terms of truth in the sense of defining, for example, beauty, and goodness and with its own affirmative facets (such as power, knowledge, subjectivity) and negating dimension (repression, disavowal, foreclosure) and its own emotional economy (fear, joy, guilt, pride). How can, then, a researcher discover the uniqueness of the meanings imbued in each experience, each event, each social entity, while he/she cannot think without his/her own categories of mind, her/his own sensibilities and affectivities? How can we enter the world of signification of others and avoid reducing the difference in their worldhoods into the same of our own worldhood? This is where self-reflexivity is inevitable part of social inquiry, where we see four layers of research, from formulating research questions and gathering data, to entering the world of meaning associated with the data, to analysing the rhizomatic relations between phenomena (unintended consequences) and the self-reflexive dimension of research (see Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009).

The researcher, hence, needs to be aware of the obligation to understand the other in their own terms and avoid reducing the difference to the logic of the same, and the other to the logic of the self. This requires more than empathy and putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes as one brings one’s own grid of intelligibility (one’s head and one’s embodiment, one’s sensibilities to sound, smell, and touch along with their associations, one’s memory and narrative of life and death) and one’s own sense of right and wrong, true and false, beauty and ugliness, taste and distaste, abhorrence and delight - which are largely unconscious and routinized - into the process of understanding the other. In the language of psychoanalysis, this requires avoidance of counter-transference, the cardinal sin of the analyst projecting his own associations onto the speech, action, or emotion of the analysand. For this the analyst need to develop the art of listening in order to understand the other in his/her own terms, her own worldhood and her own regime of truth.

It should be noted that misunderstanding the other in his/her behaviour, speech, emotion and organization of objects is the default position, as people (and generally almost all forms of social assemblages), as passive agents, are so immersed in their own life-worlds (striving to overcome their own analytic of finitude in their own daily life) that they cannot but project their own life-worlds into others. Yamada
(2002), for instance, investigates the persistent misunderstanding between Americans and Japanese, where both sides see each other through the spectacles of stereotypes where, for example, “Americans think of the Japanese as never really saying what they think, and the Japanese think of Americans as not paying enough attention to participants in communication” (Yamada, 2002: 25 and 98) or “the Japanese are sneaky and evasive, or Americans loud and pushy” (Yamada, 2002: viii)”. In exploring the impact of social (or cultural) constructs on communicating and understanding each other, Yamada (2002: 34) gives an example of how the rules of grammar can cause misunderstanding:

As a rule, Japanese emphasis is found in word order, while American emphasis is shown through intonation. In cross-cultural communication, missing a point of emphasis can mean missing a point altogether. In his study of British-East Indian interaction, anthropologist John Gumperz shows how a large part of the British stereotype of East Indians as ‘rude’ owes itself to the East Indians’ non-British use of stress and intonation. For example, native British waitresses used rising intonation when serving gravy, and said, ‘Gravy?’ whereas Indian waitresses used falling intonation and said, ‘Gravy’. The same word with a rising intonation was heard by British customers as, ‘Would you like some gravy?’ but with a falling intonation was heard as, ‘Take it or leave it. This is gravy’. In the same manner, stereotypes about Americans and Japanese emerge from their mutual inability to understand their different grammars of emphasis. Unexpected uses of stress often end up creating the stereotype that the Japanese are monotonic, reserved and cold, while Americans are overly emotional and aggressive.

Zizek, as Myers (2003: 105-6, original italics) reports, sees the same problem at a philosophical level:

Ethnic tension is caused by a conflict of fantasies, if, in this regard, we understand fantasy as a way of organizing enjoyment. The specificity of their fantasy conflicts with the specificity of our fantasy. So, for example, a strand of American racism is ‘bothered’ by the way the Japanese seem to enjoy working and work at enjoyment. The Japanese, by American conventions, do not know how to separate work from play-their relationship to enjoyment is in some way disturbed or ‘not normal’. They are therefore a ‘threat’ to the American way of life.

Social assemblages set their own life-worlds and their rationalities as the gold standard and try to evaluate other actions, speeches, experiences, events and entities in terms of their own sensibilities (in violation of the principle of
incommensurability). This kind of cultural tribalism seems to be inherent to how our being-in-the-world is organized in a particular way where things are closed, disclosed, foreclosed, and categorized to us in particular ways in distinction from others.

In everyday life we frequently commit the cardinal sin of reducing the difference to the same and the other to the self. This leads to the phenomenon of otherization and demonization of the other and glorification of the self, which is at the root of violence, brutality, and inhumanity towards the other. The physical violence is rooted in the epistemic violence, the inability or unwillingness to understand the other in her/his/its own terms. As such transference and counter-transference are prevalent in the interaction between selves and identities, as we frequently project our own way of thinking, feeling and being on the past, people of alternative gender, race, nationality, faith, age, family background, accent, weight, height, and other forms of distinction. This is what Rumi complains about when he says:

Every one became my friend from his own opinion; none sought out my secrets from within me. My secret is not far from my plaint, but ear and eye lack the light (whereby it should be apprehended).

In other words, understanding the other using his/her dictionary with its different sets of denotations and connotations is an achievement against the immense gravity of our own sedimented forms of embeddedness and our own regime of truth, our own addicted form of rationality and life style.

Most of our embeddedness is stored as habits of thought and embodiment and work at pre-ontological and pre-conceptual levels and are hard to even notice, but the process of encountering with the radical other alongside the ethics of listening (being charitable and hospitable to the radical other) and awareness of general principles of our embeddedness makes it possible for the researcher to gradually achieve self-reflexivity and be a vanishing mediator in the process of voyage of discovery of the life-world of the other. The encounter with the radical other or “strange stranger” (Bryant, 2011: 268) bestows the chance to the analyst to turn himself/herself from a ‘dasein’ into a ‘cogito’, from a self into a subject by subtracting the relevant contents and reducing himself into a form (see Zizek, 2012: 876). This requires the state of selflessness and becoming a void or a vanishing mediator (as Zizek conceived it), a
gap between the real and the symbolic. The self as embodiment of particular grid of intelligibility and its associated economies of power, discourse and affectivity alongside its negating facets of repression, disavowal and foreclosure is the condition of possibility/impossibility to understanding the radical other.

Ironically, to understand ‘daseins’ we need to become cogito but before that we need to have the experience of being a ‘dasein’ (because without the affirmative and productive dimensions of the symbolic we are mere feral children). The researcher needs to take a risky voyage of discovery from his own specific content to the universal form of ‘cogito’ and move to new content offered by the other (the other’s dasein). The journey from one ‘dasein’ (the researcher’s) to another ‘dasein’ (the researched, the radical other) passes through the bridge of universal ‘cogito’. The universality of the forms of language, actions and emotions allows this movement from content-to-form-to-new-content to be possible. Because all social assemblages have the three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary with their negations and affirmations, it is possible to understand the other by following the other’s internal logic of signification (the other’s chain of signifiers with their particular quilting points and master signifiers) in the other’s speeches, actions, emotions or organization of objects.

It should be noted that in any act of signification we have the signifier, the signified and the absent presence of a referent. The existence of such a three-term structure in any encounter between two social assemblages with markedly different contents makes the communication possible. It appears that we move from the signifier, to signified and to absent presence of referent and we enter into the world of signification of the other through the common absent presence of system of references. The fact that we encounter the real as a reference and symbolize it through our systems of signs (in words, actions, emotions, and organization of objects) is the condition of possibility of communication (even misunderstanding). In any encounter we move from a signifier to a signified (which is a chain of signifiers), and to an absent presence of a referent (part of a system of reference, the real) and then from there we enter the world of signification of the other and her/his own chain of signifiers (the signifier and the signified). This applies to everything from tree, to water, violence, love, and democracy. Through this process we enter the other’s dictionary and its denotations and connotations.
In this, thus, the denotations are the arrested meanings of terms and the connotations are how the statements (and images, actions, emotions and organization of objects) are made to function as the signifier to convey new meanings (see Lechte, 1994; Eco, 1976). Thus, in this process what acts as the ultimate bridge is the three-term structure involved in the act of signification and symbolization. In relation to Iranian realities, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 1953 coup, for instance, function as common (absent) referents for alternative forms of symbolizations and phantasies. We can enter the world of signification of the other through these common absent referents and how they are caught up in the dynamics of symbolic-imaginary orders.

In exploring and giving meaning to all these, Myers (2003: 109) reports how Zizek sees the commonality in forms in the following terms: “Instead of vilifying other cultures … Žižek enjoins us to come together in the ‘solidarity of a common struggle’, when [we] discover that the deadlock which hampers [us] is also the deadlock which hampers the Other’… ”. In this, what makes the other unique is the other’s unique regime of truth with its distinct denotations and connotations, in the sense that the meanings associated with speeches, actions, emotions, or organizations of objects are different but the act of signification and how its lack is mended through the order of imaginary and how the realm of the real disrupts the symbolic-imaginary order is the same. In other words, differences in every day articulations is understood and justified through all social constructs having the similar formal structures. Otherwise, the difference in the content leads to clash of selves (and other forms of social assemblages) who misunderstand each other. As Myers (2003: 107, added emphasis) states:

What is the way of avoiding a clash of ethnic fantasies? Žižek's first answer to this is to propose a kind of ethics of fantasy. Simply stated, this proposes that we try as much as possible not to violate the fantasy space of the ‘other’, the specific way in which an individual looks at the world. This does not mean that we love our neighbour in so far as he or she resembles ourselves, nor that we love our neighbour because of his or her Symbolic mandate, even if we stretch that mandate to include his or her status as a human being. In other words, we do not respect ‘others’ for any universal feature that they might share with us, but rather for what they do not share with us, which is their fantasy. We therefore do our utmost not to prove that what they think is a house full of significant meaning is actually a ruined old shack as the young man does in Patricia Highsmith’s ‘Black House’.”
Here we see that the discourse of common humanity may lead to the cardinal sin of reducing the content of the other to the content of the self. We have to strictly avoid to reduce the content of the other’s regime of truth into a load of irrationalities, superstitions, dogmatic beliefs, devilish ways of being and seeing. Frequently, the other is seen as the ensemble of negativities such as irrational, emotional, intolerant, despotic, imperialist, morally bankrupt, spiritually decapitated or scientifically or technologically backward. The aim of understanding, hence, is to negotiate with the other in a way which allows us to understand the uniqueness and dissimilarity of the other’s world of signification.

This requires heavy and risky investment in time, energy, effort and emotion and is hard to achieve (and therefore the negative, easy and content empty nature of ‘tolerance’ is used instead). We almost always misunderstand each other and portray the worldhood of the other as ‘a ruined old shack’. As Foucault (1981: 8) says:

One does not have to be in solidarity with them [the opponents of the Shah’s regime in Iran]. One does not have to maintain that these confused voices sound better than the others and express the ultimate truth. For there to be a sense in listening to them and in searching for what they want to say, it is sufficient that they exist and that they have against them so much which is set up to silence them.

It is not good enough to say that we all eat, sleep, fight, love and hate (the discourse of common humanity), we have to understand that we attribute different meaning to eating and sleeping, and love and hate for different reasons and prioritize things differently. If there is, however, no element of commonality even in the form of the act of signification, no communication (even misunderstanding) would be possible, and as such we would get the Wittgenstein’s famous saying: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him”. Derrida as reported by Belsey (2005: xii) encounters the same problem:

Jacques Derrida records the unnerving experience of meeting the gaze of his cat when he was naked. We easily take cats as objects of our regard, but what do they make of us? Anything, or not much? What is it to be a cat looking at a human being (Derrida 2002)? We pose the question from our own place in culture, but it cannot be answered from there.
The principle of incommensurability (Berlin, 1990; Kuhn, 1962) establishes that meanings emanating from alternative world of signification cannot be translated to a universal or standard system of meaning. Ultimately we are simultaneously universal and particular, universal in form and particular in content, and our content becomes particular due to the work of universal processes as described in semiotics, process ontology, causality, emergence, complexity (butterfly effects, path-dependency, Markov processes). What we have is the return of the same and the same is difference; form is the same but content is different and this double-edged sword of sameness/differences, universality/particularity constitute our singularities. As John Stuart Mill (1859: 122) maintains:

Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.

As Boldeman (2007: 78) reports:

[Elster] does not believe that social norms can be reduced to any single principle [of rationality]… He even suggests that a form of irrationality—what he calls magical thinking—plays an important role in many decisions to cooperate. … Every society and each community will be glued together, for better and for worse, by a particular, idiosyncratic mix of these motives.

Elster’s verdict applies to all forms of social assemblages from experiences, to events, individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions as well as nations. The rhizomatic movement turns social assemblages and regimes of truth into idiosyncratic mix of messy, disparate, and sometimes contradictory components. As Rapport and Overing (2000: 81) maintains:

Early on, Malinowski [1948:194] appreciated that: arguing by the law of logical contradiction is absolutely futile in the realm of belief, whether savage or civilised. Two beliefs, quite contradictory to each other on logical grounds, may co-exist, while a perfectly obvious inference from a firm tenet may be simply ignored.
These diverse components are synchronized and harmonized either through compartmentalization and the act of active forgetting and disavowal or are synchronized through the act of active symbolization, leading to creation of philosophies and rationalities which justify the co-existence of those disparate elements, such as the symbiosis between Christianity and Western modernity or between constitutionalism and Islam. This demonstrates the principle of multiple realizability (Sawyer, 2005: 66), applicable to social phenomena. Each social phenomenon - like love, violence, war, democracy, development - is realized differently in different historical contexts.

This indicates, for instance, that there are various distinct paths or mechanisms to socio-economic development distinct to each particular context of culture (regime of truth) and context of situation (the state of pioneering or the state of belatedness). Chan (2002), for example, questions the assumption adopted by many commentators on a close connection between liberal democracy and economic development and

… suggests a new theoretical framework, in which liberal democracy is ‘decomposed’ into economic, civil and political dimensions that can be combined in different ways, allowing for a range of ‘institutional matrices’. She then shows, in a case study of Japan and the Asian newly industrialising countries, how these seemingly less democratic countries have enjoyed a unique mix of economic, civil and political liberties which have encouraged economic development without the need to share the institutional structures and cultural values of the West.

The key concept here is ‘a unique mix’ and the attempt to understand it rather than turning social phenomena into the cases for the application of general covering laws. The whole point of our methodological discussions is how through a combination of hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion we can come up with a better understanding of social phenomena.

In understanding hyper-complex social phenomena, the study design can have major impact on whether the researchers are able to identify the elements of uniqueness in the experience of development or ignore it by suppressing it via subjecting the development experience to the law-like principles governing all experiences of development (see: Elgström and Hyden, 2002; Besley and Persson, 2011). The kind of universalism advocated by Skousen (2008: 8) and reported below is in conflict with the nature of social phenomena as embedded, emergent and incommensurable
social assemblages: “The principles of accountability, economy, competition, incentives, investment, opportunity, and welfare apply to all peoples and all nations”. Instead, Foucault’s archaeology, genealogy and problematization are attempts to capture the social phenomena in their uniqueness and haecceities. As we elaborated throughout this chapter, all social phenomena including competition, incentives, and investment are entangled in particular regimes of truth and in each instantiation take new meanings.

The work of social scientist, hence, is to carefully unravel the meanings invested into “accountability, economy, competition, incentives, investment, opportunity, and welfare”, Skousen (2008: 8), in each particular context of culture (regime of truth), in its intersection with the context of situation (the interaction between regimes of truth). The meanings attached to these concepts are subtly but significantly different in Japan, India, China, and Iran in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries (see Taylor, 2001 on the drastic difference in the conception and institutions of work in the Japanese society compared to the hire-and-fire model of work in the Anglo-Saxon context). What is common is the form while the content (historically embedded and situated denotations and connotations) is entirely different.

In the realm of social science and in everyday life there is a common misconception that because we- humans all over the world- eat, sleep, work, have children, communicate through language then we are the same and a common set of laws govern our experiences in the realms of life, work and language. While, instead each field of experience (economy, sexuality, criminality, etc.) is woven into a Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, the sky and the earth with its alternative spatiotemporalities. How economy and competition relates to sexuality and spirituality, for instance, is different in different context of culture and its associated regime of truth. As Chakrabarty (2000: 72, original capital letters) observes:

A SECULAR SUBJECT like history faces certain problems in handling practices in which gods, spirits, or the supernatural have agency in the world. My central examples concern the history of work in South Asia. Labor, the activity of producing, is seldom a completely secular activity in India; it often entails, through rituals big and small, the invocation of divine or superhuman presence. Secular histories are usually produced by ignoring the signs of these presences. Such histories represent a meeting of two systems of thought, one in which the world is ultimately, that is, in the final analysis, disenchanted, and the other in which humans are not the only meaningful agents. For the purpose
of writing history, the first system, the secular one, translates the second into itself. It is this translation—its methods and problems—that interests me here as part of a broader effort to situate the question of subaltern history within a postcolonial critique of modernity and of history itself.

Here we see how Chakrabarty identifies the relation of labor to the realm of gods through rituals and observes how secular history usually fails to practice the art of listening and understanding the radical other, and has frequently opted to reduce the difference to the logic of the same. In same line, Mbembe (2001: 2) observes the same phenomenon in the relation between the West and the rest:

“We should first remind ourselves that, as a general rule, the experience of the Other, or the problem of the ‘I’ of others and of human beings we perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed virtually insurmountable difficulties to the Western philosophical and political tradition. Whether dealing with Africa or with other non-European worlds, this tradition long denied the existence of any “self” but its own”.

Mills (2004: 114), in the same line of argument, reminds us that “Said also argues that colonised countries were often described in negative terms”. The same cardinal sin of social inquiry (reducing the difference to the logic of the same) seems to have been committed by Kuran (1993, 2004, 2011) when he sees no identifying distinction in Islamic economics but for rituals and as such dismisses the notion of Islamic economics and combatively opts to “prove that what they think is a house full of significant meaning is actually a ruined old shack”. While the rituals and the mere act of appellation by saying ‘In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful’ is meant to relate the mundane realms of life like economy and sexuality to the realm of sacred, as Chakrabarty reminded us already, and as such weave spatiotemporal existence with the realm of eternity (Rajaee, 2007).

The same cardinal sin was committed by Hahddad Adel (1981) when he seem to have failed to understand the meaning of nudity in the West in terms of West’s own regime of truth and projected his own standards of truth on the West and called it “culture of nudity and nudity of culture” assuming a universal meaning for the notion and practice of nudity irrespective of its historical entanglement, reducing Western modernity to modern ignorance (jahiliyyah) in the process, once again reducing the house of being of the radical other (this time the Western dasein) to ‘a
ruined old shack’ (for the meanings invested in nudity in the West see Barcan, 2004). This misunderstanding of the other is frequently repeated with regard to the experiences of suicide in Japan, eating dogs in far eastern countries, treating cows as holy in India (Adcock, 2010), and gun ownership in America, amongst others.

In line with this argument, Chakrabarty (2000: 89) calls the writing of history which is attentive to difference and incommensurability of the life-worlds history 2 as opposed to history 1 (the secular history) which reduces and translates all forms of the past to its own life world. According to Chakrabarty, the history 1

seeks to dispel and demystify gods and spirits as so many ploys of secular relationships of power. The moment we think of the world as disenchanted, however, we set limits to the ways the past can be narrated.

Here in history 1 the hermeneutics of suspicion is used to suppress and disregard the hermeneutics of understanding:

But the idea of History 2 beckons us to more affective narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable through a third term of equivalence such as abstract labor (Chakrabarty, 2000: 71).

The extremely important point made here by Chakrabarty (2000) is that the fact that social assemblages and regimes of truth and life-world are inevitably open to each other and trade and learn from each other does not imply that they lose their unique characters, as their layers of sedimented embeddedness and path-dependency determines how they select from the rival life-worlds and how they uniquely combine them and make sense of them in a new whole. Chakrabarty (2000: 94) further alludes to the fact that

… to talk about the violent jolt the imagination has to suffer to be transported from a temporality cohabited by nonhumans and humans to one from which the gods are banished is not to express an incurable nostalgia for a long-lost world. Even for the members of the Indian upper classes, in no sense can this experience of traveling across temporalities be described as merely historical.
This clearly demonstrates that the realm of work and economy (productivity, investment, saving, inflation, unemployment, and growth) takes different meanings in different contexts of culture and there is nothing universal about work and economy except its form in the sense of this realm being embedded in a life-world and a regime of truth with its three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary, with their negating and affirmative dimensions. Yet again what is universal is the form and what is particular is the content and that is the story of each singularity, and that is what hermeneutic of suspicion (the attempt to explain the interconnection between vectors of forces) need to be combined with hermeneutics of understanding to do justice to both universal and particular facets of social phenomena.

2.8.5 Free Association

No one feels another's grief, no one understands another's joy. People imagine they can reach one another. In reality they only pass each other by.

Franz Schubert

To be able to understand the difference as manifested in the denotations and connotations associated with actions, images, words, emotions and organization of objects we need to use the method of free association to be able to enter the worldhood of the other (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). The method of free association allows the internal logic of the social assemblage to emerge, free from any imposed, external or universal standard of relevance, significance, or meaningfulness.

This method challenges the established standards of meaningfulness and relevance or importance. As De Mijolla (2005: 615) states: “In free association the patient says whatever comes to mind without exercising any selectivity or censorship”. Freud, as reported in De Mijolla (2005: 216), makes it clear to his patient:

Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting thread running through your remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that may occur to you and any side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point. But in this case you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite up important, or nonsensical, so that there is no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must
say it in spite of them- indeed, you must say it precisely because you feel an aversion to doing so. … So say whatever goes through your mind.

Applying the method of free association to the social phenomena means being attentive to the internal logic of social assemblages by listening to the totality of the meanings expressed in actions, talks, events and organizations of object rather than selectively approaching them based on the analyst’s standards of rationality, relevance and importance (as Chakrabarty reminded us about two types of history).

In our case, we use the sum total of the speeches, actions, images, emotions and organization of objects produced with regard to the social phenomena to discover the life-world underpinning them with its particular regime of truth and its affiliated rationalities and structures of power/knowledge, discursive formations, institutional arrangements and emotional economies. The point in using the free-association method is to break away from the addicted connections, and sense of meaningfulness, relevance, and importance embodied in the life-world of the researcher and give the researcher the tools and the theoretical justifications to enter the wonderland of shared singularity of social assemblages (experiences, events, individuals, groups, organizations or nations). This means that in understanding social phenomena like London Riot, Islamic Revolution, hostage crisis, 1953 Anglo-American coup against Mosaddegh in Iran, financial crisis, socio-economic underdevelopment, high rate of suicide in Japan, high rate of driving accidents in Iran, we need to enter the wonderland of the world of signification associated with that particular event, rather than subsuming it under a covering law-like generality.

The method of free association, hence, frees the researcher from the chains of traces of different forms of positivism and scientism plaguing the social inquiry and turning social sciences into a form of epistemic violence. Furthermore, it allows the internal rationalities of social assemblages to disclose themselves. Free association turns the researcher from a master of knowledge into a seeker and listener to the alien voices embedded in every experience, event, or social entities like individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, or nations. It is apt, therefore, for Shayegan (2012a) to invite us to conduct a cultural psychoanalysis in order to understand the roots of current problems in Iran. It is worth noting that, as Myers (2003: 20) observes,
psychoanalysis is usually narrowly conceived as a field of knowledge, one that comprises a method for treating neurotic patients and a set of theories about mental processes. In the hands of Lacan, however, psychoanalysis assumes cosmic ambitions, vaulting over the boundaries of its own discipline and engaging with politics, philosophy, literature, science, religion and almost every other field of learning to form a vast theory that has a hand in analysing every arena of endeavour in which human beings take part.

We need to deploy the method of free association to be able to practice cultural psychoanalysis, as Freud (1900: 110, cited in De Mijolla, 2005: 216) elaborates in his ground-breaking book *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

the success of the psycho-analysis depends on his [patient’s] noticing and reporting whatever comes into his head and not being misled, for instance, into suppressing an idea because it strikes him as unimportant or irrelevant or because it seems to him meaningless.

We will see that social life and social phenomena have dream-like qualities and as such we need the method of free association to interpret them. To elaborate why the method of free association possesses clear comparative advantage over its rivals, we start by pondering on the nature of understanding and offer free association as a proper approach to understand understanding. We establish that understanding entails idiosyncrasy and singularity inside commonality and sharedness (Schmid *et al.*, 2008). As we have articulated already the presence of commonality per se does not necessitates the sameness and does not justify resort to the reductionist search for law-like regularity through the positivist method of compare and contrast in an attempt to understand and explain the formation and transformation of social phenomena. The sharedness (sharing a common language and a regime of truth) is the condition of possibility of emergence of uniqueness. The signifiers may be shared but the strings of signifiers (signifeds) are particular; this is how particularity is produced out of sharedness, generality and universality (*see* Fink, 1997: 93). In Islamic philosophy, the two notions of verbal sharedness (*moshtarek-e lafzi*) and meaning sharedness (*moshtarek-e manavi*) can be used to generate difference out of sameness and singularity out of sharedness (*see* Mesbah Yazi, 1999: 137). To gain access to the shared singularity of the social phenomena we need to adopt the approach of free association.
2.8.5 Understanding of Understanding

Heidegger opened our eyes to the fact that everyday existence is a form of understanding and attunement with the world, through which he extended the notion of understanding from the interpretation of texts into all human activities, in the sense that in everyday life in all fields of experience and in all forms of behaviour we are, consciously or (overwhelmingly) unconsciously, engaged in the act of understanding, un-concealment or disclosure. As Hoy (1993: 182) states:

Contrary to present tendencies to think of the reading of texts as the paradigm case of interpretation, Heidegger's paradigm cases are everyday activities like opening a door or hammering. Even Heidegger’s philosophical Interpretation is an interpretation not of a text, but of Dasein. But these cases are analogues of texts insofar as Heidegger’s point is that even the most obvious ordinary objects taken by themselves do not have their characteristics inscribed in them. Instead, the characteristics of the tools come into being in the concrete interpretation manifested in the activity of using them. Contrary to an empiricist epistemology that presupposes that we first “perceive” objects with their particular properties and only secondarily apply or use them, Heidegger's suggestion is that this type of perception is not primary. Seeing is not simply perceiving the properties of external objects with the bodily eyes (BT [Being and Time] 187). Instead of construing seeing as seeing that an object has such and such a property, Heidegger construes seeing as already interpreting something as something (e.g., seeing something as a hammer, as a door, or as a table).

For Heidegger action, or more generally any form of behaviour (speech, affectivity, for example), is a particular interpretation of the world. Hoy (1993: 183) further elaborates on the holistic nature of understanding: “Meaning for Heidegger thus involves the holistic way in which something can become intelligible as something in a web of relations (BT 193)”.

Heidegger, as Hoy elaborates (1993: 183-4), shows how seeing something as hammer require seeing it in the larger context of a workshop, which soon if we peel the layers of larger and larger contexts involved in the experience of using a hammer we arrive at Heidegger’s fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth. The act of hammering is almost always embedded in a form of worldhood (characterized by particular configuration of relation between mortals and gods, sky and earth) and takes its meaning and significance from it. As Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005: 14) remind us: “The fourfold names the different regions of our existence which can
Contribute to giving us a particular, localized way of dwelling”. Charles Taylor (2005: 449-450; see also Edwards, 2005) shows how the notion of fourfold sheds light on the holistic nature of understanding in the example of a jug:

Take a humble entity, like a jug. As it shows up in the world of a peasant, as yet unmobilized by modern technology, it is redolent of the human activities in which it plays a part, of the pouring of wine at the common table, for instance. The jug is a point at which this rich web of practices can be sensed, made visible in the very shape of the jug and its handle which offers itself for this use. So much for the human life which co-shows up in this thing... the human modes of conviviality that the jug co-discloses are shot through with religious and moral meaning... If we are not closed to it, the jug will also speak of its history as a formed entity, of its emergence from unformed matter, of its continuing dependency on the unformed, since it can only exist as an entity as long as it is supported by the whole surrounding reality. It rests ultimately on the earth, and that is the word Heidegger uses for this dimension of co-disclosure. Finally, the jug and the whole round of activities it speaks of, and the earth, are open to greater cosmic forces which are beyond the domain of the formable, and which can either permit them to flourish or sweep them away.

The alternation of day and night, storms, floods, earthquakes, or their benign absence; these are the things which Heidegger assembles under the title 'sky'. They provide the frame within which the earth can be partly shaped as our world”.

The work of fourfold in shaping the holistic dimension of existence is succinctly manifest in the Khayyam’s poems (as translated by Edward Fitzgerald, 2004: 45) centring on the humble entity of a jug: “A Book of Verses underneath the Bough, A Jug of Wine, a Loaf of Bread--and Thou; Beside me singing in the Wilderness- Oh, Wilderness were Paradise enow!”’. The layered dimensions of being is further elaborated in the following Khayyam’s poem (as translated by Ahmad Saidi, 1992: 132): “The sphere upon which mortals come and go, Has no end nor beginning that we know; And none there is to tell us in plain truth: Whence do we come and whither do we go”. This form of understanding which encompasses and constitutes our being as being-in-the-world can best be understood in its uniqueness and singularity through the deployment of the free-association method, because the links and associations affiliated with everything is unique to each order. The extremely important subject of comparative advantages of free association over rival methods of research alongside the issue of hermeneutics of suspicion was explored more extensively but was not included in this work due to word limitations.
This study, however, endeavours to combine the hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion in making sense of the bitter experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran. In the analysis of the emergence of Khomeini’s Islamic state, for example, in the chapter on the Islamic revolution it is shown how the three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability can be used to understand this event as an unintended consequence of interacting forces, voices and faces shaped by the warring regimes of truth in the state of belated inbetweenness.

In sum, this study can serve as an example of how hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of understanding can be used as complementary approaches (rather than substitute ones) in the production of contextualized knowledge about social phenomena.
Chapter 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place”.
Michel Foucault (1980: 93-4)

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of institutions in the process of socio-economic development is being increasingly acknowledged in the literature on socio-economic development, liberalization, privatization, and the economics of emerging markets, as manifested in the emergence of ‘institutional economics’ as a sub-discipline in economic theory.

The success of different waves of late-comers such as Japan, and Korea and recently China and India is being ever more explained by resorting to the specificity of their institutions, and the failures of many countries in Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and Russia is analysed through lack of the appropriate institutional structures in the historical and current contexts of their evolution. A consensus has been emerging on the fact that lack of natural resources or physical, financial and human capital cannot explain the roots of socio-economic stagnation. In a sense, the literature on development can be mapped on a conceptual space moving from natural capital (the importance of natural resources, and the specific characteristics of nature and geography), to physical and financial capital, human capital, and ultimately to social capital. The role of social capital and its main component, trust, is highlighted as the key prerequisite for the establishment of a stable path towards sustainable socio-economic development (see Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Tilly, 2005, among others).

As a developing country, Iran has enjoyed, for example, of rich reservoirs of natural resources, strategic geographical positioning, almost uninterrupted stream of oil revenues, and adequate amount of physical and human capital. Despite starting its leap for development with Japan in the second half of 19th century, the gap in the level of development between the two countries could not be greater, largely due to constant socio-political instability (see Aisen and Veiga, 2013) and intermittent
episodes of small and large scale social upheavals experienced in Iran alongside Japan being, at least internally, an ‘island of stability’ (Carter’s famous description of the Shah’s Iran) (see Gao, 2001, on Japan’s stability). In a century, Iranians have encountered many strong socio-political events in the forms of revolutions and large-scale movements alongside innumerable cases of almost daily socio-economic crises (Foran, 1994).

The history of modern Iran can be summarized in institutional failure, failure to construct stable and legitimate set of institutions required to achieve economic prosperity through establishing security, peace and order. This research, hence, as defined in Chapter 1, addresses and gives meaning to the question of why Iranian nation in its repeated attempts to construct institution of modern order, such as modern nation-state, modern parliamentary system, banking system, modern education system, and legal system failed so regularly and so consistently. If the question is traced to the lack of social capital and trust in the Iranian society, the research question of this study addresses the problem of why Iranian nation has not been able to generate adequate level of trust in the form of social capital in the social interactions to enable it to construct effective and efficient institutions necessary for achieving sustainable socio-economic development.

With regard to the fact that the literature on social capital (Evans, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Narayan, 1999; Fukuyama, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2002; Huang, 2010) points to the significance of social capital in the process of socio-economic development, the research question attempted in this study in the context of Iranian modern history is the following: What factors are involved in generating large scale mistrust in micro, meso and macro levels to increase frictions and to create paralyses and dysfunctionalities in the process of socio-economic transactions? As North (1990) maintains economic performance depends on stable institutions constituted from formal rules, informal customs and norms, and common belief systems, and their enforcement mechanisms. By reducing uncertainty inherent in the socio-economic transactions, stable institutions, with their three components, reduce the transactions costs and remove the frictions in markets and hierarchies and pave the way for socio-economic take-off. In the same spirit, Rodrik (2004, 2006, 2007) sees the essence of sustainable development in the establishment of institutions of conflict resolution. In the face of bounded rationality and the inherent incompleteness of

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29 For a critique of the concept of social capital see Fine, 2001, 2010a and 2010b.
contracts, Williamson (2000, 2002, 2005, 2010), a transaction-cost economist, emphasises on the role of informal norms and consensus, and common legal and ethical cultures in minimizing the costs of conflict resolution.

In explaining all socio-economic phenomena, Williamson (2000) distinguishes four levels of analysis, level of prices, level of governance, level of institution and level of mind, each of which function at its own specific time scale with differential speed of change, spanning a spectrum from instant change in prices to a millennium required for the change in mind-sets. At the level of prices, for example, the role of price signals in allocation of scarce resources in the markets is the focus of attention, while at the level of governance the internal structure of power, ownership and management, and the incentive mechanisms in socio-economic organizations (hierarchies) such as corporations, schools, families, bureaucracies is at the centre of gravity. At the level of institutions (such as property rights and institutions of conflict resolutions), the formal laws and informal rules defining and grounding the institutional structure of human activities are at the pinnacle of analysis, while at the level of mind the internal structure of human mind with its conscious and subconscious components, its values, beliefs and preferences is the focus of analysis. Overall, all these interactive systems produces the co-evolving structure of political economies.

These four levels of analysis can be summarised as follows:

(i) prices matter - referring to the premise that removing distortionary interventions in the signalling function of prices leads for the economy to grow based on its comparative advantages;

(ii) governance matters – referring to the premise that implementing stabilization policies at the macro level and organizing the contractual structures at the micro level culminates in the growth of the economy (making the rights and obligations of stakeholders at macro and micro levels transparent);

(iii) institutions matter – referring to the premise that ensuring the rule of law by designing institutions of conflict resolution and property rights leads for the economy to prosper; and
mind matters – referring to the premise that getting the structure of beliefs, values, and preferences right and making them compatible with the requirements of modern economy results in the economy to enjoy sustainable socio-economic development.

Removing price distortions and establishing proper governance structure may seem easy but arriving at right institutional structure or appropriate preference configuration may appear to be a daunting task. As such, Dixit (2003, 2004) acknowledges that in many developing countries the institutions of rule of law cannot be established as prerequisite of socio-economic growth and development, and as a result the state of lawlessness would be the default position in these national settings. He strives to develop a theory where the task of conflict resolution is achieved through private arrangements in the state of public lawlessness.

In acknowledging the lack of universal blueprints for constructing development-oriented institutions and in admitting to the specificity and uniqueness of the trajectory of emergence of them, Rodrik (2007, 2008) states that the recent sustained rate of growth in China is achieved not through public institutions guaranteeing the rule of law as exercised in the Western societies but through the distinctly Chinese institutions of district and village ownership developed in the communist era. Many researchers of Far East countries such as Japan and South Korea (see: Ha-Joon Chang 1994, 2003, 2008; Wade 1990) view their processes of industrialization and modernization as an outcome of the close cooperation and negotiation among the political, military, bureaucratic, scientific, and business elites of these societies rather than the rule of law as formulated and implemented in the Western countries. This body of research explicitly or implicitly strives to immunize the researchers against the epistemological diseases of Orientalism and Eurocentrism, and prompt us to search for country-specific model of socio-economic development away from universalism inherent to most social and economic theories.

Another strand of literature in economic theory takes us to the direction, which results in the premise that ‘history matters’ (Tilly, 2006). Arthur (1994, 1997) and David (1985, 2000, 2007) demonstrate that whenever increasing return to scale is at work in a context, the economy may get locked in an inefficient outcome purely because of a (even small) random event; as such the phenomenon of path dependency is the result of the work of increasing return to scale. It can therefore be
argued that history in the form of random events may determine the economic stagnation of a specific country or region.

The existence and prevalence of path-dependent systems (entailing ‘non-ergodic stochastic processes’) make almost all forms of socio-economic analysis historical. David (1985: 332, original emphases; see also Arthur 1994, Pierson 2000, Mahoney and Schensul 2006, David 2007) emphasizes on this important point in the following terms:

A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are called non-ergodic. In such circumstances "historical accidents" can neither be ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic analysis; the dynamic process itself takes on an essentially historical character.

Lang (2009: 103) attests that in macroeconomics of labour market, some ‘path dependent’ models generate involuntary unemployment “after two shocks of the same size but of opposite signs”. According to the literature on economics of complex systems (Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur et al., 1997; Blume and Durlauf, 2006; Hommes, 2013) it is possible to identify some random events that disrupted the on-going course of events, with irreversible consequences.

Due to the widespread presence of phenomenon of increasing return to scale and positive feedback mechanisms in the socio-economic systems (norms and beliefs are knowledge-based phenomena with strong tendency for increasing return to scale), path dependency is prevalent in such entities. The notion of path-dependency will transform the social sciences into sciences of historical evolution of social phenomena as it necessitates that Geertz’s (1973) ‘thick descriptions’ (equivalent to Hirschman’s [1984] ‘against parsimony’) need to replace or complement the reductionist thin ones (Solow’s ‘keep it simple’). This notion can be deployed, for example, to analyse the North-South divide in the international order or ‘the tale of two cities’ in New York or London. Pierson (2000, 2004) utilizes the concept of path dependency to analyse distinct trajectories of welfare states. The notion of path-

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30 To acknowledge how the detailed historical analysis is gradually creeping into highly formalistic economic journals like American Economic Review see for example Libecap (2011).
dependency leads Hodgson (2001, 2002, 2004) to reject the universalism intrinsic to
the mainstream economics and argue that there is a need to have different theories to
analyse different economic phenomena and systems, implying that historical
contexts must be taken into account by recognising the historically situated
(embedded and incommensurable) nature of economic phenomena.

When we combine the two aforementioned strands we reach the conclusion that
based on five premises of ‘prices matter’, ‘governance matters’, ‘institutions matter’,
‘mind matters’, and ‘history matters’, we can venture on a historical analysis of the
country-specific roots of socio-economic stagnation, utilizing an interdisciplinary
approach at the interface between ‘development economics and institutional
economics’, fully taking advantage of theories in philosophy (such as the theoretical
readings of Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze, and Berlin, amongst others),
psychoanalysis (such as of Lacan), economics and politics.

Thus, construction of a logic is possible, whereby history embeds and shapes the
embodied minds which overflows into institutions, governance structures and price
mechanisms. The basic point is that the historical functioning of the economic
system through the signalling role of prices at the international and national levels
generates opportunities for national, regional and local economies to initiate their
process of development by activating their static comparative advantages (whether
this comparative advantage is in natural resources, cheap labour, geographical
positioning as a hub, tourism or any other component) and to start their processes of
rapid growth and use the yields and surpluses of growth to generate sustainable
socio-economic development through engendering dynamic comparative advantages
in higher value-added and knowledge-based sectors and products with increasing
return to scale, but the whole process requires coordination between all those four
Williamsonian levels of mind, institutions, governance and prices.

In a sense, sustainable socio-economic development is a process of generating
surpluses and accumulation of wealth by moving from static comparative advantages
to dynamic comparative advantages, but the whole process require a level of
dynamic cohesiveness achieved through the dance of co-evolution, multilateral
harmonization, and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization (Mosekilde et
al., 2002; Foster and Hözl, 2004) between those four aforementioned levels, which
by implication involves the functioning of the whole social order within a particular

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social formation. That is why we require a set of methodologies and theoretical frameworks enabling us to study social orders in their wholeness (the dynamic movements between those four levels) and in their uniqueness, specificity and contingency referring to case specific analysis beyond all forms of content universalism.

Depending on the nature of social order, the process of chaotic synchronization of four levels of social assemblages may fundamentally succeed resulting in the creation of homogenous societies like the Western countries and Japan, or it may produce heterogeneous and highly stratified societies like Lebanon or Malaysia with relatively stable consensual system of division of power, or may partially succeed, which produce dysfunctional social orders like Iran, Mexico, Pakistan and Russia or may totally fail, which engenders failing social orders as in Somalia or Afghanistan. There are also categories of countries that have been in transition from one category to another such as China and India, moving from the state of dysfunctionalities to a state of homogeneity or countries like Yemen, Iraq or Syria, which may be moving towards becoming failed states.  

Based on the stability and intensity of social cohesion, hence, there are four types of societies: homogenous, heterogeneous, troubled and failed. Iran belongs to the troubled category with dysfunctional synchronization while having the traces of the other three in its constitution. This is a typological analysis, but as we mentioned elsewhere in this study, the typological and axiomatic analysis need to be accompanied with the topological ones (see: Tizro, 2011; Flynn, 2005), which we embark on throughout this study. Based on Hodgson’s verdict, which is reiterated in the recent reports on development from World Bank and IMF (2005), different economic phenomena require different theories, and historical contexts and local  

31 Of course in each social order we may have pockets of phenomena or orders with the characteristics of the alternative categories. Three phenomena of prostitution (Jeffreys, 2009), drug consumption (Gray, 2012) and migration (Doty, 2003) are examples of social phenomena where most Western countries are suffering from various degrees of dysfunctionalities and failings manifested in the fuzzy status of prostitution between being legal and illegal (the shadow economy of prostitution), and the war on drug and its dysfunctionalities and devastating effects on both sides of the border between Mexico and the USA and in the whole world with large Western demand and the countries of supply in Colombia, Burma, and Afghanistan and transit countries like Iran and Russia or in the case of migration between Mexico and the USA or Europe and the rest of the world particularly North Africa and Middle East where there is a dysfunctional synchronization between the forces of globalization and the forces of nation-states. The positions of the West on drug, prostitution and migration and their supply and demand sides are schizophrenic (compare them with supply and demand of alcohol and cigarette and the new consensus built on smoking); what is different in Iran is that this schizophrenia (Shayegan, 1993) extends to the whole social order, covering almost every small or big issues of life, work and language.
knowledge (Rodik, 2007; Easterly 2001, 2007a, 2007b; Kalb, 2006) should be considered in the analysis.

Borrowing from different strands of theoretical literature in economics and beyond, and inspired by the unique history of socio-economic development in Iran, as mentioned previously, this study attempts to develop a unique theory for the analysis of Iranian experience of socio-economic stagnation and to apply it to the three major events in the Iranian modern history and their associated periods to demonstrate its potency in explaining the patterns and regularities inhibiting socio-economic development and creating socio-economic underdevelopment and stagnation. The philosophical dimension of the work borrows from the binary opposition of Heideggerian dasein (Heideggerian term for human existence as being-in-the-world) versus Cartesian cogito, or Heideggerian existential phenomenology (Dreyfus, 1991; Blattner, 2006) as opposed to Cartesian subject-object relation.

The Cartesian approach to social phenomena leads to the strand of social analysis based on reductionism. The Heideggerian phenomenology culminates in the articulation of social order (situating a social phenomenon in its signified and contextualized whole), producing a thick description of specificity and singularity of life-worlds acting as the background, riverbed, condition of possibility, and historical a priori for social phenomena. The analysis based on the features of complex adaptive systems serves as the bridge between the other two strands of social analysis. In a sense, every social assemblage in its vertical and horizontal movements possesses three levels of causational, system-based, and meaning-centred dynamisms captured by three strands of social analyses based on reductionism, complexity systems, and worlds of significations (captured by cultural psychoanalysis).

In the methodological analysis undertaken by this study, the Heideggerian being-in-the-world is characterized by the Lacanian trinity of ‘symbolic’, ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ orders. Furthermore, the Foucauldian articulation of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Flynn 2005) is deployed to characterize the affirmative dimensions of a symbolic order. In addition, Deleuzian process philosophy (DeLanda, 2006) is deployed to elaborate on affirmative dimension of ‘real’ and Kristeva’s, Laplanche’s and Castoriadis’s theories and philosophies are adopted and adapted to theorize the affirmative dimension of ‘imaginary’. Zizekian (1989, 2012) interpretation of Lacan (based on three negating dimensions of disruption, foreclosure, repression and
disavowal, and ideology and fantasy) is used to characterize the negating dimensions of ‘real’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ as embedded and embodied in various forms of being-in-the-world and social assemblages.

In a sense, this study has been set up to demonstrate that Rodrik’s (2007, 2008) emphasis on local knowledge in designing country-specific recipes for economic development and Williamson’s diagnosis of ‘mind matters’ in determining the economic destiny of a nation or a community inevitably take us to deep waters and uncharted territories of philosophical, psychoanalytic and other interdisciplinary theories never fathomed by these economic theorists. The analysis is expected to demonstrate that there is no universal cause of economic backwardness; in any specific community or nation specific factors emanating from specific situations may act to perpetuate the state of socio-economic underdevelopment. The study aims to establish the parameters of social science of singularity and situatedness where the study of causes is located at the holistic levels of complexity systems and worlds of significations by combining hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion, and demonstrate its potency in understanding the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran. The rest of this chapter is organized around introduction of the theoretical model in Section 2, and development of four cluster concepts of tragedy of confusion, impossibility of stable coalition formation, institutional failure, and chaotic order in Sections 3 to 6.

3.2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL (TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION)

As mentioned above, following the diagnosis made by Hodgson (2002), Rodick (2007, 2008) and the recent IMF report on development (2005), this study aims to come up with a conceptual model uniquely tailored to the Iran-specific experience of socio-economic (under)development. The main argument of this study revolves around the proposition that Iranian experience of backwardness is the outcome of failure to produce stable regime of truth (Foucault, 1980) as a result of dynamic interplay between the state of culture and the state of situation, as formulated by Malinowski (Firth, 2010). In the case of Iran, the state of culture is characterized in this work by the notion of ‘inbetweenness’ and the ‘state of situation’ by the concept of ‘belatedness’ (Bhabha, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Huddart, 2006; Shayegan, 2007; Byrne, 2009).
The state of ‘inbetweenness’ manifests itself in the notion of ‘tragedy of confusion’ resulting from the warring regimes of truth. The modern history of Iran is littered with ample evidence of tragedy of confusion. The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beg (Siyahatnameh-ye Ibrahim Beig) (Maragha’i, 2006) written at the end of the 19th century and one of the texts behind the Constitutional Revolution captures, as reported in Nasri (2007: 89, see also Sohrabi, 2012: 121-3), the Iranian state of confusion succinctly:

everywhere the landscape is disturbed (ashofteh), people disturbed, commerce disturbed, imagination disturbed, beliefs disturbed, city disturbed, king disturbed, oh God, why is there so much disturbance [everywhere]?

This description is applicable to almost all episodes of Iranian modern history- as Movahhded (1999, 2004a, 2004b) uses the notion of “confused (or disturbed) dreams (khab-e Ashofteh)” to characterize the oil-nationalization movement, affirming Ibrahim Beig’s insight on the nature of Iranian modern social reality- barring for the rare and fleeting moments of manifestation of “perfectly unified collective will” (Foucault, as reported in Afaray et al., 2005: 95) or rare cases of institutional stability. About a century later Simin Daneshvar (1993, 2001), the prominent Iranian novelist, explores the same themes of “disturbance”, ‘bewilderment’, ‘perplexity’ and ‘confusion’ in her trilogy “Wandering Island (Jazireh-ye Sargardani)”, “Wandering Cameleer (Sareban-e Sargardan)”, and “Wandering Mountain (Koh-e Sargardan)”.

The state of belatedness, on the other hand, refers to the state where Iranian social order has found itself dwarfed by the shocking arrival of modernity, positioning it in the state of catching up (Abramovitz, 1986) and outside-in (rather than inside-out) model of development. The interaction between these two states is captured in the theoretical model proposed in this study as articulated in the following sections and in the previous and next chapters. This model starts from the level of mind as a social institution, as elaborated by Arkoun (2006) and the transaction-cost economist, Williamson (2000), and explores the implications of the specific characteristics of Iranian mind and preference structure in an attempt to develop a micro, meso and macro dynamic model in fulfilling the aim of this study.
3.2.1 Proposed Conceptual Model

The proposed conceptual model can be expressed in the following way: Tragedy of confusion emanates from the state of inbetweenness with its associated confused preference structure, as Iranians have been captivated by three rival regimes of truth and identity markers of Islam, Persianism (the idea of pre-Islamic Iran), and Western modernity. The state of inbetweenness in its interaction with the state of belatedness prompts the translation of three regimes of truth into three projects of social engineering. This dynamics results in the emergence of three projects of reverse social engineering of ‘Persianization’ (bastan-geraei), Islamization (Islam-geraei or Islami kardan), and modernization in order to achieve social transformation.

Reverse social engineering requires the formation of collective will and collective action, which through formation of stable coalitions could achieve its goals. But in the state of confusion the formation of such coalitions is almost impossible. This leads to a phenomenon described as ‘situational impossibility theorem’ in this study, indicating that in the complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness (hence, belated inbetweenness) it is impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work and language to achieve the desired social transformations (we will see why later). This leads to turning Iran into a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels. This in turn leads to the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘institutional failure’ in the form of inability to construct stable and functional institutions such as modern nation-state, or market economy based on property rights or any other stable forms of institutional structures, which turns Iran into the country of institutional dysfunctionalities and deformities. The accumulated experiences of ‘tragedy of confusion’, ‘formation of unstable coalitions’ and ‘institutional failure’ lead to the emergence of a society immersed in a state of ‘chaotic order’.

The state of chaotic order can be explained in the following terms: the experience of tragedy of confusion with its associated instability of coalitions and institutional dysfunctionalities frequently leads to the emergence of widespread sense of discontent and disillusionment, in turn, triggering the emergence of large- and small-scale social movements and revolutions culminating in the experience of constant waves of socio-political instability, where the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between
and within various social assemblages in the springs of freedom, and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. In this process, the order is restored based on the emergence of final arbiter or the Iranian leviathan as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution leading to socio-economic underdevelopment and stagnation.

The following sections, hence, aims to briefly discuss and unpack the components of this theoretical model.

3.2.2 Tragedy of Confusion

Our voyage of discovery for understanding the complexity, specificity, and singularity of Iranian experience of underdevelopment starts with the fundamental question of ‘What constitutes Iranianness (in the same vein as Turkishness, Britishness, …)?’, as the question of ‘Why are we backward?’ logically leads to the question of ‘Who and what are this ‘we’ as Iranians?’.

With regard to the notion of Iranianness and its constitution, Frye (1977: 1-3), the Harvard professor of the Iranian history, observes that:

Of all of the lands of the Middle East, Iran is perhaps both the most conservative and at the same time the most innovative. Whereas Egypt and Syria, for example, underwent great changes in the course of two millennia of history, Iran seems to have preserved much more of its ancient heritage. The Christianization of the eastern Mediterranean world brought a profound break with the past for both Egypt and Syria... Iran, however, retained its ancient Zoroastrian faith, together with customs and practices, unchanged by alliance to a new religion. Politically, too, Iranians never forgot the glories of imperial rule... Empires and kingdoms come and go, but the memory of a unified great state not only continued to inspire folk bards and poets but also to motivate political action... Then came Islam... It was more than a religion. It was a way of life and a complete culture and civilization which erased the past.... Iran was converted to the religion of Islam, but ... [t]he continuity of ancient Iranian traditions down to the present is impressive... Paradoxically ... Herodotus ... said that no people were more prone to accept foreign habits as the Persians. Anyone who has walked the streets of new Tehran can see all kinds of styles of architecture and the latest women’s dress styles from Paris and elsewhere.

Bernard Lewis (2004: 43) affirms Frye’s observation in the following terms:

These other countries of ancient civilization, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, were Islamized and Arabized in a remarkably short time. Their old religions were either abandoned entirely or dwindled into small minorities; their old languages almost disappeared. Some survived in scriptures and liturgies, some

32 There is a burgeoning literature in economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Sen, 2007; Davis, 1994) exploring the relation between identity and socio-economic outcomes, which is largely based on a reductive approach relying on thin descriptions, and treating identity as a variable rather than a worldhood.
were still spoken in a few remote villages, but in most places, among most people, the previous languages were forgotten, the identities expressed in those languages were replaced, and the ancient civilizations of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt gave way to what we nowadays call the Arab world. Iran was indeed Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained Persians.

Lewis (2004: 46; see also Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001, 2009) further adds that

We see the difference in a number of ways: in the emergence of a kind of national epic poetry, which has no parallel in Iraq or Syria or Egypt or any of these other places; and in the choice of personal names. In the Fertile Crescent and Westwards, the names that parents gave their children were mostly names from the Qur’an or from pagan Arabia—Ali, Muhammad, Ahmad, and the like. These names were also used in Iran among Muslim Persians. But in addition, they used distinctively Persian names: Khusraw, Shapur, Mehyar and other names derived from a Persian past—a recent Persian past, that of the Sassanids, but nevertheless Persian. We do not find Iraqis calling their sons Nebuchadnezzar or Sennacherib, nor Egyptians calling their sons Tutankhamen or Amenhotep.

These observations demonstrate how the three large forces of Persianism (the affiliation to the Iranian ancient pre-Islamic heritage), Islam and Western modernity—as three distinct regimes of truth (regimes of truth as Foucauldian “things of this world” and as Lacanian-Zizekian (2001) pieces of symbolic ‘real’) interact and intermingle to shape the minds, institutions (all realms of life from family to economy, polity and security), systems of governance, and the configuration of prices in the Iranian society.

Foucault (1984: 73) coins the notion of regimes of truth in the following terms:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

He further elaborates on the notion of truth and its intertwinement with power:

“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. “Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it—A “regime” of truth.
The three hybrid packages of (real-symbolic-imaginary) truth of Persianism, Western modernity and Islam fulfil Foucault’s definitions. These ‘symbolic’ pieces of ‘real’ act as grid of intelligibility and condition of possibility and impossibility for actions, affects and thoughts (see methodology chapter). Regimes of truth are social assemblages which are subject to the rules and regularities governing the complex adaptive systems, and survive and thrive through the processes of ‘reproduction’ (constant routine circulation, reproduction, and reiteration of truths about life, work and language inside its various platforms and institutions of power, knowledge and subjectivity), ‘variation’ (borrowing from alternative regimes of truth through assimilation, accommodation, and appellation without losing their integrity and identity), and ‘inheritance’ (the use of social institutions and techniques of memory and subjectification to transfer itself to next generation of social assemblages).

Abrahamian (2008: 2) alludes to the affiliation of Iranians with alternative regimes of truth in the following terms:

Iranians identify with both Shi‘i Islam and their pre-Islamic history, especially the Sassanids, Achaemenids, and Parthians. Names parents choose for their children are living proof of this: from Shi‘ism come Ali, Mehdi, Reza, Hussein, Hassan, and Fatemeh; from ancient Iran, via the poet Ferdowsi and his epic Shahnameh (Book of Kings), come Isfandiyar, Iskandar, Rostam, Sohrab, Ardashir, Kaveh, Bahram, and Atossa.

Milani (2011b) points to the same fact when he states that:

Iranian identity is bifurcated, split between the pre-Islamic traditions of Zoroastrian and Manichean millennium before Islam, and the Islam-influenced developments of the last 1,300 years. But there has never been a consensus about which side of this bifurcation should be privileged.

The two notions of bifurcation and giving privilege or precedence to one regime of truth over another, deployed by Milani in the above quote, play important roles in our analysis, as our voyage of discovery strives to combine thick and thin descriptions through achieving cross-fertilization and hybridization between causational analysis (Cartesian cogito’s reductionism), analysis based on complex adaptive systems (lending the notions of bifurcation and butter-fly effects, for
example), and articulations achieved through the notion of worldhood (Heidegger’s compound notion of being-in-the-world or Foucault’s notion of regime of truth or Castoriadis’ notion of world of signification).

The use of hybrid method of analysis guides us to introduce the three principles of ‘embeddedness’ (rootedness), ‘emergence’ (the law of unintended consequences), and ‘incommensurability’ (viewing social phenomena as texts imbued with meanings and significations alongside acknowledgement of the fact that the state of misunderstanding and misreading is the default position plaguing the relation between social assemblages). This way of analysis acknowledges that social phenomena emerge in the interplay between the context of culture (incommensurable forms of embeddedness) and the context of situation (the ecology of social assemblages encompassing the topological configuration of different emergent social assemblages).

Following Badiou (Hallward, 2003), the best way to see the two notions of context of culture and context of situation is to theorize them as two sets. Each psycho-social phenomenon is the outcome of the interplay of set of historical embeddedness (context of culture) and the set of the geographical configuration of social assemblages (context of situation). One relates to how time is configured and another to how space is organized. While Milani (2011b) does not include the continuous presence of the West in the matrix of Iranian social identity, order, and public imagination, Bausani (1975: 44; added emphasis), Italian Orientalist, attests to the uninterrupted presence of the West in the Iranian life-world: “we may distinguish a slow process of Westernization during the entire course of Iranian cultural history”.

Milani’s observation was reaffirmed by Sharifi (2013), Shayegan (2007), Soroush (1993), Jahanbeglou (2004, 2008), and Rajaee (2007: 3, 24; 2006), Asgharzadeh (2007), Mackey (1998), among others, but only by adding the dimension of Western modernity to the prism of Iranian identity.

Shayegan (2007: 87-91) introduces the notion of inbetweeness (‘na in na aani’ literally translatable as ‘not thisness not thatness’) and comes up with the grand, shocking, and paradoxical observation that “the current state of identitylessness is our identity” (Shayegan, 2007: 90). Javad Tabataba’i (2006: 74), a prominent historian of political thought in Iran, endorses the same observation by maintaining that “from the perspective of the history of thought, the modern history of Iran
commenced in the state of not-this-not-that”. Following these historical observations on the forces at work in the Iranian society, we start our analytical voyage with the structure of Iranian embodied and embedded mind (Williamson’s level zero) and introduce two notions of ‘confusion’ and ‘tragedy’.

3.2.2.1 Confusion

The notion of confusion is intended to capture the fact that each and every Iranian person is simultaneously captivated and repelled, affirmatively or negatively, by three large historical forces of Persianism (bastan-gerayee, i.e. classicism or archaism), Islam, and modernity (tajaddod and its dominant forms of Westernism=gharb-garaei). As Nietzsche put it historical (unconscious) forces shape and configure subjectivities and their preferences and intentionality (Ferrer, 2004: 81). The unique and long history of Iranian nation on the Silk Road of alternative cultures and civilizations bequeaths them with a distinctive discursive and non-discursive reservoir and repertoire of historical resources in the form of three grand meta-narratives or regimes of truth originating in the Persian Empire, Islam, and Western modernity which function as identity markers overflowing into everyday life of the nation in all sites of being and becoming from birth to death, in the selection of names at birth to selection of dress code, public spheres and spaces (like streets, parks, beaches, mountains etc.), to family, polity, economy, art, science, education and entertainment. In this process, every site of social existence becomes a battleground for these three proselytizing forces for attaining a monopolistic position in the market for production of truth, turning Iranian social order into a site for incessant truth war in the search for total allegiance and loyalty.

In this dynamics, each regime of truth strives to be the dominant force in the market for packages of ‘truth about’ life, work and language. When one particular regime of truth wins the battle and takes over the formal structures of life, language and work, informal guerrilla wars are initiated by the marginalized ones. For example, when the coalition between Persian classicism and modernization dominated the socio-political space in the Pahlavi era, and the Western dress code under the appellation of Persianism became the advocated public policy, the Islamic side staged a guerrilla war by adopting and developing a new Islamic dress code which became dominant in the next era, which in turn invoked another round of backlash guerrilla war from the Western style of dress code in this period (see Paidar, 1995; Sedghi, 2007); while
Western style fashion designers were the dreaded and decadent cultural elites of the Pahlavi era they were turned into revolutionary guerrilla fighters in the Islamic era, as manifested in the notion of lipstick jihad (Moaveni, 2005).

These forces have shaped the material landscape of existence in speech and action through alternative structures of power/knowledge, institutional arrangements and discursive formations, all materially embodied in memory and in senses, shaping the experiences associated with embodiment in the realms of vision, sound, smell, taste and touch. These three alternative paradigms of ‘language’, ‘thought’, ‘affects’, ‘actions’, and ‘organization of objects’ with their distinct ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, jurisprudence, mythologies, rituals, ceremonies, processions, memories, narratives, and sign systems formed on three axes of truth, goodness and beauty and manifested in discursive and non-discursive practices are dynamically defined in contradistinction to each other in a process of constantly changing unities in multiplicities.

These forces are events and processes, keeping their unities through the narratives of trajectories of their evolution (via symbolized and imagined genealogies and appellations); these are the retroactive and forward-looking narratives, which weave the present to the past and future, and are associated with particular conceptions of space-time continuum. Each force has the traces of the other in its constitutional make-up. These forces intermingle and generate rhizomatic movements and hybrid forms of beings at the level of ‘real’, while at the level of ’symbolic’, each regime of truth strives to incorporate the best of the alternatives under its own discursive integrity, while at the level of ‘imaginary’ (ideological and phantasy level) attempts are made to purify each regime of truth from being contaminated and polluted by the alternatives, which instigates the process of glorification of the self, based on its own white book of records and its own politics of piety, and demonization of the other, based on the black book of the other and her politics of ordinary, which presumes a Cartesian logic of subject-object relation and an Aristotelian logic of substance ontology. This dynamics generates a heavy burden of judgement and leads to the tragedy of confusion for the Iranian dasein.

The state of belated inbetweenness prompts the emergence of different projects of reverse social engineering to counter the sense of backwardness induced by the dwarfing effects of the arrival of modernity. As Rothenberg (2011: 1) puts it:
In their logic, we find the most common gesture of every political program and every call for social change: identify a problem, locate its cause, and then eliminate that cause to solve the problem. This logic seems so self-evident as to be virtually tautological.

As we addressed in the methodology chapter, taking the approach of reverse social engineering is the outcome of the application of Cartesian cogito-based reductive method of analysis to the social phenomena. As Borgmann (1993: 35) reminds us: “In the Discourse on Method, Descartes explicated his method in four rules: the rule of abstraction, of dissection, of reconstruction, and of control.” The application of this reductive method in the state of belated inbetweenness turns regimes of truth into projects of reverse social engineering. Each regime of truth gives rise to a project of social transformation. This process culminates in the emergence of three large projects of social change in the forms of Persinaization, Islamization and modernization, as each regime of truth historically evolved to specialize in particular filed of rationality- Islam in emancipative rationality, modernity in instrumental rationality, and Persianism in communicative rationality (these are addressed more extensively later in this chapter)- and are deemed lacking and less credible in alternative fields of rationality. As such, they attempt to fill the gaps by adopting and borrowing from their rivals. Regimes of truth, as things of this world, are engulfed in the play of finitude/infinitude (Foucault’s analytics of finitude, see Flynn, 2005) and endowed with abundances and lacks, affirmations and negations; they attempt to mend their lacks by assimilating the select bright elements of the others as a ‘defensive strategy’.

This process leads each project to become constitutive of three wings (subprojects). The three wings of Persinization project are: ‘Persianized Persianization’, ‘Persianized Islamization’, and ‘Persianized modernization’. The three wings of Islamization project are: ‘Islamized Islamization’, ‘Islamized Persianization’ and ‘Islamized modernization’. The corresponding three wings of modernization project are: ‘modernized modernization’, ‘modernized Islamization’, and ‘modernized Persianization’. As such each project has turned into a hybrid combination of all three regimes of truth, while prioritizing one regime of truth over the other two. Inside each hybrid project of reverse social engineering there has emerged shades of voices emanating from the permutational combination of elements of the three sets (regimes) of truth. Voices emerge out of application of operations of addition and
subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth. Khomeini’s voice of political Islam, for example, can be described as:

\[
\text{fiqh} + \text{Islamic philosophy} + \text{Islamic mysticism} + \text{revolutionary Islam} + \\
\text{progressive clergy} - \text{reactionary clergy} + \text{Western constitutionalism} + \text{Western science and technology} - \text{Western social freedom (sex, drug and rock and roll)} + \\
\text{modern social justice} - \text{modern godlessness} + \text{Persian poetry} - \text{Persian monarchy}.
\]

This, as can be seen, is a particular hybrid combination of the elements of three regimes of truth, distinct from Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s voice of cultural Islam (Hiro, 2013), Shariati’s voice of political Islam (Rahnema, 1998), Bazargan’s voice of liberal Islam (Chehabi, 1990, Bazargan, 1984), or Mujahedin’s voice of Marxist Islam (Abrahamian, 1989). We will map the internal composition of these voices more extensively in this chapter and in the application chapters, as these voices are much more detailed and issue-based than presented at this junction of our voyage of discovery.

It should be noted that voices inhabit faces depending on particular trajectories of the biographical and genealogical evolution of social assemblages and social faces (individuals, organizations, and groups); the different levels of exposure to the different regimes of truth generate different types of voices and faces. Thus, in a sense, the faces have become the seat of voices. In ‘face’ and ‘voice’ relationship, the faces migrate from one voice to another in a dynamical process where it is not possible to attribute fixed identities to them. Forces, voices and faces move in a dance of music chair where faces cannot be affiliated to fixed set of forces and voices, compared to heterogenized or homogenized societies where faces assume stable identities via their stable affiliation to stable set of voices and forces and their associated institutions. In the troubled society of Iran, faces frequently convert to alternative set of forces and voices as they encounter novel contexts of situation. Different contexts of situation, even on a daily basis, prime and activate different components of alternative regimes of truth and their emergent hybrid voices. This is manifest in the (in)famous saying of Makhmalbaf, the renowned Iranian filmmaker, where he confessed that

I wake up in the morning as Che Guevara, at noon I am Abuzar [the famous disciple of the prophet Mohammad, glamorized by Shariati for the purity of his egalitarian and revolutionary zeal], in the afternoon I am Forough [the distinguished Iranian modernist poet], and in the night Sadegh Hedat [the
This observation applies to almost all Iranians who move back and forth nomadically between the boundaries of alternative regimes of truth in various moments of their lives and form bewildering variety of constantly changing cultural tribes as a result. Therefore, faces become the dynamical texts where forces and voices imprint themselves on. As such, in such a bewildering state of belated inbetweenness, actions, texts, faces, experiences, and events become different social assemblages and sites where warring regimes of truth battle for territory and loyalty. This process establishes the ‘confusion’ element of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness as an inevitable outcome of Iranian embeddedness, where Iranian dasein is a “projective thrownness” (Mulhall, 1996: 127; Aho, 2009) immersed in the tug of war between alternative regimes of truth endowed with incommensurable set of truth about life, work and language. This throws every Iranian social assemblage (individuals, organizations, groups and the whole social order) in a state of tri-polarity. The modes and moods of living, thinking and talking ‘bifurcate’ unpredictably between alternative regimes of truth and their innumerable voices emanating from countless incidences of hybrid combinations and permutations.

This confusion originates from the fact that the Heideggerian fourfold of mortals, gods, the sky and the earth, and their associated brands of rationalities (instrumental, communicative and emancipative) are conceptualized and packaged differently in each regime of truth. The potentially infinite ways in which the different elements of these packages of truth can be combined create irreconcilable differences within and between voices and faces. In this state of ‘confusion’ in the Iranian dasein where no fixed identity can be assumed for any Iranian social assemblage we see the working of embeddedness (rootedness), emergence, and incommensurability as three principles constitutive of social phenomena. Social actors and analysts frequently misunderstand the meaning of social phenomena and as such commit the cardinal sin of counter-transference in the inevitable act of cultural psychoanalysis. In this, the notion of incommensurability calls for seeing the social assemblages as worlds of signification with their particular dictionaries and their associated denotations and connotations. This calls for understanding of Iranian dictionary associated with the
dynamic and non-linear interplay between the states of inbetweenness and belatedness.

In the next element (tragedy) we will see the working of the principle of emergence more clearly.

3.2.2.2 Tragedy

The notion of ‘tragedy’ is meant to hint to the disastrous unintended consequences of individual actions (Poole, 2005). In the interface between the Iranian context of inbetweenness and belatedness, the interplay between the individual actions, speeches and emotions create tragic unintended consequences. In the context of belated inbetweenness, the evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization between alternative forces, voices and faces produces frequent experiences of failures, dysfunctions, and deformities without any need for devious plots, intentional fallacy, intelligent design, or conspiracy theory. In this tragic context, a series of intelligent designers and reverse social engineers of different orientations intent on transforming the society from top to toe produce the unintended consequence of a history of confusion, instability, deformity, and chaotic order.

In the genre of tragedy the intentions and actions of characters of the story are secondary to the spontaneous doomed plot casting its shadow over their social and personal existence. The Greek exposition of tragedy in the story of Antigone and its Iranian counterpart in the story of Rostam and Sohrab where the father kills the son (filicide) unintentionally and unknowingly (Islami Nadooshan, 2004: 24-5; Katouzian, 2010: 22-24; Dabashi, 2011: 92-3), alongside the notion of tragedy of commons in the economic theory are three examples of a mode of thought and analysis where social events are emergent outcomes of the interaction between embedded forces rather than the intended outcome of conscious faces engaged in the epic struggle between good and evil, right and wrong, and modern and traditional as manifested in the discourses of transition\(^{33}\) or the dichotomous or dialectical logics of antagonism and confrontation\(^ {34}\). As Markell (2003; 74-5; emphasis added) puts it

\(^{33}\) As manifested in the conception of development as structural change based on the shift from tradition to modernity or in the share of three sectors of the economy, like Chenery’s and other version of the transition theories from big push to take off, to bottle-neck and the rest.

\(^{34}\) As manifested in all oppositional genres of literature between modern and pre-modern in liberal and neo-conservative theories or theories of post-colonialism and cultural studies alongside orientalism and subaltern literature like Spivak and Said and anti-development literature.
Aristotle makes a famous claim about the relative importance of the constituent parts of tragic drama: “The most important of the six [parts of tragedy],” he says, “is the combination of the incidents of the story,” for “tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life”…. Thus, for Aristotle, “the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of tragedy is the plot,” while “characters [e’the]’ come second”…; indeed, character is included for the sake of the action rather than the other way around.

The notion of plot corresponds to the notion of emergence (and not to the plans cooked in the minds of the social actors).

The genre of tragedy (Nietzsche, 1999) captures the interaction between the Apollonian force of embeddedness- which gives form and meaning to human existence- and the Dionysian force of emergence- the dynamism inherent to ‘being’ through its valance (Elster, 1998) and its ‘power to affect and be affected’ (see Adrian Parr, 2010 on this Deleuzian notion), generating new forms of beings which act as sources of chaos and disorder in the fabric of embedded reality, producing and adding new layers to it. Accordingly, the Iranian embeddedness with its multiple forms of regimes of truth generates emergent and unintended consequences of ‘tragedy of confusion’, which is enacted in texts of discourses and contexts of strong and weak historical and biographical events.

The concept of ‘tragedy of commons’ (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) in economics captures the adverse collective consequences of individually rational actions culminating, for example, in the devastation of natural resources. In the same way, Prisoners’ Dilemma in game theory is a theoretical device designed to capture the calamitous and unintended collective outcome of the individually rational actions (Dixit, 1999). Put it in a game-theoretic language, the invocation of the notion of tragedy in the context of modern Iranian history is meant to indicate that although the construction of social orders is a coordination game (a potential win-win structure), in the context of Iranian embeddedness it has turned into a prisoner’s dilemma game in the form of a lose-lose structure (Hardin, 1995).

The notion of ‘tragedy’ is closely related to two notions of embeddedness (thrownness) and emergence (projection) and to the fact that social orders are non-linear adaptive worlds of signification, as addressed in the methodological section of this study. In a sense what Iranian dasein is suffering from and is at the heart of its
‘tragedy of confusion’ is the specific nature of its ‘projective thownness’. The doomed plot, in the context of political economy of truth in Iran, is rooted in the Malinowskian notion of ‘context of culture’ in its interplay with the ‘context of situation’. The context of culture and the notion of embeddedness is actualized in the Iranian state of inbetweenness where three large forces of Persianism, Islam and Western modernity intermingle via the incessant emergence of new generative and rhizomatic forms of phenomena resulting from their interactions in all sites of social existence from self, to family, state, street, to arts and culture, economy, security, and diplomacy. The context of situation is captured by the notion of belatedness, which calls for the wholesale transformation in social order, inspiring the emergence of different projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering. When the state of belatedness combines with the Iranian state of inbetweenness it provides a recipe for disaster in the form of the social calamity of the tragedy of confusion.

The interplay between the two contexts of culture and situation gives rise to the emergence of different projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering whose legitimacy and credibility are perpetually contested viciously, through episodes of epistemic or physical violence, in wars of attrition being waged against alternative truth camps, leading to the erosion of mutual trust and emergence of unstable social order, unable to take any form of stable synchronized and harmonized collective action and incapable of consistently pursuing any model of sustainable development. In the continuum of forces and voices each voice deems itself as pure and unadulterated and others to the left and right of itself as too radical or too pragmatic and embarks on de-legitimizing them incessantly through activation of religious or non-religious brands of discourses of binary oppositions of good against evil by demonizing the radical other and glorifying the self. No force, voice, or face is capable of granting legitimacy to its radical others and accepting them as its legitimate interlocutors in the evolutionary process of social production of truth.

As such, our voyage of discovery gives rise to a set of novel concepts such as the notions of ‘dysfunctionalities and deformities’ alongside the notion of ‘zombie’ (the return of the repressed, the rerun of forms of life which looked ‘dead and buried’, ‘zombie categories’ and ‘zombie institutions’; see Bauman, 2000: 6; Quiggin, 2010), amongst others, to describe the chaotic social order produced by the state of tragedy of confusion. More extensive and detailed analysis of the notion of burden of judgement (and how Iranian dasein becomes confused between alternative regimes
of truth, where the black and white books of records (the balance sheets) of each regime of truth are assembled and strategically activated and deactivated, avowed and disavowed against each other in incessant waves of de-legitimizing and eroding war of attrition) was not included in this work due to word limitations.

These propaganda wars between alternative regimes of truth and their affiliates alongside bewildering arrays of radical and pragmatist positions and voices emerging out of combination of different components of the three regimes of truth makes the burden of judgement for the Iranian dasein even more unbearable and the degree and extent of his/her confusion much deeper and wider. The three associated notions of topology of voices, zombies, and blame games and victimization were further explored but were not included in this work due to word limitations.

3.2.3 Intertextuality and Intercontextuality

This section will explore the extent and manifestations of tragedy of confusion in the play of forces permeating and interlinking texts and contexts, in experiences of intertextuality and in intercontextuality. Intertextuality (Allen, 2000) represents the dialogue and interconnection between various texts and intercontextuality points to the dialogue and interconnection between diverse contexts (for the notion of contextuality, see Dummett, 1981; and for the notion of intercontextuality see Medina, 2006: 48-51). Medina (2006: 50, original emphases) states that

There is always an elsewhere to which any given context is oriented; in fact there is always a multiplicity of elsewhere, composed of past, future, and contemporaneous contexts. In this sense intercontextuality can be described as a kind of elsewhere

This hints towards viewing events and texts as social assemblages acting as the sites of operation of regimes of truth. Based on the two notions of intertextuality and intercontextuality, we will demonstrate that the current state of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran can be explored and understood in the interplay of five texts- the Quran, Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, the Hafez Poetry collection (Divan-e Hafez), Resaleh-ye Amaleieh (the self-help book of collection of Shia rulings), and Western constitutional and statutory book; and three strong events in the form of French Revolution (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990), revelation to Prophet Mohammad and Cyrus’ treatment of the Jews in the Achaemenid conquest of Babylon (Brosius,
The interaction between these texts and contexts produced three strong events of Iranian modern history: Constitutional Revolution, Oil Nationalization Movement (ONM), and Islamic Revolution. The three proto-constitutional treaties affiliated with modernity, orthodox Persianism and Shia Islam were Magna Carta, the Cyrus Cylinder, and Imam Ali’ letter to Malek-e Ashtar, his newly appointed governor-general of Egypt in 658-9, respectively (see Amin, 2003: 736; Amanat, 1997: 71). In effect, the Iranian dasein faced three forms (with their inevitable numerous intermingling) of ‘mirrors for princes’ genre of political writings in the shape of Islamic mirrors (Lambton, 1980), Persianist mirrors, and Western mirrors (see Brague, 2007: 119, 159; Tabataba’i, 2006). These are the main textual and contextual sites through which the play of forces are enacted and manifested.

While the Quran and Resaleh represent the Islamic dimension (Nasri, 2007: 435), the Western statutory book (with its roots in Western philosophy and political philosophy) epitomize the modern dimension, and Shahnameh which is called Persian Quran (Ghoran-e Ajam) (Islami-Nadooshan, 2007; Omidalar, 2011, 2012) embodies the regime of truth of Persianism. Shahnameh was resembled to the China’s wall in its protective function of the cultural empire of Iran (Azmayesh, 2001: 7) and in its functioning as a house of being for the Persian dimension of Iranian dasein (Azmayesh, 2001: 8-9, 14-5). The collection of Hafez poetry is the most captivating and magnificent hybrid space created by the Iranian dasein striving to combine all historical components of its identity (Persia, Islam, and the West) in an organic structure (see Ashouri 2011; Lewisohn 2010; Loloi 2004; Khoramshahi 1988). This is the closest terrain where all sides of Iranian identity can feel a sense of belonging and ownership to, which, hence, provokes the fierce battle between Iranian contemporary cultural figures such as Motahhari, Shamloo, Ashouri, Khoramshahi, Kasravi, and Kiarostami, among others, over the interpretation and ownership of this space. Ali Ferdowsi (2008: 670) alludes to this fact in the following terms:

This apperception of Hafiz is not restricted to any particular group or ideological tendency. From the most ardent Aryanist nationalists to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic the notion of the intimate bind between Hafiz and the national spirit of Iran is shared, even as they disagree over the essence and source of this connection.
Ferdowsi (2008: 691) further adds that Hafiz and his Divan have become the foci of a shared national sentiment that gather Iranians of various stripes, from zealot religionists to ardent secularists, into an imagined community of spiritual patrimony. Consequently Hafez, as Dick Davis (2012) maintains, “comes closest to being all things to all readers”.

It should be noted that the ‘Blind Owl’ or Boof-e Koor (1989), the famous novel of the renowned Iranian novelist Sadegh Hedayat (see Katouzian, 1991, 2008a; Mashallah Ajodani, 2006), is the modern battleground where the interaction between historical forces of Islam and Persianism is characterized as the relationship between a death-bound old man (Islam) and a heavenly girl (pre-Islamic Persia) in the context of a modern form of literature, novel (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006). In this work, the play of puritanism and pragmatism alongside the hybrid and bastard movements in thought and action are displayed in the character of Lakkateh (the loose woman, the whore) who represent the rhizomatic and contradictory nature of ‘real’ of Iranian social existence, manifesting the intermingling and co-existence of conflicting ways of thinking, talking, being and becoming. In the site of this surreal masterpiece, modernity acts as the context (context of belatedness) in which the conflict between Persianism, modernity, and Islam is enacted (state of inbetweenness). Hedayat’s use of modern medium of novel, as the unspoken and given background of the interaction, mirrors the universal dominance of modernity as the global context of interaction in all forms of textual and non-textual encounters (see Rajaee 2006, on the double function of modernity as the dominant civilization and as a contesting culture in the melting pot of rival cultures).

Hedayat’s ‘Blind Owl’ provides a rich textual contemporary terrain and a ‘wondrous world’ (Katouzian 2008a), alongside Hafez’s classical collection of poetry, where the forces of the West, Islam and Persianism battle over defining who and what Iranian dasein (Iranianness) is or can be. Thus, different forces and their associated voices and social movements can be mapped in this space by changing who the character of heavenly girl represents and who the force of death and decay is and what kind of background we should interact in. Ayatollah Khomeini (see Dinani, 2010b; Harmon, 2005; Algar 1999) in his special version of politics of piety (see Mahmood 2005), for example, views Islam as the heavenly girl being gradually suffocated by the forces of Persianism (which prioritizes common ancestry and
history over the emancipatory and liberating force of faith) and modernity (in its godlessness and excessive materialism) and contests the global and universal dominance of modernity as the hegemonic civilizational background and attempts to replace it with a modern civilizational form of Islam.

The interaction between purity and authenticity of angelic goodness embodied in the character of heavenly girl (whether it is deemed as pure Islam, pure modernity or pure Persianism as we mentioned in the notion of white book) and the deathly, despicable character of old man (whether it is violent and backward Islam or decadent and pernicious modernity or chauvinist Persianism, which is, in this study, already captured by the notion of black book) and the impurity and looseness of pragmatism captured in the character of Lakkateh (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006: 73-78), can provide us with a contemporary site to map the dynamics at work in modern history of Iran and its tragedy of confusion. The hazy and dreamy atmosphere of the novel recreates the confusions and dissonances experienced in all realms of Iranian social existence, the dreamy and surreal nature of Iranian social reality as captured in the quote from Ibrahim Beig or in the Movahhed’s notion of ‘confused dream’. Hedayat with his connection to Khayyam (see Aminrazavi 2005; Dinani 2011), with his famous life-affirming celebration of ‘here and now’ as opposed to faith’s death-affirming celebration of ‘hereafter’, further brings into sharp contrast the modern and Persianist spirits with the Islamic one. Shayegan (2012b) refers to how these multiple texts, from Hafez to Kant, worked on him and through him, each striving to operate as grid of intelligibility for his understanding of life, work and language.

Among the three historical contexts, the subject matter of the case studies in this work, the Constitutional Revolution enshrines the triumph of regime of truth of Western modernity and its associated project of modernization (with its three subprojects) to capture the public imagination and find the opportunity to attempt to modernize Iran based on the logic of rule of law and constitutional government (alongside some elements of socialist discourse) and through selectively reconfiguring and redeploying the forces of Islam and Persianism in the service of establishing modernity. In this era, the dominant position of modernity was severely challenged by alternative regimes of truth and their associated projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering.
The Oil Nationalization Movement (ONM) represents a short reformulated return to the project of Constitutional modernization sandwiched between the two Persianization periods of the Pahlavi rule. Mosaddegh’s modernization project strove to tame the forces of Islam, Persianism and colonial modernity and employ them in the service of reviving Iran’s independence from the external forces in order to establish a sovereign nation-state required for founding a constitutional order. On the other hand, the Pahlavi dynasty represented the triumph of the project of Persianization with its own three subprojects, attempting to restore the glory of Persian pre-Islamic kingdom through selective assimilation and repression of elements of Islam and modernity.

Islamic Revolution depicts the victory of the regime of truth of Islam and its project of Islamization (with its own three subprojects), the force of Islamic revivalism and its attempt to shape the terrain of national and international orders by taming the forces of modernity and Persianism and bringing them in the service of restoration of golden age of Islam.

In the Constitutional Revolution and the ONM, ‘the idea of’ modernity took the centre stage while in the Pahlavi order ‘the idea of’ Persia found official currency and in the Islamic Revolution ‘the idea of’ Islam managed to prevail. There is an intercontextual dialogue interlinking between these strong events as each is a reaction to the lacks and failures of the other, as there is an intertextual dialogue between the main texts of Iranian history: Shahnameh, for instance, is in constant dialogue with the Quran and Resaleh alongside the statute book of modernity with its theoretical underpinnings while striving to revive the Persian monarchy, Persian language and the wisdom of Persian religions, Persian forms of life and civilization. In Derridian sense there is nothing but text as text finds its way into context and context is fed back into text (of course in a Lacanian-Zizekian sense there is always an order of ‘real’ beyond the text which disrupts the text’s web of symbolic and imaginary orders). The same set of forces imprint themselves either on the paper and through words and statements (the realm of virtual being) or on material and corporeal being and in the language of action and events. As such both texts and events are invested with signification and meaning and as such they are interchangeable; texts are events and events are texts.
A large set of implications follow this state of tragedy of confusion and its associated dynamics of texts and contexts, which will be explored in the following sections of this chapter and the following application chapters.

This process of being torn between rival forces, however, is not unique to the Iranian mind and Iranian social reality. Its particular features are unique to the Iranian case but it shares a set of common features with a larger set of cases investigated under the topic of multiple selves.

### 3.2.4 Multiple Selves (Politics of Mind: Individual as an Unstable Coalition)

Ainslie (1992, 2001) has developed an account of people as communities of internal bargaining interests, in which subunits based on short-term, medium-term and long-term interests face various conflicts that they must resolve. This is a kind of reincarnation of Freudian thesis of divided self (between id, ego, and superego). In a sense, as elaborated by Critchley (2010: 104), individual is ‘dividual’, and politics of the brain and politics of the society are mirror images of each other in their property of being divided. If social assemblages at micro, meso, or macro levels fail to overcome their internal conflicts and achieve stable outcomes, the ones who manage to do so will succeed to outperform them in the competition for scarce resources, as America manages to outperform Somalia.

In the internal conflict within the self, the device of the Hobbesian tyrant is unavailable to the brain. Therefore, its behaviour (when system-level psychosis and insanity is avoided) is a sequence of self-enforcing equilibriums of the sort studied by game-theoretic public choice literature on coalitional bargaining in democratic legislatures. That is, the internal politics of the brain entails ‘logrolling’ (Mueller, 2003: 110; Stratmann 1997: 322). These internal dynamics are then partly regulated and stabilized by the wider social games in which coalitions (people as wholes over temporal subparts of their biographies) are embedded (Ross, 2005: 334-353). For example: social expectations about someone's role as a salesperson set behavioural equilibrium targets for the logrolling processes in his brain. In a sense, the politics of external social mind (Clark’s and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind) sets up the games and agenda for the politics of internal individual brain. In a Deleuzian sense, these binary oppositions of internal/external, social/individual are artificial and misleading as the internal is the fold of the external and individual is the name of the collective. This explains, as Ross (2010) envisages,
why it is in the context of stable institutions with relatively transparent rules that people most resemble straightforward economic agents like insects, and that classical game theory finds reliable application to them as cohesive units. The message is that stable institutions produce stable selves, but the fundamental question is “Where does this context of stable institutions come from in the first place?” and “Why can some countries and communities manage to construct a set of stable institutions and others cannot?”

This study addresses the two critical questions raised by Ross in the above passage.

Following Ainslie’s logic, the formation of identity and selfhood is as an exercise in the art of coalition formation in the context of multiple selves. In a wider sense, the formation of identity for any social assemblage at any level (individual, organization, or nation) is an exercise in the art of coalition formation, as part of the Deleuzian process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. It is interesting that we can identify the same dynamics at work in the Iranian mind. We can allude to modernity as constituting the short-term subunit of Iranian selfhood, Persianism constituting the medium-term component of Iranian selfhood and Islam constituting the long-term element of the Iranian selfhood, where the same dynamics of logrolling and striving for forging coalitions of different shapes and kinds is at work inside the Iranian selfhood (and its subjectivity and preference structure) and in the society at large.

3.2.5 The Composition of Dasein

To elaborate on how this trinity of regimes of truth—similar to the trinity in the Christian theology, our trinity is full of impossibilities and contradictions—is deeply instituted in the Iranian selfhood and how it turns into alternative identity markers and choice bundles—in a move from unconscious level of background to the conscious level of choice—we start from the fact that for Heidegger (1962) our being-in-the-world (our worldhood) is characterized by the interplay of four components, the Heideggerian four-fold of mortals, gods, the sky and the earth, implying the fact that human being (dasein) is an spatiotemporal being, a being-towards-the-end. The Heideggerian dasein is a spatiotemporal being with bounded rationality as opposed to Cartesian cogito who is an abstract, boundless and timeless thinking machine casting its panoptical gaze on the events of material world. Due to its finitude, dasein is encapsulated in its spatiotemporality; it is something that has a beginning and an end; it is an embedded and embodied corporeality. Due to its having an origin, its
being rooted in something else, it is ingrained in its past which defines its embeddedness and due to its having an end it is a projection into future.

It should be noted that *dasein* is mortal in its existence; its being is abyssal (see Almond, 2004; Chapter 4 on ‘abyssality of being’) from both ends and as a mortal its being is defined by immortals and its relation to the sky as its horizon of being and the earth as its spatiotemporal house of being. The earth relates self to its beginning, its incommensurable embeddedness and the sky to its emergence, as the open horizon of its being-towards. *Dasein*, hence, is the site where the principles of embeddedness, incommensurability, and emergence operate. That is why *dasein* is a ‘projected thrownness’ or ‘thrown projection’. This conception of man as *dasein* takes us to the intertemporal choices it faces inside rival conceptions of time. As Aho (2009: 18) puts it

For Heidegger, *Dasein* must ultimately be understood in terms of temporality, as the twofold movement of “thrown projection,” which represents the frame of reference on the basis of which things can light up as intelligible or remain dark and unintelligible. “Ecstatic temporality,” says Heidegger, “originally lights/clears (lichtet) the there” (BT, 402). This temporal framework is referred to as “Care” (Sorge), an expression that represents the basic ground of intelligibility, a ground that is prior to das Man and is constituted by the fact that *Dasein* is always “ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (BT, [*Being and Time*] 237).

As we see, self is as an event or happening, an emergence, an unfolding event of this world, between two indefinite points of birth and death, which makes it into a being-towards. *Dasein*’s being is ‘directionality’, and ‘care’ towards a (in)definite birth (where and when did I really originate from? maybe in the beginning of the time) and a certain but indefinite death (see, White, 2005). *Dasein* is a ‘now’ originated and directed towards an embeddedness of the past and a projection, emergence and openness of the future.

The closure/disclosure/foreclosure dimensions of *dasein* is manifest in the following piece on empathy by Aho (2009: 66), where it demonstrates that we do not ex-nihilo ‘choose’ to show empathy as we are always already embedded in an emphatic world of signification:
In the case of the embodied experience of “empathy” (Einfühlung), for example, Heidegger will argue that it is only because the other has already been disclosed as such—as a daughter, a wife, a friend, or simply another human being—that we can, in the present, feel affection for them. Again, fundamental ontology is primarily concerned with the conditions that make the world meaningful, allowing things to show up as such and such. And it is not by my present involvement in the world that things make sense to me. The world is meaningful because as I invariably press forward into social possibilities, I am thrown back into a public situation where things already count and matter to me. It is only on the basis of this horizon of “thrown projection” that I can interpret myself and the world in one way or another. To this end, empathy does not reveal a “primordial existential structure,” because the experience of empathy is always mediated in advance by a temporally structured familiarity with the other; the other, to some extent, already matters and makes sense to me. Thus for Heidegger, individual experiences such as empathy are themselves made possible by Dasein (BT, 161–63).

The whole dynamics of spatiotemporality of dasein locates and interweaves temporality of dasein in a fabric of finitude/infinitude, mortality/immortality and permanence/impermanence. Embeddedness points to the fact we are born in a world of signification, which signifies and discloses things to ‘social assemblages’ (Connolly, 2008b) in a specific and particular way through placing him/her/it in a signifying chain; and through the act of disclosure and signification constitutes them and makes them what they are. This world of signification invests in the self a narrative of beginning and end, and how ‘now’ is related to these abyssal points of no return. As such dasein is nothing but time, even space is time or a continuum of space-time. As Aho (2009: 62) puts it “Dasein is not a being that moves along in time. Rather, Dasein—as an already opened clearing of intelligibility—is time”.

This world of signification, the regime of truth, makes sense of what it means to be ‘a now’ extended into ‘a past’ and ‘a future’, ‘a being-towards’. The embeddedness of the past makes the ‘being’ of my ‘being-towards’ and the projection and emergence of the future makes the ‘towards’ of my ‘being-toward’, which together in the chain of past-present-future constitutes my being-towards as an event, a happening. Death, in its indefinite certainty, defines the open horizon of my being and that is why in Heideggerian term my being is a being-towards-death. In the Islamic conception dasein is a being-beyond-death (see Mahmoud, 2007: 13); this is manifest in Khomeini’s reversal of the customary formulation of the life-death equation: “Dying does not mean nothingness: it is life.” (Brumberg, 2001: 125).
3.2.5.1 The Composition of Iranian Dasein

The subtle point is that there are no universal points of birth and death, beginning and end; our world of signification (our embeddedness) makes sense of what our births and our deaths and the events in between are. In the language of Lacan, birth and death are events of ‘real’ where the ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ orders determine the quality and ‘whatness’ of our encounters with the events of ‘real’; they name them, signify them through making them part of a signifying chain and house them. Through different worlds of signification acting on different conceptions, enactment and disclosure of time, the Iranian dasein is invested with diverse beginnings and multiple ends, and different continuum of beginnings and ends.

The Persianist world of signification connects our birth to the emergence and evolution of the Aryan people, a story of creation is narrated as related to the creation of Aryan people and how they came to inhabit a particular geo-political space in a particular time and how their way of life, their language, their polity and economy, their religion and civilization and their mythology evolved in contradistinction to non-Aryan people (Iranshahr versus non-Iran (an-Iran), Daryaee, 2009) and how our death is signified as death of an Iranian with a particular glorious and majestic history and a heritage bequeathed to the next generation of Iranians (see, Savant, 2013). Our births and deaths, thus, are projected in a timeline of Persianist beginning and end. Here my birth and death is made sense of (placed in a signifying chain) through its connection to a particular community of people and its evolution in the continuum of time-space. This particular world of signification constitutes the medium self of the multiple selves of Iranian dasein. My medium self is configured through its connection to the ‘idea of Iran’ (Gnoli, 1989).

In contrast, the Iranian short-term self is located in a signifying chain narrating the birth of modernity (Bayly, 2004) and how it is rooted in Roman and Greek civilization, and in affirmative or negating relation with Christianity and Islam (and hence the Middle East) and how it has been part of Iranian self through the intense entanglement of Persian self with the Greek and Roman others in the dynamics of the binary opposition of Iran/an-Iran and the presence of Zoroastrian Persian philosophy (Corbin, 1993) in Greek philosophy and the heightened trace of Greek philosophy in Islamic rationality (Legenhausen, 2007: 173; Ashouri 2005); and the
invasion of modernity in our life-world in the last four hundred years and its intense presence in the last 200 years.

The short-term self is embedded in ‘the idea of modernity’, supplying peace and prosperity through adherence to techno-scientific rationality creating a techno-scientific utopia (future as its land of utopia). Modernity specializes in offering increasing levels of freedom from the despotism of nature. In the modern narrative my being is a now which is connected to nothingness of a distant past (ground zero of Cartesian cogito) and a techno-scientific heaven of an unfolding future. The pursuit of the pleasures of the flesh is the main purpose of existence and technology is the only way to achieve it and prolong it against the forces of nature such as diseases, aging and scarcity. Scientific reasoning, liberal democracy, human rights and capitalism are the most promising avenues discovered by the mankind to ever higher levels of technological prowess (technological heaven on earth).

Islam configures our long-term self by locating our births and deaths in a story of creation where life originates from impeccable fullness and descends into lesser forms of beings. In this conception, life is light, lights upon lights, layers of lights, stemming from the fullest light, the light of lights. In this narrative embedded in discursive and non-discursive practices, life originates from fullness and infinitude and returns to it. This is a story of a fall and return and the story of prophets who were missioned to show the way to salvation and emancipation from the finitude and darkness of the lesser forms of light, and the terrors of loss, failure, rejection and death. This story positions Iranian dasein in yet another chain of signification and another chain of being. This life and the next are part of the same fabric of eternal being, and this life is nothing but a fleeting moment in the eternal theatre of existence. In this regime of truth, the distinction between now and then, short- and long-term evaporates as we are already located in the fabric of eternity. The Quran warns mankind that this life is only half-a day or even less in the time scale of eternity. The connection to eternal and everlasting is the prominent feature of the Islamic long-term self of the Iranian dasein. The long-term self is configured through “the idea of Islam”.

These three forms of being-towards-death through ‘the idea of modernity’, ‘the idea of Persia’ and ‘the idea of Islam’ characterize the Iranian dasein’s multiple selves. In the framework of modernity, the birth of something truly new starts at the end of
18th century (Bayly, 2004) and genealogically goes back to 12th century Magna Carta and further back to Roman and Greek civilization and further flashbacks to Homo-Sapiens in Africa, and the emergence of life on earth and the emergence of earth itself and to the big bang. However, for Persianism, the true time starts from the time of Aryan people inhabiting the Iranian plateau and their ancestral kings and mythical figures of Iranian mythology and the connection to the eternal time of Ahura Mazda and Ahreman (here the emphasis is on the history of Aryan people as distinguished from other peoples rather than the story of creation). As for the Islamic narrative, time is truly everlasting and eternal and the piece of time we inhabit is infinitely minuscule and insignificant compared to the vastness and enormity of eternal time. These layers of time constitute the multi-layered being of Iranian dasein.

In the language of Chakrabarty (2000: 243), hence, Iranian dasein is trapped in a ‘timeknot’ (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006: 148, for the same phenomenon, “naahamzamani va darhamzamani”, in the Hedayat’s works). As dasein is time Iranian dasein is multiple forms of contradictory and conflicting forms of time, each pressing its demands on his/her/its being. As Liu (2010: 306), reporting from Lacan (1991: 193), when redeployed to fit into our context, puts it: “the [Iranian] subject is always on several levels, caught up in crisscrossing networks”. The ‘trembling’ and sometimes ‘horrifying’ effects of the images and statements made in the Quran puts Iranian dasein on a different plate of space-time. It warns the believers that this life is not more than half a day and that when everything meets its end the blanket of regret and the burning wish to return to compensate for the wrong deeds will be the biggest torture the ignorant souls will be wrapped into and suffer from.

It further produces images of rewards and punishments associated with their pious or sinful deeds, and warns the believers of falling into the trap of becoming ignorantly busy with the accumulation of wealth, children, and status in this passing and transient world at the expense of forgetting their own eternal happiness. In the Quranic discourse, raining daily on people through different platforms, God is a site of combination of opposites in being the beginning and the end, the appearance and the substance, and a transcendental immanence (Almond, 2004: 61), and is closer to man than the veins in his neck.
Discourses like these which are iterated and reiterated, and are in circulation in different social landscapes, while becoming part of everyday cheap talks of the nation, can transform Iranian *dasein* from one mood/mode into another in a blink of an eye. Iranian *dasein*, therefore, is called to attune itself with alternative discursive homelands (for the notion attunement, see Taylor, 2001). Heidegger conceptualizes understanding as attunement (Taylor, 2007) and Iranian *dasein* becomes confused due to alternative demands and requirements made on him to attune his being with (seemingly) irreconcilable and incommensurable universes of knowledge and power.

The shocking ontological news by Islamic founding fathers, as reported in Almond (2004: 113), puts the Iranian *dasein* on the plane of eternity: “All men are asleep in this world; only when they die do they wake up”. The awareness of dreamy nature of material existence calls for “lifting of the veil of ignorance”, which requires “love of the Absolute” (Schimmel, 1975: 4). In the same vein, when Khomeini offers his vision of the ontological and deontological composition of this world through his speech indicating that “universe is the seat of presence of God, do not commit sins in the presence of God”, which appears on the advertising boards and walls throughout the country, the intensity and shock value of the insight, compared to the vision offered by modernity or Persianism on their advertising boards, shakes Iranian *dasein* to the core, and turns him/her being entangled into a daily voyage between parallel universes housed in packages and master signifiers of Islam, Persianism and modernity.

The Islamic regime of truth, thus, offers a regime of training and discipline to keep the believer from deviating into the wild temptations of pleasures of the flesh through committing to the codes of Islamic morality and jurisprudence. Elster’s (1979, 1983, 2000) constraint theory reveals the rationale behind such programs of constraints based on the possibility of addiction to the addictive substances (see also Ainslie, 2001). Here For Islam the addictive pernicious substances are modernity and Persianism.

In the Islamic discourse, the excessive and ignorant pursuit of pleasures of the flesh with its transient, impermanent and decaying qualities prevent the believer from attaining liberation from the terror of death. Rajaee (2007: 13-4) points to the hold such regime of constraints has on the Iranian *dasein*:
the centrality of Islamic-revealed law, shari῾a, which comprises two main parts: prayer (῾ebada, regulating man’s relation to God for eternal salvation), and transaction (mo῾amela, regulating man’s relations with his fellow man so that worldly transactions, smoothly conducted, will pave the way for eternal salvation). Both are devotional acts, whether one recites the word of God or concludes a business transaction. Here lies the root of the inseparability of religion and politics in Islam. An average Muslim, therefore, by the sheer dictates of his faith, must be both secular—that is, concerned with the profane and serious about worldly affairs—and religious—that is, pious and free from worldly attachment—while remaining aware that “the world is the cultivating ground for the hereafter” (ad-Donya Mazr῾a al-Akhera). In other words, the average Muslim should be a saint in addition to whatever else he does: a saint-merchant, a saint-soldier, a saint-politician, a saint-doctor, a saint-professor, and so on, combining the idealism of what ought to be with the realism of what actually is.

In the Islamic regime of truth, thus, the Iranian dasein is tasked with achieving a form of complementarity between this-worldly and next-worldly concerns by investing heavily in the activities of this world to achieve spiritual growth and salvation from fear of death and eternal happiness in the next world, or falah at both existential levels (see Motahhari, 1993).

As such, the believer is encouraged to engage intensely in the activities of this world from sexuality to economy, and polity, and art and culture and sport, as grounds where he/she can practice his religious commitment to attain spiritual excellence. This task requires living a contradiction in simultaneous engagement with different layers of time as demanded from the believer in the following saying of the Prophet of Islam: “Plan for this world as if you expect to live forever; but plan for the hereafter as if you expect to die tomorrow” or in another version “Do for this life as if you live forever, do for the afterlife as if you die tomorrow”. The believer is, hence, charged with reconciling (seemingly) irreconcilable positions in order to be able to attain salvation or falah at both levels of existence. This appears to be the coping strategy evolved to overcome the terror of death without harming the level and intensity of engagement with the world, or paradoxically a program of achieving salvation through intense engagement with the material world. The task is to invite the sacred in without quitting the profane, or remove the duality of sacred/profane in the first place. This is the political, the site of the emergence of new truth, according to Badiou (Hallward, 2003) and Ranciere (Davis, 2010).
It should be pointed that the nature of supply of and demand for regimes of truth was further explored but was not included in this work due to word limitations.

3.2.5.2 Death and selfhood

To demonstrate how these philosophical understandings are directly related to the analysis of concrete historical realities, we resort to the subtle observation made by Frye (2005) in the book ‘The Greater Iran’ on the critical role of ‘death’ in understanding civilizations. Frye observes that civilization is a response to the problematic of death and different civilizations address it differently (see also Shayegan, 2007, Chapter 4 on death and Bourdieus’s, 2000, exposition of Pascalian meditations on the issue of death). Frye (2005: xiii) addresses the issue in the following terms:

If asked to explain the history of world civilizations in one word it would be ‘death’. Of all animals man alone knows he will die, and this has fashioned his approach to life, and indeed to all existence.

Frye perceives different civilizations as different coping strategies evolved to handle the issue of awareness of death (see also Cave, 2012).

Furthermore, the insights from two Beckers may shed more light on the centrality of the phenomenon of death in establishing how three types of worlds of significations or regimes of truth turn into three types of selves and then into three types of choice bundles or identity markers. One Becker resides in cultural anthropology, Ernest Becker (1973) and the followers of his research program in Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Goldenberg et al., 2000; Burke et al., 2010); and another in economics, Gary Becker (1996) and his followers in economics of family, human capital, economics of religion (Iannaccone, 1998, 2006) and household-allocation-of-time models. Goldenberg et al. (2000: 201) maintain that

Cultural worldviews assuage the terror associated with the fear of death by providing answers to fundamental cosmological questions such as How did I get here?, How should I live my life?, and What happens after I die?, structuring perceptions of reality (e.g., clocks, calendars, tarot cards, and horoscopes), and providing standards through which individuals and their behavior can be evaluated and perceived as meaningful and valuable.
In line with this, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 512) emphasize on the role of the afterlife motive in their seminal paper on religious participation, maintaining that:

There is one crucial element ... that distinguishes an analysis of religious participation from an analysis of participation in other activities. All previous household-allocation-of-time models assume that the expected stream of ‘benefits’ which an individual plans to receive terminates at the time of his death. This assumption is inappropriate for a model of religious participation because most religions promise their members some form of an afterlife. Furthermore, the expected afterlife benefits are often viewed by individuals as being at least partially related to their lifetime allocation of time to religious activities. This suggests that household participation in church-related activities should be analyzed in the context of a multiperiod household-allocation-of-time model which allows for "afterlife consumption," with this variable being at least partially a function of the household's investment of members' time in religious activities during their lifetimes.

Based on this long-term view of the continuum of this life and the next, Islam, as main defining component of the long-term self in the Iranian context of culture, acts as a distinct choice bundle offering wide range of cultural products and symbolic goods in contradistinction to classic Persian identity, as the main component of the medium-term self, and modernity, as the main constitutive part of the short-term self.

With regard to the distinctive character of Islam (and most religions) as the space of permanence, a regime of truth and a multi-product manufacturer of supernatural commodities, Iannaccone (2006: 21-2) maintains that

A fundamental characteristic of religion is that it constitutes a uniquely general technology. There is literally nothing that falls beyond the theoretical limits of supernatural production and exchange. Consider the consequences. People call on religion for everything: health, wealth, salvation, power, long life, immortality, eternal bliss, military victory, and even good sex. Major religious traditions thus evolve into immense systems of beliefs, behavior, and institutions with links to every conceivable human activity and concern. Strong religious organizations almost never specialize in just a few niche products or a few niche needs. Diversity of output ... mirrors the advantages of product bundling. Commercial firms use product bundling to persuade different types of customers to pay the same relatively high price for a collection of products, such as a newspaper, a year-long theatre subscription, or a three-day pass to all the attractions in Disneyland. In a similar manner, many different types of people can be persuaded to join and remain loyal to a religious group that offers members an array of benefits, including, for example, intense camaraderie, status, honor, identity, purpose, an exalted calling, dramatic rituals, powerful emotional experiences, and the prospect of heavenly rewards. Single-purpose groups are more fragile, being susceptible to defection whenever a member loses faith in the group’s one product, purpose, or principal activity.
Iannaccone (2006: 19) further suggests that

One may seriously question a cleric’s claims that action “A” will lead to afterlife reward “R,” but this much is sure: no strictly secular system can offer any hope of “R” at all.

What can be inferred from Iannaccone’s analysis is that religion creates a space of permanence—what he calls “the supernatural content of many religious ‘technologies’” as “the defining feature of religion” (Iannaccone, 2006: 19)—alongside its holistic nature as a regime of truth which he tries to capture in the economic notion of “product bundling” and the fact that it offers jouissance and experience of fullness which transcends the normal logic of cost-benefit analysis and is reflected in his use of adjectives such as “intense”, “exalted”, “dramatic”, “powerful”, and “heavenly” in his description of benefits offered by religion (this is what modernity also offers via sex, drug, alcohol and rock and roll alongside sanitized forms of the eureka in the experience of scientific discovery and westernized version of eastern spirituality). This reaffirms Taylor’s (2007) identification of religion as the space of “experience of fullness” which is fully supported by the mystical dimension at the heart of almost all religions alongside their philosophical and legal facets.

Iranian dasein is embedded in the spatiotemporal space created by the intersection and interface of three worlds of Islam, classic Persian Empire and modernity. Iranian dasein lives and negotiates his/her life in the space between spaces. In this state of inbetweenness, its ‘real’ is a rhizomatic movement of abundance in the plane of hybridity and multiplicity, while its ‘symbolic’ has been struggling to construct a legitimate discursive and non-discursive house of being for such hyper-rich forms of ‘real’. Iranian dasein is care; it cares about all these three wondrous worldhoods, and its body and mind, emotions and thoughts are woven through and into these worlds.

These various forms of worldhood go far beyond conscious choices and envelope all layers of conscious and unconscious being and becoming. They are not variables, they are life-worlds creating and affecting all variables. Dasein as care is more than choice and consciousness; care is about fabric of being and condition of possibility
of action and emotion, cognition and affection, disclosure and foreclosure. As Hoy (2009: 64) puts it:

the worldhood of the world is the way that the world presents itself, the way in which the whole is disclosed. Worldhood is prior to objectivity, and makes objectivity possible. No worldhood, no objects. Worldhood is not itself a specific content. Instead, it is that which makes it possible for content to appear as content, that is, as a feature of the world.

This state of intense, engulfing, and overwhelming entanglement with incommensurable life-worlds characterizes the Iranian state of ‘tragedy of confusion’. It should be noted that the characteristics of the regimes of truth as economic firms were extensively investigated but were not included in this work due to word limitations; the genealogies of the three regimes of truth were also extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

3.3 THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORMATION OF STABLE COALITIONS

The state of belatedness calls for collective action (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982; Sandler, 1992; Medina, 2007), which requires the formation of collective will which itself requires formation of stable coalitions to make institutional investments feasible and to start and finish tasks in areas such as birth control, vaccination, education, health, security, diplomacy, gender relation, ethnicity, inflation, employment, or economic growth. However the state of inbetweenness with its associated tragedy of confusion and irreconcilable differences within and between various social assemblages would act as condition of impossibility for the formation of stable coalitions. The state of belated inbetweenness leaves Iranians incapable of fully and irreversibly committing to the implementation of any project of social transformation. In a sense, Iranians have put into practice what Zizek (2008: xv) perceives as lack of full commitment in the realm of virtualized games on the Internet:

“if the thing doesn’t work out, I can always leave!” If you reach an impasse, you can say: OK, I’m leaving the game, I’m stepping out! Let’s start again with another game!
In a similar vein, the Iranians stepped out of Taqizadeh’s Constitutionalist version of modernization game to start the Pahlavi’s Persianization game, only to abandon that one as well to start Mosaddegh’s independence-based constitutionalist modernization game, only again to leave it shortly and go back to the Pahlavi’s Persianization game, only to once again leave it to start Khomeini-Shariati’s Islamization game, once again on the verge of abandoning this and going back to another round of modernization game through two strong events of Khatami’s Reformist Movement and most recently Mousavi’s Green Movement. The state of belated inbetweenness would not allow Iranians to stand the full course of implementation of a project or a program.

This lack of commitment is rational and is due to the sheer multiplicity of voices and their inhabited faces, which has made the emergence of stable consensus on any issue impossible. The voices and faces could not find and found adequate common grounds to be able to agree to disagree and achieve unity without uniformity. The horizontal and vertical movement in ‘real’ has created multiplicity of forms of ‘symbolic’ wholes. The enormous multiplicity of voices can be grasped when we note that in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness we have three regimes of truth, each having at least two major orthodox and non-orthodox branches (the Shia-Sunni divide in Islam, liberal-socialist divide in modernity, and monarchy-poetry divide in Persianism). Inside each orthodox or non-orthodox divide we encounter further instances of orthodox and non-orthodox divide like four schools of Sunni Islam or at least four versions of socialism/communism in revolutionary, religious, democratic and nationalist forms of socialisms, for example. Each one of these branches has their own white and black books, their own radical and pragmatic versions, and their own politics of piety and politics of ordinary.

The common ground between two large brands of modernity (socialism and liberalism) is the pursuit of realization of techno-scientific heaven on earth, one through central planning and collectivism, and another through trinity of liberal democracy, capitalism and human rights.

It should be noted that each regime of truth has roots in the other, like madness being the affirmative and negating condition of possibility for reason and vice versa. In the Focauldian language, as reported by Koopman (2010: 551),
these terms are reciprocal but incompatible: they can neither be fully liberated from one another nor totally assimilated to one another... and at the very same time, these terms could never be fully detached from one another.

Accordingly, each regime of truth is the manifestation of madness for the other and embodiment of reason for itself. In a sense, the other (madness) forms the core of the self (reason); namely everything is what it is not.

As such, Islam in its actualized form is Greek from top to toe; in its textual research methodology of jurisprudence, it is (largely) Aristotelian; in mysticism and philosophy it is largely (but not exclusively) Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic, which ultimately in its evolution ends up into a form of Heraclitus-type process philosophy of “you cannot step into the same river twice” in Molla Sadra (see Rizvi, 2013; Soroush, 2007). Thus, Islam can be considered as Greek and it is not: it starts with Greek but evolves in the riverbed of religious texts and contexts, which changed it drastically into a non-orthodox form of philosophy, a process philosophy, which is again Greek of different type. The dependence of fiqh or the Islamic jurisprudence on Greek logic is apparent in the chasm between Usuli’yun (Principalists) and Akhbari’yun (Literalists) (see Gleave, 2000, 2007) as Literalists (and the proponents of School of Separation) allude to the contradictions and sense of irony in use and development of the fiqh research methodology where Greek logic and philosophy are deployed to infer rulings from the Islamic sacred texts and contexts. This, for instance, was one of the constant lines of attacks by first president of Iran Banisadr against the methodology of inference in fiqh (see Dabashi, 1993). This is to the extent that in response to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s (2011) assertion that Greek philosophers had preserved monotheism Banisadr (2013) declares that “The clergy is the oldest Westernizers in the history of Iran; they have turned the Aristotelian logic into the tool of despotism for 14 centuries”.

The Greek-dominated methodology of inference was deemed not to be fit for the purpose of inference from the sacred texts and contexts. It was deemed heretical to borrow from outside the terrain of religion for the sake of inference of religious obligations, asking “Imam Plato” and “divine Aristotle” (Javadi Amoli, 2010; Legenhausen, 2007: 173) to help in the understanding of the Quran and Imam Ali. This is the contradiction pointed by Literalists, which was eventually defeated by Behbehani’s violent uprising against Literalists and was reformulated
methodologically by Sheikh Ansari (see Armstrong, 2000; Dahlen, 2003; Boozari, 2011). The emergence of School of Separation (Maktab-e Tafkik) in Shia Islam is indicative of the perceived impurity at the heart of Islam and Shia Islam (see Davari, 2005: 7-8 on Maktab-e Tafkik).

The emergence of modernity owes much to Islam (Lyons, 2010; Rubenstein, 2003; Gutas, 1998; Hanif, 1997: 350-1, among others), which makes Islam constitutive of modernity. Persianism especially in the form of Persian poetry has deep roots in and inseparable affiliations to the Islamic religious texts; and Persians contributed immensely in the development of Islam from a nascent faith to a mature civilization (Motahhari, 1970).

Persians and Greeks have been twins from the beginning of their historical and mythical time, each looming large in the imagination of the other and each constitutive of the identity of the other, to a lesser or larger degree, in negative or affirmative forms (for the mutual fascination between the Greeks and the Persians see Crawford and Whitehead, 1983: 183; and for a philosophical treatment of the relation between ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘he/she/it’ see Buber 1937: 15, among others). Compared to other civilizational zones like China or Latin America, the West in its multiple forms of Greek philosophy and sciences, the Alexandrian Invasion of Iran, Roman Empire, Crusade, and Western modernity has always loomed large in the Iranian imagination (see Dabashi, 1993: 576 on how, for example, Banisadr incorporated these components in the definition of the West and also see Malik Khan, 1891, on the role of Crusade and Christian theology in the negative conception of the West in the Muslim and Iranian imaginations). As Holiday (2011: 155) maintains

relationship with an external ‘other’ is integral to Iranian national identity construction. Mostly this ‘other’ has been the ‘West’.

As we mentioned before, each regime of truth has orthodox and non-orthodox branches. The significance of Persian poetry as the non-orthodox branch of Persianism needs to be further elaborated and emphasized. The status of Persian poetry as the non-orthodox form of Persianism is confirmed by Ali Ferdowsi (2008: 686 added emphasis; see also Dabashi, 2012) when he maintains that:
In fact the true monarchs of Iran are its poets who have ruled the hearts of this nation. Persian poets forever have set up their humble tents across from the lofty palaces of mighty and opulent kings, but destiny’s decree has never been issued against their lordship, and the age of their sovereignty has continued down to our time without interruption. No turn of events, even the invasion of the Mongols, has managed to subvert their power.

This leads to the emergence of what Ashouri (1990) calls ‘the empire of Persian poetry’ and Shamlou (2007: 38’) dubs ‘poets as prophets’. The non-orthodox Persianism of Persian poetry immediately forms its own branch of orthodoxy and its own form of non-orthodoxy. Each regime of truth immediately gives rise to its own Sunni and Shia forms. In terms of its relation with the regime of truth of Persian monarchy, three are three traditions of Persian poetry, according to Sadri (2011); some Persian poets deployed their business of production of truth in the service of the kings and enjoyed king’s generous patronages, others kept their distance and ardently preserved their independence, and still minority of others who cooperated with the kings productively but from the position of independence (also see Sharlet, 2011; Scott Meisami, 1987). Ansari (2012: 34, 56-7, 176-7) attests to the tensions and incongruences between orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism (in the case of how to approach and appropriate Ferdowsi’s *Shahnameh*, particularly in the reign of the second Pahlavi).

Each branch and sub-branch of regimes of truth further divides in terms of its high and low cultures, the ‘politics of piety’ (Mahmood, 2005) and the ‘politics of ordinary’ (Cavell, 1988; Mulhall, 1994; Dumm, 1999) alongside its philosophical and ritualistic dimensions (each sub-branch having its own jurisprudence, mysticism, and philosophy or *Shariat, tarighat* and *haghibat* corresponding to the organization of action (embodiment), emotion (heart), and thought (mind) (see Chitick, 2000). Each branch and sub-branch has its own bright and dark sides (white and black books35) and its radical and pragmatic divisions, depending on how it attempts to organize its relations with rival regimes of truth based on three principles of substitution, complementarity and subsumption. Greer and Lewis (2005: xxvi), for

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35 On the white and black books of different regimes of truth see Zarrinkoob 1957, 1969; Scaff 1989; Taylor 1991; Avini (1997); Courtois et al. 1999; Young 2000; Sedgwick, 2004; Mann, 2005; Lincoln, 2007; Mignolo 2011; Alexander 2013; Ibn Warraq 1995, 2013; Daryaei 2009, among others, where we encounter statements like ‘why Islam is the best’, ‘why west is the best’, or ‘why Persia is the best’ affirming the white books or statements like ‘why I am not a Muslim’, ‘why I am not a modern’, or ‘why I am not a Persian’ referring to the black books.
instance, refer to the notion of “the good and the bad of the West” and state the following about the bad West:

This is the image of the West as seen by its victims, enemies, and critics. The features of the Bad West include imperialism, class conflict, the manipulation of the masses by the elite, genocide, racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, environmental pollution, consumerism, and dumbed-down mass entertainment. Among its misdeeds over the centuries are gladiatorial combats, the burning of heretics, the African slave trade, the Nazi death camps, million gallon oil spills, porno Web sites, Third World sweatshops, and the atom bomb. ... So far as the West ever did anything right, it was as a result of stealing ideas from non-Western civilizations without giving them any of the credit.

Greer and Lewis (2005: xxv) refer to the good West in the following terms:

The features of the Good West include, for example, freedom, democracy, respect for law, reasoned debate, forgiving one’s enemies, scientific discovery, technical progress, pluralism, gender equality, and material comfort and leisure for all. Among its heroes are such figures as Socrates, Jesus, Leonardo da Vinci, Abraham Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony, Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill, and Martin Luther King.

The same good and bad sides apply to Islam and Persianism (which due to lack of space we do not address here). These multiple forms of regimes of truth operate inside the three projects of reverse social engineering and their internal subprojects. The proliferation of formal branches of regimes of truth is further exacerbated by the dynamics of generation of unique and hybrid issue-based voices out of the multiplicity of forms of regimes of truth. The operation of addition and subtraction on three sets of regimes of truth and their internal divisions would generate multiplicity of hybrid voices.

This dynamics can be manifested in numerous examples, one of which is Shariati’s voice. Shariati’s voice (Rahnema, 1998; Jafarian, 2007; Nasri, 2007), as a particular brand of political Islam, entailed Islam minus the clergy, which was added to modernity (especially revolutionary, post-colonialist, and socialist form of modernity) minus consumerism and capitalism, and Persianism minus monarchy. This is one example among many on how voices emerge out of the application of operations of addition and subtraction on three sets of regimes of truth. The voices have densely populated the three dimensional space created by three axes of Islam,
Persianism and modernity. Each voice, depending on its position on the spectrum may consider the voices on the left and right of itself as too radical or too pragmatic as Shariati regarded Nasr’s voice as too pragmatic and an example of a form of Islamic ecstasy (Jafarian, 2007), reminiscent of Marxism’s depiction of religion as opium of the masses, and Nasr regarded Shariti’s voice as madly radical (Jafarian, 2007; Nasri, 2007). This was despite the fact that Mujahedin-e Khalgh considered Shariati as pragmatist, lacking adequate revolutionary credentials and in collusion with the Shah’s regime (see Abrahamin, 1989).

In the state of belated inbetweenness, the social agents are engaged in the business of rhizomatic form of truth portfolio construction (Guerard, 2009). Each voice is a truth portfolio constituting of elements from alternative regimes of truth and evolved as a coping strategy against the terrors of various forms of finitude in Iranian context of inbetweenness and its hyper-complex interplay with the state of belatedness. Depending on the biographical and genealogical trajectories of different faces, they become hosts to these diverse voices. As each social assemblage is subjected to the different combination of the three regimes of truth, they attain their passive subjectivity and agency based on lexicographical ordering of different regimes of truth and their components.

Each face’s selfhood, hence, is formed based on particular combination of general and local preference orderings. As such, depending on his particular biographical and genealogical trajectory, the second Pahlavi (see Milani, 2011a), as a social assemblage, was subjectified in Persianism, modernity and Islam, in that order, as his general preference ordering alongside a set of local preferences for food, music, art, cinema, etc., which were selectively borrowed from all three regimes of truth. This formed the pyramidal and prismatic dimensions of his subjectivity and selfhood (see Tizro, 2011 and Flynn, 2005: 172, on pyramidal and prismatic nature of selfhood). Depending on their trajectories of social and individual experiences, different social assemblages at micro, meso, and macro levels float between these alternative packages of truth. Different context of situation primes different components of this general or local preference ordering (for the notion of ‘priming’, see Mikulincer and Florian, 2000: 262, 271; Burke et al., 2010: 155-6, 186). Social agents move between forces and voices in search for a complete package of three forms of (instrumental, communicative and emancipative) rationalities. Different context of situation awakens different dimensions of Iranian selfhood. This constant
movement between and within general and local preference orderings makes the formation of stable coalition impossible.

At the time of crisis, social assemblages revert to their general preference ordering and their pyramidal selfhood. At normal times, they take their general preference ordering as given and act within their local preference structure and prismatic selfhood. In contrast to the Shah, Khomeini’s subjectivity was, for example, formed inside the regimes of truth of Islam with modernity and Persianism deployed as complementary elements. Inside this general preference ordering, he was invested with particular set of local preferences, which idiosyncratically combined various elements of all regimes of truth. For instance, he was reported to have developed a taste for Western female fragrances or used to practice Persian poetry. In the case of Mosaddegh, for example, his general preference ordering was based on giving precedence to modernity followed by Islam and Persianism as complementary components. His local preference ordering was once again a unique combination of the elements of the three regimes of truth, for example, in his tendency towards play-acting or his stubbornness (see Mirfetos, 2011; Rahnema, 2005).

Each social assemblage at a particular time is a particular and unique combination of the three forces, and their combinatory voices, and their associated general and local preferences. Depending on the change in context of situation, social assemblages move between different forces and voices, and either convert to new general preference and affiliate themselves to new regime of truth or change the elements of their local preference and adopt different permutation or ordering of local preferences (preference reversals; see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). The asymmetric structure of preference is such that what is lacking gains bigger weights in the consumption basket. This can be explained by a series of cluster concepts known as “loss aversion”, “endowment effect” and “contrast effect”. As Tversky and Kahneman (2004: 902) state:

The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes below the reference state) loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference state). Because a shift of reference can turn gains into losses and vice versa, it can give rise to reversals of preference.
With regard to endowment and contrast effects Tversky and Griffin (2004: 917) maintain that:

a salient hedonic event (positive or negative) influences later evaluations of well-being in two ways: through an endowment effect and a contrast effect. The endowment effect of an event represents its direct contribution to one’s happiness or satisfaction. Good news and positive experiences enrich our lives and make us happier; bad news and hard time diminish our well-being. Events also exercise an indirect contrast effect on the evaluation of subsequent events. A positive experience makes us happy, but it also renders similar experiences less exciting. A negative experience makes us unhappy, but it also helps us appreciate subsequent experiences that are less bad. The hedonic impact of an event, we suggest, reflects a balance of its endowment and contrast effects.

Whatever dimension of Iranian identity which manages to capture the centre gradually loses its priority and significance and the society gradually moves towards the marginalized dimensions of identity. This is due to the fact the new project of social engineering with its demonization and/or marginalization of the alternative regimes of truth activates the loss aversion, endowment and contrast effects; as the default position of Iranian preference structure is a state of tri-polarity, due to the process of subjectification, the demonization and marginalization of the other regimes of truth is deemed as loss by the Iranian dasein and as such it moves towards reversing its loss by adhering to the marginalized regimes of truth even more enthusiastically. This creates a recurring gap between state and society (Katouzian, 2010; Abrahamian, 2008) where if the state is Islamized the society moves towards Persianization and modernization and when the state is Persianized the society moves towards Islamization and modernization and when it is modernized the society moves towards Islamization and Persianization, which is the outcome of the state of belated inbetweenness and not the cause of it.

This process creates a topological space where even voices and faces residing in close proximity cannot find adequate common grounds to form stable coalitions. This is due to the fact that each social assemblage finds the idiosyncratic structure of forces and voices in other social assemblages as either too radical or too pragmatic, alongside the fact that selfhood as a coalition itself is highly volatile and unstable. This process creates a highly volatile set of unstable coalitions at individual, organizational and societal levels. This dynamics makes the landscape of Iranian
social order filled with different brands of cultural tribes replacing more stable forms of old ethnic tribes. The Shah, Khomeini, Mosaddegh and Taqizadeh are amongst the Iranian social order’s cultural warlords engaging in waves of de-legitimizing wars of attrition against each other. Any social relation is a field of possibilities and as such a battleground for alternative regimes of truth; theses social terrains are fought over by fleeting and floating tribes scattered all over the social space.

The transition from the state of socio-economic underdevelopment to the state of sustainable socio-economic development requires change in purpose, direction, vocabulary, institutional and governance structures and socio-economic policies, which can be formulated in the framework of political parties or any other stable forms of coalitional alliances. The consistent collective action required to achieve sustainable development in Iran is impossible due to a process similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1956; List, 2002; Gehrlein, 2006; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2011). If we have six persons and three choices, differently ordered-for example God, family, and country which demand different set of loyalties and commitments (this example is taken from Sara Palin’s statement when she decided not to run for the presidency in 2012) - when they come into conflict, the lexicographic orderings determine what is given precedence over what and what are sacrificed for what. These three elements can be ordered in six different ways (see Gehrlein, 2006: 229; List: 72), which makes coming to stable consensus on a particular course of collective action impossible.

At normal times, the different elements of the preference orderings can act as mutually reinforcing and complementary, leading to the emergence of prismatic self. But when the different components come into conflict, for example when the pursuit of God requires some sacrifice in terms of the interests of family or country, the selves turn into pyramid structures dictated by the lexicographic nature of their preference orderings. In this example, we have a set of two God-dominated preference orderings (God-family-country, God-country-family), which we call God-dominated set. We also have two distinct sets of family-dominated and country-dominated preference orderings. Furthermore, if at time 1 particular preference ordering happens to rule the other two at the collective level, the proponents of the other two preference orderings can form a coalition and overthrow it. The victors will suffer from internal strife immediately after victory and the conflict has to be resolved by resort to some form of final arbitration (randomization or violence).
Even the proponents of particular set, after victory, will be plagued by internal strife as their orderings differ with regard to the second element of their ordering structure; if in opposition to God-dominated set, the family-dominated set becomes the final victor after eliminating the country-dominated set, they have to embark on internal fighting as they differ in terms of whether after family, God should be given precedence to country or the other way round.

The above case implicitly assumed that the individual voters have stable preference orderings and are not plagued by preference reversals. But if we have fluid preference orderings where the agent A at time $t_1$ has God-dominated preference ordering and at time $t_2$ has family-dominated preference ordering and at time $t_3$ country-dominated ordering, the dynamics of coalition formation and collective actions would become even more complex. In this social order populated by agents with time-inconsistent preference orderings (see Loewenstein and Elster, 1992) and preference reversals, the shift in orderings can happen within and between sets (creating our two important notions of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ (see: Jackson, 2003: 45)). In this state of belated inbetweenness, the unit of analysis cannot be individuals or other forms of social agents but preference orderings themselves. For example, in our case, two notions of forces (regimes of truth) and voices define these preference orderings and social agents are treated as faces who are dynamic and unstable carriers of the forces and voices. The individuals do not possess well-defined, consistent, and stable preference structures. This fluidity of identity for social agents makes them move within a particular set from one preference to another or they may convert to alternative sets. In the case of Iranian dasein instead of God, country, family, we have Islam, Persianism and modernity.

The constant changes in preference structures makes coalitions highly unstable and volatile and the formation of stable collective actions and institutions impossible. Preference reversals lead to coalitional reversals and institutional reversals. The change in dominant regime of truth happens when these highly fluid preference structures unexpectedly, through the accumulation of discontent at a critical mass level, converge towards a common alternative, as the description of Islamic revolution by Foucault (in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 95) indicates, “a perfectly unified collective will”. These instances of perfectly unified collective wills occur negatively and against common enemies (which are the incumbent cultural tribes), culminating in change in the incumbent regime of truth and its associated project of...
reverse social transformation. Soon after a short period of honeymoon, the ‘unified collective will’ starts to degenerate into multiplicity of warring wills, leading to the emergence of civil strife, which in turn motivates the emergence of the final arbiter as the coping strategy for conflict resolution against incessant and widespread levels of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ plaguing the Iranian social landscape.

Westwood (1965: 124) attests to this fact in the following two observations: “Iranians have found it exceptionally difficult to trust one another or to work together over time in any significant numbers”. The notion of ‘over time’ refers to the time-inconsistency of Iranian preference structure and ‘significant numbers’ to the floating and unstable nature of identities. Westwood (1965: 129, added emphasis) further adds that:

Political parties have been nonexistent in any real sense. Party labels have proliferated from time to time, but most have been tiny and tenuous factions who saw advantage, for the moment, in the symbolism of numbers and unity. The Majlis [parliament] has been a collection of individuals and tiny factions, none dependent upon party for their seats, without stable majority coalition. Men have coalesced on particular issues, usually against the government, have been prepared to leave this coalition on the next issues and have expected others to do so.

Based on this observation, coalitions are issue-based and highly unstable and volatile. The incidences of ‘difference between’ occur due to the antagonistic and binary logic of good against evil prevailing between affiliates to alternative regimes of truth. The incidence of ‘difference within’ occurs due to lack of consensus on different positions within the affiliates of any regime of truth. The sudden and disorientating encounter with modernity has thrown the Iranian subjects to the state of belatedness, not bestowing them adequate time and space to form new stable and largely tacit and unconscious consensus on different positions related to life, work and language.

As such in the camp of Shia Islam, we encounter violent differences on ontological, epistemological, methodological, ethical and jurisprudential positions alongside differences in political philosophy, economics and aesthetics. The voices inside the set of regime of truth of Shia Islam, differ antagonistically with regard to ontological positions, for example, such as whether the universe has been eternal or emergent phenomenon, or whether the next-worldly resurrection is only in soul or has bodily
manifestation as well, or the relation between God and creation whether it is unity in multiplicity or in total dissimilarity. Furthermore, there are violent differences on how to harmonize reason with revelation between different approaches in Shia jurisprudence and between intellectual and clerical versions of Islam.

Inside the *fiqh* community there is violent differences between those who advocate the literal truth of almost all Islamic rulings - for example on adultery, theft, capital punishment, abortion, inheritance, murder, veiling, usury, or apostasy - and their immutability and the obligation for their universal application in all times and places. There are irreconcilable differences on whether Shia rulings can be the subject of the principle of ‘secondary rulings’ (*Ahkaam-e sanaveeyeh*) and be suspended temporarily for the pursuit of bigger common good of the community and on which rulings cannot be subject to suspension. Furthermore, there are significant differences between intellectual and clerical versions of Shia Islam on whether some *Quranic* rulings (for example on retribution or *ghesas* and capital punishment) can be abolished altogether as examples for the topic of ‘the abrogating and the abrogated or *nasikh va mansukh*’ (Wild, 2006: 3-6).

The confusion and incessant differences, hence, on, for example, what constitutes usury and how to abolish it from the economic system and how to harmonize the Islamic economic system with the wider international economic system creates widespread and debilitating levels of dysfunctions, reversals, and abortions in the banking and economic system (see Lafraie, 2009). The issue of abolishing usury (*riba*) achieves high level of urgency and significance for Muslims as the *Quran* banned it explicitly and resembled it to ‘eating fire’ and the hadith (sayings from the infallibles of Shia Islam) likens ‘engaging in usury to be worse than sleeping with one’s own mother 70 times in the house of God (*Kaba*)’. The shock value of this statement cannot be underestimated (for the most recent rant about the prevalence of *riba* in the economic system see Abbasi, 2013). The decentralized nature of the clergy and the Shia community makes the task of reaching agreement on any issue almost impossible. Every possible solution is disputed by some voices, which can act as cultural tribes and soon take over the centre.

The trouble becomes even more exponentially devastating when we see that there is no consensual method to resolve differences, or to ‘agree to disagree’ (see List, 2002 for two concepts of agreement, and Dryzek and List (2003) and Gehrlein and
Lepelley (2011) for the relevant notion of single-peakedness) or achieve ‘unity without uniformity’ (Zibakalam, 2008) as the differences extend to the methods of conflict resolution themselves as well. There is no consensus on whether the irreconcilable differences on small and big issues of life, work and language should be resolved democratically, by resort to the experts in religion or science, or by resort to the experts in communal wisdom like poets or even the wisdom of the kings. Islamic, Persianist, and modernist textbooks comes into bitter truth war with each other (see Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, on the strife between Roughani Zanjani and Nili on the side of the modern economic textbooks and the war-time prime minister Mousavi on the side of the Persianist and Islamic textbooks over the organization of Iranian economy in the Iran-Iraq war period). As such the emergence of consensus on the level of “meta-preference” (Grofman and Uhlaner, 1985) is blocked and the dynamics of coalition formation converges towards issue-based transitory and fleeting forms of coalition formations, as attested by Westwood (1965: 129).

These cases of ‘difference within’ can be found in the voices and faces affiliated to the regimes of truth of modernity and Persianism as well (as we elaborate in the case study chapters). The existence of irreconcilable differences on method of conflict resolution is the defining feature differentiating the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness from the experience of multiculturalism in the developed societies. In the developed societies, there is a historical (largely tacit and unconscious) consensus on liberally democratic method of conflict resolution alongside, more importantly, stable arrangements institutionalizing the historically-formed consensus. In addition, in the advanced societies there is a stable common ground upon which the fluidity of postmodernity and multiculturalism can be introduced, leading to the incremental change in the sedimented embeddedness of these societies. This is incomparable to the state of belated inbetweenness, where there is no stable common ground and no shared stable embeddedness and no way to agree to disagree or achieve unity without uniformity and there is no stable institutional background. As such importation of methods or solutions from the advanced societies (like independence of central bank or inflation targeting or liberalization and deregulation) is totally counterproductive for the countries immersed in the state of belated inbetweenness.

The fluidity of Bauman’s (2000) ‘liquid modernity’ or Lyotard’s (1984) ‘postmodern condition’ (Loyard acknowledges that his analysis only applies to the developed
societies) is entirely incommensurable with the fluidity of Bhabha’s (1994) state of hybridity and inbetweenness (especially when combined with the state of belatedness) (see: Huddart, 2006). Fluidity of identity and its fragmentation in the state of belated inbetweenness is drastically different from (seemingly) similar phenomenon in the state of multiculturalism or liquid modernity in advanced societies with synchronized and harmonized embeddedness and its associated institutional stability. Nomadic behaviour in a stable institutionalized background is playful and enriching while nomadic behaviour in a liquid embeddedness creates psychosis, disintegration, and collapse. Hybridity in such a context breeds discontent (Brah and Coombes, 2000). That is why Shayegan’s (2001) universalization of the phenomenon of fragmented identity, for example in the book ‘Modern Enchantment: 40-piece identity and fluid thinking’ is a less than satisfactory analysis of the particularity of the Iranian situation of belated inbetweenness. As Ross (2010) reminds us stable institutional structures bestows stability to the self, as selves act as coherent and predictable entities (as ants or happy slaves) in the contexts of situation where institutions are stable. The stable societies produce happy slaves while the troubled societies immersed in the state of belated inbetweenness produce unhappy slaves (for the notion of happy slave see Herzog, 1989; see also Milgram, 1974).

The state of belated inbetweenness can be further contrasted with other theoretical constructs as well. Fukuyama’s (1992) narrative of the end of ideology and Huntington’s (1996) narrative of clash of civilization bring the clash between stable selves and identities to the fore. Civilizational analysis (Arjomand, 2004) assumes a coherent and stable civilizational identity, which hardly exists in the state of belated inbetweenness. The postmodern “metanarrative of death of metanarratives” (Wright, 1999: 8) equally does not apply to the Iranian context of belated inbetweenness. Rawls’ call (1971, 1993, 1999) to appeal only to a shared family of political conceptions of justice could not work in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness as hardly any such set of shared frameworks exist. As such, the notions (and debates surrounding them) such as multiculturalism, liquid modernity and postmodernity and their associated packaged and cluster concepts such as liberal democracy, open society, critical realism, end of ideology, clash of civilizations, secularism, fundamentalism, despotism, Mafia, totalitarianism, fascism, Nazism, populism and the like, which are used widely and frequently to make sense of Iranian human condition, are largely the case of epistemic violence and counter-transference,
misdiagnosing and mis-categorizing the novel situation of Iranian form of belated inbetweenness.

By exploring the logic of collective action and the calculus of group and coalition formation (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Wilke, 2000; Diane, 2004; Demange and Wooders, 2005; Poulson, 2006; Ray, 2007; Jones, 2010; Fadaee, 2012), this study demonstrates that the confusion between alternative identity markers and packages of truth produce agents with time-inconsistent and context-specific preference and choice structures (agents who listens to the voice of short-term self one minute and medium-terms self the next, and the long-term self at the third; an agent-in-crisis), which create short-lived alliances and unstable coalitions, hence, making sense of the stylized fact of Iran being known as the country of short-lived alliances (Nategh, 1983; Abrahamian, 1989; Azadi, 2011). Lambton (1954: 16) attests to this phenomenon in the following terms: “factional strife, in one form or another, has been a marked feature of Persian life” (see also Abrahamian, 1974: 17). Almost every Iranian person or face is an example of the process of short-term alliance at micro level. Frequent migration to alternative discursive lands leads to Iran being known as a country of unstable coalitions. This is not restricted only to the realm of polity but is endemic to all realms of life, work, and language (like the incessant fights at all levels over language and language policy). This research demonstrates that the phenomenon of instability of coalitions is not restricted to particular ideological or doctrinal affiliations and plagues all ideological orientations and persuasions from left to right and from religious to secular (if such categorization is ever applicable to people immersed in the state of inbetweenness) and emanates from the exposure to the state of belated inbetweenness and warring regimes of truth.

3.4 INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

At the next step, this chapter, consequentially, aims to show how institutions cannot be built, grounded, and sustained as a direct consequence of multiplicity of regimes of truth and its associated confused selves and unstable alliances.

Some theorists (Binmore, 1994, 1998, 2005) model the emergence and change in institutional landscape of societies using the tools of game theory. The work of game theorists demonstrated that the process of establishing institutions can be modelled as a coordination game. Lewis (1969) modelled the emergence of language,
convention, and propositional justification and belief as a coordination game. Ross (2010, added emphasis) demonstrates that:

The basic insight can be captured using a simple example. The word ‘chicken’ denotes chickens and ‘ostrich’ denotes ostriches. We would not be better or worse off if ‘chicken’ denoted ostriches and ‘ostrich’ denoted chickens; however, we would be worse off if half of us used the pair of words the first way and half the second, or if all of us randomized between them to refer to flightless birds generally. This insight, of course, well preceded Lewis; but what he recognized is that this situation has the logical form of a coordination game. Thus, while particular conventions may be arbitrary, the interactive structures that stabilize and maintain them are not.

Ross (2010) further observes that:

In coordination (and other) games with multiple NE [Nash Equilibria], it is known that what counts as a solution is highly sensitive to conjectures made by players about one another's beliefs and computational ability.

This is exactly where the problem arises in the Iranian context. In the context of the confused agents, reading the mind of the other and even their own minds become problematic and achieving an stable equilibrium of, for example the case regarding rules of the road, ‘all drive on the left’ or ‘all drive on the right’ becomes impossible.

The dilemmas and crises depicted by a simple coordination game with multiple equilibria can shed considerable light on the institutional failure in the Iranian context. The Iranian case of multiple equilibria can be seen as a social order organized around Persianism, Islam or modernity, or a viable and stable combination of them. The presence of irreconcilable difference between and within social assemblages turns the win-win cooperation game of institutional building into the lose-lose PD game of institutional failure, where no long-term equilibrium can be established. Hardin (1995) shows how the Yugoslavian civil war of 1991-95, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide can be analysed “as Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PDs) that were nested inside coordination games” (Ross, 2010).

Due to the failure in achieving a stable outcome in the framework of the coordination game and the ensuing social disorder and personal dissatisfactions, the dynamic of the search for a unified and coherent identity triggers a chain of reactions leading to
strong events such as revolutions and large social movements in order to solve the problem of non-coordination once and for all. In this context, coordination game turns into prisoner’s dilemma through the play of identity game. Here one component of Iranian multiple identity strives to eradicate the traces of the others once and for all by either incorporating the main attractive ideas and practices affiliated to the other packages or/and eliminating them from the public discourses and practices and annihilating their main outspoken figures and loyal followers. In other words, the logic and language of ‘either with us or against us’ is at its full force and is practiced by all sides. While in reality, Islam, Persianism, and modernity, which are themselves unities in multiplicities (Flynn, 2005), interact and combine in innumerable forms of permutations to generate different shades of multiplicities of ways of being, seeing, and speaking, the violence of unified identity (negating dimension of ‘imaginary’ order) ignores (or is unable to find a new satisfactory unified identity) these multiplicities in search of pure unities in order to solve the urgent issue of non-coordination.

A brief example of how these paradigms of truth interact in reality to produce new combinations are as follows: modernity is materialized through the establishment of nation-states, which requires a national identity which further fuels a demand for resources embedded in the Shia Islam and/or Persianism. This puts a demand to form a viable narrative out of resources of Islam and/or Persianism, made compatible with modernity. This in turn leads to the emergence of three incompatible forms of Islamic nationalism, Persianist nationalism and modernist nationalism, and a variety of combinations of them with different priorities, emphases, elisions, and silences. The three strong events of the modern Iranian history (the constitutional revolution, the oil-nationalization movement, and the 1979 Islamic revolution) are the manifestations of the efforts to find a stable equilibrium for a sense of national identity as a case of multiple equilibria (this will be addressed extensively in the application chapters).

If we adopt three criteria offered by Hilbert (consistency, completeness and decidability) for the assessment of mathematical systems (see Floridi, 2004) as a heuristic guide for the assessment of socio-economic philosophies and policies (as Foucault’s typological and axiomatic moves require), we will demonstrate the disorienting array of inconsistencies, incompletenesses, and undecidabilities at the heart of social life throughout Iranian history. As such, all areas of life from
economy, to culture and art, to family, education, health, security and crime, justice, social freedom, morality, legal arrangements, and relation with the foreign others have become the battle grounds for alternative regime of truths without ever settling in any coherent set of vocabularies, philosophies, or policies. Institutional investments encounter abortions, reversals or deformities and dysfunctionalities. Hence, this study shows how these constant undecidable battles over fundamentals of social life have produced constant shifts in the position of individuals and formed unstable coalitions and alliances. Some brief examples of these battles over languages, philosophies, and policies are as follows:

In the realm of economic life, the questions about the truth of things revolve around the questions such as the following: should we give priority to the pursuit of self-interest (which is condemned in the language of religious and Persianist texts but deeply rooted in the language of modernity at least in its current form) or should we order our economy based on the will to serve (God and/or people)? This battle over the vocabulary and content regarding the binary of interest/service has paralysed economic life in Iran for a century (see Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, for example). Or how can the institution of property rights and its associated discursive and non-discursive practices be harmonized with the needs and requirements of social justice and/or belief and commitment to faith? In his London speech, Malkam Khan (1891: 239), one of the leading figures of the constitutional revolution, summarizes the relation between property rights and prosperity in the following terms:

"certain facts are self-evident. Without security of life and property, no progress- without justice, no freedom- without freedom, no national prosperity, no individual contentment and peace."

How can the institutionalized respect for “security of life and property” be reconciled with the need for political stability and security where in the state of belated inbetweenness the economic power is frequently deployed to change the political system, tuning economic activities into issues of national security? How can the excessive use of sexual signs and symbols as inputs in the production of goods and services be reconciled with the Islamic laws of chastity and Persianist ethics of public decency? How can the notion of Halal and Haram investments in Islam or banning of riba (interest or usury?) be coordinated with excessive permissiveness of the modern business world and modern banking system? What is the road map
through which we can reach a viable consensus on the parameters of the business atmosphere, setting the stable, formal and informal, terms of “licence to operate” (see Sadler, 2002, chapter 10) to generate trust and optimism amongst investors and entrepreneurs towards the socio-economic system?

No option seems to be able to overcome the other in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people and no consensus appears to be ever emerging. Another example is in the realm of defining relations with the West and Arabs, the first world and the third world. Should we form stable alliances with the West and Israel against Arabs (as the dominant philosophy of the last kingdom in Iran was) or should we form stable coalitions with our Muslim brothers (inside the larger notion of ummah) and the oppressed third world against the oppressors of the West and Israel (as the philosophy of the current order in Iran implies)? Should we prioritize our national interests or should we sacrifice our interests for the good of Islamic community at large and the oppressed people of the world (modern nationalism versus Islamic and oppressed-people-of-the-world internationalism)?

None of the possible solutions has gained legitimacy and supremacy over the other so that they could irreversibly be turned into the axioms of foreign policy, which turns it into a perfect case of undecidability. Whatever policy is pursued, a wave of discontent and disillusionment is created (just like Sophie’s choice in the concentration camp; see McConnell, 2010) leading to constant tensions and sudden shifts and zigzag metamorphoses in policy. In the realm of economy, for instance, should we allow direct foreign investment in the country or not? In the case of letting the foreigners in, should we be content with ‘infidels’ taking charge of Muslim affairs and lands and properties or should we not care as long as they generate employment, wealth and prosperity? If we let the foreigners in would not they bring their own life styles and philosophies in direct opposition to our way of life and our ethos, which would contaminate our purity and our pride and corrupt our youth and erode our morality and social fabric alongside our prospect of eternal salvation? (see: Euben, 1999; Tripp, 2006; Zaidi 2011)

Would it be wise to exchange the impermanent benefits of this world at the expense of losing permanent payoffs associated with eternal salvation? Is it not true that such an exchange is utter madness? Would not they use the realm of economy to change our faith? What is the price we are ready to pay for establishing a normal relation

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with the outside world? Should it be at the cost of losing our eternal happiness in our hereafter? Or is the fact that these foreigners (largely westerners) are not infidels, they are our brothers in Aryan race and Indo-European language family and we have to form stable alliances with them against the true aliens like Arabs and/or Russians?

Ultimately, how can we reconcile the three distinct forces of Persianism, Islam, and modernity with their three distinctive structures of power/knowledge, discursive formations and institutional arrangements, and their associated negating facets of repression, disavowal and foreclosure in different realms of life from diplomacy, to polity, to economy, art, security, family and gender relation, to education and entertainment? All these are entirely unclear and society has become an experimental lab for alternative solutions implemented through the mechanism of reverse social engineering due to the requirements of state of belatedness, leading to constant reversals, abortions and restructuring and waste of resources which marks the socio-economic stagnation in Iran. The preference reversals ultimately lead to money-pump cycle (see Munro, 2009: 62; Goldman, 2008: 103; Santos, 2010: 167) and socio-economic underdevelopment.

The experience of institutional failure and its associated dysfunctionalities and deformities, hence, breeds discontent and waves of social upheavals, which will be elaborated more extensively by bringing historical evidence into play and uncovering the repeated patterns and subtle regularities which have roots in the tragic ‘context of multiple regimes of truth’ in interaction with the state of belatedness and its manifestation in Iranian confused mind and identity crises. For this, this study uses all types of evidence to fully elaborate on the regularities and irregularities of Iranian social life leading to socio-economic stagnation. This will suggest a general equilibrium (or disequilibrium) and co-evolutionary theory of Iranian social life relating economy to politics, religion, morality, culture, and mind whereby a hybrid and interdisciplinary analysis is attempted.

It should be noted that such a theoretical framework starts to fill the gap in the four-level analysis offered by Williamson (2000), especially at the level of mind and its associated layers of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. In a sense, there is almost always a social process behind the mechanism of price formation (see Zafirovski, 2000, on this important point) and this study is an attempt to unravel the “underlying forces operating beneath supply and demand” (Zafirovski, 2000: 277)
and the hyper-complex processes working behind the price signals guiding the allocation of scarce resources and determining the nature of governance structures, institutional arrangements, and socio-economic development. This relates to the relation between wealth-creation and truth-creation as Foucault (1980: 93-4, emphasis added) conceives it:

*In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place.*

This statement, in a way, succinctly captures the hypothesis of this study. The failure in the production of truth in the Iranian modern history has led to the failure in the production of wealth.

In a sense, this study is an attempt to have another go at the Foucault’s attempt to map the Iranian regime of truth:

the events in Iran, he proposed, cannot be captured by traditional categories like Marxism, for Iranians ‘don’t have the same regime of truth as ours’ (Moaddel, 2011: 127).

The tragedy of confusion alongside the impossibility of formation of stable coalition and failures in establishing functional institutions has culminated in the emergence of a chaotic order in the modern history of Iran, shaping the price and non-price factors involved in determination of the nature of socio-economic development. The following section addresses the fourth stage of the four-level social mechanism of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran.

### 3.5 Chaotic Order

The experience of discontent and disillusionment emanating from living within dysfunctional and deformed institutions (reminiscent of Ibrahim Beig’s ‘disturbance evaluation’) endemic to the interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness culminates in the emergence of large social movements and revolutions leading to the collapse of the old order. The collapse of the incumbent regime of truth with its associated project and subprojects of social transformation and its affiliated shades of voices leads to the emergence of a spring of freedom
where all the marginalized regimes of truth and their associated projects/subprojects and voices erupt into the social space producing multitude of groups, societies, and associations. The irreconcilable differences between and within alternative forces, voices and faces culminate in the emergence of state of chaotic civil strife where the social order converges to the state of total disorder and collapse. The sweet taste of freedom turns into bitter experience of civil war, anarchy, and chaos.

The war of attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their associated cultural tribes results in the production of limit-experience of degeneration and collapse, where Iran verges towards and touches upon the symptoms of failed states. But frequently the process of degeneration does not end in the collapse of the whole order as the same forces which plotted its state of near-collapse coalesce to save the country from the brink of total breakdown. Depending on the nature of old order, it is expected that a new final arbiter would emerge to put an end to the state of civil strife and act as a device for conflict resolution. The final arbiter (Iranian leviathan re-emerging time and again in different disguises) resorts to the repressive strategies to eliminate the rival forces, voices and faces from the social order and to establish itself as the new incumbent force and to restore a semblance of order to the social life of the nation.

The marginalized forces, voices and faces lay dormant in the short euphoric honeymoon period of the new incumbent regime and soon they come back with vengeance and start a new round of war of attrition with its incessant waves of de-legitimization and discrediting, severely eroding the legitimacy, credibility and popularity of the new incumbent regimes, ultimately making them incompetent in establishing functional institutions, which culminates in its collapse and the same truth cycle (similar to business cycles in economics) recommence, whereby the population migrate (exit) in mass to the new regime of truth by voting with hands or feet (see Fleck and Hanssen, 2013; Hirschman, 1970). The ease at which Iranians can freely enter and exit the alternative regimes of truth is mind-blowing. The existence of such alternative set of options is at the root of such a state of chaotic order and is endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness. Naturally, there is no irreversible commitment to a particular regime of truth and its associated project and subprojects of reverse social engineering. The minute you are unhappy with a particular state of affairs you have the option of moving to alternative regimes of
truth. Sudden jump, rather than an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization, is the dominant method of social change.

It is a fact that in ‘troubled societies’ like Iran, trapped in the compound state of belatedness-inbetweenness, the social order relies on an scattered army of final arbiters to regenerate order and as a result the power appears to be arbitrary, capricious, discretionary (saligheh-ye) and atomic. The phenomenon of discretionary nature of power (ha’kemee’yat-e saligheh) is equivalent to what Katouzian (1998) terms as “licence” and opposes it to liberty. For him liberty is rule-based and always operates within consensual constraints while licence is willy-nilly and arbitrary. Alternatively, Katouzian (2010: 16-8) calls it “deep-seated personalism” of the Iranian society. It is worth noting that what appears as exercise of “licence” or “personalism” is exercise of a particular combination of regimes of truth, which for the outsiders appears as idiosyncratic, arbitrary and discretionary. The duality of licence/freedom or personalism/rule of law seems to be a case of counter-transference and another application of hermeneutics of suspicion without hermeneutics of understanding.

Even the social actors themselves frequently commit the same cardinal sin and classify the positions of others as the cases of rule of discretion (saligheh-ye) while classify their own positions as principled and disciplined. As we mentioned in the methodology chapter, there is no arbitrary taste or action; the wills, speeches, actions, emotions, and organization of objects are willed by the worldhood and the big Other composed of real, symbolic and imaginary orders with their affirmative and negating facets. The point is that the actions, speeches and emotions of the radical other are frequently manifested to the self as irrational, arbitrary and licentious because of addiction to a particular form of rationality and its grid of intelligibility. The discourse of licence and arbitrariness is based on poorly theorized grasp of social phenomena and human agency. Abrahamian (1974), for instance, demonstrates how even the shahs of Qajar who were supposed to be the pinnacles of oriental despotism were extremely powerless in terms of access to a powerful army and an efficient bureaucracy and their power was rooted in people and their elites throughout the country believing in the necessity of the submission to the power of the shah as a way to prevent chaos. This belief was rooted in the institution of Persian kingship and its associated regime of truth (see Rajaee, 1993; Soudavar, 2003).
Furthermore, As Amanat (1997) reports, despite having access to as many women as he could wish, Nasir-al-Din Shah had to strictly abide by the Shia ruling of having only four permanent wives and the distinction between permanent wives and temporary wives through promotion to or demotion from the status of being amongst the four permanent wives had produced a particular configuration of harem politics. This is alongside the fact Mohammad Reza Shah could not even have more than one wife due to the penetration of modern regime of truth in the Iranian life world and as such he had to resort to secret and illicit relations with other women, as Milani (2011a) reports, buying him a bad reputation for being a womanizer. As such, regimes of truth almost always set the parameters of “licence to operate” in all realms of life, work, and language. Hence, this kind of misclassification in seeing the positions of the radical others as arbitrary and spineless, which itself is the product of the state of belated inbetweenness, further exacerbates the relentless war of attrition between and within coalitions and creates a cumulative atmosphere of bitterness and spitefulness, feeding back into the state of chaotic order.

The nature of diffusion of power in the state of belated inbetweenness is different from the decentralization of power in the state of harmonized and synchronized embeddedness. In the state of belated inbetweenness power at each particular context emanates from contradictory sources of knowledge. In the university context, for example, the scientific credentials act as the well of power, which may come into conflict with the power generated from the status and discourses of martyrdom (religious and/or revolutionary credentials) (Varzi, 2006; Khosronejad, 2013), and they both may come into conflict with the powers emanating from the access to the “Persian house of wisdom” (Polastron, 2007: 56). Each person in authority or outside of it is a biographically-determined idiosyncratic combination of these wells of power/knowledge/subjectivity invested with multiple forms of legitimacy. In each context of situation different elements of this multi-layered structure of power/knowledge/subjectivity are activated or deactivated.

This makes the exercise of power look arbitrary and discretionary, while in reality it depends on the trajectory of evolution of each social assemblage and not on their whims or ex-nihilo wills. In a particular context it is not predictable whether the person in authority or outside of it activates power predominantly based on modern discourses, Islamic discourses, or Persianist discourses and whether their discourses are found credible and bought or not. Furthermore, what a social assemblage (like
army, a newspaper or a person like Banisadr) does at time A is not a guide or predictor for what he/she/it does at time B, as the composition of its hybrid voice may change drastically through conversion to alternative regimes of truth or slightly but significantly through change in emphases and in the nature of silences, elisions, and in the economy of attention (see Zerubavel, 2006; Shariff, 2000; Berman, 1998; Bourdieu, 1977). The individual, group or organization is the vessel through which multiple forms of networks of power-knowledge come into conflict, while intermingling, co-habitating, and reinforcing each other. This dynamics makes power look discretionary and atomic, and as such unpredictable.

This dynamics of atomization of power is manifest in everyday experiences of Iranian *dasein*. The common and popular notion of a mode of governance called *muluk-al-tawa'ifi* (the rule of chiefs of clans) (see Katouzian, 2010: 6) captures the discretionary nature of power in Iran, but in modern times such clan-based power emanates from the prevalence of cultural clans and cultural tribes rather than traditional clans and tribes; in the state of inbetweenness, a clan (*ta'efeh*)- the circle of people around prominent figures like Beheshti, Rafsanjani, the queen or Hoveida, for example- is the coalition which is very fluid and unstable, and has nothing to do with geographical territory or any other form of stable affiliations. An entrepreneur, for example, may obtain the licence for investing on a particular economic activity from a particular authority at time $t_1$, but his ‘licence to operate’ may be revoked or ignored and by-passed by the same authority or by another authority at time $t_2$ (see Frye, 1984; Milani, 2000; Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, for instance).

Thus, the power becomes time-inconsistent as preferences are time-inconsistent. Consequently, the confusion in the realm of knowledge trickles down to the realm of power. That is why Jamalzadeh, the father of modern novel in Iran, implicitly calls Iran the house of the insane (*dar-al-majalin*, translated as lunatic asylum) (see: Katouzian, 2013: 250), and Forough Farrokhzad, the prominent modernist poet, portrays Iran as a leper colony in her short film (see: Brookshaw and Rahimieh, 2010). This is due to the nature and bewildering variety of different preference orderings inhabiting the landscape of Iranian social order. The irreconcilable form of ‘difference within’ finds opportunity to reveal itself when the ‘difference between’ is not activated or highlighted.
The phenomenon of arbitrariness and discretionary nature of power, hence, is the unintended and emergent outcome of the dynamics of creation of voices out of the application of operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth. In this process, paradoxically the same three regimes of truth, which create chaos in the Iranian social reality save it from degenerating into oblivion. This is similar to a dysfunctional family, whose deep familial connections keep them together without ever turning into a functional unit. The deep affiliations to the three regimes of truth keep Iranians together without ever allowing them to build a peaceful and functional house of being. As such the social order fluctuates between the state of chaos and the state of order without ever falling into stable states of total collapse or stable state of functional order. It oscillates between order and chaos and the states of elation and exuberance and discontent and disillusionment, which creates dysfunctions and deformities in all realms of social life.

This state of deformity is at the heart of the Iranian bitter experience of backwardness and underdevelopment. In essence, almost no institution works as they are supposed to (Akhavi, 1998: 701). This is despite the fact that Iran has adopted almost all institutions of modernity from schools, hospitals, to universities, prisons, legal system, transportation system, parliamentary system, banking system and institutions of culture, sports, entertainment and many more, as almost none of them work smoothly the way they are supposed to. The reason has to be located within the fitness frame, as they are not fit for purpose due to being transplanted and forced to function through different mechanism as opposed to the mechanism for which they were created or innovated. In other words, these adoptions were made through the process of reverse social engineering without going through evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization involving ‘vanishing mediator’ forms of adaptations, and therefore, they are vulnerable to delegitimizing challenges launched by various forces, voices and faces and as such are embroiled in the state of deformities and dysfunctionalities.

Consequently, adoptions without adaptations are vulnerable to experiences of abortions, reversals or deformities and dysfunctionalities. This common experience of institutional reversals and abortions is what Katouzian (2010: 17) terms as ‘the pick-axe society (jame’eh-ye kolangi)’. This is related to the theory of selection (see Runciman, 2009) from alternative social assemblages and their regimes of truth, and theory of emergence of new forms of life, work and language (which we have
addressed in more depth in the chapter on methodology and case study chapters) and
the issue of multiple realizability. The story runs almost similarly for the institutions
affiliated predominantly to the regimes of truth of Islam and Persianism.

3.6 CONCLUSION

The preceding discussions investigate the constitution of Iranian dasein and
complete four stages of our theoretical model offered for the analysis of enigma of
socio-economic underdevelopment in modern history of Iran. The following chapters
put into test the explanatory power of these methodological insights and the
theoretical model proposed in relation to understanding of three strong events of
Iranian history spanning a period of a century, namely the Constitutional Revolution,
the Oil-Nationalization Movement (ONM), and the Islamic Revolution (up to the
start of Reformist Movement in 1997).

In this explorations, this study follows the formula offered by Movahhed (1999,
2004a) in his seminal book on the ONM and calls the history of Iran a series of
‘confused dreams’; the confused dream of Mashroteh, oil nationalization and Islamic
revolution, followed by latest versions of the same dreams in Reformist Movements
and Green Movements.
CHAPTER 4

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” Marx

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The 1906 constitutional revolution in Iran was a world event both in its causes and its consequences (see Kasravi, 1994; Martin, 1989; Bayat, 1991; Afary, 1996; Abadian, 2006; amongst others). It happened as an outcome of interplay of two sets of Malinowskian conditions: ‘condition of situation’ and ‘condition of culture’. The particular configuration of forces, voices, and faces in time and space, in history and geography, shaped the events of this era. While the condition of situation constituted of the configuration of forces and balance of power/knowledge in the world of international order, itself an assemblage of multiple worldhoods (a world of worldhoods), the condition of culture enshrined the particularity and singularity of historically emerged sedimentation and embeddedness of Iranian social order. The site of the constitutional revolution was the scene of intermingling of two social assemblages, the social assemblage of international order and the social assemblage of Iranian social order.

In this chapter we investigate how these two sets of social assemblages interacted and manifested themselves in and through historical forces, voices and faces, culminating in the emergence of a series of epoch-making events known as the Constitutional Revolution in the early years of 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This chapter aims to explore the rise and fall of the constitutional movement by locating it in the framework of the political economy of regimes of truth, the state of inbetweenness, in its interaction with the state of belatedness, as manifested in a mechanism constitutive of four stages of state of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and the emergence of a chaotic social order of deformities and dysfunctionalities, where the society neither disintegrates into a failing state nor turns into a normal and functioning country.
4.1.1. The Level of Analysis

This section of the introduction aims to demonstrate that for theorization of the rise and fall of the constitutional revolution we need to move from the level of prices, governance, and institution to the level of regimes of truth; it is worth noting that this study does not intend to be a chronological history of this strong event of the Iranian modern history, rather it strives to offer a novel theoretical reading.

The constitutional revolution is known to be a revolution for the establishment of rule of law as manifested in the demand for an order in which “the shah and the beggar will be equal within the confines of the law” (Enayat, 2013: 1). The following part of Afghani’s (1892: 241) speech in London succinctly captures the spirit of the time:

[Afghani was giving a report of his visit to Persia] The people gathered around me as about their deliverer. “A code of law! A code of law!” was all their cry; “no matter what, only some law; we have no law, no courts of justice, no security of life and property; let us be taxed, squeezed, and oppressed in moderation; but let us have some law and we will submit!.

Based on this fact and the fact the recent Reformist Movement and Green Movement in Iran had practically the same demand as the constitutional revolution (see Dabashi, 2011b; Afary, 2013) we can arrive at the conclusion that the analysis of Iranian backwardness, both at the level of history and historiography, has not yet managed to finally cut the king’s head, as Foucault (1980: 102) suggests: “We must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power”. The analysis frequently gets fixated at the level of politics, the rule of law, the state, and the consciousness, while this level of analysis at best covers the three Williamson’s (2000) levels of prices, governance, and institutions without entering the level of mind and its associated continuum of unconscious/conscious regime of truth.

The contrast between the levels of truth and law is evident in this specimen from Seyyed Jamal al-Din Va’ez Isfahani, one of the leading lights of the constitutional revolution, as reported in Katouzian (2011: 764):
People! Nothing would develop your country other than subjection to law, observation of law, preservation of law, respect for law, implementation of the law, and again law, and once again law.

Here in Va’ez Isfahani’s interpretation, as well as Katouzian’s, the socio-economic development of the country depends on the rule of law, while the establishment of rule of law requires, in Foucault’s conception, the production of truth, which acts as the condition of possibility for the creation of wealth. If we delve deeper at the prerequisites of the establishment of law we arrive at the level of production of truth; in Williamson’s terms we move from the level of prices, governance, and institution to the level of mind.

In a brief assessment of the failure of the constitutional revolution and other attempts for modernizations in Iran, Katouzian (2012, 2011, 2000) puts the blame on such vague notions as ‘cultural roots’, ‘habits’ and the like, which is evident in the following statement that “the old habits of discord and lack of social cohesion and cooperation, and the attitude of total gain or total loss – in short, the politics of elimination – was too ingrained to make peaceful developments possible” (Katouzian, 2011: 773). Here Katouzian resorts to such notions as ‘old habits of discord’, ‘lack of social cohesion and cooperation’, and the ‘politics of elimination’ being too ‘ingrained’ without adequately theorizing them. This study hopes to be a right step in the direction of filling this considerable gap in the level of theorization in answering the questions such as why thing are the way they are; why in the Iranian context old habits do not change and are not replaced by new habits, while in other historical contexts habits clearly do change (Iranians themselves changed their habit of practicing Zoroastrianism or agrarian mode of production, for instance, and other nations changed their habit of despotism to new habit of democracy), why there is not adequate level of social cohesion, and why some things become ingrained and others do not. As such, there is an urgent need to offering a theory of “cultural roots”, “habits”, “lack of social cohesion”, and “politics of elimination”.

In actual fact, Va’ez Isfahani, in the rest of the above passage, as reported in Katouzian (2011: 764), refers to the level of regime of truth explicitly without being able to term it as such:
Children must from childhood read and learn at schools that no sin in religion and the shari’eh is worse than opposing the law... Observing religion means law, religion means law, Islam, the Koran, mean God’s law. My dear man, qanun, qanun. Children must understand, women must understand, that the ruler is law and law alone, and no one’s rule is valid but that of the law. The parliament is the protector of law... The legislative assembly and legislature is the assembly which makes law, the sultan is the head of the executive which implements the law. The soldier is defender of the law, the police is defender of the law, justice means law, prosperity means implementing the law, the independence of the monarchy means rules of the law. In a word, the development of the country, the foundation of every nationality, and the solidarity of every nation arises from the implementation of the law.

Here he moves to the deeper level of making respect for law and understanding of it as part of women’s and children’s subjectivities and daily discursive and non-discursive practices, where the defiance of law is treated as sin. He resorts to the notion of sin and cardinal sin, which is a very entrenched notion in the Shia theology, and its moral and legal formulations. Alongside Islam he refers to the notion of majlis and monarchy and the institutions of modern state like police and army. Thus, he brings the two regimes of modernity and Persianism into the equation as well. To entrench the culture of respect for law and achieve the culture of law-abiding citizenry require the deeper engagement at discursive and non-discursive level (engaging with the Heideggerian fourfold) and the level of affectivity and emotional economy (see Neuman et al., 2007), as people need to feel guilt and shame (like the loss of sexual honor which brings the sense of shame) if the disregard for law is supposed to be experienced as sin. This needs to be complemented with the cultivation of the sense of joy and pride in being a law-abiding citizen and society alongside the experience of being rewarded eternal and material prizes in the case of abidance by law.

As such, the entire social order comes into play, requiring a cultural revolution, which in turn requires deep and sustained engagement of the clergy, the intelligentsia, and the Persianist literati and monarchy to reconcile deep differences on who has the right to legislate and what are the ontological, epistemological, methodological, aesthetic and moral axes of such act of legislation. There is also an urgent and pressing need for the development of a collective dialogue on the issues such property rights, freedom, justice, equality, sexuality (prostitution and the sexual freedom of two sexes), permanence and impermanence, pleasures of the flesh and
spirituality, faithfulness and faithlessness, the issue of social vices (drinking alcohols and consumption of drugs and gambling), the nature of good and evil, and nature of the healthy society as foundations of new conception of significance of rule of law. In particular the whole social order need to see how three conceptions of time (Chakrabarty’s timeknot, 2000) and the path of the prophets and the path of mankind can be reconciled and how the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth can be coordinated. Without engagement at these deeper levels and production of philosophical and theoretical consensus, which are implicit in any assertion on any social issue including the issue of rule of law, the whole project of establishing a functional social order based on the rule of law is doomed to fail as it failed frequently.

Consequently, the debate needs to abandon the obsession with the level of politics and law, and engage at the deeper and more fundamental level for the society to be able to move from the state of lawlessness to the state of lawfulness. This requires a theory of social order and social phenomena, which can investigate how they are formed, reformed and transformed in order to be able to understand how the transition from lawlessness to lawfulness can happen. This is what is not offered in Katouzian’s works, or almost any of the other analysts of the Iranian contemporary history, while all of their works are rich repertoires for the traces and materials for the development of such a theory or set of theories.

In terms of the experience of the historical actors in the constitutional era, the level of analysis has only moved from ‘cheap bread and meat’ issues, to who should govern and how (good governance as manifested in the demand for house of justice), and the institutions of good governance (the constitution and the rule of law) as evident in the following piece, reported by Arjomand (1988: 38), from the constitutional era (in a rally in Tabriz in support of the constitutional movement):

The people were asked: "What do you want, cheap bread and meat? Or do you have another objective?" The mass which was privy to no knowledge said yes, we want cheap bread and meat. It was suggested once more to them: "Do you want constitutional government (mashruteh)?" This time they said yes three times in a loud voice.

Arjomand (1988: 37) further observes that:
For the teleology of the Constitutional Revolution to unfold without hindrance, the Constitutionalists had to transcend not only the particularistic goals of the clerical estate and the mercantile class, but also the constant preoccupation of the masses with bread and meat.

Thus, the three Williamsonian levels of prices, governance, and institutions can be easily seen in Arjomand’s observation in the three categories of demands in the constitutional era: ‘the demand for cheap bread and meat (bread riots)’, ‘the demand for good governance’ as manifested in their protest against the governors of Tehran and Kerman and the subsequent demand for the house of justice (edalatkhaneh), and the ‘demand for constitution’.

Alongside these three levels of analysis, the analysis of Iranian modern history is in desperate need of transcending obsession with them in the hope of entering the level of mind and its hyper-complex and largely unconscious level of regime of truth. This study aims to see these four levels as complementary levels via viewing the market for truth as the condition of possibility for the production of wealth (as Foucault conceived it). As such, the study covers a spectrum from truth to bread; truth is manifested in bread, and when we eat the bread we eat the truth we managed to produce collectively to support the stable socio-economic structure leading to the production of bread. Thus, truth and bread are social twins. Failure in the production of truth leads to failure in the production of bread. As we will see later in this chapter almost all analysts of Iranian history and the historical actors suffer from the same shortcoming; the best they achieve is to travel to the level of ideas and beliefs and their associated institutions without locating them in the wider notion of being-in-the-world and its associated warring regimes of truth.

The analysis in this chapter, hence, locates the modern Iranian history in the political economy of supply and demand for truth or the war between rival regimes of truth to dominate the market for truth (see Witham, 2010, for the extension of the notion of market to other realms of life, for instance, in the analysis of market for gods). The encounter with the real of modernity generated the state of belatedness in the non-pioneering countries and regions of the world, which in turn prompted the sense of discontent with the status quo and steered demand for change. The demand for change became a global phenomenon as manifested in reform and revolutionary movements in Russia, China, Mexico, Portugal, amongst others, as attested by
Kurzman (2008: 4-6) (also see Sohrabi, 1995; Keddie, 1962). Modernity dwarfed and derailed almost all pre-modern social orders in an irreversible manner. As such what was experienced globally by non-pioneering societies was dwarfment (Thomson, 1880: 78) rather than decline. As the encounter with modernity had disturbed and derailed the old equilibrium in the market for truth, the demand for change instigated a demand for truth about every aspect of life, work and language. To catch-up with the Western modernity, the belated countries needed to know about where and how and with what pace the transformation needed to be achieved, generating the need for a theory of selection from other orders, in turn prompting the need for understanding the nature of social phenomena and their logic of formation and transformation with their ontological, epistemological, methodological, ethical, and aesthetical dimensions.

This process in turn required deep engagement with ‘truth about’ gods, mortals, sky and earth, which created sustained and uninterrupted demand and supply for truth about life, work, and language. Foucault (1980: 93-4) refers to how the production of truth acts as condition of possibility for the production of wealth:

In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place.

Based on this formulation, the wealth of nations depends on how truths are produced by nations. The disruptions and dysfunctionalities in the production of truth are translated into the experience of disruptions and dysfunctionalities in the production of wealth. The creation of stable and dynamic market for goods and services relies on the creation of stable and dynamic markets for truth.

The (in)famous call of Taqizadeh (one of the leading figures in the constitutional and post-constitutional era) for wholesale Westernization (becoming Europeanised from top to toe) (Ansari, 2012: 62; Boroujerdi, 2003: 22) is the hallmark of the age where all realms of life have undergone a crisis of legitimacy and identity and the demand for new truth has emerged. The politicization of all realms of life is another symptom or by-product of such a crisis in the production of truth. In the state of belated inbetweenness, life, work and language inevitably are experienced as politics (see Bayat, 2009). In his tract called “the war of seventy two belief systems” (Jang-e Haftad-o du Mellat), resorting to the famous poem of Hafez, Mirza Agha Khan
Kermani (1925: 102, emphasis added), one of the leading theorists and activists of the constitutional era who was killed almost 10 years before the start of the revolution, addresses the issue of ‘truth’ as one of the central issue of the age:

*is there any truth or not and if there is, what is it and where is it and who has it and what is its signs and after knowing it how can it be pursued and how can it be achieved?*

These are the deepest questions residing at the heart of almost all social movements and everydayness in the modern history of Iran, including the constitutional era, which demands from the researcher to conduct the analysis at the level of regime of truth in association with the level of institutions, governance, and prices. Interestingly, in the above tract Kermani explicitly and implicitly elaborates on how different people have different regimes of truth, without naming it as such, and even explores the fact that even people’s taste, physical sensibilities, and emotional economies are scaffolded by their particular regime of truth. He offered a set of alternative truths and ultimately falls into Hafez’s trap of favouring the unity of all religions and what Berlin (1990) calls monism of truth (*see* Pedersen and Wright, 2013; Weir, 2012).³⁶

It is worth noting that in the above piece of work, Kermani demonstrates the traces of appreciating difference in itself as the default position, while ultimately leaning towards taking modernity as the gold standard and trying to harmonize it with a version of ‘true’ Islam. Iraj Mirza’s poem as reported in Ajodani (2002: 241), on the non-existence of God, where he poses a series of rhetorical questions and expresses his atheist conclusion in the form of “Where is God? Who is God? What is God? Stop debating uselessly; there is no God (*Kou khoda? Kist khoda? Chist khoda? Bee jahat babs makon nist khoda*)”, demonstrates how the demand for and supply of reform of the old order- triggered due to being dwarfed in the state of belatedness- was inevitably translated into the deeper dimensions of search for truth directly relating to the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth. We see the traces of Nietzsche’s famous declaration of “death of God” in Iran without the same evolutionary background. In the pioneer societies catastrophic and sudden changes

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³⁶ Here he reduces difference to the logic of the same following Hafez, saying that these seventy two voices are there because they failed to see the Truth and fell prey to the path of the myth; ironically Hafez fails to see myth and illusion (*afsaneh va afsoon*) as constitutive of truth (*see* Gabriel and Zizek, 2009), as we addressed in the methodological chapter.
like revolutions (in thought or in social order) happen within a deeper gradual and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization while in the state of belatedness, the society faces a series of catastrophic changes imported from without through Cartesian projects of reverse social engineering and intelligent design.

These developments, hence, led to the narrative/strategy of modernization, rule of law, and constitutionalism being associated with denotations and connotations of atheism, and anti-religion orientations alongside the traces of support for free love and the spread of social vices (for example in the work of Akhundzadeh; see Adamiyat, 1970), all of which as a whole would generate suspicion towards the new regime of truth. This association between the doctrine of rule of law, atheism, materialism, and social vices, which demonstrates the co-evolutionary nature of social orders as meaningful complex systems, was at the roots of the negativities generated and expressed towards modernity at the time.

The sharp difference between alternative voices and faces manifested themselves at all levels from rival ontologies, to epistemologies, methodologies, ethics, aesthetics and philosophies of life, work and language with their associated affectivities and rituals, in short, in their alternative regimes of truth, worlds of signification, houses of being, fantasies, and their conceptions of time and permanence and impermanence, pleasures of the flesh and jouissance of the soul, finitude and infinitude, life and death, and all levels of Heideggerian fourfold. The demand and supply sides of the political economy of truth in this era were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

In an attempt to theorize the encounter with the problematic of backwardness, the subsequent sections go through the four stages of state of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure with its deformities and dysfunctionalities, and the state of chaotic social order to elaborate how the state of inbetweenness in interaction with the state of belatedness shaped the concrete historical experiences of the rise and fall of the constitutional revolution.

4.2. THE TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION

This section addresses the forces involved in the creation of the state of belated inbetweenness and its subsequent confusion in the period covering the constitutional
revolution (the period between 1794 and 1925 when the Qajar dynasty ruled the country) in Iran.

4.2.1. Map of Forces

In this section, we explore the genealogy and archaeology of forces acting as historical a priori for the emergence of speech, action, emotion, images, and organizations of objects in this period.

It seems that the following gesture or event more than anything else shows the multiple regimes of truth operating in this period. Mozaffar-al-Din Shah who signed the Constitutional (Mashroteh) Edict in 1906 a few days before his death, asked to be buried in Karbala (Shoukat, 2006: 54). Nasri (2007: 316) reports that before signing the edict the Shah asked his associates:

“What is the purpose of constitutionalism?, the advocates of constitutionalism replied: ‘justice and science and progress and building the country’; he said: does it mean that Tehran becomes like London? They answered: yes; he said: what can be better than this.

He was reported to have achieved one of his dreams by establishing majlis (the parliament) (see Martin, 2005, 2008, 2011). Alongside demonstrating enthusiasm for modernity with its constitutionalism and his desire to make Tehran like London, the Shah was the King of Persia, gaining his legitimacy from the institution of Persian monarchy with its structure of power/knowledge (and hence the representative of orthodox Persianism). This complex combination of affiliations to modernity and Persianism wills to be buried in Karbala (with its profound symbolic meaning for the Shia faith as the site of the martyrdom and burial of Imam Hossein) and asks for his corpse to be transferred to that place for burial. He does not ask for his corpse to be buried in Persepolis or in any other place next to the great kings of Persia or next to Ferdowsi’s (the great poet of Persian language) or any other figure of Persian poetry and literature.

For him, modernity and Persianism lacked comparative advantage in the realm of freedom from the terror of death. In this period, modernity takes initiative in establishing its own agenda on how to organize the terrains of society and polity largely but not exclusively through the discursive and non-discursive practices
associated with constitutionalism and rule of law. At the time, this new layer was added to the deeply sedimented layers of Persianism, Greek philosophy and logic, and Islam already operating in the Iranian life-world. The spatiotemporality of life and being at work in this context is fascinating. The supply of and demand for truth are manifested in the interlink between three spaces of majlis, royal court and holy shrines with their corresponding meccas of Paris, Persepolis and Karbala, all embroiled in three layers of time, namely, linear short-time of modernity, mythical medium-time of Persianism (the mythical time of the origin of a people, the foundation myth) and the eternal time of the presence of God.

These multiple forms of legitimacy were centred on people and their political representatives in Majlis and their intellectual voice in the intelligentsia, God and His intellectual voice in the clergy, and the Persian king and his house of wisdom in the institution of vizier and its court literati, and the institution of Persian language and its associated institution of Persian poetry. We see the interplay of Heideggerian fourfold (mortals, gods, sky and earth) at work here; the interplay of finitude and infinitude is manifested in three rationalities, namely, ‘instrumental rationality of progress’, ‘the communicative rationality of belonging to a shared communal life and history’, and ‘the emancipative rationality of liberation from terror of death’ and ‘existential anxiety associated with finitude’.

The symbolic importance of taking Mozaffar-al-Din Shah’s corpse to Karbala for burial should not be underestimated. This event puts death and the whole regime of truth surrounding it at the centre stage of Iranian life-world, and challenges the dominance of Persianism as the main constitutive facet of the notion of nation-state, as unified by the Persian King. Here the Persian King of the land, who is supposed to be the symbol of the integrity of the Persianized nation-state against its foreign others opts to be buried in the foreign Ottoman land of Iraq, which for him was his eternal home due to his scared affiliation to that place according to the standards of time of eternity. The divided selfhood of Mozaffar-al-Din Shah was typical of the state of the Iranian subject’s state of belated inbetweenness.

The burial phenomenon was widespread in the 19th century and an industry had developed around the cumbersome and near-impossible task of transfer of corpuses to Atabat (Shia holy cities in Ottoman Iraq) (see, Ates, 2011) or to the city of Mashhad inside Iran. Here we see how a demand and supply side was formed around
a preference for burial in holy places in the hope of gaining favours in the hereafter. This preference for the Islamic regime of truth was translated in the widespread role of the clergy in the constitutional movement. This whole complex structure of preferences was reflected in the set of demands made in the period of taking *basts* (sit-ins), ranging from cheaper bread and meat, to governance issues related to the governors of Tehran and Kerman and to the demand for House of Justice, ultimately leading to the demand for constitutionalism (*mashroti’yat*), or Islamic or Sharia-based constitutionalism (*Mashroteh-ye Mashroeh*) (see Arjomand 1988, Azimi 2008, Katouzian, 2010).

We can see that the Willimason’s (2000) four levels of ‘prices’, ‘governance’, ‘institution’, and ‘mind’ are conditioned and mediated by the Iranian particular state of belated inbetweenness and its warring regimes of truth. The regime of truth shapes the likes and dislikes, attraction and repugnance (Roth, 2007), which in turn shape the price mechanism and its associated allocation of resources, governance structures in firms and other hierarchies, and institutions. Here Shoukat (2006) and many others do not identify the great significance of the fact that the King of the Persian realm expressed the will for his corpse (he has become the vessel of this will through the Islamic regime of truth where death is the main issue of life) to be taken to the realm of the Ottoman enemy to be buried (entirely at odds with the logic of modern nation-state). In a modern analogy, it is like American president asking to be buried in Russia or Mexico.

With the logic of modern nation-state, which the king advocated in his endorsement of the constitution, Karbala is part of alien land while by applying the logic of Shia Islam it is part of the spiritual homeland. This fact shows the complex nature of the King’s selfhood and his subjectivity as his core resided in the other (as a Persian King the core of his selfhood is supposed to be formed by Persianism, while what were equally involved in the core were the forces of Shia Islam and modernity) and how death organizes life and how this act of the King in transferring his corpse to Karbala sends signals to the rest of population on what is desirable and what is repugnant (for the signifying effect of actions and organizations of objects, see the methodology chapter).

This is a remarkable fact, which shows how a new reading can highlight the importance of the facts other theories opted to ignore. The death industry, the corpse-
carrying industry, was the manifestation of the intense affiliation of the Iranian dasein with the regime of truth of Islam and its promise of eternal happiness alongside its warning of eternal damnation. The figure of the king and his selfhood and his corpse was the site of forces of modernity, Persianism, and Islam. The king was the passive agent of the historical forces operating on the body and soul of the Iranian dasein. This act of a Persian king, and its associated death industry, emanates from the deep embeddedness and sedimented background of a people and reinforces it.

Mozaffar-al-Din Shah’s subjectivity, hence, was the canvas upon which conflicting forces of Islam, modernity and Persianism were hard at work. While his subjectivity was the product of these conflicting forces, at the same time it was sending conflicting signals to his own people on the regimes of truth of monarchy, constitutionalism, and Islam. His ‘unconscious’ was part of the social unconscious, and his consciousness was only the pinnacle of the unconscious forces in Iranian worldhood and tip of the social iceberg of Iranian world of signification. It is worth looking at politicians as the entrepreneurs who supply what is demanded by their people and the map of his subjectivity indicates the conflicting signals sent by the sum of forces in the Iranian being-in-the-world on the kind of politician and monarch they were demanding. The life and death of Mozaffar-al-Din Shah is a mirror through which we can read the demand for multiple regimes of truth in the people of Iran and their state of belated inbetweenness and its associated states of dissonance and confusion.

Another highly interesting example (see Hairi, 1988) through which the topology of forces in the constitutional era can be mapped was extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

In this era, the encounter with a fully-formed package of truth, modernity, changed the dynamics of Iranian life irreversibly and created a unique and unprecedented problem for the Iranian dasein. This problem emerged in the form of the sudden availability of a seemingly easy option of conversion to the new regime of truth while the society had not developed the capacity, the tacit consensus, and the stomach to digest the new way of life, its discursive and non-discursive practices, its relations of power, and its techniques of subjectivity.
Keddie (1962: 272-3, added emphasis) refers to this fact without exploring the full implications of it in creating the tragedy of confusion in the Iranian social order:

The comparison also raises another question often asked by students of modern Asian religious thought. Why did not Asian religions develop a theologically consistent “Protestantism” in the modern period? ... many thinkers who were early concerned with religious reform, abandoned inward concern with religion as such, and passed over to more modern Western free thought. Also, the pressing nature of political problems, which involved questions of national survival or revival not faced so acutely by the sixteenth century West, turned the attention of thinkers from religion to politics, so that even apparently religious writings were often directed to political and nationalist goals.

This rather lucid observation demonstrates that being thrown in the state of belatedness creates the sense of urgency and impatience, which prevents the patient and painstaking step-by-step work of theorization and philosophization of new ways of seeing, thinking, feeling and living to be developed and secondly the existence of the ready-made packages of truth apparently made the task of adopting and recreating modernity easy. In other words, the West was pioneer and had time to develop itself gradually and without any pressure from outside in a spirit of blind watchmaking, while the belated countries found themselves under pressure to achieve social transformation as quickly as possible; otherwise their mere survival was at stake and they would literally go extinct (as the American Indians and many other indigenous people experienced such brutal fate). That is where the dysfunctional conversion to modernity frequently happened and still happening at different levels and degrees.

Taqizadeh’s messianic mission for modernizing Iran (see Katouzian, 2012) through reverse social engineering was a clear example of this phenomenon, where he called for the change in every aspect of Iranian life from surface to depth, from top to toe, from politics to education, legal system, gender relations, dress code, shaving habits, and almost everything else (except ironically for language and religion, which were the reservoirs of the other two regimes of truth, Persianism and Islam) in an attempt to create modern ‘imagined nation-state’.

Despite such ardent cases of radicalism Iranian people immersed in the state of belated inbetweeness like Mozaffar-aldin Shah, could not sustain their position of being in truth limbo and would easily cross the borders between alternative regimes
of truth, culminating in a state of being one day a religious reformer and the next day a free thinker, as Keddie (1962: 287; added emphasis) attests:

Consideration of the personal opinions of Malkam, Ruhi, Kermani, and possibly Afghani indicates that intellectual development in modern Iran was not marked by a gradual change over generations from old ideas to new ones. Rather, more and more intellectuals have been exposed to Western ideas, and these ideas have tended to change their outlook radically from that of their traditional upbringing. As one elderly Iranian who himself experienced this change described it to me, the modern and scientific ideas of the West penetrated "like a flash of light", overthrowing the earlier ideas held by him and his associates. Such a process can be documented in the writings of Kasravi, who began as a religious conservative and became an iconoclastic and anti-clerical nationalist.

Here we see the lack of mediating effects of “vanishing mediators” (Jameson, 1988: 25) which are crucial for the development of sense of ownership towards the new order, which gradually emerges through an evolutionary process of blind watchmaking and chaotic synchronization. The encounter with a fully-developed package of truth in the state of belatedness in intersection with the state of inbetweenness (where all three regimes had serious truth claims and all three were tainted with their dark sides, Islam with religious despotism, modernity with occidental despotism and Persianism with oriental despotism, and as such none could lay exclusive claim to new truth about the state of backwardness unequivocally) resides at the roots of the impotence of all sides to offer deep and relevant forms of new truth which could grasp people’s imagination and create a theoretically and philosophically sustained support and rationalization for the supply of social reform.

Ajodani’s (2002: 115-7) criticism of Ashouri’s (2005) claim that the intellectuals failed to grasp modernity in its totality addresses how a set of contingent situations (in terms of the urgency of the situation of backwardness and encounter with dark and bright faces of modernity; for two faces of modernity see Hairi, 1987; Rajaee, 2006, 2007) forced the Iranian intellectuals to embark on the act of reverse social engineering in introducing this or that aspect of modernity as the panacea for the ills of their society. In reflecting on this, Ajodani (2002) describes the impossible situations the intellectuals were facing in the following terms:
as a result the intellectuals, on one hand, were pro-modernity and supportive of novelty with the acceptance of Western culture and on the other hand, in opposition to colonialism they were in search of reviving the exaggerated achievements of the ancient past [what Ajodani calls the nationalist and religious passions], which were not in tune with the new realities the society was facing with.

Ajodani takes the anti-colonialist sentiments as given and does not ask why the intellectuals had to be anti-colonialist and could not deploy pro-colonialist position as leverage (as potential saviours and liberators) in order to change their backward society irreversibly. We need to note that Akhondzadeh did not take such an anti-colonial approach against the Russian imperialism and was working in their administration (see, Cole, 1995). In fact, Katouzian (2010) reports how the presence of the embassies of Western powers restricted the absolute power of the Qajar king in the act of arbitrarily killing of people occupying high offices who had fallen out of king’s favour.

Ajodani (2002) takes it as given that the intellectuals were bound to fight the Western colonialism. What forced them to fight the foreign powers were the other two regimes of truth, Persianism with its narrative of the glorious past and its Persian language and poetry and Islam with its demonstrative abhorrence for the power of infidels over a Muslim society alongside traces of modernity itself where it calls for the right to self-determination and freedom from external oppression.

In critically reflecting on this debate, it seems that what Ajodani and Ashuri both failed to grasp is the fact that the Iranian society did not have the chance of experience of vanishing mediators and had not endogenously travelled the path and owned modernity through the process of multiple realizability. Adoption of new truth always happens inside the old truth and through gradual adaptations of the old truth to the attractions of the new truth (see Abadian, 2009a, 2009b); this is evident in the experience of theorists and reformists like Luther, Locke or scientists like Newton who were deeply religious and tried to develop new way of living, engaging in market economy, doing science, or advancing liberal philosophy in tandem with religion. Nuovo (2011) elaborates on how Locke was attempting to construct a coherent theory out of resources of Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment. The final outcome of such a process may have turned out to be deeply anti-religion in the Western context, but in the process of mediation and transition the process was
deeply and passionately religious in almost all realms of life from economy to science, liberal and feminist philosophies, and ways of life (on Newton’s religiosity and its relation to his science see Christianson, 1995, 2005).

As such, due to the encounter with the ready-made package of modernity, Iranian intellectuals could suddenly and without going through the process of mediation convert into modernity and lose their faith of Persianism and Islam. It was the sign of their deep rootedness that they could not fully disembed themselves from their historical background, where they were forced to revive elements of Persianism and Islam to fight the perceived dark sides of Western colonialism and to generate a sense of national unity required for adoption of modernity. The state of belatedness had invested a pragmatic orientation on the intellectuals, which would prevent them from taking a consistent theoretical position, as they needed to save the dying patient called Iran. The state of belatedness has inevitably given rise to waves of socio-political messianism (see Amanat, 2009b; Amanat and Bernhardsson, 2002). As such they would try any permutations of solutions including going into fleeting and unstable coalition with Islam as well as Persianism (Persian king and the wisdom of Persian literature) to save the nation from annihilation.

The Westerners like Locke, Newton or Luther did not have the pragmatic concerns of saving their homeland from the threat of annihilation under the constant threat of an external civilization (see Easterly, 2007a, 2007b on a similar point with regard to development). The experience of change within the pioneer context was from within and inside-out while for the belated context it was from without and outside-in. These pragmatic concerns along the fact of state of inbetweenness would not give the theorists and reformists time and space to develop their consistent form of modernity and to be insistent on it until they could convert majority of the population to their new truth. Ironically, Ajodani (2002: 125) issues the verdict that these pragmatic considerations were unwarranted and useless, while he acknowledged their necessity a few pages back.

Ultimately what is at stake here is the nature of social phenomena and its three dimensions of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability, and how they are related to the theory of selection from alternative regimes of truth. The methodological arguments of this work have demonstrated that social phenomenon are almost always embedded, emergent and incommensurable and as such the
Iranian society could not digest the role of woman and sexuality, for example, in modernity without going through the gradual change in the meaning of woman and sexuality happened in the West. The impasses reported in Ajodani (2003: 219), where he essentializes the inability of Iranians of all sides to produce viable and potent theoretical and philosophical thoughts, was a contingent phenomenon and product of the intersection between the state of belatedness (the call for immediate change) and inbetweenness (the need for gradual change involving philosophical engagement with all three regimes of truth with their white and black books and their orthodox and non-orthodox branches and their associated politics of piety and politics of ordinary).

Ajodani (2003: 219-220; 225) looks for the freedom of expression as the precondition for the development of new forms of truth, while the freedom is the outcome and not the precondition for or the engine of the emergence of new truth. The outcome (freedom), in a Cartesian move, is conceived as the condition of possibility of its own condition of possibility (modernity). The potency, novelty, richness, and relevance of new truth can flourish and go viral in short period of time even and especially in the worst kind of oppressive and dark environment. The easy conversion to the fully-packaged new truth for the sake of saving Iran from total annihilation alongside its being tainted with its own black book and lack of vision on the state of inbetweenness was at the heart of impasse in the production and circulation of vibrant and potent new truth and not lack of freedom or any of the oppressive attempts by authorities in the royal court, the religious establishment or the colonial force. No finite force is so omnipotent and omniscient to prevent the new truth from emerging. Any finite system is defined by its limitations and by its cracks and gaps (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 504). Thus, the intelligent design approach inherent to the state of belatedness takes society as an object for reverse social engineering rather than ensuring active or passive participation of all stakeholders in achieving sustainable and stable forms of social transformation, where people could enact the new ways of life in their everyday ways of interaction in all levels of social interactions.

The logic of reverse social engineering, whose adoption was inevitable to the context of belatedness, was so obvious and so self-evident that almost nobody consistently questioned its validity in transforming societies and social orders. This is evident in the frequent logic of social actors like Akhundzadeh, (see for example Ajodani 2003:
232), where he says that ‘doing this depends on that’ and ‘doing that also depends on something more fundamental’. This is the logic of causation which is possibly good for building a mechanical bridge, but ignores the logic of complexity science and world of signification, and the necessity of willing and thoughtful participation of all stakeholders in the act of social transformation and the necessity of dialogue and mutual understanding and not acting based on their own best isolated judgement (for the role of persuasion and willing participation in the success of social movements see Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).

In the case of belated inbetweenness, even willing participation, as indicated by Taqizedeh (Ansari, 2012: 64-5, 95), is not enough as people can commit themselves to a particular project of reverse social engineering in a moment of excessive exuberance but soon become regretful of their choices due to the gap between meta-preference and preference levels and its associated time-inconsistency, and consequently change side and actively or passively participate in the process of reversing the social changes. The history of Iran is fraught with cases where elites of different projects of social engineering complain about people’s spinelessness and their chameleon-like behaviour and their wax-like identity (which we address later in this chapter). To sustain change, a tacit agreement needs to emerge incorporating all regimes of truth and their negating and affirmative dimensions. What is important is not a particular solution or blueprint but the process of adaptations involving vanishing mediators and leading to affectively deep sense of association, belonging, and ownership.

The approach which tries to use freedom as engine of change applies the hermeneutics of suspicion and totally ignores- it is foreclosed to it- to see the society as a world of meaning and the need for the hermeneutics of understanding. There was little or no attempt to understand how different social assemblages and faces-individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies- understood the world around them.

The curious feature of the encounter with modernity as a fully-developed package created the state of belatedness which robbed Iranians from the opportunity of fully participating in its development and as such they could not cultivate the sense of affective ownership towards it. And secondly, as Ashouri (2005) stated, when Islam came to Iran (in contrast with the arrival of modernity) Iranian were not thrown out
of their background of attachment to the sacred, but the scared was reaffirmed in new guise and in new set of vocabularies, discourses and rituals (see also Mohammadi Malayeri, 1996-2003), while the fully-developed modernity (in contrast with its developing stage which was intensely religious and deeply engaged with the sacred) was fiercely advocating locating human life and society in the profane and denying and negating the sacred.

As such Iranians have not found opportunity- due to no faults of their own or any other forces, voices or faces- to separate modernity from the West the way they had managed to separate Islam from the Arabs, and in the process fully owning one (Islam or modernity) while repelling the other (the Arabs or the West). These two curious sets of conditions in the condition of situation (being exposed to modern colonialism in the form of being sandwiched between world powers in the Great Game and facing modernity as a fully-developed package alongside its negation of the sacred) made the task of a successful encounter with the Western modernity and its double face immensely more complex compared to all other episodes of encounter with foreign invasion in the Iranian history.

As such, Iranians who were not happy with their inherited regimes of truth in Islam (jurisprudence, mysticism or Islamic philosophy) or Persianism (Persian monarchy or Persian poetry) could easily migrate to the fully-developed packages of Western modernity in its two broad versions of liberalism and socialism (Keddie refers to this implicitly). They would not need to go through the agony and ecstasy of the process of conception, gestation, birth and development of the new truth out of and in dialogue with the old truth in an evolutionary process of blind watchmaking and chaotic synchronization. The urgency of the state of belatedness alongside the ready-made nature of the packages of new truth and its perceived dark sides of colonialism and being excessively materialist and excessively anti-religion acts as condition of impossibility of “reinventing the wheel” (reinventing modernity), while this was exactly what was needed (for the issue of multiple modernities, see: Gaonkar, 2001).

4.2.2. Map of Voices

In this section we elaborate only on one specimen of voices and leave out other significant voices due to word limitations. The dominant strand of voices (manifested in figures like Akhundzadeh or Taqizadeh, among others) which set the agenda for social change in this period was the project of modernizing Iran by
locating the oriental despotism (in the figure of Qajar monarch and the institution of monarchy) as the main cause of Iranian backwardness and the main breeding ground for the intrusions of occidental despotism while at the same time would attack elements of the religious despotism. This voice favoured total conversion into modernity except for support for a reformed version of Persian language. On the negating side, the main enemy of this strand was monarchy (orthodox Persianism) while attacking occidental despotism (Russian imperialism and British colonialism, itself a form of democratic despotism; for the notion of ‘democratic despotism’ see de Tocqueville, 2004: 810-22) and religious despotism when and where they were deemed as obstacles to modernization.

On the affirmative side, this strand relied on the bright side of the Western modernity, especially on the idea of the constitutional government (belonging to the orthodox branch of modernity) and rule of law in order to create a hybrid institution of limited and constitutional monarchy, blending orthodox Persianism (monarchy) with orthodox modernity (liberal democracy). This was an uneasy hybrid and highly volatile synthesis as the spectre of republicanism was lurking over monarchy and the spectre of monarchic absolutism was lurking over constitutionalism, which made the relationship fraught with mutual suspicion and distrust (see Algar 1980: 253, note 61 and Rahim Khani, 2004). Adamiyat (1978: 178) reports how Mirza Agha Khan Kermani perceived the message of Mazdak (the heretic prophet of justice and equality in the pre-Islamic Sasanian era; see Davaran, 2010: 89-93) to be the abolition of monarchy and establishment of a republic.

Abrahamian (1979: 406) maintains that in the event of taking refuge in the British Legation in Tehran, “According to another eyewitness, some of the students from the Dar al-Funun spoke even on the advantages of the republican form of government”. The spectre of republicanism was lurking under the skin of official discourses and was frequently used as a label to attack the constitutionalists, until it found written representation in an article written by Dehkhoda in exile after the events of ‘Minor Despotism’ (Ajodani, 2003) and establishment of small republic enclaves in two provincial cities of Mahabad and Rasht (see Afary, 1995), and finally became a formal voice and a political position in 1924 in Reza Khan who wanted to turn Iran into a republic like Ataturk’s Turkey (see Rahim Khani 2004; Ettehadieh 2004). Republicanism, in the process, also gained the connotations of and was associated
with separatism and irreligious or anti-religion tendencies. We see here how free association works at the heart of history.

More importantly Persian monarchy and orthodox modernity belonged to two different regimes of truth with their associated discursive and non-discursive practices, and emotional economies. They possessed distinct and contrasting negating dimensions of repression, disavowal and foreclosure. Through achieving reform in the realm of polity by establishing national assembly (Majlis), the modernists intended to use it as a factory to produce reform in all other realms of life from education, to gender relation, language, legal system, realm of national security (establishing modern army, police), economy (tax system and costumes, reform in the system of land ownership, foreign investment), religion, and arts and sciences. In reforming the realms of economy they embraced element of non-orthodox modernity (socialism), especially in the realm of land distribution and social justice. In order to instigate a sense of unified modern community in Iranian people and to construct a modern nation-state, the sense of nationhood was attempted to be fashioned based on the non-orthodox form of Persianism (Persian language and mythology, and Persian literature and poetry) and even some positive dimension of orthodox Persianism (in the idea of great monarch such as Cyrus the Great and Anoushirvan the Just by pressing on the positive components of ideal model of kingship in preserving justice and ethical and non-discriminatory relations and the idea of a gentle and caring father-figure king) in order to repel the colonialist dimension of the Western modernity and the centrifugal forces of tribalism and promote the sense of nationhood.

In effect this voice was a product of the operations of addition and subtraction on three regimes of truth of modernity, Islam and Persianism, all packaged under the trade mark of constitutionalism. A combination of a forward-looking will to progress with a backward-looking will to a glorious Persian civilization was activated to construct a sense of modern nationhood. To restrict what was deemed to be the divisive and discriminatory nature of religious affiliation, this voice favoured the separation of religion from politics in the constitution (see Abadian, 2006).

The rhizomatic and combinatory nature of voices can be clearly seen in the attempt to construct a new house of being under the umbrella of modern nation-state. In the dual nature of nation-state (nation and state), the package for constructing a modern
state was taken from orthodox modernity (constitutionalism) combined with
elements of non-orthodox modernity (just distribution of resources including land
and other resources) while the component related to constructing a sense of
nationhood was offered to be achieved through highlighting the non-orthodox
Persianism and some selective components of positive dimension of orthodox
Persianism, as they attempted to retain the idea of the king as a unifying and
centripetal force (especially against the centrifugal force of tribalism). One example
of this radical modernist voice was Akhundzadeh. As Kia (1995: 439-40) observes:

According to Akhundzade, Islam perpetuated inequality between man and
woman, supported slavery, and opposed the right of the individual to think and
express himself freely. In a critique written on Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar
od-Dowle's treatise, Yek Kalameh, (One Word), Akhundzadeh attacked the
author for arguing that Islam was compatible with the European ideas of
progress, freedom, and constitutionalism. He reminded Mostashar od-Dowle
that Islamic law not only stood for inequality between men and women but it
also imposed veils on women and supported the institution of 'Harem', where
young men were brutally deprived of their manhood and turned into eunuchs.
Moreover, Islamic law falsely and foolishly condemned sexual intercourse
between an unmarried man and woman as adultery. Akhundzadeh argued that
there was nothing wrong with a relationship of free love between two rational
individuals and that Islamic law had no right to prescribe rules and
commandments for thinking adults.

Here we see the issue of sexuality and gender relations at the heart of
Akhundzadeh’s anti-Islamic discourse. Akhonzdadeh was, naturally and inherent to
the state of belatedness, practicing the act of reverse social engineering and was
trying to introduce all elements of the European package of modernity into the
Iranian context. The issue of sexuality, gender relation and the role of women in the
Western societies were frequently addressed in negative or positive connotations in
the travelogues of Iranians at that age (see Tavakoli-Targhi, 1994, 2001: 65;

These radical modernisers’ logic was simple: ‘these Europeans are practicing free
love and they have a progressive society and they are sane and rational people and
they are the masters of the world why we should not follow suit’. Thus, sexuality
alongside republicanism, atheism, materialism, and infidelity are amongst the themes
lurking in the air at the time and used to emerge occasionally either as an insult or as
favourable positions but never fully acknowledged or adequately theorized in the
Akhundzadeh ignores the fact that each of these subjects required adequate level of theorization and dialogue to rationalize the new position with regard to the Heideggerian fourfold, the different conceptions of good and decent life, and the issue of permanence and impermanence and its relation to the pleasures of the body and jouissance of the soul. Here once again Akhundzadeh, as a radical believer in modernity and in good faith, embarked on the act of reverse engineering and the outside-in model of social transformation based on the model of Western modernity. Akhundzadeh, as Kia (1995: 440-1) reports, expresses his materialist and atheist position as well:

Akhundzade contended that the universe constituted a 'uniform', 'harmonious', self-perpetuating, self-regulating 'cosmic machine', which worked according to rational laws and principles. In other words, the existence of the world was not dependent on the presence of a supreme being, an external force, or even a primary cause. The universe was made out of matter and functioned according to its own laws.

This position was not owned or actively promoted by many secular and liberal constitutionalists at the time and was repressed or disavowed or actively forgotten in order to maximize the support for the constitutionalist cause (as the state of belatedness had turned all social actors into activists). These components were amongst the positions, which fuelled the liberal intelligentsia but never fully theorized or even owned by them.

Akhundzadeh was also feverishly looking to change the language and its alphabet and calligraphy and put great deal of efforts to develop new alphabet and tried to make it implemented in practice. As Ajodani (2003: 220) reports he believed that:

the railroad is urgently needed but the change in alphabet is more urgent, the telegraph is urgently needed but the change in alphabet is more urgent.

For educating the whole population they needed to modernize the language as well as the religion through the act of intelligent design. We can summarize this
voice/strategy in the following formula (based on the operations of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth) manifest in the affirmative and negating dimension of this voice:

orthodox modernity (constitutionalism) + elements of non-orthodox modernity (land reform) + non-orthodox Persianism (Persian language, mythology, and great Persian poet Ferdowsi) + elements of positive orthodox Persianism (invoking the examples of ideals of Persian kings) - official language and poetry (reform in language and democratization of its use) - oriental despotism (absolutist monarchy = negative side of orthodox Persionism) - occidental despotism (the negative side of Islam and support for separation of religion and politics) – centrifugal nature of tribalism (tribalism represented the threat of the despotism of anarchy and the Hobbesian state of the war of all against all which justified and created excuses for the emergence of the absolutist monarchy in the first place as the Iranian leviathan to create peace and order) – negative dimensions of modernity in modern excesses in social vices (opposition to semi-modernism and the discourse of good freedom versus bad freedom; this element was mixed with great deal of ambiguities and silences).

As we see this voice is a hybrid assemblage dominated by modernity but at the same time constituted of a set of additions and subtractions emanating from the three regimes of truth, their internal divisions and their perceived dark and bright sides. Its main project was modernization with three subprojects of modernized modernization (reform inside modernity or ‘with modernity against modernity’, critique within modernity), modernized Islamization, and modernized Persianization. Keddie (1962: 288) enlists a specimen of such a set of additions and subtractions (ensemble of plusses and minuses): “rejection of Islam, anti-clericalism, agnosticism, Westernism, anti-imperialism, glorification of the pre-Islamic past, and hatred of modern Iranian actuality”.

The continuum of voices (voices with predominantly Islamic orientation, voices with predominantly Persianist orientations and voices with predominantly modernist orientations with their associated “difference within” and “difference between”) could turn to each other by the operation of addition and subtraction, affirmation and negation in the topological space of political economy of truth. The voices are the product of an operation of giving precedence to something over something else, or what is dubbed as preference ordering. What is prioritized over what determines the

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37 The details of these voices were not included in this thesis due to the constraint of word limitations.
character of the voice (its preferences and meta-preferences, in the sense of what we want and desire alongside what we want to want and desire to desire, plus what we do not want and desire, and what we do not want and desire to want and desire) (see Sen 1982 and Grofman and Uhlker, 1985 for the concept of meta-preference). Thus, what ultimately define the truth affiliation of voices and faces are not their desires or behaviours but what they desire to desire and what they do not desire to desire (meta-preference level).

As such voices and faces, based on their meta-preference (Sen, 1982: 101-2), may rebel against themselves and condemn their own un-Islamic, un-modern, or un-Persianist behaviours and desires, and as such suddenly and unexpectedly (butterfly effect) turn against their own normal self and convert from pragmatism to radicalism or the other way round within and between regimes of truth (the phenomenon of self-control is one of the manifestation of the meta-preference; see the literature on the economics of self-control, Cameron (2002; 2009), with its application to obesity and other forms of addictions). That is why in the state of belated inbetweenness the revealed preferences of people in particular period or small window of time is not a good guide for predicting what they would do in the future, as the butterfly effect in the state of belated inbetweenness may suddenly shift them towards alternative life path. Societies with homogenous or heterogeneous regimes of truth do not encounter such a problem compared to troubled societies like Iran. The method of free association can uncover the level of meta-preference hidden in behaviour and expression of desire (see Methodology Chapter), saving the researcher from falling into the trap of judging social assemblages solely based on their behaviours or preferences.

4.2.3. Tragedy of Confusion

This section addresses how the above-mentioned multiplicity of voices and their associated cultural tribes created a state of confusion through the immense heaviness of the burden of judgement. Rather than engaging in the art of mutual understanding, almost all sides were involved in the art of demonization of the radical other and glorification of self. Of course, it cannot be expected of them to have striven to understand each other as they were all immersed in the battle of truth against falsity and good against evil based on their own regime of truth. The clear example is Akhundzadeh and his sincere, honest, and passionate belief in the necessity of
applying the European model of critique to the Iranian context and its inhabitant forces, voices, and faces. The same applies to Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri who inhabited the opposite pole of the spectrum of voices. Thus, all sides embarked on the cultural war of attrition leading to mutual de-legitimization which eroded the energy and enthusiasm for the social transformation and led to the eventual collapse of the whole project of constitutional modernization.

Almost all sides were plagued by the malaise of misunderstanding, involving practicing transference and counter-transference on each other, applying hermeneutics of suspicion to the other and hermeneutics of understanding to the self, and committing the cardinal sin of intentional fallacy. All sides were engaged on practicing “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 150) against each other. For example, Akhunzadeh, as Kia (1995: 440) reports, commits the intentional fallacy:

The ulema wished to keep the people ignorant and superstitious, so that they could preserve their privileged status as the intellectual and religious leaders of the society.

Akhundzadeh forgets his own inevitable immersion in different form of power relation, which is attacked, applying the same perverse logic, by Cole (1996), as the traitor and servant of Russian empire. Furthermore, he gives the total agency and dominance to the supply side and views the demand-side of the market for truth with total passivity and receptiveness. He does not address the question why people do not rebel against the clergy and exit Islam in mass. Akhundzadeh does not ask himself why people converted irreversibly to modern medicine away from the traditional medicine and not irreversibly to modernity away from Islam or Persianism. Foran (1991: 810) attributes the position of Nuri “largely” to jealousy towards his fellow clerics such as Behbehani and Tabataba’i while accepting the involvement of ideological reasons as well:

Nuri himself seems to have been motivated largely out of jealousy for "the two sayyids," to whom he considered himself superior in learning. The defense of Islam endangered by "reprehensible innovation" (the following of Western constitutional ideas) provided an ideological motivation as well.
In another example, Ajodani (2003: 233-4) “understands” the logic behind Moshir-al-Douleh, the reformist prime minister of Nasir-al-Din Shah, who was involved in granting the Reutter concession which was deemed to be detrimental to Iran’s national interests (he says Moshir-al-Douleh did it to preserve the independence of Iran), but does not try to play devil’s advocate with regard to two mojtabah who excommunicated Moshir-al-Douleh and paved the way for his resignation. In yet another example of misunderstanding which extends to both the historians and the historical actors, Foran (1991: 812) called Mohammad Ali Shah “reactionary” without any attempt to understand him in his own dictionary, and its associated denotations and connotations, while Nuri make almost no attempt to understand his opponents in their own terms and calls them, as Foran (1991: 811) reports, “infidels, atheists, and Babi”.

In almost all of these cases, almost all sides, whether historians or historical actors, operate within the binary opposition of good and evil (while their conceptions of good and evil are different their dichotomous framework is the same) and each side takes the absolute truth of his own side as given and judges the opposition based on his own gold standards, frequently applying the hermeneutics of understanding to the self and hermeneutics of suspicion to the radical other (as Kogler (1996) reminded us). Katouzian (2003: 6-7) demonstrates a glimpse of the hermeneutics of understanding in offering a proto-defence of Atabak (Amin-al-Soltan) when he says that Atabak, like many other officials at the time, was not a clean man, especially when the corruption did not have the same meaning as it had after the Mashroteh period but he was an efficient bureaucrat, or when he offers a proto-defence of Behbehani and his acceptance of money (similar to campaign money received by Western politicians and political parties in elections), when he states that whoever had not accepted money at the time would have been a saint like Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba’i. He brings the notion of meaning and its difference in different dictionaries into analysis, which this study intends to apply more systematically as part of a hybrid methodology combining the ‘hermeneutics of understanding’ with ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and blending the three principles of ‘causation, complexity science and world of signification’ inside three notions of ‘embeddedness’, ‘incommensurability’ and ‘emergence’.

The widespread presence of transference and counter-transference in the Iranian social order, which is due to the intersection between the state of inbetweenness and
the state of belatedness, is attested by Katouzian’s (2010) observation on the state of Iranian historiography being entrapped in ideological intolerance alongside Frye’s (2005: xiii) reversal of the famous statement regarding historiography: “to know the past one must also study the present”, or Croce’s ‘all history is contemporary’, which indicates counter-transference, as historians frequently project the categories, power relations, and the emotional economy of their time on the past events and figures (anachronism).

The current state of affairs and the hatred for the dominant cultural tribe overwhelms and overshadows the reading of history. The state of confusion rules the history as well as its historiography. This practice may be unproblematic when the society ends up with a settled dominant regime of truth, but it is totally unsuited for the state of inbetweenness where almost all subjects are confused between alternative warring regimes of truth. This kind of historiography takes the cultural war of attrition to the level of historiography as well as history itself.

In the state of inbetweenness, there is no shared and common benchmark and that is why the art of criticise is impossible (for the notion of critique and social critique in the works of Akhundzadeh and other Mashroteh intellectuals see Parsinejad, 2003: 87 and Vahdat, 2002: 43). In such a state, critique is turned into imposing one’s own grid of intelligibility on the radical other. In such a state there is no universal or consensual tribunal to judge right from wrong, good from evil or beautiful from ugly. In the language of Wittgenstein the meaning reside in use and not in Russell’s basic fundamental logical forms (Friedlander, 2001: 111). As Wittgenstein’s theory implies, these different people were involved in different ‘life forms’ or ‘language games’ and as such what is right in one language game may be wrong in another. We cannot understand the meaning of cat, dog, cow, man, woman, mankind, justice, freedom, life, death and every other signifier in a disembedded and universalist fashion, we have to understand them inside historically evolved and formed contingent but holistic life forms and language games (see also Kundra, 1999 on different connotations of words like cemetery or demonstration for different characters in his story). They are, as Foucault (see Flynn, 2005) maintains, particular product of the movement of real in its particular topological, typological and axiomatic movements.
In other words, meaning is produced through associations and our historical actors ‘free associate’ differently (form different chains of signifiers) and the job of the analyst is to make sense of these contingent and situated associations and their denotations and connotations in the context of their world of signification in relation to the context of situation and in the structure of power/knowledge they reside and the strategy-narrative they operate. The meanings of the signifiers are formed in the historical evolution of language communities and their particular life forms and their language games. As such, the meaning of “the” shit (meaning the best) in the language community of drug addicts (see Peckham, 2012: 223) should be understood from insider point of view. In the state of belated inbetweenness the society and almost all of its different forms of social assemblages travel between and within these different life forms and language games without ever settling in one equilibrium as each has comparative advantage on one realm and comparative disadvantages on other realms (based on the analytic of finitude and its, at least, three forms of rationalities).

This is what Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1925: 97) addressed in his tract “Seventy Two belief systems (Haftado do Mellat) where he says:

that person used to say I do not have dispute with anyone on why you have this belief system or that, but my point is that why you do not abide fully by what you believe to the best of your ability.

This is a critique within a regime of truth and cannot be smuggled to the relation between regimes of truth. The dispute over theory between alternative regimes of truth cannot be extended to or muddled with the dispute over the gap between theory and practice within each particular framework.

Iran at the time and throughout modern age has been the site of the strife between seventy two shades of grey (the symbol of extreme multiplicity and variation) in the form of different forms of voices and cultural tribes, and as such no undisputed common ground exists which can be relied upon for universal form of criticism. All forms of criticisms and labelling (like reactionary, atheist, liberal, fundamentalist, and the like) without associated logic of understanding only adds to the state of confusion and make the burden of judgement for Iranian people much heavier. Iranian people are forced to experience the agony and the ecstasy associated with the
dilemmas of Sophie’ choice in the concentration camp of the state of belated inbetweenness. Ajodani (2002: 272), for instance, criticizes Akhundzadeh and Kasravi for going too far in denying the entire mystical heritage of Iranian culture and in the case of Kasravi even denying the value and worth of Hafez (also see Ridgeon, 2006 on Kasravi as a Sufi castigator). Here in the state of belated inbetweenness, what is ‘too far’ or ‘too little’ and what is good comprise or rotten compromise is not clear at all. In a sense, Ajodani sees them as radical critiques and not moderate critique like himself without understanding why they went to the extreme, adding another layer to the layers of transference and counter-transference in the Iranian social existence. As such, he replicates the familiar divisions between radicalism/extremism (efrat va tafrit) and moderation/pragmatism (e’tedal) throughout Iranian modern history.

We give the following example to provide evidence for how the notion of critique was deployed in the spirit of reverse social engineering and how it was offered in opposition to the embedded forms of counsel and sermons (va’z va khetabeh). Sanjabi (1995: 48) reports how Akhunzadeh’s entire approach was informed by his conception of European tradition of social criticism:

Akhundzada then goes on to admire the European press for providing a forum for social criticism: Today in all European countries there are satirical papers—that is, critique and satire—which every week write and publish the vulgar acts of their fellow countrymen. European nations have reached such order and progress by means of critique, not by counsel and sermon. The European peoples have reached this degree of wisdom and perfection by means of critique, not counsel and sermons.

Sanjabi (1995: 41) goes on to say that

His attention was focused especially on the three elements of religion, language and government which he condemned as root causes of Iran’s decadence and defeat. This spirit of criticism (qirltika) was at the heart of his discourse and a key concept for appreciating his intellectual predispositions.

The attempt in this study is not directed towards critiquing the critique, which culminates in falling into the same trap, but understanding it and acknowledging that Akhundzadeh was a true believer of the regime of truth of modernity, and as such had no choice but to attempt to purify modernity from traces of impurities of
alternative regimes of truth, which for him were the embodiment of falsity and backwardness and immaturity. This is at the heart of ‘tragedy’ of confusion: all sides- whether Akhundzadeh, Malkam, Afghani, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, Na’ini, or Mohammad Ali Shah- act and think and criticize based on their favoured regime of truth and their own gold standard and the unintended consequence is the tragedy of socio-political instability and institutional deformities and discontent, and ultimately socio-economic backwardness.

The traces of instinctive understanding of the limits to the art of critique were present in Akhundzadeh’s pragmatic friend Malkam Khan, as Ajodani (2003: 226) reports, who warned Akhundzadeh not to apply the art of critique to Islam or Christianity, without being able to theorize why.

As such, the conflict between the rival regimes of truth is based on each working to replace the other (the supply side follows the logic of substitution), while the demand side was following the logic of complementarity. Even when elements of alternative regimes of truth were incorporated in projects and subprojects of social engineering, the issue of subsumption (packaging and appellation) was a serious point of conflict within and between alternative truth camps. What Iranian dasein desired was a happy and functional family of the three regimes of truth while each supplier was striving to establish monopoly over the production and distribution of truth. This is exactly what was impossible to supply due to the urgency and impatience associated with the state of belatedness.

This makes the unambiguous and straightforward conversion to any of these forces and regimes of truth impossible for the Iranian dasein. While the supply side almost always tried to offer themselves as the one and only option for all the cure of the ills of the Iranian people, pragmatic forces adopted a pick and mix approach under the general dominance of one or the other regimes of truth. All these forms of packaging and repackaging of truth were faced with the crisis of legitimacy as they lacked adequate tri-polar theoretical and philosophical justifications. The constant war of attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their radical and pragmatic versions created the state of confusion for the Iranian dasein.
4.3. UNSTABLE COALITION

This section aims to elaborate only on general properties of the formation of coalition in the constitutional era and address several specimens of unstable coalitions through the leading actors engaged in the process, such as the Taqizadeh coalition, the Malkam coalition, the Afghani coalition, the Nuri coalition, the Behbehani-Tabataba’i coalition, the Shah coalition, and the Russian-British coalition (the details of which were extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.). As discussed so far, the Iranian people after the events of encountering modernity were thrown into the political economy of truth, which was working as the condition of possibility of formation and transformation of state and society. This is equivalent to the level of embeddedness where the entire social order was struggling with the fundamental question of what deserves to act as Iranian people’s regime of truth, defining and disclosing ‘what is true and what is false’, ‘what is good and what is evil’, ‘what is beautiful and what is ugly’, and ‘what is tasteful and what is repugnant’.

The encounter with modernity had shattered the Iranian house of being (a fragile house of being reconstructed in Safavid era out of the materials and resources of Persianism, Shia Islam, and Greek philosophy) and Iranians have been ever since plagued with the state of discursive homelessness (for the significance of the notions of home and ideal homes in the midst of social transformation see Chapman, 1999 and also Molavi, 2002: 54). The formation of coalitions was driven by the urgent need to form a collective will and collective action to construct a new house of being after the violent arrival of modernity in the landscape of Iranian embeddedness.

4.3.1. Map of Faces

After considering the nature of forces and voices in the preceding sections of this chapter, this section considers the characteristics of faces (coalitions) involved in the rise and fall of the constitutional revolution. Based on the three groups of producers of truth and their internal division between the radical and pragmatic divisions, we will consider seven coalitions: the shah coalition (radical and pragmatic Persianism), the Nuri coalition (radical Islamism), the Taqizadeh coalition (radical constitutionalism), the Malkam coalition (pragmatic constitutionalism), the Behbehani-Tabataba coalition (pragmatic Islamic constitutionalism), the Afghani coalition (pan-Islamism), and the British-Russian coalition. All of these rainbows of
unstable coalitions were extensively explored but not included in this thesis due to word limitations.

All of these coalitions were formed to construct collective actions required to achieve social transformation, but their preference orderings were drastically different. In the Shah coalition, the reform was meant to be achieved in the framework of orthodox Persianism (either pragmatic or radical version). As such they wanted to make modernity and Islam in the service of Persianism. In other words, for this position, modernization and Islamization would be endorsed as long as they would strengthen the dominance of orthodox Persianism as the main regime of truth. In the constitutionalist camp, the pragmatic and radical modernizers gave prominence to modernity over Persianism and Islam and would only accept elements of them as long as they could end up helping the rise of the position of modernity as the dominant regime of truth. In the Islamic tradition, the radical and pragmatic factions were intent to achieve reform through Islamization and would accept elements of modernity and Persianism, which would strengthen Islam as the prominent regime of truth of the Iranian people.

It should be mentioned that there were shades of grey within each faction. In other words, each coalitional faction was a fleeting unity inside lasting multiplicity; each was a transient social assemblage, an amalgam, and a compound. This was due to the fact that there were sharp differences within and between coalitions in terms of emphases, elisions, silences, and affections. There were conflicts within and between coalitions and zigzag movements between them. The main suppliers of truth, the clergy, the intelligentsia, and the poet, the king and his literati as well as other classes of people could be found in almost all coalitions.

As such, in the constitutional era, all players formed fleeting coalitions with each other and with foreigners, as in the example of fleeting coalitions of the constitutionalists with the British or Nuri with the Russians. The notion of ‘coalition’ covers a wide range of actors from individuals, to groups, parties and classes of people. This study contends that almost all of these players (faces) were unstable coalitions. This analysis treats individuals as ‘dividuals’ (Critchley, 2010) with divided loyalties to multiple regimes of truth, with global and local preference structures, with preferences and meta-preferences, which were primed and activated differently in different contexts of situation, depending on the configuration of forces.
in the context of situation and its intersection with the context of culture. Social assemblages (individuals and groups) as texts are the sites of polyvocality and intertextuality.

4.3.2. The Taqizadeh Coalition

Taqizadeh’s coalition, representing radical constitutionalism, produced the main ideological blueprint of the constitutional revolution. They were the true believers in modernity and its magical power of progress, science, liberal democracy, rule of law, social justice and land reform, equality before law, gender equality, the establishment of institutions of modern nation-state and social freedom. As such their overriding regime of truth was orthodox modernity (liberal democracy) combined with selective elements of non-orthodox modernity (socialism). They were radical modernizers and the affirmative dimension of their project of social engineering revolved around institutionalization of modernity (modernization) through intelligent design and reverse social engineering complemented by selected elements of Persianism and Islam to fill the lacks in modernity where and when they were required. The whole project was captured in the master signifier of constitutionalism. The negating facet of the Taqizadeh coalition’s project of social engineering targeted the oriental despotism, religious despotism, and occidental despotism, in that order, as the main obstacles towards institutionalization of modernity.

This coalition contained a spectrum of radicalism spanning from radical radicalism to pragmatic radicalism. This spectrum is evident in the case of revolutionary assassinations of Behbehani and Amin-al Soltan, for instance, and the ambiguous role of Taqizadeh in them (Katouzian, 2013; Shahbazi, 2003). In such cases, verbal violence of the leaders like Taqizadeh, who was deemed by Sheikh Ibrahim Zanjani to be the soul of Majlis and the ayatollah of modernity, was bound to be translated to the physical side of the equation by the more radical elements.

Even if one has the best package of truth in one’s repertoire, the society (or any other social assemblage) requires a process through which it can own and internalize the new package of truth. This is evident in the following observation by Abrahamian (1979: 413, added emphasis), which demonstrates how deeply-ingrained the Islamic sensibilities were in public imagination versus the skin-deep penetration of modernity:
At times of crisis, the public moved into action not with images of Cromwell, Robespierre, Voltaire, Tennis Courts, and besieged Bastilles, but with traditional concepts of social justice and emotional symbols derived from the Shi'i heritage - especially from the martyrdom of Hussein and his family. In short, the modern intellectuals were advisers to the revolutionaries, but the traditional guild members of the bazaars were the actual revolutionaries.

The act of reverse social engineering and intelligent design is evident in the work of Akhundzadeh, as Adamiyat (1970: 91) reports, in his allusion to the notion of “project” where he says “in the last 15 years I have been continuously sending projects to Iran and Rome [Istanbul]”. For him, and almost all other social reformers, social transformation is the implementation of a series of projects of social engineering, rather than participatory and dialogical work of capacity and consensus building. Akhundzadeh correctly identifies the problem when he says, as Adamiyat (1970: 103-4) reports, that “without training people [and their imagination] laws would not suffice”, but the issue of imagination takes us to the warring regimes of truth in the Iranian state of inbetweenness, which requires new and independent waves of dialogical theorization with other interlocutors in the process of social production of knowledge and truth. Akhundzadeh correctly identifies that pragmatic processes in constructing rails and banks and even writing laws and establishing institutions are not sustainable without the supporting theoretical progress (Adamiyat, 1970:104). But it was foreclosed to him that theories cannot be imported as a package from other worlds of signification and needed to be reproduced based on particular resources available and questions posed in the particular language community and context of culture.

Akhundzadeh never identifies this participatory process and never bestows legitimacy to all the participants in the market for truth. Instead, he naturally saw others as dead (Adamiyat, 1970:104) as a result of his particular version of discourses and narrative of decline and declares “the last 1280 years as the age of ignorance” (Adamiyat, 1970:128) and intends to start the history from ground zero.

This approach ignores the ‘thisness’ property of social phenomena and the fact that every social phenomenon (constitutionalism, love, economic development, etc.) has to evolve and emerge many times in different forms of embeddedness and different contexts of culture (the principle of multiple realizability). Imposed truth of any
colour or persuasion, however well-intentioned, can breed calamity while internalized falsity can bring liberation. Akhundzadeh’s vehement attack and epistemic violence against religion, language, and monarchy (as the main culprits in the narrative of Iranian decline) was ultimately translated into physical violence in the assassination of Bebbehani, and Ami-al Soltan (who was deemed to have been in the service of constitutionalism at the time of his assassination (Ajodani, 2003: 130)) and the attempted assassination of Mohammad Ali Shah, and threatening of the two grand Ayatollah’s of Najaf (Ajodani, 2003: 127-8) by the radical advocates of modernity in the Taqizadeh coalition. The spitefulness of the critique inspired by the discourse of decline frequently breeds immense level of violence. It was inevitable for the radical modernists to treat the (supposed) enemies of modernity as germs and viruses killing the nation’s chance of achieving real progress and as such embark on discursive and physical annihilation of them.

The verbal violence ranged from spiteful labelling such as being neophobic (kohneh-parast) or being anti-majlis (Ajodani, 2003: 154-5) to smear campaign and extreme insulting (see Katouzian, 2008b on insulting in the constitutional poetry). There were different levels of radicalism from polite radicalism of Taqizadeh to insulting radicalism of the writers of radical newspapers such as Sor-e Israfil and Mosavat (see Katouzian, 2003: 8) or the newspaper Roh-al Ghodos (Ajodani, 2003: 389). In a sense, the operations of radicalism and pragmatism were activated within the camp of the radical modernizers and they were divided into pragmatic or moderate radicals and radical or extreme radicals (see Ajodani, 2003: 381). They were instinctively acting like the military and political wings of revolutionary parties (good cop/bad cop). In the state of warring regime of truth this is a normal phenomenon as no regime of truth is able to (it is foreclosed to them, they cannot think the unthinkable of granting legitimacy to what they perceive to be the embodiment of falsity, evilness and ugliness) grant legitimacy to rival regimes of truth and as such in the state of political economy of truth, “the theory and policy of elimination”, as Katouzian (2012, 2010) alludes to, inevitably prevails.

Mutual tolerance and compromise is only possible when one regime of truth manages to win the tournament for truth and to act as the dominant regime of truth. In spite of being non-religious, anti-religion, or strong supporter of the separation of religion and state, the radical supporter of modernity were occasionally forced, seemingly largely out of desperation for avoiding to be ex-communicated, to defend
their own adherence to Islam and declare the congruence between Islam and freedom of speech and equality before law (Ajodani, 2003: 141, 183-4) or land distribution (Ajodani, 2003: 417), which because of their general outlook as secular, was not credible to any side. This demonstrates that there was a demand for the religious element and the radical modernizers were driven to achieve horizontal integration by supplying an Islamically-baptized program of social change, which could enhance their chance of success in achieving real reform, which in the state of belatedness was their dominant concern. Almost all sides were full of self-censorship and secrecy, and all sides knew that behind the scene and in private conversations these radicals, for instance, were against religion, the clergy, and the monarchy with different degrees of intensity and they would not dare to express it in public due to the requirements of the state of belatedness.

This common knowledge gap between the private and public face of the historical actors was a white elephant in the room and was disavowed, but frequently erupted in the form of Shabnamehs (nightly letters) (Ettehadieh, 2004), even in the period of the victory of the constitutional order (see Ajodani 2003). Ajodani (2003) maintains that this self-censorship with regard to Islam, despite the excessive freedom to attack and even severely insult monarchy, was due to the fact that they were not free to criticize Islam and it was associated with the threat of extreme punishment. This analysis ignores the fact that freedom is the outcome of process of change and not its pre-requisite or its engine. No established system allows freedom to those who want to destroy it.

As such, the freedom to attack monarchy was not there in the first place and was gained through the process of resistance, rebellion, and revolution by a coalition of religious and non-religious forces. This could be achieved against religion as well. But the radicals, because of their practical concerns, were either unwilling to open a new front against religion before elimination of the oriental despotism or were not strong enough in terms of support amongst ordinary people and elites to launch attack on the clergy and religion and pay the price for it as well in the form of going to exile or being killed or worst killing the whole project of constitutionalism prematurely. This is the route which was taken by the Babis, who launched a double-edged ideological and military attack on monarchy and Shia religion, which provoked even a reformer like Amir Kabir to embark on suppression of them (see Amanat, 1989, 1997).
This lack of clarity and prioritization of elimination of oriental despotism plus the futile example of Babi anti-establishment movement and lack of adequate philosophical and theoretical development in the indigenous language, all contributed to the silence on outright and direct attack on Islam. The lack of freedom is the condition of possibility of emergence of new truth and not an obstacle against it. Christianity managed to capture Rome not because it was welcomed by the Roman establishment but exactly because it was suppressed by it; it had the potency in the market for truth to capture the market from the incumbent. The existence of informal market for truth (in the form of shabnamehs and imported newspapers and books flooding the market) leaves the market for truth almost always contestable. It is a myth that modernity and constitutionalism could not succeed because there was no free public space for it to flourish. Sufism and Greek Philosophy in the Shia land survived and even occasionally thrived despite being severely suppressed; even Islam itself thrived in the environment of severe oppression.

The fact is that people of Iran were converted to Islam, and Shia religion, and could be converted to anything else if the alternative force could meet the demand of Iranian people for its desirable regime of truth, which later on appeared in the language of Shariati in the form of demand for “spirituality (erfan), equality (barabari), and liberty (azadi)”, which is a call for a house of being which can combine and harmonize, emancipative, communicative and instrumental rationalities as manifested in Islam, Persianism, and modernity. Because of immersion in the state of belatedness and adoption of a ready-made package of modernity, they were not able or willing to invest on carving a consistent position for themselves, which could stand up to smear campaigns and attacks from all sides and be able to convert people to their own stable and coherent positions.

4.3.2.1. The Instability of the Taqizadeh Coalition

The Taqizadeh coalition formed alliance with religious constitutionalists and even religious non-constitutionalists against the common enemy, the oriental despotism. The alliance with the non-constitutionalist faction (the Nuri coalition) disintegrated quickly after the establishment of the first Majlis in dispute over the secular or religious nature of the constitution and its principles of equality before law and freedom of speech (Afary, 2005), which led to the coup against the constitutional
order. After the restoration of the constitutional order and in the second Majlis the
alliance with the religious constitutionalist coalition (the Behbehani-Tabataba’i
cohesion) collapsed following the assassination of Behbehani, which was perceived
to have been committed by one of the members of the Taqizadeh coalition (Ajodani,

Before the constitutional era, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, one of the leading figures
in the radical modernizer coalition, successively entered into the Babi-Azali religious
faction, Afghani pan-Islamist coalition and even tried to form a fleeting coalition
with Zel-al-Soltan, the hated governor of Isfahan and one of the members of the
monarchy, to topple Nasir-al-Din Shah as the emblem of oriental despotism (see
Adami’yat, 1970). Agha Khan Kermani was one minute in one camp and the next in
another; one minute in Babi-Azali camp and the next in Afghani’s camp and still the
next trying to form coalition with Zel-al Solatan to topple the shah, and ultimately
ending up acting as an irreligious and a free thinker and a socialist.

This zigzag in positions would add to the confusion and internal division within the
Taqizadeh coalition. This created an atmosphere of bitter hatred and animosity which
ultimately poured into a series of assassinations and executions. This led, as Ajodani
(2003: 121-2) attests, to attempts by the radical modernizers to impose the separation
of religion and state by force and violence. This process involved even attacking the
public and their ignorance and even saying that “even if the population of the whole
country are with you (the anti-constitutionalists), the population of the world is with
us” (Ajodani, 2003: 139), demonstrating the ‘belated inbetweenness’ dimension of
the political economy of truth. As such, the state of belatedness had left no time and
space for capacity and consensus building exercises, and the debate on whether
Taqizadeh was directly involved in the ordering and planning of assassinations may
seem to be irrelevant or inconsequential as the theoretical, ideological, and verbal
hatred and spitefulness permeating the social space would eventually translate itself
into the physical violence with or without any conspiratorial plots. Thought
assassinations and character assassinations eventually lead to physical assassinations.
It was genuinely thought that Iran was on the verge of embracing modernity in its
constitutional form and only some backward characters like Nuri, Behbehani or
Mohamad Ali Shah were preventing Iran from entering the heaven of modernity.
They felt the urgent need to take people to the heaven of modernity by will or by
force.
The strife within the Taqizadeh coalition became even more pronounced when the episodes of verbal and physical extremism prompted influential faces like Ali Akbar Dehkhoda and Mohammad Khiabani to voice their dissatisfaction (see Ajodani, 2003: 129 for Khiabani’s letter of dissatisfaction to Taqizadeh) and ultimately to leave the radical modernist coalition and join the moderate constitutionalist side. The radical modernists were plagued by division and conflict within themselves.

Lambton (Ra’in, 1976: 180) reports about the existence of factional strife within the Secret Society (one of the influential societies founded by the radical modernizers), leading to the emergence of Second Secret Society (on societies and associations and the divisions between and within them see Sohrabi, 2011: 311-2; Kharabi, 2007; Bayat, 1991). The fact is that almost on any issue, for instance on land distribution, gender relation, the use of violence, the use of insult against the rivals, whether Islam needed to be deployed in the service of constitutionalism or be attacked and if so which aspects of it, which elements of Persianism needed to be valorised and which marginalized, among others, there were marked differences between members of the Taqizadeh coalition (see for example Ajodani, 2003: 430), and these shades of grey had frequently created factional strife within the Taqizadeh coalition and made it highly volatile and unstable. This is attested by Ajodani (2003: 437-8): “In the secular intellectual fronts, deep chasm emerged too”.

Bahar, one of the leading members of the Taqizadeh coalition, for instance, “backed Vosuq and [deeply controversial] 1919 agreement” (Katouzian, 2013: 186) and expressed fierce opposition to Jangali modernizing and constitutionalist movement in the north of Iran, as Ajodani (2003: 442) observes, in the name of preserving the national unity and in fear of spread of separationist tendencies, and when the strong state arrived in the name of national unity, he started opposing that one as well (Abrahamian, 1982: 122; Katouzian, 2013: 218).

One example which can clearly demonstrate how alliances and coalitions could break quite easily and turn bitter in the most extreme sense is the initial friendship and subsequent animosity between Akhundzadeh and Moshir-al Douleh in the pre-constitutional era (Adamiyat, 1970: 89). Akhundzadeh launched a severe attack on Moshir-al Douleh while he used to be one of his closest allies; Adamiyat says that he even wrote deeply insulting poems against him.

The issue was the deep difference in their emotional economies of nationalism and in their associated structure of power/knowledge which erupted when Akhundzadeh
was introduced to the Turkish Ottoman authorities for his novel ideas in reforming the alphabet and script. Moshir-al-Douleh who at the time was the Iranian ambassador and Akhoundzadeh’s host and patron in Istanbul was deeply offended by Akhoundzadeh giving his satire writings which had targeted Nasir-al Din shah and his courtiers to the Turkish authorities. This move turned the relation between the two from alliance for reform and friendship to deep animosity and division in no time, which is one of the constant patterns of Iranian modern history due to irreconcilable differences emerging in the biographically-based degree of attachment to different regimes of truth and their dimensions of power, knowledge, and subjectivity (emotional economy).

Despite being in the same modernist camp, the attachment of Moshir-al-Douleh to the system of monarchy (orthodox Persianism) was much deeper and markedly different from almost total detachment of Akhoundzadeh (who was working for the Russian system, which had occupied Akhoundzadeh’s homeland (see Cole, 1996)). Furthermore what Moshri-al-Douleh had allegedly said to the Turkish authority about Akhoundzadeh being anti-religion and anti-state was accurate but as Akhoundzadeh was pursuing a practical project of social engineering with regard to the change in alphabet he did not want anything to hinder the success of his project including the knowledge of his opposition to religion and state.

The same was true for Moshir-al-Douleh whose pragmatic project was to work with the Qajar system to reform it from inside, while Akhoundzadeh’s action of giving his satire books to the Ottoman authorities, when he was introduced by Moshir-al-Douleh to them and when he was his guest in Istanbul, was deeply offensive to him. Officially Akhoundzadeh was the guest of the Iranian government and was introduced by a high profile member of this government to the Ottoman government and Akhoundzadeh giving his satire books ridiculing the head of Iranian government and the whole system was deeply offensive for Moshir-al-Douleh.

In a sense both were right in different ways in being offended. They had two different projects and two different symbolic orders, which shows the need of all sides to apply hermeneutics of understanding and free association to understand each other’s dreams and world of significations. This dispute was a clear case of mutual misunderstanding. The dream of Akhoundzadeh was to revolutionize the world of the Islamic east, and especially Iran, while Moshri-al-Douleh as a representative of the Qajar state who had introduced Akhoundzadeh to the Ottomans did not like him giving
them his works on ridiculing Iranian state. In that particular context his discontent can be easily understood as the topic of concern was the alphabet and not the features of the Iranian state bureaucracy and secondly Akhundzadeh was associated with Moshir-al Douleh as his guest and had formed a bigger transient assemblage in that context. Moshir-al Douleh might not have had any problems if the Ottoman authorities had accessed and read Akhundzadeh’s works independently (here we try to apply Kogler’s (1996) version of devil’s advocate).

Both sides were looking to implement their own projects, and the emergence of obstacles would naturally fill them with rage. As such they moved from deep alliance to even deeper animosity in no time due to the tragedy of confusion. The fact is that each member of the Taqizadeh coalition, like Bahar and Dehkhoda and Taqizadeh himself, was trapped in the state of tri-polarity between the three regimes of truth and their internal division between orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, politics of piety and politics of ordinary alongside their black and white books.

The internal divisions would inevitably result in the self-destruction of the radical modernists, as Ehtesham-al-Saltaneh attests (Ajodani, 2003: 23), where in his opinion it was a blessing that Mohammad Ali Shah attacked the Majlis in a military fashion, prompting the constitutionalists to unite in their pursuit of constitutionalism. Otherwise, they would have imploded earlier under the weight of their own incessant infightings.

This coalition used the clergy against the oriental despotism and then in the affirmative stage of the revolution they embarked on a second revolution in trying to cleanse the constitutionalism from the impurities and obstacle caused by the clergy (Ajodani, 2003: 126-7). For them, no true and genuine constitutionalism and freedom could be delivered from the starting point of Islamic laws. The fundamental dispute was whether Islam, modernity or Persianism needed to be taken as the ‘main base’ for theorizing, inspiring, and justifying the programs of social reform, and whether verses of the Quran, or quotations from the modern philosophers and modern texts, or the poems of Ferdowsi needed to be deployed to act as the master signifier for discursive and non-discursive practices leading to the writing of the constitution and achieving social transformation. Every voice was attempting to shape and monopolize the agenda of the social movements and change.
The disputes revolved around whether modern phenomena such as secularism, freedom of speech, republicanism, atheism, land distribution, science, art, social freedom, gender equality and free love help or hinder to the move towards achieving social common good? Nobody knew for sure. The same were true with regards to aspects of Islam and Persianism; which elements of Islam and which elements of Persianism or which combination of them would help or hinder the pursuit of common good? There was no consensus and no method of achieving consensus. As such, every little or big issue could generate bitter split and strife within coalitions. The issue is that harm and benefit, and common good and the significance attached to different issues were conceived and prioritized differently within and between different truth camps and in different language communities. Passions, emotions and affectivities were attuned differently as well.

Different rationalities with their unique dictionaries associated different denotations and connotations to the notions such as harm, benefit, science, consumption, constitution, justice, freedom, woman and all other signifiers due to their distinctly different world of signification with their distinctive ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies, ethics, aesthetics, and their associated discursive and non-discursive practices and affiliated forms of affectivity and emotional economy. The society trapped in the state of belated inbetweenness cannot have a consensual and commonsensical conception of harm and benefit. As such good and bad modernity, true and false Islam, progressive and regressive Persianism, whatever they may mean for the social actors, enter the truth market in bizarre and unexpected forms and contents and are exposed to the process of selection in the market for truth. We know that selection is a social phenomenon closely associated with the notion of emergence. Social outcomes are the unexpected and unintended consequences of interaction of forces (the principle of emergence). Confusion over the nature of social phenomena and the theory of selection is at the heart of perpetuation of the confusion associated with the intersection between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness.

The failure of the constitutionalist model of adoption of modernity led to return to experimenting with the more rooted option of oriental despotism and deploying it as the leverage to achieve techno-bureaucratic modernity in the Reza Shah era in the hope of achieving deeper levels of modernity at subsequent stages of socio-economic development (Abrahamian, 1982: 121-4). The radical constitutionalists like all other
Iranians were ultimately interested in the practical outcome of different project of social engineering (as Akhoundzadeh frequently stressed) in saving Iran from the verge of annihilation in the encounter with modernity (the state of belatedness) and as such they were ready to experiment with any permutations of the three regimes of truth as long as they could offer a glimmer of hope to save the deeply sick patient of the mother “Iran”. The intersection between the state of inbetweenness in the context of culture and the state of belatedness in the context of situation and the naive theory of selection (ignoring the incommensurability and embeddedness of social phenomena and the role of vanishing mediators and the process of emergence in any attempt to graft new elements to the social order, and ultimately the issue of multiple realizability) sewed the failure of any coalition and their associated project and subprojects of reverse social engineering.

The state of belated inbetweenness had turned even the selfhood of each of these faces into unstable coalition of a society of selves. Even Akhoundzadeh who possessed the most consistent position in the pre-constitutional era against the religious and oriental forms of despotism and in support of a liberal order, became a pragmatic modernist when he tried to engage with the social reality through his program of reform in the alphabet and script, where he occasionally retreated from his uncompromising positions against Islam and/or monarchy in the hope of achieving tangible reform within his general strategy-narrative of modernization (see Adamiyat, 1970: 79-80; Ajodani 2003: 42). Shoukat (2006) reports on how Taqizadeh himself turned into a revolutionary despot, as part of a 20-member revolutionary council (hei’at-e modireh), after the defeat of the minor despotism in order to control the chaotic situation after the restoration of the constitutional order.

4.3.2.2. Taqizadeh as an Unstable Coalition

In effect, not only his coalition but Taqizadeh himself was an unstable coalition. Taqizadeh zigzagged between alternative and sometimes contradictory positions in his stormy public life (see Ansari, 2012). As Katouzian (2013: 49, 53, 59) reports, the biggest regret Taqizadeh had was the mistake of not compromising with Mohammad Ali Shah after the defeat of the Shah’s coup against the constitutionalists. In a sense, Reza Shah was the best example of the return of the repressed and the zombie which came back to haunt the radical constitutionalists like Taqizadeh. He resisted Mohammad Ali Shah and forced him to abdicate, leading to the eventual collapse of the Qajar dynasty, and almost quarter century later after the
failure of the constitutional revolution he had to compromise with Reza Shah. But
the analysis offered in this thesis shows that even if he had compromised with
Mohammad Ali Shah it would not have worked and he would have only lost his
credibility and reputation earlier at the time, and would have been marginalized as he
became marginalized and defamed in later stages of his life when he took a
pragmatic approach to social change. When a radical or pragmatic position is left
vacant it is filled by other faces as in the case of oil-nationalization movement where
the radical position was occupied by Mosaddegh while Taqizadeh had already
moved to a moderate position; Katouzian (2003, 2012) says Taqizadeh frequently
saw his own earlier radical self in the clothes of others.

The turbulence in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness had reflected itself in
the turbulence in Taqizadeh’s life. As Katouzian (2012: 195) reports:

In his memoirs he used the term tufani (tempestuous) in describing his own
life, and that is how it appeared in the title of the posthumous publication.

The boom and bust in the truth cycle is evident in the following observation from
Katouzian (2012: 203 added emphasis) where Taqizadeh moves from being a
genuine devotee of the Iranian people to expressing deep contempt for them:

Taqizadeh, who during the constitutional revolution often signed his name as
fada’i- ye mellat (devotee of the people), had become thoroughly
disillusioned with his compatriots, such that he had written to a friend:
“Most, in fact virtually all, Iranians are spineless, two-faced, sycophantic,
liars, who play up to authority, hide their views . . . and each day, depending
on their position, subscribe to the idea which happens to be in vogue . . . And
they are constantly busy making plots and intrigues”.

Taqizadeh’s observation on the chameleon-like features of Iranians is repeated by
almost all observers in the modern history of Iran, and was used to demonize people
while in the beginning of the movement they used to treat people as angelic victims
of demonic forces inside or outside the country. Ironically, Taqizadeh with a c-turn
in his position on oriental despotism and on wholesale Westernization was himself
one member of this chameleon-type nation. It is another incidence of
misunderstanding if we essentializes this attribute in the Iranian people and their
elites and attach active agency and blame to them. In effect, just like chameleon, the
change of colours between and within regimes of truths was a coping strategy for a people trapped in a complex interaction between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness in search for practical remedies for the malaise of socio-economic backwardness and for constructing a new house of being based on coordination of three incommensurable forms of rationalities.

In the state of belatedness, where everyone is turned into a campaigner to save the nation, it is rational to “hide” your views to form fleeting coalitions with strange bedfellows to find practical solutions to urgent problems. This property has little to do with the old Shia practice of taqya (the act of dissimulation of religious belief in order to be safe), which was deployed by Keddie (1963) and repeated by Poulson (2006: 55) to make sense of prevalence of this feature amongst contemporary Iranians. Alongside the active use of secrecy and silence, in the state of belated inbetweenness, it is quite natural to change your mind frequently and convert to alternative truth camps if you find your adopted truth camp and your particular shade of grey and its associated project and subprojects of reverse social engineering cannot deliver the utopia and the dream of escape from socio-economic backwardness and/or other ideals.

4.3.2.3. Instability of Radical Constitutionalist Coalition as Manifested in the Example of Agha Khan Kermani

Another case of selfhood as unstable coalition is Agha Khan Kermani (see Adamiyat, 1978). Kermani was the member of both Islamic and anti-Islamic coalitions, and amongst those who wanted to activate the role of the clergy and those who wanted to marginalize them. He moved between these positions depending on what the context of situation primed and the strategy-narrative of saving Iran demanded. He oscillated between extreme positions ranging from pragmatism (Ajodani, 2002: 120-1) to the unconditional adoption of the Western modernity to declaring the clergy as the champions of the progress in Iran despite the clergy’s own wariness about intervening in politics and being afraid of making a mess of it. Kermani (1925: 57) was critical of the messy synthesis made by Mirdamad, the famous Safavid philosopher, while he himself was a highly volatile synthesis and an explosive cocktail of contradictory forces. Kermani (1925: 99) made criticism of Iranians’ lack of principles (spinelessness in the language of Taqizadeh) and their semi-modernism by pointing to their tendency to excessively and conspicuously imitate the foreign others.
Adamiyat (1978: 251), in turn, points to the eclectic mind of Kermani and Kermani’s own form of spinelessness (corresponding to Hedayat’s notion of *lakatteh*, as mentioned in the chapter 3 of this thesis). It is ironic that while Kermani attacks Mirdamad for being a useless eclectic (lakatteh) he himself becomes a modern lakatteh. Here we see everyone accuses everyone else of spinelessness while they all are the unconscious victims of the state of belated inbetweeness and its associated property of exuberant and impatient tri-polarity, resulting in perpetual zigzag movements between alternative regimes of truth.

Kermani (as reported in Adamiyat, 1978: 272) writes an important poem on wishing the bride of Iran not to suffer from being raped by the Russians and the British, which demonstrates his practical concerns to save Iran at any cost even at the cost of sleeping with bizarre bedfellows. These practical concerns in the state of belatedness turned almost all sides into promiscuous social actors (lakatteh) and unstable coalition of a society of selves in the search for finding sound-bite solutions to save the bride of “Iran” from irreversible demise. Different facet of Kermani’s identity was primed and activated at different context of situation (*see* Kermani, 1925: 100). Saving Iran required constructing a modern nation-state and all Kermani’s zigzags can be understood as attempts to make a national house of being out of the resources available to him, predominantly from the regime of truth of modernity, but also from Persianism and Islam whenever there was lack in modernity.

His nationalism was a composition of good Persianism (good governance with reference to the assembly of consultation in the pre-Islamic period, good gender relations, good Zoroastrianism, good glories, good language) plus good modernity (science and technology plus good political and non-political philosophies) and good Islam minus bad Persianism, bad Islam, and bad modernity (colonialism and quasi-modernism), and minus bad Arabs. Here the image of utopian Iran as a bride with its pure beauty is reminiscent of the heavenly girl of Hedayat (*see* Kermani’s influence on Hedayat (Adamiyat (1978: 281)). All of his chameleon-like positions should be summarized through his modernist nationalism and how it required the stretch towards joining Babis-Azalis at one time, Islamic nationalism/internationalism at another time, and Persianist nationalism at yet another and international humanism at still another. The main guide for understanding his zigzag approach in public life
and his theory and practice of selection and his particular cocktail is manifest in the very important principle alluded to by Adamiyat (1978: 381) in the hermeneutics of understanding “the meaning of his words should be understood through knowing his purpose”.

His will and his purpose were willed by multiple regimes of truth in the state of belated inbetweenness. His strategy was based on the creation of modern nation state and his narrative was an ad-hoc and rhizomatic combination of a set of pluses and minuses, affirmations and negations, demonizations and glorifications, through the operations of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth, where the prominence was given to modernity over and above Islam and Persianism and where he, for instance, launches an attack on Iranian people for choosing the religion of their attackers (Adamiyat, 1978: 284-5), which according to him, in his particular genre of discourses and narratives of decline, culminated in the general deterioration of Iranian people in all walks of life. Kermani (1925: 102) addresses the issue of truth and talks about gradualism, patience, and wisdom (see Adamiyat, 1978: 43), which he does not consistently adhere to (as Adamiyat maintains). While he attacks Mirdamad for the mishmash of his system of thought he himself inevitably constructs a bizarre mixture of his own as Adamiyat (1978: 151) observes.

4.3.2.4. Remarks on the Instability of Taqizadeh and Kermani

In the pre- and post-constitutional era, each face was a coalition acting as the vessel through which the rival forces implanted their particular cocktailed voices. This is manifest in the (in)famous case where Taqizadeh defended his role in signing of the 1933 oil treaty with Britain in Reza Shah era by denying his own active agency and declaring himself as “instrument” (ا’لئت-عفي’ل), conduit, or mouthpiece of another active agency (see Katouzian, 2013: 68-9). This shows how the philosophical and theoretical stances on the nature of agency have practical implications in history and in the everyday experiences. In this case he perceived Reza Shah as the real agent behind the signing of the infamous treaty, while in truth Reza Shah himself was another instrument in the chain of passive agency. The active agents were the three regimes of truth and how they were combined to form multiplicity of voices, implanting themselves in particular faces depending on their particular biographies and the trajectory of their life histories. Akhundzadeh, for example, alluded to how coming into contact with a teacher in his particular biographical context changed his life trajectory and put him on a path towards liberal form of modernity (see
Adamiyat, 1970). His path took him from Islamic jurisprudence to mysticism and from there to liberal modernity.

Taqizadeh’s alleged “principled compromise” (Katouzian, 2013: 64, 79) with Reza Shah was as radical as his old revolutionary radicalism against Mohammad Ali Shah, leading to the severe loss of his reputation, as the agent of the British and other accusations and ultimately, “the instrument” (one of the common meanings of the word a’lat in Persian is penis or phallus). Katouzian (2012: 207) observes that:

Until the end of his life Taqizadeh was often contemptuously referred to as a’lat-e fe’l (the instrument [of the act]), alluding to his Majlis speech where he had said that if a mistake was made, it was the fault of the decision taker, not the instrument.

In effect, he was blamed both for his radicalism and his pragmatism as both positions were untenable because they were severely un-theorized and unjustified. He was a “confused dreamer (gong-e khabdideh)” and the rest of the world “deaf (a’lam tamam kar)”. For him, his positions were principled but for the others (and even for his later self) they were clear cases of spinelessness or “excessive exuberance” (Ansari, 2012: 47).

This is the classic case of mutual misunderstanding, and transference and counter-transference. As he saw people of Iran as spineless many saw him as equally spineless. This was to the extent that Mosaddegh, who was once Taqizadeh’s close friend (Majd, 2001: 205), in the 14th Majlis had said that “Mother nature has not given birth to any traitor like Taqizadeh” (Sahabi, 2007: 244). Taqizadeh’s life was a turbulent one enshrined in the move from pragmatic radicalism to radical pragmatism, which immersed him in the controversies of revolutionary reign of terror and in the signing of the 1933 oil treaty. As such he moved from one extreme of radicalism in the controversy of assassinations of Amin-al Soltan and Behbehani to another extreme of pragmatism in signing the oil treaty under Reza Shah. Ajodani, (2003: 116) alludes to how Malak-al Motakallamin and Sayyed Javad Vaez Isfahani, Taqizadeh’s close allies, were reported to be involved in the assassination of Amin-al Soltan. Both types of radical or pragmatic positions were futile in producing any lasting effects on the Iranian social order except for contributing to its truth cycle of boom and bust, exuberance and disillusionment in the market for truth and political economy of truth and its associated waves of innocent cruelty.
4.3.3. Remarks on the Unstable Coalitions

As a result of state of belated inbetweenness and its associated tragedy of confusion, in this era we encounter how radicals frequently turn into pragmatists and change sides. Alongside the examples supplied in the various coalitions of this section, two sharp observations by the immediate actors and observers of the era will support how the state of confusion permeated all realms of life from state to civil society and culminated in fluctuations and instability in coalitions, positions, and selves. Nasim-e-Shomal’s observation enshrined in a piece of poem (Mir, 1993) captures the sense of instability and fluidity in identities, which he, like almost all actors, falls into the trap of blame game and blames people for being excessively unstable and chameleon-like, which is based on an implicit philosophical position of treating people as active agents of history in the spirit of Cartesian cogito rather than passive instruments of various forms of embedded, emergent, and incommensurable worldhood in the spirit of Heideggerian dasein as manifested in the following poem by Nasim-e Shomal:

We, the nation of Iran:
We, the nation of Iran, are all clever and astute,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour,
We are not afraid of insult and blame,
We do not incline toward the signs of health,
If there is no wine we say hooray to the drug,
We have passed the state of being concerned with reputation as we are all inclined towards disgrace,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour,
At times we are disturbed and are in plenty of pain because of our concerns for Constitutionalism,
In this we became thin [lost weight] as we miss our Majlis deputies,
One day we act like a person who is not concerned at all and at another time like a person who is deeply concerned,
In the night we think of wine and on the dawn we are using drugs,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour,
The tools of progress became all ready,
The youth are flying to the starts,
The ship of science are flowing in the sea,
We are drowned in the sea of ignorance like whales,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour,
O’ my God, why did Muslims’ positions become so miserable?
Why have they ignored Islam and the Quran?
The righteous all confirmed the Quran,
We, the wishy-washy, are following the laws of the Westerners,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour,
Out of piety and asceticism, we blame Salman [the most pious],
We all have the desire for the heavenly women and men,
Not an unbeliever, not a Christian, not a Jew, not a Muslim,
Not a pure Roman and not a pure non-Roman,
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour.\textsuperscript{38}

Here we see that the essence of instability of identities and positions is captured in the notion of Iranians not falling into any known categories of identities and constantly shifting between them. The poet himself shifts between modernity and Islam in the framework provided by Persianism (Persian poetry); he is the perfect example of what he is blaming, being an ad-hoc mishmash of everything and anything.

The American financial expert, Shuster, hired by the constitutionalists to organize the public finance of the Iranian government makes similar observation. Shuster’s (1912: xv) remarkable description confirms Nasim-e Shomal’s observation on the Iranians’ constant changing of colours:

The first point is that Persian political affairs, fraught as they are with misfortune and misery for millions of innocent people, are conducted very much as a well-staged drama I have heard some critics say, as an opera ‘bouffe’. The reader will find the same old characters weaving in and out of the story, at one time wearing the make-up of a Royalist Minister, at another the garb of a popular patriot. Cabinets are formed and dissolved with unreal rapidity. Men high in the councils of the nation sink in a day into perfect obscurity, only to emerge again as the ceaseless whirl of intrigue drags them into public favor.

While descriptively accurate, both observations (Shuster’s and Nasim-e Shomal’s) suffer from counter-transference in their negative judgemental connotations. Rather than asking why things are the way they are and why and how Iranians developed these coping strategies, they embarked on making value-judgements based on their favoured or utopian state of affairs where there are stable regimes of truth, stable minds and institutions and stable subjectivities and selfhoods. As such, they fall into the trap of intentional fallacy and counter-transference. \textit{The constant movements between the two positions of radicalism and pragmatism among multiple regimes of truth should be understood as the translation of the two options of complementarity/substitution and subsumption (appellation) between regimes of...}

\textsuperscript{38} See the original Persian version of the poem in the following address: http://ketabnak.com/comment.php?dlid=15757.
truth in order to find viable solutions for the problems caused by being thrown in the state of belatedness.

In the state of belatedness, the actors desperately search for the cure for the fatal ills of the society, which is deemed to be on the verge of death, amongst the resources available in the three regimes of truth through constant application of operations of addition and subtraction. Each promised solution fails and they are driven to move to test alternative cocktails and potions (ma’joon), which are ad-hoc and un-developed and as such cause more problems than they solve. The intersection between the states of belatedness and inbetweenness, hence, causes the property of changing colours and being like chameleon. Accordingly, agents move in different directions at any particular moment of time due to the trajectory of their bitter experiences and their level of exposure to different forces and voices. Only at the fleeting time of revolutionary euphoria and at the time of total disillusionment almost all voices and faces converge in the same direction, which soon collapses after a honeymoon of optimistic or nightmare of pessimistic state of near-equilibrium.

4.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

This section demonstrates how the tragedy of confusion alongside its resultant unstable coalitions led to the establishment of dysfunctionalities and deformities in the processes and outcomes of building institutions. First, the general patterns behind the experience of institutional failure are explored and then this section embarks on providing an overview of a few social realms to demonstrate how the experience of dysfunctional and deformed institution was widespread in the Iranian social order at the time. The disruptions, reversals, abortions, and deformities experienced in the process of conception, gestation, birth, growth and maturity of institutions is explored in the case of the institution of nation-state. The extensive discussions on the failure in building other institutions (such as constitution, polity, economy, legal system and education) were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations. Furthermore, this section attempts to compare the rare cases of institutional success as opposed to the common experience of institutional failure in this era in order to explore the reasons behind the widespread experience of institutional failure at the levels of worlds of signification, complex adaptive system, and causal reductionism.
As we addressed in our methodological and theoretical chapters, institutions emerge, they are not designed. Even when there is an element of conscious design involved in their construction, the consciousness itself is the emergent product of the regimes of truth alongside the fact that the interaction between the conscious and unconscious decisions and actions of multiple agents give rise to the emergence of institutions (as such institutions are embedded, incommensurable and emergent phenomena).

4.4.1. Rare Examples of Stable Institutions in a Sea of Dysfunctional Institutions

It is worth emphasizing that consciousness and conscience are two emergent institutions constructed by regimes of truth (as we extensively addressed in the chapter on methodology). To appropriate Marx’s famous statement, as quoted in Abrahamian (1979: 381), on the relation between mode of production and consciousness, we can say:

The mode of [regime of truth] conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, the social being that determines their consciousness.

By providing an example of institutional success and making a contrast with the common experience of the emergence of dysfunction and deformed institutions in the context of the constitutional era, we can shed light on how the inner working of the state of inbetweenness in its interplay with the state of belatedness creates the experience of institutional failure, which would in turn leads to dysfunctional governance structures and dysfunctional price system (in Williamson’s four-level analysis), and ultimately the experience of chronic underdevelopment.

The public religious ritual is the site where Iranians could achieve high level of cooperation and collaboration in conducting a set of relatively coherent and harmonized public actions. Thus, what was not possible in the realm of socio-economic development and political governance was possible in the realm of rituals. Here we observe that different class of Iranians in the Qajar period could actively participate in the enactment of the religious rituals through coordinated and harmonized performances based on clear division of labour and a coherent emergent and consensual script. The language game of Ashura processions and their associated
sets of discursive and non-discursive practices were fully familiar and internalized for the Iranian people at this era and they were fully fluent in conducting them with efficacy and efficiency. The same society-wide level of cooperation and participation was not possible in the realm of development, democracy, foreign policy, social justice, property rights, or gender relations, for instance. The subtleties and complexities of this cooperative institution which provided a place for all “within the cooperative venture of organising rituals” (Aghaei; 2005: 379) is astonishing. The successful yearly enactment of this religious ritual refutes the psychologism hypothesis of those who claim that Iranians are individualistic and bad at collective ventures (see Abrahamian, 1982, 1993; Katouzian, 2010).

While the language game of Muharram rituals was performed to its highest possible precision and effectiveness as a form of collective action, the collective action failed in the realm of development or constitutional government. Beeman’s (1976) analysis on how Iranians’ national characters could be made understandable based on the subtleties of the contextualized communicative system, which can shed light on the logic behind institutional failure in one context and institutional success in another. As North (1990) observes institutions have roots in common belief systems, informal norms, and the mechanisms of enforcement. All of these components were instituted in subjectivities, vocabularies, memories and narratives, and were institutionalized in specified time and allocated space. In other words, the people of Iran were scaffolded and subjectified in the rules of the game of religious rituals and their meanings for centuries, especially from the Safavid era (Niazmand, 2004; Dabashi, 2011a). Thus, the Shia regime of truth in coalition with Persian monarchy had managed to construct this language game and make its meanings and religious denotations and connotations intelligible in the larger picture of the emergence of Islam, the mission of prophets, the place of Shia Imams, and the perpetual war of good against evil.

All of these evolved to function in the process of establishing Iranian political and social identity in contradistinction to the Ottoman and Christian others. These rituals are believed to have roots in the Persian myth and pre-Islamic rites and world of signification (in the perpetual war of light against darkness in Persian religions) as well as managing to borrow elements from similar rituals in Christianity (Niazmand 2004; Dabashi, 2011a: 92). To institutionalize these rituals, an army of educators (religious clergies and other functionaries) reiterate and perform their main
components every year throughout the country, in rural and urban settings. These rituals have gradually evolved in a process of chaotic synchronization involving rhizomatic and arborescent movements in linguistic and non-linguistic dimensions of social assemblages. It means that they managed to incorporate elements from pre-Islamic Persia and mix it with Shia theology and rituals alongside assimilating elements of Christian iconography and rite, and formed a cohesive whole out of all of them as an institution in which people could perform the discursive and non-discursive practices associated with Shia Islam in contradistinction to Sunni Islam and Christianity.

In contrast, the new game of constitutional government, which required participation and cooperation of different classes of people, was totally unfamiliar to the Iranian dasein. They did not know how to play this new game; they did not know what were the ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics and aesthetics behind it and they did not own it in a gradual process of evolutionary change. As such, its terms and associated passions and emotions did not become part of discursive and non-discursive practices of people in everyday life. They had developed such practices with regard to the norm of namus (sexual honour), Hajj rituals (pilgrimage to Mecca), the rituals of pilgrimage to other shrines in Mashhad and Qom and in other places throughout the country, fasting in the month of Ramadan, the Persian rituals of Nowrouz (New Year), and Muharram rituals, for example, but not with regard to the games of constitutionalism, liberal democracy, or economic growth. Thus, people were not trained through formal and informal education to understand the philosophy, the stories and narratives, the small talks, and the discursive and non-discursive practices behind the institutions of constitution, Majlis, constitutional monarchy and how and why these institutions emerged in the first place and how and why they went through different stages of development and how their latest reincarnations compared with the earlier ones.

This makes the Muharram rituals a national and communal game while turned the constitutional government into an alien and imported one. More importantly the advocates of this new game did not want to go through the gradual and patient process of capacity and consensus building with regard to the new institutions as the immersion in the state of belatedness called for finding immediate cures for urgent ills of the society. This is the core of the tragedy of confusion in Iran; there is nobody to blame and there is no decline. The discourse of freedom and its relation to the
notions of transgression and compromise (see Sohrabi, 2012: 119) had not been even started to be incorporated into the worldhood of Iranian *dasein* and its dictionary, and did not have time to develop its own unique denotations and connotations the way Americans have developed their unique relations with gun ownership (Halliwell, 2008: 224) and Japanese with regard to the social norm of committing suicide (where the self-help book on how to commit suicide became best seller) (Kingston, 2004: 265-8).

Thus, at the time the constitutional order had arrived as a package and had to be absorbed by different classes of people without going through the evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization and harmonization with other notions and practices such as justice, piety, spirituality, morality, sexuality, vice and virtue (*amr-e be maroof va nah’ye az monkar*), body and its relation to permanence and impermanence, and the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth, and the relation between people, as new source of legitimacy, with kingship and divinity (the relation between the intellectual, the Persian king and the clergy and their corresponding sources of authority and truth, namely, people, king, and God).

In such a process of reverse social engineering, it was not at all clear how the will of people could be reconciled and harmonized with the will of the king and the will of God. It was not clear at all when conflicts arises between these alternative sources of truth and authority what needed to take precedence over what and why. It was not clear what happens when people themselves opt to make their own will subservient to what they perceived to be the better judgements emanating from the will of the king or the will of God; people may see themselves as addicts who are seduced by the pleasures of the flesh promised and delivered by modernity and consequently willingly submit themselves to the warnings and tough love of the king (Persianism) or the clergy (Islam). As such, people may rebel against themselves and willingly and irreversibly transfer the authority to the king or the clergy (meta-preference overriding and vetoing preferences).

These alternative forms of rationalities were the realms of competing sensibilities and imaginaries with contradictory set of priorities. People might have preferred Akhundzadeh’s free love or consumption of alcohol but had a meta-preference which questioned such preferences. People in the face of encounter with bigger truth frequently question their own desires and behaviours. As such their revealed
behaviour and expressed desire cannot be the ultimate decider of what they want, but whether they can defend the truth of their own behaviours and desires in the court of meta-preference. Hence, we see frustrated modernists frequently attacking people for their backwardness and for their constant changing of colours and their being like a chameleon. As Katouzian (2008b: 286) reports:

Eshqi wrote …
If the father of this nation is this bastard (i.e., Ahmad Shah)
Then the nation and the soul of its father must be shat on.

Katouzian (2008b: 285) goes on to attest that

Aref went overboard and described the entire Iranian people as asses:
. . . People of this lawless land are asses
By God both commoners and elite are asses
He who is the head of the ministers
I swear by the God of both worlds
Is a bigger ass than them all
In fact he is a stable-full of asses . . .
Sheikh, police chief and the police are all asses
Wife, children and companion, all asses . . .
From the bazaar to the street, asses
Village, town and country, all asses
Those wearing hats and turbans, all asses
Worker and laborer, certainly asses
The preacher on the pulpit is an ass
From the altar to the door, asses.

As can be seen, the modern rationality, sensibility, and imaginary had not been cultivated in the soil of Iranians’ historical and complex embeddedness. Signifiers such as constitution, freedom, justice, love, violence and the like gain their meanings through their interconnection with each other and with quilting points and master signifiers such as Islam, Christianity, modernity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Neoplatonism, Hinduism, and the like (as mentioned in the methodology chapter, social phenomena are signifiers embedded in incommensurable and emergent wholes and cannot be understood or changed atomistically).

As such, social phenomena are not atomic they are relational and holistic. It was, hence, not at all clear how the people’s claim to power, knowledge and legitimacy could be reconciled with the rights and ideals of the Persian kingship and the claims advanced by the clergy in having access to divine truth; the whole social order had

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not even began to contemplate on how the path of the mankind could be harmonized with the path of an ancient heritage (archaism), and both with the path of the prophets.

We can see all the various dimensions of manifestation of truth from economy, to polity, culture, and morality present and harmonized in the Muharram procession. Power and prestige is produced, circulated, exchanged, and distributed in such rituals as well as wealth, gift, love and care, and solidarity, identity, piety and spirituality in a game of cooperation and competition. The Iranian historical embeddedness in its unique evolutionary trajectory involving rhizomatic and arborescent movements had managed to set up the language game of *Muharram* rituals and make different classes of people play them willingly in both cooperative and competitive spirits.

The whole process and outcome closely resembles the organization of a football league. The people had to cooperate, and coordinate their actions and plan first to know what football is and what distinguishes it from other games and how to set up the league and then to play in it through different clubs (religious societies in towns and rural areas are the equivalent to football clubs) in a spirit of cooperation inside the club (*hei'at*) and competition between the clubs. The players gain stable identities inside the stable institutions whose legitimacies are not constantly questioned and the society reaches an emergent and stable consensus on its legitimacy. The ritual of Muharram, hence, was such an institution where people could compete and cooperate within a stable structure. Within this process, the market for the production of religious truths and feelings was established with all of its co-evolving dimensions attached to it; it was produced inside the parameters of the regime of truth as well as reproducing it, and depositing and sedimenting it anew in every incident of its re-enactment.

After encountering modernity, people from all segments of society could participate at different scales in the language games or tournaments of economy (how to produce, distribute, and consume goods and services), polity, art, sports, education, gender relation, security (army, police and intelligence) and foreign policy. While in the game of religious rituals of Muharram people from all segments of society, and despite all of their differences, knew how to participate in the game and could, as Aghaie (2005: 379) maintains, contribute “in their own way, either financially or by
donating their possessions or services”, they lacked this, largely tacit and unconscious, knowhow with modern institutions. As Aghaie (2005: 379) attests,

Every ritual became a massive cooperative project in which a variety of social relationships, such as those between elites and their various subordinates, were expressed and strengthened.

All the conflicts and rivalries and juggling for power and pursuits of interests, and their associated emotional economies were at work in this communal tournament. This social assemblage was a tripartite assemblage with all of its diverse components. In its dimension of real it went far beyond the approved standards and entered the realm of theatre and became a realm of rhizomatic and criss-crossed hybridization. This provided a space where different forms of Shi’ism could compete with each other, as this was the space where the shah’s Shia through Ta’ziya could compete with the clergy’s one (Amanat, 1997) and both with the Shia of ordinary people at the level of politics of ordinary. As Amanat (1997: 434-5) reports,

The shah's expressions of religiosity beyond regular prayer and fasting, which he keenly recorded in all his travel diaries, also included an active patronage of the ta’ziya, the Shi’ite passion plays commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn and the sufferings of his house. A thriving aspect of popular religion in Qajar Iran, these plays were performed during the holy month of Muharram in a mixed spirit of mournfulness and fanfare. The shah’s love for the ta’ziya cannot be attributed merely to a fondness for dramatic arts nor to a mundane desire to glance through binoculars at the nobility, particularly the women, sitting in private boxes reserved for “society.” A deeper reason for the shah’s consistent support for the ta’ziya was a conscious desire to preserve an alternative form of Shi’ism, even in the face of the ‘ulama’s vociferous disapproval.

This paragraph demonstrates how the society achieved social cohesion through the Muharram rituals and exhibits how in the common space of Muharram rituals the whole society, men, women, the shah, the ulama, the ordinary people and the elites came together mixing the symbolic/imaginary dimensions of these rituals with rhizomatic and un-symbolized one of turning it into a fanfare and a market for sensuality and sexuality (see Haeri, 1989: 11 on shrines as market for sex) alongside taking the rituals far beyond the control of the clergy.
The clergy could not establish their monopoly on how they were enacted in practice and were unable to keep it closed to what they perceived as impure traces being introduced to the rituals through the presence of women, ordinary people, and the shah. The dimension of ‘real’ was so present that the impurities could turn a mourning ritual into a ‘fanfare’, at least partially, which involves the extensive use of music, which is the sworn enemy of the clergy. Sex, music and the climate of festivity, and the profane was introduced to something which was supposed to be entirely mournful and sacred (see also Afary and Anderson, 2005: 48). We can see the dynamism of evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization at work here where an institution is developed internally as an emergent social assemblage following an inside-out model of development through interaction between different forces inside and outside a society without an external model disrupting its gradual process of creation and recreation.

However, the spectre of de-legitimization was always haunting them through radical intellectuals like Akhundzadeh (who questioned these rituals as superstitious and reactionary; see Adamiyat, 1970) and the foreign embassies (who ridiculed them or found them amusing; they could not understand them from indigenous and insider eye view). They could exclude the foreigners from attending the ta’ziya to partially control their destructive effects. For example, Amanat (1997: 263) reports an incident where the British envoy

… protested to [Mirza Agha Khan] Nuri about the exclusion of European missions from the annual royal ta’ziya performance (passion plays reenacting the tragedies of Husayn’s martyrdom in Karbala and the sufferings of his house), which Murray predicted would be a “clumsy and ridiculous” drama anyway. He was not satisfied by Nuri’s explanation that, because the ta’ziya was considered “an amusing spectacle” by Europeans but a very serious occasion by the Shi'ites, the ulama found the European presence disagreeable.

This is a perfect example of how stable institutions can evolve from inside and how they are taken to different directions alongside attempts made to de-legitimize them. If the British envoy had their own more advanced version of Muharram rituals and had introduced them as an alternative and the society had fallen into ambiguous situation of being not sure about the legitimacy of the indigenous or the European versions and the clergy, the Shah, the intellectuals and the people had taken different positions and changed their minds frequently on the truth or un-truth of these two
models of Muharram rituals the evolution of the whole institution would have been aborted and fallen into deformities and dysfunctionalities. The Muharram institution is an exhibition of what Iranian society could become in the constitutional era but never was; in a sense it was the Japanese face of Iranian society, where the elites and the people, by in large, worked together for the common purpose.

It should be mentioned that the Tobacco movement is another case where all Iranians, except for royalty and the British, came together peacefully to create change, as Katouzian (2010) attests. This was a fleeting experience, which yet involved bitter demonization of more than one side of the truth equation (the monarchy and the British), breeding the seeds of the constitutional revolution.

4.4.2. Modernity and the Institution of Nation-state

This section explores the institutional failure in the exemplar case of formation and transformation of Iranian nation-state. Modernity, as the dominant regime of truth in the international order, forced all social actors to operate within the bounds of nation-state. The big Other of international order demanded the communities to organize themselves in the framework of a nation-state. As such attachment to nation-state became the most salient and obligatory feature of each and every social actor in all realms of life. Societies needed to construct a modern sense of nationhood alongside its twin notion of statehood to be able to gain recognition from the international order in order to survive and thrive. This is the same as the symbolic order asking for a new-born male baby to act and attain the identity of a man. As such, a male has to be able to perform the discursive and non-discursive practices associated with masculinity to be able to gain recognition from the big Other and to be able to survive and thrive.

After encountering with modernity, the construction of nation-state became the most important project of belated societies like Iran. As such in the framework of international order, people could not freely move between Muslim societies based on their extraterritorial identity of being a Muslim. They had to act as the members of a nation-state and were recognized as such and nobody could stay nationless or refuse to attach herself to a nation. Nobody could act as the citizen of the world, as a member of mankind, or a member of a religion. The imposition of the notion of nation-state on all inhabitants of the earth and its associated discursive and non-discursive practices alongside its institutional arrangements, discursive formations
and structure of power/knowledge is the most prominent sign of dominance of modernity at the global scale. This section, therefore, aims to show how in the constitutional era the state of inbetweenness coupled with the state of belatedness endangered dysfunctional and deformed sense of nationhood and dysfunctional and deformed institution of state, which made the modern Iranian nation-state a beleaguered one.

As for the nationhood, facing the inevitability and urgency of the need for constructing a sense of nationhood in order to join the community of nations in the modern international order, the question was centred on how the sense of belonging to a shared house of being, called a nation, can be constructed to form a sense of social cohesion despite people’s different affiliations to various ethnic, linguistic, religious, communal, tribal, familial, class, gender, age, and other forms of identities. How could a sense of belonging to the same shared homeland be constructed out of so much diversity and difference? What could be used as the focal point for shared act of identification?

As discussed before, the resources for constructing this new house of being was provided by the three regimes of truth and their three forms of time, the linear short-term time of modernity (with its forward-looking property where future is conceived as the techno-scientific and consumerist utopia), versus archaic and mythical time of common ancestry (where Iran is narrativized as the cradle of civilization and as a noble cultural empire), and the atemporal time of eternity and its association with the prophets and infinitude.

In the constitutional era, all sides especially the modernists activated a sense of patriotism and nationalism to generate adequate unity and enough momentum and enthusiasm to sustain the process of modernization. Modernity on its own cannot provide adequate materials for the construction of sense of nationhood. While it demands the construction of nationhood it cannot supply adequate materials to construct it as it is future-oriented and is based on instrumental rationality with little or no relation to the past and communicative and emancipative rationalities. Modernity lacks a blueprint for constructing a sense of nationhood amongst fragmented cohorts of people and even its liberal democracy, constitutionalism, and rule of law presupposes an already formed nationhood where they can be activated.
As such, ironically for the adoption of modernity a strong dose of non-modern heritage is needed (Smith, 1998, 1999, 2003).

To demonstrates how the construction of modern nation-state is doomed to rely on non-modern materials we follow the following line of reasoning. Now that we are compelled by modernity as a global civilization to form nation-states, the question is why Azerbaijan, Gilan, Kordastan or Khorasan (or even smaller regions and cities within these provinces) should not be a nation of their own and try to achieve modernization within the boundaries set by these names. Here modernity cannot shed any light on which kind of people have to come together to form a socio-political unit as a modern nation to strive for adoption of modernity. The national unit can be as small as Iceland or Qatar or as large as China or Russia; modernity is indifferent to the size of the nations. As such, what largely determines the size of the nation is the non-modern backgrounds. European forms of knowledge like archaeology or orientalism were used to makes the lost pre-modern resources available for the construction of modern sense of nationhood (Marashi, 2008: 60).

For modernists ‘people of Iran’ was to be made to act as agent of their destiny through being recipient of techno-scientific rationality and through being transformed into a modern nation-state with constitutional government. Akhundzadeh, Malkam Khan, and Taqizadeh belonged to this category of nationalism where Akhundzadeh mixed his modernism with a carefully-tailored dose of Persianism while Malkam mixed it with an equally carefully-tailored dose of Islam, and Taqizadeh mixing it with a careful selection of Persianism. For Akhundzadeh all forms of resort to the historical heritage of pre-Islamic Persianism is childish compared to modernity (as for him any other achievement pales into insignificance compared to what modernity has achieved), but compared to other childish materials like Islam, he finds the pre-Islamic Persianism as better material for the construction of sense of modern belonging captured in the notion of nationhood (see Adamiyat, 1970; Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001; Ajodani, 2003; Marashi, 2008; Ansari, 2012).

Malkam Khan found in his bitter early experiences that modern nation-state could not be constructed by recourse to modernity alone and as he found the Persian monarchy extremely unreliable partner, he resorted to the Shia Islam and the clergy to create the momentum for the creation of modern nation-state (Keddie, 1980: 56).
Even Nasir-al-Din Shah himself, as Amanat (1997: 300) reports, felt the need to resort to the Shia Islam to fortify the sense of nationhood in the face of relentless interventions from the world powers:

His appeal to a providential will and, more specifically, to the “founder of the faith” (apparently a reference to ‘Ali, the first Shi’ite Imam, rather than Muhammad the Prophet) to save the “Persian state,” the symbol of the “saved nation” of Iran, reflected a novel view of Shi’ite Islam as a source of common identity and national cohesion. His reference to “death with honor” and the “honor of the nation” versus disgrace and a whorish submission to unjust demands hinted at a sense of modern patriotism with a romantic tinge. Whether such pristine Shi’ite nationalism came to him by way of reading history or was the outcome of historical circumstances, it was a remarkable element in redefining his self-image as a modern ruler, a king with a mission to save his nation by means of “reason and fortitude.”

Taqizadeh and others before him resorted to Ferdowsi and his Shahnameh, as Marashi (2009: 99; 2008: 60) attests, to create a common ideological glue for the generation of the sense of belonging to a modern socio-political unit called nation:

In Taqizadah’s rendering of Ferdowsi, the historical, political, and ideological significance of the poet becomes amplified, Ferdowsi becomes more forcefully identified as the spokesman for the nation, and the Shahnamah becomes evidence, not only of a once-felt Iranian identity, but also becomes the blueprint for a new Iranian cultural renaissance.

In the state of belated inbetweenness, the ideologization of the three regimes of truth was inevitable, as each voice attempted to construct its own favoured sense of nationhood through a project of reverse social engineering by repressing the alternative ones. Shahnameh was ideologized (used as the only or predominant blueprint for construction of the sense of nationhood) alongside the Shia jurisprudence and the Western constitutions. For the people like Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, nationhood was primarily and predominantly defined in terms of affiliation to Shia Islam and its jurisprudence and as such his defence of Iran was due to its people’s adherence to Shia Islam and Iran per se appeared to have no intrinsic value for him (see Arjomand, 1984: 200-2; Shimamoto, 1987; Martin, 2013).

As such, different voices attempted to construct the sense of nationhood out of different materials from alternative regimes of truth with different preference.
orderings. Different voices prioritized differently in using the resources from the rival regimes of truth, in constructing the Iranian modern house of being. To achieve the sense of nationhood, they resorted to both affirmative and negating dimensions. In affirmative dimension they glorified the memory of Persian pre-Islamic empire (they activated the discourse of Persianism) and demonized the Arab ‘other’. They attributed all darkness and lack to this negative other and suggested some reform in Persian calligraphy as well (see Adamiyat, 1970, 1978). Ajodani (2002: 226-238) identifies the pragmatic and radical nationalism amongst the poets in the constitutional era, ranging from pure Persianism of Aref and Eshghi against both Islam and the Christian West to pragmatist nationalism of Adeeb, Bahar, or Ashraf resorting to Islamic and pre-Islamic heritage (Ajodani, 2002: 248) to entice people to coalesce around the sense of nationhood against the occidental despotism of the colonial powers.

It can be noted that the site of constructing a sense of nationhood was another microcosm where Iranians could not come to agree on how to reconcile their irreconcilable differences on how to combine their three regimes of truth. As such any conception of truth was objected by all others, creating a zigzag between alternative conceptions without converging to any particular stable outcome. A set of pragmatic and radical voices offered to construct the sense of nationhood out of different materials adopted from alternative regimes of truth, each by emphasizing on certain aspects while omitting or leaving others in silence. Every conception and the attempt for its institutionalization was challenged and blocked by the alternative ones, leaving the construction of the sense of nationhood in a state of deformity and dysfunctionality.

The dysfunctional attempt to write a constitution was symptomatic of the impetus towards constructing a modern nation-state, the details of which was not included in this thesis due to the issue of word limitations. The extensive discussions on the failure in building other institutions (such as political parties, economy, voluntary associations, legal system and education) were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

4.5. STATE OF CHAOTIC ORDER

In each truth cycle, the process governing Iranian modern history starts from tragedy of confusion and end up in chaotic order passing through formation of unstable
coalitions and institutional failure. As Mirza Malkam Khan (1891: 239-40) observes in his London speech:

> each reform movement ends in revolution, each revolution ends in blood; and after the storm, the waters subside into the same sluggish calm, and there is just as little security of life and property, as little justice and freedom as before.

Katouzian (2011: 773-4) affirms Malkam Khan’s observation by stating that: “The chaos that had followed the revolution had been such that constitutionalism quickly fell into disrepute”. Taqizadeh’s project of wholesale modernization (radical modernization) through constitutionalism came to its end by a thousand cuts in 1925 when the new Pahlavi dynasty was formally founded, and initiated a new project of Persianized modernization through enlightened absolutism. The internal strife within and between different cultural tribes expressed through verbal and physical violence in an ambience of acrimony and antagonism and in an inevitable war of attrition exhausted the revolutionary movement and in its failure to create viable political, economic, and military institutions led to a state of chaos, culminating in the call for a strong man who could act as the final arbiter and Iranian leviathan to restore social order through the systematic deployment of coercion. As Saidi Sirjani (2011) attests,

> Even the veteran journalist Majd-al-Eslām Kermānī, in a leading article in the comic paper Kaškūl (5, 27 Rabī’ I 1325/10 May 1907), expressed longing for an exceptional personality to take the country in hand.

The demand for the strong man was met by its corresponding supply in the figure of Reza Khan before two other candidates, Vosuq-al-Douleh and Sayed Zia, having been dismissed as nonviable options for various reasons (Azimi, 2008).

It is worth noting that events (like the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the subsequent Russian ultimatum of 1911 to Majlis over Shuster’s control of Iran’s finances and occupation of the country by the foreign forces and dissolution of second Majlis; see Keddie and Amanat, 1991: 206-7) per se could not be seen as the causes of the collapse of the constitutional order. They functioned as triggering factors in the context of deep division and bitter conflict within and between groups and institutions, and the chronic lack of social cohesion due to the intersection
between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness. In other contexts, such events could even lead to cementing a stronger sense of social cohesion as in the case of Japan after the humiliation of “the so-called Unequal Treaties regime” (Goto-Jones, 2009: 16). Depending on what they historically denote and connote for a community, emergent events have different causal influences in different complex systems of meaning and worlds of signification. Causation, as we extensively addressed in the methodology chapter, works within complex adaptive systems (system-specific causality) with non-linear criticality (butterfly effects and path-dependency) and both operate within the regimes of truth and worlds of signification with their affiliated affirmative and negating facets and associated dictionaries and accompanying denotations and connotations.

As such, foreign intervention or any other events cannot, per se, be deemed as the prime mover in the collapse of the constitutional order but the lack of social cohesion can.

A series of events from Mohammad Ali Shah’s coup, to Anglo-Russian ultimatum over the demand for the dismissal of Shuster, chronic experience of rampant inflation, Iran’s reluctant entanglement into the quagmire of first World War, alongside occurrence of famine and epidemics, incidences of rioting, looting and pillage, the emergence of local and regional movements instigating the fear of secessionism, and the British attempt to turn Iran into its protectorate through the 1919 agreement with Vosug-al-Douleh’s government (Azimi, 2008: 43; Katouzian, 2011: 773-4), served as the thousand cuts for the death of the constitutional revolution in the framework of lack of social cohesion due to irreconcilable differences within and between different social assemblages.

At the deeper level and away from all these events, what created the condition of possibility for the collapse of the constitutional order was the Iranian dasein’s confusion between alternative regimes of truth, exacerbated by the urgency to find immediate solutions for the ills of the society and the impatience to implement them through the act of reverse social engineering. Ultimately what caused the chaos was the fact that each cultural tribe tried to capture the centre and implement its own favoured package of reform or anti-reform without paying adequate attention to building capacity and consensus.
Iran needed to act urgently to the military, economic and cultural challenges of modernity without possessing adequate theoretical and philosophical capital on how to combine the three regime of truth in a viable and productive fashion which could coordinate and harmonize instrumental, communicative, and emancipative rationalities and their associated discursive and non-discursive practices. In the war between alternative regime of truth, each cultural tribe (which was the product of ad-hoc combination of three regimes of truth through addition and subtraction, emphases, silences, and omissions) inevitably embarked on the antagonistic war of good against evil, and glorification of self and demonization of the other. This led to a war of attrition which exhausted the energy and goodwill of all sides and ultimately resulted in the call for the emergence of final arbiter, who could supposedly once for all resolve the irreconcilable differences in one direction or another, and restore the social order even if by resort to extreme violence. This approach rested implicitly on a theory of selection and a methodology of analysis of social phenomena which was based on Cartesian subject-object relation where the social order could be made the object of social engineering and intelligent design, without any attention to their properties of embeddedness, incommensurability, and emergence.

If they had had a theory of selection and a methodology of social science based on Heideggerian dasein and the notion of being-in-the-world and free association, they would have embarked on non-violent acts of mutual understanding and the associated acts of capacity and consensus building. Such language and theory was not available to the historical actors at the time and as such they embarked on practicing transference and counter-transference and could not understand each other’s different worldhood with different dictionaries, and denotations and connotations. This led to seeing the other as evil and false and the self as good and true. This inevitably led to the ‘politics of elimination’. What else they could do? They had to embark on eliminating evil and establishing good; it is not clear how the compromise with evil could be legitimized for them. It was foreclosed to them to see the contemporary age as the age of belated inbetweenness and not the age of the conflict between good and evil, modern and traditional or any other form of binary oppositions.

The prevalence of post-revolutionary chaos is attested by Azimi (2008: 47) in the following description of the central government, where it was deemed to be suffering from “political fragmentation, chronic cabinet instability, administrative incapacity,
and lack of effective means and resources, particularly an adequate military force”. The post-revolutionary chaos was the result of all sides exhausting each other in the war of attrition and eroding the political and social capital of the revolution; the chaos was the outcome of the continuum of voices (manifested in the multitude of societies and associations competing vehemently and violently for the capturing of centre of power and influence; see Shoukat, 2006) originating from the intermingling between the three regimes of truth. These multiple voices and cultural tribes could not manage to come into consensus to form stable coalitions to establish the institutions of modern nation-state to achieve the purpose of stable and legitimate modernization.

The society could not organize itself into stable political parties, as there were differences of emphasis between different individuals and groups on how to combine different regimes of truth. With the change in context of situation, different components of the complex repertoire of truth were activated, making behaviours unpredictable and prompting the ambience of mistrust, conspiracy theory, and impatience. The bitter division between radicals and pragmatists emerged within and between groups and these divisions further developed into the forms of extreme radicalism such as Amo-oghli’s (see Sheikholeslami, 2012) and extreme pragmatism like Vosuq-al-Douleh’s (Azimi, 2008).

In line with these developments, new groupings and associations were emerging throughout that period by the function of the operation of addition and subtraction over the set of three regimes of truth. Civil society was as much divided as the state (see Schirazi, 2002: 49-50; Fadaee, 2012: 75, 127). The state of inbetweenness in intersection with the state of belatedness gave rise to frequent incidence of “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 150), where both the perpetrators and the victims fell prey to the tragedy of confusion while each working for what they perceived to be true causes. In the meantime, Reza Khan’s suppression of Jangali movement, culminating to the death of its constitutionalist idealist leader, Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali (Azimi, 2008: 46) was one example amongst many of such incidents of innocent cruelty (see Abrahalian, 1982: 122). Each side was attacking the black book of the other while relying on the white book of the self; each side embarked on de-legitimizing the other based on the other’s politics of ordinary and promoting itself based on their own politics of piety.
They wanted good modernity, good Islam, and good Persianism, without paying attention to the fact that you cannot have goodness of any regime of truth without the less good and bad sides emerging with it. As such the politics of piety cannot emerge without the politics of ordinary. They further ignored the fact that one person’s bad thing maybe another’s good one and one entity’s ordinariness is another one’s piety. Ultimately the immersion in the hyper-complex state of belated inbetweenness led to the emergence and collapse of the constitutional revolution, as all cultural tribes did not possess adequate tools to understand each other and as such misunderstanding created violence and chaos, leading to the re-emergence of Iranian leviathan as the final arbiter.

4.6. CONCLUSION

We need to look at the rise and fall of Mashroteh as an instantiation of principle of emergence; revolutions come and go without having any specific creator or intelligent designer (Skocpol, 1982; Selbin, 2010). At the time the three types of diseases striking the Iranian social body were conceived to be the three forms of despotism –religious, oriental, and occidental- themselves manifestation of the malfunctions of three forms of rationalities evolved to solve the despotism of three varieties of finitude associated with the despotism of nature, despotism of man, and despotism of death (as manifestation of existential finitude). The three regimes of truth constitutive of Iranian embeddedness offered diagnoses and cures for the three diseases. The three general types of doctors of society emerged on the scene were the intelligentsia, the clergy and the people of pen in Persian bureaucracy (as part of the long tradition of house of wisdom in the Persian history) and Persian poetry. As such, those regimes of truth, which were parts of the problems, were parts of the solutions as well.

Based on the three regimes of truth and their internal divisions into orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, and their perceived dark and bright sides (none of them being virgin regimes of truth), and whether they could be mixed (pragmatism) or segregated (radicalism; puritanism), multitude of positions, voices and strategies emerged based on the applications of two operations of addition and subtraction. These multitudes of voices gave birth to numerous forms of cultural tribes personified in groupings, societies, and associations. These societies formed the basis for the emergence of fleeting number of unstable coalitions. These coalitions in turn shaped the
configuration of forces behind the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary fronts. The multitude of forces, voices and faces instigated and at the same time hampered and disrupted the gestation, birth, or maturation periods of institutionalization, which in turn gave rise to the emergence of deformed and dysfunctional institutions. These deformed institutions produced a chaotic order which in turn prompted new round of soul searching and the end of one round of Iranian truth cycle.

4.6.1. Major Features of the Constitutional Era
In the constitutional era, the dominant methodological approach guiding the soul searching cycle (the attempts made to identify the root-causes of the ills of the society) was reductionism, which led to the discourse of decline and the dangerous and violent form of blame game, and subsequent waves of acts of reverse social engineering leading to layers of institutional deformities and dysfunctionalities.

The common outcome of the reductionist methodology, when applied to human relations, is misunderstanding. As a result, in the Mashroteh era individuals, groups, and societies constituting the social body misunderstood each other frequently. In effect, the main failure was the failure in mutual understanding. Each self failed to understand the other, which culminated in the lack of self-understanding and self-discovery as in the state of inbetweenness understanding the other is constitutive of the understanding of the self.

The constitutionalist side failed to understand the internal logic of Nuri’s approach to life and ultimately executed him. The Nuri’s Sharia-centred side also could not grasp why the modernizers wanted to send women “naked” into the field of social interaction: they failed to understand the signifiers of “woman”, “sexuality”, “nudity”, “dress code”, “social interaction” in the life world of modernity and unpack their wide range of historical and situated sets of connotations and denotation in the dictionary of modernity, which are completely different from the free associations and conventions reflected in the dictionary of Islamdom. Furthermore they failed to understand the secrets of the Iranian fascination with modernity. This failure to analyse social phenomena in their singularity was at the heart of institutional failure and ultimate failure of the constitutionalist project of modernization.

The actual workings of methodological reductionism can be reconstructed in the following ways. The original problem in the pre-constitutional era triggering the
whole series of revolutions and reform movements in the last two centuries was the encounter with modernity in its two white and black faces. The society was put in the position of therapy and not theory (the immediacy and gravity of the problem left no time for theorization and only time for therapy). The doctors of society encompassing the intelligentsia, the clergy, the poet, and the royalist house of wisdom offered diagnoses and solutions to the problem based on the textbooks of the three regimes of truth and their orthodox and non-orthodox divisions.

A set of prescriptions were recommended incorporating different doses of modernity, Islam, and Persianism. In this era, the predominant purpose was to save Iran from oriental despotism (the dark side of orthodox Persianism) with its element of arbitrariness deemed to be the main obstacle to turning Iran into an industrialized society. The project of wholesale modernization became the dominant paradigm entailing the establishment a modern nation-state.

The alternative truth camps and their associated cultural tribes competed violently and relentlessly over how to define and shape the three main components of the projects of social engineering, namely, establishing the institutions of modern state, constructing a sense of nationhood aiming to achieve progress, and building modern institutions of techno-scientific rationality. In the face of humiliating waves of economic, cultural and military defeats in the hands of world powers, almost no voice denied the need for reform, but they disputed vehemently over the nature of reform, its main players, and its main winners and losers.

In the competition between the alternative truth camps, the radical constitutionalists with their project of radical modernization with its three subprojects won the race and set the agenda for the change, and other coalitions including the pragmatic constitutionalists, and radical and pragmatic coalitions with Islamic or Persianist affiliations challenged the dominant cultural tribe ruthlessly.

Almost all doctors of society, with different affiliations and associations to different regimes of truth, from intelligentsia to the clergy and the people of pen in bureaucracy and Persian poetry, from Taqizadeh to Nuri, Naini, Malkam Khan, Mostashar-al-Douleh, Dehkhoda, among others, had this causal approach to diagnosis and treatment of the ills of the society.

Different modern doctors of society offered different doses of modernity to establish a constitutional state, from minimalist pragmatists like Malkam who advocated the
idea of rule of law and sweetened its bitterness to the taste of Iranian nation by mixing it with Shia Islam to Akhonzadeh’s advocacy for liberal democracy with Persianist taste. The main dilemma for these doctors of society resided in coming up with a comprehensive blueprint which could incorporate the white books of all three regimes of truth and avoid their black books. The dispute was over what were their white and black books and what the architecture of the new order was supposed to be in the sense of what regime of truth with its symbolic and imaginary dimensions needed to be prioritized over what and why.

Ultimately, with some nudges from the British Embassy, the idea of radical constitutionalism won the day. For many, including Taqizadeh and his associates, the writing of constitution and the establishment of Majlis were the first steps towards conducting deeper reforms in all institutions of society from language to economy, family, education, legal system, army, and religion. The religious constitutionalists like Naini and others (including pragmatist poets like Adeeb or the Qajar kings like Nasir-al-Din Shah) offered the resources of Shia Islam in the service of establishing a sense of nationhood and formation of modern constitutional state.

For the modernizers the avenues to import the new rationality and its institutions were activities like sending students to Europe, establishing new educational and legal systems and inviting foreign educators and foreign missionaries for establishing schools and translation of material from the European languages, and hiring foreign experts for establishing modern finance, modern law, and modern army and police and apparatus of national security. Alongside the technical knowledge some thinkers emphasized on the importance of philosophical foundations of new rationalities both in scientific realm and in political realm and encouraged the translation of Western books on modern philosophy.

Yet another doctor of society (Afghani) identified the roots of problems differently. He put the blame for the decline of Iran and other Muslim countries not on specific factors in each specific country but on the disunity of Islamic world and civilization. This civilizational approach tried to work in the framework of civilizational conflict and deemphasised the notion of nationhood in favour of the unity of the Islamic world (Islamdom) in opposition to the forces of colonialism. This voice represented an attempt to revive Islamic civilization through creating reformation in understanding and practice of Islam internally and resisting the colonial invasions of Islamic lands by the West through unifying the world of Islam externally. For this
voice the main disease of Islamic world was occidental despotism externally and oriental despotism and religious despotism internally. This approach wanted to actively adopt modern political organization and techno-scientific rationality without much emphasis on the idea of nationhood. This approach inspired the emergence of religious reformation in the Islamic world alongside awakening its anti-colonialist sensibilities.

In opposition to the ideas and institutions of constitutionalism, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri and his followers felt that the cures and therapies offered by the modern intelligentsia was killing the patient spiritually and was disconnecting the Shia community from its relation with the sacred, the source of revelation and guidance for overcoming the terror of existential finitude as manifested in death. For this voice, modernity through overemphasizing the pleasures of the flesh was making the soul poor and was depriving the nation from its prospect of eternal happiness in heaven by side-lining the role of Shia jurisprudence in the organization of the believers’ daily lives. For this approach the diagnosis was that the modernization cure was more pernicious than the disease itself and as a result an attempt was made to treat the patient from the treatment itself by forming a coalition with Persian monarchy and even with part of occidental despotism (Russia) against the onslaught of orthodox modernity combined with traces of non-orthodox modernity and its associated allies in non-orthodox Persianism and Shia Islam.

In reaction to this latter voice some ulama declared the self-sameness of constitutionalism and Shia jurisprudence and saw the idea of constitution and its associated institutions as effective ways of restricting the monarchy and the foreign powers, and conducive to progress. This diagnosis reinforced the mainstream diagnosis and endorsed the same treatment minus the social freedom of vices which they deemed not inherent to constitutionalism. Alongside all of this the royalist voices like Amin-al-Soltan and Mohammad Ali Shah emphasised on the possibility of achieving progress via formation of a wide coalition inside an enlightened authoritarian and despotic regime like Japan and Germany, which was largely ignored.

All sides in the market for truth about life, work, and language with their mechanical logic of reductionism and their associated discourse of decline embarked on the act of mutual de-legitimization leading to the erosion of the collective will to reform and the ultimate collapse of the whole constitutional movement.
This period sees the constant interplay of the notions of legitimacy and bastardity; many pragmatic voices and alliances and hybrid voices were seen as illegitimate and incoherent. The radical voices treated the pragmatic voices as examples of bastardy and whoredom (lakkategi) and coalitions were enjoying only partial legitimacy in terms of the language of one regime of truth while they were suffering from lack of legitimacy from alternative ones. Identities were wax-like (as Nasir-al-Din Shah was at pain to admit), spineless (as Taqizadeh put it) or chameleon-like (the way Nasim-e Shomal had put it) and were incessantly moving between different regimes of truth and between radical and pragmatic camps.

In effect, this era was the site of fierce war of attrition between and within the radicals and pragmatists of all sides. It was inevitable that all sides felt under siege and would embark on brutally attacking each other verbally or physically; what Amanat (1997: 152, added emphases) said with regard to Nasir-al-Din Shah applies to all sides of the social body: “the "cannonballs of sedition" were destined to rain on his "castle of mirrors." These “cannonballs of sedition” were launched from all sides against each other’s “castle of mirrors”. The voices were highly fragile combinations of all three regimes of truth and the war of attrition was fully operative.

Deploying Dehkhoda’s very influential notion of nonsense (charand va parand), we can see that at this era every cultural tribe treated what was said and done by others as nonsense (charand). All sides de-legitimized and discredited each other one way or another. All sides were putting each other on trial and declaring each other as guilty. The methodology used to analyse the position of alternative voices was the familiar reductive method of “compare and contrast” with borrowing examples from various parts of history (the destructive logic of exemplarity; see Hollander, 2008; Harvey, 2002), all leading to misunderstanding of the radical other.

All cultural tribes were changing their positions and alliances frequently in response to the new configuration of forces in the context of situation. Britain activated the liberal idealism one minute and was the inspiration behind and the supporter of the constitutional movement, when idealism and Realpolitik were on the same side, and suddenly changed its position to oppressing constitutionalism due to the needs of Realpolitik coming into conflict with idealism of emancipatory spirit of liberalism and democracy. Britain supported the constitutional revolution for a while and then helped to curb it later due to change in context of situation.
In this era we had three forms of coalitions: the Persianist coalition, the Islamic coalition and the modernist coalition, where their regimes of truth and strategy-narrative were distinctly different. Behbehani-Tabatabi and Nuri coalitions belonged to the Islamic coalition, the Taqizadeh, Malkam Khan, and even Afghani, and Russian-British coalitions belonged to modernist coalition and the Shah and his followers belonged to the Persianist coalition. These coalitions formed fleeting strategic alliances with each other (like the British formed a fleeting coalition with Taqizadeh and constitutionalist coalition, and the Russians formed a coalition with the Shah and Nuri).

All sides resorted to repression and disavowal, alongside being trapped in their own cases of foreclosure (unable to think the unthinkable).

Mashroteh movement and Islamic republic are mirror image of each other; both had a set of coalitions of seculars and religious entities, one was ultimately dominated by seculars (modernization project) while the other by the religious (the Islamization project). The revolutions’ deeper causes were rooted in the truth wars and the truth cycles endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness when a social assemblage is thrown in a state where it has to choose its own condition of possibility of choosing (burden of judgement). Mashroteh movement formulated its demands at all four Williamsonian levels; people were unhappy with the level of prices and inflation and hence frequent incidences of bread riots, with the governance of the cities (complaints against Ein-al-Douleh), with the institutions of the state from taxation to legal system, and hence the call for the house of justice (edalatkhaneh) to fill the gap between theory and practice, or/and the establishment of a new language game in the form of writing a modern constitution and institutionalizing it in the form of an constitutional monarchy, which would inevitably require a drastic change in the institution of mind and its associated regimes of truth.

Here we also see how social change occurs in three levels of causation, complex system, and world of signification. The phrase “Inflation causing demonstrations and bread riots” works at the level of mechanical causation. While this small event turning into an avalanche for change is an example of non-linear criticality, path dependency, and butter fly effect, where a small event can cause a big effect. Bayat’s observation (2005: 400) implicitly refers to the work of non-linear criticality within complex adaptive systems of meaning:
Not all events that provoked the ulama’s second exodus from the capital followed a logical sequence. A series of unrelated instances of unrest in Tehran and the provinces, with diverse causes and involving different social groups, produced cumulative effects of greater consequence to the revolution than each one taken in isolation.

The point is that social phenomena do not follow “a logical sequence”. Each system of meaning and world of signification develops its own unique and internal logic of causation, association, interpretation, and action following the rhizomatic movement of free association and its associated symbolization and harmonization at three forms of topological, typological, and axiomatic movements. All these events occurred in the context of encounter with modernity and the ensuing war between three regimes of truth and its emergent truth cycles.

In this era, and throughout Iranian modern history, Iranians have frequently committed intentional fallacy, in the sense of attributing their ill fate to the bad faith of their rulers or alien others. This ignores the fact that passions and interests are shaped and operate within regimes of truth, alongside the fact that in the stable institutional structures even the bad intentions can produce good common goods. All social activities need “licence to operate”, which is issued by the dominant regime of truth in any social order. This is what ultimatum and trust games (see Camerer, 2003) measured in the cross-cultural contexts (see Berry et al., 2011: 90).

When a social assemblage cannot produce truth, coordination game, ultimatum game, and trust game turn into prisoner’s dilemma game. The failure to produce truth leads to failure to produce trust which in turn leads to the failure in the production of stable institutions and in turn wealth. This is what Siegfried (2006: 106) observes:

the relationship between trust and oxytocin is central to understanding many of the world’s economic ills. Oxytocin is linked to happiness, and the countries where people report high levels of happiness are also countries where people report high degrees of trust. Trust levels, in turn, are a good indicator of a country’s economic well-being. “Trust is among the biggest things economists have ever found that are related to economic growth,” …

The level of oxytocin is related to trust and trust to economic growth, leading to the conclusion that if a social order could produce trust it could produce wealth and
happiness. The production of trust was not possible in this era due to the intersection between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness. As we observed, mistrust was rife and was associated with prevalence of suspicion, conspiracy theory, intentional fallacy, and endemic impatience, all leading to different projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering, which in turn led to institutional failure and chaotic order as there was no time or patience for capacity and consensus building.

In producing the tragedy of confusion, dysfunctions and deformities, and chaos, faces were only the instrument (a'lat-e fe', as Taqizadeh put it) of their affiliated regimes of truth. Multiplicity of cultural tribes emerged out of the combinations of the three regimes of truth and engaged on existential war with each other, leading to the war of seventy two cultural tribes, all engulfed in the antagonizing and self-righteous war of good against evil. Blaming these seventy two voices and declaring them as false (famous Hafez’s poem chon nadidand haghghat rahe afsaneh zadand, as they did not see the truth they travelled the path of myth) ignores the fact that in the state of inbetweenness every voice is constituted of a truth (haghghat), a myth (afsaneh), and a piece of magic (afsoon) (reference to Hafez’s poem dah roz-e mehr-e gadroon afsaneh ast va afsoon, the short days of this life are myth and magic), corresponding to three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary (see Gabriel and Zizek, 2009). The war between the radicals and the pragmatists was inevitable as there was no conceptual framework or platform to enable different sides to understand each other; and as such blaming the radicals for the failure of the constitutional revolution (see Ajodani, 2003; Nategh, 2003) is a futile exercise, as it does not address the condition of possibility of emergence and persistence of radicalism.

In all of this, as Afghani (1892: 241) put it: “The dream was short-lived”. All sides had their own dreams and all dreams were short-lived. This dynamics was engulfed in the relation between universal and particular, the word and meaning (lafz va ma'na) (Ajodani, 2003: 371-2), and ultimately in the Heideggerian fourfold, theory of social phenomena, theory of language and meaning and the theory of selection from alternative social assemblages and alternative regimes of truth.

Malkam Khan’s London lecture can serve as a site where all of the above set of cluster concepts was hard at work. Malkam’s London lecture (1891) can be treated as the manifesto of his pragmatic modernist coalition. His main question was why
we are backward and the West is advanced. He activates his own discourse of decline (rather than the West’s emergent exceptionalism). He tests and refutes a series of hypotheses on the secret of the decline of Muslim world and ultimately comes to the conclusion that now that we are not pioneers we have to think about how we can become good copyists and “copy” and “imitate” (see Ansari, 2012: 65, footnote 104, for the two similar notions of akhz, adoption, and eqtebas, acquisition, in circulation in the post-constitutional era) the western model of modernity successfully (see Malkam Khan, 1891: 240).

In this lecture, Malkam demonstrates his extraordinary and rare ability to apply hermeneutics of understanding both (and especially) to the Islamic side and to the western side where he acknowledges the good intention of the western side in attempts being made to offer western technology and expertise to Iran, but was unable to extend the same treatment to the monarchy as monarchy was the incumbent side and in his particular form of situatedness he sees the incumbent as the main source of Iranian continuous experience of decline; here he implicitly sees the society as the product of will of the leaders. Here Malkam identifies the deep crisis and the issue of messianism in the Islamic world and maintains that except for polygamy there is nothing in Islam which opposes western civilization (and he refers to the issue of polygamy with which the western people are puzzled and compares it to what the Muslim people are puzzled, the west’s promiscuity in sexual relations), what seems to have evaded his sharp intellect was the state of belated inbetweenness.

Malkam (1891: 239) implicitly identifies Islam as a ‘regime of truth’ where he says that

Islam is not a religion; it is a vast system which embraces the whole society—the man from his birth to his death. There is nothing that is beyond its scope. Besides the Koran, there are traditions which are as powerful and even more respected than the Koran itself.

Malkam (1891: 241; emphases added) implicitly refers to the Muslim people’s preference structure and their demand for three forms of instrumental, communicative, and emancipative rationalities in the search for the question of why Muslim people cannot ‘copy’ the western modernity in the following terms:
The ambition and aspiration of Musselman people are not to have railways and telegraphs, or great empires, although not averse to these things in themselves; their chief object is only to serve God, to worship God, and to fight against those who do not worship Him exclusively, and to die and go to paradise. That is the only principle that governs all Mohamedan people.

He identifies the hierarchical structure of preference structure where some elements are given precedence over others. In his statement the phrases “chief object” and “although not averse to these things in themselves” capture the nature of what he perceived to be the Muslim people’s preference ordering (which he wrongly assumed to be stable and fixed). Malkam (1891:241) also alludes to the notion of ‘repugnance’ (see Ruth 2007 for Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets) and sees the animosity of the Muslims with the Christians in the difference in their corresponding theological doctrines of unity of God versus Trinity of God and divinity of Jesus:

for that reason, Mohamedan people have a great repugnance for anything which comes from Europe.

The notion of repugnance offers the dimension of affectivity and emotional economy alongside the dimensions of power and knowledge, and how they all determine “the licence to operate”. Malkam also alludes to the structure of power/knowledge in the Muslim and Shia community by noting the important feature that they do not have a formal church and the structure of authority in the Shia community is highly decentralized, and suggests the ways through which this character can enhance the process of copying from the West.

Malkam’s short lecture is rich with all the dimensions of social assemblage we addressed in the chapter on methodology. It is extremely important to note that Malkam points to how Muslim people see Europe as a threat to their faith due to the experience of crusade and their different theologies; Malkam implicitly acknowledges the fact that for Muslim people Europe associates with historical trauma of crusade and with false theology, both of which produce repugnance in them towards the West and its products (implicitly implying how all historical assemblages are immersed in their own worldhood and its associated historically
evolved dictionary and accompanying denotations and connotations, which shows the need for hermeneutics of understanding alongside hermeneutics of suspicion).

In a sense Malkam was saying that Muslims want progress and grand civilization but not at the expense of losing their beloved faith. Malkam states that that is why they do not call the western capitalists to come and develop their resources, which amounts to the rejection of foreign direct investment. This is due to the fact that for them the signifier of the West is associated with the robbery of their faith. In that sense, for Muslims it is not a good deal to do a Faustian deal with the West, to lose their soul for the sake of gaining material progress. This Malkam’s observation (1891: 242) beautifully captures what Foucault deems as the fundamental relation between the creation of wealth and the production of truth.

Alas Malkam did not have adequate theoretical resources or time to develop these insights further. He comes up with the idea that the only way to make the Muslims embrace the Western modernity is to repackage it in the name of Islam by saying to the Muslims that all of these advances were already hidden in the Islamic laws and Islamic civilization, and reminding them that they only needed to recapture their lost heritage. In a sense Malkam well understood the different denotations and connotations of signifiers such as West, Islam, Christianity, progress, freedom, equality, law and the like. He sees the proselytizing nature of Christianity as a perceived danger for the Muslim people; this was complemented with modernity’s proselytizing irreligiosity (which Malkam does not address).

He comes to the impasse: we cannot develop ourselves in the sense of becoming pioneers (for him mainly due to the oriental despotism) and we cannot copy you, the westerners, as we are traumatized by you. Malkam (1891: 143) says the Japanese managed to copy Europe as their religion was not as strong. Here he implicitly acknowledges the embeddedness and incommensurability of social phenomena, in this case the fundamental difference in the meaning and role of religion in Japan compared to Iran; which implicitly acknowledges that Iran cannot follow the path Japan travelled. What is the way out of the dilemma of not being a pioneer like England and not being a follower like Japan? His answer is simple; stop packaging modernity in the name of the West and repackage it as the lost heritage of the Muslim people themselves. Here we can understand Malkam in his own terms and act as devil’s advocate despite Ajodani (2003) and Nategh’s (2003) attacks for intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy, treating him as disgrace to the intellectuals.
For Malakam and his coalition the way out was to introduce western civilization in the garb of Islam. This is a brilliant analysis, but misses the state of belated inbetweenness and the fact of division within the Iranian selfhood, and within the clergy as well as all classes of Iranian people. Despite the fact that his analysis is severely unsustainable (despite all of his sharp observations), this lecture is a genuine analysis and he is a genuine analyst. He is innocent of almost all charges levelled against him by all sides. He refers to the point that in Islam, especially Persian version of it, there is no church (1891: 243) and sees that feature as positive compared to Europe. He perceives that the decentralized nature of the clergy can help in the process of Islamization of modernity, as some clergies can be found who could willingly endorse the bright features of modernity, like techno-scientific advances and the rule of law. He wanted to persuade the West that Islam is potentially modern and secondly, inviting them not to package their truth products in their own name, instead packaging them in the name of Islam. In the state of belated inbetweenness both of these features were subject to scathing attacks and war of attrition from all sides.

The important point is that this was Malkam’s idiosyncratic brand of project of reverse social engineering (see Taqizadeh’s and the Young Iran party’s manifestos of reverse social engineering in Ansari, 2012: 62-8), which was inevitable to the state of belatedness and was bound to fail due to lack of tri-polar forms of credibility and legitimacy, fatal but innocent immersion in the discourse of decline, and lack of attention to the significance of building capacity and consensus in the state of belated inbetweenness and failure to consistently see social orders as embebed, emergent and incommensurable social assemblages.
CHAPTER 5

THE OIL-NATIONALIZATION MOVEMENT

History 'Stephen said, 'is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake'. James Joyce, Ulysses

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to explore another case study with the parameters established in Chapter 2 and 3, which was applied to ‘the constitutional revolution’ in Chapter 4. This chapter provides a theoretical exploration of how after the demise of constitutional revolution and the transient resurgence of oriental despotism as a benevolent modernizer and its sudden collapse, occidental despotism gained prominence in becoming the new face of evil for the Iranian subjectivities in the events of Oil-Nationalization Movement (ONM henceforth). The three strong events of the last 150 years (constitutional revolution, the ONM, and the Islamic revolution) alongside numerous weak events along the way are symptomatic of the desperate attempts made by the Iranian dasein to construct a new house of being to solve the problem of discursive homelessness while facing the question of what materials should be used from what regime of truth with what logic of prioritization and precedence in the construction of the house. This chapter covers the period between the rise of Reza Shah in 1925 and beginning of the end of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 15 Khordad (June, 5) uprising of 1342 (1963).

It is worth noting that in the Oil-Nationalization era, the scenario was deceptively simple; a (supposedly) sovereign nation opted to nationalize its main natural resource in a process of popular uprising and democratic decision-making with its ensuing compensation arrangements in an age where nationalization of industries was a common practice (Abrahamian, 2001). This collective action aimed at regaining the collective ownership of the country and its resources was meant, consciously or unconsciously, to restore a sense of national pride, putting a stamp of authority and achieving real and effective sovereignty on its own affairs. This episode, in theory and on paper, should have ended in a civilized and amicable outcome for all the stakeholders, but the intersection between the ‘condition of situation’ and ‘condition of culture’ turned it into another tragic and traumatic
experience for the Iranian people and tainted the reputation and credibility of the West greatly and delegitimized the monarchy and created a sense of bitterness and disillusionment with modernity and Persianism which ultimately culminated in the emergence of the third strong event, namely Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Kinzer, 2003). This chapter attempts to uncover the dynamics of interaction of forces, voices, and faces acting as condition of possibility for the rise and fall of the ONM and its traumatic reverberations in the history of modern Iran.

5.1.1. Dreams and Interpretations alongside Trials and Judgements

The outcome of the ONM was tragic for all sides concerned in the short- or/and long-term. Tragedy is not the direct and immediate product of conscious design of a singular actor or a group of actors but an emergent and unintended consequence of the conscious and unconscious actions and interactions of many independent players in the theatre of social life. Actions and texts in their properties as sign systems (see methodology chapter) possess dream-like qualities where as in analysing and interpreting the chain of signifiers in a dream and connecting them with their meanings we need to locate the dream and its sign system in the worldhood of the dreamer and extract the clues and keys for interpreting the dream from the singular and incommensurable dictionary of the dream world of the dreamers.

As such in understanding the actions and events of the ONM our task as an interpreter of the dream is to extract the dictionaries of faces, voices, and forces involved in the rise and fall of the movement based on the internal logic of their singularities as embedded, emergent and incommensurable products of movements of social assemblages in their triple structures. One of the proximate actors and renowned historian of this event, Movahhed (1999, 2004a, 2004b), refers to it as a “confused dream of oil” (khab-e ashofteh-e naft). The notion of dream (khab) and truthful dream (ro’ya-ye sadegeh) plays a significant role in the constitution of the life world of Iranian people in this period and throughout the modern and non-modern history of Iran (Robinson, 2003: 151). In a sense, the significance attached to dream and truthfulness of dreams differentiates Iranian worldhood from alternative life worlds. The two features of dream-like nature of social assemblages (in their imaginary and symbolic dimensions) and the notion of confusion in the dream-like assemblage of Iranian social order plays significant roles in understanding the meanings and significance attached to the ONM and its tragic consequences.
In the interpretation of this confused dream it is easy to fall into the trap of
countertransference and impose analyst’s dictionary (and its own denotations and
connotations) on the dictionaries of the actors and voices and faces involved in the
unintended creation of the events associated with its rise and fall. This is what
frequently happened; the historical actors and historians have been immersed in the
dynamics of transference and counter-transference, and misunderstanding. As such,
the Iranian subject was a confused dreamer (gong-e khab dideh) and the rest of the
world deaf (a’lam tamam kar) to his actions, words, and emotions (Fischer, 2004: 1).

With regard to the dream-like nature of social orders, it is acknowledged that the
human life is wrapped in different layers of first-order, second-order, and ultimately
nth-order interpretations (see Britten et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2011); the
denotations and connotations of actions, talks, and texts need to be deciphered based
on the actors’ own accounts and the best defence and rationale which can be
constructed for them based on the logic of their own life world in the spirit of
‘devil’s advocate’. In a sense, any historiography functions as a trial in the court of
history, and the historiographer is required to launch the best defence possible for the
faces, voices, and forces involved based on the internal logic of their life worlds and
their own dictionaries in order to understand why things happened the way they did.
The nature of historiography as a court of judgment was not hidden from the
historical actors themselves in this era and they frequently resorted to the notions of
‘dadgah-e tarikh’ (the court of history) or divine court (see Rahnema, 2005).
Taqizadeh’s (Katouzian, 2003: 120-122) encounter with and response to Mosaddegh,
where Mosaddegh accused Taqizadeh of betrayal in the signing of the British-Iranian
oil contract of 1933, is an example of that awareness. Navvab, for instance, invited
Mosaddegh (Rahnema, 2005: 256) to put each other on trial.

Furthermore, Mosaddegh himself was put on military trial after the collapse of the
ONM movement- which Mosaddegh turned into a trial for the Shah’s regime
(Sahabi, 2007: 173)- and recently by new generations of activists, historians and
historiographers (for example see Mirfetros, 2011; Mojtehedzadeh, 2011;
Ghaninezhad, 2011). The military trial of Mosaddegh by the Shah is symptomatic of
every social actor putting every other actor on trial, leading to issuing verdicts and
passing judgments on others based on their own grid of intelligibility, which
culminates in misunderstanding and epistemic/physical violence. The frequent
episodes of mutual misunderstanding are endemic features of Iranian modern history
and its historiography. Mosaddegh, for instance, judges all other prime ministers as puppets of the world powers (Rahnema, 2005) or embarks on misjudging Taqizadeh, while almost all actors issued a negative judgement on Qavam (Shoukat, 2006). Thus, dreams and misinterpretations of dreams are constant feature of this hazardous and tragic period of the Iranian history.

The historical actors themselves were/are deeply aware of the judgement of the history and some of them were deeply plagued by transference, in the sense of doing things for the eyes of the historical beholders and being fearful of their brutal misjudgement. The historical actors project the next generations as their judges and try to construct a defensive wall around their reputation for the time when they cannot defend themselves after their demise; they strive to establish a good name and reputation in pursuit of their symbolic immortality, while being severely frightened of the hell of bad reputation in the court of public opinion or in the divine court. The concern for symbolic immortality, hence, is part of analytic of finitude; it is a coping strategy against the terror of death and immerses the historical actors in the dynamics of intergenerational misunderstanding, where the historical actors engage on transference and the next generations practice counter-transference. Reza Shah, for example, refers to this dynamics when he was in the process of signing a new oil contract with the British side and explicitly expressed his fear of judgement of history (Rahnema, 2005).

With reference to the concepts developed in Chapter 3, the strong events of Iranian modern history can be analysed based on the attempts (dreams) to overcome the dark sides of three regimes of truth via relying on the bright sides of the same three regimes of truth. In a sense, Iran’s modern history is a set of attempts to liberate the country and its people from three despotisms in the hope of embracing their corresponding bright alternatives in three different varieties of freedom and emancipation. In the ONM era, the turn of events put the occidental despotism as the main candidate for causing the ailments and decline of Iranian society (the discourse of decline). The identification of the chief culprit in causing the decline of the nation had moved from the occidental despotism in the first half of 19th century and after the defeats in the hands of the British and the Russians, to the oriental despotism in the constitutional revolution and after the gradual fall of the constitutional order and re-emergence of oriental despotism in the figure of Reza Shah to the religious despotism, and back to occidental despotism once again in the ONM era.
5.1.2. Reza Shah’s Dream of Persianized Modernization as Conversion of Taqizadeh’s Dream of Modernized Modernization

The message of the failure of the constitutional revolution for the modernizers like Taqizadeh was not to prompt the abandonment of the project of modernization but to pursue it by other means, this time through top-down military, benevolent, and enlightened dictatorship of Reza Shah rather than bottom-up model of the constitutional revolution (see Ansari, 2012; Abrahamian, 1982). Taqizadeh’s project of ‘modernizing the country from top to toe’ needed to be pursued by other means, through coercion; it was believed that a society of illiterate and uncultured people deeply embroiled in superstitious and supernatural quagmires was incapable of knowing their best interests and pursuing them in a set of rationally planned steps. Consequently, the society needed to be taken to the heaven of modernity by force (see Abadian, 2009a, 2009b). With the disillusioned constitutionalists (like Teymourtash, Davar and others) providing the discursive and non-discursive firepower for the project of forced modernization and reverse social engineering, Reza Shah’s mission was to complete the project of modernization triggered by the constitutional revolution. In practice, Reza Shah turned the project of authoritarian modernization designed by the modernist intelligentsia to Persianized modernization of his own (see Ansari, 2012: 78-9; Katouzian, 2010, chapter 9). In a sense, Reza Shah succeeded where Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar had failed; they both wanted to subsume the life-changing power of modernity under the larger project of Persianization.

The coalition formed by the modernists and the Persianists in the government of Reza Shah was transformed from authoritarian modernization to Persianized modernization, or as Koutuzian (2010) puts it from dictatorship to despotism. This was due to the fact that Reza Shah was driven to act, despite his initial orientation towards republicanism, within the regime of truth of Persian monarchy (Soudavar, 2003; Rajaee, 1993; Lambton, 1962), which served as the re-emerged project of Persianization.

The lack in modernity (Euben, 1999; Zaidi 2011) in constructing a sense of belonging to a national unit resulted in the reactivation of discursive and non-discursive practices associated with the regime of truth of orthodox Persianism,
which led to the Reza Shah’s Persianized modernization in order to achieve modernized Persianism. This was an inevitable outcome of a process in which with the defeat of the Reza Shah’s initial project of republicanism, the intelligentsia’s project of modernized modernization through enlightened despotism was gradually turned into Reza Shah’s project of Persianized modernization through oriental despotism. Persianism managed to hijack the top-down modernization reform movement instigated and legitimized by intelligentsia like Taqizadeh, Davar, Teymourtash and others (Abadian, 2009a, 2009b). This was partly due to the fact that the project of republicanism was defeated by the Islamic and non-Islamic elements loyal to the ideas and ideals of constitutional monarchy (Nejati, 1999) and their fear of secularism (Ansari, 2012: 78-9).

In effect, with the collapse of the constitutional revolution the modernist project of modernization was already in tatters, and with the retreat of religion into the safe ground of religious schools after the bitter experience of civil war within the religious camp, the only option left was restoration of oriental despotism and the reactivation of the regime of truth of orthodox Persianism. Modernists alone could not implement their project of modernization and had to go into fragile coalition with Islamists or Persianists to make their project practically feasible. The modernists’ coalition with the Islamists in the constitutional era to negate the Persian despotism and affirm the constitutional monarchy failed as the two main sides fought incessantly in a war of attrition to shape the new order in their own image.

In effect, after the bitter experience with modernity (in its form of constitutional monarchy) and Islam in the constitutional era, it was time for the Persianism to return as the final arbiter to save Iran from falling into anarchy. This explains why the Reza Khan’s collective modernizing dictatorship, as Katouzian (2010, chapter 9) puts it, turned into oriental despotism; such transformation was inevitable as he was acting within the bounds and parameters of Persian monarchy where the king is the shadow of God and effectively owns the whole country (Soudavar, 2003; Rajaee, 1993; Lambton, 1962). Reza Shah’s project collapsed due to the severe deficits in its modernist, Islamist and Persianist (Persian house of wisdom) credentials and legitimacies.

The whole dynamics of movement from the failure of the constitutional movement to the failure of Reza Shah’s project is indicative of the fact that in the Iranian state of
belated inbetweenness no regime of truth could single-handedly shape the new Iranian order and the infightings and discontents within and between coalitions of forces were bound to lead to the collapse of both projects.

The historical accounts demonstrate that Reza Shah’s attempts against tribalism, although brutal (Cronin, 2007; Katouzian, 2010), was largely successful but against Islam and communism enjoyed far less success. This is due to the fact tribalism was not, at the time, a powerful regime of truth on its own and was not actively and unconditionally supported by any of the three main regimes of truth in the Iranian landscape. Reza Shah’s regime can be characterized by its antagonization against religious despotism and revolutionary (communist) despotism in a coalition formed between occidental and oriental despotisms to Persianize the country through modernization, in which elements of modernization and Islamization were deployed in the services of Persianization.

5.1.3. How The Occidental Despotism Became Enemy Number One?

After Reza Shah’s fall, the monarchy lost its strategic position as the source of problem and/or the source of solution (as oriental despotism was severely weakened), and occidental despotism through the allies occupation of the country and their subsequent attempts to control Iran and its resources became once again the source of the problem. The story of why and how the West in its colonialist and imperialist incarnation (occidental despotism) was turned into the new main enemy (tazad-e asli) (Rahnama, 2005) for the Iranian dasein (after the two failed experiences of Taqizadeh’s constitutionalism and Reza Shah’s Persianism to replace the oriental and religious despotisms) is a fascinating one. The irony is that the structure of oppression already experienced with regard to Persinaism and Islam was replicated in modernity. A liberating force once again had turned into an oppressive one. Despite retaining large portion of its liberating potentials, modernity in its encounter with non-modern societies turned into occidental despotism (colonialism and imperialism) to satisfy its urgent needs for expansion into new regions in search for raw materials and for the new markets for its finished commodities, and in its general proselytizing need to conquer new physical and cultural territories (Foran, 1993, 2005).

39 The family resemblance was established between the West and Iran through Indo-European language family and the myth of common racial background in Aryanism (Marashi, 2008, 2009).
Western expansionism, as such, was a contingent attempt to overcome the limits of finitude. Western exceptionalism (Fukuyama, 2011) and expansionism (Bhaabha, 1990b) created waves of chaos in the international order and greatly eroded the credibility and reputation of the Western modernity. There was no ethical discourse or binding legal mechanism in modernity asking its agents to unilaterally practice discursive and non-discursive dimensions of liberal democracy and principles of fairness and equality in their encounter with its non-modern societies and colonized subjects. Like all regimes of truth, it possessed dark and bright dimensions; the logic of realpolitik where ‘might is right’ and domination over the alien non-modern other is the aim operated alongside a set of emancipatory ideas and discourses in science and technology, in freedom, democracy and rule of law, and in the discursive and non-discursive practices of unstoppable drive for wealth creation and socio-economic equality and justice (socialism). The ‘might is right’ approach (Redbeard, 2005) almost always relies on ‘right is might’ principle (Wetherill, 1991) in the long-run (Henkin et al., 1991) (see the methodology chapter on the topics of power and knowledge).

As such Western modernity’s exceptionalism and expansionism turned the realm of international order into a realm of occidental despotism and romantic imperialism (Makdisi, 1998) ironically in the same way that oriental despotism was practised at the national level. The lack of unified regime of truth at the national level in Iran led to the emergence of the Iranian model of final arbiter and Iranian leviathan, and the emergence of the same phenomenon at the global level led to the emergence of global model of final arbiter and global leviathan in the form of the Western imperialism or the Soviet totalitarianism. Inside the Western societies, with the emergence of a dominant regime of truth in the form of orthodox modernity, there was no need for the emergence of a final arbiter; in the realm of Western nation-states and their internal affairs, the discursive and non-discursive practices of liberal democracy was prevalent as a binding mechanism (at least in some Western and modern societies). Modernity in its British incarnation, for instance, was an angle (liberal democrat) internally and a devil (in its colonial face in India and elsewhere) externally due to the particular evolution of regimes of truth at the national and global levels.

Modernity like all social assemblages possesses the dual structure of idealism/realpolitik, politics of virtue and politics of ordinary. In encountering with
radical others, the discursive and non-discursive practices of liberal democracy and human rights would be suspended and deactivated and the expediencies and pragmatism of realpolitik would prevail. This dual structure makes any regime of truth tainted and inevitably results in loss of their ideological credibility and their moral high grounds to their oppositions.

The emergence of the ONM shows once again the demand for freeing the Iranian people from the state of semi-colonialism and a state of “state within a state” (Abrahamian, 2001), which was back on the agenda after the defeats of about 100 years ago in the hands of Russia and the British. The ONM was an act of therapy, a coping strategy evolved in order to cure the Iranian soul, mind, and body from the sense of humiliation and inferiority inflicted on them for more than a century by the forces of occidental despotism.

Despite Mosaddegh winning his battles on legal aspects of his project of nationalization of oil in the formal structures of international order (like Hague and United Nation), the West determined in resolute pursuit of its interests for the survival of ‘free world’ (Abrahamian, 2001) acted upon the principles of realpolitik and forced Mosaddegh and his ONM into submission, culminating in the West being accused of hypocrisy and double standard (Ansari, 2006). As Bhabha (1990b: 218, added emphasis) reminds us:

That ideological tension, visible in the history of the West as a despotic power, at the very moment of the birth of democracy and modernity, has not been adequately written in a contradictory and contrapuntal discourse of tradition. Unable to resolve that contradiction perhaps, the history of the West as a despotic power, a colonial power, has not been adequately written side by side with its claims to democracy and solidarity.

As such, in the state of belated inbetweenness, the people of Iran are faced with the dark and white sides of all regimes of truth side by side. The example of Mosaddegh’s ONM is a case of these three dimensions of despotism coming into conflict and ultimately occidental despotism becoming the dominant face of Western modernity for the Iranians and appearing as their main enemy. In effect, the international order immersed in the state of cold war and institutionalized via the prevalence of national democracies amongst the Western nations and prevalence of capitalism at the global scale alongside the lack or weak institutions of global
citizenship plus the internal crisis of a nation trapped in the state of belated inbetweenness led to the killing of one democracy (the Mosaddegh’s one) by a coalition of two others (the UK and the US) in front of the watchful eyes of the global community of nations, leading to the tragedy of Western democracy killing an emerging democracy in its infancy, and damaging its own reputation greatly in the process.

In the rest of this chapter we explore the fate of the ONM and its associated events through the mechanism characterized by four cluster concepts of tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order. The demand and supply dimensions of the ONM were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

5.2. TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION

In the ONM era, we encounter the permutation and multiplication of voices and strategies stemming from the creative and rhizomatic intermingling and criss-crossing of the three historical forces of Islam, the West (in its latest reincarnation for the Iranian dasein in the form of Western modernity) and Persianism. These forces (as elaborated extensively in the methodology and theoretical framework chapters) are unities in multiplicities. There are ‘differences within’ and ‘differences between’ each one of these forces and these differences are emphasized to create de-territorialisation and multiplicities or de-emphasized to create territorialisation and unities.

In the ONM era, the period between the rise of Pahlavi in 1925 and the fully-fledged emergence of political Islam as a political force in 1963/1342 (which we treat as the beginning of the end of Pahlavi dynasty), a multitude of voices and strategies emerged based on the operations of addition (affirmation) and subtraction (negation) (what the voices affirm in three axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity and what they negate in repression, disavowal and foreclosure). Voices/strategies are hybrid social recipes constituting of multiple ingredients drawn from the three sets of Islam, Persianism, and modernity with different doses and different emphases. The phenomenon which causes the state of tragedy of confusion is exactly this dynamics where hybrid voices borrow different elements from diverse regimes of truth with failed or no attempt for legitimization (alongside numerous attempts of de-legitimization).
We are faced with a continuum of voices stretching from non-orthodox modernity (communism) to social and liberal democracy and nationalism to revolutionary and radical Islamism, where the gaps in between groups and orientations were filled with bridging voices like Fatami towards the left and Bazargan towards the right. Effectively we have a continuum of voices from radical communism to radical Persianism and Islamism with different degrees of pragmatism filling the gaps in between the radical sides. Altogether, the voices as a whole map the complexities and nuances of the general and particular preference structure of Iranian \textit{dasein}. What was on offer in the market for truth reflects a range of demands signalled to the truth entrepreneurs. The immensely colourful and incredibly complex nature of the carpet of Iranian social existence charts the forces acting on and shaping its grid of intelligibility, desires, wants, likes and dislikes. Here the voices are categorized in terms of their dominant and general preference components. We have all classes of people like intellectuals, clergies, royalists, workers, women, literary figures on all sides of the continuum of voices and forces.

The following section, hence, discusses the rival regimes of truths in operation at the time via exploring the ONM through the parameters formulated so far.

\textbf{5.2.1. The Voices of Islam}

In this era, we have a multitude of Islamic voices forming around five figures: Navvab, Kashani, Boroujerdi, Behbahani, and Borgha’i (Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 2007). The voices are generated from the intermingling of Islam with orthodox and non-orthodox modernity and orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism.

In the state of belated inbetweenness, the recipes and prescriptions for social reform and social therapy of the ills of the nation were created by mixing different doses of various components of Islam, modernity and Persianism. As our methodology requires, we try to listen to their unique voices based on their own accounts, their own discourses, their own subjectivities, and their own emotional economies (motivations, passions, emotions and intentions). In the spirit of ‘devil’s advocate’ and ‘suspension of disbelief’, we supplement their own accounts with other accounts, data, and theories to produce the best possible defence of their position in order to bring to the fore the articulated and unarticulated rationalities and rationales of their positions based on the affirmative and negating dimensions of their own social assemblages.
Ultimately we try to apply Mirfetos’ (2009) principle of motherly treatment to all sides of the ONM equation without exception and without bias introduced to the analysis due to the analyst’s or historian’s favouritism (favouring one regime of truth, voice, or face over another due to the nature of the researcher’s embedded experiences in life). Ultimately, as we elaborated in the methodology chapter to understand the *daseins* we need to be both a *dasein* and a *cagito*.

The following section explores the Boroujerdi’s voice and the exploration of other voices such as Kashani’s and Navvab’s alongside the general characteristics of Islamic voices were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

### 5.2.1.1. Boroujerdi’s Voice

Ayatollah Boroujerdi (a *marja*, or source of emulation) was the custodian and captain of the ship of orthodoxy in Shia jurisprudence (Rahnema, 2005; Bayandor 2010), whose main and immediate obligation was to complete the task of reconstruction of the house of Shia jurisprudence in Iran initiated earlier in 1301/1922 by Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi, who had founded *Houzeh-ye Elmieh* (centre of religious studies) in the city of Qom.

In this period Shia jurisprudence was going through a recovery episode in its evolution after the sharp fracture in its midst, an episode amounting to almost a civil war amongst the religious jurists (*ulama*) themselves, culminating in the execution of one mojtahed (jurist) by another in the constitutional era, and the existential attacks launched by Reza Shah on Shia orthodoxy in severely restricting the number of religious schools and clerics and banning many of the core Shia rituals and symbols (like banning religious turbans and veiling alongside *Ashura* processions).

In a sense, this period is a survival period for the religious orthodoxy with the aim of retaking the lost core territories; as such Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s main aim was to preserve the centre of religious studies in Qom and to help it to educate new generation of clerics who could help to promote and propagate the teachings, institutions and rituals of religious orthodoxy in the entire country. As such, he acted as a quietist and attempted to be quite impartial and apolitical in his positions with
regard to the ONM, as he had seen initial euphoria and ultimate collapse of the constitutional revolution before. In effect he would not trust the people or the secular and religious elites and saw the ONM as another uprising, which could soon collapse under its own weight (Rahnema, 2005). He could not afford to invest his fragile social capital on a very uncertain joint venture, as his investing strategy involved a strong ‘wait-and-see’ option rather than investing his meagre capital on any particular horse. He was cautious not to make the same mistakes committed by his predecessors on both sides of the truth divide in the constitutional revolution.

It should be noted that he was worried exactly about the nature of ONM as an ambiguous and confused dream which starts with sweetness and end up in nightmare as Movahhed (1999, 2004a) put it. Alongside his immediate aim in establishing the institutions of religious studies, his long-term aim was to preserve the pillars of religiosity in the Iranian nation.

In Boroujerdi’s dictionary the real oilfield of Iran was the wells of Islamic beliefs and passions as they were the fuels of spiritual and material revival of the nation; as such, according to him, by preserving and enhancing people’s religiosity, Iran’s long-term happiness in this world and the next would be assured. His traumatic experience in Mashroteh’s disastrous outcome in Nuri’s execution, Akhond Khorasani’s regret, Ayatollah Naini’s disillusionment (Nasri, 2007) and lack of trust in long-term commitment of people made him extremely cautious. We see here how his traumatic experience in the Mashroteh era shaped his positions in the ONM era, which makes the analysis of the whole phenomenon resembling a psychoanalytic session, a cultural psychoanalysis as Shayegan (2012a) puts it.

As such, the three components of ONM, ‘oil’, ‘nationalization’ and ‘movement’ denoted and connoted differently in the dictionary of Boroujerdi’s world of signification. The long-term affirmative dimension of his voice made communism as its main enemy. For him, the forces of orthodox modernization and monarchy ranked at a lower level of risk in terms of undermining the pillars of religiosity. As such his declared aim was only to intervene in religious matters and not in the political ones. But as we will see in the following sections of this chapter in the state of belated inbetweenness, no differentiation of social spheres is possible and as such his intervention in ‘religious’ matters inevitably dragged him to his intermittent interventions in almost all realms of life from the affairs of the state, to the economy,
education, culture and entertainment. Even his passivities and silences carried their own intentional or unintentional political reverberations. In the state of belated inbetweenness, life, work and language are inevitably experienced as politics.

In summary, Boroujerdi’s main aim was to retake and expand the ethico-legal and spiritual homeland lost to the forces of modernity and Persianism in the earlier periods. Based on the configuration of forces in the context of situation the main existential enemies in this task were the forces of non-orthodox modernity (communism), Bahaism, and Kasravism (Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 2007; Nasri, 2007). Orthodox modernity and the forces of Persianism (orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism) were ranked as lesser evils (based on the principles of prioritization (Alahm falaham) and secondary rulings (ahkam-e sanavieh) in the science of Principles of Shia jurisprudence; see Mottahedeh, 2003), which could be strategically deployed to block the advancement of non-orthodox modernity and/or Bahaism and Kasravism. As such, his priority could not be material resources like oilfields (Rahnema, 2005).

It should be noted that due to the decentralized nature of Shia jurisprudence (Mir-Hosseini, 1999; Malkam Khan, 1891; Khalaji, 2011), Boroujerdi’s authority as the leader of Shia community was frequently challenged, weakened or undermined internally by other ulama in the same circles of orthodoxy in Shia jurisprudence and from the angles of political Shia Islam in its moderate and radical versions as manifested in two figures of Kashani and Navvab (Jafarian, 2007).

Boroujerdi’s hybrid voice in its affirmative and negating dimensions could be summarized as:

eternal salvation and this-worldly prosperity requires religiosity (the social utility function is defined over two worlds and two eternal and ephemeral times, in two horizons of permanence and impermanence, finitude and infinitude marked by death as the demarcation line) = the establishment of centres of religious studies (in order to educate the religious scholars who could teach people to keep and enhance their levels of religiosity= production of religious truths) + religious rituals (the sites of reproduction of religious truths on ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence and political economy)+ Shia monarchy (the Shia monarch supporting the dominance of Shia Islam in Iran) + technical modernity (in science, medicine and engineering)- communism and Marxism- Bahaism- Kasravism- political intervention of ulama- modern social vices- occupation of Muslim/Shia homeland by the alien forces.
This was Boroujerdi’s recipe for cooking the food of truths for generating happiness and prosperity, whose substance was drawn from the cookbooks of Islam, Persiansm and modernity. Accordingly, his voice was constructed out of affirmative (power, knowledge, subjectivity) and negating (repression, disavowal, and foreclosure) dimensions. His voice was constituted of the materials and the ordering he could offer at the time for constructing a house of being, a discursive homeland for the Iranian dasein. His emphases, elisions, and silences constructed the distinct nature of his voice among other Islam-centred voices (via the play of general and particular preferences in his voice).

5.2.2. The Voices of Modernity

This section aims to map the landscape of voices organized around the central and defining theme of nationalization of oil, as a project inspired by modernity. We can use the ONM as a site to explore the voices whose main affiliation was to the regime of truth of modernity, which can help us to see the map of voices committed to modernity in the Iranian state of belated inbetweeness at the time. It is important to note that the project of oil nationalization by Mosaddegh and his associates in the National Front was originally part of the larger project of modernization in the spirit of constitutionalism and the creation of a modern nation-state following the ideals of the constitutional revolution, as the establishment of modernity was deemed to require the creation of an independent nation-state. For this voice, the discursive and non-discursive practices of nationalism as manifested in the site of ONM were the prerequisite for building a constitutional government. The ONM was considered to be a site where the Iranian dasein could form and exercise its will (through collective action) and gain the ownership of the country in order to take the country back from the direct and indirect control of the British (Katouzian, 2010; Abrahamian, 2001).

As mentioned already, the fall of constitutional revolution alongside the collapse of the Reza Shah’s variant of benevolent and modernizing oriental despotism, and the severe weakness of the religious despotism (after the experience of civil war within the clerical establishment and the relentless attacks launched by the Reza Shah’s oriental despotism against the religious despotism and attempts made by him to nationalize religion), occidental despotism in the form of monopolistic control of Iranian oilfield in the south of the country by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
became the evil incarnate and the main enemy of Iran’s revival. After the retreatment of the two other perceived enemies of Iranian people (oriental and religious despotism) to their safe territories in order to lick their wounds and renew themselves, the only active enemy left on the scene was the occidental despotism. After the collapse of the constitutional movement with its big project of modernization and its three subprojects of modernized modernization, modernized Islamization, and modernized Persianization, and the collapse of Reza Shah’s big project of Persianization with its associated subprojects of Persianized modernization, Persinaized Islamization, and Persianized Persianization, the ONM had come to revive the big project of modernization with its associated subprojects through taking the occidental despotism as the main enemy. The site of the ONM was an alibi to revive the modernization project with its associated attempt to build a modern state and a modern nation.

When the force of nationalization of oil was launched different orientations attempted to take control of it and redirect it towards their own larger projects (subsume it under their own general preference). The Mosaddegh’s project of ‘nationalization in the service of modernization’ was tried to be redirected towards an alternative project of nationalization for Islamization by Fadaiyan-e Islam, nationalization in the service of communism (non-orthodox modernity) by the Tudeh Party, and nationalization for Persianization, later on, by the royal court and the monarchy, alongside the pragmatic project of economizing the ONM pursued by pragmatists like Razmara and America (both strived to empty the movement from its nationalist feelings and bestow it a pragmatic logic of economic cost-benefit analysis in the status quo of the map of Realpolitik).

This latter voice wanted to deploy the oil question in the service of turning Iran into a normal country invested with normal national interests. This was an impossible dream, as Iran was immersed in the political economy of truth and its associated identity crisis, and lacked an established regime of truth, and as such could not be treated as a normal country with a well-defined set of interests and strategic alliances.

In a sense, although the agenda for nationalization of oil was originally set by the Mosaddegh’s orthodox modernity but other regimes of truth were naturally striving to highjack it and redirect it into their own life world and put their own stamp on it
and take the leadership and ownership of it, largely through the act of appellation followed by associated discursive and non-discursive practices.

In effect, the movement was pulled and pushed in five different directions, in the process being redefined at least as five projects in one, namely Mosaddegh’s modernization project of revitalizing constitutionalism, the *Fadaiyan* project of Islamization, the Tudeh project of non-orthodox modernity, the Shah’s project of Persinaization, and the American-Razmara project of normalization (economization) all organized in opposition to the British project of preserving the status quo.

As can be seen in one movement, that is the ONM, five projects were competing with each other to define the dominant characteristics of the movement against the counter-project of keeping the control of oilfields in the hands of the British by the British government and Iranian Anglophiles like Sayyed Zia (Milania, 2011a). Mosaddegh was effectively operating inside the parameters of orthodox modernity (such as constitutionalism, liberty, democracy and rule of law) although he later on moved gradually towards non-orthodox modernity of a democratic version, social democracy rather than liberal democracy.

As for Mosaddegh’s political identity, Khalil Malaki (1998) sees him initially as a liberal democrat and criticizes him (also see Katouzian, 2013) for not caring adequately for social justice. The various components of prism of Mosaddegh’s preference structure were activated at different context of situation. This is how priming worked with regard to Mosaddegh; while he performed his religiosity in front of largely non-religious Reza Shah’s *Majlis* (de Bellaigue. 2012: 75; Nejati, 1999) he performed secularism with regard to the demands of the *Fadaiyan* for implementing the rulings of Islam (Rahnema, 2005). As can be seen, in different context of situation different element of general or particular preference ordering was activated by Mosaddegh. He was instinctively playing with the cards (discourses, power relations and affectivities) available to him to enhance his own project of reverse social engineering.

The success in implementing his ultimate goal of building a modern nation-state (of the liberal democratic colour or social democratic persuasion) required mobilization of people in mass to compel the forces of British occidental despotism into submission to the will of the nation. The will of the nation needed to materialize itself in the open for all to see. To mobilize people from all walks of life,
Mosaddegh’s social capital (Badescu and Uslaner, 2003) from his credential in orthodox modernity was severely inadequate as a way to motivate people to invest their time, energy, their heart and mind and even their lives in the service of the nationalization project.

It should be noted that as Mosaddegh’s Islamic and Shia credentials was important but negligible he needed the support of other regimes of truth in order to be able to communicate with people in convincing them to invest heavily and to stay committed to the success of project in good and bad times. That required passion and sacrifice and the active participation of religion and religious leaders in the movement. Ayatollah Kashani, who favoured the religious constitutionalism of Mashroteh era-in a sense was committed both to religion and constitutionalism-, and who had political credentials in being the political prisoner of the British forces in Iran and in his fight against the British occupation of Iraq lent support to the cause and incited the crowd in religious occasions to call for the nationalization of oil in their demonstrations and street movements (Abrahamian, 1968). Kashani was striving to deploy the religious passions and emotions in the service of the success of the project, all ultimately in the hope of a restabilising constitutional nation-state with a religious colour.

While Mosaddegh and Kashani were involved in the same project their differences were stark, contributing to the failure of the project. The difference between Kashani and Mosaddegh was in the level of commitment to religion; while Kashani was a religious pragmatist generally in favour of preserving the Shia spirit of the country, Mosaddegh put less emphasis on this dimension, while not being totally alien to these kinds of concerns as well. The accent of Mosaddegh’s constitutionalism was predominately liberal or socialist followed by traces of concern for Shia Islam, while for Kashani it was predominantly religious followed by commitment to elements of liberal and/or socialist modernity.

These two faces (alongside their associates and supporters) and their inhabiting voices were not rich enough in terms of street politics, as social capital, for invoking actual presence at the level of violent and non-violent clashes in streets, mosques, and bazars (see Sahabi, 2007 for the need for street politics in this era). The voice of Fadaiyan came to fill the gaps at this level (of the need for active street politics). In other words, they used the forces of Fadaiyan, who were persuaded by Kashani to
lend support to a largely irreligious force with strong secular outlook, in the form of several steps leading to the success of the ONM. These steps included monitoring over the elections for “the Constitutional Assembly, 16th Majlis election, and First Senate” (Kazemi, 2012) to prevent them from being rigged (Sahabi, 2007:78, 98-9; Kazemi, 2012), as well as committing assassinations of Hazhir and Razmara (Rahnema, 2005; Azimi, 1989; Abrahian, 1982; Katouzian, 2010).

The assassination of Razmara was done with the approval of the Mosaddegh’s National Front (Sahabi, 2007: 99-100) and was further supported by freeing the assassin via the intervention of the Majlis (Rahnema, 2005, Mirfetos, 2011; Mojtabahedzadeh, 2011). What Fadaiyan wanted in return was the implementation of the rulings of Shia jurisprudence after the success of the movement, which was promised to them by the main members of National Front, which was reneged later (Rahnema, 2005). In this, Fadaiyan represented the attempt to redirect the nationalization movement in favour of Islamization (Kazemi, 2012). The Fadaiyan’s attempt to Islamize the oil-nationalization movement is supported by the fact that, as Sahabi (2007: 100) reports, the National Front leaders saw Razmara as “the imminent main danger” and saw him as the agent intending to “sell Iran to England” alongside the fact that Navavb asked the National Front leaders “whether they would promise to implement the Islamic rulings after Razmara’s elimination, which they responded affirmatively”. Sahabi (2007: 100) further affirms that “the death of Razmara was very effective in the nationalization of oil [to such extent that] the oil industry was nationalized within a week [after the death of Razmara]”. The active and effective participation of Fadaiyan in the process of Majlis election (leading to the election of National Front leaders) (Sahabi, 2007: 109) and their effective attempt to remove the (perceived) obstacles towards oil nationalization (Sahabi, 2007: 123-4, 140) and their explicit deal with the National Front leaders and their subsequent rift with the National Front after National Front’s reneging of the terms of the deal (Sahabi, 124-5) demonstrates their (failed) attempts to Islamize the movement (see also Jafarian, 2007: 192-8 on a set of evidence on Fadaiyan’s attempts to Islamize the ONM). This is further evident in the assessment made by Ayatollah Taleghani (1979), one of the actors in the ONM movement, in the early days of the Islamic revolution on the tomb of Mosaddegh: “Fadaiyan-e Islam, passionate and faithful young men who opened the way and removed the obstacles, removed the first obstacle [reference to the assassination of Hazhir] and the free
election began. They removed the next obstacle [reference to the assassination of Razmara] the oil industry was nationalized in the Majlis. … What happened next? … They [the agents of colonialism …] said to Fadaiyan that you were the ones that started the movement. Fadaiyan were saying “we wanted a total Islamic government”. … Late Dr Mosaddegh said “I am neither the man of Islamic government nor want to be your ruler and prime minister forever; give me a chance to resolve the case of oil”. [In response] Fadaiyan-e Islam said “we have made a large contribution and you have to implement our demands”.

Abdekhodaei (2010) refers to the overarching tendency towards Islamization in Navvab Safavi, the leader of the Fadaiyan in the following terms: “I went to visit Navvab Safavi in the Ghasr prison and said to him “stop opposing Mosaddegh”. He said “[if] they implement Islamic rulings we will have no problems”. … Hence for Navvab Safavi, there was no difference between Mosaddegh and the shah, as both did not agree with his ideals”. Navvab’s unrelenting pursuit of Islamization project in all walks of life is fully evident in his 1953 declaration entitled “I am not a man of compromise”. Fadaiyan maintained that the aim of the ONM could be better achieved under the discipline and dedication of Islamization away from corruption and pursuit of self-interests by the secular elements; for them, true modernization, in science, technology and economy, could be achieved without the modernity’s perceived dark side in promulgation of social vices (Jafarian, 2007). For them, Islamization would automatically achieve true modernization and nationalization.

As Mosaddegh leaned towards the model of social democracy and authoritarianism, this would remind us of the other two failed voices in the process of modernization, namely, Mashroteh model of revolutionary and bottom-up modernization which led to the sudden turn of the disillusioned constitutionalists and other modernists into the top-down project of reviving oriental despotism as the means to achieve the desired end, modernization. This voice, as represented in Taqizadeh, had an ambiguous position towards the ONM; while supporting the main agenda of the ONM Taqizadeh was reluctant to lend his unconditional support to the radical spirit governing some of the strategies, tactics, and narratives adopted for achieving that aim.

Another force which could lend support to the ONM at a later stage was the voice of non-orthodox modernity. The Tudeh party initially opposed the nationalization bill,
as they sought to grant the access to the oilfields in the north of Iran to their big ideological brother and their Mecca, namely Moscow (Azadi, 2011). Later on they converted to the cause of the ONM. Through raising their class consciousness, Tudeh Party, initially acting as a national front under the leadership of socialists, was able to mobilize the people of middle class and working class in urban settings in support of the ONM. In return they attempted to redirect the country towards communism and alliance with the Soviet camp, to the extent that originally they asked for the implementation of ‘positive balance’ in bestowing the right to the use and control of the oilfields in the north of Iran to the Soviet Union in order to counter-balance the British privileges in the south and with the excuse of Mosaddegh being the American agent who was deemed to have the intention of making the new imperialist America the new master of the Iranian oilfields (Katouzian, 2010; Zabih, 1966).

They were acting in the framework of the global communist community and their commitment to the cause of international communism had priority over their commitment to particularities of the oil industry or the Iranian national interests. They used the language of ‘imperialist’, ‘capitalist’ and ‘feudalist’ as evils incarnates against the British and Americans as well as the monarchy and royal court, and the liberal and Persianist democrats. In their ideological positioning, therefore, initially they severely attacked Mosaddegh for being the puppet of the American imperialists (Zabih, 1966: 186). As for their preference structure, their global preference was for non-orthodox modernity and as such they were against all signifiers of orthodox modernity like freedom and human rights, monarchy (their original support for constitutional monarchy later turned into support for republicanism), and religion (although they were more pragmatic with regard to religion). In addition, in terms of economic policy, they were able to activate a strong dormant demand for social justice and redistribution (except in the rural areas as reported by Kazemi and Abrahamian (1978)). In effect, they were operating in the framework of global community of socialist camp against the capitalist camp.

As such it is quite understandable for Tudeh to sacrifice their national homeland and their national interests for the greater good of their ideological homeland of socialist internationalist camp. It is quite similar to Islamists giving precedence to the interests of wider Islamic community (ummah) at the cost of particular national interests. When one joins a faith community, one is obliged to prioritize the good of
the faith community over any lesser/smaller unit, whether that unit is self, family, or country.

Tudeh Party was operating within the parameters of a philosophy whose mission was to create a just society and to free mankind from the oppression of capital and its resultant structural discriminations in the form of class and income inequalities. As their purpose was noble they perceived it as even nobler to sacrifice their inherited and habitual attachments for the sake of a much bigger good, the good of mankind. Despite this, at times they zigzagged between supporting the global socialist camp in public and national interests in private (Abrahamian, 2008). Labelling them as traitors or betrayers is a clear example of misunderstanding and another case for counter-transference, as betrayal is when one disregards or acts against what one believes in, and as their global preference centred on international socialist camp, their actions and words cannot be classified as betrayal. We should not forget the fact that at the time the Leninist-Stalinist model of social change was deemed to be the fastest and most efficient and just method of modernization, something similar to Reza Shah’s benevolent modernization but this time in the socialist camp rather than in the Western camp.

Similar to the approach taken by intellectuals who supported Reza Shah, for Tudeh intellectuals the proletarian dictatorship was the most efficient method of modernization for a backward society (revolutionary leviathan) and the notions of freedom and human rights could be luxuries that backward societies could not afford alongside the fact that freedom in practice was perceived to mean the freedom for the rich and powerful (the elites of land-owners, the newly-formed industrialists and the royal court and army) and not for the poor, dispossessed or the newly formed industrial workforce. The notion and institutions of human rights were deemed to function as freedom and would have reinforced the rights of the few at the expense of the many. For them human rights and freedom could take their real meanings in a level playing field, and reaching such context required socialism.

It should be mentioned that Tudeh Party’s negative image was sealed due to their ideological support for occupation of Azerbaijan by the Soviet forces, which led to the Soviet’s ultimate withdrawal due to the Qavam’s diplomatic trick in promising the Soviet the north oil concession (Shoukat, 2006; Milani, 2011a). Their excessive attacks on Mosaddegh alongside their internal infightings over the unshakable
commitment to the Soviet and their overt support for republicanism after the first failed coup against Mosaddegh culminated in them being portrayed as the main enemy in the framework of politics of fear; fear of communism was activated and a large section of Mosaddegh’s former allies of deserted him as a result and the context became fertile for the success of second coup and the eventual collapse of the ONM project. Ultimately what created their failure in capturing Iranian imagination and social order was their perceived ideological opposition to religion. In the war of regimes of truth they would negate more than what they would affirm.

As regards to their contributions to the Iranian social order, Tudeh Party’s great influence can be seen in reviving and modernizing literature, philosophy and art in Iran and in putting the issue of social justice and social critique on the social agenda of all forces and voices (Mirsepasi, 2004). They created a space of social justice which was almost unprecedented in the history of Iran (excepts for vague traces of it in the figures of Mani and Mazdak in the Sassanid era and in the mythical reputation of Anoshirvan the Just; this ancient perception of justice was largely a kind of equality before law and not social justice in the sense of vertical mobility and the ideal of a more equal society in terms of class divisions). Thanks to the efforts of socialists-Marxists-communists, the space of social justice became so entrenched as part of national psyche with associate unshakable demand for a more equal society where monarchy and religion in their own different ways wanted to highjack this space and assimilate it under their Persianism or Islamism and embarked on appropriating it through the relevant policies and the act of naming (appellation). Their contribution made the theme of social justice the fixed element of discursive and non-discursive practices in the demand and supply side of political economy of truth.

In Tudeh Party’s radical and unshakable support for and dedication to the homeland of communism, the Soviet Union, they greatly resembled Fadaiyan-e Islam, as the Tudeh Party was the devotees of communism (Haghshenas, 2011). Katouzian (2010) affirms their genuine dedication and love for their ideological homeland Russia. It is interesting to note that this further division into orthodox and non-orthodox, and radical and moderate branches would occur in all regimes of truth alongside the segregations in terms of three levels of depth and intensity of commitment, namely, formalism, dedication, and thoughtfulness: we see these three in non-orthodox modernity as well; people like Khalil Malaki belong to the thoughtful branch.
(Katouzian, 2013), while Kianuri and others belong to the formalist branch of socialism alongside many who were dedicated devotees of it (see Behrooz, 2000).

In the camp of non-orthodox modernity, the Tudeh party represented the orthodoxy and the reformists (the voice of protest against the orthodoxy in the non-orthodox modernity), like Khalil Malaki, formed the non-orthodox branch of the non-orthodox modernity. This non-orthodox form of non-orthodox modernity formed the social democrats of the Third Force (see Poulson, 2006, 156-8). This force was distinguished by their advocacy for socialism in the framework of nationhood and not international community of socialism-communism and in their promotion of democracy and the idea of gradual change rather than sudden revolutionary and violent form of change advocated by the orthodox form of non-orthodox modernity of Tudeh Party. This voice loyally supported Mosaddegh’s ONM but criticized his passivity with regard to poverty and class divisions and lack of active agenda for redistribution of land and other resources.

In effect, while they approved the negation of occidental despotism they were highly critical of the orthodox elements in the Mosaddegh’s core alliance. Furthermore, Khalil Malaki (1998) did not have an essentialist understanding of the forces of imperialism, and saw enough bright side and internal divisions within the imperialist camp, allowing the possibility of effective dialogue with them if a unified national position could be forged (on Khalil Malaki see Mirfetros, 2011; Katouzian, 2013). This formula could offer a way out of the phenomenon of misunderstanding of the radical other (the dynamics of transference and counter-transference among historical actors themselves), but it was not adequately theorized, lacked sufficient level of social capital, and was not consistently applied to all sides of truth divide in the compound state of belated inbetweeness.

Lastly, another voice emerging through the operation of addition and subtraction was the voice of national socialism, combining the glory of Persian pre-Islamic civilization with the ideas of socialism. They supported the ONM project but their spiritual homeland was Germany and they negated other branches of socialism as well as different branches of Islam and orthodox modernity. Alongside these voices we encountered the voice of anglophiles like Vosuq-al-Douleh (in the case of 1919 agreement with Britain) and Sayed Zia who supported the close alliance between
Iran and Great Britain (Milani, 2011; Azimi, 2008). As Kia (1998: 35, note 63) reports:

Vosuq od-Dowle was the prime minister responsible for signing the famous 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement which caused the eruption of anti-British and nationalistic feelings in Iran. He, therefore, had a reputation for being an anglophil and an ardent supporter of a close alliance between Iran and Great Britain.

5.2.3. The Voices of Persianism

This section explores the voices affiliated to orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism, through which we briefly address the voice of monarchy and leave out the voices of the institution of vizier (the voice of Persian statecraft enshrined in faces like Qavam or Foroughi) and the voice of non-orthodox Persianism due to word limitations.

As regards to Orthodox Persianism or Monarchy, in this era we see the presence of Persianism at different levels (Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005). Regarding the voice of the orthodox Persianism (monarchy), the Shah’s position was eerily similar to the position of the king of religiosity, Boroujerdi. The two kingdoms of Iranian history, Persian kingdom and religious kingdom, were both on the retreat and unsure of themselves and in desperate attempts to strengthen their niche markets. Both of their kingdoms suffered severe damages and as such they went for the option of wait-and-see rather than actively committing to one or the other side; the Shah was trying to act based on the principle of positive balance, the principle where the weak tries to keep almost all powerful sides happy by giving them the impression that he is with them. The Shah nominated the Tudeh Party and National Front as two enemies of Iran and in the meeting with the British Ambassador declared the latter as more dangerous in terms of the ambiguity of its demands and its negating dimensions (Rahnema, 2005: 522-3). The details of the Shah’s position can be seen in the following sections.

5.2.4. Summary Remarks

As the preceding discussion identifies, the site of oil nationalization was, in a sense, turned into a battleground in the political economy of truth. The question was how the issue of oil needed to be approached; how was it to be mediated through alternative regimes of truth, what could have priority over what? The specificity of
oil and its various knowledge/power structures was immersed in a larger framework of the warring regimes of truth battling to gain the right to become Iranian embeddedness. In other words, nationalisation of oil was a microcosm around which various socio-political powers and their associated regime of truths battled for dominance and supremacy.

Once again the inability in production of truth hampered the production of wealth as Foucault maintains. The question revolved around what was going to act as the main truth-production factory. Iranians once again were called to choose the condition of possibility of their own choices in the guise of the ONM project. In this categorization, the general preference, which gives unity to a voice and differentiates it from any other, was different for different voices and faces. The priorities were different for different social assemblages, creating a spectrum of preferences over what could take precedence over what, when things come into conflict with each other. It was not clear whether the protection of faith (emancipative rationality over the fear of death) needed to take precedence over the protection of national sovereignty (communicative rationality) and how they could both be harmonized with the pure economic logic of cost-benefit analysis and the logic of realpolitik (instrumental rationality), as each voice attached different denotations and connotations to the signifiers such as oil, independence, national unity, economic well-being, people, the shah, the clergy, the foreign powers and the like, and was filled with different fears, hopes, and dreams, and emotional economies.

The narrative-strategy associated with progress was competing with the narrative-strategy of preservation of spiritual homeland and both with the establishment of autonomous constitutional nation-state and all with joining the global camp of socialism. The pragmatic and radical voices and cultural tribes affiliated with each regime of truth were fighting within and between each other relentlessly over discursive and socio-cultural territories and loyalties. In this, silence and fear, alongside disavowal and repression, played significant roles in this period on all sides, in what they did and said privately and publicly (as in the fear of Anglophiles and economizers and pragmatists on the nationalist modernist side; and on the religious side on the repression of voice and action of Fadaiyan by Boroujerdi’s orthodoxy). The working of repression was evident in the behaviour of Boroujerdi, for instance, and his followers against the Fadaiyan’s discontent from within.
In this process, due to the state of belatedness, we witness the social body being permeated with the politics of silence and how silence reflects ambiguity and holding one’s options open rather than investing on one entrepreneurial project or another; in terms of portfolio management Boroujerdi and his camp were opting to keep their options open. On the other hand, Abrahamian (2008: 111) reports on the politics of secrecy and silence in the case of the Tudeh Party in the following terms:

Bullard [the British ambassador] reported that many Tudeh leaders had privately informed the prime minister that they opposed the Soviet demand and instead supported the official policy of postponing all oil negotiations until after the war.

Here we see the phenomenon of polyvocality in the Tudeh Party members, breaking the assumed rule of one man one voice (Tizro, 2011), where they publicly supported their ideological mecca and privately their thoughts and feelings were with the nationalist independence approach. This is alongside the fact that Soleiman Mirza Eskandari, the Tudeh Party leader, “was well-known for his strict observance of religious duties” (Katouzian, 2010: 234). Abrahamian (2008: 111) refers to this state of confusion amongst the Tudeh Party members in the following terms:

Iraj Iskandari later revealed that the Tudeh leaders had publicly supported the Azerbajian and Kurdish Democratic Parties for the sake of socialist solidarity with the Soviet Union, but privately they had remained “bewildered,” “surprised,” and “shocked.” They had even sent a protest letter to the Soviet Communist Party. One leader wrote to Moscow insinuating that the whole disastrous scheme had been cooked up by local leaders in Baku to further their own “personal interests and dictates” against both Iran and the Soviet Union.

Here we see the state of how Iranian subjects suffer from discursive homelessness. They were unable to construct a coherent voice out of contradictory materials from warring regimes of truth. As such, they were driven to resort to the politics of silence or politics of disavowal and two-facedness. The sentence Boroujerdi said to Mosaddegh is very telling in wishing success for Mosaddegh where he “accords precedence to the strengthening of Islam and then Muslim affairs” (Jafarian, 2007). The confusion was over what should be given precedence to what and why.

In effect, while in Mashroteh era the purpose was to take the people back from the absolute power of monarchy, in the ONM era the purpose was to take the country
back from the occidental despotism, in both cases with the larger affirmative purpose of establishing a constitutional order. While in the constitutional era modernity was tried to be adopted through antagonistic opposition to the oriental despotism, in the ONM era modernity was tried to be appropriated through antagonistic opposition to the occidental despotism; in the period in between the two, Reza Shah attempted to adopt modernity within the parameters of orthodox Persianism through antagonistic opposition to religious despotism, tribal despotism, and revolutionary despotism of non-orthodox modernity (communism).

In the ONM era, we face a spectrum of positions and voices from the British one to Mosaddegh’s, Tudeh’s, and Fadaian’s Islamic one, and in the middle Razmara, Qavam, the Shah, Kashani, Boroujerdi, Sayed Zia, Baqa’i and many others. These are the names of positions and voices, like the hybrid voice of Razmara who had constructed a middle-way position, a hybrid strategy-narrative of a win-win option; but his discourse was infuriating for the majority and was poorly theorized. The hyper-complex nature of the proliferation of these voices and their resonances for the Iranian dasein was at the heart of the tragedy of confusion in this era. Once again, Iranian subject was in the position of Sophie’ choice in the concentration camp of the state of belated inbetweeness.

5.3. UNSTABLE COALITIONS

*Dr. Mosaddegh you are taking us to the hell but we will go with you to the hell.* Khalil Malaki (Katouzian, 1981: 36)

In the ONM era, we face coalitions, which are quickly formed and dissolved between faces inhabited by voices, which were the outcomes of the combination of forces. The tragedy of confusion led to formation of unstable coalitions. In the state of belatedness coalitions were needed to form collective will and actions in order to implement projects of reverse social engineering to combat the grand issue of backwardness. Formation of coalitions was a coping strategy to organize and mobilize voices and faces into forces for social change. As such, the Iranian social space became littered with multitude of unstable coalitions in this era. The voices were formed through the operation of addition and subtraction applied on different components of the three regimes of truth and their internal divisions between orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, radicalism and pragmatism. These voices inhabited faces through the trajectories and singularities of particular biographies and
genealogies. The vectoral interaction (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 33) between different forces, voices, and faces generated events (such as 30th of Tir, 14th of Azar, 4th of Khordad, 9th of Esfand, 28th of Mordad), which shaped the fate of the country in this era (Rahnema, 2005; Mirfetros, 2011).

This section aims to show that the warring regimes of truths, which were competing to shape the characteristics of Iranian embeddedness or to act as Iranian embeddedness, produced social assemblages and entities (whether individuals or groups, organizations or institutions), which were themselves the outcomes of unstable coalitions between different components of these three regimes of truth. This population of social assemblages (themselves as unstable social coalitions) formed successive waves of new unstable coalitions with each other to achieve negating and affirmative aims in their radical or pragmatic projects of Persianization, Islamization, and modernization. Each face is characterized by the particularity of its inhabiting voice and its internal preference ordering with its general and particular components (the notion of preference orderings was used in Rahnema, 2005: 475 and in page 528 of the same reference the notion of the difference in taste or ekhtelaf-e saligeh is the code for difference in the general and particular components of the preference structure and their ordering). Each face is named through the particularity of its thrownness or embeddedness; for individuals this process works through their familial affiliations and for the groups and organizations or institutions through the particular context of culture in which they emerge.

The line of argument in this section is deceptively simple. We show over a set of defining events how unstable coalitions were formed around the negation of an ‘evil other’, what Rahnema (2005) calls the main conflict or tazad-e asli. In the process of opposing the evil other, they go through a fairly short honeymoon period (Rahnema, 2005: 112) and then they disintegrate at the affirmative phase of social movements. Events such as ‘30th of Tir’ or even ‘28th of Mordad’ coup were the coalescing point and product of the interaction between several broad forms of coalitions. In the process of coalition formation, everyone courted everyone else but at an affirmative dimension there was no stability.

As if the algorithm of the Iranian social order was as follows: ‘antagonize and polarize, form a strong coalition, defeat the antagonized opposition and start infighting, find another instantiation of polarization and eliminate another evil other;
and iterate this process until the total collapse of the order and its disintegration into ungovernable components; in such states resort to a final arbiter and save the order from chaos and disintegration; repeat the same cycle’. To counter the process of disintegration the iron fist of the benevolent dictator, the despotic Mosaddegh, Shah, Khomeini is needed to act as the final arbiter and Iranian leviathan to stop the psychotic process of total disintegration. Alongside this iron fist of order, what holds the order together is exactly what makes it slide towards the state of ungovernability, namely, Islam, Persianism and the West, as manifested for instance in Ashura rituals, Persian language and Nowrouz, and insatiable desire for material progress, social justice, and consumerism.

The examination of these events shows that the process of coalition formation and disintegration occurs at incredibly fast speed within and between social assemblages. The constant and drastic change occurs within and between social assemblages (individuals or collectivities), for instance, inside Fadaiyan (coalition formation and disintegration in Navvab and in Fadaiyan), in Kashani and Mujahedeen-e Islam, Mosaddegh and National Front, Baghaei and the Workers’ Party, Khalil Malaki and Tudeh Party, the Shah and royal court, Sayed Zia and his party, Qavam and his party, just to name a few. In this process every class of people can be seen in all sides. Merchants, intelligentsia, clergy, royalists, ordinary people, and women can be identified on the religious, royalist or modernist camps. The state of inbetweenness in its intersection with the state of belatedness creates fleeting coalitions and divisions within and between different social assemblages. We cannot find stable organizations and fronts based on clearly defined ideologies and/or interests. We see clerics against clerics, thugs against thugs, workers against workers, intellectuals against intellectuals, middle class against middle class, women against women (see Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 2007) and selves against selves.

We can identify the role of middlemen in creating a continuous and compact social space. These middlemen were the opposites of missing links; they were connecting links and bridging social capital, hooking the favourable sides of the people from opposing camps together. In this process of intermingling, attempts were made by alternative regimes of truth to antagonize the social space (based on binary oppositions such as good against evil, modern against tradition, Persian versus foreign), which created a chaotic phase, which then moved to a (apparently) stable phase where one kind of cultural tribe dominated and then ultimately it reveals its
deep problems by being toppled or severely challenged and de-legitimized in a constant war of attrition.

Change in coalition structure would occur either through the drastic change in general preference or the reordering of the components of particular preference. An example for the change in general preference is Hakamizadeh who was the son of a grand ayatollah and moved to Kasravi’s side (Ridgeon, 2006: 22) and the example of change in particular preference is the change in Mosaddegh’s position from being a liberal democrat to a social democrat at a general level (Sahabi, 2007: 149), and at a more situated level from his performance in the Reza Shah’s assembly for changing the Qajar dynasty as a firm believer in the Quran (de Bellaigue, 2012: 75; Nejati, 1999) to his kissing of Queen Sorya’s hands (which was referred to by Fadaiyan as a signifier of his transgression from the codes of Islamic behaviour; different contexts of situation primed different components of the preference ordering) (Mirfetros, 2011). What we see at this era is the degeneration of any and every coalition at an individual (individual as a coalition of selves) or collective levels into its constituent parts. The process of generation of strife, divisions, and subdivisions progresses at an astonishing speed and rate in all groups and assemblages of any colour or persuasion, from the religious to the modernist and Persianist.

Here we have a complex sets of forces, voices, and faces interacting at a bewildering pace of taking positions, forming coalition, changing positions and forming new coalitions, and changing sides and colours, voices and sides at an incredible speed, resembling something like “speed dating”. Kashani dates Mosaddegh and Tudeh and even Anglophiles (while he was a known dissident in the occupation period and was in British prison for 23 months) like Sayyed Zia and then changes side and dates with the royal court (Sahabi, 2007; Rahnema, 2005). Mosaddegh has allies like Kashani who connects him to Islamic circles of different shades of colour and at the same time is in close alliance with people like Fatami who has close friendship with the Tudeh Party (Sahabi, 2007). The same is true with Boroujerdi who through Falsafi and Behbehani was connected to the Shah’s circle and ends up sending a telegram to the Shah for his return to the country after the success of the coup (Movahhed, 2004a: 154; Sahabi, 2007: 161; Jafarian, 2007: 197). Thus, the voices and faces were spread on a continuum creating a network of connections where we see in these connections the map of Iranian preference structure unfolding.
If subjectivity is a fold, social reality is an unfold and manifests map of the set of connections formed in the Iranian mind. Mind and reality are two manifestations of the immersion in the two states of inbetweenness and belatedness at two different scales. Social reality is the map of the mind which through these interconnections reveals that there is no discontinuity in the Iranian preference structure and in Iranian social reality, and that is why no stable set of coalitions can form, and antagonization (as a strategy for the creation of coalitions) does not work in the long run. If there is any lasting antagonism it is the conflict of self with itself in itself for itself. And Critchley’s (2010: 4) saying that individual is ‘dividual’ holds more fully than anything for the Iranian assemblages in this era.

We have coalitions of Navvab-Kashani-Mosadegh form which Navvab and Kashani were insiders in the religious circles as part of the religious family, and that is why they could go to Boroujerdi’s house and protest and moan and plea for help while Mosaddegh’s circle did not have similar access to this social capital in the same way that Fadaiyan did. Fadaiyan-e Islam could provoke the sympathy of young religious students (Montazeri, 2001) and put immense pressure on Boroujerdi’s circle; while seculars could negotiate with Boroujerdi they could not wrap their demands in religious performatives and rituals. Navvab and Kashani, in this sense were part of the religious language community and their internal dialogue of the religious kingdom and part of their discursive and non-discursive practices, which creates the dysfunctional network of Boroujerdi-Kashani-Navvab.

We have the coalition of Navvab-Kashani-Mosadegh, which after a while is trimmed into Kashani-Mosaddegh one, until its total dissolution into opposite coalitions (Sahabi, 2007: 155). These processes create a continuum between religious and nationalist modernist camps with the bridging figures like Kashani who could move in both camps in Majlis and in religious circles. Then we have Mosaddegh-Fatami coalition and the loose coalition of Fatami-Tudeh, which creates a continuum from religious space (the dominant regime of truth in bazar) to the space of orthodox modernity (liberal democracy and constitutionalism among students and in Majlis and formal institutions) and to the non-orthodox modernity.

There is no clear-cut distinction in terms of group affiliations and identity markers. Then we have Mosaddegh-Fatami-monarchy connections and the connections between National Front, nationalist socialists, social democrats, liberal democrats.
and religious socialists. The three regimes of truth were interwoven in this way through coalitions within and between individuals and assemblages. All faces from Navvab-Kashani to Haerizadeh-Makki (nationalist modernists) to Tudeh and Sayed Zia (anglophiles) participated (see Rahnema, 2005: 126 on Sayyed Zia-Tudeh-Kashani-Mosaddegh coalition) in the anti-Hazhir coalition (and in anti-despotism coalition of journalists). The role of middlemen like Makki, Rafie, Ashrafi was crucial in creating links between different leaders and different realms. Mehdi Mirashrafi acted as a middle man who had loyalty and sympathy to both sides, to Kashani and the Shah and the national Front people like Baghaee, Makki or Fatami (Rahnema, 2005); these middlemen figures acting as bridges were extremely important as they turned the space of Iranian social life into a ‘continuum’ rather than a ‘discrete space of unities’ endowed with fixed identities playing a game of cooperation or competition with each other.

Due to the demands of the state of belated inbetweenness, coalitions are suppliers of truth (truth entrepreneurs) and collective actions, and instigate and advertise their truth products to create and sustain adequate demand for their own products. The Buddhists, for instance, were not part of the truth supply chain at the time as there was no tangible demand for their products in the Iranian embeddedness. And the extreme fascist group such as Sumka were tiny in comparison due to the low demand for their brand of supply, based on the principle of revealed preference. We have five names as signifiers of various voices: the Shah, Mosaddegh, Kashani, Navvab and Boroujerdi; almost all of these figures had to lead a coalition while attempting to be a national figure of unity over and above all forms of factionalism; the state of belated inbetweenness creates such a paradoxical state. We also encounter an organization, namely, Tudeh Party, and an external coalition of Anglo-American alliance, which with their associate groups and societies and countries shaped the destiny of Iranian in this era. The fire of antagonization ultimately engulfed Mosaddegh, Navab and Kashani in itself, until the revival of oriental despotism in coalition with occidental despotism extinguishing it only temporarily and redirecting it towards religious despotism and revolutionary despotism of non-orthodox modernity.

In the following section we briefly explore the features of the Shah coalition as an example of instability of coalition formation in the ONM era.
5.3.1. The Shah Coalition in the ONM Era

The Shah was a complex social assemblage constituted of the institution of kingship alongside the personal figure of Mohammad Reza as a particular person with a particular biography (see Milani, 2011a; Afkhami, 2009). In this era, the institution of kingdom was composed of the royal court (Persian institution of vizier and its associated house of wisdom, manifested in the figure of Hazhir or Qavam), the army (manifested in Razmara, for instance), the conservative clergy (manifested in the figure of Ayatollah Behbehani), and Anglo-American alliance (the Shah owed his reign to the powerful external forces from whom he would frequently seek advice (Rahnema, 2005: 667)). The person of king himself was a relational being constituted of his family and his individual self, as an unstable coalition between Persianism, modernity (largely orthodox and partly non-orthodox modernity), and Islam (his personal affiliation to the dream of being protected by infallible occult Imam or in the case of especial prayer of protection being read in his ears by Hasan Imami whenever he was going to long trips (Rahnema, 2005: 607), and the case of his mother’s religiosity as opposed to his father’s fierce secularism; Islam had potent (largely unconscious) presence in his life world whether he wanted or not) (see Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005).

After the death of his father, his family, who were the source of tension in this period, was composed of queen mother, his twin sister Ashraf, and his brothers. The order of precedence in his preference structure was from Persianism to modernity and Islam. In most of this period, there were strategic differences between the Shah’s wildly fluctuating positions and the position of the institution of kingship as these difference existed between any leader and his institutional affiliates, close associates and coalition members; in Mosaddegh’s case this was between him and the National Front, equally prevalent in the cases of Kashani’s, Navvab’s, and Boroujerdi’s circles as well.

There were multiple layers of schism and division inside the core royalist coalition between the Shah and the institution of vizier in the tension between the Shah and Hazhir, the Shah and Razmara, and the Shah and Qavam in 30th of Tir. The Shah had tension inside his own family with his big sister and his mother and brothers (see Rahnema, 2005: 595-6 on anti-Mosaddegh coalition incorporating queen mother, Ashraf and the opposition deputies; Mosaddegh complained about the activities of
Ashraf and had the Shah send her into exile in the West). The Shah had disagreements with conservative clerics in the events of 9th of Esfand 1331 (1952) when he wanted to leave the country for a self-imposed exile while Behbehani and his associates in the form of the men of street (thugs) opposed it. The Shah was, most of the time, non-complaint or hesitant towards the advice given by his foreign masters. The Shah was dividual in his subjectivity as Mosaddegh was in his; the modern sensibility in his subjectivity, for instance, was awakened towards the end of Mosaddegh era where he had fully accepted to act as a constitutional king (Rahnema, 2005).

The Shah’s coalition was, composed of layers of internal divisions, unified around the ancient institution of kingship and the figure of the king. The Shah was seen and made to act as the figure-head in the coalition of oriental and occidental (democratic) despotisms and a thin layer of religious despotism against the religious despotism of political Islam in pragmatic and pious versions and the irreligious and undemocratic despotism of non-orthodox modernity (communism) and the anti-colonialist despotism of radical orthodox modernity (Mosaddegh’s coalition) with its constant resort to direct democracy (later on deemed as an example of Mosaddegh’s populism).

The institution of kingship, the royal court (darbar) and their leading figures (such as Hazhir) were largely against the movements for free and fair election and nationalization of oil industry, while anglophiles like Sayyed Zia were sometimes with and other times against the movements (Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005). We witness the presence of ambiguous figures like Qavam in the institution of vizier who initially became national hero for his use of shrewd diplomacy to free Azerbaijan from the Soviet occupation during the occupation of the country by the allies forces during the World War II and later on was turned into a villain due to his harsh and uncompromising stance against the ONM project (Shoukat, 2006). In a sense, Qavam antagonized the antagonizers, and took a radical uncompromising stance against the radicals, in order to solve the issue of disorder arising from the ONM (Rahnema, 2005: 658). This was a paradoxical position where he was launching waves of radical pragmatism regarding one set of players (the external powers) and currents of pragmatic radicalism with regard to another set of actors (the internal pro-ONM coalition). He was attempting to reach a compromise with the external powers at the cost of antagonizing the internal pro-ONM coalition.
The Shah did not favour Qavam as he was too powerful of a figure for him to be able to handle and only agreed to nominate him for prime ministership to get rid of Mosaddegh who was asking for the control of ministry of war. The Shah had been fearful of Razmara as well due to his immense power in the army and his general persona as the next strong man who was deemed to be likely to conduct a coup and abolish the Pahlavi dynasty altogether and establish a new one in his own name (Abadian, 2011). Razmara was almost a universally hated figure as all sides had grudges against him including his Anglo-American allies who were not content with his lack of firm opposition to the demands of the ONM. Later on towards the end of Mosaddegh’s era, the Shah’s position was in sharp contrast to his minister of royal court, Ala (Rahnema, 2005:896). While Ala was an active member of anti-Mosaddegh coalition the Shah was favouring the support for Mosaddegh and was coming to an agreement with the Mosaddegh’s vision of the Shah as a proper constitutional king.

In this period while the Shah was turning into Mosaddegh (Rahnema (2005: 896) maintains that Mosaddegh had managed to awaken the Shah’s internal Mosaddegh), the chaotic nature of social order was awakening the shah in Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh was increasingly turning or was perceived to be turning, even by his close allies like Kashani and his close friends and aids like Haerizadeh and Makki, into an unconstitutional shah himself (Sahabi, 2007; Mirfetros, 2011). In these moments of Iranian history, we could clearly see another example of how the liquid state of belated inbetweenness was manifesting itself in the make-up of the institution of selfhood, revealing individuals as dividuals and as unstable coalitions.

The Shah’s aim throughout this period was to protect and prolong his kingship but after the disgraced fall of his father from power (his forced abdication with the consent of his former foreign allies (Katouzian, 2010)), the institution of kingship was severely weakened and its bad reputation as the seat of oriental despotism greatly enhanced. The legitimacy of the institution of monarchy was severely under question and the watchful eyes of the civil society were on him in order to prevent him from becoming another cruel despot like his father. He could not trust anybody and nobody could trust him. He could not even trust his Anglo-American allies who had forced his father to abdicate and put him on the crown; as they could conceivably do the same to him and they had put him on probation (Milani, 2011a). His position was precarious; his best option after the severe damage being inflicted
on the credibility and reputation of the monarchy was for him to retreat to the safe
ground of royal court in order to rebuild it as a viable force again.

He could not afford to commit himself irreversibly to a particular side at the expense
of alienating others. He had to remain promiscuous. He was effectively an investor
in a turbulent market for truth and as such he was trying to diversify his portfolio to
generate a balance between risk and reward. That is why he was extremely hesitant
and indecisive in his decisions and actions (Milani, 2011: 176, 224, 298). The Shah
was not in a stable coalition with almost any side including himself. There was a
conflict between Mosaddegh and the Shah over the ministry of war (Rahnema, 2005:
648-9), where the Shah could not trust Mosaddegh and Mosaddegh had to remind
the Shah of his oath of allegiance to the Shah in the 14th Majlis (Mirfetos, 2011).
The Shah’s original position was to govern in the framework of the constitution and
avoid bloodshed (Rahnema, 2005: 668; Milani, 2011a: 103-4) and he mistrusted the
British while the British were advising him not to strictly adhere to the terms of the
constitution (Milani, 2011a: 142), which was a clear case of occidental despotism.
The Shah resisted the pressure put on him by the Americans and the British
(Rahnema, 2005: 669). His best option was a wait-and-see policy quite similar to
Boroujerdi’s one.

They were two kings whose kingdoms suffered severe blows from the past course of
events and both were trying to rebuild their kingdoms. But the negative side of the
wait-and-see policy is that it exacerbates the climate of mistrust, and makes all sides
suspicious of him and discontent with his silences and inactions (which could for
them have the echo of conspiring behind the scene). For instance, the Shah paid the
ultimate price for his silences, inactions, indecisions and hesitancies by carrying the
ultimate responsibility for the massacre of 30th of Tir (Rahnema, 2005: 670-1).
Silence, hesitancy and inaction have their own high prices especially in the state of
belated inbetweenness. In that climate of mistrust and inaction, towards the end of
Mosaddegh era he came to see Mosaddegh as the only viable option for managing
Iran, as Rahnema (2005: 648) reports, and started to turn to Mosaddegh’s side and
ignored the demands of the British at the exact time when Mosaddegh was becoming
more suspicious of the conspiratorial Shah and his deceiving royal court (as the Shah
and his court were moving in opposite directions and Mosaddegh was not
theoretically aware of such internal inconsistencies within the royal camp). When the
Shah was zigzagging in one direction Mosaddegh was zigzagging in the opposite direction.

While the Shah had taken steps to meet Mosaddegh’s demands regarding the Shah’s family’s interferences, and the need for the royal lands to be transferred to the government (Rahnema, 2005: 939), Mosaddegh had lost his trust of the Shah after the events of 9th of Esfand 1331 (Rahnema, 2005: 940), which led to Mosaddegh’s avoidance of meeting the Shah (Rahnema: 839), which in turn left the Shah’s ears, as a battleground, vacant for others to ‘pray’ in. In the state of belated inbetweenness, middlemen of all sides can suddenly, in an example of butterfly effect, change the direction of movement of their leaders. The leaders are led by their followers; as they are the product of state of belated inbetweenness they have receptivity towards diverse forms of forces and voices; we witness the same phenomenon with regard to Khomeini in the Islamic Republic.

After the success of 30th Tir uprising for the pro-ONM coalition, the royalist clerics (Behbehani and associates) started to mobilize their resources against Kashani and the coalition of Kashani-Mosaddegh (Rahnema, 2005: 605) and in a strategic move activated the demand for the implementation of second article of the constitution calling for the presence of five mojtabahids in Majlis to monitor and ensure the Islamic character of the laws passed (Rahnema, 2005: 606); this is the part of the constitution which was actively forgotten by the whole system including the Kashani-Mosaddegh coalition. The second article was the white elephant in the room for the constitutionalists as well as the clergy. This once again reminds us of the incomplete contract nature of the laws passed at any level. The faithful implementation of the law (see Tizro, 2011; Aghion and Holden, 2011) requires a society-wide consensus, which requires settling down of the fundamental debates and the convergence of ideas and life styles or achieving consensus on how to agree to disagree, both of which were impossible in the state of belated inbetweenness. This confirms the observation made later by Shams Ghanatabadi (Rahnema, 2005) on how the constitution was used as a wax to serve the aims and interests of different groups. The proper use of law requires a stable embeddedness where the supply of truth is homogenized and unified under a universally legitimate master signifier, like Islam, communism, liberal democracy and the like.
Here the conservative clerics suddenly realized that by activating the second article they had a chance to block the advance of Mosaddegh-Kashani coalition in Majlis. The state of belated inbetweeness is at the heart of the enigma of rule of law on the question of why in Iran, despite more than one hundred years of struggle for constitutionalism, rule of law cannot be achieved in practice. The theory of incomplete contract and bounded rationality can help us to understand it deeper (see Ginsburg, 2013: 41, 192; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009: 5). We can see the hybrid nature of the pro-monarchy clerics in striving to strategically combine Islam and monarchy against Tudeh Party and communism. They saw communism as the main enemy and as such naturally their narratives and strategies differed drastically from the pro-Mosaddegh, pro-ONM coalition.

The decentralized nature of the clergy would allow different groups of clerics to join different side of the truth divide in Iran. In the ONM era some clerics would join the Ksahni-Navvab camp of political Islam, while others would stick to the isolationism of Boroujerdi, still others would join Mosaddegh’s side of constitutional nationalism, and still others would join the pro-monarchy coalition, and many move between these camps nomadically depending on the latest configuration of forces, voices, and faces (like Navvab who moved from pro-ONM to anti-Mosaddegh and Boroujerdi-type isolationism). A coalition between old and experienced politicians such as Qavam, Majlis deputies, and conservative clerics who did not see the Western colonial powers as the main enemy was formed against the Mosaddegh-Kashani alliance; and their antagonism was directed against anti-religiosity of communism (Rahnema, 2005: 614). The decentralized nature of the clergy would allow the conservative clerics like Behbahani and Falsafi to ask the Shah for a severe attack on Tudeh Party (Rahnema, 2005: 607) or to act against Mosaddegh without the Shah’s or Borouhjerdi’s knowledge or agreement; in the latter stages of the Mosaddegh’s rule they formed a loose coalition with Kashani against Mosaddegh, while they were bitter enemies early on.

While the Shah was converging towards Mosaddegh’s position through another middleman, Qa’em Maqam-e Rafi’ as the link between Mosaddegh and the Shah (Rahnema, 2005: 900, 941), who had sympathy with the slogan of Ham Shah Ham Mosadegh, both Shah and Mosaddegh, (Rahnema, 2005: 904), the components of institution of kingdom (royal court, the army, the pro-monarchy clerics and their Anglo-American allies) were busy plotting against Mosaddegh via organizing coups.
against his government three times, in Mehr 1331 (Rahnama, 2005: 695), 25\textsuperscript{th} of Mordad 1332, and 28\textsuperscript{th} of Mordad 1332, the third of which succeeded in overthrowing Mosaddegh’s government and returning the Shah from exile back to his thrown.

Zahedi was the reincarnation of Razmara, another figure from the army who had significant impact on the course of events in this era. While early on in the Mosaddegh camp, he later on became the focal point of anti-Mosaddegh campaign; he activated the discourse of the threat of regime change and the dangers of communism to coalesce all anti-Mosaddegh forces around himself (Rahnema, 2005: 695). Kashani, formerly in the camps of anti-oriental and anti-occidental forms of despotism, joined his former enemies, pro-monarchy clerics like Behbahani and Falsafi, through some middlemen (Rahnema, 2005: 755) to finally overthrow Mosaddegh’s government. Kashani changed sides both due to the growing power of the Tudeh Party (and the looming spectre of communism, which prompted a shift in his priorities in a butter-fly effect) and due to his perception of Mosaddegh increasingly turning into an authoritarian figure (Abrahamian, 1982: 274).

A set of tactics were deployed by the anti-Mosaddegh coalition to undermine, weaken, and delegitimize his government. One of the tactics used by the plotting coalition was the creation of manufactured crisis through kidnapping and murdering of some key members of the Mosaddegh’s government (Rahnema, 2005: 914-5). The group in charge of creation of violent episodes were largely formed of retired army officers who were equivalent to a kind of Fadaiyan-e Islam in reverse; they were Fadaiyan-e Shah, the devotees of the Shah. Mosaddegh’s coalition’s implicit or explicit endorsement of the use of terror and assassinations against Hazhir and Razmara (Mirfetros, 2011) was coming back to haunt him and his government. As pro-Mosaddegh coalition used violence to remove obstacles towards their ‘legitimate’ aims, pro-monarchy, anti-communism coalition was using the same tools to remove the obstacles from the pursuit of the aims they deemed legitimate and justifiable. They were creating skirmishes in the provinces (Rahnema, 2005: 911-3) to project an atmosphere of insecurity, whereupon they could activate the discourse of the need for security and the discourse of patriotism highlighting the dangers of Iran’s disintegration and collapse, and falling prey to communism (Rahnema, 2005: 931-3).
There were middlemen like Khatibi (Rahnema, 2005: 914) and Rashidiyan (Rahnema, 2005: 819) who connected Baqa’i (and his Toiler’s Party) and the British with the Shah in order to attract the Shah’s support for the coup. The Shah could be hooked to different coalitions through different middlemen as he had soft spots (local preference) for almost all of them. Almost all voices had resonances for the Shah and for all others (all of whom were the product of the state of inbetweenness) as Kashani could be hooked to Tudeh Party or America, or the British (for example through Sayyed Zia) and the same with Mosaddegh and the clergy. The Shah, for instance, in conversation with Khalil Malaki said ‘I am a socialist’ and Khalil Malaki replied but socialism is against monarchy (Amirkhosravi, 1996: 185-6).

Another tactic they deployed was waging a psychological war through the spread of rumours (Rahnema, 2005: 920); the climate was ripe for all kinds of rumours and activating different scenarios on, for example, the murder of Afshartous, Mosaddegh’s chief of police force. They spread rumours in the free media (Rahnema, 2005: 933) as a tool to delegitimize the Mosaddegh’s side largely through activating the discourse of falling into the camp of Iron Curtain (Rahnema, 2005: 935). The show of strength by Tudeh Party in 30th of Khordad and the holding of referendum by Mosaddegh to dissolve the Majlis were effectively used to substantiate these forms of propaganda (Rahnema, 2005: 936).

Alongside these, Mosaddegh with his transgressions provided great alibi for the coup coalition; de-legitimization of Mosaddegh’s government could be achieved by reference to the bill of national security, maintaining of martial law (hokomat-e nezami), alongside the gaining of emergency powers and separation of ballots in the referendum (Rahnema, 2005: 971-2). They also activated the discourses of dangers of Bahais alongside the dangers Tudeh Party (threat to the institution of property rights and the ownership of land) inciting Boroujerdi into action (Rahnema, 2005: 996). The Shah activated the discourse of resort to Islam against Tudeh Party (Abrahamian, 1982), which shows the Shah’s inevitable promiscuity and lakkategi.

In a small project involving the collaboration between Behbehani and his circle and the British Embassy to intensify the politics of fear of communism, they managed to produce a book called “The Guardians of magic and myth (Negahbanan-e sehr va afsoon)” and broadly disseminated it amongst the people and dropped it in the house of many top clerics. This book was against, religion, religious taboos and the clergy,
in the name of the Tudeh Party, enticing people to take revenge of “these guardians of magic and myth” namely the clergy, taking advantage of the previous episodes in which the Tudeh Party gatherings threatened a clergy-less future (Sahabi, 2007: 162).

In the final coup, Behbehani activated his men of street (thugs) (Rahnema, 2005: 950) in the service of coup’s street actions. The anti-Mosaddegh coup had propaganda wing as well as the street wing. The irony is that some members of Fadaian-e Islam (Va’hedi and his circle) had joined the coalition with ultranationalist parties like Arya and Sumka (Rahnema, 2005: 1014; Jafarian, 2007) while Nabvab, Fadaian’s leader, was adopting Boroujerdi’s position of impartiality and cultural isolationism. While Fadaian were involved in the assassinations of two pro-monarchy elements (Hazhir and Razmara) and an anti-religion pro-Reza Shah thinker (Kasravai) and were catalyst in the rise and manifestation of popular feelings against the pro-monarchy forces through the generation of climate of fear and martyrdom (Sahabi, 2007; Jafarian, 2007), this time they joined the opposite side and were inadvertently and indirectly instrumental in overthrowing their former allies. Overall, this section demonstrated how and why the Shah and his coalition were zigzagging between alternative forces, voices, and faces.

5.3.2. Remarks on the Instability in the Shah and His Coalition

Ultimately, the Shah’s move from a constitutional monarch to the coup leader damaged his reputation and legitimacy greatly, leading to the collapse of his dynasty in the Islamic Revolution. The Shah, however, was driven to act as the final arbiter and his contradictory positions in promising to act as a constitutional monarch and reneging on it (Milani, 2011a) can be resolved, in the spirit of devil’s advocate via constructing the best possible defence of the Shah’s position, in the following way: the Shah was bound to renege on the promise of being a constitutional monarch as Iran was immersed in a turbulent market for truth where no language game including the language game of constitutional monarchy had been consensually legitimized. The constitutionalism was a new game in town and was frequently used just as a strategic ploy in the hands of various historical actors rather than a consensual framework establishing the rules of the games of life, work, and language.
What the Shah was doing in declaring allegiance to the rule of law in theory while undermining it in practice was what almost everybody else was doing as well. Almost all players were activating and deactivating constitutionalism (and other discourses like martyrdom) when and where suited them best. They were allowed to play games with constitutionalism exactly because it was a new game in town and there was no deep and unshackle consensus on its parameters and how it needed to be played. Nobody could play games with Ashura or Nowrouz that easily as they were deeply entrenched and disrespect towards them or violation of their terms would incite strong sense of public outrage, repugnance and abhorrence. The widespread public repugnance in the case of violations is the main sign of the entrenchment of a language game and its main enforcement mechanism.

Ghanatabadi’s observation is extremely significant when he complains about how the constitution was treated as a wax in the hands of people to turn it in whatever shape and direction they desired (Rahnema, 2005: 862). This is related to the incomplete contract nature of the constitution and how the law is activated and deactivated depending on the spirit of time, like the example of the second article and its total abandonment and reactivation by Behbehani and his circle to serve their transient purposes. When there is no historical consensus on the nature of fundamental laws, their sources, their dominant spirit and their direction of evolution, constitution becomes a tool in the hands of historical actors and at every era the constitution becomes a battleground for alternative faces and voices over the rights and obligations of various figures and institutions, and their boundaries become a matter for deep theoretical and pragmatic disputes. In the context of belated inbetweenness constitution or any other form of laws cannot act as ‘binding mechanisms’ and can encourage opportunistic behaviour in the light of bounded rationality and the inevitable gap between ex ante and ex post eventualities (see Forte and D’Amico, 2007: 300; Furubotn and Richter, 2005: 411).

As the constitution becomes reshaped in the image of different forces and voices, it loses its credibility and legitimacy as a binding commitment device, which then permeates into the whole realm of law and the principle of rule of law. This is an important point of conflict and discontent in the modern history of Iran: the mechanical resort to the principle of rule of law without settling the fundamental disputes on the big questions of life and the state of inbetweenness where alternative regimes of truth offer contradictory truths regarding those big questions. As such,
law lacks the condition of possibility of emergence as a credible and mutually binding commitment device for all sides involved in the political economy of truth. Even the Shah’s Western allies were strategically activating and deactivating the discourse of being a constitutional monarch depending on the context of situation (Milani, 2011a: 142); the British could not easily activate and deactivate the principles of constitutionalism at home in the British context due to the long and entrenched tradition of constitutionalism. When there is no consensus on a set of discourses, the actors activate and deactivate them strategically which leads to instability, acting as a barrier to conflict resolution (see Arrow, 1995).

The reason why the Shah behaved the way he behaved is as follows. From outset, the Shah felt under siege from all sides, effectively facing the same problem as Nasir-al-Din Shah, where “the "cannonballs of sedition" were destined to rain on his "castle of mirrors" (Amanat, 1997: 152). Rival figures from the army like Razmara or Zahedi or strong figures from the institution of vizier like Qavam could gather adequate support and momentum to topple him the way his father toppled the weak Ahmad Shah Qajar; he could not trust his masters (Western allies) as they could easily replace him with a better alternative as they did with regard to his father and as they frequently indicated to him that he was on probation (Milani, 2011a: 104); the spectre of republicanism was hovering over the country; Islamists and Tudeh Party were fancying entirely different models of political governance. These series of existential threats alongside immense pressure and expectation directed at him by the royal court and society at large (the big Other), demanding him to act according to the parameters of a proper Persian king would inevitably drive him to act as the final arbiter (this dynamics of big Other is implicitly attested by Bahar, as reported in Katouzian, 2013: 186, when he says that “as soon as a strong man appears, he is surrounded by a few ‘tramps’ who would” invite him to act as a Persian king).

As such, it was quite rational for the Shah to express his fear about “the end of all regimes of constitutional monarchy” and frustration that “It was … “impossible to be a constitutional ruler” in Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 124). Ironically the answer he received from the British ambassador that “A dictatorship was also impossible” (Milani, 2011a: 124) was also true, showing the long-run non-viability of any form of final arbiter in the state of belated inbetweenness. It was inevitable that the Shah’s ‘public’ belief in “democracy and rule of law” (Milani, 2011a: 103) would come into conflict with his ‘private’ belief in the role of a “powerful king” in the progress of
Iran (Milani, 2011a: 103). We notice here how in the state of belated inbetweenness the gap between public and private views re-emerges as a structural property time and again (see Kuran, 1995 on how this gap leads to sudden changes like revolutions).

The irreconcilable differences between and within truth camps in the state of belated inbetweenness makes the rise and fall of final arbiters, and the constant threats of collapse, inevitable. In the state of belated inbetweenness “the consent of the governed” (Milani, 2001a: 107) cannot be formed in any stable manner, making democratic governance impossible alongside making “dictatorship” and “constitutional monarchy” equally impossible. This was true with Reza Shah, who initially wanted to establish a republic, and was made to be an enlightened despot through being in a coalition with the modernists who wanted him to act as a modern benevolent dictator, ultimately becoming an oriental despot through being a Persian king, and Khomeini who wanted to delegate the political power and authority and act only as a monitor and keep the clergy from the executive branch of state, ending up in suggesting and embodying the theory of absolute authority of Faqih.

We extensively explored the formation of seven salient unstable coalitions which were instrumental in the formation of collective actions in the ONM era; these explorations were excluded from this work due to word limitations. It is important to note that the social life at the time was littered with multitude of unstable coalition in all realms of life, work, and language and these seven unstable coalitions are the most salient ones and are given as examples of a general trend towards the formation of unstable coalition in this era. These seven social assemblages are Mosaddegh’s coalition, Kashani’s coalition, Boroujerdi’s coalition, Navvab’s coalition, the Shah’s coalition, the Tudeh coalition, and the Anglo-American coalition.

5.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

As stated by North (1990, 2005), institutions make life predictable and stable, as they establish the rules of the game in different realms of work, life and language. Institutions such as money, language, market, court, family, state and church- as Hayek (1988) alongside Sugden (1989) and Heiner (1989) theorize them- are the spontaneous and unintended product of evolutionary processes (see also Backhaus, 2005; Thelen, 2004).
With this theoretical background in mind we need to note that the question in this era revolved around how Iran could move from the state of belatedness (backwardness) to the state of progress, which required building new institutions. The answer was deemed to be simple as Taqizadeh and Rasoulzadeh declared in Kaveh magazine (Katouzian, 2003, Abadian, 2009b; Ansari, 2012). They stated that the blueprints and recipes for building such institutions were already ready for us; the Westerners had done the hard work of inventing all of them; we just needed to import them, adopt them faithfully and implement them. The blueprints for a modern army, modern economy, modern family, modern polity, modern security forces, modern education system, modern bureaucracy were there, we just needed to adopt them by sending people to learn them from the Western countries or inviting their experts to teach us. In these set of institutions, some gave priority to the realm of polity, some to the economy (such as Davar) and others to education, army or legality. Having the minimum human capital for progress required the founding of schools, polytechnics and universities, and it was assumed that following such measures Iran could be on its way toward total modernization. The same prescriptions were issued for the design of other institutions.

There were only two small problems with this model of catching-up and theory of selection where one already has easy access to the modern perfect recipes, which only needed to be implemented. Firstly, this was a case of reverse social engineering, which totally violates the condition of possibility for the emergence of stable social institutions, which has to be achieved through an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization and the work of vanishing mediators. Secondly, it is intimately relates to two other regimes of truth in the Iranian embeddedness that have claims into the right to shape Iranian life world and to furnish it with institutions. The dispute was over the logic of substitution and complementarity and the logic of subsumption.

All three projects aimed to modernize (to actualize the will-to-progress), while subsuming it in different larger projects, one through ‘assurance of the right-to-eternal-happiness’, the other through the ‘right-to-restore-ancient-glories’ and the third through the ‘right-to-temporal-pleasures’. What is common to all these projects is that all of them are unconsciously engulfed in the modern spirit of Cartesian social engineering, a logic of change and a theory of selection where the society is refurnished with new institutions by intelligent design. This spirit of reverse social
engineering sweeping the developing countries was due to immersion in the state of belatedness. The chief engineer has been an Islamist, a Persianist, or a modernist. The state of belatedness and catching-up prompts all sides into the act of reverse social engineering as opposed to evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization manifested in gradualism, enfranchisement, and negotiation between different regimes of truth, different layers of time and space, and their associated voices and faces.

As such, the main problem with building institutions in this era resided in misguided theory of social phenomena and inadequate theory of selection from alternative civilizations and cultures. The rare example of institutional success in this period is the successful management of the case of Azerbaijan through the shrewd diplomatic movements of Qavam in collaboration with religious and secular elites in Majlis and religious circles outside of it to save the country from an enormous crisis (Shoukat, 2006). Other successful cases include the change of calendar, standardization of weights and measures, establishing the institution of family names and obligation to obtain birth certificates, and compulsory military conscription in the Reza Shah period (Ansari, 2012: 77). These success contrasts with the institutional failure of nationalization of oil. Other examples of the emergence of new and/or (relatively) stable institution are the emergence of modern poetry (she’r-e nou) or poetic modernity in the language of Karimi-Hakkak (1989, 2012; see also Karimi-Ḥakkak and Talattof, 2004) alongside the rituals of Nowrouz and Ashura. In this era, remaking a community in the form of a nation-state was basically deemed to be an engineering project, resembling the construction of an airport or a stadium. In other words, remaking society or social assemblages was deemed to be a construction kind of project; this urge for reverse social engineering happens when societies encounter an alternative truth package, which inspires people to demolish the old order and replace it with a ready-made one with a well-defined set of blueprints.

In contrast in the pioneering countries, when there was no such a ready-made alternative an organic process of gradual emergence of bits and pieces of new order was at work; encountering with a whole new alternative turns social change into an engineering project. We face two types of change, engineering one versus evolutionary one. This shows why encountering Islam or any other invader was not an engineering project for rather a gradual process of bringing all components together in a process of trial and error, blind watchmaking and chaotic
synchronisation, like the process of emergence and spread of universities, modern family, new sexualities, voting systems, constitutional monarchy, emergence of cinema in the Western world. In the case of the institution of cinema, for instance, it started from an embryonic stage, which in interaction with other components of society evolved gradually in a process of blind watchmaking; the same process of gradual change happened with regard to the emergence and evolution of highways, for instance. The society went through gradual process of capacity and consensus building.

In the case of developing countries, the dynamic of situation (being thrown in a state of belatedness and catching-up) gave rise to the emergence of social engineering (or conscious watchmaking) as the dominant approach in making new societies and building new nation-states and their associated institutions. The application of the logic of reverse social engineering in a state of inbetweenness and in its interaction with the state of belatedness culminates in the construction of deformed and dysfunctional institutions, which in the word of Davar, one of the architects of modern legal systems in Iran (Mohammadi, 2008), is referred to as “dying young” or “javanmarg shodan” (Abadian, 2009b: 34). The womb of Iranian dasein mis-carries any program, any forms of life or any institutions at any colour, which is not blessed with tri-polar form of legitimacy.

In the following section the dysfunctionalities and deformities experienced in the realm of institutionalization of social virtues and vices in the ONM era is briefly explored as an example of institutional failure arising due to the tragedy of confusion and formation of unstable coalitions.

5.4.1. The Institutionalization of Social Vices in the ONM Era

The site of social vices is one of the leading microcosms in the battle of regimes of truth to conquer the terrain of morality and act as the only supplier of truth about the nature of virtue and vice and institutionalize them. The topic of enjoining to virtues and preventing from vices (amr-e be maroof va nahy-e az monkar) is one of the central topics in Islam (re-emerging throughout the modern history of Iran as one of the main concerns of religious people against modernity; see Najmabadi, 1987). Persianism has also a famous ethical advice inviting people to “good thought, good talk, good deed” (Farazmand, 2009: 36) while modernity is deemed to be equivalent to advocacy for the ethic of citizenship while lacking strong moral commandments
and commitment aimed at attainment of moral excellence and is deemed to be tantamount to advocacy for permissive society (see Larmore, 1996: 74; Srigley, 2011: 78; for the notion of “moral poverty of modernity” see Sevenhuijsen, 1998: 18 and for the notion of “moral blindness” of liquid modernity see Bauman and Donskis, 2013). The demand for truth about the nature of virtue and vice revolves around “What is virtue? What is vice?” And “How can we effectively eradicate (or reduce) the vice and promote the virtue among a people?”

Different regimes of truth offer different conceptions of vice and virtue and how they manifest themselves in the social order. In a long process of philosophical, cultural, and social evolution, modernity baptized many of the traditional vices into virtues while creating its own set of new vices and virtues. The two main old vices of greed and lust were baptized by Mandeville (and Smith and others) and de Sade (Shapiro, 1993). Other vices such as drinking alcohol or gambling were decriminalized and gradually became part of fabric of permissive society (Collins, 2007). Modernity in large part valorises the pleasures of the flesh and celebrates almost all physically non-harmful forms of exciting the body. Through the fundamental change in the philosophy of life and death, beginning and the end, the material and the spiritual modernity revolutionized the system of values and made many of the old vices as new virtues and vice versa (see Israel, 2001). It changed the balance between the permanence and the impermanence, the ephemeral and the eternal, the body and the soul.

Modernity drastically reversed the traditional hierarchy invested in these binary oppositions in favour of the body, the ephemeral and the impermanence (see Blackburn, 2004 for the life-affirming property of lust in the modern imagination). Modernity has created its own set of social vices such as poverty, illiteracy, infant mortality, unemployment, inflation, child labour, domestic violence, and recently smoking, obesity, aging, and even death itself. At its heart, modernity disdains pain, decay, death, and whatever detrimental to the pleasures of the body and mind and whatever harmful to the survival and health of the body and mind, which is institutionally constructed as vices.

The open and unrepentant celebration of human sexuality and the relentless and unashamed pursuit of self-interest (Force, 2003; Rogers, 1997) alongside almost total evaporation of the discourse of chastity and service to people, pursuit of moral
excellence, godliness, and the intimate relation with the sacred were amongst the biggest shocks for the Iranian life world. Iranian people may have been as materialistic or as lustful as any other nation but their ideal model of existence had always condemned these ways of existence and treated them as immoral and leading to the loss of their eternal happiness.

This duality between preference and meta-preference, between action and the value system allowed people to always have the possibility of genuine repentance, even in the last minutes before death, which would reconnect them with the realm of the eternal. Throughout their sinful lives they would never step out of their regime of truth, they had only occupied one of its categories “the sinner”. Modernity revolutionized the vocabulary of vice and virtue and gradually the category of sinner was eliminated from the public discourse. For Iranian dasein modernity with its new vocabulary, while has plenty of positive resonances in its new set of vices and in its praise of wealth-creation and its ability to promote science and technology, prohibits the possibility of collective access to the truth about the realm of gods and how it relates to the realm of mortals in everyday existence. It vanished the highway between the sky and the earth as it turned the sky into another form of the earth and transformed the sky, as the realm of supernatural, into an illusion or at best an entertaining fiction. This was a prohibitively expensive price to pay for the Iranian dasein to attain modernity (see Milani, 2004).

The Western dasein had internalized and developed a sense of ownership towards modernity and its new set of vices and virtues; they had actively participated in its creation at different levels through their philosophers, their politicians and their civil wars and active participation in societies, groups, cults and new religious denominations. Modernity was the outcome of an evolutionary process of blind watchmaking; it spontaneously emerged out of intermingling of ideas and blood in a long and gradual process of embedded emergence. Even large and sudden changes like revolutions occurred inside a larger framework of gradual and internalized change. When Iranian dasein encountered modernity as an almost finished product in the 19th century and more fully throughout 20th century, it had not severed or even loosened its connections with the eternal and with its deep mythical history.

The encounter with modernity was not an encounter with an embedded entity; it was an encounter with a piece of real. As such Iranian embedded womb was not ready to
receive the seeds of modernity; it wanted something from modernity, for example its constitutionalism and rule of law which for the Iranian dasein echoed constraining man’s arbitrariness (slavery to whims) through God’s rule and as such could relate to it and try to appropriate it as religious constitutionalists tried to do, but they could hardly find resonance for modernity’s reverse value system. No human order beforehand defended and praised and worshiped the pleasures of the flesh so openly, so wholeheartedly, and so unashamedly (Wilson, 2008: 268).

They could not fathom the piety of unbelief (Caputo, 1997; Fraser, 2002; Buckner and Statler, 2005); they could not relate to the story of how in the history of the West, when oppression, exploitation and demonic values had captured the kingdom of god, spirituality, and truth in the Medieval Europe, the truth had to flee from the realm of religion and free itself from the shackles of untruth by migrating to the realm of untrue. For the Western dasein truth was now working in the guise of traditional untrue while untrue was residing in the traditional realm of truth, affirming the fragility of goodness. Modernity for Western dasein was a liberation movement freeing mankind from the shackles of oppressive kingdom of divine. In this instantiation of modernity, life is nothing but the pursuit of self-interest and pleasure of the flesh and, as Foucault (1977: 30) phrased it, “the soul is the prison of the body”.

That long experience and that long escape to freedom were not replicated in the experience of Iranian dasein. The encounter with modernity was through cultural invasion, material intervention and the act of social engineering. As such modernity in its permissive value system was a totally misplaced and alien entity for the Iranian dasein. This led to the operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truths. Iranian dasein wanted modernity in its science and technology and maybe in its constitutionalism without its permissive value system. People like Taqizadeh (see Katouzian, 2013; Ansari, 2012) frequently condemned what they called as pseudo-modernism of Iranian society, in immersion in what they treated as superficial and immoral aspects of modernity (modernity’s politics of ordinary). In a sense they wanted freedom without freedom, good freedom without bad freedom. They wanted Islam without superstition and religious despotism and intolerance and they wanted Persianism without its oriental despotism. In a sense they wanted modernity without modernity, Islam without Islam and Persianism without Persianism. They wanted to travel ‘with modernity against modernity’, ‘with Islam
against Islam’, and ‘with Persianism against Persianism’, alongside applying the white book of each against the black book of the other.

They were applying the values of Islam on modern freedom (while the main claim of modernity was a set of new truths about good and bad, virtue and vice; the notion of good and bad themselves were being challenged and replaced, bad with good and good with bad) and were turning them into Islamic freedom and they were applying the values of modernity on Islam and turning it into modern Islam (while for the finished modernity the whole of religion was nothing but superstition, and for Islam the whole point of religion was opening the horizon of supernatural and miraculous to the material world of animal kingdom; for Islam the whole project of modernity in its obsession with the material and the embodiment and the pleasures of the flesh was the biggest illusion ever in the history of mankind; man was from God and was returning to God and anything denying this fact was the biggest betrayal to mankind and “the” biggest crime against humanity; the crime of modernity was killing human soul while as Foucault (1977) said the mission of modernity was to free the body from the prison of soul) and they were applying the values of modernity to Persianism and declaring it despotic while it perceived itself as being gifted with the divine grace.

A deep series of philosophical work was needed to contemplate on the contradictions and inconsistencies of such a rhizomatic demand involving the intermixing of competing systems of values and philosophies. It could have been invented in a long process of evolutionary philosophization but Iranian dasein never seriously attempted it due to the impatience of the state of belatedness. Many positions emerged from radical modernity to radical Islamism and radical Persianism and numerous pragmatic hybridization of the three sets, each carrying their own inconsistencies and contradictions and each totalizing its own truth into the one and only truth (different ideologies of radicalism versus different ideologies of pragmatism as the work of imaginary order). In this context, the ONM era witnessed the battle over the site of virtue and vice.

One of the sites where the battle over social vices occurred in the Mosaddegh government was the bill of banning the production, distribution and consumption of alcoholic drinks (Rahnema, 2005: 482-8; Shoukat, 2006: 308-10). The demand for the bill was created through sending petitions, letters, and telegrams to the
government and Majlis by the religious circles in the country. The supply side prompted the demand for its own product through the act of marketing; like all businesses, the clergy who were in the business of production of truths promoted the demand for their own products. In their attempts to create a favourable atmosphere for banning of alcohol to put pressure on the government and the deputies in Majlis, Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Shariatmadari in a letter to a Majlis deputy asks for the banning of alcohol and calls alcohol the mother of all evils and Ayatollah Sadr asks for religious punishment of lashing to be applied to the transgressors (Shoukat, 2006: 309-10).

There were no public disputes about the principle of categorization of drinking alcohol as a social vice. Kazemi, the minister of economy, summarized this consensus in the phrase that “there is no difference of opinion on the principle itself” (Rahnema, 2005: 488, Shoukat, 2006: 311). This bill was used to reaffirm the fragile coalition between National Front and Kashani. The supporters of the bill reactivated a number of discourses on the evilness of drinking alcohol from the embedded archive, a set of discourses ranging from the role of alcohol in the promotion of crime, sexually transmitted diseases, health, moral decadence and opposition to religious teachings. These discourses were activated by the secular members of the National Front as well as the clerical deputies (Rahnema, 2005: 482-8, Shoukat, 2006: 308-10). The alternative discourses activated by the opposition to the bill revolved around its impracticality in the process of implementation as it opposed the habits of people and could even harm religiosity of the people as it could lead to the increase in the underground consumption of alcohol, its adverse effects on the tax revenue (which Mosaddegh was desperately in need of due to the confrontation with the British on the oil front) and on jobs and employment (Rahnema, 2005: 483).

Here none of the opposition could openly object the validity of the theoretical claims on the viciousness of drinking alcohol; their opposition revolved around practical considerations. Hazhir, one of the outwardly non-religious prime ministers, had already banned alcoholic drinks in the three religious cities of Mashhad, Qom and Ray while leaving it free in other cities (Jafarian, 2007: 194; footnote 2; Rahnema, 2005: 466). Here the non-religious were accepting the legitimacy and potency of the religious discourse by applying it in three cities. The immediate question raised was why not to extend the ban to all other cities; if it is banned in the Quran it is banned for all Muslims in all cities not only for ultra-religious cities; this was the position of
Fadaiyan-e Islam who wanted to use the site of alcohol consumption (alongside other social vices like gambling, films and women’s veiling; see Fadaee, 2012) to promote their own project of reverse social engineering, namely, Islamization (see Jafarian 2007 on their passionate manifesto for the Islamization of the country).

This clearly demonstrates that in this realm the religious discourse of Shia jurisprudence had monopolized the supply of truths about the nature of relation between man and alcohol. In the market for discourses about social vices the Islamic discourse was the incumbent one which was setting the agenda for debate and public policy as compared to the issues relevant to the establishment of parliamentary democracy where modernity was the incumbent regime of truth and was setting the agenda and the other regimes of truth had to challenge or moderate the incumbent to find a niche for themselves in the market. This demonstrates how the traditional division between secular and religious categories does not strictly apply to people in the state of belated inbetweenness, as they have nomadic identities and float between boundaries of regimes of truth. Kashani, a top religious leader, activates the discourses of constitutionalism and secular deputies and secular government ministers use the religious language on viciousness of alcohol; people are multilingual in the state of belated inbetweenness where, depending on the context of situation, they may shift from speaking in the language of religion to the language and vocabularies of modernity or the language of Persian poetry or Persian rituals and civilization or Persian mythology.

Similar phenomenon was witnessed in the age of the Islamic Republic where Akhavi (1983: 209) observes that “Principled coalitions, in the sense of group adherence to an internally consistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify”. Selves were unstable coalitions. This is why the criticism levied by Shoukat (2006: 310) on the secular politicians about their deviance from the secular language and secular program is misplaced as the secular regime of truth in Iran did not have a viable, sound, and widely accepted discourse on the nature of good and evil, virtue and vice. Iranian people were not divided into clearly demarcated and distinguished communities of all-or-nothing type of identities. It was not politicians’ fault; the Iranian embeddedness in its philosophical and theoretical capacity did not even begin to address the fundamental questions on the pleasures of the flesh and their opposition or association with the pleasures of the soul. Behind the religious circle in Majlis were Ayatollahs and a long tradition of religious reasoning and long tradition
of Persian poetry celebrating purity of love; nothing much was there in terms of theoretical legacy and heritage behind the secular deputies to equip them with alternative discourse on the nature of alcohol and its relation to body, soul, permanence and impermanence, this world and the next.

As religious circles had nothing substantial on parliamentary democracy the secular circles had nothing much on the nature of virtue (maroof) and vice (monkar) distinct from the religious or Persian epistemes. The politicians are only the passive agents of the historical embeddedness; they only play with the cards available to them (Billig, 1995). This is also a great example of how the Foucauldian chain of statements, discourses, discursive formation, archive, and episteme works in practice. Even those who were monarchist, like Farrokh (Rahnema, 2005: 483), had to disguise or reformulate their opposition to the bill in the name of its unintended adverse effects on the level of religiosity of people (this is the level of discursive formation). He could not say that the promotion of people’s religiosity should not be the purpose of public policy or claim that the right to drink alcohol at a moderate scale is the right of every rational Iranian. In this context, the discursive formation was the total adherence to God’s commandment in the Quran on the banning of alcohol in the Islamic society (as mentioned in the Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s letter, Shoukat, 2006: 309).

One of the themes emerged in the site of demand and supply of the bill for banning alcohol was the strategic use of this bill by Kashani and his circle to pursue their political aims (the politicization of the bill). Rahnema (2005: 467-8) questions the sincerity of Kashani and his circle in the case of apparent contradiction in his behaviour; when he was in opposition he passionately activated the demand for the bill for banning alcohol to be passed in Majlis and then implemented without delay but when he was in power he chose to quietly ignore the bill and let it fall out of Majlis agenda. Kashani and his circle seem to have activated and deactivated the discourse of social vices at will. They launched and silenced the discursive missiles in the service of their strategic interests. Here again we see the false duality between knowledge and power and the application of intentional fallacy. The apparent inconsistency in the position of Kashani can be removed by applying the principle of devil’s advocate and the charitable application of hermeneutics of understanding and the careful application of hermeneutics of suspicion in revealing the affirmative and negating dimension of his social assemblage and its unintended consequences.
If we listen to Kashani faithfully, we hear that he mentioned in many contexts that what was significant for him was taking charge of the ship of social order as its pilot; when he was the pilot he could assure its long-term direction towards Islam-based order and he could afford to suspend the actual implementation of Islamic rulings regarding alcohol based on the principle of expediency inherent in the topic of secondary rulings in Shia *fiqh* as well as the principle of prioritization (*al-aham-fal-aham*), indicating that the more significant issues should be given priority over the less important ones. But when he was out of power and in opposition, the pilot of the ship was someone else who could not assure the long-term direction of the ship towards Islam-based outcome and as such he activates the discourses of the social vices to mobilize his core supporters and his cultural tribe in order to take the leadership of the ship and capture the centre.

The discourse of social vices, or any other discourse, has two different functions in and out of power. This applies to almost all social assemblages. The West activates the discourse of human rights against the regimes which are not its allies and deactivates it in favour of the regimes which are its allies. There is a logic behind it and it is related to the long-term direction of the ship of international order. Mosaddegh himself famously activated the discourse of the evilness of the demand for emergency powers and its oppositions to the principles of the constitution and deactivated the same discourse when he himself was in power (Sahabi, 2007; Rahnema, 2005). This applies to almost all social assemblages at micro, meso (family, organizations), or macro (societies and states) levels. The demand for banning social vices far outweighed the single issue of alcoholic drinks. Fadaiyan (Jafarian, 2007: 217-8) and Kashani (Rahnema, 2005: 141, 467, 285) had a long list of social vices including prostitution, dance clubs, gambling, women working in public offices, abortion, drug consumption, non-religious education, broadcasting music from the national radio, and many more. Mosaddegh was forced to abolish music from radio in the month of Ramadan due to the incessant pressure from various corners (Rahnema, 2005: 481).

Even Kasravi (1946) (a famous historian and supporter of Reza Shah’s modernization project) severely criticized the blind adoption of Western mode of free intermixing of the sexes in the name of girls being exploited by the devious men who only had one thing in mind in their relation with women. The constant unease with social vices and the difficulty in finding viable and stable way of coping with
them created constant fluctuations between the positions of banning and toleration, which in turn gave rise to dysfunctional sets of institutions in charge of handling the issue of social vices. The theme of social vices and their prevalence always created waves of discontent with the nature of the social order and created attempts to recast the system. The issue of social vices and social freedom (which opposes spiritual freedom from slavery to animalistic desires; see Dinani, 2010b) has been one of the great faultlines in the history of Iran and a cause for the de-legitimization of any form of socio-political order.

We extensively investigated how the states of tragedy of confusion and formation of unstable coalition led to the emergence of deformed and dysfunctional institutions in the ONM era; the details of this investigation were excluded from this work due to word limitations. A number of institutions were probed to demonstrate the general and specific patterns and dynamics involved in the miscarriages of modern institutions. The excluded explorations incorporated the realm of polity and the attempts made to institutionalize the sense of nationhood. It also covered the exploration of the institutions of state and political party, language, foreign policy and diplomacy (incorporating all voices from the British, to Tudeh Party, and Qavam at work in the microcosms and battlegrounds of the ONM project).

5.6. CHAOTIC ORDER

The Iranian embeddedness was oscillating between alternative regimes of truth throughout this period; as the social order fluctuated between extreme cases of chaos and limited experience of stability while experiencing fundamental instability and tension throughout this period. In other words, the volcano of Iranian social order oscillated between states of total apparent inactivity and sudden eruptions, while experiencing small scale eruptions and disturbances throughout this period. This period started with Reza Shah’s coup and ended up with his son’s coup, while in the middle experienced considerable level of turbulence manifested in Reza Shah’s forced abdication, episodes of terrors and assassination and constant daily battles between the forces, voices and voices in politics and in other realms of social order. The social space was bursting with discontent, hatred and various forms of verbal and/or physical violence.

Katouzian’s (2010) and Movahhed’s (Jafarian, 2007: 197) descriptions of the chaos in the time interval between the fall of Reza Shah and the 1953 coup are
symptomatic of general state of chaos in the social order in this period. Chaotic order is a continuum governing the whole period and made manifestly visible in the events of abdication, terrors, bitter strife between and within groups and individuals within the establishment and outside of it, and the coup followed by periods of icy stability established by the emergence of the final arbiter or the Iranian modern leviathan. The establishment of security was in inverse relation with the level of freedom. The chaotic dimension of the Iranian social assemblage was manifested in the emergence of divisions between the voices and faces, while the dimension of order was manifested in the emergence of final arbiter. Paradoxically, the forces which created division and difference guaranteed the prevention of the collapse of the society into the state of failed state.

In this period, three final arbiters emerged two (two Pahlavi shahs) in the name of Persianization with their own subprojects and one (Mosaddegh) in the name of modernization with his own subprojects. The system fluctuated between the state of chaos in the beginning of the Pahlavi era and then in the period of 10 years after forced abdication to the state of oppressive order enforced by iron fist in the Reza Shah’s reign and post-coup establishment and partially in the last months of Mosaddegh reign (as he was accused of despotism even by his best friend like Makki and Haerizadeh, for example) (Mojtahedzadeh, 2011; Mirfetros, 2011; Sahabi, 2007).

The chaotic order was rooted in the ‘tit for tat game’ of de-legitimization and discrediting, entrenched in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. The blame game inspired by the discourse of decline was incessantly played out throughout this period, leading to the discrediting of all forces, voices and faces by all forces, voices and faces. Mosaddegh’s reputation was possibly the only exception to the rule (Sahabi, 2007: 173), which was restored through his gaining the status of eternal victimhood for being overthrown by the 1953 Anglo-American coup. He became victim par excellence in the modern history of Iran. However, Mosaddegh’s reputation for incorruptibility (Abrahamian, 2008: 115; for a recent biography of Mosaddegh see De Bellaigue, 2012) had/has corrupted Iranian social order through unintentionally and unconsciously immersing it in the perpetual dynamics of culpability/victimhood. Iran and its people formed a perception of themselves as the powerless victim of forces, voices and faces beyond their reach. The perpetrators
changed from oriental, to occidental and religious or even revolutionary forms of despotisms but the sense of victimhood remained intact.

It seems that there was some grain of truth in the Iranian sense of powerlessness against the powerful forces, but these powerful forces were not the forces of world powers, the West and the Soviet Union or their internal agents and conspirators, but the impersonal forces of tragic battle within and between alternative regimes of truth inside Iranian subjectivity and social order. The multiple forms of regimes of truth created incommensurable forms of rationalities with multiple grammars of legitimacy and countless forms of language communities and language games. The irreconcilable differences in knowledge had created irreparable rupture in power and subjectivity. This in turn made the power extremely diffused and dispersed as reflected in the resort to the notion of the difference in taste or ekhtelaf-e saligheh (Rahnema, 2005: 528) for explaining the chaotic state of affairs. As such Iranians were the victims of the particularity of their own history as a whole and not particular forces, voices or faces inside or outside the country. This demonstrates that the discourse of decline is a highly poor conceptual scheme for understanding the state of affairs in the Iranian modern history (see Sadeghi, 2013 and Sohrabi, 2012 for examples on critique of the discourse of decline or the paradigm of declinism or enhetatgerae).

With regard to the incessant blames directed at America and Britain as sources of chaos in Iran for their participation in the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh’s government, it should be noted that America and Britain could be treated as a resource like oil, a force of culture and a piece of real which could be used for creating stability and development if and when the indigenous country had a sense of unity of purpose and direction like Japan, South Korea or Germany. America was not the invincible force it was deemed to be as it could not break the resolve of little island like Cuba in its own backyard. It is worth stressing that Mosaddegh’s battle with the West was a battle inside modernity (see de Bellaigue, 2012: 134, for instance, on how Mosaddegh “regarded Britain's constitutional monarchy as the best model for Iran's government”), asking the West to honour its own ideals and act upon them rather than acting upon Realpolitik. Even without the coup, Mosaddegh’s government was deeply in trouble, as the whole social order, the forces within the Mosaddegh’s coalition or beyond it, were deeply divided on almost all aspects of
how to organize the realms of life, work and language. This is what Sahabi (2007: 155) alluded to:

As Bazargan once said “the coup saved the National Front” [from total annihilation] as the level of discord within the Front was such that the internal strife would have become scandalous and destroyed its reputation, ultimately ending up in dismantling the Front.

This is similar to the observation made by Ehtesham-al-Saltaneh (Ajodani, 2003: 23) in the constitutional era on how Mohammad Ali Shah’s coup against Majlis was a blessing for the constitutionalists as it united them in their pursuit of constitutionalism; otherwise they would have imploded earlier under the weight of their own internal strife.

As a result, the whole social order was in a state of flux, to the extent that, to restore security and order it was called for the re-emergence a final arbiter and another reincarnation of the Iranian leviathan. This final arbiter was deemed to be either Mosaddegh (or Tudeh party) or Kashani (alongside Navvab and Boroujerdi) or the Shah; these three figures represented three regimes of truth, namely modernity, Islam, and Persianism each with their own projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering. At the time, the balance of power favoured the Shah, as the other candidates were much more divided and their forces were in tatters, paving the way for the Shah to emerge as the lucky winner with the support of his foreign allies. The Anglo-American alliance formed in support of the Shah only acted as the catalyst in the inevitable collapse of the Mosaddegh’s coalition which was imploding from inside. Mosaddegh’s version of modernity had much shallower root in the Iranian embeddedness than the Shah’s orthodox Persianism or the Ayatollah’s Islam.

Thus, in both the constitutional and the ONM eras, it was demonstrated that the voices and faces supporting the modernization project of constitutionalism and rule of law were the more fragile one compared to the two other projects of Islamization and Persianization, but all of them were under siege and deemed themselves to face the existential threat of annihilation, as in the state of belated inbetweenness no single project can dominate the social order for long. As such embarking on different waves of the blame game, whether blaming the Shah, the West, Kashani, Mosaddegh (Mirtetros, 2011; Mojtahedzadeh, 2011; Ghaninezhad, 2011), or the
Tudeh Party misses the point that the tragedy was produced by the context, and the actors were only the instruments in an unfortunate and unintended tragic plot generated by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness.

The loss of legitimacy on all sides was the outcome of a ‘tit for tat process of de-legitimization’ and ‘war of attrition’ through strategic activation of different discourses of the black book of the other and the white book of the self, involving the contrast between their own politics of piety versus the others’ politics of ordinary. This was manifested in the discourses such as the other being despotic, reactionary, idiot and illiterate, being puppet of the foreigners (see Rahnema, 2005), and in mutual hatred and disgust, creating a tense and volcanic social order (a version of Hobbesian war of all against all) fraught with an atmosphere of impatience, distrust, and spitefulness. In this process, almost all sides embarked on physical and/or verbal violence and resorted to physical assassinations and/or character assassinations, due to their particular matrix of classification borrowed from their affiliation to particular regime of truth in opposition to the rival ones.

At the end of this period almost all sides lost legitimacy to different degrees. Abrahamian (2001: 213-4) refers to this fact in the following observation: “In short, the coup struck a hard blow at liberalism as well as at socialism and secular nationalism”. Even the reputation of the religious factions were severely damaged by the ONM experience and the (inevitable) zigzags in the positions of Boroujerdi, Kashani, and Navvab, to the extent that the revival of the religious movement required the passing of ten years and the death of the old generations like Kashani and Boroujerdi for a new wave like Khomeini to be able to enter the scene with a revolutionary discourse of political Islam in the 1963 uprising.

During this era, ‘discursive war’ (war of words) had turned into ‘power struggle’ (war of swords) and ‘war of emotions’ (the mutual senses of spitefulness, hatred, and repugnance). In the physical and epistemic war of de-legitimization, the sides exhausted each other and eroded the social order and sucked the revolutionary energy out of the ONM into begging for the emergence of yet another final arbiter. Excessive exuberance for the “Thing” itself once again produced intense disillusionment and bitter disappointment. They all suffered from the lack of art of understanding the radical other, who in the state of inbetweeness is always already constitutive of the self. While the art of understanding is the art of legitimization of
the voice of radical other, almost no force, voice or face embarked (or could embark) on such an exercise at a societal level.

They all resorted to the strategy of inclusion/exclusion where some forces, voices and faces were always classified as residing on the side of darkness and evilness. This misunderstanding was further enhanced by their theory of selection from alternative orders and their naïve theory of transformation of social order, according to which the social order could be shaped in the image of this or that project of reverse social engineering through exclusion of what were perceived to be dark forces. This is in sharp contrast with the nature of social phenomena as the outcome of spontaneous and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization (and not the outcome of intelligent design) involving the work of vanishing mediators and leading to the phenomenon of multiple realizability.

As an example for such tragic cases of reverse social engineering, Katouzian (2010: 219-220) maintains that Reza Shah’s decree in 1936 on compulsory unveiling of women “was tantamount to a decree in Europe at that time that would have forced women to go topless in public”. Katouzian’s observation is confirmed by an eyewitness, Nesta Ramazani (2002: 2), in the following terms: “Suddenly women were faced with having to go out in public unveiled. There were few options: either go out feeling “naked” or stay at home”. The point is that women ‘can’ end up going topless in public but such an outcome needs a series of vanishing mediators (like no-pants day) emerging and disappearing in an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization where the society comes to inspect various dimensions of novel way of being, seeing and living and comes to own a way of life and normalize it and practice it freely and out of their own free will via discursive and non-discursive practices. Mosaddegh’s nationalization of oil was another case of project of reverse social engineering like Reza Shah’s compulsory unveiling, both without going through the painstaking and patient process of capacity and consensus building. It is worth comparing the Reza Shah’s success in the cases of institutionalization of new calendar, standardization of weights and measures, or compulsory military conscription and his failure in the institutionalization of unveiling or nationalization of religion (among many other failures or deformities in the act of institutionalization).
These experiences of reverse social engineering were further exacerbated by the misguided theory of social order where the role of unconscious forces and processes were not adequately identified or taken as subservient to the forces of consciousness. This was exacerbated by the fact that immersion in the state of belatedness further magnified the role of consciousness and intelligent design in the transformation of social orders. The Cartesian theory of social order- attempts directed at redesigning ontic, ontological or epistemological assemblages from ground zero; the desire to act like God by commanding 'Be! And it is' (Kun Fayakun) - was at the heart of the phenomenon of chaotic order in the Iranian society at the time, and ever since.

In this war of mutual de-legitimization, each side wanted to use the other only as an emblem and instrument to advance its own project. Each project of reverse social engineering had its own subprojects designed to assimilate bright and popular side of alternative regimes of truth in its own framework. That is why project of modernization had its own subprojects of modernized modernization (critique of the western occidental and democratic despotism by resorting to constitutionalism), modernized Islamization (resort to religious sensibilities by Mosaddegh against Reza Shah’s plan for crowning himself as a new king, or using religious passions and discourse of martyrdom in the events of 30th Tir to advance the cause of the ONM) and modernized Persianization (Mosaddegh’s quest, for example, for the Shah to restore calm to the country in the days before the coup and his general and consistent support for a constitutional monarchy, which would keep monarchy as part of the package). The example of what Mosaddegh said to Makki (1996: 20) with regard to the Shah and Kashani is very telling in this regard: he said to Makki that “the Shah and Kashani should be kept in a castle as emblems, only to be taken out where and when they are needed”. All sides wanted to do the same and treat the voices and faces of alternative regimes of truth as emblems, ready to be activated and deactivated strategically. But no force, voice or face wants to be only ceremonial and decorative entity; they all desire to shape the social order in their own image and subsume the alternative forces under their own appellation. This dynamics culminates in a state of chaos, which then is resolved partially and temporarily through resort to the final arbiter.

What was needed was a harmonized combination of all three regimes of truth without a priori prioritization of one regime over the others, which was partially pursued by the original founders of the Tudeh Party (Katouzian, 1991: 162) which
was supposed to act as a broad church for progressive forces, which was not possible to sustain in an uninterrupted fashion as it required a non-violent space of mutual respect where the organic combinations would emerge through a spontaneous and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization, where new well-developed and consensual philosophies could emerge to support new ways of thinking and living. The emergence of such an organic space of selection would be impossible in the state where each regime of truth operates in the binary space of good against evil, a state in interplay with the state of belatedness calling for quick and sound bite solutions to urgent social ills.

The outcome would be the emergence of a truth cycle where each project of reverse social engineering with its subprojects attempts to dominate the social order and shape it in its own image, only for its efforts to be aborted, reversed or perturbed by alternative regimes of truth and their machine of de-legitimization, which leads the process to tilt towards the emergence of a new truth incumbent. The final outcome would be a social order immersed in the state of chaotic order, where it fluctuates and zigzags between alternative regimes of truth via going to the brink of the state of total chaos (failed state) and ending up in a dysfunctional order, culminating in the bitter experience of perpetual dysfunctions and deformities constitutive of its state of underdevelopment.

The traumatic experience of the 1953 coup, equivalent to the experience of slavery or colonialism for other nations, has haunted Iranians and their relation with themselves and with the foreign forces, especially the West ever since. The coup has connoted in the Iranian dictionary with the West’s violent disruptive intervention in the sweet dream of an indigenous democracy. The blame game and sense of victimhood inherent to the state of belated inbetweenness makes the understanding of the experience of Mosaddegh’s government almost impossible as all sides project their own grid of intelligibility and their own emotional traumas and affective investments on it, turning it into another tragic site of mutual misunderstanding.

It can be argued that in the counterfactual case of no intervention from any external forces from any of the two camps in the cold war, the Mosaddegh’s government had two options, either converge towards the state of becoming the final arbiter, the direction it was increasingly moving into by its change of emphasis from liberal democracy to social democracy and by resorting to constitutionally illegal actions.
such as referendum and the particular manners it was held, or it had to collapse and pave the way for the emergence of another final arbiter, the Shah, or an internal coup, the repeat of Reza Shah’s coup against the weak Ahmad Shah Qajar. In reality, whatever route having been taken would have culminated in the experience of dysfunctions and deformities. It would have made little difference which policy options or projects were adopted, it would have been destined to failure; the adoption of doctrines of positive balance (movazeneh-ye mosbat) or negative balance (movazeneh-ye manfi) with the world powers, constitutionalism or monarchism, Islamism or socialism, no project of social transformation or any form of internal or external policies were viable in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness.

Alas, the conflicts and irreconcilable differences between the three regimes of truth and their internal divisions are also reproduced in the site of historiography of the ONM experience. In reality, the state of belated inbetweenness had made any form of social consensus impossible, leading to the experience of anarchy in the management of the country, itself culminating in the act of people voting with their hands or feet for the final arbiter. The hands acted in the Mosaddegh’s referendum and the feet in the Shah-West 1953 coup referendum (where they voted with their silences and inactions). In line with these, those Iranians who could not understand the reality of their compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness and its genre of tragedy of confusion where the traumatic outcome happens due to no fault of any of the historical actors (and how tragedy of confusion manages to produces repeated bitter experiences of failures and defeats in their modern history) had to resort to conspiracy theories, like “if you lift the beard of any cleric it is marked with the label made in Britain” (Mojtahedzadeh, 2011), to make sense of the presence of evil in its social order. Furthermore, they had to recourse to the fantasy of a perfect utopia, where the ‘Thing’ itself, object petit a, could be embraced and jouissance and the intense experience of fullness (socio-political orgasm) would be achieved.

This fantasy blamed the West for the Iranian messy reality and for stealing Iranian jouissance (democracy, independence, or spirituality) from them. The West- or for some other forms of historiography other forces, voices or faces who had betrayed the ideals of the ONM like the Tudeh Party or the religious leaders or even the people themselves with their sudden change in allegiance to the Shah and his forces through direct support or through staying silent- became the quintessential evil other, robbing the nation from its mojo (see Marshall Goldsmith and Mark Reiter, 2010)
and its development. This lethal blame game guaranteed the experience of subsequent waves of chaotic orders in the Iranian modern history.

5.7. CONCLUSION

The ONM era started with the end of Mashroteh modernization project and the commencement of Pahlavi Persianization project, which was disrupted only temporarily by the Mosaddegh’s restoration of modernization project, and ended with the burgeoning seeds of Khomeini’s Islamization project in 1963. In contrast to the modernization project of constitutional era, this era was largely the era of the Persianization project of the Pahlavi dynasty, only being momentarily interrupted by the Mosaddegh’s restoration of the Mashrtoeh project of constitutional modernization in the garb of the ONM. As the Pahlavi dynasty was the zombie of the Qajar project of Persianization in new form, Mosaddegh’s ONM was the zombie of Mashroteh project of modernization in a new disguise, leading to the re-emergence of the zombie of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri’s and Navvab’s project of Islamization in the Islamic Revolution of 1978.

This chapter demonstrated how Iranian social order went through four stages of tragedy of confusion, unstable coalition formation, institutional failure, and chaotic order in the site of the ONM due to immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness with its hyper-complex forms of embeddedness, incommensurability, and emergence.

The state of belatedness turned all regimes of truth into projects of reverse social transformation (ideologies, fantasies or dreams and blueprints). While Pahlavi’s revolutionary project of Persinaization and its three subprojects of Persianized Persianization, Persianized modernization, and Persianized Islamization was a top-down program of social transformation Mosaddegh’s movement was a bottom-up one. Both, however, culminated in the bitter experiences of instabilities, dysfunctionalities and deformities as Iranians suffered from discursive homelessness due to their immersion in the state of belated inbetweeness.

As such, it would have made little difference whether the source of change and transformation was elites or people, top-down or bottom-up. Both the elites and the people suffered from immense level of confusion and fluidity of subjectivities, culminating in the experience of sudden or gradual change between alternative
regimes of truth. Around the dynamics generated by the state of belated inbetweenness, elites and people were equally the sites of battle between alternative regimes of truth plaguing Iranian social assemblage with its affirmative axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity and negating facets of repression, disavowal and foreclosure, and their associated irreconcilable differences and their accompanying ruptures and inconsistencies.

Consequently, In Iran it does not make much difference whether the social movements are top-down or bottom-up, they are done through reform or revolution; they are destined to end up in failure as they suffer from fundamental problems at the philosophical level of embeddedness (ontological and pre-ontological), which is common to both forms of movements. In this era, each force and its associated project of reverse social engineering desired to take the Iranian people by will or by force to their own heaven of Persian utopia, modern utopia of socialism or liberalism or the Islamic utopia of piety (as in the case of Fadaiyan-e Islam whose project was followed by Ayatollah Khomeini). Regardless of whether the utopia was located in Paris, Moscow, Persepolis or Karbala/Mecca, each time the pursuit of utopia inevitably prompted by the state of belatedness produced dystopias of various forms and shapes. Iran became the house of madness (dar-al-majanin or lunatic asylum) (Katouzia, 2013: 250) or the haunted house of confused dreams and nightmares. As Westwood (1965: 135) puts it: “all is changed and all remains the same”.

The inertia in the sedimented layers of embeddedness is ignored and sudden eruption of exuberance for one project or another fools many into believing that Iran has fundamentally changed irreversibly (see for example Zabih, 1966: 124 on Tudeh Party’s “widespread illusion of … imminent victory”), while the mode of change, outside-in model of change triggered by the requirements of state of belatedness, as a non-engaging, abrupt and/or coerced form from outside, leaves the sedimented layers largely unchanged. The more they change the more they stay the same as Zizek said in another context.

The irreconcilable differences between and within the forces, voices and faces culminated in the Iranian social assemblage going through four stages of tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, experience of institutional failure, and

40Milani (2011a: 124) reports on how the Azerbaijani separatist “adopted Moscow time, half an hour behind Tehran” when they came to power.
the emergence of a chaotic order. This process oscillated between freedom-induced chaos and oppression-induced order of the final arbiter (formerly known as despot; there is no traditional despotism in Iran and it seems that the notion of despotism is a poor and bankrupt concept for understanding the unique compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness). The final arbiters are the saviours of the social order (and not despots) as they frequently are at pains to remind the people and the historians.

Despotism as an explanatory concept has only meaning, relevance and application in a homogenized regime of truth where it is legitimized as a tool against anarchy. Iran with its immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness is far from a homogenized (or even a hetrogenized) society, it is a ‘troubled society’ and the resort to final arbiter emerges as the pragmatic last resort (without tri-polar form of legitimacy, which paves its eventual demise) to save the whole social order from collapse. This fact alongside the associated fact that the cultural tribes has replaced the ethnic tribes in the modern era due to the emergence of political economy of truth (which means that people lack fixed ethnic identities or do not attach prominence to their ethnic identities) distinguishes Iranian modern history from its pre-modern one; while in the modern era we have final arbiters relying on hybrid cultural tribes, in the pre-modern era we had despots depending on ethnic tribes and relying on the institution of kingship and its discursive and non-discursive practices.

This is due to the fact that the compound state of belatedness-inbetweenness is unprecedented in the whole history of Iran; in the pre-modern history of Iran we had the state of inbetweenness without suffering from the state of belatedness simultaneously. As such, the Iranian social assemblage in this period, like other periods of modern age, managed to produce a chaotic order where it did not collapse into disorder and it did not produce a functional order either. The experience of discontent emanating from the experience of deformities and dysfunctionalities culminates in the collapse of final arbiter and initiation of new project, which produces a new final arbiter with its own experience of deformities and dysfunctionalities.

As the discussion so far indicates, each project had its own period of spring of freedom followed by the winter of discontent induced by the so-called despotism of the final arbiter, while all having roots in the tragedy of confusion and are manifest
of tragedy of confusion. This is why towards the end of his reign Mosaddegh was increasingly turning into a figure of final arbitration for conflict resolution. Much of the political struggle during Mosaddegh’s short term in power took the form of a constitutional crisis, with the arch-constitutionalist Mosaddegh demanding emergency powers from Majlis and his conservative and non-conservative opponents resisting them in the name of constitutional order (for details, see Azimi, 1989: 257-338, amongst others).

It can be argued that the strategic activation and deactivation of discourses operates as one of the condition of possibility of perpetuation of conflict (see Mirfetros 2011: 94 on quick changes in positions in the ONM era), but this is due to the fact that almost all discourses have valid truth claims and some resonances of truth for the Iranian dasein (such as Mosaddegh activating the Islamic discourse when it was required or National Front deputies activating the Islamic discourse of social vices more fervently ahead of their clerical opponents; see Rahnema, 2005). This makes social life into a game of music chair where faces constantly move between voices and forces, preventing the possibility of emergence of a synchronized embeddedness and achieving the state of unity without uniformity and the shared logic of agree to disagree. Kashani’s move between the initial pro-ONM radicalism of his life and the final pro-monarchy radicalism and the pragmatism in between is the effect of the context of belated inbetweenness; the instability of the state of belated inbetweenness is folded and reflected in Kashani’s subjectivity as unstable coalition; the stable selfhood is the effect of stable regime of truth and stable institutions, which cannot emerge in the state of belated inbetweenness.

In reflection, as Foucault states, when the society fails to produce truth, it fails to produce wealth. The root-cause of the problem resides in the interplay between the ‘context of culture’ and ‘context of situation’ and not in particular forces, voices or faces inside or outside the country. The ‘context of culture’ is plagued by irreparable rupture, as it is immersed in the state of inbetweenness, while the ‘state of situation’ is characterized by the state of belatedness inducing the turning of regimes of truth into projects of reverse social engineering. In concluding, the rise and fall of these projects and the instabilities experienced even in their periods of domination, is the outcome of lack of understanding of the radical other, constitutive of the self, and misdiagnosis of social order as a case of declinism, and treating it as the object of reverse social engineering in the spirit of Cartesian cogito rather than seeing it as the
outcome of Heideggerian *dasein* with its three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. As such the problem is philosophical and methodological rather than technical or personal. Character is not the destiny, the context is.
CHAPTER 6

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Me and you are the story of an old book, aren’t we? We are a question, a question with no answer, aren’t we?
Bizhan Samandar sung by Shajarian

Islam is not an inn where you can get in and out of. Hojataloeslam Daneshmand (2012)

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The modern history of Iran is a continuum of nested events, whereas each strong event is a reaction to and in dialogue with the others. Islamic Revolution was a reaction to the ONM, and the ONM a reaction to Reza Shah’s brand of Persianized modernization, and Reza Shah’s reign a reaction to the failures of the constitutional revolution, and this in turn a reaction to the humiliations suffered by the Iranian people earlier for military defeats and economic concessions granted to the world powers. A logic of intertextuality- involving the dialogue between the Quran (Taghavi, 2005: 90), Shahnameh (Molavi, 2002: 45-6) and the texts of Western constitutions (Arjomand, 1984: 200-2)- and intercontextuality was at work in the Iranian social assemblage and in its manifestations in social events. Each strong event was inspired by a ‘return to’ discourse (return to the Quran, return to Shahnameh, or return to the Western texts) and was using a larger strong event in history like French revolution, Cyrus’ treatment of the Jews in the Achaemenid conquest of Babylon (Brosius, 2006: 70; Holliday, 2011: 49), or the revelation to the Prophet Mohammad as its reference point. In the Islamic Revolution the dominant discourse was the discourse of return to the Quran (Lafraie, 2009), with all its affirmative and negating facets, largely unbeknownst to the historical actors participating in the events of the revolution.

As a result, the details of the Shah’s record in terms of socio-political, economic and cultural indicators and whether they were predominantly black or white were less important than what the character of Shah’s regime was (its affiliation to a particular
regime of truth in contradistinction to the alternative ones) and what particular set of truths it affirmed and negated. The Shah’s regime was a monarchy-centred (Moaddel, 1993: 63) corporate state (Akhavi, 1983: 197) supplying a particular selection or basket of truths to its people under the discourse of ‘return to Shhnameh’ with Cyrus as its historical reference point. As Harmon (2005: 27) indicates:

What Pahlavi wanted for Iran was what his father had wanted: a modern, industrial empire that would be as glorious, in its own time period, as ancient Persia had been.

At the time when Islamic Revolution happened, Iran was boiling from inside, which as Mehdi Bazargan (1984), its first prime minister, states needs to be studied in its two movements: in ‘its negating movement enshrined in the opposition to the Shah’s regime’ and ‘in its affirmative movement in the act of establishing the Islamic Republic’. The negating dimension was driven by the repulsive nature of Shah’s regime, and the affirmative dimension was guided by the mysteriously seductive dimension of the Islamic alternative to the Shah’s regime and its contingent superiority over other candidates (the left and the liberal alternatives, for example).

With the Islamic revolution, once more Iranians in their incessant attempts to conduct large-scale social experiments developed a combined hatred for one side of the social divide as ‘evil incarnate’ and the other as the ‘goodness made flesh’. This time the binary logic of good against evil targeted the coalition of oriental and occidental despotism (the Shah-West coalition) alongside their thin layer of alliance with religious despotism as the root of all evils in the Iranian society. In this, the dark sides of all three large forces of Iranian embeddedness were deemed to have united on one side of the truth divide and the bright sides of the same three forces (different factions of revolutionary Islam in alliance with liberal nationalists and Marxists) on the other side of the divide.

The process of antagonization was fairly bloodless in the negating stage of the revolution compared to other revolutions and extremely bloody in the affirmative dimension of the revolution. The Shah’s antagonization and repression of ‘black and red reactionaries’ (Abrahamian, 2008: 152) had culminated in the return of the repressed and the sudden eruption of unexpressed energies in the form of destruction of the Shah’s house of cards. The collapse of Shah’s regime of truth can be
approached at least at three levels, at the level of triggering events, at the level of socio-political indicators, and at a more holistic level on the status of Shah’s regime in the Iranian worldhood and embeddedness.

The event-based approach enumerates a number of seminal events and traces their subsequent implications, leading to the eventual collapse of the Shah’s regime and its replacement with the Islamic Republic. This leads to the act of periodization of the time landscape based on the distance between seminal events. The analysis based on indicators (balance sheet approach) is based on the notion of causality and assesses regimes’ successes and failures in terms of socio-economic indicators, while the worldhood analysis is an analysis based on the nature of the social phenomena as being-in-the-world and not primarily as a particular point in a causal chain of events (each worldhood has its own grid of intelligibility and way of categorization leading to different balance sheet analysis and different periodization, and different system-specific causality). Social actors in parallel with the historians deployed a set of cultural, economic and political indicators to challenge the legitimacy of the Shah’s regime, while another set of indicators were deployed to embolden the legitimacy of the Shah’s regime by its supporters.

While the Shah was valorising his own white book of achievements, his opponents were expanding on the list of his sins and adding pages and volumes to the black book of his failures (see for instance Banisadr’s indictment of the Shah’s record in Dabashi, 1993: 374). Despite all of the usual cost-benefit analysis (Amuzegar, 1991: 305-6), the main reason behind the Shah’s sudden collapse was not his normal successes and/or failures (Ramazani, 1982: 19 and 2013; Kurzman, 1996: 153), as no finite socio-political system can be whiter than white and be free from minor and major failures. Each social assemblage and its associated regime of truth with a history has a white and a black book and is experienced as a Janus-faced entity. Baring (2010: 245) alludes to one instantiation of this general pattern with regard to France:

Tillion distinguished between “two Frances, the Beauty and the Beast”: the France of Voltaire and Rousseau and that of the tortures and killing. Her dearest hope was that Algerian independence would mean renouncing only the latter.
Each social assemblage through its two faces of beauty and the beast generates its magnetic field of attractions and repulsions. The Shah’s social assemblage was another case of a Janus-faced entity.

If Iranian society had been happy with the Shah’s brand of regime of truth and his implicit or explicit social contract with the people of Iran, or at least a powerful section of Iranian society (for example middle class) had been consistently content with his particular recipe for how to organize the social order, they would have supported him in thick and thin and would have attempted to amend his failures and expand his successes⁴¹.

‘Normal’ countries with stable embeddedness rarely embark on socio-political regime change even in the face of catastrophic failures and costly blunders. In every social system there are winners and losers - Axworthy (2009) enumerates some of the winners and losers of the Islamic revolution - an stable society with strong social cohesion (or Ibn Khaldun’s asabiya; see Zaidi, 2011: 21, 93-98) either convinces the losers to blame themselves for lack of efforts or persuades them to condemn the forces of destiny and bad luck, or embarks on suppressing the losers’ social protests and resistances and their attempts to change the situation, or tries to win their allegiances through expanding the fruits of the success to the losers through gradual step-by-step reform (like the emergence of welfare state in the West) (see, Bayat, 1997: 39). However, Iran in the last one hundred years rarely followed the routes of a normal country; it had proved that it was the country of revolutions (Foran, 1994).

Iran, for example, in the century before the Islamic Revolution had experienced two widespread movements (the Tobacco Movement of 1892 and the Oil-Nationalization Movement of 1951), two revolutions (the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and the top-down reform of so-called ‘White Revolution’ in 1963), two coups (the 1299 coup in 1921, and the 28th of Mordad coup in 1953), two popular uprisings (30th of

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⁴¹ The example of Japan (which has played significant role in the Iranian public imagination since the time of constitutional revolution) as one of the most stable societies in the world after the catastrophic defeats of the second world war is an extreme example of a society which did not rebel against its emperor and its fundamental beliefs at a large scale; state and society, elites and masses together changed direction and accepted to join the American-led, Western club type pursuit of progress (see Thurow, 1993; Goto-Jones, 2009, for example). The contrast between Japan as one of the most stable and Iran as one of the most unstable countries in the world my offer us the deeper insights into the nature of their unique social orders and singular worldhoods. The stability of the Japanese system and the instability of the Iranian system cannot be fully explained relying on event-based or indicator-based analysis (as the Japanese should have been more of a revolutionary nation based on such indices after the horrors of the World War II), but on analysis of their distinct worlds of significations.
Tir uprising in 1952, 15th of Khordad uprising in 1963), the assassination of one shah (Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar in 1896), the exiles of three shahs (Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar in 1909, Ahmad Shah Qajar in 1923, and Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941), the assassination of three prime ministers (Amin-al-Soltan in 1907, Razamra in 1951, and Mansur in 1965), the execution of one top-ranking Shia clergy (Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri in 1909) and countless events of violent nature and incidents of social disturbances (such as separatist and dissident movements or imprisonment, torture and execution of dissidents or sending them into exile). Thus, the Iranian society after its military encounter with modernity in the first half of 19th century has been constantly in turmoil (Behnam, 2004: 11). Therefore, the occurrence of Islamic Revolution needs to be analysed in this wider history of a country in perpetual turmoil (Foran, 1994).

If we embark on deconstructing the interpretation of the historical actors and the historiography of the Islamic Revolution we see the reference to a set of socio-economic indicators, a few triggering events, a set of master signifiers like Islam, modernity and the pre-Islamic Persia, and the presence of strong element of surprise in the emergence of national figures and in the turn of events. The resort to a wide range of indicators, from military, to cultural, economic and political, demonstrates the co-evolutionary nature of the social order while reference to particular events (Harmon, 2005: 47-8; Katouzian, 2013: 97) like the sudden rise in oil prices in 1973, the insult directed at Ayatollah Khomeini in a national newspaper, or the events of Cinema Rex in the city of Abadan, among others, represent the prevalence of butterfly effect (non-linearity) in the social order. The constant reference to allegiance to Islam, modernity and Persian monarchy as the master signifiers and regimes of truth refers to quilting point and worldhood nature of the social order. The incessant allusion to the unexpected nature of events in this period points to the destructive eruption of real, breaking the symbolic and imaginary webs of social arrangements.

For the West, the unexpected nature of Islamic Revolution (Kurzman, 2004, 2009) was clearly manifested in the Carter’s famous “oasis of stability” speech. Other historical actors and commentators expressed their amazement of the speed and direction of change in the oasis of security and stability. The phenomenon of “dramatic rise to prominence” (Harmon, 2005: 49) experienced frequently in the Iranian history (in figures or organizations like Sayyed Zia, Reza Shah, Mosaddegh,
the Tudeh Party, Ayatollah Khomeini, Shariati, Banisadr, Mujahedeen-e Khalgh, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad, among countless others) is another symptom of being immersed in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. In this state, those socio-political entrepreneurs who can offer to deliver the marginalized dimensions of Iranian identity gain sharp rise to prominence. The compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness is the condition of possibility for the unexpected rise to prominence of groups and individuals and their subsequent sharp or gradual fall from grace (Boroujerdi, 2010).

This chapter, thus, provides an in-depth analysis and theoretical reading (and not event-based or chronological reading) of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 by following the methodological and theoretical strategies and insights established in other chapters of this study.

The detailed explorations the general characteristics of the Iranian embeddedness acting as condition of possibility for the Islamic Revolution were excluded from this work due to word limitations.

In the rest of this chapter we will follow the forces and voices operating in the field of Iranian social reality in the section on tragedy of confusion. Then we will proceed in the section on unstable coalitions to explore how these forces and voices integrated and disintegrated to form coalitions to formulate and implement collective actions to achieve social change. In the section on institutional failure we will address the dysfunctionalities and deformities emanated from instability of coalitions and constant zigzag movement between forces and voices. In the section on chaotic order we will explore the effects of institutional failures on the landscape of Iranian social reality and its two simultaneous features of chaos and order. In the conclusion section we will provide a holistic picture of the map of forces, voices and faces and how they interacted to create a truth cycle which gave rise to the birth of dysfunctional institution and a social order littered with reversibilities, ambiguities and epistemic and physical violences, which creates a tragedy of confusion in the form of production of a society permanently in crisis.
6.2. TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION AS CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979

Any social order is the emergent outcome of a series of events produced through the vectoral interaction between embedded and incommensurable forces, voices and faces. The 1979 Iranian revolution was an instantiation of this general pattern. This section, hence, aims to explore the anatomy of forces and their rhizomatic symbiosis into voices, which were invested in faces. Forces are the elements of embeddedness which combine to construct incommensurable voices inhabiting faces; their interaction produce events unexpectedly which is manifestation of principle of emergence.

As before, we can trace the signs of the three common forces of Iranian history (Islam, Persianism, and modernity) throughout the pre- and post-revolutionary stages of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Their interactions and rivalries produced a volatile market for truth.

The notion of market for truth- the supply and demand for ‘truth about’ life, work and language- and competition between rival regimes of truth are acknowledged in the following passages, as reported by Lambton (1964: 134), from Motahhari, one of the leading thinkers in Ayatollah Khomeini’s coalition:

The mardji’ would also become free and the mosques would no longer be markets in which the members of the religious classes displayed their wares for sale … As long as there is no central financial organization and the religious classes depend upon the support of individuals, it is inevitable that there should be rivalry among them to attract followers. In such circumstances the religious classes are forced to trim their sails to the desires and will of the masses.... if Islam and the religious institution do not offer a positive answer to the needs and desires of the people and satisfy their aspirations, they will turn to new ideologies and the very existence of Islam will be threatened.

Here we see the traces of mosques as markets and the threat of new ideologies to the niche held by Islam in the Iranian market for truth. This market is not a normal form of market and is not a perfectly competitive one either. Rather, it is an oligopolistic form of implicit market with half a dozen or so truth producers who are active in the supply side, which is composed of formal and informal sectors, where the formal market exists around the underground or black market for truth. If we consider both
formal and informal dimensions of the market for truth, there is no barrier to entry to the market as a whole, although there are huge numbers of barriers for entry into the formal market for truth. As indicated in Motahhari’s utterance, the suppliers, like Islam, are threatened with the consumers changing their loyalty and switching and converting to alternative producers of truth (however, there are heavy ‘switching costs’ associated with such cases of change of loyalty and incidences of conversion).

In the market for truth, people reveal their preferences through supporting particular faces and voices via voting by feet and/or by hands. The demand side of any social movement (as a market for truth) is evident in the following excerpt from the leftist group the Fadaii ‘Minority’ (aghaliat) in a 1981 publication (Alaolmolki, 1987: 225):

> The power and potential of the revolutionaries lie in the fact that their movement is in accordance with mass interests. Their success is dependent upon mass mobilization. A revolutionary upheaval can only become a reality with the presence of the vast power and support of the masses. Therefore, the revolutionaries must adopt strategies for mobilising the masses.

Here we see clearly the characteristics of social agents as entrepreneurs of truths in the business of winning the allegiances of people. Voices which fail to capture public imagination drift away into oblivion and have to exit the market for truth. Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the same dimension of social movement, when he famously said to the crowd in his first speech after arrival in Iran that “with your support I will appoint a government” (as opposed to the Shah-designated government of Bakhtiyar) (Coughlin, 2009: 27). All of these interactions in the market for truth happen in the intersection between context of culture (the state of inbetweenness) and context of situation (state of belatedness).

Voices emerge as recipes for making sense of and ordering social life from the intermixing of different components of the three large regimes of truth. The application of operations of addition and subtraction on three regimes of truth produces a wide range of voices in the field of Iranian social reality. This phenomenon was instinctively detected by many observers in the name of hybridization, eclecticism or syncretism (elteqat, equivalent to Hedayat’s lakkategi) and was frequently condemned by them, while they were unaware of the rhizomatic nature of voices where each voice has roots in other voices and there is no purity. As reported by Jafarian (2007: 392, added emphasis), Ayatollah Taleghani (who was a
fatherly figure for almost all groups opposing the Shah’s regime) refers to this phenomenon in the following terms in a speech in 1980:

sometimes our intellectuals mix Islam with some other issues, some other schools of thought, *a bit of communism or capitalism, or [something] from here or there, from socialism;* no, brothers, sisters, our children, *Islam is neither communism nor capitalism or socialism, Islam is Islam.*

This indicates the attempts made to create new voices out of rhizomatic combination of the master signifiers of Islam, capitalism, communism, and socialism, which are examples of regimes of truth as synchronized wholes producing truth about life, work, and language. The truth menus constructed out of mixture of these regimes of truth are voices and these voices inhabit faces like Ayatollah Taleghani through the lived experiences of biography, and they all form the supply side of the market for truth. We can clearly see the work of three notions of forces, voices and faces in the above quote from Ayatollah Taleghani. Ironically, Taleghani, himself being inhabited by a hybrid voice, here acts as a voice of territorialisation against the voices of de-territorialisation.

These voices lie on a spectrum where each radical voice may be deemed as pragmatic from a point closer to radical end of spectrum and each pragmatic voice can be deemed as radical from a point closer to the pragmatic end of the spectrum. To give an example, Behdad (1994: 782) observes that:

Shariati regards property as a source and a manifestation of oppression. Mutahhari does not. Shariati views total destruction of property relations as the necessary condition for human liberation. Mutahhari does not.

Their positions on the sex segregation, dress code or foreign policy, and all other issues of social life, lie on a spectrum as well. A voice which has radical components in terms of its position on property rights may consist of pragmatic positions on dress code or foreign policy. And overall depending on the composition and order of priority in the internal structure of the voice, they may be dubbed as pragmatic or radical depending on their position on the spectrum of voices and whether the judgement is made within or between regimes of truth.
These forms of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ voices determine their categorization as radical or pragmatic of particular persuasion. For a predominantly liberal voice, for instance, both Motahhari and Shariati are dubbed as Islamic radicals, while for Motahhari only Shariati may be dubbed as contaminated, hybrid and impure. Motahhari’s own voice is dubbed as contaminated and impure by the conservative and scholastic version of Islam in the religious seminaries. Depending on how their additions and subtractions are organized, they may be perceived as radical or pragmatic, elitist or populist, genuine or eclectic, true or false, progressive or regressive, impure or pure. Every radical voice may be deemed as pragmatic from a slightly different position. Thus, every voice becomes an island of truth in itself while sharing with other voices in their affiliation with the three master signifiers of Islam, Persianism and modernity. As each voice deems the other as impure, false, radical or pragmatic, the voices become antagonistic towards each other and as such no harmonized and synchronized whole can emerge (no agreement and no agreement to disagreement).

Following our theoretical Focauldian concepts of ‘analytic of finitude’ and ‘market for truth’ with its associated ‘forces, voices, and faces’, in the Shah’s reign the incumbent assemblage (the Shah-West coalition of truth) was exuberantly oversupplying truth products in the realms of instrumental and communicative rationality and severely undersupplying them in the realm of emancipative rationality. This supply package did not fully meet the demand pattern of the Iranian dasein and consequently, the search for missing element found immense significance, intensity and urgency. In the dynamics of preference ordering what is missing finds greater significance over what is taken for granted (see Liu, 2011). As such, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in a sense, was a collective search for jouissance and experience of fullness (Taylor, 2007: 10), a series of moments of drunkenness and ecstasy in order to embrace the ‘Thing’ itself (Cheng, 2008: 1169). In a collective madness (histeri-ye omomi) (for the notion of collective madness see Gupta, 2001: 11, 63; Almond, 2007: 37; Glazov, 2009: 192), as argued by Reza Pahlavi (2010), the last Shah’s son, the population was seduced by the positive freedom from the small pains and pleasures of isolated everyday modern life of struggle for survival (rat race) in the modern urban environment where, as Agamben, (1998: 181) maintains, the concentration camp is the “biopolitical paradigm of the
modern age”. In the search for jouissance as a political factor (Zizek, 1991; 2007), as Afary and Anderson (2005: 36) attest,

The Islamists and many others who joined the Iranian Revolution seemed to believe that by adopting an attitude of “freedom-toward-death,” by recognizing and submitting to the finitude and limitation of their own insignificant human existence, and by aspiring to a cause greater than themselves, they could bring about the collective authentic existence of the Iranian community.

The sense of spiritual unity and solidarity created in the process of revolutionary activities (as the truth product of the Khomeini coalition) liberated people from the pains of existential finitude and gave them the chance to be part of a larger movement and a bigger whole bestowing them, as Freud (1929: 2) puts it, “oceanic feeling” (see also Parsons, 1999) and allowing them to go “beyond the pleasure principle” (Freud, 1922). That experience generated the flavour of the experience of fullness and abundance, and emancipation from finitude and fear of death and loss. This is attested by Brumberg (1997: 42) in the following terms:

By proposing methods of regaining a sense of spiritual ‘wholeness’ that were both practical and cathartic, Khomeini captured the imaginations of millions of people.

The methodology chapter of this thesis has already addressed the significance of the search for the experience of fullness and wholeness in the attempts to escape the finitude and lacks of ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ orders and in the longing for returning to the infinitude and abundance of the ‘real’. The agony and ecstasy of participation in the revolution and in the post-revolutionary events such as the hostage crisis and Iran-Iraq war offered the limit-experience of embracing the ‘Thing’ itself, incomparable with small pains and pleasures offered by instrumental rationality of cost-benefit analysis supplied by modernity or ancestral calculus of magnanimity and continuity (Ansari, 2012: 177) of communicative rationality offered by Persianism.

There was a simple logic of supply and demand at work. People wanted more of ‘it’ and wanted to stay on the state of high forever. In ordinary mundane experience of everydayness, life is a house of cards susceptible to the threat of collapse from the
forces of real; attempts aimed at holding those cards together turns life into a rat race with inevitable spectre of defeat and doom looming large. In the context of Iranian particular evolutionary trajectory, revolutions and large movements have emerged as coping strategies allowing people to liberate themselves from the pains of modern existence and to embrace a bigger truth. This is why, unbeknownst to himself regarding the depth of his own insight, Reza Pahlavi (2010) saw the events of 1979 as “revolutionary madness (jonon-e enghelabi)” of Iranian people, “immersing themselves in a state of religious ecstasy and drunkenness (khalseh va nash’agi-ye maz’habi)”. In line with this, Fatemi (1982: 61) observes the traces of madness and confusion in the Iranian social order at the time:

By the late 1970s, more than any other time in its history, Iran had become a land of contradiction, bewilderment, distraction, and diversion. Economically, it was a nation of nouveaux riches; sociologically, it was a nation in confusion, if not madness; and politically, it was a nation of phobias, fear of failure, fear of SAVAK, and in general, fear of the future.

Iranians, with their embedded desire for spirituality, needed to throw themselves into the search for the experience of fullness and oneness with the ‘Thing’ itself to escape the madness of contradictions, and liberate themselves from being ‘a nation of phobias’.

The Shah himself in his book ‘White Revolution’ (1966: 22-3; see also Ansari, 2001, 2007, 2012 and Summitt, 2004) alludes to the role of spirituality in the balance and survival of nations. In a sense spirituality is an answer to the problem of being-towards-death which itself is a subset of the problem of loss and the threat of loss, which is a subset of the problem of impermanence and finitude. We see the traces of Heideggerian fourfold at work here. In the Shah’s (1966: 17) attempt to fulfil the nation’s five basic needs (food for all, health for all, education for all, shelter for all, and clothing for all) there was no plan for spirituality for all. Spirituality is a collective product like any other and at the time in Iran there was a comprehensive network of mosques, shrines, pilgrimage sites, alongside an army of interpreters of the text of spiritual experience and the experience of the sacred text with huge number of specified occasions and dates to collectively produce the precious commodity of spirituality. But the legitimacy of this network for the production of spirituality as well as recognition of spirituality as a fundamental need was severely
undermined by the emergence of modernity (for the notion of spiritual capital and its depreciation and depletion see Zohar and Marshal, 2004; Verter, 2003; Nasr, 2001).

As such, the national endeavour for attaining progress and pleasures of the flesh had left almost no place for the legitimate collective production and consumption of the experience of fullness (to counter the terror of death) in the Shah’s reverse social engineering project of Persianized modernity. At its basic ordinary level, it meant that the nation had lost its collective connection with the eternal, the sacred, and the infinitude. In Islam, the experience of fullness is more than a momentary event at a particular period of time; Islam deems spirituality as more of a basic need than food and shelter. With Islam every experience from defecating, to making love, working in the farm, trading in the market, and doing politics can be and should be turned into spiritual experience like praying (Rajaei, 2007).

As such, Iranian nation starving from the lack of legitimate collective spiritual experience, in a place where spirituality and its symbols were deemed as a sign of backwardness and out-datedness in the public settings at the time (see Sahabi, 2007 on how, for instance, praying in university settings was deemed as a sign of backwardness), the nation lungen itself into Islam to liberate itself from the experience of fragmentation and division and homelessness brought in by the modernity and its Persianist ally. The Shah’s lavish festivities for the celebration of twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of Persian Kingdom by Cyrus the Great in 1971 (Ansari, 2007: 221) and how it was performed was the perfect symbol of modern and Persian ignorance (jaheli’yat) manifested in the unholy alliance between orthodox Persianism and orthodox modernity (techno-bureaucratic modernity) to embrace the material and the impermanence and to forget or marginalize the spiritual and the permanence.

Alongside the Shah’s and Khomeini’s voices, Bazargan’s voice served as one of the main suppliers of truth at the time. It should be noted that while Bazargan’s main concern was Iran’s place in the modern league of nations and the Shah’s was primarily centred on Iran’s position in the history of civilizations, Ayatollah Khomeini’s concern was Iran’s place in God’s eye and in the league of eternal happiness. The sharp disparity between the Shah’s, Bazargan’s, and Khomeini’s contrasting conceptions of what is the essence of Iranianness became strikingly clear in that single word ‘nothing’ uttered in the airplane by Khomeini (when asked about
his feeling of returning to Iran after 15 years in exile) (Taheri, 2010: 54; Redjali, 2013: 348). The ‘shock’ value of his response became more pronounced when one of his aides (Qotbzadeh), in a state of bewilderment, (mis)translated his remark into “he made no comments”. This is a clear example of breakdown in the hermeneutics of understanding, where Khomeini was a confused dreamer (gong-e khabdideh) and Qotbzadeh and the rest of the world was totally deaf (a’lam tamam kar).

For Khomeini, the material life and its illusionary pains and pleasures pale into insignificance (nothingness) compared to the enormity, magnanimity, and magnificence of eternity (reminiscent of Pascal’s wager). That dual experience of nothingness/abundance through transcending the mundane pains and pleasures of everyday life was what Ayatollah Khomeini was going to offer to the Iranian nation as the essence of being. The other side of the experience of negation (nothingness) was the experience of affirmation, the experience of fullness. Therefore, immediately after his landing, in his first speech in the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery (see, Axworthy, 2013), where he visited the graves of the martyrs of the revolution, Khomeini elaborated on his vision of advancing the nation’s spirituality alongside taking care of its material well-being while stressing on the decadent sins of the former Shah and his regime (Moin, 1999: 201-2).

Khomeini’s vision entailed achieving material progress and social justice inside the larger framework of living a spiritual life as measured and operationalized by being obedient to God through implementing His Shari’ah. Such a connection between obedience to Shari’ah and ‘spirituality for all’ (a kind of democratization of spirituality and egalitarian access to the experience of fullness), as a bridge between politics of piety and politics of ordinary, had roots in the Islamic sciences, for example in the case of Ibn Khaldun, as attested by Zaidi (2011: 90, added emphasis):

Contrary to the philosophers, Ibn Khaldun is adamant that while rationality is useful in its own sphere, intuition, faith, and adherence to religious law alone provide inexpressible happiness, because they connect man to the supra-human realm and ultimately to God.

With eruption of excessive materialism of modernity and orthodox Persianism in the Shah’s reign, the nation had missed the taste of spirituality and unity and solidarity offered by Islam with its widespread local and global networks. The nation needed to
have a honey moon with Islam to the dismay of modernity and Persianism. The Islamic Revolution, thus, can be deemed as a collective experiment in “the search of the sacred” (Nasr, 2010; Bennett, 1996), or the “search for perfection” (Moin, 1994). The search for the impossible is constitutive of possible (Irwin, 2002).

It is worth noting that all other segmentations and divisions in social existence such as ethnicity, generation, class, gender, education, region, type of settlement (urban versus rural or tribal), profession, etc. act through and mediated by the three regimes of truth. As such class and other divisions between people became less pronounced in the collective search for the sacred inspired by Islam and Persian poetry.

Throughout the pre-revolutionary, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary eras we witness the strong traces of these three regimes of truth and their competition for attaining the monopoly of supply of truth about life, work and language to the Iranians. This time, in the Islamic revolution, the leadership had fallen to the clergy in contrast to the other big occasions. In this period, after the failures of previous attempts, as Zibakalam (2009: 86) observes:

Many Iranians perceived the Islamic Revolution as a “third way” between Western capitalism and Eastern communism. The great slogan of the revolution “na sharghi, na gharbi” (neither the East nor the West) reflected the conviction that Islamic Iran would be a truly independent state — independent from both Western and Soviet domination. Gradually, however, the notion of “neither the East nor the West” turned into an ideological crusade implying the superiority of the Iranian-Islamic model that had been established in Iran since the revolution. The bitter eight-year war with Iraq and a host of other problems which emerged in the country persuaded many Islamists not to greatly boast the merits of the Islamic Republic to the West or the East. The ideological crusade receded during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s term as President (1989-1997), and receded further during the reformist period under President Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005).

During the revolutionary process, alongside a plethora of leftist and Islamist groups, the main three voices which generally reflected the predominant affiliation to the three regimes of truths were the voice of the Shah (with Persianism as its overriding master signifier), the voice of Ayatollah Khomeini (with Shia Islam as its main regime of truth) and the voice of Bazargan (with modernity as its overriding frame of reference).
For the Shah, the true nature of Iranianness was defined by its Persianist heritage of pre-Islamic Persia, while for Ayatollah Khomeini it was captured by Iranian people’s historical dedication to Islam throughout centuries; for him that signalled the fact that Iranians prioritized the homeland of Islamic spirituality (manifested predominantly in Shia jurisprudence and complemented by Shia mysticism and Islamic philosophy) over and above their attachment to the geographical and cultural land of Iran. In fact Iran was immensely precious and the defence of its territory was immeasurably obligatory, because of Iranian people’s sense of exceptionalism (Zibakalam, 2009: 85) in being the only nation on the face of the earth to embrace the truth of Shia Islam collectively and unshakably throughout a turbulent history (officially from the Safavids onward). Bazargan’s voice, in contrast to both other voices, was the continuation of Mosaddegh’s school of thought where Iranian affirmative dimension is defined by its dedication to modern constitutionalism and rule of law. Bazargan gave more weight to Islam in constructing of the sense of nationhood compared to Mosaddegh, while committing to his project of building the apparatus of modern nation-state based on the spirit and articles of constitutionalism.

As attested by Chehabi (1990: 55), Bazargan famously referred to this difference in emphasis and order of priority between his position and Ayatollah Khomeini’s one by saying that ‘we want Islam for Iran while Ayatollah Khomeini wants Iran for Islam’ (see also Dabashi, 1993; Jahanbakhsh, 2001). The Shah, Khomeini and Bazargan differed in their preference orderings and their final destinations (their utopias); what Bazargan wanted to arrive at was Paris, London or New York with special flavours of Islam (especially on how to live an ethical life) and Persianism (especially the heritage of Persian poetry as a repertoire of wisdom about how to live a moral life) (see Dabashi, 1993: 330). For him the source of law was modern human rights and the liberal constitution and national democratic Majlis (alongside modern science and technology), and Islam and Persianism were used to complement modernity’s lack in ethics and spirituality (which itself required monotheistic ontology). In a sense he wanted to graft Islam minus jurisprudence (which was largely perceived as religious despotism) and Persianism minus oriental despotism to the Western modernity minus its colonialism, its permissive ethics, and its nihilistic metaphysical ontology (here we see the operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of truth at the level of Heideggerian fourfold).
Where the Shah wanted to arrive at was the gates of Great Sassanid and Achaemenid kingdoms and used modernity selectively to realize his dream of “march towards the gates of great civilization”, while Islam was largely and inherently perceived as an obstacle unless and until the threat of non-orthodox modernity (communism) became serious (Milani, 2011a; Abrahamian, 1982), where Islam was promoted instrumentally as a shield and as an effective firewall to fend off communism (this shows how pragmatically Islam was absolutely necessary for the survival of monarchy and its dreams). Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to take his nation to a journey into a modernized Kerbaka/Mecca, the spiritual homeland of Islam and selectively used modernity's techno-scientific achievements, constitutionalism, and search for social justice alongside Persianism’ sense of belonging to a common Persian homeland and common Persian language to realize it; for him Iran could become that spiritual promised land, and that modernized mecca as the spiritual homeland of Shia and Muslim ummah.

Ayatollah Khomeini, thus, was driven by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness to use modernity and Persianism strategically to produce that dream of discursive home of spiritual Shia Islam. As Harmon (2005: 31) observes:

While Khomeini and other Iranian clerics were concerned primarily with the heritage and lineage of the prophet Muhammad, Shah Pahlavi was more interested in the heritage and lineage of the bygone Persian Empire.

In this sense, ‘each voice was composed of the traces of all three regimes of truth but with different orders of priority and distinct architecture’. The belated tri-polarity of Iranian embeddedness compelled each voice to possess a tri-polar structure with different order of priority. The traces of three regimes of truth in Bazargan’s works, for example, can be found in the following quote from Chehabi (1990: 78) where Bazargan’s eclecticism is evident in the economy of referencing in his book “Rah-e Tey Shodeh” (The Path Travelled), indicative of state of belated inbetweenness:

For his historical data Bazargan cites such diverse sources as the Quran, the Belgian symbolist poet Maurice Maeterlinck’s book le Grand Secret, and one Major Owrang’s opus Yekta-parasti dar Iran-e bastan (Monotheism in ancient Iran).
Here we see multiple forms of legitimacies, rationalities and vocabularies operating in Bazargan’s work. Here Bazargan’s voice as a truth supplier attempts to offer a synthesis of multiple regimes of truth by referring to Islamic source of truth (the Quran) alongside the modern regime of truth (the Western sources), and Persian regime of truth (in a source from ancient Persian house of wisdom).

The presence of the three regimes of truth with their multiple dimensions can be found in Shariati’s (1970k: 36) contemplation on the question of the constitution and composition of his own selfhood. The selves he identified in himself, as Rahnema (1998: 155; see more extensive elaborations in Shariati, 1970k: 36-42) reports, were as follows:

First he identified a religious and faithful self, whose orientation was towards Mecca. Second, he recognized a rational and Cartesian self, who did not possess faith. Whereas the religious self was born in Medina, this rational self was born in Athens and alien to Medina. The Third self was that of a young author and orator. It was the personality that was more renowned than the others and had obtained some fame; yet according to Shariati it was the most alien to him. The fourth self was that of a brave hero. It represented the adventurist, the dare-devil popular revolutionary, bent on avenging the disinherited of this world. This self thrived on breaking asunder the chains of the people and basked in the applause and the praise of the people. This was Shariati’s political personality. Finally Shariati acknowledged his fifth personality or self, which he maintained was the last to blossom in him. This novel self was the one he had long waited for; it was his real or gnostic self.

Here we see Shariati as being a perfect example of and best elaborated embodiment of the forces at work in the Iranian embeddedness. Here he, as an individual, was the name of the collective; he was an incommensurable emergence in the Iranian embeddedness. He was rhizomatically driven towards constructing a hybrid selfhood and eclectic regime of truth matching the needs of a society in a state of belated inbetweenness. To achieve such synchronization, Shariati’s leading theory was the thesis of “return to self”, whose details were further explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.

We can follow the traces of the three forces (regimes of truth) and their associated hybrid voices and faces in the realm of literature. Literature is the site where historical forces battle for territory and dominance. The literary imagination of any society is the archaeological site of battle of forces and philosophies operating in its
history (Gyekey, 1995). It is true that literature can act as history and as philosophy (see Okolo, 2007: 22-3, for example). The literature in the pre-revolutionary period attests to the active presence of the three regimes of truth and the resulting prevalence of “confusion”: as Tornesello (2011: 105) reports in his reading of Pedersen’s (2002) work:

Pedersen provides a reading of some works by three writers and intellectuals (Sadeq Cubak, Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ahmad Golshiri) of the period between the end of World War II and the Islamic revolution—one he regards as ‘a confused time, also in the field of literature’. Around this time, Iranian writers attempt to: discover what was, and still is, the core of Iranian culture and identity. The country has witnessed a progressively stronger Western influence from the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty. At the same time, an Islamic and pre-Islamic culture several thousands years old still persisted.

Literature turned into a battleground revolving around the conception of Iranainness and the three forces which could define it, as Tornesello (2011: 106) reports:

Hedayat attempts to find ‘Iranianness’ in Iran’s pre-Islamic past as well as in a chauvinistic form of nationalism. Al-e Ahmad and Golshiri point to the Islamic history of Iran as the main key to Persian identity, while Cubak questions both Islam and ‘the Pahlavi-state nationalism’ as traits of an authentic identity.

In these literary works, the dark sides of the three regime of truth and their politics of ordinary and their decadences and superficialities come under attack from the revolutionary and non-revolutionary literary voices and faces. In the battle of regimes of truth where the black book of each regime of truth becomes the centre of attack the question of “true” modernity, “true” Islam, and “true” Persianism would dominate the agenda. The bewildering permutation of voices on the true and false versions of various regimes of truth generates the immense heaviness of the ‘burden of judgement’ for the Iranian dasein and is at the heart of the Iranian state of ‘tragedy of confusion’. True modernity, for instance, is sought in libraries and laboratories rather than pubs and clubs, gambling houses and brothels (see Nasri vol 2, 2007: 25-42). The same voice is repeated in the Islamic Republic era when Soroush, for instance, calls for learning from the West of the day rather than the West of the night.
The formalist and ritualistic dimension of Islam and Persianism were equally under attack in the literary works. Vulgarities of all three regimes of truth were under attack in different works of literature. As Ahmad (1982: 296) puts it

It is important to underline that throughout the twentieth century the dominant trends in Iranian literature - political, fictional, and poetic - have been overwhelmingly reformist or socialist, democratic and, frequently anticlerical. Even Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati, who are credited with cultural and religious revivalism in contemporary Iran, were anticlerical, lay thinkers.

The literature was a battlefield for the white and black books of the three different regimes of truth and their internal divisions and contradictions. The literary works were the site of social criticism with various accents leaning towards anti-monarchy, anti-Western or anti-clerical and sometimes even anti-Tudeh and anti-Soviet orientations (Dabashi, 1993: 57, 63). The fragmentary and confused being of Iranian selfhood is most clearly expressed in the following honest and genuine assessment made by Al-e Ahmad of himself and reported by Dabashi (1993: 59), which is a clear manifestation of the state of belated inbetweenness:

"You have run for a lifetime," Al-e Ahmad once addressed himself: searched every corner, and before you reach some understanding of yourself, you have committed stupidities, have gone ways astray, banged your head on walls, and from all these you have none but fragmented records.

Despite their inevitable hybridity, each voice tried to establish its own purity. In order to defend its own ‘imaginary’ unity, identity and totality, each voice tried to disavow the presence of the alien elements in its heart and/or rename them (apellation via Persianization, Islamization, or modernization, by saying ‘Islam is Islam’, ‘modernity is modernity’, and ‘Persianism is Persianism’) and/or repress the unwanted element of the alternative regime of truth (like repressing the West of the night or Islam of jurisprudence or Persianism of formalistic poetry). Khomeini, for example, as Abrahamian, 2008: 163) reports, refused formal acknowledgement of any need for any alternative regime of truth with the following argument:

What the nation needs is an Islamic Republic – not a Democratic Republic nor a Democratic Islamic Republic. Don’t use the Western term ‘democratic.’ Those who call for such a thing don’t know anything about Islam.” He later added: “Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because
Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect.

For him, modernity without the Islamic appellation was ‘pernicious’ (Ridgeon, 2012: 127) and an iron cage depriving man of his right to spirituality and freedom from the fear of death. He frequently insisted that “We accept Western civilization, but do not accept their decadences” (Moassesseh-ye Farhangi-ye Ghadr-e Velayat, 2001: 244; added emphasis). Khomeini repeatedly changed and enriched the composition of his voice through his response to the evolving context of situation, largely through improvisation with little or no systematic attempt in symbolization, and standardization (theorization), which exposed his particular cocktail (ma’joon) to the threat of de-legitimization from rival all truth camps.

Shariati shared Khomeini’s mistrust of modernity. Shariati sees modernity in its capitalist form as a reductionist and hedonistic force intent on commodification of culture and faith, and homogenization and standardization of life on earth, depriving mankind of its spiritual biodiversity. For him capitalism equalled cultural imperialism and the death of difference and heterogeneity, manifested in turning all human being into the consuming machines in the utopia/dystopia of techno-scientific consumerist hedonistic pleasure island. Here Paz (1985: 172, added emphasis) captures Shariati’s (and Khomeini’s) concerns for pernicious homogenizing power of the West.

Our cultural crisis, for perhaps the first time in history, is the same as the crisis of our species. . . . It is not Western culture that is in danger of being destroyed tomorrow, as the cultures of the Greeks and the Arabs, the Aztecs and the Egyptians were destroyed in the past: it is man himself. The old plurality of cultures, postulating various and contrary ideals, and offering various and contrary views of the future, has been replaced by a single civilization and a single future. Until recently, history was a meditation on the many truths proposed by many cultures, and a verification of the radical heterogeneity of every society and archetype. . . . All of today’s civilizations derive from that of the Western world, which has assimilated or crushed its rivals. . . . World history has become everyone’s task, and our own labyrinth is the labyrinth of all mankind.
This passage, in effect, bemoans the emergence of modern global village under the homogenizing force of American Disneyfication (Bryman, 2004) and Mcdonaldization (Ritzer, 2012).

As such, Khomeini’s vision was in sharp contrast with the Shah’s. The Shah deployed the pseudo-scientific discourse of Aryan race and the linguistic theory of Indo-European language family to portray Iranian people’s racial affiliation with the European people and their disassociation with the Semitic race and Middle Eastern topology of neighbourhood (Zia-Ebrahimi, 2011: 450, 461). Zia-Ebrahimi (2011: 446) points to this fact by saying that

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahлавi—who had himself titled ariyâmehr, the “Light of Aryans,” a title without any previous incidence in Iranian history—declared in 1973 “Yes, we are Easterners, but we are Aryans. This Middle East, what is it? One can no longer find us there. But Asia, yes. We are an Asian Aryan power whose mentality and philosophy are close to those of the European states, above all France.”

In a private audience, he confided to then British ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons that as “Aryans,” Iranians were in fact members of the European family and that it was a mere “accident of geography” that Iran found itself in the Middle East rather than among its fellow European nations.

Each voice carried its own forms of foreclosure (inability to think the unthinkable), which due to lack of space, we were compelled to leave out of this thesis.

We extensively explored the most significant voices of this era- the voices of the Shah, Khomeini, Bazargan, Shariati, the literature, the left, and the West- but excluded them from this work due to word limitations. In the excluded section we demonstrated in details how these voices were formed out of the operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth. It is worth noting that these voices were natural species of the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness and its associated tragedy of confusion, and profoundly contributed to perpetuating the tragedy of confusion in Iran.

6.3. UNSTABLE COALITION

This section explores the logic of formation and decay, generation and degeneration of coalitions in the pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian compound context of belated
inbetweenness. Encounter with modernity and its transformative nature created the state of belatedness and necessitated and provoked various forms of collective actions to incorporate, reject or selectively adapt it to the Iranian historical background. Organizing collective actions in order to attain appropriate social changes requires the coordination of discourses, strategies and actions emanated from individual and groups, which leads to the formation of different species of coalitions.

It is worth noting that Iran is known to be the country of unstable coalitions (Nategh, 1983; Abrahamian, 1989). Coalitions appear and disappear at the speed of light; they are simultaneously easy and impossible (*sahl va momtane*). The dynamism of the formation/disintegration and degeneration/regeneration or collapse/re-formation of the coalitions was succinctly captured by the following observation from Akhavi (1983: 220; emphasis added):

*Simultaneously, shifting and even unprincipled coalitions, which have characterized the social reality of the revolution since its inception, continue to appear.* The analyst of the Iranian revolution, therefore, can only try to record the variations and *seek explanation* of their meaning in the cultural and social contexts of Iranian history.

The ‘power to affect and be affected’ among the components of three incommensurable regimes of truth engenders synthesis between highly volatile truth materials, which makes the resulting compounds highly unstable and short-lived. Contrasting and even contradictory forces, voices and faces join to form highly volatile and explosive coalitions to materialize their own brand of projects of reverse social engineering through collective actions. This dynamism bestows Iranian social fabric its two paradoxical features, factionalism and strife alongside high-level of connectivity; first we address its continuity, compactness, and convexity and then we explore its factionalism, rupture and strife.

### 6.3.1. The Convexity of the Social Space

The social space constituting of world of signification in Iran spans from the orthodox and non-orthodox modernity to Shia and Sunni Islam, and orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism. Many faces of Islam intermingle with many faces of Persianism and many faces of modernity. There are bridges and hybridities making the social space compact and connected without any structural hole (Burt, 2004) or
gap except for the gap emanating from the order of real which is due to finitude of all worlds of significations (comprising of symbolic and imaginary orders). We use the Shah and Khomeini as two pillars around which coalitions were formed; in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness all social assemblages (individuals, groups, and organizations) are different types of unstable coalitions. These two faces acted as the sites around which different forces, voices, and faces coalesced in an antagonized repositioning of regimes of truth.

It should be noted that Iranian social fabric has been continuous as everyone was linked to everyone else. The lines between various segments of Iranian social fabric and its constituent regimes of truth were not sharply drawn. Salient identities constituting the social order have not been in the zero-one or all-or-nothing forms, instead they have been configured in the fuzzy form of a continuum. In this, each face has had multiple truth affiliations and has been subjectified in manifold structures of power/knowledge, institutional arrangements, and discursive formations, and each voice was a unique synthesis of different components of alternative regimes of truth. In the language of Chehabi (1990: 223), each voice and the face carrying it has one foot in each truth camp: “the religious movements around him [i.e. Bazargan] had one foot in the Nationalist, liberal opposition to the Shah, the other in the religious camp under the leadership of Khomeini”. This premise does not only apply to Bazargan and his circle, it applies to almost every face in the Iranian social order. Hossein Nasr (2010), the prominent theorist of traditionalism and the doctrine of Islamic monarchy, acted as a bridge between the Shah’s circle and the Islamic circles like the Allameh Tatatabaei’s philosophical circle, which incorporated Ayatollah Motahhari who was the prominent member of Ayatollah Khomeini’s circle (Dabashi, 1993; Jafarian, 2007). In the above two examples Bazargan acted as a link (bonding social capital) between liberal modernity and Shia clergy, and Nasr acted as the link between monarchy and the Shia clergy. Nasr’s (2010) notion of tradition incorporated both Pre-Islamic wisdom and Islam, and unified them under the notion of search for the sacred (this unification strategy resurfaced in new form recently in the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei’s discourse).

Such connectivity indicates that the circle of links between alternative landscapes of truth was complete. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was a link between rival truth realms of Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism alongside a link to modernity through his strong connection with religious intellectuals like
Banisadr and Ebrahim Yazdi. As reported in Jafarian (2007: 390-5), Ayatollah Taleghani (and other high-profile clerics like Montazeri and Hashemi Refsanjani particularly in the pre-revolutionary era) acted as a link between Ayatollah Khomeini and Mujahedin-e Khalgh; the latter itself had developed close connections with the Marxist group Fadaiyan-e Khalgh; the link was so intense that some of the financial help collected from the traditional Shia believers of bazar by the political clerics like Rafsanjani would end up in the hands of Marxist Fadaiyan through Marxist-Islamist group Mujahedin (Jafarian, 2007: 462 and 478, footnote 1). Because Taleghani acted as a bridge between Fadaiyan Islam and Mosaddegh’s National Front in the Mosaddegh era, he effectively served as a long and multi-layered bridge between contradictory fields of truth from Mo’talefeh (who were, in a sense, the reincarnation of Fadaiyan-e Islam) to Fadaiyan-e Kalgh. As Taleghani was also a bridge between Bazaergan and Khomeini (Jafarian, 2007: 391-2), he was effectively a bridge between jurisprudential political Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini, Marxism of Mujahedin and Fadaiyan, and liberalism of Bazargan.

While Ayatollah Shariatmadari acted as a bridge between the Shah and the clergy and the wider community of Shia believers (which created rifts between him and Khomeini), Ayatollah (at the time Hojjatoleslam) Sobhani acted as a bridge between him and Ayatollah Khomeini (Jafarian, 2007: 311). Each single social assemblage whether individual, group or organization was a web of interconnections in a wider cluster and network of interconnections. The principle of ‘six degrees of separation’ in the formation of networks (West and Grigolini, 2011: 265) prevailed in the Iranian social fabric at a much tighter level. This meant that the social space could not be clearly divided into separate camps and distinct language communities and associations with clearly demarcated competing agenda for social change.

6.3.2. Factionalism

This super fluidity and conductivity of social space made it prone to astonishing levels of break-up, strife and factionalism due to the immense levels of variability afforded to the social agents to construct new voices through conversion to alternative regime of truth (changing their preferred regimes of truth) and rearrangement of the old components as primed by new context of situation. As mentioned before, faces move between various voices and, positions of pragmatism and radicalism, moderation and extremism, politics of ordinary (popular culture) and
politics of piety (high culture), black books and white books of alternative regimes of truth, and politics of mainstream and politics of streets in a dynamics of conversions and rearrangements triggered by the reorganization of forces and voices in the ever-changing context of situation. If the realm of politics is captured by a voice constituted of orthodox Persianism and orthodox modernity, for instance, a mass exodus occurs towards Islamism and non-orthodox modernity at the level of civil society.

As a result, state and society move in opposite directions due to the economy of lacks and abundances (analytic of finitude). As such, the realm of culture, for instance, may be totally dominated by the opposition forces and voices while the formal terrains of politics are captured by the incumbent one. When the state is conquered by a coalition of Islamism and non-orthodox modernity the society moves towards orthodox modernity and Persianism. When the realm of politics, for instance, is colonized by a rising new voice and a new cultural tribe, the newly defeated and marginalized voices and tribes migrate to the realm of culture, underground economy, popular culture, street politics, and colonize the realm of informality and civil society. In the Iranian society it is quite normal for the realms of politics and state to be controlled by one cultural tribe, and the realms of culture and public opinion to be dominated by an entirely different cultural tribe (see Mirsepasí, 2004 and Milani, 2011a on how the left had colonized the realm of culture, arts and literature in the Shah’s reign and how the lapsed Marxists had captured the queen’s circle and the Hoveida’s circle, for example). In this flurry of activities old connections break up and new ones emerge, culminating in the emergence of new fronts, coalitions and alliances. If one potion or cocktail does not work another is tested. The whole social order is engaged in the art of mixology and alchemy. The faces occupying the positions of radicalism of different persuasions move towards pragmatism of various colours and old pragmatists become new radicals, or new radicals from the new generation fill the seats of radicalism left vacant.

The observations made by Chehabi (1990: 307-8) attests to the high-level of volatility in the process of territorialisation/de-territorialisation (fusion/fission) in the social fabric of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness:

The radicals of 1953-63, the NRM/LMI, were the moderates in 1977-79. The selfsame people who, in 1957 and 1960, had accused the leader of the
National Front, Allahyar Saleh, of maintaining too much contact with the American embassy in Tehran now had privileged access to the U.S. ambassador, whom they tried to reassure about American interests.

This process leads to groups, societies, parties, organizations and coalitions to have short life-span. They frequently degenerate into smaller and smaller groups until they implode into nothingness. One example among many is the case of Mosaddegh’s National Front leading to the emergence of Bazargan’s Freedom Movement, itself triggering the emergence of *Mujahidin-e Khalgh* and Sahabi’s religio-nationalist group (Sahabi, 2007: 227, 248-9). Mujahidin further violently split into Marxist and Islamic factions. This particular genealogical trajectory of degeneration and regeneration had originated from Mosaddegh’s constitutionalist nationalism and ended up in radical Marxism, passing through Bazargan’s Islamic liberalism/constitutionalism and Mujahidin’s Islamic Marxism. The speed and multiplicity of mutations are bewildering and mind-blowing. Various forms of monstrosities (mutant cultural tribes) emerge from each other in a perpetual process of violent discontent, dislocation, and disorientation. The Marxist-Mujahidin (later named *Paykar*) group later divided into smaller groups until it totally vanished from the socio-political space (Behrooz, 2000: 121). Social space with high level of connectivity creates immense amount of strife, divisions and factionalism. Groups split into two (or more) and the two further split into two or more until the process leads to the total annihilation of the original entity. Simultaneously alongside these decays and collapses new forms of socio-political coalitions are fashioned under new doctrinal compounds, which after a short period of flourishing follow the same fate. As Akhavi (1983: 208) observes

Factions and splits have characterized the Iranian revolution. The cleavages are characteristic not only of relations between clerical and secular groups, as might be expected, but within the clergy itself.

The fact that the clergy is divided is affirmed by Abrahamian (1982: 436-7) and Jafarian (2007: 238-241) where, for example, Jafarian attests to at least four different orientations amongst the clerics regarding their political stances to the Shah’s regime. The same observation was made regarding the Iranian left by Alaolmolki (1987: 233): “This inability to unite is perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the
left's collective political immaturity”. In addition, Jafarian (2007: 378) reports of the split in Mo’talefeh between those who were in favour of armed resistance as opposed to those who preferred non-armed one (see also, Abdkhodaee, 1980). The same disease of excessive division was reported to have plagued the opposition of the Islamic Republic by Homayoun (2004).

There are always so many dimensions and issues, big or small, around which split can occur in the groups and organizations from foreign policy to the issue of interpretation of the Imam Hossein’s uprising against Yazid (Jafarian, 2007: 853-866) to the issue of founding cinema in Qom (Jafarian, 2007: 241, 246; Sadr, 2006: 129), for instance. In the post-revolutionary era, the anti-Shah, Khomeini-based coalition degenerated in successive stages, which was triggered by strong and weak events such as the first referendum on the nature of new political system, the rights and obligations of various ethnicities, the process of writing of the new constitution, the imposition of veiling on women in public space, the implementation of the law of retribution (qesas) in the criminal justice system, the land reform, the hostage-taking crisis, the management of Iran-Iraq war and the role of private and public sectors in the management of economy, the attempted Nouzhe coup against the system (with alleged involvement of Shariatmadari and Qotbzadeh) (see Hiro, 2011), the treatment of the political prisoners (split with Ayatollah Montazeri), the Rushdie affair (serious rift with the West), post-war reconstruction policies of liberalization and deregulation and advocacy for socio-economic freedom (the split with Hashemi Rafsanjani), and in the instigation of Khatami’s reform movement (advocacy for political freedom).

Due to affiliation to different regimes of truth and being inhabited by different hybrid voices, a wide range of conflicts appeared in the revolutionary front tearing apart the initial anti-Shah coalition. These conflicts appeared as there was no common regime of truth acting as pre-ontological riverbed, unconscious a priori (Foucault, 1970: 6), shared embeddedness and consensual background, which could serve as logic of negotiation and bargaining on rules of the game for sharing power or for ‘agreeing to disagree’ or achieving “unity without uniformity” (Zibakalam, 2008: 228). This lack of common calculus of give and take (calculus of compromise) was at the root of the excessive level of conflicts erupting immediately after the victory of the revolution as no force, voice or face could bestow legitimacy to the
radical other as their regimes of truth dictated on them to view the radical others as evil, reactionary, falsehood, infidelity (kofr) and the like.

They could not share power because their master signifiers and their associated discourses and narratives on every issue of life and its meaning and the relation to the Heideggerian fourfold of mortals, gods, earth and sky were entirely different. They belonged to the multiplicity of different language communities although each could understand a bit of the other, they were trapped in the depth of incommensurability and disjointed and fragmented forms of embeddedness producing dissonance and confusion. Banisadr (1981: 173), the first president of Iran, enumerates some of these bewildering arrays of rifts in the following terms:

conflicts between the clergy, happening also at the top level of “sources of emulation” (marjas); the conflict between new institutions and within these institutions among different orientations; creation of conflicts with the political groups while taking the position of eliminating them; the conflict between new and old institutions; the conflict within the religious-political closed circle participating in the Khomeini’s leadership; [in the cases of] provisional government of Bazargan, Islamic Republic Party and us [Banisadr’s circle], the conflict was more with provisional government in the beginning and then with both; foreign conflicts; regional conflicts; conflicts in the articulation of Islam; …. 

These conflicts caused the gradual degeneration of the original anti-Shah coalition led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Furthermore, the opposition to Khomeini’s coalition has been even more divided. Akhavi (1987: 198) alludes to this point in the following observation:

At bottom, the elite is unified enough to prevent the opposition from mounting a challenge to its rule. But this is largely due to the fragmentation of that opposition, which itself is riven with factionalism. The political system is centralized around the faqih and key judicial institutions. But the system is far from monolithic, and the contention between factions on socio-economic issues seems quite strong.

These conflicts between and within groups and coalitions often manifest themselves in the particular configuration of exchange of violence between the incumbent coalition and the opposition where the dominant coalition resorts to the physical
violence and the dominated and marginalized opposition retaliates by performing epistemic and verbal violence. One side imposes the physical restriction on the other or aims for the physical annihilation of the other and the other aims at symbolic destruction and de-legitimization of the incumbent.

The common theme is ‘demonization of the other and glorification of the self’ (Rabie, 2001: 2; Beeman, 2005) and using antagonistic language and physical violence against the radical other due to the specific functioning of the regimes of truth in the state of belated inbetweenness. Banisadr (1981: 161) captures this dynamics succinctly where he refers to both sides of the conflict embarking on the gradual process of mutual destruction in a war of attrition (*namadmali*) between his circle and the rest of Khomeini’s coalition:

> We and they, both, were using Khajeh Nasirddin-e Tusi’s method in gradually pressurizing the other to death; they were restricting the power of the president and we were discrediting them amongst different classes of people in the society. … Khomeini himself told me that you want to destroy me.

These observations demonstrate that any relation in the state of belated inbetweenness is highly unstable and volatile, and prone to inherent high dose of mistrust (Abrahamian, 1993: 4, 127-8) and sudden surge of animosity and antagonism. Alliances and friendships suddenly and unexpectedly turn sour and waves of animosity and incriminations engulf the relations. Old enemies become friends and old friends become enemies at a remarkable speed.

This is strong evidence that all socio-political groups, classes and communities whether in power or in opposition, religious or non-religious, left or right, political or non-political, within state or in civil society have been plagued by internal divisions and were subject to the dynamic working of the state of belated inbetweenness.

The dominant and driving force behind the process of coalition formation is negation and antagonism against something (a common enemy) rather than affirmative force of being for something. Basically the negation of a common enemy motivates the formation of coalitions and the affirmation of a project of reverse social engineering
prompts the disintegration of the coalitions. And this dynamics is evident in the Katouzian’s (2013: 110) description of the post-revolutionary processes:

The single unifying aim of overthrowing the Shah and the state having been achieved, it was now time for each party to try, not to share, but to grab as much as possible the spoils of the revolution. Apart from the virtually powerless liberal groups, headed by Bazargan’s provisional government, most of the players were highly suspicious of one another’s motives, hoping to try to eliminate their rivals as best they could from the realm of political power. Apart from the liberals no one was interested in sazesh (compromise), the dirty word of Iranian politics.

As we will see in the coming sections of this chapter, this dynamical process of strife and split is driven by the inherent features of the context of culture and context of situation characterized by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness and its associated warring regimes of truth and not by the bad intentions or power-hungriness or ignorance of its historical actors; the ‘no compromise solution’, frequently mentioned and lamented in the Katouzian’s writings, is due to the absence of a common logic of ‘give and take’ and ‘agree to disagree’ and lack of legitimate method of arriving at mutual recognition of all truth entrepreneurs and interlocutors (on “Compromise and Rotten Compromises”, see Margalit, 2009).

In effect, there was no legitimate logic of granting mutual recognition to each other and there was no big Other making them see and feel each other as belonging to a shared community. As such, cultural tribes with irreconcilable truth claims were fighting each other to death. This was motivated by the emergence of irreconcilable differences on all small and large issues of life, work and language, which is the natural outcome of the operations of addition and subtraction on the three regimes of truth with their internal divisions. Abrahamian (2008: 169) attests to this fact in the following observation:

Many lay people – royalists, leftists, secular nationalists, and members of the intelligentsia – tended to look down upon the clergy as out of place in the contemporary world. They certainly did not consider them capable of running a modern state.

The clergy inevitably reciprocated such negative sentiments towards almost all others from the intellectuals, to the monarchists, and the Westerners. This was the
dictates of their rival grids of intelligibility. With such mutual perceptions how could rival social assemblages compromise and cooperate with each other in a climate of freedom? Each incumbent force with any colour or persuasion would find itself ‘under siege’ from all angles. As Abrahamian (1993: 131) points out “One does not compromise and negotiate with spies and traitors [or reactionary, despotic, backward, misogynist, criminal or oppressive forces, for instance]; one locks them up or else shoots them”. How can one compromise with the forces of evil and darkness? This demonstrates that the notion of compromise is highly under-theorized, especially in the state of belated inbetweenness. Consequently, the volatility of coalitions and the existence of ‘no compromise solution’ was the inevitable default position in the state of belated inbetweenness. The highly volatile state of collation formation in Iran is summarized in the following terms: “Ann Lambton, in a much quoted work from the 1950s, remarked that "factionalism, in one form or another, has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times (Abrahamian, 1989: 113; see also Behrooz 1991, 2004; Siavoshi, 1992; Moslem, 2002).”

Akhavi (1987: 182) identifies the phenomenon of lack of internal coherence amongst the clergy (despite their homogenous education) as a paradox: “paradox is that the clerics' homogeneous training is not sufficient to ensure their unity”. The above quote ignores the role of pre-ontological background and unconscious a priori. The paradox can be resolved by noting the fact that the clergy like the rest of society is subjectified in a larger social order (in family environments, streets, and other institutional contexts through small actions, cheap talks, nonverbal gestures and postures, and habitual forms of organizations of objects), which exposes them to the variability and multiplicity of the state of belated inbetweenness. The regular raid to religious school dormitories by Ayatollah Golpaygani’s special squad to find unwarranted books and pamphlets (Jafari an, 2007) was one example of all classes of people being exposed to the rainbow properties of the Iranian worldhood.

The factions and groupings emerging in this process of degeneration and regeneration, which are endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness, do not follow the categorization and classifications pertinent to the homogenous or heterogeneous societies. Ayatollah Khomeini frequently pointed to this fact instinctively in his public speeches that the left and right in Iranian politics do not have the denotations
and connotations of classic left and right in Europe. Akhavi (1983: 209, added emphasis) confirms the point in the following terms:

“traditional labels of “leftist” and “rightist” do not serve the purpose of analysis very well. Principled coalitions, in the sense of group adherence to an internally consistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify.

6.3.3. Philosophical-Theoretical-Empirical Dimension of Coalition Formation

As it has been fully explored in this research, one of the leading reasons why the Iranians frequently failed to produce stable markets for the production of truth and wealth is their failure in producing a common logic of agree to disagree. This logic is developed when the rival voices acknowledge and even welcome the truth claims of the alternative voices and accept their status as legitimate interlocutor in the process of societal level of dialogue and deliberation; when the alternative voices cannot find a legitimate way of granting legitimacy to each other they frequently classify the radical other as the enemy and antagonize the relationship. This in turn was due to their being trapped in a catching-up and outside-in model of development and change (the state of belatedness, inducing a sense of urgency to find urgent solutions for pressing problems) alongside their deep-rooted state of inbetweenness (the fight over irreconcilable conceptions of what is the problem and what is the solution). Immersion in such a compound state frequently and inevitably calls for theoretical and philosophical contemplations on small and large issues of life, work, and language.

Throughout its long history, Iranian society could not afford to be non-philosophical and obedient to authority due to its geographical position, which made it exposed to the winds of new truths from all its geographical corners (Islami Nadooshan, 2007; Solasi, 2007, chapter 2). Geography made the constant exchange of cultures and trade in alternative regimes of truth an inevitable feature of Iranian embeddedness (Katouzian’s (2010: 10) cross-road effect). Iranian discursive home with its fragile philosophical foundation has been vulnerable to the winds of change blowing into its lands from all angles of its borders. Despite this embedded need for philosophical discursive home, the speed and urgency of change brought into the social order through encountering with the immense dynamism of modernity suppressed and side-lined philosophical and theoretical and research-based contemplations which is
by nature incredibly slow and time-consuming and painstakingly difficult to master as they required mastery over multiple vocabularies and languages spanning tumultuous terrains from the Western philosophy and sciences and literature and arts to Islamic philosophy and mysticism and theology and jurisprudence alongside deep understanding of Persian poetry and Persian house of wisdom with its vast cultural heritage.

These situational factors all worked against the reliable and constant supply of philosophical and theoretical thoughts and discourses despite the implicit and deep but hidden and unnoticed demands for them. In the state of belated inbetweenness the need for philosophical theorization and contemplation is more urgent than bread and water and eggs as it manages to produce a stable society in which bread and water and eggs can be produced and traded to feed the people. Since the production of truth is a prerequisite for the production of wealth as Foucault (1980) attests, founding a philosophical/theoretical/empirical factory (philosophical community of interlocutors) is more critical to achieving a sustainable and stable model of socio-political development and change than any physical factory.

The following section, hence, provides examples of the need for philosophical theorization which was left unmet and as a result created tragedies and crises in the Iranian social existence.

One of the clear cases of instability in group and coalition formation was the conversion in the Mujahidin organization from Islam to Marxism (Abrahamian, 1989). This event shocked the political clerics and the rest of the constituency of Islamic resistance against the Shah’s regime and created waves of mistrust and resentment between the Marxist and Islamic groups and within the Islamic movement, which erupted in violent form in the post-revolutionary era. Due to this event, as Chehabi (1990: 215; see also Zibakalam, 2008: 269) observes, “the unity of the Islamic movement in Iran was broken”; the deep roots of conversion revolved around the philosophical foundations of Marxism as the science of resistance (elm-e mobarezech) and on the philosophy of history and the nature of modern world and property rights and class war and the role of belief in metaphysical entities like God and the hereafter and the angles in this structure.

It should be mentioned that the Mujahidin were tested by Khomeini in their philosophical foundations and were rejected as un-Islamic (Haghshenas, 2012;
The problem was that there was no strong religious philosophical alternative to the Marxist option and the conversion to Marxism for the militant forms of resistance was almost inevitable, as they were in urgent need of ready-made philosophical packages to legitimize and guide their resistance against the Shah’s regime and its Western backers. The tension between the two sides of the resistance divide was clear in “the state of prison in prison”, as described by Mohommadi Gorgani (2005; see also Jafarian, 2007; Zibakalam, 2008: 265-6 and 270-2), and the bitter strife between the fiqh-based religious and Marxist sides of resistance, where the religious side would count them as untouchables (najes) (Abrahamian, 1999: 111; Abrahamian, 1993: 46), while the Marxist side would bitterly complain about it and treat the religious side as backward and reactionary and metaphysical (a kind of modern najes).

This was deeply related to the issue of piety of unbelief (Fraser, 2002; Shang, 2006) and the question of whether unbelievers, in their search for truth, can attain truth through their thoughts and actions (see Jafarian, 2007: 392, footnote 1 on Taleghani’s understanding of the piety of unbelief). This is, at a larger scale, related to the status of man as man and not as believer and ultimately the relation between the path travelled by mankind and the path travelled by prophets (rah-e anbiya va rah-e bashar) (Chehabi, 1990: 78, 211; Abrahamian, 1989: 92). The questions over the nature of science and modern world, metaphysics, good society, Islamic jurisprudence, its method of inference and the nature of reality, knowledge and truth and ultimately between two incommensurable regimes of truth of non-orthodox modernity (Marxism) as a science of resistance and Islam as a science of salvation and eternal happiness, were at the heart of these conflicts inside and outside the prison in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras.

The questions tabled by Ayatollah Talaghani’s son’s letter (Jafarian, 2007: 487-8; Taleghani’s son was amongst those who had converted to Marxism) indicate the genuine ideological and philosophical problems facing every concerned soul at the time (see also Zibakalam, 2008: 270 on the deep ideological problems of Mujahidin). To satisfy these philosophical needs, lay study groups emerged at all levels. The militant groups called such make-shift theoretical activities as the act of organizing the revolutionary ideology (Zibakalam, 2008: 266-9); the truth was that except for Ayatollah Tabatabei’s work there was no substantial philosophical treatise on the fundamental questions of life, work, and language and as such there was not
adequate indigenous and owned knowledge upon which the Islamic revolutionary ideology could be built (see also Sahabi, 2007: 297). Lack of philosophical capital showed itself in the subsequent conflict and violent rift, which emerged in the Mujahidin organization (Abrahamian, 1989: 148). The deep philosophical and ideological issues had been previously buried under the urgency of pressing issues of anti-regime movement (Zibakalam, 2008: 118). Once again the impatience induced by the outside-in model of change and development, the urgency to find a blueprint for the rescue of the nation from imagined or real threat of annihilation and collapse, took precedence over the deeper unresolved philosophical and theoretical questions on the main questions related to life, work and language.

The emergence of various forms of study groups (Molavi, 2002: 50; Boroujerdi, 1996: 91; Taghavi, 2005; Jafraina, 2007; Zibakalam 2008) like "the new Shahnameh discussion group", ‘the Quran study group’ or ‘the Western philosophy discussion group’ is one of the common phenomena of the modern history of Iran, where they functioned as quick make-shift hospitals in the middle of truth war zones to treat the philosophical and theoretical injuries and illnesses induced by the encounter with modernity and in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness, where the ideological blueprints for a successful transformation were quickly assembled. The theoretical activists were almost all lay philosophers and theorists. As these activities were conducted in isolation and without a dynamic knowledge community and in the atmosphere of urgency without calm and measured national dialogue they would soon run into trouble and collapse.

The attacks launched by Ayatollah Motahhari on Shariati for not knowing adequate level of Islamic sciences (Jafarian, 2007: 545, note 5) alongside the attacks launched by Shayegan (1992: 124) on Motahhari for not knowing adequate level of Western philosophy and the attacks launched by Taheri (2010: 234) on Khomeini for not knowing adequate level of Persian poetry and lacking mastery over Persian language and Persian house of wisdom demonstrate the complex picture and the daunting task of founding philosophical and theoretical production line in the Iranian context of belated inbetweenness, requiring respect for and mastery over multiple traditions of scholarship and erudition. Basically, the particular hyper-complex discursive formation associated with the state of belated inbetweenness demanded that on any issue one has to follow the pattern of ‘Kant said that’, ‘Imam Ali said that’, and ‘Ferdowsi said that’ and be able to theoretically justify such a hybrid approach to
constructing a line of argument; otherwise the label of *lakkategi* (whoredom) and monstrosity was ready to be stuck by the puritans of all sides. Bazargan and Shariati were examples of such hybrid approach without being able to methodologically justify their adopted mode of reasoning.

The socio-political concerns over reaching the promised lands of modernity as quickly and smoothly as possible overshadowed the philosophical ones. Few had the patience and tolerance for philosophical and theoretical contemplations. Non-philosophical approach is the hallmark of outside-in model of change, which can work in one context of culture like Japan and not in another one like Iran, which has had a long tradition of philosophical thought (*see* Malkam Khan, 1891). The poverty of philosophical thought both in the religious schools (*see* Dabashi 1993, Jafarian 2007, Legenhausen, 2007:171, for the perils of teaching philosophy in religious seminaries) and in universities and intellectual circles was at the heart of violence of conversion of large segment of Mujahidin to Marxism (and later conflicts of all against all in the post-revolutionary era, and the reverse conversions of Marxists to the ideology of Islamic Republic in the Khomeini era; *see* Javadzadeh; 2011), which exacerbated the deep mistrust permeating the Iranian social space as Mohammadi Gorgani (2005) reports, where he was suspected of attempting to convert top clerics like Ayatollah Montazeri and Taleghani into Marxism in the guise of his apparent adherence to Islamic ideology and rituals.

Bizarrely and ironically Khomeini’s political Islam managed to capture and convert, at least politically, significant sections of Marxist groups (*see* Javadzadeh; 2011) while a few years back Mujahidin-e Khalgh were captured by the Marxists. This demonstrates the multilateral truth wars between the Shah and the West with the Islamists and Marxists and liberals and Persianist nativists and how fast people could change sides in this truth war. Paradoxically, the Revolution led to total annihilation of the left, a bitter reality which was addressed by Alaolmolki (1987: 218):

Why did the Iranian left cease to exist as a major political factor so soon after the revolution, given the role it played in its inception? There were two principal factors in the author's view. The first was the leftists' debilitating organizational factionalism and the alienation of the middle class leftist intellectual elite from its mass following. The second was an external factor—-the lack of both political and ideological cohesion on the part of Marxism-Leninism as an international movement. As long as the Iranian left remained underground, the significance of these factors remained latent and unfelt.
With the advent of the revolution and the surfacing of the left, however, they became manifest. Paradoxically, the left seemed unable to survive the fulfilment of one of its chief wishes.

Any new leftist group would soon divide into a number of mini groups in successive waves of divisions due to theoretical differences in their positions on various aspects of national and international issues and events.

Akhavi (1983: 220) observes how the prevalence and depth of division amongst all social assemblages in the Iranian social order including the clergy had roots in philosophical and theoretical issues:

The very high degree of factionalism exhibited by social actors in the Iranian revolution is complicated, furthermore, by the tendency of individuals to have differing orientations within a particular ("leftist," "moderate," or "rightist") perspective. Thus, on a variety of issues, including communal relations, due process, civil rights, constitutionalism, autocracy, corruption, and intraelite relations, a high level of conflict has been characteristic of the last five years.

Harmon (2005: 67) follows where Akhavi has led:

The mullahs disagreed on so many things that they left the average Iranian in a state of fear and confusion.

Bashiriyeh (2009: 35-6) makes an observation along the same line:

the clerical ruling elite differed over a number of important issues ranging from cultural and economic policies to how to interpret the laws of Islam.

As these observations indicate each individual, whether a cleric or an intellectual or a poet or a monarchist or an ordinary citizen, is a unique hybrid of forces and voices; they all take different positions on any and every single issues facing the social order. The following passage is the self-description of an ordinary citizen, an educated professional, reported by Molavi (2002: 45, 49), who is the perfect example of a society of selves, Hedayat’s notion of lakkategi, and an explosive cocktail of various materials from alternative regimes of truth (what Iranians colloquially call
shotor-gav-palang or camel-cow-tiger, as the effect of bricolage and the act of improvisation):

Mr. Ghassemi described himself succinctly, in short, declarative sentences: "I am a nationalist. I revere Mossadeq. I despise our clergy, but I have religious faith in a Sufi [mystical] way. Reza Shah, our greatest king, was right to attack our clergy. Ferdowsi is our greatest poet. He rescued our Iranian identity when the Arabs tried to swallow us." … "I admired Khomeini for his bravery in standing up to the Shah, but I didn't think the clergy should run our government."

This causes the individuals, as unstable coalitions, to join a coalition for a while and leave it soon afterwards. This dynamism is starkly manifest in the figure of Khomeini himself, as alluded by Brumberg (2001: 98, added emphasis), when, in late 1983, he stated publicly that he was not above making mistakes and admitted the time-inconsistency of his positions and tried even to theorize it and make a virtue of the property of ‘one man, many voices’: “I may have said something yesterday, changed it today, and will again change it tomorrow”.

Another example of the urgent need for philosophical and theoretical products is when the Shah ordered ideological and theoretical foundations of his Resurrection Party (Hezb-e Rastakhiz) of 1975 to be formulated based on the principle of dialectics. As Milani (2011a: 383) reminds us:

The Shah, strangely, ordered the new party ideology to be based on “dialectics,” which opened the door for both lapsed Marxists and Heideggerian anti-Semites to legitimately leave their dialectical mark on the party.

Here again the belated model of outside-in form of change and reverse social engineering alongside a logic of demand-supply was at work. Here the Shah ordered a philosophical product (like a ordering a jet to his American ally), and philosophical entrepreneurs of Marxists orientation were supposed to supply it. Rather than an evolutionary process of philosophical developments and exchanges flourishing into a manifesto for political party, the outside-in model of intelligent design was initiated from the need to import the ideas and institutions of political party to the country to attain both modern legitimacy and its effectiveness as a rational tool of governance; as such the Shah ordered its construction like the construction of a dam or a steel
mill and by the miracle of intelligent design it was supposed to be based on the principle of dialectics. The Shah’s desire for dialectics was not strange, contrary to what Milani (2001a: 383) says, as it was part of the intellectual fad at the time and Marxism had the ideological hegemony in the realm of culture and literature amongst the opposition forces even among the religious ones like Mujahedeen and more importantly Shariati. This was part of larger process of eclecticism (Hedayat’s *lakkategi*) inspired by the compound state of inbetweeness-belatedness.

This demonstrates that while Persianism had captured the political realm, Marxism had large influence in the cultural terrain (Mirsepasi, 2004: 230-1; Matin-Asgari, 2004: 46). The Shah like all voices in the Iranian context of inbetweeness opted to construct an ad-hoc synthesis of the best of modernity, Islam and Persianism under the umbrella of master signifier of orthodox Persianism and monarchy. Amongst the best of others was socialism which was incorporated in his project of White Revolution and now he wanted to incorporate dialectics into the philosophical foundation of his new party to bestow it an aura of intellectual grandeur and respectability and to disarm the opposition from their prized intellectual tool, dialectics. Furthermore, dialectics as a methodology would fit the oppositional thinking of the Shah and his war of ‘good against evil’ against the red and black reactionaries. What was lacking was a logic of difference.

This need for ideologues and theorists opened a demand for philosophical thinking of people like Fardid and also lapsed Marxists (Milani, 2011a: 382-3). This in turn demonstrates the deep and unassailable demand for viable and potent philosophical and theoretical thinking in Iran due to its state of belated inbetweeness and being immersed in the warring regimes of truth alongside its long history and tradition of philosophical thinking. The outside-in model of social change, and the urgency and impatience to transform the country alongside the need to import the best from the West which results from universalist mode of thinking inhibits the development of a viable philosophical community amongst Iranians, which could organically combine the languages of modernity, Islam and Persianism.

The urgency of the state of belatedness prohibited Iranians from developing deep philosophical thinking in an evolutionary process of dialogue and exchange in the spontaneous market for philosophical and theoretical thinking on the big questions of life and existence from ontology to political philosophy, as they always had to
assemble something quickly to satisfy the needs of different political projects of reverse social engineering, which itself was innocently triggered by the state of belatedness. The urgency of the situation gives the quality of ad-hocness to the philosophical products and eradicates the role of vanishing mediators, which seriously harms their credibility and viability and as a result, they become perishable and disposable products; by the time they arrive at the market they are already out of fashion as better and newer products are available in the Western market of philosophy and theory. The breakdown in Shariati-Motahhari collaboration with violent ramifications is another example of the need for philosophical theorization, the detailed analysis of which was excluded from this thesis due to word limitations.

In an attempt of providing more substance, the fate of different coalitions were extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations; the excluded section was the extensive study of the logic of coalition formation in the context of a series of strong and weak events leading to the generation and degeneration of different species of coalitions which spontaneously emerged in the landscape of Iranian social order. As the Islamic revolution was the outcome of the clash between the Shah’s coalition and the Khomeini’s coalition, their features and properties were extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations; the excluded section also addressed the Shah’s coalition with the clergy, the intelligentsia, the people and the West in details alongside pondering on the properties of the Shah’s selfhood as an unstable coalition. The excluded section further explored the Khomeini’s coalition with the clergy and the intellectuals like Bazargan and Shariati and the left.

6.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

In this section we explore how tragedy of confusion and formation of unstable coalitions lead to institutional failure, failure in building viable and functional institutions, which could bestow predictability to the social transactions in the realms of life, work, and language. The process of institutional building was frequently aborted, reversed, halted or informally ignored. This section focuses on how the attempts to build viable institutions in different realms of life, work, and language ends up in failure due to the confusions and contradictions arising from the particularities of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness. We start with examining the
institution of nationhood and then move briefly to the institution of state and leave the rest of institutions out of this work due to word limitations.

6.4.1. The Formation of the Sense and Institution of Nationhood

With the Islamic Revolution, the project of Islamization of all walks of life including the narratives and institutional arrangements associated with nationhood took precedence over two other enveloping projects of modernization and Persianization. Once again, the sense of nationhood became the battleground for alternative regimes of truth and their corresponding hybrid voices; different voices desired to build the new house of being based on different composition of resources from the three regimes of truth with different priorities and different architecture and different appellation. In the Khomeini coalition, the sense of nationhood needed to be rebuilt based on Islam, modernity and Persianism, in that order. As such the Khomeini’s project of nationalism was a form of Islamic nationalism in contradistinction to Persianist nationalism of the Shah and his father and the modernist nationalism of the constitutionalists, Mosaddegh and Bazargan (for the notion of Islamic nationalism, see Martin, 2013: 6, 27; Fazeli, 2006: 14, 167).

It is worth noting that Khomeini’s coalition did not challenge the legitimacy of modernity’s project of nationhood per se, instead it opted to subsume it under the project of Islamic universalism, entailing the ultimate formation of a unified Islamic ummah. This is evident in the following excerpt from one of Khomeini’s speeches, as reported in Algar (1981: 302):

“To love one’s fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim nations, is something quite different” and contrary to the Qur’an and Muhammad’s teachings.

In this sense, the formation of the Iranian Shia nation in the short-run was a stepping stone towards the eventual formation of larger Islamic ummah in the long-run. As such, for Khomeini Islamic nationalism would not necessarily come into conflict with Islamic internationalism (see Sheikh, 2003: 60-1), although their relations have remained largely unarticulated and poorly theorized. The issue revolved around how
to coordinate the national interests with the interests of global Islamic ummah and the rights and obligations of being part of global international order, dominated by modernity.

At the civilizational level (international order), the new order had to act within the limits of a nation-state while at the cultural level it needed to act globally in support of the oppressed of the world, the Muslim ummah, and the Shia community. These contrasting levels of affiliations frequently came into conflict with each other and it was not clear at what context what aspect needed to be prioritized over what for what reason. The issues of Rushdie affair and support for Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraqi Shia are examples of acting within global Muslim and Shia communities which came into direct conflict with what was perceived to be the national interests. As such, the conflict can arise at the international, Muslim, Shia and national levels. But such apparent conflicts were deemed by the Khomeini coalition to be based on parochial modern pursuit of materialist national interests, while in the long run the Islamic internationalism could be harmonized with the Islamic nationalism (note that even modern nation-states sometimes sacrifice their narrow national interests for the preservation of modern international order, like entering the coalition of the willing, which is deemed to be in line with their national interests in the long-run).

This becomes even more complex as at the national level what perceived to be the interests of the system (nezam), revolution (enghelab), the leadership (rahbari), the clergy, and various institutions do not easily coincide with the interests of the nation as a whole. This becomes even more hyper-complex when we factor in the fact that how the national interests are defined and prioritized based on economic, political or cultural measures (the defence of faith, welfare or independence of the nation) is perpetually contested and differs at time 2 depending on what the priority had been in time 1. This entanglement of issues is further exacerbated by noting the fact that the notion of ‘interest’ itself is heavily contested and is contrasted with the notion of ‘service’ (like in famous Beheshti’s statement with regard to being the devotees of service).

As such, whatever is done by whoever in the realm of national interest is severely contested and de-legitimized, leading to a dysfunctional institution of nationhood. Making a coherent and consensual doctrine of national security and national interest out of such an explosive cocktail of truth materials and resources is a monumental
task requiring long-term investment in philosophical and theoretical capital, which can be owned by the nation through a process of national and international dialogue. The big Others of national and international variety has to bestow ‘recognition’ to such a hybrid national entity.

To see how daunting the task is, we explore a few facts. Islamic universalism, for example in the form of commitment to fight against global arrogance and support for the dispossessed of the world is enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic (Reda, 2014: 135; Buchta, 2001: 335), which counters the modernity’s universalism, demonstrating that both have their own projects of nationalism. While modernity has formed its own nation-states working within larger modern ummah (modern international order at large and so-called free world at smaller scale), Islam could develop an aspiration to form its own Islamic nations working within a larger Islamic ummah as a cultural and civilizational bloc. Both modernity and Islam share the sense of being exceptional (exceptionalism) and are strikingly similar in their desire to convert others to their brand of truth (expansionsm) (Vucetic, 2011: 30). The Persianist model shares the property of exceptionalism (seeing the pre-Islamic Persia as an exceptional form of civilization and culture) but lacked the proselytizing feature of expansionism (although there were traces of it in the ideology of Aryan race, attempting to create family affiliations between Persian civilization and the European one). As such it is important to avoid the common mistake frequently committed by almost all analysts in the form of contrasting Islam with nationalism, as Islam possesses its own brand of nationalism as well as its own brand of internationalism (this applies equally to modernity and Persianism).

In the project of Islamic nationalism, Shia Islam was nominated as the main ingredient from which the sense of nationhood needed to be rebuilt; modernity (in the will to modernization as manifested in the selective adoption of elements such as constitutional arrangements, election mechanism, techno-scientific rationality, etc.) was also used under the umbrella of Islam to construct a viable sense of nationhood. In addition, Persianism was either reluctantly embraced or largely suppressed or used strategically in certain contexts to enhance the viability and acceptability of the other two main ingredients. For Khomeini, the affiliation to the pre-Islamic Iran or a secular Iran was largely a sign of return to the age of paganism and ignorance (Rubin, 2002: 118; Taheri, 2010: 54-6), and for him the salient character of Iranian people was their unconditional love and affection for Shia Islam, as manifested in
their passionate affiliations to the rituals of Ashura and Ramadan, among others. As such, for him, the Shia-based Islamic names, narratives, symbols, holidays, rituals and other forms of discursive and non-discursive practices were bound to form the main materials upon which the Iranian national identity were meant to be institutionalized. The selective components of modernity and Persian regimes of truth were absorbed into the mix, guided by the need to strengthen and decorate the basic Islamic architecture of the Iranian nationhood.

In the project of Islamic nationalism, the Iranian people were praised only as far as they showed their good taste by unconditional embracement of (Shia) Islam and by prioritizing it over everything else. “The President has to travel in the path of Islam; if he opts to move against Islam and the whole nation support him”, Khomeini in 1981 declared (Gharaviyan, 2012), “I would single-handedly stand up to them” (see also Banisadr, 1981). In Khomeini’s voice, the unconditional prioritization of will to modernization was the sign of selection of paganism and ignorance, equivalent to Sen’s (1982) notion of “rational fools”, over the eternal happiness promised by the Islamic faith. The revolutionary slogan of ‘neither the East nor the West’ (na sharghi na gharbi) summarized the policy of non-reliance on any form of modernity—whether communism or capitalism— as the main overriding component of the project of ‘nationalizing Iran’.

The issue of the coordination between general and local preference structure becomes a matter of dispute and strife within all forms of nationalization. In Khomeini’s project of nationalizing Iran, Persianist components are sacrificed for the modern and the modern components are sacrificed for the Islamic ones when the survival of the whole system is at stake. When such threat is not pressing, the order of preference can be revered locally and modern or Persianist components can be temporarily given precedence over the Islamic ones. The guiding principle in the project of Islamization is, hence, the dominance of Islam in the definition of nationhood; elements of modernity and Persianism could be synchronized with Islam and assimilated under its linguistic and non-linguistic integrity and appellation as much possible, and when conflicts arise the elements perceived to be in opposition to the content and form of Islam are discarded and suppressed.

The clear example is hijab (veiling) which spontaneously emerged as the sign of Islamic Revolution in the latter stages of the Shah’s reign and was formally
reinforced as the flag of new sense of nationhood after the victory of the revolution (Sedghi, 2007; Paidar, 1995). The economic and social participation of those national and international voices openly objecting Islamic veiling was sacrificed for the preservation of this salient feature of Islamic character of the nation. In this, veiling, effectively, emerged as the emblem of the nation. For the Khomeini’s coalition the legalized use of veiling in public space (the institution of veiling), like wearing ring in a marriage, served as a “commitment device” (Frank, 2001: 57; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 177) and was the sign that Iran was permanently wedded to Islam in rejection of other possible suitors; it was a public sign, which differentiated Iran as a nation in the family of nations from any other nation on the face of the earth.

It can therefore be argued that veiling effectively served as the national flag in the post-revolutionary era (Sedghi, 2007: 210). As a result of the Islamisation project, large sacrifices were made in terms of lost economic growth due to lack of foreign direct investment, inflow of capital, and brain drain and capital flight of Iranians who were objecting to, among others, the forced public veiling law (Amid and Hadjikhani, 2005: 89, 188; Carrington and Detragiache, 1998). As Gordon et al. (2008: 162) maintain “The fact that Iran also experiences a significant brain drain of educated professionals is both a symptom and cause of the nation's difficulties”.

Here we see how the Foucauldian relation between the production of truth and the production of wealth works; the failure in the production of consensual ‘truth about’ veiling (and its hyper-complex relation to sexuality, femininity and masculinity, nationhood and their relations to the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth), among others, was directly translated into the failure in the production of wealth through brain drain and other mechanisms.

For the project of Islamic nationalism this sacrifice was worthwhile in order to preserve the Islamic identity of the nation. Legalizing veiling was an act of defiance towards the decadence of the big Other of the Western modernity with its over-sexualisation of public life and its celebration of impermanence of the body (Crooke, 2009). Resistance towards veiling (Afary, 2009) was an act of defiance (Khosravi, 2008) against the big Other of the Islamic order with its over-spiritualization of public life and celebration of the permanence of the soul through its jurisprudential formalism. One was resisting the panoptical gaze of the West and the other
‘panoptical gaze of the ayatollah and his authoritarian God’ (Afary, 2009: 268). There were multiple levels of multilateral misunderstanding at work here. The emergence of veiling as the flag of Islamic nationalism in the Khomeini’s project of nationalizing Iran is the mirror image of the emergence of unveiling as the flag of Persianist nationalism in the Pahlavi’ project of nationalization (Najmabadi, 2005: 150). The imposition of veiling led to the guerrilla war between women and the morality police and the emergence of the phenomenon of bad veiling or mal-veiling (bad-hejabi) (Sedghi, 2007: 211; Kusha, 2002: 249-50; Moaveni, 2005), leading to the emergence of the dysfunctional institution of veiling, which can be treated as a symbol of all forms of dysfunctionalities and deformities resulting from the act of reverse social engineering. As a result, the zombies of Westernization and Persianization have returned through “politics of resistance” (Holliday, 2011: 155) to haunt the Islamic Republic the way the zombie of Islamism had returned to haunt the Shah’s Persianist order (Crooke, 2009). As both veiling and unveiling were the outcome of reverse social engineering lacking adequate and irreversible level of legitimacy and consensus, their corresponding institutionalized forms of Islamic and Persianist nationalism were plagued by debilitating forms of deformities and dysfunctionalities.

However, within the framework of Islamic nationalism, when the Islamic dimension is not ‘under siege’, some elements of Persianism or modernity may be given local precedence over the Islamic ones; some concessions can be made and/or the system can turn a blind eye towards them. This is evident in the example presented by Molavi (2002: 50), where in 1992

He [President Rafsanjani] invited scholars from around the world to discuss the poet [Ferdowsi] and praised Ferdowsi’s work lavishly himself. A shrewd move, it said; "Look, people of Iran, we clergy also love Ferdowsi."

This kind of local concession, however, is very unstable, as the incorporation of Ferdowsi and his Shahnameh as ‘the Quran of Persianism’ is a monumental theoretical task, far beyond the capability of a pragmatic figure like Rafsanjani or anyone else in the system. As a result, such pragmatic movements are vehemently attacked by radicals of all sides as signs of illegitimate forms of syncretism or eclecticism (elteqat) (Naficy, 1993: 18-24. 127), reminiscent of Hedayat’s lakkategi.
Such promiscuous movements have the features of one-night stand or at best temporary marriage (*sigheh*) rather than permanent marriage of love and mutual commitment. Lacking adequate theoretical foundations, the credibility of such movements is fiercely challenged by radicals of all sides. This leads to zigzag movements in the cultural policy of all sides of the truth divide (see Fazeli, 2006). Due to being the outcome of reverse social engineering, such policies and positions are reversed and aborted under the immense pressure from the radicals (or pragmatists) of all sides. As such, any form of hybridity was accused of not being a ‘true’ Muslim, a ‘true’ modern, or a ‘true’ Persianist. Consequently no policies, whether in favour or against the three Qurans of the Iranian *dasein*, become stable.

One of the prominent examples of Khomeini giving the modern and Persianist sides of the equation prominence over the Islamic side is in the case of Jalaladdin Farsi (Moin, 1999: 233) who was selected to be the candidate of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) against Banisadr in the first post-revolutionary presidential election. It was reported to Khomeini that Farsi’s father was born in Afghanistan. Abrahamian (1993: 15) refers to this episode in the following terms:

> He increasingly spoke of the Iranian fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot, and the honorable people of Iran. He even disqualified one of his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential elections on the grounds that his father had been born in Afghanistan. The nationalistic language, together with the use of exclusively Shiite symbols and imagery, helps explain why the Khomeinists have had limited success in exporting their revolution.

As a result, Khomeini vetoed Farsi’ nomination because of his questionable nationality; this deprived IRP from a strong candidate (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011) and changed the history of the Islamic Republic in a drastic fashion. In this case, Khomeini opted to give precedence to the modern and Persianist dimension over the Islamic dimension (Farsi’s father was part of Islamic international community).

In the writing of the new constitution, the same debate on the conditions required for presidency was reported in Montazeri’s memoire (Montazeri, 2001: 454). Khomeini deemed granting such concession to the modern and Persianist dimensions not to be detrimental to the survival of the Islamic nature of the whole system and as such he allowed the local dominance of the other two dimensions over the Islamic one. But
in hindsight, this choice had a butterfly effect on the fate of the system, as the collision between IRP and Banisadr plunged the Islamic Republic into its first huge internal conflict just two years after its birth. Before vetoing Farsi’s candidacy Khomeini had vetoed Ayatollah Beheshti’s candidacy due to him being a cleric and Khomeini, at that stage, not wanting for the executive posts to be occupied by the clergy (Banisadr, 1981: 255; Brumberg, 1997: 50; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011). It was likely that had Farsi’s candidacy been approved by Khomeini overriding the terms of constitution on the requirement for the president to be native citizen of Iran, using his power of issuing fatwa, the IRP machine would have worked for Farsi to be elected rather than Banisadr and the Islamic Republic would have been likely to avoid having its first devastating crisis, namely, the impeachment of its first president, Banisadr (Ehteshami, 1995: 12; Mohajerinejad, 2010: 123).

The issue of synchronization between general and local preferences creates a great deal of tension and conflict within the Islamization project as different faces are invested with and inhabited by different hybrid voices with various threshold of sensibility for Islam, modernity, and Persianism. As a result, different voices undermine the dominant voice and attempt to capture the centre and reverse the policy or enhance it, which itself provokes new rounds of opposition and new sources of instability. Ultimately no stable sense of nationhood can emerge out of this process where the three identity markers of Islam, modernity, and Persianism can be peacefully and irreversibly synchronized. The zigzagging between alternative identity markers became evident, for instance, in Khomeini’s use of his Iranian national passport to enter France with a tourist visa where no Islamic country would accept him as an Islamic religious leader when he was expelled from the Saddam Hossein’s Iraq at the request of the Shah. After the revolution, Khomeini’s coalition insisted on his identity as a religious leader of Shia and Islamic international community when they invited the Iraqi Shia people to rebel against the Saddam’s regime, ignoring his identity as the formal leader of the post-revolutionary nation (Pollack, 2004: 184). In a sense, the ambiguity and confusion over Islamic nationalism and Islamic internationalism or pan-Islamism and how they interacted with other forms of nationalism and internationalism was one of the conditions of possibility of the Iran-Iraq war.

Montazeri (2006) perceives as one of his own mistakes not to have taken the idea of sending political envoys to different countries to assure them of Iran’s non-
threatening stance towards the international order and towards the individual countries, while at the same time Khomeini had given precedence to his Islamic identity as the Marja for the Shia and Muslims of the world over his identity as the leader of Iranian nation in the family of nations. The two regimes of truth required two different sets of discursive and non-discursive practices; while Khomeini wanted to prioritize his Islamic dimension over his Iranian dimension, Montazari, although not simultaneously but later on, favoured to act upon the notion of national interest (although Banisadr (1981) simultaneously favoured the policy of promoting détente with the Iraqi regime) and work within the limits of Islamic nationalism. The conflicts and ambiguities between the three dimension of Khomeini’s character and his prioritization of the Islamic dimension over the modern and Persianist dimensions was ultimately one of the contributing factor in the Saddam Hossein’s decision to attack Iran and the 8-year war between the two Muslim and largely Shia nations (Montazeri, 2001: 438 vol. 1).

Another example of such tension disrupting the détente policy with Europe was the case of Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie (Malik, 2009), which led to the withdrawal of European ambassadors from the country, exacerbating the reputation of Iran as a pariah state in the international order (Taheri, 2010: 229), which had already been triggered by the hostage crisis. The constant tension over how to define the relation with Israel (Parsi, 2008) is another manifestation of the tensions and conflicts among the three projects of nationalizing Iran, with distinct and contrasting conceptions of national interests and classification of friends and foes.

As such, the issue of how the two notions of affiliation to international Shia and Islamic community and commitment to the national interest of a modern nation can be reconciled was a matter of constant tension and a source of destabilization in the establishment of a stable institutionalized conception of nationhood (see Farhi, 2007; Ahmadi, 2007, among others). The issue revolves around how to synchronize the requirements of formal politics of modern nationhood organized in the family of nations inside the international order with its associated systems of rights and obligation with the street politics of affiliation with the Shia and Islamic

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42 There is a potential tension between Shia and Islamic dimensions as well as Shia and Sunni divisions may come to conflict with each other, which Khomeini’s coalition strived to curb through their doctrine of Shia-Sunni unity which was pursued both at jurisprudential level by viewing Shia as another school at the same level of the four other jurisprudential schools in the Sunni denomination and at political level; see Jafarian, 2007.
international community, and even wider global community of the dispossessed (Emadi, 2001).

Ironically, the label adopted for the new post-revolutionary order fully depicts the destabilizing tension between alternative identity markers and how such a tension prevents the institutionalization of the notion of nationhood. The new label is ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’. Taheri (2010: 76) calls it a “strange beast” and “a triple lie on a grand scale”, which is, once again, reminiscent of Hedayat’s notion of *lakkategi*, equivalent to a form of illegitimate monstrosity. The three notions of Islamic, Republic and Iran were put together in an apparently unified whole at the level of appellation and imaginary order. The notion of ‘Islamic’ refers to the Islamic dimension of Iranian embeddedness which immediately brings the whole Islamic regime of truth with its affirmative and negating dimension in the equation. The notion of ‘Republic’ refers to the modern dimension of Iranian embeddedness with its own discursive and non-discursive practices while the label ‘Iran’ refers to the Persianist and pre-Islamic dimension of Iranian identity with its association with the ‘Aryan race’ and its orthodox and non-orthodox regimes of truth in Persian monarchy and its “tradition of prudent statecraft that has been created by centuries of experience in international affairs beginning with Cyrus the Great more than 2,000 years ago” (Ramazani, 2009: 13) and its Persian language and Persian poetry.

As Holliday (2011: 155) attests “the idea of the Islamic Republic itself is contested. This has been evident since the establishment of the Islamic Republic”. The lexicographic ordering is organized in terms of Islam, modernity and Persianism (creating the possibility of six forms of permutations, amounting to many more when the internal divisions between orthodox and non-orthodox and other forms of difference within and between truth camps come into play). The monumental task of synchronizing these three regimes of truth with the significant phenomena of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ these identity markers causes frequent derailment of the project of institutionalization of any construction of the sense of nationhood. The deep tension between these different regimes of truth manifested themselves in the adoption of national flag, national anthem, national calendar (Moaddel, 1993: 63), personal appearance (Molavi, 2002: 87), street names (Taheri, 2010: 67) and the selection of national holidays and the selection of names for the new-borns (Abrahamian, 2008). This also reflected in the language policy on how to prioritize the relation between three languages of Farsi (Persian), Arabic, and
Each one of these symbols of modern nationality has been the site of immense level of hostility between and within truth camps, leading to revolutionary steps of reversal and abortion of any attempts made for institutionalization of the sense of nationhood under these symbols. This is due to the fact that no particular adoption of these particular symbols of modern nationhood gains irreversible popularity at a consensual level; any adoption is immediately attacked and the grinding process of de-legitimization is initiated and the process of ‘death by a thousand cuts’ and ‘war of attrition’ (namadmali) starts. This is due to the state of belatedness, which prompts the search for quick solutions for pressing issues of social order. The case of adopting a national calendar is a perfect example demonstrating the dilemmas and paradoxes of synchronization of different regimes of truth in a viable and stable institution.

In the pre-revolutionary era, the Shah became so confident on the stability and viability of his particular model of nationhood that he embarked on changing the national calendar from the solar-based Islamic one (already experienced a change from lunar-based Islamic one by Reza Shah, his father) to a monarchy-based calendar which immediately outraged the Islamic sensibility of the clergy and different layers of Iranian society. Abrahamian (2008: 152) points to the Shah’s attempts to further enhance the materialization of his vision of Iran, while

… denouncing the clergy as “black medieval reactionaries”; and, in declaring Iran to be on the road to the Great Civilization, supplemented the Muslim calendar, including Reza Shah’s solar model, with a new imperial calendar which allocated 2,500 years for the presumed length of the Iranian monarchy and another 35 years for Muhammad Reza Shah. Thus Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the imperial year 2535.

The direction and orientation of the change demonstrates the nature of the Shah’s project of nationalization. It is important to pay attention to what he did not do alongside what he did do. He did not change the calendar to the modern Western calendar; if his project was predominantly a modernization project he would have changed it to the modern calendar like Turkey and many other Muslim countries like Malaysia and with that change he would have sent the message of ‘we are open for
business’ and we are prioritizing synchronization with the tune of modernity and the West over all other concerns. Instead he opted to change the calendar to the imperial one to reaffirm his allegiance to Persianism over modernity and in direct opposition to Islam at his time of high self-confidence.

This demonstrates that his project of reverse social engineering was Persianization and not modernization; modernization was made subservient to the Persianization project. His model of Great Civilization was not predominantly a Western one but a pre-Islamic one where the loyalty to the king and the regime of truth of Persian kingship acts as a unifying factor for the whole social order (Moaddel, 1993: 61).

The calendar attains immense prominence for the Iranian dasein as it signifies the qualitative periodization of time; time is defined in terms of before and after a significant event acting as a turning point in the life of the nation. Calendars imply the non-linear shift in the meaning and significance of time, enshrined in the collective memory and collective emotional economy and affective investment. As such, the institution of calendar (with three options of Western calendar, Islamic calendar and Persian calendar with their internal and external permutations) (Moaddel, 1993: 63) faces significant level of deformities and dysfunctions (just like the institution of veiling) due to being torn between alternative regimes of truth and their associated affirmative and negating facets, their dark and white books, and their politics of ordinary and politics of piety. In 1978 Khomeini, as reported in Riesebrodt (1998: 129; see also Rosenberg, 2011), stressed on the significance of the institution of calendar in the following terms:

He [the Shah] is against the Islamic calendar. To be against the Islamic calendar is to be against Islam itself; in fact the worst thing that this man has done during his reign is to change the calendar.

The adoption of migration of Prophet Mohammad as the base of Islamic calendar attunes the nation with the eternal time of emancipative rationality, liberating them from the terror of death, while Persianist calendar puts the nation in contact with its imagined birth in the pre-Islamic era of great kings and grand empires and magnanimous civilizations in accord with the communicative rationality, liberating Iranian dasein from the despotism of chaos and anarchy, while the adoption of Western calendar signifies the participation in the global economy and in
the festival of wealth creation in line with instrumental rationality, liberating Iranian
dasein from the despotism of nature. One example of intense investment in the
nature of calendar is the case of Ayatollah Monatzeri (2001: 421, vol 1) in his
encounter with Heykal, the famous Egyptian journalist. In a conversation with
Heykald during Heykal’s visit of Khomeini in Paris in 1978, Monatzeri condemned
some Arab countries for their adoption of Christian calendar and Sundays as
weekends and strongly recommended the adoption of Islamic calendar, and the
revival of Islamic history and the adoption of Fridays as weekends.

In these diverse narratives of foundational myth, the adoption of each calendar has
its own set of denotations and connotations, which makes the creation of balance and
synchronization between the three forms of rationalities a hard task to achieve due to
their being packaged in three distinctive regime of truth with distinct discursive and
non-discursive practices and distinctive appellations. Once again we see the
Chakrabarty’s (2000) timeknot at work in this period of the Iranian modern history.
The issue is how to override and overcome the default position of
incommensurabilities associated with alternative regimes of truth with de facto
incompatible linguistic and non-linguistic traditions. The tragedy of confusion with
regard to the three regimes of truth leads to tragedy of successive experience of
failures in the rival projects of institutionalization of ‘nationalizing Iran’.

6.4.2 The Formation of State

Now we briefly attend to the formation of state as a dysfunctional and deformed
institutions. The formation of modern state was another pre-requisite of formation of
a modern nation; modern nations cannot exist but as a compound entity of nation-
state; effectively in the modern formation of social order in the community of
nations the state acts as the nation’s consciousness. Without a functional
consciousness, the nation-state is dubbed as a failed state, equivalent to being
psychotic at an individual level.

Yet again we encounter with at least three large projects of formation of modern
state in the form of modernist state, Persianist state and Islamic state, with many
shades of grey in-between. Here we briefly explore the Shah’s and Khomeini’s
models of formation of modern state.

6.4.2.1. The Shah’s Persianist State
The centrepiece of the formation of the project of the Persianist state in this period was the Shah’s White Revolution, offering a social contract to the Iranian people entailing a transaction involving the exchange of obedience to the Shah for material well-being. This social contract was supposed to rescue the Shah’s reign from being ‘under constant siege’ from inside and outside enemies by mobilizing people’s unshakable support for the Shah. The whole package was an attempt to co-opt socialism (Milani, 2011a: 313; Moaddel, 1993: 63) and act as a firewall against the threat of communism and ‘red reactionaries’ and make all of them irrelevant through its wings of land reform policy, women rights policy, and workers’ rights policy (Milani, 2011a: 292). This was a transaction exchanging security and prosperity. People produce security for the Shah and his kingdom by demonstrating unconditional obedience and the Shah produces prosperity for his people (see Tizro, 2011 on a version of such a contract in Islamic marriage) through forming alliances with almost all the stakeholders.

The Shah wanted to insure his system against the threat and risk of collapse by giving each and every class of people from the peasants, to women and workers, to professional middle classes a stake in the new Persianized order (Garthwaite, 2005: 248-9). His policies of expansion of secular and Persianized education, health, industry and commerce, arts, sports and entertainment alongside attempts to “nationalize religion” (Liu, 2000: 124), in effect, sanitizing the religion and allowing the expansion of religious organizations and activities (Mirsepasi, 2004: 233), were meant to make political Islam and ‘black reactionaries’ obsolete. This program, which was increasingly funded by oil as its main economic wing, was complemented by expansion and modernization of bureaucracy and the security apparatus (legal system, army, police, and intelligent service) and by establishing strategic alliance with the West with the leadership of America. This foreign alliance was increasingly and gradually expanded to the Soviet bloc as well in a foreign policy based on the principle of positive balance (movazeneh-ye mosbat). These were rhizomatic movements to incorporate the selective elements of all the three regimes of truth to achieve his project of Persianization of the state.

As such, when the demand for truth has the property of hybridity matching the requirements of the state of belated inbetweenness the supply of truth is bound to have the same feature. The White Revolution ultimately led to its logical conclusion in the form of the emergence of Rastakhiz Party, despite the Shah originally being
vehemently against one-party system (Milani, 2011a: 381-2), to optimize the functioning of the Shah’s corporate state in the spirit of centrally planned systems of the communist camp with their economic successes, which the Shah increasingly came to admire at the time (Milani, 2011a: 224).

As such, all components of a functional and dynamical adaptive system seem to be in place to take the Shah and his people to the promised land of “great civilization” by intelligent design and reverse social engineering. Alas, the problem was that all of these programs and policies were introduced abruptly without going through an evolutionary process of building capacity and consensus, leading to the development of the sense of ownership (there were no time and capacity to attempt to create the widest possible consensus amongst various elites and their corresponding ordinary followers) by the people and its diverse elites alongside the fact that they were labelled under the appellation of orthodox Persianism (Persian monarchy) and as such lacked comprehensive form of tri-polar credibility and legitimacy. As Mialni (2011a: 379) reports “The Shah insisted that the principles of “his revolution” could not be subjected to criticism”.

The exchange of letters between the Shah and Khomeini (Milani, 2011a: 291-2) over a piece of legislation on election bylaws before the announcement of the Shah’s “White Revolution” was one of the rare lost opportunities for building an irreversible dynamical consensus behind a viable plan with slower pace for change, which could have a better chance of not suffering from abortion and miscarriage or multiple forms of dysfunctionalities and deformities. Some traces of alternative approach of dialogue-based process of conception and execution of projects for social transformation can be seen in the Shah’s regime, which was abandoned before they were fully born. As Milani (2011a: 312) reports, the trace of an alternative approach can be seen in Pakravan’s, the Savak’s chief, position, involving “negotiating with some of the regime’s stalwart enemies”; Bijan Jazani, the celebrated Marxist dissident, “told one of his trusted comrades: “This guy is really different and wants to create a dialogue.”

Alas, the condition of possibility of such dialogue was not available as in the state of belated inbetweenness with warring regimes of truth and the urgent race to save the nation from the plague of backwardness it was impossible to build “legitimate loyal opposition” (Milani; 2011a: 379) or construct an order based on “unity without
uniformity” (Zibakalam, 2008: 228). The condition of possibility of mutual criticism and constructive engagement was absent.

As such, the lack of tri-polar form of credibility and legitimacy for the Shah’s grand project was not because of its components but because of the abruptness of their introduction to the society (it was not ‘our’ project), and their quilting point and their master signifier. The Shah and his coalition could not theoretically and philosophically justify his brand of socialist monarchy, or Islamic monarchy (saltanat-e Islami), all mixed in a cocktail containing alliance with the capitalist West and imperialist America. Any rhizomatic movement requires adequate level of symbolization and harmonization through an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization to be able to be presentable as a legitimate package of truth. Rhizomatic, eclectic, and hybrid combinations can live at the unconscious level of the popular culture (see Naficy, 1993: 22; Willis et al., 1990) but for inhabiting the conscious space of public policy, for example, they need theoretical sublimation. That is why the Shah, seemingly bizarrely, asked for his Rastakhiz Party to be theoretically founded on dialectics.

These sets of strategic discursive and non-discursive practices with their three wings of Persianized Persianization, Persianized modernization, and Persianized Islamization were deployed in the service of perpetuating the dominance of orthodox Persianism, which was deemed to lack genuine commitment to Islam or modernity and/or even to non-orthodox Persianism (Persian poetry and Persian house of wisdom), and as such was plagued from its inception by lack of (or at least questionable) legitimacy almost from all sides of the truth spectrum.

As Milani (2011a: 293) reports: “Ironically, the Iranian opposition, even amongst the feminists, also never supported those reforms, dismissing them as “cosmetic” and superficial”. This was despite the fact that the White Revolution, according to the British Embassy, was “one of the most revolutionary measures in 3000[-year] history of Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 292). Investigating why even the secular opposition, let alone the clergy, did not support the Shah’s top-down revolution, despite Montazeri’s (2001: 207: vol 1) acknowledgement that it had some level of attraction for the intelligentsia, takes us to the deepest level of why the Shah’s project of Persianized modernization was aborted so abruptly and unexpectedly by the Islamic Revolution (see also Sahabi, 2007: 249-50).
From the Islamic angle the Shah’s project of formation of state was under siege due to its lack of commitment to the name and laws of Islam and its alliances with the enemies of the Muslims (like America and Israel)- the phenomenon of “alliance curse” (Root, 2008: 129)- and its support for (or indifference towards) social freedom and expansion of social vices (such as the prevalence of *riba* in the banking system, the widespread presence of the infidel Westerners in the security system, or in the economic system as investors or tourists (Brumberg, 1997: 37) intent on undermining the Islamic way of life and spreading Western life style leading ultimately to the imposition of their faith in Christianity or their faithlessness; unveiling, prostitution, gambling, drinking alcohol, free love, and display of nudity in art, cinema, and literature, and breaking the taboos of respect for Islamic saintly and infallible figures and Islamic texts, excessive consumerism and materialism, amongst others).

From the perspective of non-orthodox modernity (socialism/communism and even feminism), it lacked legitimacy due to lack of genuine commitment to social justice and classless society in name and in content, rampant levels of corruption and inequality alongside its strategic alliance with the capitalist and imperialist camp. From perspective of the orthodox modernity (liberal democracy), despite being a loyal ally of the West, it lacked adequate level of legitimacy due to its lack of commitment to constitutionalism, democracy, liberty, human rights, and freedom of speech. From the perspective of non-orthodox Persianism, it possessed questionable legitimacy due to its lack of genuine commitment to Persian ideals of a spiritual and just monarchy infused and enriched with a Persian house of wisdom (with its own form of spirituality, statecraft scholarship and commitment to social justice) alongside its increasing pseudo-modernism and vulgarity in the realm of popular culture. This form of Persianism represented the Persianist branch of nativism (see Boroujerdi, 1996; Fazeli, 2006; Mirsepasi, 2011) in the search for ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ Persianism against excessive Westernization with the motto of *a’liche khod dasht ze beeganeh tamanna meekard* (why ask from the other what you yourself already have).

All of these multiple forms of crisis of legitimacy within and without Persianism and their associated forms of perceived bastardities and monstrosities (*lakkategi*), where even the Shah’ prime minister Hoveida did not believe in *Rastakhiz* Party (Milani, 2011a: 382), were bound to lead to “more paralysis” and culminate in the emergence
of armed and non-armed opposition, which in turn generated the sense of ‘being under siege’ and prompted the generation of rampant levels of mistrust (Milani, 2011a: 149, 372, 440), suspicion and conspiracy theory in the Shah’s system (Milani, 2011a: 132, 409) and transformed it into a police state with the dominance of Savak, further exacerbating the legitimacy of the whole project of Persianization of the state. Iran was once again turned into a site of “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 150) from all sides in the form of epistemic violence, responded or complemented with physical violence, all leading to making the Shah’s corporate and rentier state increasingly dysfunctional, culminating in its eventual “abortion” (Milani, 2011a: 338) through the butter-fly effects of small events.

6.4.2.2. Khomeini’s Islamic State as a Bricolage

With regard to Khomeini’s project of formation of state, it is worth noting that Khomeini lacked any detailed and well-developed blueprint for his new Islamic state (Harmon, 2005: 69). The Khomeini’s project of Islamization of the state with its three associated subprojects was almost a mirror image of the Shah’s one and was plagued by similar multiple forms of legitimacy crisis, identity crisis and ultimately truth crisis. Khomeini started where Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri had left off (Moin, 1994: 81; Coughlin, 2009: 52, 113). Initially he wanted to establish a religious constitutional order (*mashroteh-ye mashroah*) (Brumberg, 2001: 98) and ended up in offering and institutionalizing the theory of absolute authority of the Islamic jurist (*velayat-e motlagheh-ye faqih*). The Islamized state as a bricolage emerging out of a process of trial and error and improvisation is perceived to be a form of monstrous hybridity in the international order (Hedayat’s *lakkateh* at the international level), a *velayat*-based constitutional order entailing elements of democratic and authoritarian systems (Farhi, 2009) in an explosive and unstable cocktail, being attacked for lack of legitimacy by radicals and pragmatists of all alternative truth camps. In the state of belated inbetweenness almost everything is a bricoalge (*sar-e ham bandi*) and as such is vulnerable to attacks from all sides.

While it is true that he had suggested the theory of *velayat-e faqih* before the revolution, it was largely deemed to serve as a scholarly piece of work to instigate a debate on the nature of alternative order to the monarchy, as Banisadr (2011, 1981) attests in his report on a five-stage development of the theory. The guiding principle driving the evolution of his position was to save Islam and (Iranian) Muslims from
the encroachment of pernicious modernity through finding practical utilitarian solutions for the plights of the Muslims, drawing upon his capacity as an Islamic jurist (Faqih), complemented by his brands of mysticism, Islamic philosophy, and political Islam (see Brumberg, 1997; Moin, 1994). This evolution was the unintended consequences of the interaction of forces, voices, and faces in the post-revolutionary state of belated inbetweenness.

Immediately after the collapse of the old regime Khomeini wanted a division of labour between the clergy and the intelligentsia (see Banisadr, 1981 on how Khomeini and Rafsanjani wanted to approve the draft constitution similar to the Mashroteh constitution without velayat-e faqih and how the new constitution was the unintended consequence of Bazargan’s position). The clergy were to perform their main monitoring function left unattended in the constitutional and post-constitutional eras alongside their normal functions in the judiciary and in the parliament while the realm of executive was to be left entirely to the intelligentsia (educated professionals, bureaucrats, technocrats, and intellectuals). As Hojjati Kermani (2011), one of the members of the constitutional assembly, attests Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayat introduced the theory of velayat-e faqih into the constitution (Yaghmaian, 2002: 253) to prevent the re-emergence of old regime and its form of despotism as experienced in the constitutional revolution and the ONM, which in the face of further divisions and irreconcilable differences within the revolutionary camp turned into absolute authority of faqih. This was only putting into the words of the constitution what the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness always called for: the emergence of Iranian leviathan as the final arbiter with absolute authority as a coping strategy for the resolution of conflicts over the production of truth.

The post-revolutionary chaotic situation of unfettered freedom served as a fertile breeding ground for the explosive mushrooming of multitude of political parties and ideological groupings all over the country; they, by the dictates of their beloved regimes of truth, were intent on conducting a second revolution against the new clerical establishment and their religious intellectual allies (Banisadr, 1981). The threat of the return of the old system and/or the risk of Iran being turned into a failed state called for the emergence of final arbiter to save the system from collapse, and Khomeini and his coalition in an improvised process of trial and error supplied it (without any intelligent design or omniscient and omnipotent master plan). Once again there is a logic of supply and demand at work here. The strange fate, common
to the state of belated inbetweenness, is that the original post-revolutionary revivalist and theorist of the theory, Montazeri, lost his belief in it while the one (Khamenei) who was against the addition of the adjective ‘absolute’ to it converted to it and assumed its mantle (Arjomand, 2009: 34; Murphy, 2008).

Almost all truth entrepreneurs started discrediting and de-legitimizing the theory and its associated institutionalized form from outset; this is true even for the non-revolutionary clerics like Shariatmadri (Rastgo, 2008) let alone religious intellectuals like Banisadr, Sahabi, Bazargan, and the left and the secular liberals alongside Persian monarchist or Persian literati. Consequently, Mesbah Yazdi (2011) recently admitted bitterly that almost nobody at the highest level of authority inside the system believes in the theory of *velayat-e faqih*, ironically replicating the experience of Hoveida who did not believe in the Shah’s *Rastakhiz* Party. The misunderstanding of the evolution of Khomeini’s positions on the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* is evident in almost all forms of analysis especially in Milani (2011a), Banisadr (1981), Ganji (2011) and Abrahamian (1993), among others, which are cases of counter-transference. Even Abrahamian, who rejects the appropriateness of the label of fundamentalism for Khomeini and offers the label of populism instead, seems to have failed to understand Khomeini in his own terms and as a social assemblage immersed in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness.

As such, Khomeini’s theory of *velayat-e faqih* was the evolutionary reincarnation of the expression of the need for the final arbiter (Iranian modern leviathan) in the confused state of belated inbetweenness where all social assemblages (society, organizations, groups, and individuals) are torn between alternative regimes of truth and are unable to arrive at a consensual and synchronized hybrid to function as the condition of possibility for the emergence of shared mechanism of conflict resolution, founding an order based on ‘unity without uniformity’ and ‘agree to disagree’.

The events such as hostage crisis, the civil war with ethnic groups, Mojahedin and the left, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Rushdie affair, among others, were mixed blessing for the new *velayat*-based state. These large events ideologically recharged the system and deepened the investment of people in the whole Islamic order, leading to the emergence and strengthening of the security apparatus like *Sepah* (Revolutionary Guard), *basiq* (the religious militia) and intelligence service while economically
weakening it (Buchta, 2000). Paradoxically while the system was fighting the whole international order by proxy (the proxy was Iraq or the hostage crisis or Rushdie crisis), it heavily depended on the international order for the sale of its oil. As such in the search for political and cultural independence the economic independence was frequently lost, which threatened the survival of the whole order and prompted a zigzag movement between various forms of radicalism and pragmatism. In the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war the cultural, ideological, and political wars were largely won (or at least not lost) but the economic war was lost miserably, prompting a turn towards Rafsanjani’s pragmatism. Rafsanjani himself had already experienced a transformation from a revolutionary radical to an economic pragmatist.

Pragmatism leads to economic improvement but immediately prompts the perception of defeats in the cultural war against the Western cultural invasion and in the political war in the form of losing fronts on the political independence formulated in the principle of negative balance (movazeneh-ye manfi) and its Islamic reincarnation in the form of na sharqi na gharbi or ‘Neither the East (communist bloc) and Nor the West (the capitalist bloc)’, all of these alongside the war on distributional justice. This prompts the resurgence of radicalism which grinds into halt due defeats in the economic war (due to the troubles with the international order manifested in economic sanctions and/or inefficiencies inside the system), which drive the call for another round of pragmatism. The failure in the economic war is due to the confusion and zigzags between the requirements of three models of modernist economics, Islamic economics, and Persianist economics, which due to the word limitations was not included in this thesis. The new order was plagued by experience of dysfunctionality in all realms of life, work and language.

The post-revolutionary Islamic state was also plagued with the phenomenon of parallel institutions (nahadha-ye movazi). The same phenomenon existed in the Shah’s pre-revolutionary order in the form of “creating new ministers and civil servant posts with overlapping responsibilities” (Moaddel, 1993: 59). This phenomenon was the reaction of the new order to prevalence of mistrust (Abrahamian, 1993: 131; Ganji, 2011), impatience (Hojjati Kermani, 2011) or “the madness of speed” as Chehabi (1990: 259) puts it, and conspiracy theory (Abrahamian, 1993: 4, 127-8) between and within all social assemblages, which were the symptomatic by-products of the state of belated inbetweenness. The phenomenon of the existence of parallel institutions in the realms of security,
economy, politics, culture, etc., (Ahmadi Amoui, 2006; Banisadr, 1981) severely damaged the efficacy and efficiency of the state in performing its revolutionary and non-revolutionary functions.

This was due to the fact that there were deep and irreconcilable differences on the theory of institution-building regarding how to build the institutions of the new state and what to do with the institutions of the old state. Bazargan, Banisadr and Beheshti, let alone Khamanei, Mosavi, Montazeri, and Friday prayer leaders in every small and large city, among others, differed significantly on their theory of institution-building (Banisadr, 1981: 51-3). Alongside this and as one of its direct by-products, the crisis of succession (the removal of Montazeri from the position of successor to Khomeini) (see Montazeri’s memoire, 2001) - emerging due to prevalence of excessive violence in prisons (summary executions and tortures; see Sadr and Amin, 2012; Abrahamian, 1999; Rejali, 1994) and in the streets which de-legitimized the new state even further- culminated in the emergence of another example of dysfunctional state, this time in the form of Islamized state, in the modern history of Iran.

We further explored the manifestations of institutional failure in other institutions of the society in the realms of formation of modern state, economy, foreign policy and diplomacy, and national security (in the realms such as political war, territorial war, economic war, cultural war, and moral war), but excluded them from this work due to word limitations. These constant bitter experiences of institutional failure create a chaotic order, which the next section explores.

6.5. CHAOTIC ORDER

We have seen how, based on the holistic picture offered, explored and examined in this study, social assemblages hang together at causal, complexity system, and worldhood levels. Due to the state of belated inbetweenness, Iranian society is at a paradoxical position where what gives unity and identity to social entities and glues them together, the three regimes of truth, simultaneously creates incessant levels of conflicts and division on fundamental questions of how to organize life, work and language.

As the analysis so far indicated, the state of inbetweenness with its associated confusion and dissonance created unstable coalitions within and between Iranian
social assemblages, which in turn culminated in the repeated bitter experience of institutional failure. The mistrust resulting from fluidity of subjectivities (constant unpredictable change in local and general preference of Iranian social assemblages) and the impatience prompted by the state of belatedness generated deformities and dysfunctions, which produced broad sense of disillusionment and discontent.

This sense of frustration and discontent born out of the bitter experience of encountering dysfunctional institutions in everyday life in family, schools, hospitals, streets, *etc.* alongside the unhappiness with the incumbent master signifier and its project of reverse social engineering and its associated wings boils up in the social interactions creating social relations full of tensions and conflict (a social order ridden with conflict and violence at formal and informal levels at all sites of social interaction in selfhood, family to schools and hospitals and streets). The people develop a sense of resentment for being Iranian (self-loathing) and a feeling of hatred of all against all (where it was reported that even the Shah loved Iran but hated its people, *see:* Milani, 2011a), while they begin to admire the perfect others. They start from demonizing the other and glorifying the self but end up (through the work of principle of emergence and its law of unintended consequences) demonizing the self and glorifying the other. The state of mistrust and impatience associated with three projects of reverse social engineering created a state of innocent brutality, where the state and society, the incumbent and the opposition, and almost all social actors are permanently engaged in the act of mutual de-legitimization and war of attrition (*namadmali*) enshrined in demonization of the other and glorification of the self.

Any project of reverse social engineering - in this period of study we witnessed the shift from the Shah’s project of Persainization to Khomeini’s project of Islamization-lacked full legitimacy bestowed by all three forms of regimes of truth; any incumbent socio-political order of any colour or persuasion faced the attempts to overthrow it. This made the incumbent order filled with the sense of ‘siege mentality’ which culminated in the emergence of final arbiter and resort to physical and epistemic brutality to repress the extreme levels of chaos caused by widespread conflict within and between the groups loyal or opposed to the new system. As the social order with any form of incumbency cannot create minimum level of social cohesion (Ibn Khaldun’s *asabiya*) or ‘unity without uniformity’ or cannot sustain the principle of ‘agree to disagree’ the only way to move from intolerable level of chaos
culminating in the collapse of Iran as a socio-political unit to tolerable level of chaos is through the emergence of final arbiter, which acts as a short- to medium-term relief from chaos and anarchy caused by immense level of irreconcilable differences circulating in the social order within and between different social assemblages (individuals, groups, organizations, and society as a whole). The final arbiter, the Iranian leviathan, ultimately lacks full legitimacy and can only delay the sense of discontent with the incumbent project and its dysfunctionalities, but cannot eliminate the possibility of socio-political revolutions and movements and their attempts to restructure society from ground zero, which leads to the activation of another round of cyclic passage through four levels of tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure and the emergence of chaotic order.

Paradoxically, thus, what unite Iranians are exactly what divides them as well; what is the malaise is the cure too; that is why their social order turns into chaotic order, where it does not collapse into a failed state, while at the same time it does not function reasonably efficiently and effectively to keep its population content about the general characteristics of their own social order.

Peter Gourevitch’s (2003: 325) notion of ‘convergent divergence’ with regard to globalization is an example of a compound notion which serves as a device to bring the conflicting concepts together to elaborate on a hyper-complex reality comprising opposing tendencies (for the hybrid and seemingly contradictory notion of glocalization see Ritzer and Atalay 2010: 319); in the context of Iranian belated inbetweenness the notion of chaotic order (or organized chaos) is meant to demonstrate how order and chaos can coalesce to create a dysfunctional social order. The chaotic element is manifested in the two features of the widespread prevalence of violence and in the diffused and atomic nature of power and its apparent arbitrary and discretionary nature (Moslem, 2002: 181; Beeman, 2005: 19; Poulson, 2006: 69; Zonis 1971: 10). With regard to the diffused and dispersed nature of the power structure, Rakel (2008: 32) makes the following observation: “the formal system for policy formulation is often ignored or bypassed in favor of the informal power structure, based on personal networks and power relations”. The above description is not entirely accurate as it assumes that the informal networks have more stability than the formal ones while the tragedy of confusion plagues both realms of formality and informality.
The violent element of the chaotic order refers to the widespread prevalence of social upheavals in the social order; these violent events entail weak and strong occurrences experienced both continuously and intermittently in the Iranian social order. The daily discharge of negative energies is associated with large earthquakes and volcanoes experienced in the form of social movements and revolutions (Foran, 1994) with their associated episodes of repression and loss of lives and property and total restructuring of social order in an attempt to rebuild the social order from ground zero. The cases of political executions, imprisonment, and torture alongside assassinations and bombings plus large scale migration are just external manifestations of wider and deeper level of violence permeating Iranian social order; these events are supplemented by the daily hateful, vengeful, and spiteful exchanges in the media, within the public and private offices and in the streets, in schools and hospitals, and families, all releasing the dark energies generated by the constant clashes between embedded plates of truth, warring for dominance and loyalty. Violence permeated the whole social order at micro, meso and macro levels (see Tizro, 2011 for the case of violence against women, for instance).

The example of immense disdain shown to Bazargan in the post-revolutionary parliament and his (in)famous reaction to the martyred Rajaee’s wife (Jannati, 2010), where he reacted angrily to what Rajaee’s wife had said against him by resorting to a proverb “the one who had not shot on us was the cut-tail crow (anke be ma narideh bood kalaghe dom borideh bood),” is clear example of daily bitter experience of conflict within the new system. Another example is the astonishing case of Roughani Zanjani’s deputies being kidnapped for the sake of the economic policies they advocated by security authorities; they were interrogated and subjected to harassment and freed in unknown locations (Zanjani in Amoui, 2006: 231). These are bewildering examples of how irreconcilable differences emanating from being located in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness (and its impacts on generating mistrust and confusion on how to combine alternative regimes of truth) erupts into the expression of epistemic or physical violence (where the weaker sides predominantly resorts to verbal violence and the stronger side resorts largely to physical violence) in the form of mutual de-legitimization and mutual repression (namadmali) and the creation of waves of victimhood and culpability, where former victims become new perpetrators in the exercise of “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 369).
where every side attempts to save its favoured truth and beloved order from the onslaught of the dark forces intent on overthrowing it.

The second element of chaos is enshrined in the atomic nature of power fully captured by the notion of personal discretion (saligheh-ye shakhsi) frequently used in the social discourses and complained about. Constant waves of complaint are made about people holding private or public offices acting on discretion; these complaints are made without ever asking about the character of social order allowing its actors to act based on discretion. Frequently the prevalence of rule of discretion rather than rule of law is attributed to the wills of the individuals and groups and their bad intentions. They commit the intentional fallacy in attributing the fate of the social order to the wills of social entities inhabiting them, without asking “who wills the will?” and how the wills are coordinated in some context and discorded in others. This stance ignores the work of three principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability in the formation and transformation of social phenomena and their wills, their conscience, and their actions and emotions.

Clearly when there is historical consensus on a set of issues, there remains almost no social space for discretion. When it comes to sexual honour or observing the codes of behaviour in shrines (for instance in the case of Reza Shah’s queen entering the shrine in Qom without veiling, which provoked severe reactions, Sedghi, 2007: 85) or in mosques or in Ashura processions or in Nowruz ceremonies the rule of discretion is marginalized and the rule of norm and law prevails. As the issues around which the historical consensus has emerged are rare in the Iranian social context, almost all issues become sites for conflicts between different hybrid forms of forces, voices, and forces. What is called discretion (saligheh) (Moslem, 2002: 41, 74, 155) is the manifestation of the phenomenon where each social entity is inhabited by a distinct voice or collection of voices constituted out of a particular combination of different regimes of truth. In the frequent act of misunderstanding every social assemblage treats its own positions as principled and others’ positions as arbitrary.

The lack of unity on how to organize life, work and language culminates in the atomization of the nature of power, where power is dispersed and distributed in the social order and each individual or group can wield adequate resources and support and act unpredictably and in contradistinction to other individuals and groups. As such Power is neither centralized nor decentralized it is dispersed. The final arbiter
has to launch attacks to recapture the lost authority only to lose it gradually again. The phenomenon of parallel institution in the post-revolutionary era alongside the common notion of ‘states-within-states’ (doulat dar doulat) throughout the Iranian modern history is the manifestation of the dispersed nature of power in the modern history of Iran. This means that in reality institutions or governments were not just restricted to serve the interests of particular groups or centres of gravity, formal or informal, on the scene or behind the scene, apparent or hidden, or official or mafia types; there were fundamental differences and divisions within any formal or informal centre of power.

As such, the social order has suffered from the plague of multiple layers of unpredictable sources of power. Roughani Zanjani (2006: 87, 187, 230) reports on how the chaotic situation ruled the social relations within and between different institutions of socio-political and economic governance. In a sense confusion at the level of mind (Williamson’s level zero) has spilt over and trickled down to the levels of institutions and governance. The following sharp observation, made by Elaine Sciolino (2000: 360, added emphasis), points to this phenomenon:

I’ve learned that it is impossible to talk about a monolithic Iranian “regime” any longer; the struggle for the country’s future is far too intense for that. Today there is no unified leadership or all-powerful governmental superstructure that makes and executes all decisions. Rather, power is dispersed among and even within many competing power centers, with varying agendas and methods of operation and degrees of authority. Even as I write, alliances are shifting. Players are adapting. Coalitions are building.

The atomic and discretionary nature of power is witnessed by Ash (2005, 2009; added emphasis) in the following terms:

The very fact that the system has several centers of power adds an extra element of uncertainty. For example, I talked to one dissident student who was released by the official state security service only to be rearrested a few months later by the Revolutionary Guards. No one knows exactly where the limits are. As a result, there is both a remarkable freedom of intellectual debate and a permanent undercurrent of fear.

That is why, as Harmon (2005: 70) reports, Khomeini’s misguided policy of delegation of power (with the intention of effacing himself as the centre of gravity
and in an attempt to institutionalize the new order) in the post-revolutionary era almost resulted in the collapse of the new order under the weight of its own internal conflicts and cleavages (the new order was ridden with conflict at all levels within and between new and old institutions, groups and individuals as attested by Banisadr, 1981: 299):

Khomeini deferred hands-on problem solving to subordinates. For the struggling new republic, this resulted in near calamity. While there is wisdom in delegating authority, in this situation it posed a dilemma of strangling proportions. Since his underlings did not always agree among themselves as to specific steps to take, the effectiveness of the new government was seriously impaired.

Delegation of power requires a homogenized and synchronized embeddedness, as its condition of possibility, which was a case of impossibility in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness. The power of Khomeini, when delegated to Montazeri and Lajvardi, for instance, produced two manifestly contrasting results and Khomeini himself was internally divided enough to feel sympathy with both voices until one (Montazeri) reached the point where Khomeini felt was equivalent to undermining the integrity of the new system and had to, as the final arbiter, sever him from attachment to the system to restore the possibility of a semblance of order inside the sea of chaos. That is why the phenomenon like Mafia cannot take roots in the Iranian context of belated inbetweenness as any strong organization with defined hierarchy and codes of behaviour guaranteeing loyalty and obedience requires consensual and shared common ground, which is impossible to achieve in the Iranian context of culture in its interaction with the context of situation. Abrahamian (1993: 114; 1982: 169) reports the observation made by British consul in Isfahan in this regard: “No two Persians can ever work together for any length of time, even if it is jointly to extract money from the third party”.

The case of hostage crisis was the clear example of atomic nature of power, where the leader (Khomeini) followed his followers (the Muslim students), demonstrating Khomeini’s change of mind and shift in emphasis. Banisadr (1981: 254) summarizes the point by expressing that the determining events were shaped by forces outside the realm of control of the leading nucleus of the revolution. Within the master signifier of Islam, Khomeini was ready to follow his followers in affirming the liberal or revolutionary versions of Islam depending on the preferences expressed by
the believers (as he initially affirmed the more liberal draft constitution without the theory of *velayt-e faghieh*).

Khomeini’s subjectivity itself was deeply engulfed in the state of belated inbetweenness, and as such different voices could activate and awaken different facets of his being, inside the imaginary order of affiliation to Islam. In a sense, the power of voices within Khomeini himself was deeply atomic. For example, Rafsanjani (2011) reports how Khomeini’s mood on music and its legitimacy used to change depending on the character of his last visitors; his position could fluctuate between liberal and conservative stances in no time. This was related to the tight client-provider relation, supply and demand for fatwas, between the jurist and the believer, which would make the jurist responsive to the needs and complaints of the believer within the limits and appellation of the master signifier of Islam (Cole, 2005: 66). If the people wanted to change their allegiance to alternative regime of truth Khomeini would stand-up to them to reshape and redirect their subjectivity to the right path or suffer the fate of Sheikh Fazlollah; hence his famous saying that if all people say something [opposing the pillars of Islam] I would single-handedly stand up to them and say something else (see Banisadr, 1981). This kind of standing up to people functions as a tool to activate and awaken their meta-preferences.

At the root of the atomic and discretionary nature of power reside the Iranian preference for adopting a pick and mix approach to combining their historically situated alternative packages of truth; Iranians inhabit parallel truth universes and want to travel between them freely. The implication of this for the Iranian society is that what each individual with her particular biography or a group with its particular history picks and mixes (mixology) from each regime is markedly different from any other, which creates the rule of discretion (*saligheh*) rather than the rule of law.

The legitimacy of the pragmatic approach in picking and mixing between regimes of truth, for instance, is frequently questioned by the puritans and radicals of all regimes of truth. As such a sharp set of irreconcilable divisions emerges between different social entities; these social entities lie in a spectrum between pragmatism and radicalism, where each point to left or to the right is categorized as too radical or too pragmatic and as such rarely any consensus on any issue can emerge. For example, in foreign relation, for some, the development of warm and cosy relations with the Arab allies of America in the region was considered to be a betrayal of the
principles of opposition to oppression deeply rooted in the Qur’anic teachings and in the Shia tradition of Imams and in the revolutionary ethic (a brand of ethical or ideological foreign policy), for others it is an acceptable position to take, as it unifies the Islamic world and eliminates the possibility of internal fighting between Muslims (like in the case of Iran-Iraq war). For these latter group normalizing relation with America may be deemed as the betrayal of the ideals of revolution while for still others it is a justifiable position to take; for still others restoration of relation with Israel is the only way to restore normal relation with the West and with the international order, while for all others this is a taboo which should never be crossed.

We see a spectrum of irreconcilable positions, creating confusion, havoc, and zigzag in the Iranian foreign policy (for the notion of zigzag movements in all realms of life, work and language in post-revolutionary Iran see Ayatollah Khamenei, 2010). The complexity of situation is manifest in the individuals and groups constantly travelling between these positions and not taking fixed and irreversible stances. This is due to lack of adequate level of philosophical and theoretical capital to create consensus on the nature of modern world, international order, the West, America, Israel, Arabs, and their relation to Islam and pre-Islamic Persia and ultimately to the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth.

The same set of irreconcilable positions prevail in any other social issues related to life (dress code, sexuality and gender relation, to name just a few), work (the issue of riba or interest, property rights, accumulation of wealth, foreign direct investment, the use of sex in advertisements, income distribution, employer-employee relation and their rights and obligations, the issue of corporate and political governance, the relation between politics and economics, among others), or language (the precedence given to the three languages of Persian, Arabic, and English, the manifestation of eroticism and sexuality in poetry, literature and other forms of arts, the issue of insults direct towards the Shia infallibles, among others). In such a state of total rupture within and between social entities where power is atomized, and violence pervades the social relation, the only way to restore a semblance of order, at least in the short-run, is through the emergence of final arbiter (the king or the faqih or the intellectual or the technocrat). When, on rare occasions, consensus emerges discretion disappears and the norms or laws rule; but in large part the irreconcilable differences prevail as the default position plaguing the social relations.
The rule of final arbiter, while possessing stabilizing function in the short-run, has destabilizing property in the long run as the final arbiter is unable to attain multiple forms of legitimacy required in the state of belated inbetweenness. As a result, paradoxically while the affiliation to the three regimes of truth and emergence of final arbiter act as unifying forces creating order in the Iranian context, the same two phenomena create chaos due to the dispersed nature of power and prevalence of innocent brutality born out of irreconcilable differences between various forms of hybrid combination of the three regimes of truth and lack of full legitimacy for the final arbiter.

In this paradoxical context of belated inbetweenness, mis-categorization of the malaise of Iranian society as the rule of superstition (Rahnema, 2011; Avini, 1997), Westernization (Keddie, 1980: 236), fundamentalism (Asgharzadeh, 2007; Riesebrodt, 1998), mafia or sultanic system (Ganji, 2005, 2008) or fascism (Taheri, 2010: 82; Rubin, 2002), despotism (Rezagholi, 1998, 2007), predatory state (Lal, 1984), totalitarianism (Moaddel, 2011) or populism (Abrahamian, 1993; see also Sayyid, 1997), or like Gellner seeing Islam or Shia as a ‘closed system’ (Eickelman, 1998: 258; see also Bradley, 2007 Chapter 1) which have found its manifestation in Kuran’s (2011) thesis of inflexibility of Islamic contractual laws adds another layer to the sedimented piles of epistemic violence and innocent brutality as the analysts unwittingly commit the cardinal sin of counter-transference, and project their imported categories on the uniquely hyper-complex social realities of Iranian society in the modern era.

In sum, as Japanese islands or American coastline are prone to the occurrences of natural calamities, Iranians are prone to the historical disasters emanating from being located in the midst of the fault-lines between plates of alternative regimes of truth. The calamities are the product of tragedy and not demonic nature of particular people or their ideologies or belief systems. The following quote is a clear case of counter-transference and misdiagnosis exacerbating the malaise of mutual misunderstanding generated by historically situated forms of incommensurability, which is an example of innocent brutality (in this case verbal or epistemic cruelty, through refusing or being unable to listen to the radical other, requiring investing efforts to know the other in her own terms and to combine hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion):
The character of the post-revolutionary regime, however, stood in stark contrast to Foucault’s idealistic expectation. Far from exemplifying a new political spirituality in action that transcended Western secularism, a brutal totalitarian regime was inaugurated, displaying a remarkable resemblance to such known historical categories as fascism and Nazism” (Moaddel, 2011: 128).

6.6. CONCLUSION

The Iranian society in this era (between 1963 and 1997) moved between the two projects of Persianization and Islamization and currently is on the verge of new-style Mashroteh-type project of liberal modernization in the reformist and post-reformist period. In this period, Iranian society demonstrated its typical characteristics emanating from its compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. We saw the patterns and regularities re-emerging in this period at four levels: tragedy of confusion, unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order.

The features of Iranian society such as the prevalence of violence and discontent, the flight of human capital (migration) and financial capital and its short-termism (Katouzian, 2010), among others, are the by-products and symptoms of fundamental conflicts over how to produce truth about life, work, and language and how to synchronize the instrumental, communicative, and emancipative rationalities (freeing Iranian man from the despotisms of nature, man, and death within the analytic of finitude) based on three historically situated packages of truth, Islam, modernity and Persianism, with their many faces.

What was at the heart of Iranian malaise was the inability of Iranians to achieve self-discovery and recognize the presence of radical others in any form of imagined self. This in turn led to inability to understand each other and the alien others in the West and the East. Iranians frequently ignored or have not developed the conceptual framework required in order to understand the singularity of their own situation in the multiverse of their belated embeddedness. As such they, under the immense pressure of the state of belatedness, frequently embarked on various projects of reverse social engineering in order to overcome the malaise of backwardness as quickly as possible, which marginalizes, antagonizes or demonizes alternative packages of truth. The Shah’s project of Persianization- while having the three wings of Persianized Persianization, Persianized modernization (his techno-bureaucratic
modernization and his brand of socialism), and Persianized Islamization—demonized political Islam and non-orthodox modernity (Marxism) and even sometimes orthodox modernity in its permissive society and its democracy as being captured by big businesses and their special interests and in its colonialism (see Zibakalam, 2008). After a period of chaotic instability, the Shah consolidated his power through the activation of mechanism of final arbiter, which put the control of the society under his highly centralized corporate and rentier state. The de-legitimization of the Shah’s project and his version of final arbiter with its own deformities and dysfunctionalities led to the collapse of the Shah’s version of Persianist orthodoxy.

Khomeini’s project of Islamization replaced Shah’s project of Persianization, but the same patterns and regularities re-emerged due to the same mistakes of demonization of the radical others and glorification of the self. Due to the irreconcilable difference within and between social assemblages, the same dysfunctionalities and deformities re-merged as the same patterns of mistrust and impatience led to the atomization of power and the prevalence of conflicts and divisions ultimately enacting the need for the re-emergence of final arbiter in the theory of *velayat-e faqieh* and in the figure of the religious leader (Khomeini and Khamaniei) (Brumberg, 1997: 42).

In the post-war era, Rafsanjani during his reign as the president of the country started a top-down revolutionary pragmatism resembling the techno-bureaucratic modernization of Amir Kabir and Reza Shah and the Shah’s White Revolution, but this time in an Islamized garb and appellation. This generated its own discontent leading to *Mashrooteh*-type Khatami’s reformist movement, but this time with an Islamized flavour. While in Rafsanjani’s period the discourse of reconstruction dominated the landscape of discourses, in the reformist period it shifted in emphases towards rule of law and political freedom and democracy. These two trends contrasted with the discourse of martyrdom dominated in the Khomeini’s period (Varzi, 2006) and the discourse of distributive justice in the first half of Ahmadinejad’s reign and the discourse of Persianization prevailed in the second half of Ahmadinejad’s tenure in power. We see how the emphases have shifted from emancipation from the fear of death through the discourse of martyrdom to the liberation from despotism of nature through techno-scientific rationality of Rafsanjani’s re-constructionism and Khatami’s political freedom, to Ahmadinejad’s communicative rationality of liberation from despotism of man over man in the realm of economics (justice) and man over man in the realm of communal belonging
Islamic revolution, thus, was a response to the iron cage of modernity and its pernicious materialism and, as David Martin (2011: xvi) states, “what Bataille might call the “vengeful incursions of the sacred.” This process entailed different forms of storytelling (see Selbin, 2010) competing inside alternative regimes of truth incorporating different narratives/strategies of liberation, from despotism of nature, man (the despotism of disorder and anarchy), and the despotism of death and the overall despotism of finitude.

These dominant discourses (in every period there are traces of other discourses present in each brand of discourse as well) were primed by contexts of situation; the incidences of civil war and hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war and Rushdie affair, all constituted different forms of existential crises calling for activation of discourse of martyrdom; the post-war era primed the discourse of development, while its political restrictions and its inequalities primed Khatami’s discourse of rule of law and civil society and its inequality primed Ahmadinejad’s discourse of justice, and in response to lack of social solidarity, the discourse of Persianism in Green Movement were activated. As we see in the post-revolutionary era, the project of Islamization changed in emphasis in its three wings of Islamization, Persianization and modernization (orthodox modernization of Khatami and Rafsanjani alongside non-orthodox modernization of Ahmadinejad, for instance).

What can be seen is the continuous struggle in all realms of power, knowledge and subjectivity over how to synchronize Islam, Persianism and modernity to accomplish three forms of instrumental, communicative and emancipative rationality, all to overcome the finitude and its ontology of lack to achieve infinitude and its ontology of abundance. This was reflected in multiple forms of credentials at circulation in the Islamic Republic. By the end of this period, the allegiance to the new order could be demonstrated by accumulating from a pool of at least seven credentials: religious scholarly credential, piety credential, revolutionary credential, war credential, martyrdom credential, education or expertise credential, and serving-the-system credential.

The constant shift in emphases within Khomeini’s project of Islamization alongside the opposition to the project itself from internal and external sources created instabilities and dysfunctionalities and gave rise to its associated brutalities and cruelties, which harmed the new order greatly and reduced its popularity and
contaminated its internal and external credibility and legitimacy. The system, hence, has been plagued by a sense of siege mentality in its strong sense of vulnerability towards the plots of external and internal sources for its overthrow, which turned all realms of life into a security threat for the new order provoking new rounds of violence, destabilizing it even further in a vicious cycle of de-legitimization and violence, all due to the compound state of belated inbetweenness and lack of capacity and consensus.

Ultimately the tragedies and brutalities (civil war, hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war, succession crisis, executions and tortures alongside assassinations and campaign of bombings) experienced in this period was due to the unintended consequences of the social entities working inside their own grid of intelligibility, and largely with good intentions, to help the realization of their fragile conceptions of goodness, truth and beauty. The compound state of belated inbetweenness would not allow the emergence of what Bazargan (2007) desperately desired,

one rule, one God in the country, one law, one Majlis, one government, and one centre of gravity; this was the wish we had when we used to go to bed during the nights and we prayed for the coming of such a day.

Bazargan’s wish for the emergence of “one centre of gravity” could not be granted due to the fact that coherent and time-consistent selves with the property of “one man one voice (Tizro, 2011: 81)” could not emerge in the compound state of belated inbetweenness (see the references in this study on the Shah’s, Al-e Ahmad’s, Khomeini’s and Makhmalbaf’s daily change of positions, for instance).

Ultimately in the state of belated inbetweenness there are incommensurable set of candidates for taking the position of “centre of gravity”, and the society and its various social assemblages oscillates between them in a perpetual truth cycle. The Shah, for example, in his interview with Oriana Fallaci (Moaddel, 1993: 63), offered the institution of monarchy and the figure of the king as the best option for “centre of gravity”, while Khomeini offered the institution of fiqh and the figure of faqih (velayat-e faqih) as the centre of gravity and Bazargan offered modern constitution (rule of law) and the figure of democratic ruler as the centre of gravity.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

One day it will have to be officially admitted that what we have christened reality is an even greater illusion than the world of dreams.

Salvador Dali

is there any truth or not and if there is, what is it and where is it and who has it and what is its signs and after knowing it how can it be pursued and how can it be achieved?

Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1925:102)

7.1. PROBLEMATIZATION

The subject matter of this study has been the bitter historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran with all its ramifications. The burning questions gnawing Iranian subjectivity and its unhappy consciousness revolve around the enigma of why Iran has not developed into an advanced society despite starting its experience of attempting to achieve socio-economic development with Japan more than a century ago. Iranian experience of socio-economic underdevelopment has been associated with excessive and intense levels of socio-political instability, coalitional repositioning, and waves of verbal and physical violence and institutional restructuring and emotional upheaval. As a result, the contrast between the level of stability and development between the two countries (Japan and Iran) could hardly be more pronounced.

The enigma of the Iranian case is captured in the Shah’s bitter expression of astonishment and despair about his people, as reported by Milani (2011a: 3, added emphasis):

More than once during the days of revolution, and later in exile, he asked, with unmistakable hints of contempt in the tone, “What kind of people are these Persians? After all We have done for them, they still chose to opt for this disastrous revolution.
The question of the bitter experience of socio-economic development is translated into the enigma of the nature of Persian people (Iranianness) and their social order. This study has set out to explore these sets of interwoven questions about the experiences of development and revolutions (political instability) and their relation to the character and traits of Persian people and their social order. This also represents an attempt to offer the outlines of an answer to the Shah’s dark question. The question of the nature of Iranianness is, in turn, translated to a wider methodological question of ‘How can we analyse a social order and its historical experiences?’, and the preceding chapters aimed at responding to this question within three case studies covering consecutive periods in the Iranian history by locating it within the theoretical and methodological formulations developed by this study in the initial foundational chapters.

7.1.1. Nature of Social Order and Modes of Analysis

The two large philosophical strands or modes of thought for the analysis of social phenomena are Heidegger’s ‘existential phenomenology’ (as explicated for example by Dreyfus, 1991) as opposed to Descartes’ subject-object relation (dasein versus cogito or understanding versus representation). These two philosophical positions are rooted in two contrasting philosophical traditions going back to Aristotle's metaphysics of substance as the genealogy of the Cartesian cogito and Heraclitus' philosophy of process-relation as the ancestry of Heidegger's dasein.

As the summary and the analyses in the preceding chapters indicate, this study takes a hybrid approach by embedding the Cartesian cogito’s reductionism in the analysis of complex systems and both in the Heideggerian dasein’s being-in-the-world through its three principles of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability. Being, in its compound and relational nature, is formulated as becoming using Deleuzian process philosophy of difference rather than Hegelian/Marxian philosophy of dialectics. This study treats social orders as social assemblages following Deleuzian process philosophy and Connolly’s application of it in his works. In formulating the theoretical framework of this study, the three notions of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability have been deployed to characterize the social assemblages according to which they are almost always rooted in larger meaningful wholes, are emergent phenomena, and invested with meaning constituting a unique package of truth about the things of this world. Our
world, as a social assemblage, acts as ecology of social assemblages and evolves through topological, typological, and axiomatic developments. This means that every social assemblage is located in the neighbourhood of other social assemblages, which act as its context of situation complementing its own unique context of culture, according to Malinowski’s terminology.

The ecology of social assemblages alongside its various forms of neighbourhood indicate the finitude of social assemblages as each social assemblage is a form of bounded rationality, limited by other assemblages residing in its neighbourhood. No social assemblage fills the whole of space-time continuum. This leads us to the analysis of social phenomena as what Foucault called ‘analytic of finitude’ (Howarth, 2010: 21). The limits of social assemblages put them in the dynamic interplay between finitude and infinitude and in relation to the Heideggerian fourfold of mortals, gods, the earth and the sky. As such, each social assemblage is blessed with its abundance and suffers from its lack. This study further offered to characterize the finitude of social assemblages by deploying three Lacanian orders as three dimensions of each social assemblage and analysed their affirmative and negating dimension through the deployment of Focauldian affirmative notions of power, knowledge and subjectivity and Lacanian-Zizekian negating notions of repression, disavowal and foreclosure. Furthermore, the Deleuzian process ontology and Castoriadis’s analysis of imagination were used to characterize the affirmative dimensions of real and imaginary orders.

As a result of its hyper-complex structure, each social assemblage (at micro, meso or macro levels) constitutes a class of its own and, consequently, possesses its own unique regime of truth with its distinct dictionary and particular set of denotations and connotation, its own unique trajectory of evolution, and its own unique world in which it is rooted. As such, to analyse social assemblages in their uniqueness, we need a science of singularities, incorporating the universal and particular dimentions of social phenomena. The landscape of social assemblages is the outcome of Deleuzian process of differentiation attained through the vertical and horizontal movements of real, symbolic and imaginary orders. The science of singularity is a careful combination of hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion encompassing three levels of causation, complexity science and worldhood, and is produced through the mutual cooperation between the analyst and the analysand (the social assemblages).
The approach taken based on Heideggerian *dasein*, in contrast to Cartesian *cogito*, does not objectify the subject of study and creates knowledge in a relational and participatory process. Furthermore, Heideggerian *dasein* acknowledges the embeddedness of the observer as much as the observed and does not privilege the analyst to have monopolistic access to the truth about the observed over and above the self-analysis of the observed.

As such, the observer is as much trapped and simultaneously enabled by her own grid of intelligibility as the observed. The most effective way to know the other seems to be through the art of listening achieved through suspension of disbelief and acting as devil’s advocate which paves the way to enter the world of signification of the radical other (observed social assemblages). This establishes the art of understanding where the analyst or observer understands his own self (his own grid of intelligibility) through understanding the radical other. The dilemma is that for knowing the subject of the study, the analyst needs to know his own grid of intelligibility to be able to know her own way of knowing (Derrida, 2003) to transcend it to be able to locate the social phenomena in the world of signification of the social agents. The paradox resides in the fact that his act of knowing is made possible through his own grid of intelligibility, which makes the paradox of how she can use her own grid of intelligibility to know her own grid of intelligibility to be able to know the other (the subject of the study, or social phenomena or social assemblages).

The way out of this dilemma of incommensurability and miscarriage of understanding is the use of generality of language to discover its particularity through the act of production of meaning and signification. This approach aims to ‘otherise’ the deceptive familiarity of the self and its negating dimensions (its repressions, disavowals and foreclosures) and familiarize the illusory strangeness of the radical other (otherization of the self and selfification of the other); the encounter with radical other is a chance to overcome, at least partially, the finitude of our own embedded selfhood and its world of signification. The property of selflessness and taking the other as another self can act as a method of discovery.

The other is another me in terms of process philosophy and complexity systems and its butterfly effects and its path dependency. The worldhood of the other is detected through the particularity of the other’s chain of signifiers. The way the train of
signifiers are located in a neighbourhood of the chain of signification allows the analyst to enter the bridge of particularity of relation between signifiers through the apparent generality of the signifiers themselves. Each signifier appears to be universal while its particularity resides in how it is related to other signifiers through its neighbourhood and what quilting point or master signifier is deployed to generate meaning. Here the set of denotations and connotations associated with each dictionary and its world of significations are discovered through the method of free association which allows the analyst to understand the social phenomena in their uniqueness and singularity of their embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. Donaldson (2001: 186) addresses how repeatability/generality and uniqueness/singularity work in tandem in the process of generation of meaning through deploying the notion of “field of stabilization”:

A phrase such as "dreams realize desires" will be stabilized by a series of relations that connect it with other statements, and the field of stabilization that one discovers when this phrase is employed by Freud will be quite different from that found in Plato, leading us to recognize that the same phrase can be used in more than one statement. If one fails to reconstruct the field of stabilization, what I have sometimes called the style of reasoning, that confers an identity on the concept of perversion, one will not understand the difference between the nineteenth-century psychiatric invocation of perversion and the appearance of this word in, for instance, Saint Augustine's moral theology. Thus one will fail to see, as Mino Bergamo has put it, that discontinuity can be "dissimulated under the veil of a lexical permanence".

The expression of meaning by the social actors alongside the emergent historical events are used to map the conscious and unconscious dimensions of their world of signification and how they interact, leading to the emergence of social events.

This process combines hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion. Khomeini’s famous phrases, for instance, “the economy is for donkeys” (Willis, 1999: 166) and "There is no fun in Islam" (Wright, 2000: 77) have been frequently and deeply misunderstood by the historical actors and historians, and even by his closest allies like Banisadr (1981, 2011); these cases of mutual misunderstandings (failure in the hermeneutics of understanding) produced actions and talks, which in their interactions gave rise to the emergence of small and large events like the impeachment of Banisadr. The example of quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74 and the Shah’s reaction to it is another case where a great deal of
misunderstanding of the Shah’s position has occurred. At the time this misunderstanding was common amongst the economic experts and the West, and later on amongst the historians and social scientists. This led to the misunderstanding of the Shah, his life world and its interaction with the life world of other historical actors and ultimately the causes and meanings of the 1979 revolution. As Mafinezam and Mehrabi (2008: 25) report:

Treasury Secretary William Simon has publicly described the Shah as a "nut" and as "irresponsible and reckless."

As Khomeini’s intellectual ally Banisadr saw him as nut, the Shah’s American ally described him in the same way. Treating the radical other as nut or irrational is the tell-tale sign of the failure in the test of incommensurability and committing the cardinal sin of transference and/or counter-transference. Being imprisoned in one’s own grid of intelligibility turns the exposure to alternative regimes of truth into the experience of irrationality and madness (being nut).

Zizek (1997: 13) refers to these marked differences between alternative regimes of truth by arguing that

a true historical break does not simply designate the ‘regressive’ loss (or the ‘progressive’ gain) of something, but the shift in the very grid which enables us to measure losses and gains.

The break Zizek is referring to happens not only historically but also topologically in our daily encounters with the radical others. As such, the meaning of parts is determined in their relations with these meaningful wholes (regimes of truth). Thus, social phenomena (actions, talks, emotions, events) only attain strategic essence in their relations with a particular complex adaptive system and world of signification. As Sayer (2000: 88) notes:

If the only choice is between either regarding objects as having essences fixed for all time or conceptualising them as merely transient or even ephemeral . . . then most social phenomena, which lie in between these extremes, will be occluded.
When the relation with the whole changes, as the whole itself changes, the essence of everything— including man, woman, child, water, tree, the sun, the stone and life and death, inflation and employment, prosperity and mortality, and everything else— changes accordingly.

Thus, empirical and positivist observations can only see the surface regularities without seeing the forces acting as condition of possibility for the emergence of law-like patterns in social orders. The observed regularity of ‘spiting causes anger’ (in the case of Martin Luther King advising the black activists not to respond to the spitting provocations of the white Ku Klux Klan members; see Hazen, 2000: 93), for instance, holds only in larger sets of complex adaptive systems and worlds of signification. Spitting is part of a complex adaptive system of body which is part of the ecosystem of the working of earth, moon and the sun which makes life possible on earth and if that larger complex system is disrupted, the person who spits cannot spit as he could not be alive. Sayer (2000: 88), for instance, attests to the complexity dimension of all phenomena in the following terms:

> It helps to understand how essences or causal powers can change if it is appreciated that they are not wholly unconditional. The creation and reproduction of the essential features of animals, or of the capitalist economy, in terms of capital accumulation, ownership and non-ownership of means of production, and so on, is not automatic but conditional upon the existence of other things, such as oxygen, food, money and communication. Thus, change in these preconditions can bring about change in the essential features or natures of the objects, so that they diversify, attenuate or disappear.

All these implies that in terms of understanding social phenomena, all of social relations are embedded in a larger complex system and world of signification where the colour of the skin is ascribed with certain meaning (a dictionary with its denotations and connotations) which culminates to the Ku Klux Klan’s members spitting on the members of black liberation movement. King’s theology disrupted the cause and effect, assumed to be axiomatic, relation between spitting and fury and rage. The different conception of culpability and responsibility in seeing the perpetrators as the passive agents and as the victims of larger forces of history, as formulated by King with regard to Bull Connor (Vischer, 2013: 22), for example, allowed the action and reaction to fall in different causational loop, where the spitting causes the sense of compassion and generosity of spirit rather than anger and
hatred. The application of this logic to the 9/11 case or the 1953 coup would have provoked different reactions from the American or Iranian society.

The example of the relation between the government’s budget deficit, the excessive level of money supply and inflation is frequently observed in the Iranian modern history. That is the level of causation where budget deficit causes inflation. The reductionist approach stops at this observation and furthermore by taking a positivist interventionist approach attempts to embark on social engineering by assuming volition and agency for the government and forcing it to balance its budget while ignoring wider historical forces acting on government as the final arbiter and employer of last resort in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness where no government has full multiple forms of legitimacy and there is little trust within and between the public and private sectors, and the government cannot rely on taxation for its income (as it lacks tri-polar legitimacy) and its expenditure is always on the rise as it has to act as a Keynesian developmental state in charge of the whole of economy.

As such, the experience of inflation in Iran is located in causational relation, itself embedded in a complex adaptive system of macroeconomic ex-ante and ex-post imbalances between investment and saving, and immersion in the international economic order as a supplier of raw material (oil) and importer of finished products alongside the worlds of significations related to the notion of multiple legitimacies associated with multiple rationalities and their warring regimes of truth and their relation with Heideggerian fourfold, demonstrating the embeddedness, incommensurability and emergence properties of inflation. Even after the increase in the level of liquidity in the market due to the government budget deficit, its effects on causing inflation are mediated by the regime of truth, as Ranani (2010, 2012) maintains (see also, Schultz 2001 on the moral conditions of economic efficiency). People may hoard extra liquidity due to precautionary demand for liquidity (like current situation in the West where companies attempt to improve their level of capital adequacy due to experiencing a very restrictive level of access to banking credit or/and the pessimistic outlook towards future) and as Ranani attests the ethical economies suffer less experience of inflation with the same level of liquidity.

As such, for analysing inflation in Iran we need hermeneutics of understanding in combination with hermeneutics of suspicion. In other words, observation at a
positivistic and reductionist level fails to uncover the meanings, rationalities and philosophical unconscious acting as condition of possibility of economic behaviour and the emergent properties like dysfunctions associated with the institutions of money and state, and their relation with impermanence and permanence, spatiotemporal and eternal existence. This implies that ultimately every social phenomenon is the outcome of interplay of context of culture and context of situation, and cannot become the subject of reverse social engineering.

The following sections summarize the way analytic of finitude has shaped the special characteristics of the Iranian social order. They further contemplate on the stylized facts of the Iranian modern history and on how the presence of philosophical autism has shaped the fate of the Iranian social order.

**7.2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IRANIAN MODERN HISTORY AND SOCIETY**

This section embarks on enumerating the forces, voices, and faces at work in shaping the general characteristics of Iran in the modern era.

**7.2.1. Analytic of Finitude**

All social assemblages with their regimes of truth assimilate elements of alternative social assemblages to overcome their own lacks, but some of them succeed (like the assemblage between modernity and Christianity or Buddhism, Connolly, 2008a) due to the work of vanishing mediators and some others do not succeed due to the lack of opportunity for the proper functioning of vanishing mediators, which itself is due to demands of the state of belatedness. The dynamics of assimilation of elements of alternative regimes gives rise to the emergence of pragmatic and radical orientations in each regime of truth, based on the measures of purity and impurity. In the case of Taqizadeh we see his zigzag movement between the height of revolutionary modernist radicalism against Mohammad Ali Shah and depth of his modernist pragmatism in front of Reza Shah where he saw himself only as an instrument (a ‘lat-e fēl) of Reza Shah’s will.

Regimes of truth, besides adopting from each other and forming radical and pragmatic orientations within themselves, demonize each other by highlighting the black book of the others and glorify the self by resorting to the white book of the self
in order to maintain their monopoly over the production of truth (through the affirmative and negating dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary orders). As such truth is a thing of this world with potent productive and negating powers. The work of symbolization and harmonization causes for the regimes of truth to work at orthodox and non-orthodox levels and function at the levels of politics of ordinary and politics of piety.

In the countries like Iran which is immersed in a compound state of belated inbetweenness, these processes become even more hyper-complex. In the state of belated inbetweenness the mediating and vanishing forms are absent as the ways of life and ideas and institutions are imported as finished packages from the rival regimes of truth, which makes the whole social order deeply unstable. Furthermore the social agents are exposed to the heaviness of the burden of judgement and become confused between alternative regimes of truth and their truth claims and their adoption from each other alongside disavowing such adoptions and attacking each other’s dark sides.

7.2.2. Stylized Facts of Iranian History

The immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness acts as a fertile breeding ground for a series of features and properties, which have been regularly experienced throughout modern history of Iran.

7.2.2.1 Unpredictability

Iranian history in the modern era demonstrated a series of regular patterns addressed here as the stylized facts of Iranian modern history; and this work is an attempt to enumerate them and made sense of them. The most well-known fact about Iranian history and society is that the only predictable thing about Iran is its unpredictability (Saghafi, 2004; Kurzman, 2004, 2009). This fact envelops the three levels of causation, complexity science and worldhood in itself. It refers to the sudden change from one state to another where small events can act as tipping points for the social order, driving the whole order into a new bifurcated direction. This happens at micro, meso and macro levels.

This fact also implicitly acknowledges the fact that Iranian society reacts to the events differently due to the nature of its world of signification. The same events and
trends may not trigger the start of a revolution in India or Japan but they may do so in Iran. The unpredictability of Iranian society points to the volatile nature of its embeddedness and its confusion over how to synchronize different regimes of truth. One of the manifestations of Iranian unpredictability is the phenomenon of sudden rise to prominence, followed by gradual daily process of war of attrition, followed by equally sudden collapse into nothingness. This trend was captured by Boroujerdi’s (2010) resort to Iqbal’s famous poem “trashidam, parastidam, shekastam” (I carved an idol, worshiped it and then smashed it). "Iraniains at various levels frequently blamed their own people for being ‘wax-like’, ‘spineless’, or ‘chameleon-like’. This study demonstrates that the people, both in the supply and demand side of the market for truth, have not been culpable for such ‘identitylessness’ and carving of idols, worshiping them and then smashing them; they were only the passive agents (a’lat-e fe’l) of the larger voices and forces inhabiting them. This was due to the dynamics of preference ordering, and the nature of supply and demand for multiple forms of truth in the form of instrumental rationality, communicative rationality and emancipative rationality. As Hanming and Loury (2005) remind us “Dysfunctional Identities Can Be Rational”. As such, the state of identitylessness is the logical implication of immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness.

7.2.2.2 Zigzag Movements

The discursive and non-discursive practices associated with various experiences and events oscillated manifestly between polar extremes in a state of tri-polarity. These are the zigzag movements of a drunken social order immensely confused about the direction it needs to take and the goals it needs to peruse. The sudden rise enjoyed by the constitutionalist movement, Pahlavi dynasty, the ONM, and Islamic Revolution has been associated with persistent threat of collapse and experience of near-collapse or actual collapse. All various brands of social order at all levels have been under siege due to lack of multiple forms of legitimacy. All regimes suffered from being haunted by the spectre of collapse leading to the collapse of three (the Mashroteh, the ONM, and the Pahlavi) while the spectre of sudden fall hovering incessantly over the other. The zigzag movement is experienced at all levels (micro, meso, and macro) within and between the alternative regimes of truth and their associated projects of reverse social engineering. Ayatollah Khamanei (2010) attests to the prevalence of zigzag movements within the Islamic Republic in the following terms:

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When we say "the Islamic-Iranian paradigm", we mean a comprehensive plan. Without a comprehensive plan, we will face confusion, just as we have been suffering from zigzag and purposeless movements during the past 30 years and we have been running around without a plan. Sometimes we carried out a movement and then we did the opposite - in cultural areas, economic areas and different other areas. This was because of the lack of a comprehensive plan.

These zigzag movements in all realms of life, work, and language were symptoms of a society trapped in the doubly troublesome states of belatedness and inbetweenness, triggering the search for a panacea and a source of jouissance acting as a sudden cure for all of its ailments and discontents. The phantasy of sudden embrace of “The Thing” itself bewilderued and bedevilled Iranians to the extent of madly searching for the alchemy of turning all the dark and bitter elements of the social order into bright and sweet components of happiness and success. The search for different forms of utopias frequently culminated into the deep entrapment in various types of dystopias, which breeds an emotional economy fluctuating between excessive exuberance and intense infatuation and deep disappointment and bitter disillusionment. This leads the Iranian dasein to oscillate between the state of self-righteousness and self-loathing.

As a result of turbulence in the Iranian embeddedness between three regimes of truth, one of the prominent stylized facts of Iranian modern history is its oscillation between three large projects of reverse social engineering: Persianization (the Pahlavi dynasty’s project), modernization (Mashroteh revolution, the Mosaddegh’s ONM, and Khatami’s reformist movement), Islamization (Islamic Revolution).

All of these stabilizing and de-stabilizing movements occurred in the spirit of reverse social engineering corresponding to the needs of the intersection between the state of belatedness and the state of inbetweenness. Abrahamian (2008: 152; added emphasis) refers to one of these social engineering projects in the form of the Shah’s changing of the Iranian calendar in the following terms: “Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the imperial year 2535”. The same series of jumps were taken to manufacture the desired outcomes in the realms of the women’s veiling and men’s dress code, gender relations, language, historiography, legal forms and contents (for example regarding social vices), culture, education, economy and other
areas of social order from the Mashroteh era, to the first Pahavi’s era, the Mosaddegh’s ONM, second Pahlavi’s reign and in the Islamic Republic.

Throughout more than a century the nature of Iranian selfhood and its essence has been the site of violent war of attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their corresponding projects of reverse social engineering. All three sets of projects in the Iranian modern history had their own version of nationalism, entailing three different projects of nationalizing Iran. The social order as a whole alongside each social assemblage at micro and meso level oscillated between bikinis and chador, political anti-colonialist jihadists and lip-stick jihadists, and ultimately between three time zones of short-termism of modernity, medium-termism of Persianism and eternal time of Islam. The state of belatedness resulting from the violent encounter with totalizing nature of modernity acted as the condition of possibility for turning the three regimes of truth into three distinct projects of social engineering (ideological blueprints or comprehensive plans), each inducing their own episodes of innocent cruelty.

The irreconcilable differences between different voices created another stylized fact of Iranian history which was the oscillation between anarchy and despotism where springs of freedom in Mashroteh, the ONM era and early years of Islamic revolution quickly resulted in state of paralysis or/and civil wars where widespread levels of social chaos and anarchy were followed by the emergence of final arbiter. The rule of final arbiter (Amir Kabir, Taqizadeh’s revolutionary committee, the first Pahlavi, Mosaddegh, the Shah, Khomeini/Khamaniei) and his discretion was attacked by waves of de-legitimization from all sides, leading to its siege mentality and the possibility or actuality of final collapse, culminating to another round of truth cycle.

This cycle breeds waves of innocent brutality in series of tit for tat courses of epistemic or physical violence between the incumbent and the opposition forces. The repression of the other frequently culminated in the return of the repressed, which is another stylized fact of Iranian modern history where the zombie of religion came back to haunt the Persianist modernizers after repression of religion in the Pahlavi

43The phenomenon of the emergence of final arbiter permeates the whole social order where every realm requires a smaller scale final arbiter to resolve its small scale war of attrition between various voices and cultural tribes emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within forces, voices and faces; as such the system becomes addicted to the discretionary rule of an army of final arbiters (with conflicts within and between them) at all levels rather than the rule of law or any other form of social cohesion. This is at the root of atomic nature of power in Iran as another stylized fact of Iranian modern history.
era and the return of the zombie of secularism after its repression in the Islamic era alongside the return of veiling and the return of unveiling to haunt two different projects of social engineering. The irreconcilable differences within and between the incumbent and the opposition forces replicated in all social groups and classes from the clergy to the intellectual, the poet, the worker, the merchant and the technocrat, and other realms of social life within families, organizations and voluntary groups and plagued the social order throughout the modern period of Iranian history.

7.2.2.3 The Incessant Conflict between Radicals and Pragmatists

Another stylized fact of Iranian modern history revolves around the fact that the difference within and between voices frequently translated into the conflict between radicals, who have been searching for ideological purity, and pragmatists, who lacked ideological justification but have been looking for practical solutions to practical problems while trying to stay loyal to the fundamentals of their affiliated regime of truth. The roots of these turbulent experiences within and between different forces, voices and faces was their theory of selection; the irreconcilable differences in what can and cannot be selected from different regimes of truth and what regime of truth should act as the base or platform for selection; in a sense what should be grafted to what, how and why. The two issues of selection, hence, were subsumption, and substitution/complementarity.

Throughout these periods of turmoil, Iranians strived to liberate themselves, with different degrees of emphasis at different periods, from the religious, tribal, revolutionary, oriental, and occidental forms of despotism and to embrace negative and positive freedoms (liberation from despotisms of nature and man) alongside spiritual freedom from the despotism of desire and terror of death. The three regimes of truth and their affiliated projects of social engineering possessed their lacks and abundances and each attacked the legitimacy of the other based on the white book of the self and black book of the other. The act of incorporating the best of other regimes of truth alongside the act of strategic activation and deactivation of discourses and disavowing such adoptions frequently led to lack of credibility and legitimacy for such hybrid voices and faces, which through the war of attrition between waves of radicalism and pragmatism bred innocent cruelty of all against all.

7.2.2.4 Blaming the Resource Curse and/or the Alliance Curse

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Iran frequently blamed the oil and its associated rent-seeking behaviour or the West for its plights. In reality, Iran cannot attain socio-economic development not exclusively because of the rampant level of rent-seeking behaviour, which is a small symptom of lack of trust due to the emergence of irreconcilable differences in all realms of life, but mainly because it cannot be open for business and act as a land of opportunity, which prevents it from combining order with change, and market dynamism of creative destruction with stabilizing function of welfare state (or any other form of safety net). The oil is not the curse for the Iranians (Smith, 2007) but their ruptured embeddedness and its associated confusion is. This establishes a general rule of our methodology where no single factor or collection of factors can act as a cause for backwardness or progress (or any other social phenomenon); the work of factors is almost always mediated by the sedimented layers of social embeddedness; as such the same factors have manifestly different outcomes in different historical embeddedness.

If access to oil revenue acts differently in Norway compared to Iran it is because of their manifestly different worldhoods. What ultimately creates widespread level of turbulence in the Iranian social order is not the presence or absence of oil revenue, but the tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failures and chaotic orders emerging out of the affiliation to warring regimes of truth and their internal divisions and the burden of judgement it puts on the Iranian *dasein*. The alliance with the West (or lack of it) is not a curse or a blessing and has a similar effect to the effect of oil revenue. The West is a resource and a force of nature which can be tamed and deployed constructively or destructively depending on the existence (or lack) of social cohesion (*asabiya*).

**7.2.2.5 The Ultimate Pattern**

The ultimate pattern governing the history of modern Iran is the four-stage mechanism (in the realm of hermeneutics of suspicion), which is produced as an emergence (unintended consequence) out of the interaction between forces, voices, and faces plagued by philosophical autism (in the realm of hermeneutics of understanding). The foreclosure to understand the radical other through thinking the unthinkable led to frequent experience of multilateral misunderstanding, which in turn through their interaction through war of attrition leads to the four-stage
mechanism governing the events of Iranian modern history. Ultimately if Iranians are suffering from a curse, it is a truth curse and not the resource or alliance curse.

7.3. PHILOSOPHICAL AUTISM

The society-wide turbulence and its waves of innocent cruelty ultimately are rooted in the poverty of languages deployed in the process of understanding the unique and singular experience of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness. The languages and categories of thought and mode of thinking available through standard packages of truth (modern versus non-modern, scientific versus non-scientific, believer versus non-believer, Persian versus non-Persian) are not fit for understanding the nature of Iranian selfhood and its immersion in the state of confusion where the radical others of modernity, Islam and Persianism operate as the integral parts of the Iranian fractured selfhood with multiple loyalties and affiliations.

Misunderstanding and its associated innocent brutality relates to the philosophical autism on failure to understand the radical other. Such understanding requires overcoming the limits of addicted grid of intelligibility and understanding the other in her own terms through uncovering her world of signification with its own dictionary and associated denotations and connotations. The inability to understand the other leads to inability to understand the self as the other is constitutive of the self.

Philosophical autism leads to the Iranians treating each other with contempt, disgust, and hatred as untouchables (najes), which is another stylized fact of Iranian modern history. Each side treat the voice of the radical other side as a pile of “nonsense” (charand va parand) or at best as “magnificent impasse” (Khalaji, 2010). While Kasravi saw the Persian poetry and Persian mysticism as nonsense or magnificent impasse (Ajodani, 2003), Avini (1997) saw modernity as modern form of superstition, and Khalaji saw fiqh as magnificent impasse. As a result of state of belated inbetweenness and its associated irreconcilable differences, Iranians treat each other as untouchables as they lack common grounds allowing them to agree to disagree and have unity without uniformity, in turn enabling them to grant each other the status of legitimate interlocutors in the social production of truth about life, work, and language.
7.3.1 Blame Game

As Iranians are not able to understand each other (and as a result their own selfhood) and fail to understand how this failure to understand each other generates the chaotic situation in the Iranian modern history through the functioning of a four-stage mechanism, they embark on intentional fallacy of blaming particular forces, voices, or faces as the main cause of the Iranian state of socio-economic backwardness. If and when the discourse of decline is replaced with the discourse of belated inbetweenness the need for playing the blame game disappears entirely. As such, within the discourse of decline and backwardness, a series of reductionist analyses blamed the internal or external causes for the Iranian state of backwardness, ranging from economism to sociologism, psychologism, environmentalism and culturalism, where for example the Iranian arid environment was believed to have caused a particular form of chronic despotism shaping the Iranian modern history. Other causes were deemed to include the Iranian cultural trait of intolerance or laziness and non-receptive attitude towards hard work, bad governance and mismanagement, the presence of mafia groups at all levels of society, lack of civil society, external forces of imperialism and colonialism and their constant interventions in the Iranian history, and rent-seeking behaviour induced by oil revenue, among others. These are a short list of the causal analysis offered for the Iranian state of socio-economic underdevelopment. These explanations suffer from the flaws of black box explanations and atomistic analysis of social order away from its embeddedness in complex adaptive systems and worlds of significations.

At a more systemic level of analysis prevalent amongst almost all social actors, from historical actors to historians and from lay people to theorists, the following trend in misunderstanding of radical other and the self can be identified. The blame is laid on the perceived dark side of one, two, or all regimes of truth (religious despotism, oriental despotism, occidental despotism or revolutionary despotism) and the remedy is offered in a theory of selection which prioritizes the perceived white side of one regime of truth as the base for selection of the white components from alternative regime of truth, all packaged in a comprehensive blueprint for the act of reverse social engineering. Almost all schools of thought (with leading figures like Akhundzadeh, Malkam Khan, Agha Khan Kermani, Sheikh Fazzollah Nuri, Taqizadeh, Kasravi, Fardid, Al-e Ahmad, Shariati, Khomeini, Bazargan, Nasr, Shayegan, Dostdar, Tabatabaei, Soroush, among others) can be positioned on a
continuum spanning over the dark and white sides of regimes of truth and their particular brand of the theory of selection; the detailed exploration of this spectrum could not be presented here due to the issue of word limits imposed on the thesis.

The Persianists like the Shah, for instance, cursed the black and red reactionaries as his untouchables (*najes*) while Khomeini blamed the dark forces of Persian kingdom, and modernity and its political and materialist despotism alongside blaming what he called American Islam, which is a version of religious despotism. Many others have committed the intentional fallacy and have tried to find the culprit in the intentions of rulers or the oppositions in the form of their mischievous pursuit of power and wealth or fame. Iranians frequently activate and circulate the discourses of victimhood in the form of blaming a particular perpetrator in the form of “they came, killed, devoured and looted” (*koshtand va khordand va bordand*). This puts every new set of rulers in the status of the most familiar dark force of Iranian history, Genghis Khan, which allows them easily to makes sense of their historical plights through the dualities of rulers/ruled and perpetrators/victims. At any time 2 Iranians react to their bitter experience at time 1 by nominating a new perpetrator, while remaining incognizant to the overall patterns and regularities governing their modern history. The perpetrators change but their sense of victimhood stays the same.

In the search for explaining and curing malaise of the Iranian society, each cultural tribe of any colour or persuasion frequently attribute the pursuit of truth to the self and the pursuit of power and wealth to the others. The self is principled the other is spineless. They portray themselves as following the ethics of care and service while the other almost always acts upon the urge for anti-ethical codes of selfishness and power-thirstiness, which demonstrates Iranian confusion on human values and the relation between truth, goodness, power, interests, and subjectivity.

Philosophical autism in understanding the other and the self culminates in the emergence of truth cycles where alternative regimes of truth come to dominate the social order intermittently, where their dominance and their instability are manifested in the four Williamson’s levels of price mechanism, organizational governance, institutions, and mind and leads to the oscillation between the four states of chaos and order, creating a chaotic order.
7.4. OUTLINES OF THE SOLUTION

Iranians need to realize that they live in the genre of tragedy and not epic of good against evil, modern against pre-modern (tradition), or patriot versus non-patriot. The Iranian subjectivity, power and knowledge are trapped in the state of belated inbetweenness and are torn between affiliations to alternative regimes of truth. Iranian social assemblage (micro, meso or macro) is fractured and ruptured rather than being coherent and unified. As such the categories and concepts deployed for homogenous or heterogeneous societies cannot be applied to the troubled societies with ruptured embeddedness. What is needed is a non-combative, non-violent (epistemic or physical) approach to understanding of the alternative forces, voices and faces and making genuine attempts to enter the radical others’ life worlds and to learn their different languages and their dictionaries, discovering particular ways each particular voice offers to combine different rationalities. By listening to the various voices and offering the best and most rational defence of their positions based on their own particular grid of intelligibility and its conscious and unconscious dimensions through combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, the context becomes ready for the acceptance of all voices with truth claims to act as legitimate interlocutors in the social production of collective capacity and consensus on embeddedness and its dimensions of goodness, truth and beauty.

In terms of hermeneutics of understanding, the social agents’ accounts of themselves and their social order should be taken at face value to be used in the reconstruction of their internal rationality. Alongside this dimension, as no social agent is fully present to herself and has unconscious dimensions, the accounts and actions should be used, based on hermeneutics of suspicion, to further complement the attempt to discover the internal logic of different voices and faces and how they interact to culminate in the emergence of events and experiences. The historical agents (such as Khomeini or the Shah or any other) are not necessarily the best judges of their own world of signification (gong-e khabdideh) but their accounts, actions and emotions are windows and avenues, which can lead us towards the faithful discovery of their life worlds.

As such, the social agents are neither totally ignorant nor fully aware of their own grid of intelligibility. Social assemblages and agents, as combinations of conscious and unconscious dimensions, require the careful combination of hermeneutics of
understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion in order to discover the life world of the other.

What the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness needs is the non-combative thinking rather than critical thinking. The condition of possibility of critical thinking is not available in Iran’s compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. The exercise of non-combative thinking paves the way for understanding each other, which makes national dialogue possible, paving the way for the emergence of common grid of intelligibility which makes the practice of critical thinking possible. The practice of non-combative thinking (through avoidance of counter-transference and avoidance of projection of one’s own life world to the radical other) needs to be done unilaterally and initiated from any voice interested in ending the more-than-a-century of history of turbulence and violence and should be practiced towards all voices whether in power (incumbent voices) or out of power (the opposition voices). We need to announce cessation of all hostilities and declare unilateral truce.

In effect, what is needed is declaring a unilateral truce in the incessant waves of wars of attrition between alternative truth camps. This includes listening to the voice of the ruling clerics, the opposition clerics, the West and American establishment and the ruling religious intellectuals or the opposition secular intellectuals and the Persianist monarchists and supporters of Persian poetry and literature, among others. The voices of radicals affiliated to all regimes of truth should be listened to alongside paying careful and loyal attention to the voices of the pragmatists of all sides. The unilateral practice of the art of listening, liberating the self from the finitude of slavery to the own grid of intelligibility and its associated world of signification with its associated structures of power/knowledge, discursive formation and emotional economy, is the prerequisite of the possibility of achieving change in the historical experience of turbulence and violence. Being a dasein allows the researcher to be a strategic cogito to understand other daseins through the method of free association.

The experience of brutality from the other forces, voices and faces (the sense of victimhood) should not prevent any voice from exercising non-combative thinking since the prevalence of brutality is rooted in the confusions and dissonances associated with the state of belated inbetweenness, and as such is a form of innocent cruelty. The actions and talks of people can be criticized according to their own adhered regimes of truth and not the regime of truth of the observers or the analysts.
As Martin Luther King (Selby, 2008; Hill, 2007) states the non-violent ethic of love requires seeing people as passive agents of their worlds of signification. This non-violence of care and love is required more than ever in the ambiguous context of belated inbetweenness in comparison to the King’s context of divided society where blacks and whites belonged to two different separate communities with clearly defined sets of interests, ideas, and identities, all embedded in a larger context of homogenous society and history with a dominant regime of truth in the form of modernity.

What is at the roots of irreconcilable differences within and between forces, voices and faces is the difference in the theory of selection (in what is supposed to take the status of the main regime of truth and how the elements of other regimes of truth need to be selected and assimilated and grafted into the body of the main package of truth) to cure the ailments of the social order. There is no easy or ready-made solution for the two issues of selection, namely, subsumption and substitution/complementarity.

As such, no particular model of selection can deem itself as the only possible option for the transformation of social order. These different models need to compete with each other in a free market for ideas and ways of life, and through the process of free entry and exit, extinction and survival and continuous process of rhizomatic and symbolic mutations, new consensual outcomes may emerge, sedeminting themselves as the historical embeddedness, in the process providing stable regime of truth and historical a priori for knowing, acting and feeling. The irreconcilable differences between the voices and lack of mutual understanding led to the imposition of each project on the whole population by force in different periods of Iranian modern history, which culminated in the short-term restoration of order but long-term experience of revolutions and social movements perpetuating the experience of instability, turbulence and violence. It seems that in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness, resort to coercion or obedience does not work and only persuasion through the social production of truth can produce social capacity and consensus to produce synchronized and harmonized embeddedness. In a sense, the Iranians have to collectively produce the condition of possibility of their own collective and personal actions, and this seems to be possible only through establishing a repeated game of truth tournament (see Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Dion, 1988).
To achieve this, the social interaction needs to be turned into a tournament for truth where alternative entries compete for attracting the allegiance and loyalty of the population in an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization. To guarantee that this process does not diverge into total atomization of social space leading to the re-emergence of anarchy and quasi or total civil war, as frequently experienced in the modern history of Iran, we need to start from the current default position and by taking a non-violent, non-combative position towards it to remove the possibility of another round of reverse social engineering, which allows the philosophical and theoretical ideas alongside ways of being and becoming (discursive and non-discursive practices) about how to organize life, work and language to grow in maturity via going through several rounds of adoptions and adaptations which gives time and space to people to develop the sense of ownership and attunement towards the emergent outcomes. The main outline of the solution revolves around the protection of the field of social interaction where different varieties of hybrid (or pure) forms of truth can emerge and compete with each other, where some go extinct and others survive and thrive in an evolutionary and spontaneous process of chaotic synchronization without resort to epistemic (violent categorization) or physical violence even if others resort to violence.

The solution, thus, lies, not in particular answer to the Iranian misfortune, but establishing a factory or process, which can produce sustainable solutions to the general and particular problems of the nation. The task of selection theory is to establish a selection process which does not favour a priori a particular regime of truth over others by resorting to coercion and repression of the opposite forces but by allowing the alternative hybrid or pure voices to compete with each other for the allegiance and affiliation of the Iranian people, establishing a process which through its non-coercive and non-combative nature can lead to the emergence of a consensual and synchronized embeddedness acting as condition of possibility for agreeing to disagree and forming unity without uniformity.

This process of selection relies on the three principles of establishment of stable social orders: the principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. This process is our best hope for allowing Iranians to build a new house of ‘being’ and liberate themselves from discursive homelessness without resorting to the brutality of intelligent design and reverse social engineering and through exploiting
the spontaneous and evolutionary processes at work at the heart of emergence of social phenomena.

Currently, Iranians inhabit parallel worlds with parallel time frames and want to have the option of free entry and exit into and from one world into another, but the symbolic and imaginary dimensions of each regime of truth do not endorse such rhizomatic movement between irreconcilable worlds. The nomadic passage from one truth land to another requires truth visas. This evolutionary process of social discovery of truth would allow the emergence of synchronized and harmonized symbolic and imaginary orders, paving the way for the establishment of stable embeddedness acting as the condition of possibility of an order happy in its own skins and at peace with itself and the world. This is like turning the whole society with all its diverse forces, voices, and faces into an R & D institute for discovering ‘truth about’ life, work, and language. The production of truth leads to the production of wealth, “confirming Hegel's point that the path to truth is part of the truth” (Zizek, 2012: 477).

7.5. EPILOGUE

For me, this research turned into a deeply creative and transformative voyage of self-discovery fraught with unpredictable waves of agony and ecstasy and resulting in coming to peace with my ‘Iranian selfhood’ and even coming to develop a sense of deep love and affection for its hyper-complexity. I found Iran in its modern history to be a paradoxical entity like a “wandering mountain” as Danashvar perceptively called. By offering a new theory and new interpretation of the stylized facts of the Iranian modern history through contextualizing them in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness via deploying a hybrid methodology combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this study considers that it has offered the theoretical foundations for the emergence of a non-violent, non-combative evolutionary process of production of truth acting as condition of possibility for the production of trust and wealth in the modern history of Iran.

But like all finite entities this study has its own limitations. One of the limitations of the study was that it could not include the Khatami’s reformist movement and Green movement as one of its application chapters due to the word limitations imposed on the theses. Furthermore, it could not include the detailed analysis of each of four stages in each application chapters due to the issue of word limitations. The
expansive analysis of each section of the Methodological Chapter and Theoretical Framework Chapter were not included in the final draft of the thesis again due to the issue of word limitations. Due to the general nature of the study it could not delve into the details of historical events, institutions, or characters like the reactions of various forces, voices and faces to the oil price rise of 1973-4 or the hostage crisis or Montazeri’s succession crisis or the institution of religious schools, or the Organization for Planning and Development, or the characters of Qavam, Banisadr or Montazeri, for instance.

Furthermore, with the benefit of hindsight, I would have organized the application chapters differently. I would have preferred to put the Mahroteh and ONM in one chapter to represent the project of modernization, once through opposition to the oriental despotism and the second time through opposition to occidental despotism. I would have put the first and second Pahlavi experiences in one chapter to represent the project of Persianization. And the Chapter on the Islamic Republic would have been left intact to represent the project of Islamization. In this way the nature of Iranian modern history would have been better reflected in the structure of this study.

Future studies needs to apply the theoretical framework, methodological insights, and conceptual tools offered in this study to the study of specific events of the Iranian modern history alongside applying them to issues such as sexuality and veiling, gender relation, the relation with the West and especially America, Israel, and the Arab world, the formation and evolution of the Organization for Planning and Development, the encounter with modern topics such as human rights, freedom of speech and distributive justice alongside the economic issues such as taxation, inflation and unemployment and many other issues such as modern Persian poetry, literature, and Cinema. One of the clear examples of institutional failure in the contemporary life of Iranians is the dysfunctional road system, killing thousands of Iranians every year. It will be a greatly rewarding research to investigate how the logic of institutional building has gone badly wrong in the construction of the institutions of the road and transportation system, especially with regard to the use and abuse of cars.

Another fascinating area of research is the investigation of how the state of belated inbetweenness has affected the implicit emergence of three forms of economics (modern economics, Islamic economics, and Persian economics) and how such
development created confusion in the realm of economic thought (for example on riba or Halal investment and modern banking system) and economic policy making for the last two centuries. The same applies to the realms of architecture, cinema, arts, and literature. Yet another fascinating area of research is to explore the details of the functions of the middlemen in the formation and disintegration of coalitions in the modern history of Iran. The detailed investigations of the relations and co-evolution of realms of sexuality, spirituality, and economic growth is another fascinating area of research. The issue of how the state of belated inbetweenness affects the working of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is another fascinating realm of research. The list can go on and on. These future applications would lead to further development and refinement of the theory and will hopefully culminate in the building of capacity and consensus on the way to understand Iran and social phenomena in general.

I am hopeful that these future studies will start to break the traditional division of labour in human and social sciences between disciplines, and will prompt the study of diverse issues such as inflation, Persian poetry, and foreign policy in a co-evolutionary analysis of political economy of truth, trust, and wealth. The emergence of a breed of holistic researchers and thinkers, and its subsequent effects in the emergence of holistic policy making will be one of the rewarding outcomes of such a research paradigm, changing the dysfunctional relation between the creation of truth and the creation of trust and wealth for the better.


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Appendix 1: Diagram 1-Approaches to Social Inquiry