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Changing Security:  
Theoretical and Practical Discussions.  
The Case of Lebanon.

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.

School of Government and International Affairs 
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Abstract

This study is concerned with security; particularly security in Lebanon. It is also equally concerned with various means to improve security. Building on debates at the heart of world politics and Security Studies, this study first discusses trends in global governance, in the study of security, and in security assistance to post-conflict or developing countries. It pays particular attention to the theoretical contributions of critical security studies, the conceptual contributions of human security, and the policy-relevant contributions of Security Sector Reform.

It then moves on to examine the case of Lebanon, with particular emphasis on that country’s precarious security. It examines Lebanon’s problematic prevailing system and highlights efforts of progressive groups in transforming Lebanon’s system. Importantly, it also studies Lebanon’s security sector: both contemporary developments and historical circumstances that led up to its chronic weakness. In doing so, this study examines international aid efforts to Lebanon’s security sector, and problematizes both external and domestic roles in the reform process.

This study draws links between debates and experience taking place at various levels and the security of Lebanon. It argues for a transformative process to achieve stability and human security in Lebanon. In light of this, this study is in favour of a progressive approach combining state and non-state actors – thus recommending an institutional approach that is responsive to bottom-up voices of positive change. Nevertheless, this study’s scope is limited; it therefore puts forward suggestions and recommendations which involve Lebanon’s security sector and which can positively contribute to human security.
Declaration

I hereby declare that: “this thesis is the result of my own work. Material from published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text”.

Dima Smaira
17/9/2014
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Introduction

I- Background

Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) marked the start of a new era for Lebanon. It called for the withdrawal of ‘all remaining foreign forces’, for the ‘disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,’ for the ‘extension of the control of the Government’ over all its territory, and for ‘free and fair’ presidential elections. Since then, Lebanon has returned to the forefront of international politics. Indeed, within less than a year, following the March 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the international community greatly intensified its involvement in Lebanon in an effort to prevent the country from becoming another ‘rogue’ state.

The international community’s revived interest in Lebanon is strongly linked to the post-9/11 international security environment. Through the UN, major Western powers undertook bold initiatives pertaining to the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. These steps ranged from Chapter VI ½ to Chapter VII resolutions such as Resolution 1559 (2004), to the creation of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) into the Hariri assassination (Resolution 1595 (2005)), a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Resolution 1757 (2007)), and increased bilateral aid initiatives. On one level, the Security Council was demonstrating its new firmness against terrorist attacks; on another level, the major powers were clearly including Lebanon in their transformative plans for the Middle East. At the height of the Israeli war on Lebanon in July 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made clear Lebanon’s position within US government strategy: ‘What we are seeing here, in a sense, is the growing—the birth pangs of a New Middle East and

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1 It was sponsored by the US and France and was seen to be directed against Syria and Hezbollah; it passed with 6 abstentions including by China and Russia. From: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm (accessed on 10/5/2011).

2 Following the SC’s recognition that terrorism is a ‘threat to international peace and security’, the STL was the first and only international tribunal set up in response to a terrorist act. The STL will be covering a series of other subsequent targeted attacks on Lebanese public figures found to be similar to or connected with the Hariri assassination. The STL website, from: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/unique-features/unique-features-a-terrorism-trial (accessed on 3/3/2012).
whatever we do, we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the New Middle East, not going back to the old one.³

The Hariri assassination is now considered a landmark in Lebanese politics, as the repercussions of this event put Lebanon under a powerful spotlight. The International Community’s interest in Lebanon is linked to a number of factors—mostly pertinent to its geo-strategic position. Firstly, Lebanon represents a stepping stone into the Middle East. Secondly, it has served as an open battlefield in which regional and international powers have been able to conduct their showdowns—the height of which has been the confrontation between the West and its Arab allies on the one hand, and Iran and Syria on the other. Thirdly, because it walks a thin line between being a fragile and a failing state, while at the same time still possessing the infrastructure to alleviate it from its current position. The troubled case of Lebanon is therefore of great interest to a large range of international and regional stakeholders. Meanwhile, for the academic and scholarly community, the Lebanese situation continues to serve as a fascinating, albeit tragic, case study on fragile states and on societies in transition from war-to-peace.⁴

The relationship between Lebanon and the donor community is a symbiotic one. This study illustrates the previous argument and illuminates the link between international actors and Lebanon. On the one hand, Lebanon’s weak capabilities and periodic flare-ups justify its need for assistance, and possibly even its dependence, on foreign powers. On the other hand, Lebanon is considered a security concern for the international community.⁵ The latter has found it vital to secure Lebanon’s alignment with the West and to raise state capabilities to face the spread of instability from its territory. In a meeting with journalists from members of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Belgium, Rosa Belfour, Senior Policy Analyst of the European Policy Center made this point by announcing that

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⁴ There is no agreed upon definition of what constitute a ‘fragile state’; especially because of the difference in contexts and problems of categorization. Nevertheless, a working definition could consist of: ‘states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy.’ Post conflict and fragile states share common weaknesses; the World Bank noted in 2006 that three quarter of fragile countries are affected by conflict. Specific characteristics of post-conflict countries are: the dominance of an elite, a ‘fragile peace-consolidation process,’ a lack of confidence among socio-economic factors, and ‘weak judicial, financial, fiscal, administrative and regulatory capacities of the state.’ Frances Stewart and Graham Brown, "Fragile States,"(Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), 2009). p 1-2. And "The Transition from War-to-Peace: An Overview,"(World Bank, 1999). p 1.

‘Lebanon is the heart of instability in the region.’ She also said that it has registered little improvement and political change. As Belfour points out, under the Neighbourhood Policy, the EU expects Lebanon to implement political reform, transparent economic administration, and guarantees in terms of security and stability. 6 Far behind the strategic concerns are the developmental voices which are also echoed in some donor approaches, and which have been recognized to be inextricably linked to security. This study, nevertheless, takes the view that Lebanon’s efforts in both realms, while essential, have not benefited from the seriousness of purpose, or the commitment and the investments required. 7

The broader context explains the revival of the relationship between Lebanon and international society. 8 Traditional politics had focused strongly on competition, non-intervention, and military defence. The current environment however, has been characterized by ‘new’ or non-traditional security threats and interventionism. 9 With globalization reaching new peaks, the collapse of the ‘Iron Curtain,’ and the relaxation of international relations, ‘threats’ erupting from hot spots the world over have become truly transnational concerns. The 1990s represented a new chapter in world politics. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that: ‘the challenges to peace and security today are predominantly global. While they are not necessarily or entirely new, they take place in a new context and have far-reaching effects. They require complex and collective responses, which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed, and

7 This can be seen from the previous elusive quote: asking for ‘guarantees in terms of security’ and ‘transparent economic administration’ do not address the complexity of the situation and of the response required.
8 This study adopts the English School’s terminology. It refers to an international society instead of an international system to underscore the difference between a system and a society. The former merely consists of ‘interacting parts’, and the latter involves a more evolved form of ‘self-conscious and in part self-regulating’ community that develops institutions, shared rules and norms to regulate relations (i.e. for states to deal with and maintain order in the anarchic international system). Despite recognition of some role to non-state actors, international society remains a state system. Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," International Organizations 43, no. 3 (summer 1993). p 331-336.
9 Mary Kaldor coined the term ‘New Wars’ to describe political violence within states (wars fought by a combination of state and non-state actors for liberation/independence, human rights, ethnic, religious and sectarian reasons); but also ‘new terrorism’ (suggested by Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman), nuclear proliferation, the environment, resources, poverty, population growth, health, and migration were recognized—although contestably—as ‘new’ security threats. For the ‘New Wars’ see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999).
properly used." The attacks of September 11, 2001 also, of course, had dramatic effects on world politics and security. Prior to 2001, most calls to recognise some of these ‘new’ forms of threats were scattered and remained low politics. Since, international society realised the implications of having ignored distant hotspots and revived its engagement with countries like Lebanon.

For many scholars, Security Studies as a sub-field of International Relations had to be re-oriented or re-invented. It has slowly but firmly been evolving to include new referents and new issues under its umbrella. Nevertheless, there are vanguards, primarily realists, who have resisted this transformation. Setting this discussion aside for the time being, this paradigm shift came to broaden and deepen the scope of Security Studies.

Scholars have also highlighted the effects of globalization by emphasising the increasing interdependence between localities, states and regions in different parts of the globe. Global governance, as a by-product of globalization, has led to a dual process of fragmentation as well as integration. It is widely accepted that networks of global governance have been responsible for the severe inequality between the Global North and the Global South, which affects security at various levels. Equally, however, international society has converged on a set of human-centric norms.

Many changes are therefore taking place in international relations, particularly in terms of mobilizing actors of international society against the different manifestations of

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11 The terrorism threat is widely seen to overshadow the other non-traditional security threats. For example, Chapter VII SC Resolution 1373 imposes on states counter terrorism legislation, cooperation with the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and compliance with demands and related sanctions.
13 This by making a connection between what goes on in the South to what goes on in the North, what goes on in the East to what goes on in the West, as well as between what goes on at the local level to what goes on at the international level. Anthony Giddens defined globalization as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings by events occurring miles away and vice versa.’ Anthony Giddens, “The Globalizing of Modernity,” in The Global Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew(Malden: Polity, 2000).P 92.
15 Such as the protection of human rights, international humanitarian law, and the fight against discrimination, torture, human trafficking, global diseases, and poverty.
instability but also in propagating world society ideals. States, regional organizations, the UN, as well as International Financial Institutions, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations—the main actors in global governance—have all taken up the role of propagating and—importantly—imposing a set of norms and values for the conduct of world politics. International society has made a decisive move towards the governance of transnational issues. Former SG Kofi Annan noted that ‘soft threats’ such as environmental degradation, poverty and disease—including ‘oppressive and corrupt management’—are partly responsible for the deprivation and inequality which pose the greatest threat to the majority of the world’s population. In this respect, Amartya Sen spoke of ‘development as freedom.’ Robert Cox, more brusquely, spoke of the tendency for ‘riot-control’ to contain the instability emanating from the Global South. The reason seems to be that the strength of the international community is only as strong as its weakest link. In regards to ‘hard threats’ such as terrorism, for example, it was no longer acceptable to have legal loopholes and safe havens in which ‘terrorists’ could operate and find refuge, or for states to run against the leading governance trends and clubs. This translated domestically through binding Security Council resolutions, international conventions, bilateral treaties, conditional aid and conditional membership to international and regional organizations, as well as sanctions.

The international environment, therefore, explains international society’s heightened involvement across the world, including in Lebanon.

II- Rationale and Research Questions

This study stems from a seemingly enthusiastic national initiative, endorsed by international actors, to improve the performance of Lebanon’s security institutions. It is a process inspired by the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, but which gained momentum only in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

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16 See chapter 2.
20 ‘It is to deny them the opportunity to find refuge, in any cause, any country (…)’ said former Secretary General Kofi Annan. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan addressing the Security Council on the one-year anniversary commemoration of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) on 04/10/2002. From: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/sg10april_02.html (accessed on 3/12/2007).
This study is concerned with the lack of security in Lebanon, but it is also equally concerned with various means to improve security—primarily for the individual. Therefore, building on debates at the heart of world politics and Security Studies, this study first discusses trends in global governance and the study of security, as well as trends in security assistance to post-conflict or developing countries. It then moves on to examine the case of Lebanon, with particular emphasis on that country’s precarious security. It studies Lebanon’s security sector: both current developments and historical circumstances that led up to its chronic weakness. In doing so, this study examines international aid efforts to Lebanon’s security sector, and problematizes both the external and domestic processes. Finally, this study favours a wide transformative process to achieve stability and relative security in Lebanon. But in light of the challenges to transformation, this study puts forward some suggestions and recommendations involving, on one hand, an institutional approach for sustainable progress, and, on the other hand, concerted bottom-up efforts to feed a process of positive change – thus recommending an approach which combines state-centric and non-state-centric efforts.

This study therefore asks two core research questions:

- What is the security debate at the theoretical, conceptual and policy levels?
- How can it be linked to, and how can it contribute to Lebanon’s security?

In answering the above, this study highlights discussions pertinent to the governance of security. It constructs a tool-kit out of governance, critical security studies, human security, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) to formulate a conception of security and better understand the role of different actors in security governance. It uses the tool-kit to link trends in the study and the governance of security to the Lebanese context. At the empirical level, this study, therefore, examines the efforts that the Lebanese government and its foreign partners have undertaken to improve Lebanon’s security governance. More importantly, it assesses the extent to which these have been effective, and offers suggestions for more sustainable results.

From the above, it may at first seem that this study takes an exclusively state-centric approach; however, this is neither the choice of this study nor convenient in the case of Lebanon, since the state not only shares authority as the concept of governance suggests, but is also heavily dependent on non-state actors in the provision of justice and
security. Informal structures such as militias, community and politico-sectarian leaders constitute a long-standing alternative to the state. One must be wary of the role and the power which states have acquired throughout history. In the case of Lebanon and other war-torn countries, however, the weakness of the state has allowed alternative structures to flourish. This said, powerful non-state actors may equally replicate regressive power relations. This study, therefore, puts forth a platform for grassroots-level voices and other inclusive and egalitarian voices both from inside and outside the ruling establishment to reconcile competing forces.

Without turning the state into a scarecrow, therefore, this study finds itself halfway between the two extremes – engaging with both state and non-state actors. This issue has been a very difficult challenge to overcome given the nature of the subject and the resilience of state-centric approaches in modern Western models. Having said that, whatever structures of governance are in place, it is this study’s view that they need to be nurtured into inclusive, conciliatory and egalitarian ones.

Next, chapter 1 presents the methodological framework of this study.

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21 Although empirical work has only been conducted for non-armed non-state actors (chapter 6).
Chapter 1: Methodological Framework

This chapter discusses the methodological choices made for this study. It briefly explains this study’s general approach to social research and then outlines the research design used to conduct empirical research. It discusses methods for data collection, sampling, data analysis, and briefly shares the interview experience. This chapter also discusses issues of reliability and validity, ethical considerations and limitations, and lessons learned from the research design.

I- Research methods

Mirroring its theoretical framework, this study has sought to ground itself in critical social science. Critical social science explains ‘the social order in such a way that it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order.’1 Critical social science exposes the underlying structures that trap people in false consciousness; this exposed knowledge is intended to empower people to fight injustice. Critical social science is political and action-oriented; it is ‘unembarrassed by the label “political” and unafraid to consummate a relationship with an emancipatory consciousness.’2 Unlike other post-positivist approaches, critical social research is not content with the deconstruction of existing structures, but seeks also to reconstruct and suggest alternatives for progress. Broadly speaking, positivist social science believes in value-free science, objectivity, qualitative evidence, verification by replication, and instrumental orientation to control events and conditions. Interpretive social science believes in subjectivity, a constructionist view of reality, an understanding of social context and personal interpretations, and a relativistic view of values.3 While all approaches contribute to knowledge in different ways, these alternative approaches have been sidelined because positivism is detached from real people4 and interpretive social research is passive;5 they are ‘concerned with

4 Its emphasis on objectivity, laws and control alienates context and perceptions.
studying the world instead of acting on it. Critical social science is broader, more flexible and more ethical than positivist research. It has elements in common with post-structuralism and interpretive social science, and it is open to a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Importantly, it is concerned with both actual conditions and people’s perceptions of these conditions; it uses immanent critique to explain and critique conditions, and uses praxis by ‘putting theory into practice’ to refine explanations.

Based on critical social science’s premise that the researcher actively engages with the research rather than remain a neutral observer I acknowledge that my upbringing and my experiences as a Lebanese have shaped the direction of this study. This study aims to challenge the mainstream discourses on conflict in Lebanon, expose structural limitations, and make a case for transformation. Critical security studies and the concepts of governance, human security, and SSR are used to construct a tool-kit that helps explain what is taking place in Lebanon, and steer the system towards more progressive change. Actors of international society have tried implementing a loose SSR policy in Lebanon, broadly consisting of assistance in strengthening and reforming the security sector. This study will subject these concepts to immanent critique; it will show that they may be vulnerable to regressive and problematic policies. However, should these concepts and policy be applied in the critical normative spirit outlined in the study, then they may be able to provide some progress for Lebanon (an example of praxis). The purpose of this tool-kit is therefore to affect ‘real people’ positively by inducing change in the system (whether top-down or bottom-up).

This study asks two research questions: What is the nature of the security debate in Lebanon at the theoretical, conceptual and policy level? And how can this debate be linked to, or contribute to, Lebanon’s security? To answer these questions, this study starts with an investigative account of theoretical, conceptual and policy discussions on security.

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5 Its emphasis on context and personal perceptions ignores actual structures and conditions (such as oppression) and possibilities for change.
7 Such as the attention paid to social contexts, subjectivity and criticism of positivist anti-humanism.
8 Immanent critique is to judge the prevailing order according to its own claims instead of against outside values. Ken Booth, ed. Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2005). p 11.
From this, the study constructs a tool-kit to weigh what has been taking place in Lebanon, in order to determine to what extent reform and donor support has been conducive to progress.

This study adopts a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to answer these research questions. This choice is linked to three characteristics of social research relevant to this study. The first is a focus on the in-depth study of a specific case, which informs conclusions inductively, rather than tests hypotheses (deductively) and measures variables across cases. The second touches on the nature of the data in this study, which is mostly concerned with soft rather than hard data. The third concerns the logic of the study: it follows a ‘logic in practice’ consisting of a non-linear path rather than a systematic linear plan. That last characteristic is the basis for the flexibility of qualitative research; it allows the researcher to adjust the focus and direction of the study periodically. As the study reached its model for security governance for Lebanon inductively, this flexibility has been essential.

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10 I.e. text as opposed to numbers; thereby separating the subjectivity of soft data to an evolving context, changing factors, and diverse methods from the objectivity of precise and replicable evidence.

11 Neuman, 2003, p 165.
II- Research Design

1) Data collection

This study was conducted using triangulation by data source and triangulation by method. Secondary sources in English, Arabic and French were used throughout the study. Academic literature was used to set the theoretical framework of this study and to discuss the concepts of governance, human security, and SSR. Critical security studies were used to deconstruct conflict in Lebanon and provide a platform for emancipatory voices. The background chapters on Lebanon challenge the mainstream discourse on conflict and expose its limitations. This is followed by an empirical chapter focused on the contributions and failings of the security sector to security in Lebanon (an area very poorly covered by academics). Primary sources consisted of interview transcripts, official documents, data collected from formal websites, field-work notes, and media coverage of contemporary events, speeches, and statements by public figures. The core of the empirical data was collected from field-work conducted in Lebanon between 2010 and 2011.

Further, data from primary sources was supported by secondary sources, such as an opinion survey on the performance of the ISF and reports by international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The last chapter ties these discussions back together, evaluating the events which have been taking place in Lebanon using the tool-kit constructed for this study.

This study reached its model for assessing security sector governance and progress inductively. The development of the model was built from the ground up and took shape as a result of continuous interaction between the theoretical/conceptual framework and

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12 Data collected from different persons and through different methods. Miles and Huberman identify five types of triangulation: by data source (different persons, at different times or places), by method (interviews, observation, documents), by researcher, by theory, and by data type (qualitative and quantititative data). Mathew B. Miles and Michael A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 2nd edition ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994).
13 i.e. books and articles.
14 Such as laws, decrees, the Lebanese Constitution, UN resolutions and international conventions.
15 Of embassies, government agencies, and NGOs.
empirical evidence. This approach required acquisition of thorough and detailed data from respondents in specific positions of authority. The choice to gather data using semi-structured interviews instead of survey questionnaires was justified by a preference for more active participation on the part of both the researcher and the participant. This allowed me to establish rapport and thereby conduct a more flexible and deeper investigation. Empirical work for this study was primarily investigatory; themes were gradually identified from observations made out of the range of primary and secondary sources and arguments were formulated accordingly. The knowledge, experience, perceptions, and attitudes of respondents were essential for this study; therefore standardised survey questions, close-ended questions, and any strict control over the survey interviews were not appropriate for this study. Although some questions were formulated beforehand as an ‘aide-memoire’, the pace and direction of the discussions were fluid, leaving room for dialogue and for the participants to delve deeper into themes based on their experiences and on their positions. This in turn left room for further probing and for the respondents to elaborate and explain further.

2) Data analysis

The flexibility of the qualitative approach to social research is also useful in data analysis. The strategy for analysis is a mix of ‘successive approximation’ and the ‘illustrative method’. The latter, in the form of ‘case clarification’, is used in the Lebanon chapters, where themes from critical security studies, governance, and human security are used in subsection titles to organise the evidence from Lebanon’s pre-war, war

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16 Although the study started with field-work on state security providers, adopting critical security studies as a non-state centric framework required revisiting the initial emphasis on state actors at the expense of non-state actors. Therefore, the institutional approach was later supplemented with evidence on progressive non-state actors. In this manner, this study maintained interaction between empirical evidence and the theoretical framework.

17 They were the basis for descriptive and analytical investigation.

18 i.e. the control of the pace, direction, questions, and answers.


20 Successive approximation consists of moving ‘back and forth between the empirical data and the abstract concepts’ to adjust the final model; the illustrative method uses theoretical concepts as ‘empty boxes to be filled with specific empirical examples and description’. Neuman, 2003, p 519-520.

21 A theoretical model used to illuminate or clarify a specific case or single situation, making the case more understandable by applying theory to it’. Neuman, 2003, p 520.
and post-war experiences. Successive approximation is also used in the chapter on Lebanon’s security sector, in order to link evidence with the model formulated in the previous chapters. This change can be explained by the need to conserve the richness of the data and the decision not to limit the narrative to neat thematic boxes from the model.

3) Reliability and validity

Dependability within the study was ensured by using a variety of sources to record empirical data in order to transmit a truthful depiction of the “situation on the ground”. Evidence is consistently introduced, described, and linked to sources to provide an authentic representation of the respondents’ viewpoints and of other empirical evidence. A fair attempt at preserving ‘ecological validity’ has been made.

The field-work was checked for internal and external consistency; the former consisted of assessing whether the data fit well with the overall Lebanese context. In terms of external consistency, evidence taken from interviews was cross-checked, when possible, by two or more respondents and corroborated by secondary sources. Evidence was considered more trustworthy when corroborated by sources belonging to different sides. Some statements particular to the post of the respondents, which were more difficult to corroborate, were checked for internal consistency.

Reliability also depends on the credibility of respondents. Generally, there is no reason to doubt the credibility of interview respondents; especially as they assumed formal posts in large institutions. However, a better question would be: to what extent these institutions wished to disclose information? Although there is inherent competition and subjectivity, given that respondents have different agendas, priorities and visions, they share the common goal of improving the performance of the formal security sector in Lebanon. Despite attempting to balance statements between the varied actors, one remaining

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22 Such as analysis of interview scripts, legal documents, and other sources.
23 A measure of validity that emphasises the degree to which the researcher’s depiction matches reality on the ground or as described by respondents. Neuman, 2003, p 456.
24 i.e. that it makes sense given the range of information compiled but also the ‘insider’ status inherent in being Lebanese.
25 e.g. short articles, reports by NGOs, media coverage of events or statements.
26 That is from stakeholders from the NGO community, donors, or state agencies.
27 Insights from consultant, advisor, or information that could only be disclosed by the person possessing the information and authorised to do so.
challenge was that the main interview respondents are joined by a symbiotic relationship.\(^{28}\) While this might mean that respondents were unwilling to burn bridges by disclosing certain information, to a large extent respondents expressed a number of grievances.

Finally, in adopting a critical approach to this study I also accept that there is little space for ‘objectivity’ as understood by positivism. In spite of the awareness of my personal motivations and the lens through which I see the world, which certainly influence my analytical angle, I have made every effort to present a balanced analysis of Lebanon’s security challenges.

**4) Sampling**

The approach to sampling was a mix of purposive (or judgmental) sampling and snowball sampling.\(^{29}\) Purposive sampling consists of targeting a specific and specialised population to acquire in-depth information. As the time for field-work approached, I had already identified Lebanese state actors I needed to contact; these were not specific individuals, but rather state institutions that provide access to the ‘specialised population’. Furthermore, before embarking on field-work I conducted online research covering the work of foreign embassies in Lebanon’s security sector.\(^{30}\)

Identifying foreign state actors was relatively straightforward; identifying civil society actors was more difficult. I searched for the Beirut offices of research institutes and NGOs, which are known to issue publications and reports on security and the security sector. I also attended a number of short courses at Cranfield University on the Security Sector Management programme to expose myself to the conceptual and practical dimensions of the policy-concept that is SSR.\(^{31}\) The head of the programme, Dr Anne Fitzgerald, discussed a project currently underway intended to allow representatives of the Lebanese security sector to attend courses at Cranfield, as well as their intended support for a limited number of Lebanese civil society groups. This conversation led me to a contact within the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and to the Lebanese NGO, Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques pour le Moyen-Orient (CESMO). This was the start of snowball sampling.

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\(^{28}\) Some of the state actors and NGOs interviewed are funded by donors also interviewed.

\(^{29}\) Neuman, 2003, p 267-268.

\(^{30}\) This by researching official websites and media coverage of events.

\(^{31}\) Cranfield University is the academic partners of the UK Ministry of Defence.
Identified actors were contacted by email, formal written requests, or phone calls. Email was an efficient tool for contacting embassies, mostly western, and NGOs, and for exchanging documents.\(^32\) Formal written requests were presented to relevant Ministries.\(^33\) Phone calls were used to contact the embassies of Russia and of Arab nations. NGOs that did not respond to emails were also subsequently contacted by phone.

Embassies of Arab countries such as Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the embassy of the Russian Federation, refused requests for interview or to comment on their contributions to the security sector in Lebanon, referring me instead to the Lebanese authorities. The Geneva-based institute the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), initially accepted an invitation to discuss the work of their newly opened Lebanon office on projects that promote democratic governance of the security sector;\(^34\) however, despite a number of exchanges and referrals I reached a dead-end and eventually decided to give up.\(^35\) Furthermore, a year after conducting field-work, I was made aware that the consulting group Pursue Ltd and the NGO, International Alert, which both work on security matters, had opened offices in Lebanon, but I did not get the chance to interview them.

In total, during my seven months field-work in Lebanon (between July 2010 and January 2011), fourteen interviews were conducted. Western stakeholders interviewed included Mr Duccio Bandini (EU Delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché),\(^36\) Mr Ted Kontek (US Embassy INL Director, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs),\(^37\) Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer),\(^38\) the UK Stabilisation

\(^{32}\) Such as laws, policies, articles, referrals and advice.
\(^{33}\) These are the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities and the Ministry of Defence.
\(^{34}\) Such as the workshop held on 16/7/2010 on ‘What Role for Civil Society in Strengthening Good Governance of the Security Sector?’ (in cooperation with CESMO) and ‘Security Sector Governance and Parliamentary Oversight in the Arab Region’ held in May 2006 (in cooperation with UNDP). See DCAF website: http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Assistance-Programme-Lebanese-Security-Sector-Reform/(show)/events (accessed on 25/10/2013).
\(^{35}\) Reports of these workshops were posted online; I therefore had the opportunity to review the proceedings.
\(^{36}\) Interview held on 17/8/2010.
\(^{37}\) Interview held on 23/8/2010.
\(^{38}\) Interview held on 24/8/2010.
Advisor who wishes to remain anonymous, Mr Mirko Hinz (German Embassy, advisor to the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team), and Mr Marc Passoti (French Embassy Stabilisation Advisor).

Lebanese stakeholders interviewed included General Pierre Salem (advisor to the Minister of the Interior and Municipalities Ziad Baroud), General Pierre Nassar (ISF Head of Planning and Organisation), and ISF Major Antoine Frangieh. I initially met Major Frangieh on a short course at Cranfield University entitled Managing Public Security and Rule of Law (May 2010); upon his return to Lebanon, Major Frangieh acted as a valuable contact within the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities. His personal opinions, as well as additional information, were originally disclosed off the record, but the Major was instrumental in supporting my request for interviews to the Ministry and in speeding up my meeting with General Salem. Following initial visits, the Ministry of Defence preferred to exchange communications via its Communication Department by formal letters and email: I presented the Department with a list of questions and the Department prepared written answers for them. No interviews were approved for my request to meet with the generals in charge of coordinating operations with donors.

From the civilian sphere, interviews were conducted with retired security expert and academic General Elias Hannah; another interview was conducted with the Senior Advisor to Northern Ireland Consultant Group (NICO), Mr Marc Maouad; a separate and highly valuable interview with Mr Jonathan McIvor, also Senior Advisor at NICO, was later conducted; and an interview was conducted with Executive Director of CESMO Mrs Flavia Adib.

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39 Interview held on 25/8/2010 (although also met on a number of other occasions).
40 Interview held on 15/9/2010.
41 Interview held on 12/1/2011.
42 Interview held in January 7/1/2011.
43 Interview held in January 7/1/2011.
44 LAF Communications dated 1/11/2010.
45 These exchanges however can be regarded as a form of a fully structured interview.
46 Hannah is also an academic and an independent researcher, as well as recently becoming MTV (Murr Television) news advisor. Interview held on 14/9/2010.
47 Interview held on 7/9/2010.
48 Mr McIvor provided me with a copy of the ISF’s 2008 Strategic Review (Mr McIvor is the author of the Review). Interview held on 17/9/2010.
49 Interview held on 17/9/2010.
My sample size was limited to these fourteen interviews, which I believe led to relative data saturation.\(^{50}\) Hence, I have forgone the initial, slightly bigger, sample size. I did not pursue the DCAF interview further. Additionally, because of the slow bureaucratic process of receiving consent from Lebanese agencies, I neither arranged an interview with Airport Security\(^{51}\) nor included responses I received from the Communications Department of the Directorate of General Security (GS).\(^{52}\) My request for information and interviews was formally submitted to the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities on 30/8/2010; on 17/9/2010, as per ministerial request, I submitted a list of sample questions; general ministerial approval was issued on 22/10/2010. The Internal Security Forces (ISF), the GS and the Airport Security all fall under the authority of the ministry. In the first weeks of January (2011), I was contacted by the ISF; the GS and the Airport Security contacted me in February, after I had returned to the UK. Returning to Lebanon for these interviews would have incurred charges and time which were no longer justified as essential, especially given pending theoretical dilemmas. Despite the detail and the institutional specificity that this new data would have added to my analysis, it was clear that these two institutions would conform to the ministerial line (which I had already documented). I considered that the data would have reinforced but not added to my conclusions.\(^{53}\) In determining the sample size, it is advised to stop ‘data collection when the results start to become redundant’ – a stage I felt I had reached. Therefore, I made the choice to consider my field-work complete.

5) The Interviews

One pilot interview was conducted before field-work at Cranfield University on a short course in Intelligence Reform.\(^{54}\) Mr Kelly Conteh, a retired army general, has been the National Security Coordinator for Sierra Leone since 2000; the interview allowed me to


\(^{51}\) Approval was issued on 3/2/2011, approximately two weeks after returning to the UK.

\(^{52}\) Approval was issued on 11/2/2011, also shortly after returning to the UK. However, the General Security had attached answers to some of the questions on the list I provided with my application. These answers were brief and thus needed follow-up, which would have required another formal application I considered I could not afford to pursue (time and cost of returning to Lebanon to do so).

\(^{53}\) Rudestam and Newton, 2007, p 108.

\(^{54}\) The short course took place in September 2009.
listen to first-hand experience in a Security Sector Reform programme. It helped me conceptually understand the topic and the practical challenges involved; it illuminated themes that I went on to consider in my field-work in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{55} I practiced the use of prompts and non-leading questions while also steering the conversation towards controversial topics. The interview, in short, was good practice for a novice researcher to be confident facing ‘men of authority’ particularly in the security/military field.\textsuperscript{56}

Initially personal introductions were conducted (including probing of where I was born or currently live, the school I attended, family members etc.)\textsuperscript{57} covering my course of study, the reason for my interest in the topic, and the journey that took me to the UK. Interviews generally begun with a couple of simple descriptive questions, such as: ‘If security sector reform is (…) can we say that the security sector in Lebanon is undergoing SSR? Is this the term that your institution utilises? What other terms does your institution prefer? Is SSR (or the preferred term) a formal policy adopted by your institutions? Could individual projects loosely fit under this label?’ More open-ended questions followed, including: ‘How do you describe the security sector in Lebanon? Can you discuss, in your opinion, some of the causes for its current state (legal, institutional, cultural or societal, and political)? Is there a role for politicians that needs to be mentioned?’

Interviews were then steered back to more specific questions involving the institutions themselves:

- ‘What are some of the changes that your institution has undertaken?
- What caused these changes?
- Any help from foreign actors?
- How do you qualify the relationship between these foreign actors and your institution?
- Do you have any comments to share on all or some of these actors?
- What do you suggest can be done to improve the relationship and maximise efforts undertaken by both sides?
- Where do you see the changes taking the service?

\textsuperscript{55} Such as coordination, resistance to change, priorities, soft issues, piecemeal vs. comprehensive approaches etc.

\textsuperscript{56} Or at least as I saw them before getting to know respondents.

\textsuperscript{57} These questions are quite common in Lebanon because they help the interlocutor place you in a box. For example, if you are from Beirut, the next question asked of you is where in Beirut (what was formally known as West and East Beirut usually discloses your religion/sect). Similarly, certain areas in Mount Lebanon, the North, the South or the Beqa’a can identify a person’s sect. Attending a secular or a religious school also helps the interlocutor construct a label.
• How do you think we could have better results; or what exactly and practically needs to be done differently?
• Any priorities?
• What vision of security or values the institution promotes?
• What can you say about the multiplicity of state actors and their mandates? (checking for overlap of jurisdiction or legal gaps in delimiting the mandates or security agencies)
• What do you think about the cooperation between these state actors? With donors?
• Do non-state actors affect your work?
• Would you consider that the changes the security sector is undertaking have wider repercussions (e.g. on various forms of security and on political stability)?
• How do you view the general atmosphere in the country? Followed by prompts for political, security and other dimensions such as socio-economic and whether they are linked?’

Further questions were tailored to the post and experience of the respondents. For example, my discussion with Head of Strategic Planning at the ISF, General Nassar, was steered towards the controversial paralysis at the command council and the ‘extra-legal’ expansion of the Intelligence Department. The discussion with General Salem (advisor to the minister) was more difficult to steer, as he led the conversation and our time was cut short by a mutiny organised by Islamic fundamentalists detained in a Tripoli prison, which of course required his attention. As I assumed the listener’s role, General Salem (who has clearly bought into UK-sponsored discourse on soft security and strategic planning) expressed his frustration over the lack of vision, lack of long-term planning, lack of cooperation, and the image of his institution. Questions to foreign actors and questions to civil society actors were similar, and stressed the direction and their assessment of the changes taking place.

One success in the field-work was the general ability to establish rapport with participants. The fact that my name does not reveal a particular religious denomination and that I do not conform to mainstream Lebanese labels has meant that I could emphasise or de-emphasise certain aspects of my background in order to help me break the ice with

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58 I can confirm this because the General was using language identical to language used by the UK stabilisation advisor, language used in the UK funded NICO ISF review, and language used in short courses on the security sector management programme at Cranfield University – language which (later discussions show that) the UK has spearheaded in the donor community.

59 Many in Lebanon have distinctly Christian or Muslim first and/or surnames.
interlocutors – whether it be my place of birth, the school I attended, or the city I currently live in. Those interviewees who are only able to determine that I am from West Beirut assume that I am likely to be a Sunni, but those who discover the neighbourhood in which I was born (Mazraa) assume that I may be Shia. Neither are true. Further, those who learn that my family and I currently reside in the Metn assume that we are Christian. This is true, although we subscribe to very different political orientations than stereotypical ‘Lebanese Christian’ ideology. This ‘indeterminate’ label was therefore an asset during field-work.

As far as foreign participants were concerned, mostly they were enthusiastic that a Lebanese civilian was interested in their work with the Lebanese security sector – often treating the interview as an opportunity to disseminate their ‘positive’ contributions. In addition, British participants enjoyed discussing British weather, food, and reminiscing on their university days; the ‘Durham experience’ intrigued one key participant, the UK Stabilisation Advisor; as a result he arranged for me, among other things, to have a meeting with NICO Senior Advisor Jonathan McIvor (the author of the ISF review). Access to participants, however, started with Mr Duccio Bandini whom I met first and who shared his contact list with me. It was clear that Mr Bandini and his British colleague were gatekeepers of the Lebanon security sector field site, so I tried to nurture and capitalise on our relationship by keeping in touch, informing them of my progress and arranging informal meetings.

Although, as mentioned above, I personally targeted a number of respondents, several of the interviews were pursued and acquired through the ‘snowballing’ approach. Using the names of Mr Bandini and the UK Stabilisation Officer (as per their suggestion and

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60 The area I was born in, West Beirut, reflects a Muslim orientation; the school I attended, a French-speaking secular school, reflects a secular orientation, confessional coexistence or a Western orientation; and the city I currently live in reflects a Christian orientation.

61 I am part of a family that is ‘Greek orthodox Christian’. Traditionally, Greek Orthodox in the cities (particularly Beirut) have shared very close relationships with their Sunni and Shia neighbours. We are a family that resisted confessional segregation during the war (having stayed in what was turned into a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood during the war, my family relocated to what would be known as a ‘Christian’ area only years after the war), we attended secular schools, our careers are in what was previously known as ‘West Beirut’ (still considered as a predominantly Muslim area), and we are very much attached to the idea of confessional coexistence.

62 Although, to be fair, most expressed the challenges and shortfalls of their work.

63 A gatekeeper is a ‘person in an official or unofficial role who controls access to a setting.’ Neuman, Social, p 429.

64 Such as embassies, ministries, and a number of civil society actors such as CESMO and security expert Elias Hannah.

65 Such as the NICO interviews, the Advisor to the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, Mr Mirko Hinz, and the choice of Generals in the ISF.
recommendation) was an efficient way to target specific persons in embassies or institutes as well in expediting a number of interviews such as that with Mr Ted Kontek (US Embassy INL Director), with Mr Marc Passoti (French Embassy Stabilisation Advisor), and Mr Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer).

As a woman, I was met with frivolity, suspicion and sheer confusion as to why I would be working on this topic, especially by Lebanese state actors. However, noting that the ISF, for example, only introduced women to the police force in 2012, I can also assume that this factor (following my satisfying their curiosity) led to my being considered a ‘breath of fresh air;’ this allowed conversations to flow lightly and meant that participants were patient with my requests for further clarifications, for specificity and for advice.

Generally, I succeeded ‘in developing social trust and securing cooperation’ with respondents. However, there were two exceptions to this. Dr Mostafa Adib, head of CESMO, and Lt. Colonel Moussa Karnib, from the ISF, are two persons that I failed to establish a meaningful rapport with. The former was completely uninterested and shunned my presence at his office, and the other viewed me as a naïve and reckless person who did not appreciate the seriousness of my access and seemed paranoid about the information I was asking for.

6) Ethical considerations

Issues pertaining to consent, power, transparency, anonymity and confidentiality are key in conducting ethical research. Due effort was made to ensure that field-work and the interpretation of data was conducted in an ethical manner. Realising the sensitivity of a study on security in Lebanon, and conscious that the responsibility for conducting ethical

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66 both the look on the faces of personnel and the probing questions from the Communication Department of the ISF or the Ministry of Defence were quite explicit.
67 Although two female officers have served in the ISF.
69 Having entered the office while his executive director and I were discussing their work, he said hello in passing and for the next hour he kept himself busy with other tasks (in the same office).
70 More is said below on the meeting with Karnib.
social research lies with the researcher, efforts were made to protect respondents from any harm (physical, emotional or to their careers) that they might incur from participating in this research; efforts were made to respect their personal integrity as well as the accuracy of their responses.

Efforts to maintain transparency consisted of presenting all respondents with an abstract and outline of the study, as well as a letter of support from my supervisor to confirm affiliation with Durham University, programme of study, and topic.

Informed consent was acquired either through email correspondence, in which respondents explicitly accepted to be interviewed following consideration of my request and attached documents, or by signed approval (hard copies) from the relevant ministries. Follow-up by telephone was often necessary in order to schedule meetings. As I am aware that institutional consent is distinct from personal consent, no information recorded in confidentiality is disclosed and no pressure was exerted on respondents to provide information beyond their institutional authorisation. Recording interviews was my preferred option; however, respondents were first asked for recording permission, and many preferred note-taking instead. Out of fourteen interviewees, only three consented to be recorded.

Since this study’s sample population was not part of a ‘vulnerable group’, power was largely in favour of the respondents: access to respondents and to important information (expected from interviews) was controlled by the sample population.

In terms of anonymity and confidentiality, several opinions expressed off the record by respondents and other information discussed in informal conversation are not included in this study (or any other). Furthermore, as per Ted Kontek’s request any direct quotes included in the study are first confirmed with him. In addition, the request of the ‘UK Stabilisation Advisor’ for anonymity is respected; and since no ministerial-level permission for Major Frangieh was granted, none of his responses or views are disclosed.

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71 For a discussion on ethical social research see: Newman, 2003, p 143-153.
72 Mr Duccio Bandini and NICO Senior Advisors Mr Jonathan McIvor and Mr Marc Maouad.
73 Kontek is US Embassy INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) Director.
74 The individual in question preferred that this title be used in this study.
7) Limitations and lessons learned

Time, cost, scope, and personal challenges generally pose limits on research designs. As a result of these constraints, the pool for interviews for this study was relatively limited; additional interviews – with state actors but also more crucially with non-state actors – would have been valuable in order to explore further the wider implications of reforms to the security sector. With more time and access, political parties, armed groups, and other NGOs such as those working on human rights and transitional justice would have been added to the sample. Focus groups and survey questionnaires to document popular perceptions and attitudes towards the security sector, the changes it is undergoing, and security in Lebanon (both national and human security) would complement the work I have started here. A bigger sample size and more diverse methods (including quantitative ones such as survey interviews) would allow for a more rounded challenge and exposure of structural limitations to progress, therefore presenting a more comprehensive case for change. Having said that, the sample for this study is in itself highly valuable. It covers the necessary actors in the barely accessed site of the Lebanese security sector, thus building the ground-work for further research. The tension that may rise from a non-state centric choice of framework and a largely state-centric field-work is reduced when one considers that the objective of this study is to critique state actors with the tool-kit constructed.

Other constraints were the slow process and the resistance of some state actors to meaningfully collaborate with the research. As General Nassar (ISF) could not provide detailed answers to questions regarding statistics and figures of donor contributions, I submitted another request to the Ministry on 13/1/2011. It took until 14/7/2011 for the Ministry to contact me again to inform me of the refusal of my request. The complete file I received from the Ministry showed that not all concerned had a problem with my request; however, the deciding factor was the negative response of the head of the Intelligence Bureau on the grounds that ‘some of these questions are of a purely political nature.’ Official acknowledgement that the US is the biggest donor can cause public discontentment, although anyone following the media closely can draw this conclusion. Furthermore, the Intelligence Bureau, which seems to have become a US mini-project, is a

75 Including the share of contributions of different donors and the general distribution of aid across the different agencies and departments. Such data might have allowed me to better substantiate the observation that certain actors are disproportionately supporting departments/units of the ISF at the expense of others, or to discuss why certain agencies are receiving more western aid than others.

76 Note the time span (around 6 months).
controversial department seen by many as a biased Sunni mini-agency. Another encounter with Lt Colonel Mussa Karnib also ended in rejection. Unlike the Intelligence Branch, however, Karnib is Shia and seemed to be affiliated to Hezbollah. This could be inferred from his name and accent, as well as a book to which he referred me: *Watan Bila Siaj* (A Nation Without a Fence) is by a retired army General Amin Hoteit, who is also a Hezbollah sympathiser in support of the Hezbollah/army formula of ‘resistance’ to Israel. His discourse was also telling, as he used words and phrases such as the ‘West,’ ‘spies,’ ‘threats,’ ‘we are at war,’ ‘disclosing our secrets to foreign universities’ to dissuade me from pursuing my request for more answers on aid and donors. Two things are worth noting here: Lt. Colonel Karnib is much lower-ranking than other individuals I met with, and therefore his rejection for further details was not a major obstacle to my acquisition of other necessary information, or to substantiating the claim of disproportionate donor support made by other sources. Aside from these two incidents, and aside from the formalities and the bureaucracy that render the process excessively slow, my experience with the ISF was a pleasant one: the Department of Communication at the ISF and Generals Nassar and Salem were happy to meet with me and were encouraging.

My experience with the Ministry of Defence for information on the Lebanese Armed Forces was much more formal and distant. They were efficient in exchanging communications but quite brusque. Initially I met with the Department of Communications to present my case and explain my formal application; afterwards I followed up over the phone and any exchange of documents took place by email. Here my contacts clearly did not succeed in smoothing the process or in providing me deeper access. Therefore, another limitation to this study is my limited access to and interaction with the LAF.

A number of lessons can be drawn from my experience conducting research on and field-work in Lebanon. My status as a woman conducting research in a largely patriarchal and male-centric country, not to mention in a militaristic environment, should be given due attention. Although this largely worked in my favour (in terms of establishing a rapport with respondents), it left me in a slightly uncomfortable situation, where I was constantly self-conscious of the role I was playing in that context. My ‘insider’ status, however, was a valuable asset in terms of knowledge of context, culture, stakeholders, general attitudes,

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77 See chapter 7.
Another lesson to be drawn is not to take for granted the opportunities offered by conducting research in the West, as research in a developing country is slow, messy and unreliable. The bureaucracy, lack of transparency, and the scarcity of accessible information for researchers is a time- and effort-consuming hurdle that cannot be ignored. A simple example: at the time of my field-work, legislation could not be found online. Therefore I needed a lawyer to access the archives of the official gazette or undergo the lengthy formal process of permission from a government body. Now, with donor support, Lebanese laws are found on a database.

As for lessons to be learned from constructing a tool-kit from critical security studies, governance, human security and SSR, I think it was an ambitious decision which could have been simplified by either opting for an investigation of human security in Lebanon or by taking a critical security studies approach to investigating conflict in Lebanon. That being said, the ground I have covered will be an asset I can use in other academic projects. The final lesson is the importance of a clear focus as to the direction of the study prior to embarking on field-work; this would have spared time, effort, and confusion. Unfortunately this was not possible in my case, as my theoretical framework changed after completion of field-work.

In short, while this study encountered a number of obstacles and may likely still suffer from certain weaknesses, it makes contributions to the study of security in Lebanon. Furthermore, the experience itself has contributed to my intellectual development and has been a valuable life lesson in number of ways.

78 This included details such as the location of ministries, agency headquarters and embassies but also general political affiliations.
79 Researches in developing countries, including in the Middle East, have complained of ‘a lack of reliable data and statistics including archives, which impeded, amongst other things, the ability to define sample sizes. Twenty-nine-percent of respondents were frustrated by the challenges related to locating interviewees and data—the dearth of good directories and phone books, unreliable Internet, outdated telephone numbers, lack of accurate addresses, restrictive opening hours, and the cancellation’ or refusal of appointment due to a culture of suspicion and authoritarianism. Similarly, field-work conducted in other areas share a concern over ‘data availability and accuracy’. The chapter by Sarah Howard on her experience conducting field-research in Nicaragua is one such example. Among other things, she discusses the scarcity and sometimes contradictory data compiled by government institutions; she also mentions logistical difficulties such as the availability of photocopying machines at government institutions. All such ‘hurdles mean that everything takes longer than you think’ and affects both sample size and data collection. Janine Clark, *PS: Political Science & Politics* (July 2006). From: http://www.apsanet.org/imgtext/PSJul06Clark.pdf (accessed on 19/3/2013). Sarah Howard, "Methodological Issues in Overseas Fieldwork: Experiences from Nicaragua’s Northern Atlantic Coast," in *Postgraduate Fieldwork in Developing Areas: A Rough Guide*, ed. Elsbeth Robson and Katie Willis(London: Developing Areas Research Group of the Royal Geographical Society, 1997).p 34-35.
This chapter outlined this study’s methodological framework. It started with the choice of grounding the study in critical social science to answer both theoretical and action-oriented research questions. These research questions hold theoretical/conceptual value for the study of security as well as practical implications for security in Lebanon. In order to answer these questions, this study adopted a qualitative approach to collecting and analysing data from field interviews and in-depth reading of primary and secondary sources. It raised issues pertaining to reliability and validity arising from qualitative data, ethical decisions made throughout field-work that pertain to consent, power, transparency, anonymity and confidentiality, as well as limitations and obstacles to methods adopted. The next chapter marks the start of the theoretical and conceptual framework; it examines the concept of governance to contextualise the discussion on security.
Chapter 2: Contextualizing Security: Governance

The first part of this thesis contextualizes and conceptualizes the concept of security. The discussions in the first half gradually construct the vision of security that this study envisages for Lebanon. This chapter is an introductory discussion that lays down the nature of international society which shapes the concepts under study. It therefore sets the path for the discussion on security and SSR.

‘Architecture’ of governance has come to occupy an increasingly important role at all levels of world politics. Governance is a continuous problem-solving process in which groups interact to manage their affairs and further their goals.¹ Scholars have noted that governance is a by-product of the 70s, a period of marked increase in globalization;² it has since become a catch phrase for development, security and international relations policy-makers, practitioners and researchers alike. It is a pragmatic practice which attempts to deal with the complexities of transnational politics.³ The concept captures the gradual ‘shift from government to governance’;⁴ it refers to the formal and informal processes, structures and arrangements taking place at different levels and between different actors of the international society. Governance may be seen as offering alternatives to traditional state-centric channels; it is increasingly seen as a challenge to the supremacy of the state. As Ken Booth noted, there are options – other than the state – for everyone to play a part in world politics.⁵ The concept is fluid but also complex and evolving. Although widely adopted, it faces much criticism as to its malleability and applicability. In addition, governance is not necessarily a counter-hegemonic alternative; indeed, many scholars have shed light on the undemocratic character of the predominant structures of governance.⁶

This chapter looks at the context that supports governance, at its definitions and features, at

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² Mark Duffield and Mary Kaldor for example identify the ‘70s as the time when the post-colonial state started losing its legitimacy and when governance was sharply on the rise as a by-product of new heights in globalization’. See Kaldor, 2000 and Duffield, 2001.
⁴ Hänggi, 2005, p 7.
its shortcomings, as well as opportunities for governance to positively influence world politics.

1) International Society

For long, states were considered the primary, if not the only, actors of international society; the relationship between them – competition and cooperation – has been at the centre of the debate between and within the different schools of international relations. While much of the Cold War was characterised by the rivalry between the two main blocks, some viewed its end as ‘ushering in a new era of peace and cooperation’; others thought it would bring anarchy by unleashing conflicts around the world. One certainty is that the collapse of bipolarity revived multilateralism. This allowed for increased cooperation on a range of transnational issues, giving way to new opportunities: both new issues and new actors played a bigger role in world politics. Advances in global communication technology and globalisation reaching new peaks precipitated the downfall of stringent borders; this, in turn, led to an increase in the complexity of global issues. Globalization has taken over the economic, social, health, humanitarian, political, environmental, and technological spheres. As scholars explain, the movement of individuals or goods and the flow of ideas are taking place at a record pace, reach and low cost; ‘contemporary globalization [therefore] is marked by an unprecedented degree of integration of markets, states, and technologies’. Globalization, however, is not a new

7 Although cooperation remained part of the debate and in the real world cooperation remained particularly salient within these blocks.


9 As Barry Buzan notes, the end of the Cold War only provided ‘more scope to blow away geopolitical barriers, both opening up new areas for non-state actors and giving them more leeway in areas already open’. Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). p 80.

what is relatively new is its speed and its complexity. Scholars differentiate between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ globalization; these two characteristics essentially mark the difference between old and new globalization. New opportunities and the involvement of new actors ‘may enrich the process, but they do not simplify it (...) [instead they] add layers of difficulty as they intertwine with other issues’. The world today is defined by increasingly intricate links between global issues. Keohane and Nye speak of ‘islands of governance’ that take place in different parts of the world and at different levels – the most powerful being in the West. Simmons and Oudraat replaced ‘islands’ with ‘archipelago’ to make room for the links between the many ‘islands of governance’ that manage issues of global concern.

Scholars have long debated the incentives for, the level of, and the impact of cooperation on actors of the international society. English School scholars have made a distinction between a pluralist international society and a solidarist world society. The solidarist vision argues that the world is moving towards a humanist world society characterised by cosmopolitan values, dialogue and ‘reconciliation’ between communities,
and ‘universality’ of norms.\textsuperscript{17} The pluralist vision argues for a traditional international society characterised by state-centricism, interest-specific cooperation, and a ‘low, or narrow, degree of shared norms’.\textsuperscript{18} Many recognise the cohabitation of both.\textsuperscript{19} The latter is the perspective preferred by this study; but in any case, this debate largely underscores the different roles the schools of politics accord to actors in world affairs.

Modern day governance mirrors the state of world relations. The transformation in the international system has had ‘seismic’ effects on the conduct and study of international relations. Longstanding practices, theories and perceptions have been challenged; to a large extent, the primacy of the state has disintegrated.\textsuperscript{20} The following few sections illustrate this argument.

2) The Role of Non-State Actors

The changing nature of international society allowed for traditional concepts in international relations – including security, development, governance, and sovereignty – to be revisited.\textsuperscript{21} As mentioned, the international environment was moving towards multilateralism. Hence, the role of the UN, which had been relatively stagnant during the Cold War, was reactivated, and the international society was further opened for new actors to contribute in dealing with issues that crossed borders. Discussing this shift in the international environment, Jessica Mathews illustrates the revival of the role of the UN by noting in 1997 that ‘since 1990 the Security Council has declared a formal threat to international peace and security 61 times, after having done so only six times in the preceding 45 years’.\textsuperscript{22} This can also be linked to an evolving definition of security which will be discussed later. However, when hopes for the UN to play the leading role in

\textsuperscript{17} A solidarist vision of world society is based on a global network of actors that create a non-territorial space for the conduct of world politics – i.e. supra-territoriality. See: John Williams, “Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory,” \textit{International Relations} 19, no. 1 (2005).
\textsuperscript{19} See Williams, 2005 and Buzan, 2004.
\textsuperscript{21} In the second part of this chapter, the revisited understanding of security is discussed in detail; development is also briefly discussed; and in regards to sovereignty, a brief overview is presented in the next subparagraph.
\textsuperscript{22} Mathews, 1997, p 59.
international governance disintegrated, other state and non-state actors (regional, specialized, and private) took up the task in an ad hoc manner. In the absence of a unifying body, a move to issue-specific and regional governance was registered. For example, in 1993, several NGOs came together and formed the network for The International Campaign to Ban Landmines; its work successfully culminated in an international treaty in 1997. As a result of the contributions of NGOs to world politics, landmines became ‘a humanitarian and a human security issue instead of an arms control or national security issue’. This, as Oran Young says, is an ‘innovative’ practice ‘to solve discrete or distinct problems by creating regimes or sets of roles, rules, and relationships that focus on specific problems and do not require centralized political organizations to administer them’. As illustrated, some issues, especially those which are increasingly of global concern, cannot be managed by ‘states acting alone’; terrorism, financial markets, HIV/AIDS and other public health threats, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction’, poverty, internet, ethnic and sectarian intra-state conflicts as well as failed states ‘all require cooperation of some sort among governments and the increasing number of non-state actors in the world.’ Fathers of neo-liberal institutionalism, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971), first observed state and non-state actors interacting across boundaries. Some decades later, Karns and Mingst noted that these ‘networks have become increasingly dense’. That said, such scholars maintained their emphasis on the primordial role of the state. However, networks are not only about ‘managing’ issues that affect states; English School solidarist scholars and cosmopolitanists highlight a range of issues that attain supra-territorial status – ones that speak to a world audience and that involve a higher commitment to ethical politics. The ‘pieces of governance’ are the structures,
‘activities, rules, and mechanisms’ at various levels and by various actors, set up to regulate, institutionalise, facilitate, and promote the governance of these increasingly transnational issues.\(^{32}\) They are formulated by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations, international law, and transnational networks. Non-state actors that have gained prominence ‘in governance at all levels from global to local’\(^ {33}\) include NGOs, trade unions, private multinational businesses and corporations,\(^ {34}\) social movements,\(^ {35}\) transnational networks, and coalitions of all.\(^ {36}\)

Mathews argues that as a result of the involvement of non-state actors in transnational issues, the ‘steady concentration of power in the hands of states’ has been eroding:

National governments (…) are sharing powers – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international organisations, and with a multitude of citizen’s groups (...).\(^ {37}\)

Transnationalisation entails enhanced interaction, cooperation and coordination between actors at domestic and international levels. However, the fact that issues can be considered global suggests that actors in international society can encroach on domestic sovereignty.\(^ {38}\) The rise of the role of non-state actors domestically and internationally, humanitarian intervention, and non-traditional approaches to international relations have slowly undermined the primacy of state sovereignty, which has become a contested right rather than a natural one. Sovereignty has traditionally entailed autonomy over domestic and foreign politics;\(^ {39}\) however, both willingly and unwillingly, the state increasingly refers to non-state actors to perform its duties.\(^ {40}\) The rise of non-state actors and the fragmentation of the authority of the state have led to a debate over sovereignty.\(^ {41}\)

\(^{32}\) Karns and Mingst, 2004, p 4-5.

\(^{33}\) Ibid, p 17

\(^{34}\) Such as Sony, Nike or Shell Oil Company.

\(^{35}\) Such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The latter is the name given to the mothers of the ‘disappeared’ in Argentina under the military dictatorship.

\(^{36}\) Karns and Mingst, 2004, p 214


\(^{38}\) Ibid, 1997.

\(^{39}\) See Buzan, 1991.

\(^{40}\) Held, 2010, p 308.

Barry Buzan states that ‘sovereignty, simply put, means self-government. It requires a denial of any higher political authority, and the claiming by the state of supreme decision-making authority both within its territory and over its citizens’. However, sovereignty is much more complex to conceptualise and to operationalise. Waltz notes that a claim to sovereignty suggests that the state decides whether or not to ask for assistance; however, the need for assistance in dealing with internal or external issues detracts from the state’s sovereignty. Assistance unequivocally limits the sovereignty of the state. Buzan explains that states are too diverse; in reality, states do not always have the choice in relinquishing some of their sovereignty. While sovereignty in Weberian terms strongly entails a monopoly over the use of force, security is one of the sectors in which many states require assistance – from both state and non-state actors. Mirroring the changing nature of the international environment, sovereignty is no longer a rigid and uncontested concept. In Neil Walker’s *Sovereignty in Transition*, Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann points to the shift from the sovereignty of the state to the ‘sovereignty of citizens’ in the context of the EU. The discussion, however, is not exclusive to the EU; the debate over the concept is a global one. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the UN Charter (1945), and through the Cold War, International Law recognised state sovereignty as an irreducible right. On the international level, ‘external sovereignty’ was based on the ‘equal sovereignty’ of states; internal sovereignty meant that states had absolute domestic autonomy from the international community. International law evolved as a system for regulating state sovereignty in an anarchic international environment; it thereby specifies the rights and obligations of states. However, the right to sovereignty existed irrespective of popular aspirations and human rights standards. Nevertheless, the rights and obligations of states under International Law have undergone a transformation: ‘human rights and popular sovereignty have become universally recognised by all UN member states’. In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. The Commission ‘sees human security at the heart of a redefinition of the nature of sovereignty in respect of the state and the international

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44 Petersmann, 2006, p 145-146.
45 Territorial integrity and autonomy in domestic affairs were considered as key principles of sovereignty.
46 Petersmann, 2006, p 145-146.
community’. The Responsibility to Protect ‘re-inscribed within the juridico-political architecture of the nation-state’ human security, and was subsequently established as an international norm. The Responsibility to Protect makes a distinction between ‘effective and ineffective states’ and emphasised the rights of people living under ineffective states. When states – strong or ‘fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities’ – are unwilling or incapable of providing security, ‘the principle of non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect’. The Commission recast sovereignty as a ‘responsibility’ instead of a ‘right’. Sovereignty has become contingent upon approval from the domestic population and the international community. Nevertheless, the responsibility to protect became not only an ethical duty but a provision to maintain international stability: ‘security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities’.

It is clear, however, that despite a rhetoric that prioritises the people, the report still underscores the place of the state in the international system. Like Duffield, post-structuralist David Chandler, in The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’?, is not convinced by the moral stance that The Responsibility to Protect claims to uphold. They argue that the ‘justifications for new interventionist norms as a framework for liberal peace are as dependent on the needs of realpolitik as was the earlier doctrine of sovereign equality and non-intervention.’ The norm was developed to allow the coalition of states, notably Western powers, to intervene when it was ‘not formally sanctioned by the United Nations’. Cases which illustrate this point include the failures to effectively intervene in Kosovo, Somalia and Rwanda. Chandler contends that The Responsibility to Protect gives Western powers the space to extend their traditional Realpolitik motivations.

Notwithstanding the co-option of The Responsibility to Protect, one can safely note that the understanding of the concept of sovereignty has been revisited. And, there are now

49 ICISS, 2001, p ix.
51 The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was replaced by ‘responsibility to protect’ mostly because of opposition to annexing humanitarian work with military intervention. Chandler, 2004, p 62.
52 ICISS, 2001, p 5.
54 Ibid.
mechanisms at the institutional level that allow for seeing this re-definition applied in the real world. I prefer to be cautious, not going as far as noting that ‘the Realist framework of the Cold War Period when state security was viewed as paramount has been superseded’.55 I find the use of the term slightly sweeping since remnants of the traditional approach clearly remain present.56 I note instead that irrespective of ulterior motives and some double standards by the main actors of the international society, which have been exposed by post-structuralist scholars, at the policy level state sovereignty has received a considerable blow. This is illustrated by the new norms established by The Responsibility to Protect, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and human rights regimes such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its European alternative allowing individuals to raise claims against states.

Having considered this, however, what do the discussions concerning non-state actors and the permeability of state sovereignty say about the role of the state?

4) Revisiting the Role of the State

The state has traditionally been considered the most significant actor in the international system; scholars from the traditional schools of international relations say that it still is.57 As aggregations of resources, authority and legitimacy, states have dominated the domestic and international scenes and occupy different places in global governance.58 Multilateralism allows states to play an important part in global governance; they may act ‘as both followers and leaders’.59 However, as noted earlier, multilateralism is not only limited to states. The state can no longer act alone; and it is important to emphasise the influence of non-state actors on states. The influence to restrict, contest, support, or push in

55 Emphasis added. Ibid.
56 The entrenchment of the traditional approach is recognized by many including: Held, 2010; Buzan, 2004; Williams, 2005.
57 Including pluralists and neo-liberal institutionalists. See for example Keohane and Nye, 2000, p 12.
58 After WWII, the US shaped ‘much of the structure and rules of global governance’; at present, it is argued that the US ‘cannot shape global governance alone’, and that even superpowers have to ‘act in coordination with others’. In many instances, ‘large numbers of other countries have demonstrated a willingness to act even in the face of US opposition’; this is evident in the increased role of middle powers on the international scene. Karns and Mingst, 2004, p 15.
59 Ibid.
a certain direction should not be underestimated.\footnote{This influence can be both positive and negative. Consider for example the influence of international financial institutions, multi-national companies, and interest groups.} Critical security theorist Booth argues that states are ‘not immune to influence’, and stressed the role of non-state actors in instigating positive change.\footnote{Booth, 1991, p 326.} Similarly, Keith Krause and Michael Williams highlight that the state is ‘flexible and capable of reorientation’.\footnote{Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., \textit{Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases} (London: UCL Press, 1997). p vxi.} Despite the ‘enormous power’ of states, the space is available ‘for all those who want it to be’ to influence the prevailing order. This can be about anything and from anywhere.\footnote{Booth. 1991, p 326.} While this study espouses this stance, there are still challenges and limits to the ‘influence and effectiveness’ of non-state actors.\footnote{Seen from the poverty lens for example, Ghai Dharam is convinced that: ‘no matter how idealistic or committed, NGOs simply cannot replace the work of governments and UN agencies in the business of poverty eradication (...) they cannot cover all areas relevant to an integrated approach to poverty eradication, nor are they organized to attain universality in their coverage of countries’. Emphasis added. Ghai Dharam, "Human Solidarity and World Poverty," \textit{Global Governance} 7, no. 3 (2001).p 239.}

For many scholars, the role of NGOs is still a limited one. According to Keck and Sikkink, NGOs are in competition with state actors ‘only in clearly delimited circumstances’.\footnote{Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). p 212.} Hence, like realists/neo-realists and pluralists, neo-liberalists such as Keohane and Nye still maintain that:

The nation-state is not about to be replaced as the primary instrument of domestic and global governance. (…) Instead we believe that the nation-state is being \textit{supplemented} by other actors – private and third sector – in a more complex geography.\footnote{Emphasis added. Keohane and Nye, 2000, p 12.}

Politics is constantly being transformed; governance is now taking place ‘in new and contested spaces’.\footnote{Ibid, p 13.} However, although governments often resort to non-state actors for many of its functions, non-state actors are still in need of governments to operate (favourable legislation etc.). The state is still the final arbitrator, so to speak; it has the power to enforce policies, maintain order, and possesses the resources to cover the widest...
spectrum of issues. As Krause and Williams note, the state is still the ‘most structurally capable actor in world politics’. 68 Going one step further, Karns and Mingst argue that

States alone have sovereignty. They create IGOs and determine what actions they can or cannot take; they create international law and norms, and determine their effectiveness through their compliance or failure to comply. 69

As discussed above, objections to this statement can be noted. Sovereignty is no longer an uncontested right given to states; this is true not only in scholarly debates but also in international policy. States are increasingly under pressure from and constrained by universal norms. The Responsibility to Protect, and even more so, the Responsibility to Prevent are illustrations of the conditionality of sovereignty. In addition, non-state actors have been able to contribute greatly to international law. 70 Steve Smith also illustrates this by noting the role of non-state actors in international security. 71 Further, with the rise of world society institutions or global civil society, the tangible constituents of the state (territory, population and government) cannot account for the spectrum of factors involved in identity-formation and legitimacy. 72 Conditionality and fragmentation are now key attributes of the re-visited conception of sovereignty.

Despite recognising the centrality of state capabilities in the governance of international affairs, this study diverges from traditional schools of international relations. 73 It considers that the centrality of the state is limited to practical or pragmatic reasons. 74 The ethical commitment of this study, shared by solidarist English School scholars and critical security scholars, entails that the primary concern is the individual. Although the case study is context-specific (Lebanon), the study is concerned with issues such as security, justice, progress and emancipation, that affect individuals in any part of the world—with no ethnic, racial, religious, sectarian or national overriding denomination.

Indeed, as mentioned above, many issues nowadays transcend territoriality; they cut across geographic borders and speak to a wider audience. Some world issues such as

68 Krause and Williams, 1997, p xvi.
70 For example: the International Criminal Court, the Campaign to Ban Landmines, The Anti-Whaling Commission.
71 Booth, 2005, p 32.
72 And groups such as ‘women, indigenous peoples, diasporas, religions, trade unionists, environmentalists’ forming an ‘emerging global civil society’ are not restricted by territoriality. Williams, 2005, p 16-17.
73 Including neo-liberal institutionalist scholars quoted above.
74 i.e. structural and institutional capabilities.
human rights, social justice, fair trade, and environmental sustainability have reached supra-territorial status. While, for this study, this means that the state is not equipped to address these world issues alone; this study also recognises that the state continues to retain an essential role in advancing these and managing other traditional issues. The state’s performance however is increasingly – and necessarily – placed under scrutiny to comply with ethical people-centred norms.

This discussion shows that the state retains an important role in domestic and global governance. Three critical security theorists that share an ambivalence to the state – Krause, Williams, and Booth – attest to its ‘enormous’ power. However, more importantly, this discussion adds that the prevailing assumptions regarding the state are being transformed.

5) Defining Governance

The Commission on Global Governance defined governance as the:

> sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal (...) as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to be in their interest.

There are key elements to examine in this definition and in governance in general. It consists of a management process, it is interest-based, it takes place in the public and/or private sector, and lastly, it takes place through formal and/or informal mechanisms.

Elke Krahmann’s definition highlights the lack of central authority in the process of governance and notes that the actors of governance create ‘binding policy decisions’ for themselves to delineate their actions. Rosenau and Keohane and Nye do not limit their definitions in the same way Krahmann does. Governments may coordinate with non-state actors on certain issues while retaining their supremacy in central authority; as such,

75 Booth, 1991, p 326.
Keohane & Nye and Rosenau choose a more flexible definition of governance, whereby they note that the process may or may not involve government rule or central authority.\textsuperscript{78}

There is both a vertical and a horizontal dimension to governance. The two dimensions represent the two variables of governance: its actors and its levels. The horizontal dimension refers to the three types of actors of governance – private, governments and the third sector as categorised by Keohane and Nye.\textsuperscript{79} The vertical dimension represents the levels at which governance occurs. ‘Multi-level governance’\textsuperscript{80}, for example, occurs on the subnational, national and international levels.\textsuperscript{81} All actors can operate on all three levels. In a nine-box matrix, Keohane and Nye plotted the actors against the levels; ‘government’ occupied only one third of the table.\textsuperscript{82} This observation is important in showing the share government has in the overall concept of governance.\textsuperscript{83} This represents the ‘fragmentation of political authority among public and private actors on multiple levels of governance, as well as the emergence of formal and informal cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities’.\textsuperscript{84}

On the level of national governance, Hänggi spoke of ‘governance by government’. This might be the traditional Western approach; however, one must note that in weak states and post-conflict environments, the state has traditionally shared its powers, including the monopoly over the use of coercive force. Partnership, competition or division of labour determine domestic governance. Where governance is starkest, ‘international organisations, foreign powers, armed rebel groups or criminal organisations’ play an integral role.\textsuperscript{85} Even in stable countries, governments are increasingly less reluctant to

\textsuperscript{78} Central authority might also derive from the organizations in which governance is taking place. The definitions of Rosenau and Keohane and Nye will be discussed in more detail shortly. James N. Rosenau, ”Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000b), p 4. Also Keohane and Nye, 2000, p 12.
\textsuperscript{79} Categorized above as state and non-state actors. Ibid, p 12.
\textsuperscript{81} Hänggi, 2005, p 8.
\textsuperscript{82} Keohane and Nye, 2000, p 12.
\textsuperscript{83} In the absence of a central authority or where it is weak, there are alternative sources for authority; as mentioned above, ‘the modern state, transnational organizations, social movements, common markets, and political parties’ are all sources of ‘authority, legitimacy, and compliance’. Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
\textsuperscript{84} Hänggi, 2005, p 7.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
share responsibilities on a domestic level. This is visible through ‘the outsourcing of central government functions to the private sector’.  

This is applicable even to security arrangements; security being one sector which several states outsource to foreign and/or domestic non-state actors. Security professionals have developed private transnational networks and multinational corporations. These networks are not confined to national borders; transnationalization has pushed the domestic and the international spheres closer to each other. International society has witnessed an increase in and a deepening of ‘network-type (...) cooperation between states, international organisations and private actors’; governance on the international level, therefore, takes place between these actors. A dynamic of competition, but also of cooperation, is at the centre governance. Peacebuilding missions, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention, foreign policy, foreign aid and assistance are all scenes where governance is most obvious. In this sense, the thickness of the relationship between state and non-state actors has become denser, and the line that separates them is no longer a clear one.

The literature tells us that leverage and power are key in governance. In addition, authority is increasingly being shared by different types of actors, and opportunities are available to further common interests and goals. Thus, following this discussion, an added characteristic of governance is that sources of authority are no longer exclusive to governments.

6) Governance vs. Government

Governance ‘surpasses’ government, and the latter is therefore ‘only part of governance’. Government has traditionally had room for ‘governmental institutions’

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86 Ibid.
87 This trend has been on the rise since the early 1990s in both weak and strong states. See Caroline Holmqvist, "Private Security Companies. The Case for Regulation," SIPRI Policy Paper No.9 (2005). Also, for a comprehensive overview of the industry see: Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, 2003).
88 Bigo, 2006, p 5-49.
89 Hänggi, 2005, p 7.
90 There is widespread agreement in the literature that governance transcends government. The two concepts are ‘not equal’ and they are ‘not synonymous’. To use Keohane and Nye’s words, government
only; in contrast, governance incorporates governmental as well as non-governmental institutions and other informal arrangements. Therefore, in terms of actors, governance encompasses more actors; in terms of structure, Czempiel explains that governance ‘is not a single world order […] It is the collection of governance-related activities, rules, and mechanisms, formal and informal, existing at a variety of levels in the world today’. The word ‘architecture’ refers to the collection of ‘islands’ of governance found at various levels and at different parts of the world. The islands of governance are not subject to a higher central authority or to a world government, although they create frameworks for their interactions in the form of structures, laws, norms, and networks. Keohane and Nye explain that equating governance with government is ‘infeasible’ because it would require building state structures on an international level, as well as somehow creating the dynamic that glues people to one state.

Both can exist without the other, but some argue that governance is more important. Rosenau notes that governance is the opposite of ‘anarchy or chaos’, and it entails the existence of ‘regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively, even though they are not endowed with formal authority’. This would not be the case for countries in conflict which lose the ‘regulatory mechanisms’ necessary to bring order. This is reflected in divided societies which suffer from weak central governments, but rely instead on informal structures to maintain order; once these structures collapse, as in Lebanon, disorder and insecurity take hold.

Governance involves self-regulation in the absence of a global governor on the international level, or a reduced government role on the national level. This, however, entails constant competition, with ‘each party trying to induce, or to force, the other party to do certain things it otherwise would not have done.’ Governance does not necessarily have the means of enforcement as governments do, but it ‘uses power’ and is ‘equally

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91 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
93 ‘Global governance is not global government’, it does not possess the hierarchical, structural, and authoritative attributes of governments. Ibid.
95 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
Thus, in absence of formal enforcing mechanisms, power and leverage become the key variables. In this sense, ‘governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects)’.  

To summarize, the main differences between governance and government are their scope, their legitimacy, and their enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, they are both systems of rule:

Both refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities backed by formal authority, by police power to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police power to overcome defiance and attain compliance.

Again, as will be discussed, Lebanon’s power-sharing system has long relied on an informal system of accommodation between the political elite. Moreover, at the global level, UN, major and regional powers’ policies towards Lebanon represent the shared interest of the main actors of global governance. Governance therefore is an essential concept: it helps us understand the actors and the levels at which they interact to formulate formal or informal rules that affect security in Lebanon. Both domestic and global governance largely transcend the government in Lebanon, reducing it to a weak actor which responds to, rather than dictates, policy.

7) Critique of Governance

Building on the previous discussion, the following is a critique of the concept of governance. There is a common understanding that governance consists of proliferating sets of practices and values which are seen to be best suited to regulating world affairs. Czempiel states that governance distributes values in a non-authoritative but ‘effective’

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97 Power finds its way to the pieces of global governance; the UN Security Council is one such example. Ibid, 250.
98 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
99 Ibid.
100 Senior NICO Advisor Marc Maouad, advisor to former Minister of Interior General Salem and Head of the ISF Strategic Planning Unit General Nassar all note that the Lebanese government and state institutions are reactive rather than proactive. Interviews held in Beirut respectively on 7/9/2010, 11/1/2011 and 7/1/2011.
manner. By differentiating government and governance, Rosenau explains that governance must be accepted by the majority or the most powerful actors. The majority imposes these values through ‘power’ rather than ‘rule’. The rule of governments emanates from legal or constitutional responsibilities; whereas in the case of governance, rules are constructed by the powerful. Governance is therefore based on the ‘shared goals’ and values of the most powerful sets of islands of governance. However, the absence of a legitimate central authority makes power and hegemony central attributes of governance. It can therefore be argued that governance does not subsume representative characteristics. The rule of the powerful may be seen as a blow to those who seek governance as an alternative to hegemonic approaches. Scholars such as Caroline Thomas have noted the undemocratic nature of the structures of international governance. In ‘development, finance, trade, aid, economic policy (…) ecology, human rights, law and so forth’ governance has legitimised and universalised Western ideology and interests which contributed to the ‘marginalisation and neutralisation of competing visions and values.’ This has constituted a great challenge to the legitimacy of global governance.

Furthermore, while the complex web of governance networks play essential roles in domestic as well global issues, Simmons and Oudraat rightly point out:

Governance strategies developed by private, self-selected groups can strain the limits of democratic accountability and give rise to complaints, for instance, about the unelected NGOs that worked with the World Bank to shape guidelines for the development of an oil pipeline in Chad.

NGOs have certainly carved out a place for themselves in international relations, and have come to share the traditional role of the state. This is particularly visible through their role in promoting human rights, through their championing of developmental and environmental issues, and their role in security. There are, however, questions regarding the legitimacy of non-state actors involved in governance. These concerns involve

101 Czempiel, 2000, p 250.
102 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
103 Czempiel, 2000, p 250.
104 Rosenau, 2000b, p 4.
106 In the economic realm, for example, G8 countries dictate the norms and rules of governance on the G77.
‘representation, accountability, and transparency’ within the organisations and to the areas and individuals they claim to represent.\footnote{Karns, and Mingst, 2004, p 245.}

On a note closer to our subject, security governance underscores the regularization of security at the international level.\footnote{Heiner Hänggi, ”Making Sense of Security Sector Governance,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance ed. Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H Winkler(Geneva: DCAF, 2003). p 6-8} It suggests a framework for the governance of security within the international system. States are increasingly accepting this move towards governance, because of budgetary and expertise considerations.\footnote{For the geographical, functional, resource, interest, and normative dimensions see: Krahman, 2003, p 12-15.} Critics however have highlighted that this framework is elaborated by a club made up of the privileged few.\footnote{The role of UN Security Council and The Responsibility to Protect are such examples.} The system and structures of governance increasingly are seen to be based on trends, practices, and norms that are identified with Western interests and ideology. Having said that, as the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ has shown, China and Russia resist this system of governance; even liberal democracies such as France\footnote{In the case of the Iraq war.} and Germany,\footnote{In the cases of Iraq and Libya.} at times, run against the main stream of security governance.

That being said, critics have noted that the pieces of global governance converge into the Liberal Model in its economic and political dimensions. Post-structuralists have argued that the Liberal model, is another method for ‘Northern governments (…) to reassert their authority’ on the South.\footnote{Duffield, 2001, p 11.} Mark Duffield notes that the international extension of this model is a policy pursued in order to ‘contain instability’ and further economic interests.\footnote{Ibid, p 9-11.} Likewise, Chandler notes that ‘rather than promoting democracy and liberal freedoms, the discussion has been how to keep the lid on or to manage the ‘complexity’ of non-Western societies.’\footnote{Chandler, 2012, p 148.} Some have therefore viewed the pieces of governance as a tool to pursue this aim rather than to support an indigenous democratic process.\footnote{See Chandler (2012) for an interesting summary, categorization, and problematization of critics to the Liberal Peace.}

Post-structuralists like Duffield and Chandler have made important contributions in uncovering some of the double standards of governance and thereby dismissing its democratic potential. However, are we to take a fatalist stance and submit to hegemony?
Critical research suggests that the exposure of structural limitations is knowledge to be used for influencing change. Failure to do so simply means that we are submitting to prevailing power structures and allowing hegemonic policies to go unchallenged. What options then do we have to presently shape a more ethical future other than engaging with governance? The purpose for deconstruction should be to identify areas for reform and ideally transformation. The pragmatic approach taken by this study suggests ‘playing the game’: engaging with existing governance structures (i.e., the institutional approach) and supporting humanist actors that can pressure for progress. It is not only unethical but also empirically ungrounded to assume that we face a dead end. There has been substantial movement in global governance, and there will always be movement. Although slow, change is plausible;\textsuperscript{119} progress is seen in terms of (among other things) human rights law, international humanitarian law, in international criminal law, environmental law, and in the Millennium Development Goals.\textsuperscript{120}

While neo-liberal institutionalists and pluralists argue that cooperation is driven by self-interest, solidarists argue that there is a higher ethical dimension to the conduct of politics and governance. Although conscious of the paramount concerns of interest, power, and competition in an anarchic order, this study does not accept that these elements alone drive world relations and hence global governance. This study is convinced that a combination of both solidarist and pluralist approaches better reflects world relations (and governance).\textsuperscript{121}

In light of this, we can build on Booth’s assertion that there is a place for everyone to play a positive role. The use of scholarly work from outside and within the prevailing system can be constructive. Neo-liberal work provides access to ‘real’ institutional structures and to their reformist approach. Post-structuralist work is very useful for uncovering realities and exposing regressive policies. However, post-structuralists take a fatalist stance;\textsuperscript{122} and neo-liberal institutionalists fall short from engaging with transformative change. This study cannot be content with deconstruction; engaging with

\textsuperscript{119} Buzan, 2004, p 201.
\textsuperscript{120} In Public International Law, the individual and other non-state actors have been recognised as ‘international legal persons’.
\textsuperscript{121} Buzan, 2004.
existing or alternative structures allows us to contribute to change in the name of the individual. In subsequent chapters, this study engages with two policy-relevant concepts and with their application in Lebanon. More immediately, the next section discusses the use of governance as a tool for progressive change.

8) A tool for progressive change?

The study of governance allows us to discern the layers and the intricacies of domestic and world issues; it ‘offers a conceptual perspective which helps grapple with the complexity of the contemporary world’ where states share ‘authority with non-state actors on multiple levels of interaction’. Any study in politics must take into account the interdependent nature of world politics; this means that domestic, regional, international and global interests will have some effects on issues and problems across the world. Understanding governance traces and clarifies these relationships. It is for these reasons that governance represents the first piece of a tool-kit this study intends to construct, first to elucidate relationships between actors affecting Lebanon’s security (or other contexts) and second, to promote progressive change.

Despite the criticisms directed at a concept as wide as governance, it can offer opportunities for positive change. Governance offers a variety of channels for a variety of actors to shape world politics; in addition, the fact that governance relies on shared values – in our time, human-centric values – means that these values can be brought to the forefront. In this respect, Czempiel notes:

Understanding international systems as systems of governance also leads to insights that the object (and subject) of foreign policy is not the state but the individual. While the strategy of deterrence and neorealism neglected the individual, the strategy of democratisation and liberal theory center around it.

Governance can be joined with solidarist, cosmopolitan, and emancipatory values. Such voices and the institutions that represent them are increasingly finding a place in governance. They may be thinner than traditional ones but we are increasingly seeing actors in global governance advocating for and even successfully institutionalising

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124 For example democracy, human rights and human development.
125 Czempiel, 2000, p 271.
solidarist norms. Human rights law, the Rome Statute, the campaign to ban landmines, human security, responsibility to protect are all non-state centric norms that have found a footing in international society.

Hence, although there have been many objections as to the illiberal structures and practices of global governance, liberal values need not be hegemonic. The solidarist version of the English School’s commitment to ethical politics, cosmopolitanism, and the more radical theory in the realm of security, critical security studies are well placed to positively influence governance in the human interest. These are not about imposing liberal Western values on the Majority World, but about a higher ethical ground for the conduct of politics; about accepting emancipation as put forward by Booth and his colleagues in the Welsh School. The backdrop of governance is that it rests on the self-interest of parties involved. This facilitates hegemonic behaviour. In some ways, governance therefore constitutes an outpost for traditional regressive politics. In order to influence governance positively, the propagation of a ‘global civic culture’ needs to take place. A number of schools have supported alternatives to statist approaches for promoting change and reconciling communities. Global Civil Society needs to continue pushing for more progressive assumptions and practices. Booth’s theory of security, which will be discussed in the next chapter, centres around an emancipatory strategy that is based on an ‘egalitarian concept of liberty’; it consists of an inclusivist, reconciliatory, culturally sensitive and reciprocal strategy to advance ‘true security’. He mentions Joseph Nye’s 1987 coining of the term ‘process utopian,’ which they both agree is not ‘confined to governments’ and which suggests a process of incremental reform. The approach they encourage is ‘reformist’ and ‘progressive’ and is based on the ‘idea of reciprocity of

126 Institutions of World society are not as old, evolved, strong or entrenched. Williams also even notes that international society can hold a ‘positive and normative agenda’ and that it is ‘now in ever closer contact with the ideal of a world society’. Williams, 2005, p 16.
127 Critical security studies is divided into two versions: the broad and the Welsh School (or CSS). Welsh School is considered as the more radical of the two versions. Both are discussed in the next chapter.
128 The Welsh School or Critical Security Studies in capitals (CSS) adopts the normative commitment to emancipation from the Frankfurt School (Critical Theory). It offers a specific theory of critical security studies and defines emancipation as ‘the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others.’ Ken Booth, Theory of World Security(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). p 112.
129 Regressive policies are ethnocentric, militaristic, statist, top-to-bottom, and exclusivist policies.
132 Ibid, p 324.
rights. Along these same lines, Ernest-Ulricht Patersmann notes in Neil Walker's *Sovereignty in Transition* that ‘transforming ‘legal’ into ‘real’ sovereignty of citizens over the state involves persistent bottom-up struggles for rendering human rights and democracy effective not only in principle, but also in the day-to-day exercise of national and international government powers’. Proponents of an emancipatory strategy and of an ethical approach to global governance have been receiving consistent and rising support.

Their progress is crucial for positive change in world politics. Hence, while recognizing the maturity of institutions of international society relative to world society, the emphasis is on solidarist pressures to loosen state-centricism and attain achievements for progressive ideals.

In brief, the theoretical stance of this study goes beyond the institutional approach of neo-liberalism and pluralism, while also going beyond post-structuralist determinism.

Given the structure of international society, a combined approach involving traditional and non-traditional mechanisms is the way forward. This study argues for an institutional and a solidarist approach to governance that is engaged in ethical and progressive politics.

In this thesis, discussing the role and power of non-state actors is intended to argue that progressive voices can influence power centrifuges; that states need to open up to these voices to formulate more ethical policies. The purpose of this would be to constantly re-adjust relationships between the state and society; in other words, to constantly remind institutions that they are a service by and for the people. Furthermore, it is not the intention of this chapter to pave the way solely for an examination of the non-state actors trying to influence policy and power politics; it is also intended to weigh the performance of state actors against the interests of individuals that make up society.

Hence, this study argues that, despite Realpolitik, governance, through international society and/or world society, can propagate more ethical and progressive policies. It is

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135 Booth, Richard Wyn-Jones, Steve Smith, Williams, Held, Buzan, Hurrell, Williams, Little & Williams, and Dower and Williams.
136 Williams, 2005, p 16.
137 Although regressive non-state actors continue to dominate in many contexts.
138 i.e. for state actors to respond more inclusively and more justly.
through global governance that the world community plays a part in Lebanese politics (with positive and negative repercussions). One ideal that has risen to the attention of international and world society is the concept of human security. I am interested in the supposed marriage between governance and human security and whether current donor and Lebanese efforts reflect this concept. By the end of this study, I will assess whether these contribute to the overarching concern for progress in terms of security in Lebanon.

The next chapter takes the discussion on security one step further by discussing critical security studies as the theoretical guide to this study’s chosen approach to security. This will be followed by a conceptual discussion on human security. One way to operationalise human security has been through Security Sector Reform. Since donors that have espoused human security are active in Lebanon in what can be loosely framed SSR, the contributions of these two concepts are highlighted. I then ask: what is the situation in Lebanon? And are donors’ and Lebanese state institutions’ efforts contributing to any progress?

The first part of this study therefore provides a theoretical, conceptual and policy discussion on security. It formulates a tool-kit through which one can better understand and shape change in specific contexts. The second part uses the tool-kit to look at security, or more appropriately, insecurity in Lebanon, including causes of insecurity, waves of insecurity, and efforts to address insecurity.
Chapter 3: Security

At the core of this study is security. Therefore, it is essential to answer important questions about security that are of theoretical, conceptual and practical nature. What do we mean by security? Security for whom? How can security be provided?

The different schools of International Relations view the conduct of politics in different ways; unlike the natural sciences, many concepts in social science, including in politics and international relations, are contested ones. Security is undoubtedly one of these concepts. Furthermore, like many other concepts ‘security is undergoing a fundamental transformation’. Security has traditionally been thought of as defence from external military threats. However, changes in the meaning of security have taken place on both theoretical and policy fronts. In 1983 Barry Buzan extended the theoretical scope of security, from its original, single military dimension to five sectors of security. His work paved the way for serious discussions on the widening of security. Mahbub ul-Haq and his team at the UNDP moved the work of non-traditional approaches in academia to the policy world. The late ul-Haq was special adviser to the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of 1994 in which the concept of Human Security was first introduced. There is a long stretch between the traditional concepts of security and Human Security. This discussion covers the highlights of the debate within security studies, with an emphasis on approaches best suited to provide a more thorough investigation to the aims of this study.

Chapter 3 highlights four schools of security studies: the Copenhagen School, Critical Security Studies, Realism/Neorealism, and Human Security. The discussion on security is divided into two: one uses a theoretical dimension to emphasise critical security studies, while the other uses a conceptual dimension to discuss Human Security. The chapter ends

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3 Ul-Haq’s work was very influential to the evolution of the development and security discussions: he developed the Human Development Theory, inspired the creation of the United Nations ECOSOC, he was behind the Human Development Index, as well as recommended the creation of a Human Security Council.
with piecing together a tool-kit made of governance, human security and critical security studies to understand and shape security in local contexts.

It is believed that the international system has been moving towards new ways of thinking about world affairs. The search for security takes place against ‘a background of evolving transnational norms relating to security and governance’ notes Edward Newman. Our understanding of the concept of security is changing and will continue to transform. Furthermore, as Robert Cox writes, ‘perspectives derive from a position in time and space’; thus far, the concept of security has developed into a wider and a deeper one. There has been a move away from the security of the state and a move closer to the security of the individual.

I. Security: A Theoretical Discussion

1) The Transformation

a) The ‘New Times’

Parallel to the discussion on governance, changes in the international system also transformed traditional understandings of security – these are the ‘New Times’, writes Ken Booth. As Jessica Mathews explains in her 1997 Power Shift article, globalization and interdependence brought about ‘seismic’ changes. Generally, the state lost its privilege of unconditional sovereignty and its status as the only significant player in the international system. Traditional norms, principles and practices were revisited, and new issues

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6 Ul-Haq notes that ‘security is increasingly interpreted as: security of people, not just territory; security of individuals, not just nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all people everywhere.’ ul-Haq, 1999, p 79.
surfaced. In this sense, the changes in the international system allowed for the reconsideration of our understanding of security.

As mentioned, the meaning of security was both widened and deepened. Generally speaking, ‘widening’ refers to the horizontal dimension of security, whereby more issues have come to be considered security issues.9 Its vertical dimension – ‘deepening’ – seeks to cut through the level of the state to target deeper levels of security: the society or the individual. Superpower rivalry had long prevented non-military issues from being considered security issues; however, although the broadening of the concept of security had started in the 1980s, it ‘gained ground in the 1990s when the ending of the Cold War seemed […] to herald a new era of international politics’.10 The breathing space that the new era bestowed on international politics allowed old and new issues to be widely accepted as security issues. ‘Terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination of rapid population growth, environmental decline, and poverty that breeds economic stagnation, political instability, and, sometimes, state collapse’ were referred to as ‘non-traditional threats’.11

The schools of International Relations reacted differently to the changes taking place to the definition of security. Realists did not support ‘such an expansionist interpretation of security’.12 Even as late as 1991 Walt defined Security Studies as the ‘study of threat, use and control of military force’.13 The resistance by realists against the widening of the definition of security is associated with concern for the dilution or understatement of external military threats.14 However, in contrast to realist assumptions, most conflicts were internal: ‘the nearly 100 armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have virtually all been intrastate affairs’. As Mathews suggests, it is increasingly accepted that for most states ‘the security threat […] from other states is on a downward course’.15

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9 For example: Paris, 2001, p 97. The mainstream literature describes widening and deepening as two separate changes; but, as will be explained shortly, widening happens as a result of deepening.
14 Realists, such as Mearsheimer and Huntington, thought that the balance of power did not exist in the post-Cold War period to guarantee international security. In some ways this is true: the environment was favourable for conflicts to erupt. Huntington, 1993 or Mearsheimer, 1990.
However, scholars such as Edward Newman also argue that some of the changes underlined by many scholars have been exaggerated; the non-traditional threats are not new phenomena per se. He notes that the ‘difference today is that academics, policy analysts, and politicians are focusing on these factors more than before.’ Having considered this, there is little contestation that a new way of thinking about security has been developing; it is now increasingly being presented as a ‘public good’ open to discussion and debate. Furthermore, the emergence of concepts such as Human Security and New Wars illustrate the new dynamism and the newly found drive to re-invent security studies by questioning long-standing assumptions that no longer seem to fit neatly into the security environment. The long legacy of exclusive focus on foreign military threats is being shattered; threats to the majority of the world’s populations are beginning to be recognised.

b) The widening of security

Despite general agreement that the widening of security was cemented in the early 1990s, the same broad approach had been articulated much earlier. In 1983, Richard Ullman advised that a threat to security should be:

an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a

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17 Experts ‘are understanding the underlying dynamics of conflict – and especially the social and economic factors – to a greater degree than in the past.’ Ibid, p 179.
18 Krause and Williams, 1997.
19 In the 1980s, Mohammed Ayoob challenged the traditional schools of thoughts in International Relations for not recognizing that in Third World countries the primary threat to people emanates from their own states. He also argues against general theorization and for more ‘explicit’ perspectives that can express contextual differences. Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Critical Security Studies Concepts and Cases, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). And, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002). p 27-28
government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.\textsuperscript{20}

Ullman’s definition was prescient; it included notions of both the widening and the deepening of security. It is important to note the absence of references to the traditional conception of security; his definition mentioned neither state security nor external military threats. He identified, instead, the ‘inhabitants of a state’ as the subject of security. Secondly, he viewed security as threatening the welfare of the individual, subsuming therefore a notion of security that transcends survival and physical insecurity. And third, he recognized the effects that security threats have on governments but also recognized such effects on non-state actors. He thus defied many of the established assumptions of the time.

Similarly, Barry Buzan noted that external military threats ‘are not the only threats that face states, people and the world as a whole’.\textsuperscript{21} In this sense, Buzan also laid the groundwork (also in 1983) for the broadening of the concept of security in \textit{People, States and Fear}.\textsuperscript{22} Buzan noted that ‘the traditional conceptions of security were (...) too narrowly founded’,\textsuperscript{23} and he proposed a ‘wider perspective on security than that encompassed by the traditional focus on national military policy’.\textsuperscript{24} He identified five sectors of security overall; he maintained that military threats have a ‘special’ character because they involve the use of force, but that ‘the range of potential national security issues is wide, stretching across the military, political, economic, societal and ecological sectors’.\textsuperscript{25} That same year, Ullman identified demographic changes and resource depletion as rising security threats to states. This was picked up by Jessica Mathews in 1989; she identified the environment as a rising security problem. By the end of the Cold War, there was already a surge of voices highlighting non-military threats to security. Peterson and Sebenius pointed out in 1992 that education and economic disparity threatened the stability of developed countries, including the most powerful of them. Lynn-Jones and Miller followed suit in 1995 by highlighting the effects of migration in both economic and social terms and its role in firing up nationalist sentiments. Mohammed Ayoob noted in 1997 that for most developing

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{22} Ken Booth stresses the importance of Buzan’s work by saying that everyone else has ‘been writing footnotes to it’. Booth, 1991, p 317.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p 14.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p 116, 118.
countries ‘internal rather than external threats were the principal security concern’.\textsuperscript{26} From there on the list grew longer, and this new direction increasingly gained grounds in the study of International Relations and its subset, Security Studies. Threats from within as well as external threats were seen to threaten state security; furthermore, these were no longer exclusively military threats.

So far, however, the new threats identified were mainly considered threats to the stability of the state. Therefore, ‘widening was simply a case of extending the range of factors which affected state power beyond the confines of military and trade affairs.’\textsuperscript{27} These new issues were seen to advance or regress states’ status in respect to others. Hardcore realists did not support this extension of the scope of security studies; however, given that the widening so far maintained the centrality of the state, some neo-realists jumped onto the bandwagon of the widening agenda.\textsuperscript{28}

c)\textit{ Deepening of security}

Meanwhile, another move was slowly building ground: this was a movement towards the deepening of the meaning of security. Social constructivists and other scholars with critical inclinations continued the transformation of security. ‘Deepeners embraced the concept of ‘human security’’; they introduced the argument that the ‘chief referent object of security should not be the state or certain sub-state groups’, but the individual, as the basic unit of these collectivities.\textsuperscript{29} It is interesting to note that despite Buzan’s work in widening security and his recognition of the individual as the ‘irreducible basic unit’, he nonetheless still maintained that the state is the ‘standard unit of analysis’ of security.\textsuperscript{30}

In 1991, Booth noted that the ‘individual humans are the ultimate referent’.\textsuperscript{31} Security was increasingly seen by the likes of Richard Falk to mean ‘the negation of insecurity as it

\textsuperscript{26} Hough, 2008, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{28} Walt’s 1991 definition of security illustrate this rejection. Walt, 1991, p 222.
\textsuperscript{29} Hough, 2008, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{30} Buzan, 1991 , p 20, 35.
\textsuperscript{31} Based on Hedley Bull’s (English School) observation in 1977 that the world order relies on people rather than states because they are ‘permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not’. Hedley Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977). p22. Booth, 1991, p 319.
is specifically experienced by individuals and groups in concrete situations.\textsuperscript{32} Finally and concretely, security was transformed to be understood as threats posed to the individual. This was a drastic shift from the traditional concept of security and was seen as such even by proponents of widening the concept. This move, therefore, introduced to security a new vertical dimension, even while its horizontal dimension still faced resistance. The concept of security remains a contested one to the present day, and possibly for an unforeseeable time into the future. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the efforts made have indeed amassed support. The changes in the policy-world illustrate this through the birth of the policy-relevant concept of Human Security, the nexus between development and security, and the prominence of human rights in international relations.

The renaissance of Critical Theory in the early 1990s inspired the birth and development of interpretive approaches to security. Analysts increasingly accepted the constructed nature of security, and interpretive approaches sought to deconstruct it. Wyn-Jones, for example, contended that ‘identity’ should play an integral part in the conceptualization of security.\textsuperscript{33} Security reflects situational and cultural experiences; indeed, there are different and sometimes ‘competing conceptions of human security’.\textsuperscript{34} Buzan notes that national security is ‘as diverse as the condition and situation of the different states to which it applies’.\textsuperscript{35} His collaboration with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, dubbed the Copenhagen School, had a large impact on interpretive approaches. Their work developed the sector of societal security – based on the study of identity – as a response to issues arising from European integration in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{36} Furthermore, Ole Waever introduced the ‘speech act’ to the study of security.\textsuperscript{37} The incorporation of their contributions culminated in the Securitization/Desecuritization theory. Based on Buzan’s multi-sectoral approach, their theory recognized that threats may emanate from different areas. However, as Buzan had noted, the difficulty in defining a security issue is the


\textsuperscript{34} What constitutes a threat in one part of the world might not stand in another: while an Africa country like South Africa might identify HIV as a threat to national security, a Middle Eastern country such as Jordan would regard water as a security priority. Newman, 2001, p 240 and Hough, 2008, p 6-10.

\textsuperscript{35} Buzan, 1991, p 69.

\textsuperscript{36} Smith, 2005, p 34. See Ole Waever et al., 1993.

\textsuperscript{37} An issue has to be ‘uttered’ as a security issue by elites in power. Ole Waever et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), p 55.
characteristic that separates it from an ordinary political issue. This said, their collaboration reached the following argument:

To count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existentialist threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsements of emergency measures beyond rules that otherwise bind.

Initially, the Copenhagen School did not specify or limit the securitization actor or the referent; but it soon concluded that the state is the securitizing actor and the referent is primarily the state, and in some cases the society. The criterion that distinguishes an ordinary political issue from a security issue is its packaging by the agent to an audience as an ‘existential threat’; the process therefore involves the agent successfully constructing and selling a security issue to the public. ‘A successful securitization attempt requires that the actor has the position of authority to make the securitizing claim, that the alleged threats facilitate securitization, and that the securitizing speech act follows the grammar of security,’ wrote Smith. Securitization is ‘discourse-centric’; security issues are confined to ‘top leaders’; and the ‘language of security is (...) a jus necessitates for threatened elites, and this it must remain’. Securitization was developed to explain non-traditional threats incorporated under the new security agenda. However, securitization remained elitist, status-quo oriented and state-centric.

The expansion of the security agenda has entailed the expansion of the role of the military, with ‘the tendency of military forces to be employed less for traditional defence tasks and more on broader security tasks’. A corollary of this has been a concern over the militarization of non-military threats. Furthermore, despite the progress on both the

40 Ibid, p 36.
41 They note a ‘duality of state security and societal security, the former having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and the latter being held together by concerns about identity’. In Waever et al.,1993, p 25. Also: Smith, 2005, p 32, 33. Booth, 2007, p 162.
42 That is: ‘constructed verbally or voiced’.
43 Smith, 2005, p 34.
44 Ibid, p 166.
47 Booth, 2007, p 164.
48 Ibid, p 166.
widening and deepening fronts, since the campaign against terrorism has been launched, scholars have noted the expansion of the role of the military alongside crude power politics;\(^{50}\) this has set the two perspectives back in competition. Therefore, with the broadening of the concept of security comes broadening from an orthodox standpoint. Others such as Booth, however, do not entirely dismiss the use of the military in non-traditional issues;\(^{51}\) it is merely the orthodox approach or traditional power politics that are problematic.

Therefore, the Welsh School of critical security studies disagreed with the Copenhagen School, and argued that securitization can be populist. For Booth, ‘security and emancipation are in fact two sides of the same coin’; in contrast to traditional thinking, ‘power and order’ are not necessary precursors to long-term security. He championed the argument that emancipation is a universal value; that values such as justice, equality, sustainability, inclusiveness, the respect of human rights, equitable development bring about ‘true security’. Unjust deprivation or infringement on these human security concerns undermines security.\(^{52}\) Another Welsh School theorist, Richard Wyn-Jones, supported the rejection of the ‘fetishization’ of the individual: when the individual is the ultimate referent, analysis gains depth, and it becomes possible to ‘understand the various contexts that impinge upon an individual’s security and simultaneously [discourages] their reification and fetishization.’\(^{53}\) This suggests that such analysis can uncover or deconstruct human fears and insecurities, and clears the way for a better informed response. This study therefore believes that the individual as the referent is inescapable in the search for security.

According to the Welsh School, widening and deepening are ‘often misunderstood’.\(^{54}\) The two share a relationship much more complex than that depicted by the mainstream literature. This study agrees that it is a mistake to think that the two processes can be separated; deepening should be a precursor to widening. Booth explains that it is the deepening of the meaning of security that provides for a wider agenda: by taking the individual as the referent, the scope of issues to consider under security is

\(^{50}\) See Duffield, 2005, p 3; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2006; and Booth, 2005, p 24.
\(^{51}\) Booth, 2007, p 168.
\(^{52}\) ‘Minimal levels of political and social justice’ seem to be necessary for stability. Booth, 1991, p 318, 319.
\(^{53}\) Wyn-Jones, 1999, p 115.
\(^{54}\) Booth, 2007, p149, 157.
Therefore, widening is ‘secondary to deepening’ and deepening precedes widening. Broadening is not ‘itself a radical move’; it can be ‘conservative’. As is often illustrated by governments across the world, broadening can take place from a conservative position – for the same aim, by the same means, for the same referent, and derived from the same theory – which perpetuates existing power structures. According to Booth, the sectoral approach taken by the Copenhagen School ‘broadens the agenda, but only from within a basically neorealist perspective’; the referent is still the state and securitisation remains power-centric – a position which this study rejects as it perpetuates regressive policies. No matter how broad, some approaches cannot be considered critical.

The widening and the deepening of security has set off debates and revisions concerning every one of its constituent parts – referents, definition, levels, scope, actors, and agents, as well as interlinked and related concepts. For Booth and Vale, ‘we must simply accept the problems of an expanded security agenda’. In addition, this study supports Krause and Williams’ contention that the expansion of the security agenda may be a necessary evil before achieving progress:

It may be necessary to broaden the agenda of security studies (theoretically and methodologically) in order to narrow the agenda of security. A more profound understanding of the forces that [...] give rise to threats, [...] could open the way to [...] ‘desecuritisation’ – the progressive removal of issues from the security agenda as they are dealt with via institutions and practices that do not implicate force, violence, or the ‘security dilemma’.

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55 The most important element to the deepening process is identifying the origin of knowledge: ‘uncovering the root from which the concept of security is derived from’. In other words, it is the identification of the referent which dictates the scope of security – the widening; deepening unravels the theories that determine the conception of security and its associated policies (‘the priorities that will shape the political agenda’). Ibid, p 149.


57 Including power dynamics, institutions, socio-economics, development, domestic politics, and international relations.


2) Traditional vs. non-traditional approaches

a) The traditional approach

‘Traditional security thinking’ has long ‘dominated’ the study of security and ‘has been associated with the intellectual hegemony of realism.’ Rational choice theory, neorealism, defensive realism, and offensive realism are variations of the traditional realist discourse. These are joined together in their emphasis on the role of the state and on external military threats to security. The traditional approach stresses survival through constant competition, the multiplication of power, and the external threat in an anarchic system. Alliances or humanitarian interventions are undertaken in this mind-set. Non-military issues have traditionally been considered Low Politics and military issues High Politics; low politics issues may rise to high politics in the absence of an obvious military threat. However, this is done in conjunction with a consideration of the balance of power and the security dilemma. Booth refers to Edward Luttwark’s 1985 *Strategy and History* to summarize the traditional position: strategy’s ‘only purpose is to strengthen one’s side in the contention of nations’.

It is agreed that security is always referential. The traditional approach maintains that the state is the referent of security and resists the deepening of the meaning of security. Stephen Walt noted in 1991 that the study of security is ‘the cumulative knowledge about the role of the military’ through an ‘unbiased measurement of critical concepts’. Krause and Williams, explain that the identification of the state as the referent of security ‘provides the basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military diplomacy from the field.’ The agenda of the traditional approach has been described as ‘narrow’. In this sense, ‘defining an issue as of security on the basis of whether it

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60 Booth, 1991, p 318.
64 Concurrently, security is composed of three elements: ‘a referent, a danger, and a desire to avoid harm’. Booth 2007, p 150.
66 Krause and Williams, 1997b, p 38.
involves military forces strips the term of any real meaning.\textsuperscript{68} It severely confines the concept and fails to address its complexity. This study contends that security should subsume a much broader scope than that of the state. This becomes clearer when we remind ourselves that ‘security is a human condition’.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, it is in this study’s view that identifying a security issue should not remain an elitist exercise; rather, it requires people to be able to voice their insecurities. Security is a ‘social construct’;\textsuperscript{70} consequently, it is futile to use the traditional approach to fit security issues into state security and the military sphere. Resistance oppresses insecurities and exacerbates situations – the Arab Spring is a clear illustration of the backlash of states’ disregard for human security.

One voice against the widening of the agenda of security is David Baldwin, who argues that security ‘no longer has a core meaning’; therefore, it risks losing its ‘analytical usage’.\textsuperscript{71} However, if security is commonly understood as ‘absence of threats’,\textsuperscript{72} then the ‘movements of a neighbour’s army’ is not the main source of insecurity around the world.\textsuperscript{73}

Military and violent threats might be a precondition for other human security concerns, but in many instances, they are less significant than others.\textsuperscript{74} Security is subjective, relative and relevant to the regional and individual situation of countries, societies and individuals. A sound assessment of threats is necessary to customize a security agenda.\textsuperscript{75} This study does not argue that external military threats are no longer important; rather, that this threat

\textsuperscript{68} Hough, 2008, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{69} Emphasis added. Ibid, p 6-10. And, Booth, 2007, p 101.
\textsuperscript{70} Hough, 2008, p 6-10.
\textsuperscript{72} Buzan, 1991, p 16-17.
\textsuperscript{73} As Booth says: ‘While as students of security we should never ignore the agenda and pronouncements of military strategists, on what justifiable basis can we deny space on the security studies agenda to the violence and insecurity done by world politics to many women, the poor, and those oppressed because of race?’ Booth, 2007, p 159.
\textsuperscript{75} In this sense, Costa Rica, which chose to abolish its army in 1948, occupies one end of the spectrum; in contrast, parts of South Asia and the Middle East are still caught up in external military or internal security threats. Nowadays, statistics seem to indicate that most wars are internal; the traditional conception that threats are external, military and directed towards the state is no longer a convincing one; ‘95% of all battle deaths are caused by internal conflict’, said Collins. Ul-Haq, 1999, p 81; and Alan Collins, \textit{Contemporary Security Studies}(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p 100-101.
is not the only important one. To critics of the widening of the agenda, the concern over the loss of focus cannot be justified and should be responded to by a prioritization and division of labour.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, the Cold War fixation on ‘extravagant military spending’\textsuperscript{77} should be abandoned; resources should not be put on hold to service this one threat while the individual, society, and possibly the state are insecure in the face of other threats. It is in this sense that many analysts as well as this study argue that the state-centric approach is ‘impeding’ issues central to the individual from being prioritised.\textsuperscript{78}

The traditional approach survives by relying on power,\textsuperscript{79} but it has been facing increased delegitimization.\textsuperscript{80} As Booth notes, the traditional approach is ‘regressive’\textsuperscript{81} because ‘realism (...) has been a theory of the powerful, by the powerful, for the powerful’.\textsuperscript{82} Although the traditional approach emphasised order based on non-intervention and state sovereignty, the centrality of power and competition in an anarchic system has made realism/neorealism an approach that is power-centric; its state-centrism makes it a top-down approach focused on the preservation of the status-quo. It was shaped by the interwar years as well as by Cold War ‘necessities’, and it continues to be largely ethnocentric, non-inclusive, militarised and masculinist.\textsuperscript{83}

By taking the prevailing order – the state and the international system – as its framework, the traditional approach does not examine the status quo or its assumptions.\textsuperscript{84} This means that it ‘perpetuates’ flawed or regressive assumptions.\textsuperscript{85} Furthermore, the traditional approach believes in the fatalism of human nature and the international system;

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\textsuperscript{76} A division of labour is possible in academia and in the policy world. Booth: ‘At the level of government, sorting out priorities within a broadened security agenda is a matter of political decision, and one of the key aims of critical theorising is to bring politics more explicitly into the security field, where too much has become pre-defined’. Booth, 2007, p 159.

\textsuperscript{77} Booth, 1991, p 318.

\textsuperscript{78} Hough, 2008, p 19.

\textsuperscript{79} Through capabilities, relationships, institutions and structures.

\textsuperscript{80} The narrow realist approach is ‘no longer tenable’. Krause and Williams, 1997b: 38-39. Also, ‘over the years nuclear deterrence theory became increasingly esoteric, rococo and irrelevant’ said Booth. Booth, 1991, p 322.

\textsuperscript{81} Booth, 2005, p 13.

\textsuperscript{82} Booth, 2007, p 158.

\textsuperscript{83} Booth, 2005, p 13, and 2007, p 265.

\textsuperscript{84} It ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’. Cox, 1981, p 128.

\textsuperscript{85} Booth, 2005, p 6, and 2007, p 277.
it does not involve any commitment to change, and does not leave space to question the prevailing order – the traditional approach is therefore ‘static’.  

Another problem with the traditional approach is its foundation on ‘claims that are now presented as unproblematic facts’. Traditional approaches adopt a ‘scientific objectivist epistemology’. Their ‘epistemological position is premised on a claim that it is potentially possible to draw clear dividing lines between subject and object, fact and value, description and prescription’ writes Wyn-Jones. However, this study agrees with the argument that the study of security from a naturalist and objectivist approach is problematic. The ‘unbiased’ study of security has led to the naturalisation of seemingly objective knowledge, while disregarding the constructed social fabric. As Cox states, theory is always ‘for someone and for some purpose’. Booth and Smith hence argue that there is no such thing as a neutral place from which to speak about security. Moreover, McSweeney contends that words like security are not ‘factual’, and cannot be tested by ‘objective measurement’. Therefore, as concepts and theories always depend on a given place and time in history, Booth and Smith note that security is a ‘derivative’ concept – its meaning depends on or is derived from a particular standpoint. Along these lines, Krause and Williams write that ‘security after all is a historically variable condition: while one might perhaps agree with Thomas Hobbes’s claim that the fear of death is one truly human condition, the sources of this fear (...) vary drastically across time and space’. The objectivist approach is therefore a ‘reductionist’ one: it chooses to study humans as scientific ‘objects’, disregards constructions that shape both security and insecurity, and casts out threats that are not of a military nature.

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86 Ibid.
88 Emphasis added. Ibid.
89 See Walt’s definition. Walt, 1991, p 222.
90 Booth, 2007, p 151.
92 Booth also writes: ‘There is no politics-free definition of security in world affairs’, and ‘all conceptualizations are necessarily theory driven’. Smith, 2005, p 27; Booth, 2005, p 16.
93 In Smith, 2005, p 27.
95 Smith, 2005, 27, Booth, 2007, p 109, 150
96 Krause and Williams, 1997b, p 36.
98 Krause and Williams, 1997b, p 42.
Lastly, Buzan contends that the state is ‘the highest form of human collective’; it is responsible for ‘managing’ insecurity. The failure of states to provide security leads to ‘civil conflict among groups, communities and peoples; it threatens states from inside as it were and hence global order itself.’ Conflict in an intensely globalized international system threatens the security of individuals across borders. For states to achieve their raison d’être, they should have the capabilities to ‘manage’ insecurity. This, however, should be done in the sense of a ‘minimal state’. The failure of states to uphold rule of law, such as in Lebanon during the late 70s, causes serious and violent threats to individuals; nevertheless, irrespective of capabilities, states can also intentionally undermine the security of individuals. It is, therefore, important to note that ‘states should be treated as means not ends’. States are not reliable; they can be egocentric and abusive, and examples of this can be drawn from all corners of the world. One should have the end – the individual – clear in mind when dealing with the means – the state. Here lies the importance of critical security studies. It is adamant that parting ways with the static approach is necessary: this study supports its problematisation of pre-defined assumptions and structures, and accepts wider and deeper conceptions of security, on the basis that the individual is the ‘ultimate referent’.

b) Critical security studies

The term ‘Critical Security Studies’ was coined by Ken Booth at a 1994 conference organized by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Participants represented varied and

99 Based on Hobbes’ and Locke’s social contract theory, ‘the state exists to manage the insecurities that individuals pose on each other and that they are faced with’. Buzan, 1991, p 35, 38, 67.
100 Duffield, 2005, p 1.
101 There are two types of states according to Buzan in People, States and Fear. The maximal state ‘has interests of its own’ and ‘acquires independent standing above its citizens’. In contrast, the minimal state is largely dependent on the consent and the rights of the ‘individuals who make it up.’ Buzan, 1991, p 39-40.
102 Indeed, in the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, ‘states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their own people, and not vice versa’. Annan, K. (1999). Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Towards a Culture of Prevention. New York, United Nations. p 81; and Booth, 1991, p 320.
very different non-traditional approaches to security studies; their contributions were grouped in Krause and Williams’ 1997 *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*. Two concerns brought critical security studies together. The first was the rejection of the traditional approach; the second, the frustration with the non-critical ‘expansionist’ approach to the security agenda in the immediate post-Cold War period. As Krause and Williams explained, widening simply consisted of ‘a grab bag of different issue areas’; this move lacked ‘a cohesive framework for analysing the complementary and contradictory themes at work’. In addition, it failed to ‘move security studies away from its traditional concerns’. The reconceptualisation of security required serious critical theoretical engagement. Critical theorists re-examined this ‘expansionist’ move by breaking away from the traditional reductionist approach, and adopting a critical reflective one. Contrary to the traditional approach, interpretive epistemology does not subscribe to the argument of an abstract other and of ‘timeless structures’. A ‘fixed reality’ does not exist; rather, subjectivity is considered the basis of all human and social behaviour. Interpretive approaches investigate the origins and the causes of conflict; they examine how ‘threats and interests are constructed’. Critical reflection allows for a ‘fuller understanding of conflict’, clarifies the road ahead, and paves the way for ‘conscious transformation’.

Two schools of critical security studies subsequently developed out of the 1994 conference. There were different views on ‘the construction of a critical theory of international relations and, in turn, to contemporary security studies’. The broad version of critical security studies intends to re-examine issues that had been considered orthodoxies in security studies, and to engage with newer ones. Proponents of this broad version refused, and still refuse, to develop a specific theory of critical security studies; they do not want to ‘invoke a new orthodoxy of critical security studies’. They believe it

106 Krause and Williams, 1997, p xix.
107 Krause and Williams, 1997b, p 35.
108 The realist/neorealist approach consists of ‘the search for timeless, objective, causal laws that govern human phenomena’. However, the scientific and objectivist method of neorealism did not capture the sophistication and construction of social and political behaviour. Ibid, p 37, 48.
110 Krause and Williams, 1997, p xv.
would be ‘health[ier] for security studies as a whole’ if the field was not ‘straightjacketed by the criteria of inclusion and exclusion or by a renewed call for definitive answers’. For this reason, the broad version of critical security studies does not specifically define either ‘security’ or ‘critical’. Instead, it focuses on self-reflection, the search for, and the exploration of ‘alternative positions’.¹¹¹

Critical Security Studies (CSS), as understood by Booth and his colleagues in the Welsh School, is different to the broad version of critical security studies. Booth, along with Richard Wyn-Jones, sought to appropriate Critical Theory to security studies.¹¹² They are the foremost advocates of a distinct and coherent CSS theory based on Critical Theory – particularly on the Frankfurt School.¹¹³

Generally, non-traditional approaches view security as being constructed; according to this, they take an interpretive stance to deconstruct prevailing positions.¹¹⁴ Critical security studies supplements this by engaging in a search for alternatives in order to reconstruct these positions.¹¹⁵ Welsh School scholars further argue that a ‘distinctive’ theory of critical security studies is imperative in order to liberate security from the traditional approach.¹¹⁶ As a commitment to emancipation is at the heart of Critical Theory, CSS is committed to that goal as well. Emancipation is defined by Booth as ‘the securing of people from those oppressions that stops them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others’.¹¹⁷ Therefore, CSS not only is engaged in the deconstruction of traditional security, but also ‘has a clear view of how to reconceptualise security studies’.¹¹⁸ Wyn-Jones believes that all non-traditional approaches involve a commitment to emancipation, ‘on some notion of the existence of possibilities for progressive alternatives—that is emancipation’; some may not be aware of it, while others keep it implicit and do not engage in it.¹¹⁹ CSS explicitly develops this normative commitment.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p vii, viii.
¹¹² Booth and Wyn-Jones’ contributions were ‘the formative work of this school of thought’. Smith, 2005, p 42.
¹¹³ Their approach is characterised with Gramscian and neo-Gramscian influences—particularly in relevance to: ‘hegemony, civil society, and the different roles of intellectuals’. Booth, 2005, p 261.
¹¹⁴ Reference is to postpositivism, postructuralism and constructivism.
¹¹⁵ Krause and Williams, 1997, p xiv.
¹¹⁶ Booth, 2005, p 260.
¹¹⁷ Booth, 2007, p 112.
¹¹⁸ Smith, 2005, p 42.
However, emancipation has been the key challenge to CSS. Some critics reject CSS’s focus on emancipation; others object to Booth’s definition.\textsuperscript{120} This commitment runs in opposition to traditional, even poststructural and postpositivist approaches – including the Copenhagen School. However, Wyn-Jones argues that if critical approaches do not seriously engage in reconstruction, they are not that different from the traditional approach. He notes that ‘statism, whether its theoretical justification is realist or poststructuralist, is a hindrance’.\textsuperscript{121} Along the same lines, Booth admits that the ‘speech act’ of the Securitization theory is an interesting and helpful theory but that ‘it has been pushed too far’ by the Copenhagen School.\textsuperscript{122} This is not only because it justifies and legitimizes power and elitist discourse while excluding weaker voices, but also because the rise of new actors on all levels has illustrated the viability of a bottom-up approach.\textsuperscript{123} Furthermore, just as the ethical and moral dimension to the theory of security studies derive from the mother theory – the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory – so too does the Gramscian version of the organic intellectual accompanies the Welsh School analyst in his/her examination of security.\textsuperscript{124}

One criticism directed at the normative commitment to emancipation has been that reporting on security should be objective. In response, firstly, as we have established above, there is no neutral place from which to speak of security. Secondly, refusing to take a stance based on claims of objectivity allows the prevailing order to continue imposing its vision. Silence is an accomplice to prevailing injustices; silence justifies, empowers and replicates traditional power-centricism. Building on Robert Cox’s famous stance, Booth notes that: ‘all silences are “against somebody or against something”.’\textsuperscript{125} Prevailing theories cannot be replaced by a vacuum; therefore a critical theory of security studies needs to be developed. Moreover, in line with CSS’s normative commitment, a critical theory of security studies must be relevant to ‘real people in real places’.\textsuperscript{126} According to

\begin{itemize}
\item Waever’s poststructuralist Securitization theory is intended to “understand dynamics of security and thereby manoeuvre them”, and his theory makes it “possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue”. In: Buzan, 1998.
\item Smith, 2005, p 45.
\item Wyn-Jones, 1999, p 116.
\item Booth, 2007, p 108.
\item Booth and Vale give the example of ‘civil society in Eastern Europe in the 1980s[which show that] governments are not the only decisive agents’. Booth and Vale, 1997, p 342.
\item This reference applies to this study’s emphasis on intellectual exploration with an ethical and practical outlook.
\item Booth, 2007, p 160.
\item Booth, 2005, p 272, 274.
\end{itemize}
the Welsh School, this is the only basis by which to resist and limit prevailing theories. Otherwise, such an exercise will be ‘nothing more than an area of academic enquiry’.

A critical security studies theory relevant to the ‘real’ world therefore undertakes two tasks – critique and reconstruction:

Critique entails critical explorations of what is real (ontology), what is reliable knowledge (epistemology), and what can be done (praxis). Reconstruction requires engagement with concrete issues in world politics, with the aim of maximizing opportunities for enhancing security, community, and emancipation in the human interest.

A theoretical commitment, therefore, involves engagement with knowledge in a critical manner and on a continuous basis. The critical theory of security also has a ‘political orientation’, which entails a commitment to ‘emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels’. CSS does not ignore the omnipresence of power (and the state); it ‘cannot be escaped, but it can be reordered in a more benign direction’. This is what this study hopes to do. As we are in an ‘interregnum’; however, the future is shaped today, and ‘human society will not achieve tomorrow what its most powerful do not choose to begin to practice today’. It is therefore important to fuse ends with means ‘in a manner whereby one’s ideals are evident in how one acts’. The ideals of CSS are encapsulated in emancipation and subsume progressive values. These are based on an ‘egalitarian concept of liberty’ and on the ‘reciprocity of rights’; it is ‘inclusivist’, ‘culturally-sensitive’, ‘universalistic’ and reconciliatory.

How does Booth see emancipation taking place? The emancipatory strategy is based on an enhanced role of civil society at all levels of the international system. Emancipation celebrates the breaking down of barriers between the different levels of the international system as well as the move towards transnationalism. Furthermore, the

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128 Ibid, p 274.
129 Ibid, p 268.
130 Emphasis added. Ibid, p 263
131 Based on Gramsci. Booth, 1991, p 315
133 Ibid.
134 The progressive values put forward by the World Order school are: ‘delegitimization of violence, the promotion of economic justice, the pursuit of human rights, the spread of human governance and the development of environmental sustainability’. Ibid, p 267
emancipatory strategy involves breaking down constructed and artificial barriers that position groups and identities against each other, rather than as part of a global community with shared rights, interests and obligations.\textsuperscript{136} Emancipation and global governance can be closely linked; the architecture of governance is key to disseminating this emancipatory culture. As mentioned in the chapter on governance, world society is considered the means by which a solidarist and emancipatory global culture can be developed. Booth and Peter Vale use South Africa as a case to operationalise a strategy that spreads an emancipatory culture. They explain that the soundest approach to ‘comprehensive’ and true security is the development of ‘civil society throughout the region: within individual countries it needs to deepen, but at the same time, it needs to be transnational’, emphasising therefore the role of local, regional and world civil society. Their approach ensures that human security concerns are voiced, shared and flow across frontiers;\textsuperscript{137} and that ‘the global-we’ supports these voices by challenging power and high politics.\textsuperscript{138} ‘True (stable) security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it’;\textsuperscript{139} this attitude has to be fostered in the hearts and minds of people across the world. Hence, Booth’s emphasis on civil society is intended to encourage a bottom-up approach to the study and practice of security. The rationale of a theory of CSS is to prevent or limit the ‘maximal’ state – which Buzan referred to in \textit{People, States and Fear} – from continuing its oppressions.\textsuperscript{140} The Welsh School therefore strongly puts forward the bottom-up approach to represent ‘real people’ facing insecurity.\textsuperscript{141}

This study does not go so far as to engage with transnational politics,\textsuperscript{142} or suggesting a precise road map for wholesale transformation of the Lebanese system. CSS emphasises the need to develop local civil society, which this study also agrees with. The discussion in chapter 6 on local efforts to break from mainstream regressive policies are presented with this assumption in mind. This study agrees that bottom-up efforts are needed to induce progressive change. Having said this, critical security studies do not preclude engaging with state actors when the purpose is to critique their work, as this study does.\textsuperscript{143} Krause

\textsuperscript{136} Booth, 1991, p 322; Booth, 2007, p 146.
\textsuperscript{137} Booth and Vale, 1997, p 342.
\textsuperscript{138} Booth, 2007, p 277.
\textsuperscript{139} Booth, 1991, p 319.
\textsuperscript{140} The maximal state develops into an egocentric entity rather than remain ‘oriented towards the individuals who make it up.’ Buzan 1991, p 39.
\textsuperscript{141} Booth, 2007, p 146.
\textsuperscript{142} Whether regional and world civil society.
\textsuperscript{143} To draw from Booth’s above argument on critique and reconstruction: I attempt to engage ‘with concrete issues’, at ‘all levels’ including grassroots and state levels, for the purpose of ‘maximizing’
and Williams themselves argue that ‘to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary [and practical] exclusion’. Hence, while both critical security studies and this study are wary of state actors, we can agree that in the process of change the state is not circumventable. By using primary material from state actors, this study examines whether state efforts are reflecting and responding to peoples’ security. Thus, for practical purposes, there should be no conflict in adopting both a critical security studies and an institutional human security approach as they stand at different levels of analysis; while one looks at institutional policy the other assesses its contributions to progress.

**c) The Copenhagen School and CSS: steer or transform?**

Within the non-traditional approaches, the Copenhagen School and the Welsh School (CSS) are the two approaches that offer the most coherent and influential theories on security. As mentioned above, Buzan’s *People, States, and Fear* (1983) was a seminal work; it paved the way for the birth of the non-traditional approach to security studies. Nevertheless, Buzan did not make the full leap into what would become CSS. He maintained that the state should remain the referent object of security. Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde wrote that ‘in principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object’. However, at a later date they concluded that the state is the primary referent object and that their approach is ‘not dogmatically state centric security in the ‘human interest’. This for the purpose of being ‘relevant to ‘real people in real places’ instead of being restricted to a mere ‘academic enquiry’. Booth, 2005, p 13, 272, 274.

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144 Krause and Williams, 1997, p xvi.
145 Given its capabilities and its role in domestic governance.
146 See the narrow conceptualisation outlined below.
147 As Steve Smith explains, his foremost contributions are the identification of five sectors of threats to security and, more importantly, the idea that individuals are ‘the irreducible base units’. and that ‘referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture’ once a multi-sectoral approach is adopted. Buzan, 1991, p 35; and Booth, 2007, p 162.
148 Smith, 2005, p 32. Buzan says: ‘the referent objects for security are found primarily on the state level, with the individual and system levels contributing major elements to conditions for security’. The reason for the state’s exceptional role is its position at ‘the interface’ between internal and international security. Buzan, 1991, 27, 329.
149 Buzan et al., 1998, p 36.
in [its] premises’ but in its ‘findings’.\textsuperscript{150} In this sense, Bill McSweeney, among others, insists that Buzan’s approach did not represent a substantial break with neorealism.\textsuperscript{151} Buzan personally admits to adopting a liberal neorealist approach.\textsuperscript{152} Despite his work being categorized as a non-traditional approach, he clearly distanced himself from CSS after his collaborations with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. In \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis} (1998), the three analysts recognized the emergence of CSS as an approach ‘to challenge conventional security studies by applying postpositivist perspectives, such as critical theory and postructuralism’.\textsuperscript{153} They note CSS’s ‘intent of showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted’.\textsuperscript{154} However, their work, dubbed the Copenhagen School by McSweeney,\textsuperscript{155} emphasises that ‘the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis’ on that basis.\textsuperscript{156} In this sense, the Copenhagen School notes that it is ‘closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempt[s] to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions.’ Thereby, their work ‘stands in contrast to the ‘critical’ purpose of CSS, which point[s] toward a more wholesale refutation of current power wielders.’\textsuperscript{157} Copenhagen School scholars state that their work is intended to ‘grasp’ and ‘steer’ security; therefore, as suggested by Wyn-Jones, there are traces of a commitment to change – emancipation – which is implicit but unengaged. The implicit commitment to change is another reason why, despite their innovative work on the ‘speech act’, on societal security and on identity, the Copenhagen School remains on the margins of critical security studies.\textsuperscript{158} Despite the ‘sedimented’ practices, critical security studies adopts a more explicit (and sometime wholesale) commitment to change and insists on the irreducibility of the individual as the referent.

\textsuperscript{152} Although he admits that the traditional approach is ‘too narrowly founded’, and announces that he is committed to revising neorealism, he states that: ‘some might even see international security studies as a liberal reformulation of Realism, emphasizing the structural and security oriented approach of Neorealism, and applying it across a broad agenda. I would support such a view’. Buzan, 1991, p 14, 373.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Smith, 2005, p 32.
\textsuperscript{156} Buzan et al, 1998, p 34-35.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Booth: ‘only “marginally” critical’. Booth, 2005, p 271.
3) A final debate?

Security is possibly the term used most in this study. For ‘far too long security was not considered to be a contestable concept’; the inter-war period and the Cold War had halted the evolution of security studies. Currently, however, the concept of security has become a ‘battleground in and of itself’. The different strands of security studies approach security very differently. The realist approach maintains its statist and defensive dimensions, while non-traditional approaches continue to re-examine the concept after introducing new dimensions and other referents. The Copenhagen School supplemented, valuably, its state-centric approach with the ‘speech act’, identity studies, and the society as a referent to security. In addition, for Buzan, security ‘can only be relative’. He therefore maintains that it was futile to define it specifically: that we should accept security to be ‘an essentially contested concept’. The broad version of critical security studies also refuses to give a specific definition of the term. Booth, however, strongly opposes this. In his view we cannot aspire to something we cannot define: ‘if we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?’ – hence his efforts to develop a theory of critical security studies. It is agreed that security is a derivative concept. Krause and Williams state that security is ‘not self-referential’; it needs a subject to secure. Taking the individual, the state, or society as the referent has different repercussions on the scope of security. The choice of the referent and the degree of deepening, as Booth and Smith explain, suggest a specific theoretical standpoint. In addition, security is indeed a ‘powerful political word’ and an ‘instrumental value’. The work of Waever on security as a ‘speech act’ is of particular relevance to this argument. The label of ‘security’ transforms responses to issues; it amasses political as well as material support. According to the Copenhagen School, to identify an issue as a security issue is to label it as an ‘existential threat’; this allows the securitisation agent to remove it from the realm of ‘ordinary politics’ and allows ‘emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind’ to be taken. It is important, however, not to place CSS and the Copenhagen School in one basket. Securitisation theory views security issues as militarised and outside ‘ordinary’ politics;

159 Smith, 2005, p 58.
162 Ibid, p 317.
163 Krause and Williams, 1997, p viii.
165 Booth, 2007, p 105-108.
166 See Waever, 1995, p 55.
167 Buzan et al., 1998, p 5.
they invoke the state of exception. Their concern over the effects of securitising non-traditional issues led to its corollary, desecuritisation.\(^{168}\) Efforts to desecuritise certain issues have been made by scholars and practitioners. However, this study points out that a security issue needs not be securitised in the sense of the Copenhagen School. This study argues that a security issue does invoke priority and resources, but it does not need to be militarised and placed outside the realm of ‘ordinary’ politics. At the same time, some non-military issues might deserve militarisation or securitisation. Furthermore, although the securitisation theory seems to explain ‘sedimented practices’ well, I take issue with the logic suggesting that if important issues are placed outside the scope of security, they then need to lose ‘their salience’,\(^{169}\) or that issues can only acquire the label of a security issue if they are ‘staged as existential threats’.\(^{170}\) Salience should also be afforded to non-existential threats, as security ‘is not synonymous with survival,’\(^{171}\) rather, security transcends survival. Indeed, security need not be associated with negative, militarised and/or confrontational connotations.\(^{172}\) The conceptualisation of security by the Securitisation theory is problematic.\(^{173}\) It instils fear and introversion. True and comprehensive security requires the acceptance of egalitarian values that deconstruct the walls between groups. Inclusiveness, reconciliation and mutual rights are the bases for true security; security is not genuine, stable or sustainable if it is at the expense of others.\(^{174}\)

‘Security studies’ have undergone several changes since the 80s. However, this does not mean that the debate about security has been resolved. Buzan states that ‘the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed general definition.’\(^{175}\) In the absence of an agreed-upon definition, there is still a ‘general sense of what one is talking about’\(^{176}\); generically speaking, ‘the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat.’\(^{177}\) Many agree that the lack of a definition is not an obstacle to progress; ‘the absence of a universal definition

\(^{168}\) Ibid, p 4, 29, 209.
\(^{171}\) Booth, 2005, p 22.
\(^{172}\) Booth, 2007, p 165.
\(^{173}\) Ibid, p 168-169. The Securitization theory is discourse-centric, and discourse is dominated by power, but insecurities are mostly felt by the weak; so no opportunities are made available for the insecure. There are several important criticisms to the Securitization theory but for time and space concerns, they are not elaborated in this study. See: Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). And Smith, 2005.
\(^{175}\) Buzan, 1991, p 16.
\(^{176}\) Ibid, p 18.
\(^{177}\) Emphasis added. Ibid, p 18.
does not prevent constructive discussion’ writes Buzan.\textsuperscript{178} Krause and Williams add that the debate within security studies is a healthy one:\textsuperscript{179} ‘now we begin to see the full range and diversity of what the security concept can do across a range of issues and approaches’.\textsuperscript{180} Furthermore, security ‘needs to be challenged and contested’, particularly for the purpose of reconstructing it.\textsuperscript{181}

One assertion to take away from this discussion is that alternative approaches ‘have scored deeply in moving the understanding of threat away from purely material calculations towards more social and political understandings.’\textsuperscript{182} Even if the ‘military agenda does assert itself as central again, it seems unlikely that all of the widening and deepening developments in ISS will be rolled back’.\textsuperscript{183} The progress made is not retractable; the threshold has been pushed so that any traditional reassertion will have to take into account some aspects of this progress. It is believed that the concept will continue to evolve alongside the changing international environment.\textsuperscript{184}

In the end, one can note that security is what ‘enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live.’\textsuperscript{185} The search for it is perpetual; it is a constant struggle to, at the very least, reduce threats to everyday life.\textsuperscript{186} However, we must also accept that, to a large extent, ‘insecurity is a life-determining condition’.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{4) A stance on ‘security’}

This study particularly espouses the contributions of critical security studies. One reason for this preference is that critical security studies is intended to be ‘pragmatic’,\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid, p 18.
\textsuperscript{179} Krause and Williams. 1996, p 249.
\textsuperscript{180} Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p 272.
\textsuperscript{181} Smith, 2005, p 58.
\textsuperscript{182} Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p 272.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} A Buzan and Hansen note, ‘It will continue to evolve not just in keeping pace with new security concerns, but also in developing new ways to think about them’. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Booth, 2005, p 23.
\textsuperscript{186} Booth and Vale note that ‘no security policy can erase the whole of life’s threats. Instead, we must conceive of the search for security as a balanced attempt to try to create a less threatening structural context for life’s ordinary struggles’. Booth and Vale, 1997, p 336.
\textsuperscript{187} Booth, 2007, p 101.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, p 14.
allowing this study to engage with the efforts of the security sector in Lebanon. The study intends to critique existing assumptions in order to generate the soundest possible knowledge and to suggest the reconstruction of more inclusive, reconciliatory and egalitarian conceptions of security in Lebanon. This is done in the Lebanese background chapters by challenging the prevailing sectarian system. Critical security studies entails a commitment to engagement with political matters that are in the human interest; looking at the contributions of Lebanese non-traditional civil society groups and at the contributions of state security providers to human security reflects this. CSS takes the individual as an anchor and recognises that emancipation is the central concern for individuals.\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, emancipation is the factor that differentiates security from insecurity. Emancipation is the relative freedom – contingent on the freedom of others – to pursue life in the manner we choose; it implies the freedom or liberty from both man-made and natural constraints, both throughout the course of an individual’s life and for humanity in general. Constraints generally emanate from long-standing attitudes and structures; they might vary between war or political oppression, or environmental degradation, poverty and poor education. This study cannot address all these constraints, and the definition of emancipation remains a contested one within critical security studies. However, the study takes the individual as its referent and adopts the commitment to emancipation, particularly from oppression and violence. This study takes elements from both the broad school and CSS in order to make way for positive change. However, instead of taking a comprehensive, multi-sectoral, transformative approach, this study limits its scope to a more manageable focus on curbing threats to individuals emanating from conflict and state oppression – i.e., from regressive policies anchored on militaristic, top-down and exclusivist assumptions. It does not expand to a transnational approach as suggested by CSS, but remains limited to a Lebanese context; it does not adopt a radical approach that refutes all prevailing structures and does not refuse to engage with state actors. It instead deconstructs the system to explicitly steer efforts for change into more ethical and people-centred policies.

The first part of this chapter discussed security from a theoretical standpoint and took a stance in favour of critical security studies; the second part moves on to a conceptual discussion of Human Security.

\textsuperscript{189} ‘Security is emancipation’, writes Booth; they ‘are two sides of the same coin’. According to Wyn-Jones, ‘after Booth security is conceptualised in terms of emancipation’. Booth, 1991, p 319 and Wyn-Jones, 2005, p 216.
II. Human Security: A Conceptual Discussion

The previous theoretical discussion has set the framework for this study; this done, however, how do we translate our understanding of security to real life? The changes to the meaning of security were picked up by the UNDP in the early ‘90s; a theoretically wider and deeper security came together in the concept of Human Security. The work of the UNDP was seminal in transferring these theoretical changes to the policy world. This change took place gradually; it built up from an expanded and deeper meaning of development, it evolved to encompass these changes in the understanding of security, and ultimately linked the two together. This progress was accompanied by extensive work on the academic front; the move was supported by scholars working on humanitarian issues, on development, on security, and on the link between conflict and development. The UN, therefore, was instrumental in developing the concept of Human Security and placing it centre-stage in world politics discussions – both at the academic and policy-making levels. Hence, during the 1990s, as the UN was given a new lease on life, Human Security gathered much attention: the period witnessed a surge in the number of commissions, reports, books and publications in favour of the new concept.\(^\text{190}\)

1) Overview

The 1994 Human Development Report of the UNDP is considered the key document in introducing the concept of Human Security to international policy-making. However, its foundations were first set out in the first Human Development Report (HDR) of 1990 and in the 1992 UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. The first Human Development Report introduced the concept of Human Development; the 1992 Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace redirected the focus of security to the individual – noting that both development and security take the individual as the referent; it also broadened the scope of security to include environmental, demographic, health, economic and political threats. Finally, the 1994 Human Development Report explicitly bridged the two concepts

\(^{190}\) Mark Duffield notes the academic, government and practitioner interest in the concept. Harvard and Oxford established programmes on Human Security; reports from the Secretary General, the UNDP (1994), and OECD (1998) were published; furthermore, several commissions such as the Independent International Commission on Human Security or the Commission on Human Security and the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) were established. Duffield, 2005, p 2.
under the term Human Security. The concept was seen to incorporate both ‘freedom from fear’ as well as ‘freedom from want’.  

Traditionally, ‘security is often viewed as the absence of physical violence, while development is viewed as material development – improved living standards’. This is now accepted to be far from our modern understanding of the two terms. As Kaldor notes, ‘security is about confronting extreme vulnerabilities, not only in wars but in natural and man-made disasters as well’.  

Human Security pertains to the welfare of the individual; it transcends physical security to include human development. The first Human Development Report (1990) notes that ‘development is about expanding people’s choices’. Development is no longer understood solely in terms of economic growth and increased income; it is concerned with ‘advancing health, education, and political freedom in addition to economic well-being’. Development, therefore, became understood as ‘more than a decent standard of living’; it is now seen to encompass the opportunities to participate and advance in different aspects of life. Therefore, Human Security is not only ‘a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity’. Caroline Thomas’ seminal work emphasises the two components of Human Security: human needs as well as an ‘unhindered participation in the life of the community’. The 1994 report specifically identifies seven categories of Human Security. The concept is characterised by its

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191 The reports were, as King and Murray note, seen to be complementary. And, as defined in the 1994 HDR, Human Security is said to be a ‘unifying event’. Mary Kaldor, Human Security(Cambridge UK and Malden USA: Polity Press, 2007), p 183; and Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2001-2002). p 589-590.
192 Kaldor, 2007, p 183.
193 Based on Amartya Sen’s theory of ‘Capability’, which he develops in his article ‘Equality of What’ and which serves as the basis for the first Human Development Report. King and Murray, 2001-2002.
195 Furthermore, Duffield explains that the developmental dimension of Human Security is drawn from the notion of sustainable development: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. From the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development. Duffield, 2005, p6.
197 Caroline Thomas had taken Canadian Foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy’s human needs approach one step further by adding the ‘dignity’ component to human security. She noted: ‘human security describes a condition of existence in which basic human needs are met, and in which human dignity, meaningful participation in the life of the community can be realised’. Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security(London: Pluto, 2000). p 6. And in Smith, 2005, p 54.
198 These are: ‘economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.’ UNDP, 1994.
universality, by the interdependence of its components; it is people-centred, and is best approached through prevention. The 1994 Human Development Report notes that:

Human security has two central aspects: it means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And, second, it means protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily-life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.

Human Security is therefore a holistic concept. It is concerned with present threats and fears but also with future risks and opportunities. Duffield explains that the aim of Human Security is to empower weak populations: to make them more resilient and self-sufficient in facing the challenges of the new world order. By incorporating such a multi-faceted outlook, Human Security is seen by some to offer a multi-layered analysis of the human condition. This optimistic overview of the term will soon be put into question.

2) An Integrated approach

The 1992 Agenda for Peace by the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had shed light on a sharp increase in a ‘new’ form of wars: internal wars. Furthermore, there was growing agreement that the nature of the state in developing countries was conducive to internal conflict, which had become the source of suffering for many and instability for most. Moreover, the ‘disruptive effects’ of globalization were increasing the rift between the ‘insured’ and the ‘non-insured’. Development was

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201 Reed and Tehranian, 1999, p 35.
202 On the one hand, the security component of Human Security is largely concerned with a responsibility to protect’; on the other hand, development aims at empowering the individual and society at large. Duffield, 2005, p 10-11.
203 Reed and Tehranian, for example, note that Human Security adopts a complex understanding of security, which incorporates ‘the most local and short-term to the most global and long-term human concerns. This requires a comprehensive analysis taking into account the whole spectrum of human security concerns’. Reed and Tehranian, 1999, p 35.
205 Duffield, 2005, p5, 8.
therefore centred on the rectification of these adverse effects. As a result, development and security were found to share an increasingly intricate relationship; both had found a new and reinforced *raison d’être*. Thus far, most approaches to security and development had been separate; however, this was found to ‘actually exacerbate insecurity’. Reed and Tehranian explain that ‘each realm impinges upon the others and is intrinsically connected to wider political and economic consideration’. Collins notes that there is a causal pathway between the dependent and the independent variables of Human Security. Independent variables of underdevelopment lead to the dependent variables of insecurity as political violence. However, this pathway runs both ways; poverty and bad governance may lead to violence, while at the same time violence breeds underdevelopment, poverty and bad governance. Proponents of Human Security, therefore, strongly advocate an *integrated* approach to security and development.

Consistent with the work of the UNDP, the wide approach acts on this interconnectedness, and two separate documents by commissions from each side of the spectrum have come to represent Human Security. *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001) and *Human Security Now* (2003) constitute the ‘institutional framework’ of Human Security; the former looks at its security focus whereas the latter represents the comprehensive integrated approach. Henceforth, when this study refers to the broad approach of Human Security the term will be capitalised; in the case of the narrow approach this study will use lower case for the term.

3) Narrow and broad approaches

The 1991 *Agenda for Peace* and the 1994 *Human Development Report* as well as academic support instigated further research into the operationality of the concept and laid the ground for political action in this regard. In a Canadian-led initiative, 13 states came

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206 Ibid, p 5.8.
207 In intra-state wars: Responsibility to Protect and Prevent, collective security, aid and assistance etc.
208 Kaldor explains that the lack of human development ‘can give rise to violence’, whereas human security supplies conditions ‘that are integral to development’. Duffield also confirms that ‘conflict destroys development’; it disrupts communication, movement, livelihoods and, destroys infrastructure. Kaldor, 2007, p 182, 197 and Duffield, 2001, p 7.
209 Reed and Tehranian, 1999, p 5.
211 Duffield, 2005, p 11.
together in the Human Security Network, which was launched in Norway in 1999.\textsuperscript{212} The Canadian initiative adopted a narrow approach, which focused on \textbf{physical and political security} — \textit{freedom from fear}.\textsuperscript{213} Since the ICISS published its report in 2001,\textsuperscript{214} this category has had an ‘affinity to the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’.\textsuperscript{215} The other approach was led by Japan; it consisted of a much broader approach to Human Security. It stresses the ‘interrelatedness of different types of security’ as well as development as a ‘security strategy’.\textsuperscript{216} It is concerned with Human Security as \textit{freedom from fear} as well as \textit{freedom from want}. In March 1999, the Japanese government, along with the UN Secretariat, established the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS).\textsuperscript{217} This division evolved into two parallel schools of Human Security. Subsequently, an independent Commission on Human Security was established in 2000 and published the 2003 report \textit{Human Security Now}.\textsuperscript{218} The Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen Report is considered another ‘milestone’ in the development of the concept.\textsuperscript{219} A number of developments indicate the propagation of the concept in world politics.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{212}Canada, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Jordan, Mali, Thailand, and South Africa as an observer.\textsuperscript{213} The Canadian definition of Human Security is: ‘safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats’. The narrow approach’s focus is on ‘antipersonnel landmines, small arms, children in armed conflict, and international humanitarian and human rights law’. King and Murray, 2001-2002, p 590.\textsuperscript{214} The ICISS established a close link between military intervention and Human Security. Military intervention under the principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is an ‘exceptional and extraordinary measure’; it is taken as a ‘last resort’ where there has been an intentional and systematic ‘large-scale loss of life’ inflicted on civilian populations by governments. ICISS, 2001, p 97.\textsuperscript{215} Kaldor, 2007, p 183.\textsuperscript{216} Ibid, p 183.\textsuperscript{217} This said, ‘with no conceptual framework initially available, the majority of funding was directed towards developmental concerns including key thematic areas such as health, education, agriculture and small scale infrastructure development.’ UNHCR. ‘UN Trust Fund for Human Security’ Retrieved 17/10/2011, from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2d01fa6.html.\textsuperscript{218}Ibid.\textsuperscript{219} The Report mirrored many of the concerns discussed in the academic debate; it noted that ‘attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people’, it recognized that ‘the international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security’, and added that the state ‘often fails to fulfil its security obligation—and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people’. This said however, for reasons which will be discussed shortly, Human Security failed to gain support from many of the established security analysts. Booth, 2007, p 322.\textsuperscript{220} Human Security has been adopted by international organizations and international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank; furthermore, it has made it onto the G7/G8 summit’s agenda. The SC gradually incorporated human security issues in its mandate. This is visible in its recognition of AIDS as a human security threat, and more so in SC Resolutions 1265(1999) and 1296 (2000), which pertain to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Lastly, the 2001 International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (Responsibility to Protect) justifies intervention in response to gross human security violations. Smith, 2005, p 53; and King and Murray, 2001-2002, p 590.
4) Human Security and global governance

One relationship to highlight is that which exists between Human Security and global governance. Tehranian writes that the two concepts seem to ‘stand at micro and macro polarities’. While Human Security is involved with individual welfare and security, global governance is concerned with world affairs. However, there is more to this contrast than the apparent levels at which these two concepts operate. Due to the increasingly transnational nature of issues, domestic security problems inherently affect global governance.\(^{221}\) Reed and Tehranian note that Human Security and global governance share an ‘intrinsic relationship’.\(^ {222}\) This relationship is twofold: on the one hand insecurity affects global governance, and on the other, Human Security requires access to global governance. For Human Security to be successful, it must become part of the norms of global Governance. ul-Haq, who suggested institutionalising Human Security by creating a Human Security Council similar to the ECOSOC, noted that ‘compulsions of human security demand a new framework of global governance’.\(^ {223}\) Previous discussions indicated that ethical democratic policies, cosmopolitan norms, and a coordinated transnational response are identified as key to a solidarist orientation to global governance.

Hence, the ‘democratisation’ of global governance is considered a necessary condition for promulgating the concept.\(^ {224}\) A concerted effort is being made to turn Human Security into an established norm of global governance; this is evident through the work of individual countries, the UN and other organisations and agencies. As Falk explains, Human Security’s statute needs to rise to the level of international regimes in order for global actors to enforce it more systematically. Therefore, states, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions, and global civil society all play an important role in this. Much more effort, however, is required for Human Security to reach universality. As noted by Falk, non-state actors are required to

\(^{222}\) Reed and Tehranian, 1999, p 23.
\(^{223}\) ul-Haq, 1999, p 88.
\(^{224}\) Tehranian and Reed state that to the extent that security issues are defined democratically, human security will replace state security as a central focus of analysis and policy. But this will not happen until and unless governance itself democratises at the local, national, and global levels. Majid Tehranian and Laura Reed, "Evolving Governance Regimes," in Global Governance for Human Security, ed. Majid Tehranian(London and New York: IB Tauris, 1999). p 78.
push the Human Security agenda from below, in order to keep it in the spotlight and therefore be adopted as a policy from above: their effort ‘[requires] a much stronger and more focused campaign within global civil society, a strengthening of globalisation-from-below that balances globalisation-from-above’.

In 1994 the then Secretary General acknowledged that the UN had been lagging behind in responding to the new post-Cold War environment. Since then, progress has been made. A more complex and inter-sectoral approach was necessary. Peacebuilding missions were introduced and a Peacebuilding Commission was created in 2006. The conceptual and institutional frameworks of Human Security were conceived to address a new security environment. Nevertheless, sceptics such as Duffield contend (as in the discussion on governance) that Human Security has been used as a ‘technology’ of governance; although useful to understand and manage conflict and insecurity in different parts of the world, it serves as a tool for international actors to ‘individuate, group and act upon Southern populations’. While this might resonate at the strategic level, as the international system does not seem to be transforming into a purely solidarist orientation, ethical and people-centred concepts have managed to shape policy and have made positive contributions to international law and to a larger sample of people across the world. One can note that if Human Security continues to be linked with governance, primarily as a result of pressure from non-state actors, then grassroots concerns will have a

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225 Falk maintains however that the state is the most significant player in ‘upholding’ the Human Security agenda. It is up to states to enforce and insure sustained commitment domestically and internationally. Falk, 1999.

226 In his address to the Preparatory Committee of the World Summit for Social Development, he noted that: ‘the summit is a time to respond to the new imperatives of human security all over the globe (…) human security can no longer be considered as an exclusively national concern. It is a global imperative (…) the United Nations can no longer fight the battles of tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday.’ ul-Haq, 1999, p 88.

227 David Chandler explains that the UN has had to readjust and keep up with the changes taking place to avoid being side-lined and alienated yet again after the examples of Kosovo and Iraq. The UN Charter did not have the provisions to deal with internal wars of the post-Cold War period; this was particularly clear in the failure of its mission in Rwanda due to the restrictive mandate of the mission. Moreover, the subsequent unilateral interventions that Western powers performed threatened the relevance of the organization. The Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was set up in 2001, after the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the September 2001 incidents, to address this shortage in the UN Charter and to regulate the new norm of Humanitarian Intervention; it consequently elaborated the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which was mentioned earlier. In addition, the Security Council has since widened the interpretation of its mandate to deal with threats to international peace and security. This illustrates the changing norms taking place in the post-Cold War period. Chandler, 2004.

228 Duffield, 2005, p 3.

229 As discussed in the previous chapter.
place in policy circles. Lebanon is one case where state actors, local and international NGOs, international organisations, and regional and international powers have contributed to advancing Human Security. Although many have also been complicit in exacerbating certain aspects of Lebanon’s conflict, one needs to differentiate between actors, the roles they are playing, and the contributions they are making. The same applies to actors involved at the level of international or world politics.

5) Problematic institutional conceptualisation

This study is looking at Human Security because it is looking for tools that help contribute to change. Human Security presents a mix of contributions to the policy world; unfortunately, however, they are undermined by its conceptual overstretched. Despite Human Security rapidly becoming popular at the institutional level, the scholarly community soon recognised that the broad concept has weaknesses on all theoretical, normative and practical levels. Roland Paris describes Human Security as ‘slippery by design’. Critical and post-structuralist scholars in particular are outraged by the broad approach to Human Security. Booth strongly criticises Human Security as being incoherent, misleading and deceiving. In The Dog that Didn’t Bark, David Chandler, therefore, states that the value of Human Security ‘has been much exaggerated’.

Theoretically, Human Security stretches the concept of security without analytical rigour. The concept does not seriously explore the relationship between its constituent parts, its objectives, its principles, its values and its targets. It adopts instead an approach that Krause and Williams describe as a ‘grab-bag’ to refer to the post-Cold War widening of security.

As security threats were recognised to have become more complex, the 2003 Report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), entitled Human Security Now, talked about a

231 Booth, 2007, p 323
need for a paradigm shift that broadens the scope of attention to the ‘security of people’.\(^{233}\) Hence, CHS notes that ‘respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security’; it relies on the promotion of democratic principles to ‘enable people to participate in governance and make their voices heard’.\(^{234}\) So far this seems promising and these are aspects that this study strongly espouses. Human Security contains several buzzwords that made practitioners, policy-makers and scholars enthusiastic for its promotion. It proposes policy conclusions pertaining to the ‘protection of people in violent conflict’, ‘from the proliferation of arms’, ‘people on the move’ (refugees and migrants), provides ‘funds for post-conflict situations’, and emphasises the need for ‘a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations’. These are areas that human security can effectively contribute to. However, the CHS recognised that threats are contextual, contingent on the situation that individuals find themselves in. Therefore it preferred to maintain open-ended the ‘critical and pervasive threats and situations’ that human security is meant to address.\(^{235}\) But, conceptually and operationally this is problematic.

Building on the Millennium Development Goals to formulate responses to security\(^{236}\) is where uncertain areas begin to arise.\(^{237}\) The more controversial policy conclusions pertain for example to ‘encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor’, ‘working to provide minimum living standards everywhere’, ‘enduring universal access to basic health care’, ‘developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights’, and ‘empowering all people with universal basic education’.\(^{238}\) This long list invites us to assume that the concept is too ‘idealistic’; in the words of CS scholar Buzan, ‘simplistic’ and ‘reductionist’.\(^{239}\) Indeed, the Human Security ideal ‘embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to

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\(^{235}\) CHS, Human, p 4.

\(^{236}\) although of course the Commission also goes beyond them.

\(^{237}\) CHS, Outline, p 1.

\(^{238}\) Ibid, p 3.

education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential’. This is an ethical ideal; but the wide approach is problematic because it dilutes the meaning of security. No analytical or practical value is added by incorporating so many issues under its scope; instead this ‘diminish[es] its political salience’.\textsuperscript{240} Krause’s criticism is also directed at the wider definition of Human Security. According to him, this approach is ‘nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label “human security” on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link’. He agrees for example that ‘it is not clear that anything is gained by linking ‘human security’ to issues such as education, fair trade practices and public health’.\textsuperscript{241} Roland Paris explains that the frustration of analysts with Human Security is that the term ‘seems capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis – along with its opposite – depending on the prejudices and interests of the particular researcher’.\textsuperscript{242} This study, therefore, notes that Human Security incorporates an extensively wide range of principles and objectives but does not establish a convincing causal relationship between them.\textsuperscript{243}

Also, how do we justify labelling such issues as ‘basic education’, ‘basic health care’ and ‘fair trade’ as security issues? Following the Copenhagen School securitisation approach, labelling these as security issues provides them with added salience and resources; however, it also labels them as ‘existential threats’ that can be placed outside ordinary politics. There is much concern over the securitisation and in certain cases the militarisation of these areas. This means we are inviting the state further into controlling the governance of areas that it did not necessarily monopolise. Moreover, in relation to militarisation, in conflict areas, the securitisation of development and humanitarian aid has meant that the military has achieved primacy over non-state actors. The militarisation of

\textsuperscript{240} MacFarlane argues that if the reason behind assigning the label of security to issues is to amass support and resources, there has been no evidence to suggest that it has been successful. Furthermore, it might be that assigning the label of human security unselectively has reduced the salience of the label. MacFarlane argues that the ‘more comprehensive the sweep of human security, the less likely are the objectives of its proponents to be achieved’. Neil MacFarlane, "A Useful Concept That Risks Losing Its Political Salience," 35 3(2004). p 368-369.

\textsuperscript{241} The wide approach to Human Security does not provide causal analytical justifications for the relationships it draws between all the issues that it incorporates; this leads to a loss of ‘utility to policy-makers – and incidentally to analysts’ writes Krause. Keith Krause, "The Key to a Powerful Agenda If Properly Delimited." Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004). p 367-368.

\textsuperscript{242} On this note we may add that Booth also notes that Human Security has been interpreted differently and ‘redefined’ by academics, NGOs, international Organisations and governments. Booth, 2007, p 321.

\textsuperscript{243} Paris writes that ‘the study of causal relationships requires a degree of analytical separation that the notion of human security lacks’; also, ‘the observation that all human and natural realms are fundamentally interrelated is a truism, and does not provide a very convincing justification for treating all needs, values, and policy objectives as equally important. Nor does it help decision makers in their daily task of allocating scarce resources among competing goals’. Paris, 2001, p 92-93.
aid not only undermines the credibility and the contributions of humanitarian agencies but also subjugates them to state ‘hard’ security/military policy. In this sense, the securitisation takes us back to regressive rather than progressive change. Recognising the salience of these issues needs to take place without the state’s take-over and militarisation.

Furthermore, Human Security incorporates a dual approach of ‘protection and empowerment’. For example, in relation to post-conflict situations, the responsibility to protect is intended to be complemented by a responsibility to rebuild. While ‘strengthening the civilian police and demobilising combatants’ and ‘promoting reconciliation and coexistence’ do promote protection against violent conflict, it is not entirely clear that reconstruction and development efforts fulfil the empowerment component and that they should be moved from the realm of humanitarian/development to that of security. Furthermore, while cooperation and coordination cannot be emphasised enough and security organisations need to seriously consider and coordinate with the humanitarian and development dimensions of conflict, it is problematic that the CHS suggests that all these areas and all actors involved should be placed under a ‘unified leadership’. Crucially, how do we operationalise Human Security? The integrated holistic approach is seen by this study as problematic. It would not be feasible for actors to pursue all issues along the same priority. Therefore, many consider Human Security to be operationally unrealistic. MacFarlane and Khong explain that three problems stem from its ‘conceptual overstretch’: ‘false priorities, confusion about the causes of human security, and militarized solutions.’ As mentioned above, attempts to broaden the concept reinforces the place of the state and risks securitising issues in the sense of the Copenhagen School.

In addition, the ‘people-centred security’ that the CHS puts forward only ‘complements state security’; according to the report, strong institutions and a strong state is necessary for protecting people. Granted, capable (and democratic) state institutions are necessary to establish order, but to emphasise that human security only ‘complements’ rather than overrides state security is not enough of a paradigm shift. This is not compatible with the stance taken in this study’s theoretical discussion, which anchors the study in the security of the individual. Therefore this study believes that, by complementing state security, human security is in fact only given a subsidiary status; furthermore this complementarity

244 Ibid, p 1.
247 CHS, Human, p 3.
dangerously ‘invites’ the state into traditionally contested governance spaces such as ‘education’, ‘public information’ and ‘public media’.\(^{248}\) This risks entrenching a monopolistic state role.\(^ {249}\) However, one may take a more optimistic stance and argue that while this risk is always there, given the role of domestic and international NGOs and organisations, the state has no choice but to compromise in governance and therefore develop an interest in and pre-disposition to multilateralism.\(^ {250}\) This debate is one which is unsettled in theoretical circles; however, this study considers that giving the state a bigger role is undesirable but accepts that academics can only expose limitations and critique policies.

The CHS adds a global outlook to Human Security that rests on a support network made out of ‘public, private, and civil society actors’ to ‘create horizontal, cross-border sources of legitimacy’.\(^ {251}\) The role of non-state as described by the CHS is to ‘help in the clarification and development of norms, embark on integrated activities, and monitor progress and performance’; but this role is clearly a limited one. The ‘global initiative’ is intended to ‘strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the state with a global world’.\(^ {252}\) Human security therefore contains an inherent contradiction: it aims to empower people to ‘act on their own behalf’ but then reinstates the state as the primary domestic agent and as the link with the ‘global world’. This study’s view is that Human Security reduces rather than activates the agency of individuals. This is possibly an unintended consequence, but nonetheless a consequence that does not promote critical empowerment.

One may be tempted to assume that Human Security’s institutional, but wide and deep approach, brings it close to the stances of the Copenhagen School. However, inviting the state into such a wide array of issues has contributed to Copenhagen School scholars having to develop their desecuritisation theory in order to remove such issues from the realm of ‘existential threats’.\(^ {253}\) Furthermore, reinvigorating and expanding the role of the state, as well as giving a subsidiary role to non-state actors, makes the concept ‘inherently

\(^{248}\) The CHS rightly points out that the media is essential in giving people a voice and in providing them with ‘skills that (…) enable people to actively exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibility’ but the problem lies in the implicit link to the traditional statist approach. CHS, Outline, p 3.

\(^{249}\) This is a stance that both critical and post-structuralist scholars would take.

\(^{250}\) A stance neo-liberal scholars would take.

\(^{251}\) See: CHS, Human, p 129-143.

\(^{252}\) CHS, Human, p 4.

\(^{253}\) Seen Buzan’s criticism above on analytical value of Human Security.
conservative’. Human security fails to roll back the statist tradition. Therefore Human Security cannot be considered critical and cannot bring about transformation.

That being said, critical scholars have continued to engage with this concept, if not in order to espouse or refine it then simply to critique the ‘real world’ institutional approach to security governance. This study recognises that the concept cannot bring about the transformation that CSS advocates for. Human security largely remains a traditional neo-liberal institutional approach to responding to a broad security agenda. As this concept is people-centred and mainstreamed in global governance, what contributions can it make?

Human security provides us with an interesting and comprehensive view of the threats and conditions that affect the human experience; however, we must be cautious not to assume problematic and unnecessary corollaries and not to formulate entangled responses that undermine rather than induce sustainable progress. This study follows human security inasmuch as it seeks to provide physical and political security. This study therefore supports the conceptualisation of a human security approach which seeks to promote human rights, humanitarian law, and ‘coexistence and trust among people’. This includes ‘protecting women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable groups’, as well as ‘disarming people and fighting crime through preventing the proliferation of weapons and illegal trade in resources and people’.

This study, therefore, suggests emphasising the ‘people-centred’ aspect of human security by democratising the state and limiting its intrusiveness, by representing people’ voices, and by promoting human rights. This will, however, involve restricting the scope of human security to a more conceptually and operationally coherent package.

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255 CHS, Outline, p. 2.
256 To protection against pervasive threats of violence and oppression.
6) Trouble implementing Human Security

As noted, the width of Human Security makes it unrealistic to focus on particular issues when they are all ‘equally important’. Newman simply states that freedom from fear and freedom from want are ‘hardly a research agenda, and even less of a policy orientation’. As such, in practice, Human Security policies have either been one-dimensional, or they have been too broad to fit into a coherent operational policy. The main concern, therefore, is whether the concept can overcome its normative and conceptual aspects to translate into an operational policy.

Building on the previous discussions, the conditions of realpolitik have tainted Human Security. Hough illustrates the gap between the debate on security and the attitudes of governments by highlighting the distinction between traditional high and low politics. For example, although South Africa is a supporter of Human Security, its state expenditures put things in perspective: ‘South Africa trebled its allocation of the state exchequer for fighting AIDS for 2002–03 to $1 billion from the previous financial year’. However, the share allocated to defence was $21 billion for the same year. Nevertheless, while South Africa does not have an ‘obvious external military threat’, 11% of the population is infected with HIV; ‘AIDS is the country’s biggest killer, claiming an estimated 40 percent of all deaths in 2002’. South Africa is an interesting example because it has been almost a vanguard of Human Security, and it is the only state that has chosen to unilaterally abandon its nuclear military program. Yet the discrepancy in allocating resources to threats highlights the continued precedence of traditional concerns. Therefore, despite debates moving forward on Human Security, governments continue to prioritise hard security issues. Moreover, although some adjustments have been made, even ardent government

258 For example, focusing only on AIDS or on landmines.
262 It is important to note, however, that South Africa spends 1.4% of its GDP on defence whereas it spends an overall 3.3% on health, according to the UNDP (general health services). Ibid.
supporters of Human Security are not about to let hard security issues lag behind.\textsuperscript{263} Power seems to remain central between states, and state behaviour is still closer to the neo-realist approach.

In addition, large-scale events have added to the grim condition of the conduct of world politics. There is agreement among scholars, practitioners and policy-makers that the progress achieved in the realm of Human Security has been reversed in the aftermath of 9/11, with hard security issues overshadowing softer ones in many parts of the world,\textsuperscript{264} including in mature democracies.\textsuperscript{265} The ‘war on terror’ spearheaded traditional security policies at the expense of Human Security concerns.\textsuperscript{266} Necla Tschirgi wonders whether all this progress will wither away, while noting that there has been a return to ‘state-centric conceptions of security with human security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding moving to the back of the international agenda’. With such cases as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan in mind, she is concerned that states have and might continue to ‘consider retreating from hard-gained commitments to human rights, good governance and rule of law’.\textsuperscript{267} Duffield, Tschirgi, Hough, and Kaldor all agree that the post-9/11 era has blurred the divide between assistance and foreign policy, and that assistance has been politicised and militarised. While some agencies found in this change an opportunity to amass more resources, others are resentful of losing their most priced attribute: neutrality. Ardent critics such as Thomas and Tow describe foreign humanitarian assistance associated with such conditions, namely counter-terrorist ones, as ‘neo-imperialism’.\textsuperscript{268} An added failing of the militarisation of assistance is the military’s lack of sensitivity, experience and training to deal with non-military issues.\textsuperscript{269} The Human Security agenda is seen by some to have become a foreign policy tool used to protect the borderlands; the essence of human security therefore risks being lost when it is applied selectively and conditionally.

\textsuperscript{263} Such as South Africa, Canada, and Japan.
\textsuperscript{264} Duffield, 2005, p 3.
\textsuperscript{265} See: Bigo and Tsoukala, 2006.
\textsuperscript{266} Booth, 2005, p 274.


On the far side of CSS, Booth reminds us of his disdain of the ‘cold monster of the sovereign state’; he blames the prevailing institutions for appropriating Human Security in their favour, but, ‘business-as-usual with an admixture of progressive rhetoric will not deliver the improved human security the framers of the concept first envisaged’. Booth writes that ‘governments have learned to talk the talk about human security without changing their priorities’. Chandler (true to his post-structuralist roots) argues that Human Security was not only co-opted by governments; rather, ‘its integration into the mainstream of policymaking has reinforced, rather than challenged, existing policy frameworks’. Chandler is sceptical of what came to be considered a ‘global responsibility’, and he highlights the negative aspects of post-Cold War norms associated with Human Security. He argues that these new norms are ‘pragmatic’ ways of dealing with the new conditions of realpolitik, and that the protection of individual rights is less concerned with humanitarianism and more with the ‘balance of power in the international sphere’. Chandler cites the militarisation of humanitarian work, and argues that the Responsibility to Protect and the Liberal Peace theories are mere justifications for intervention. Along the same line, and like Duffield, Booth refers to Human Security as a ‘technology of control’; in this sense, he notes that Human Security masks Western interests, and that it ‘has taken on the image of the velvet glove on the iron hand of hard power’. Booth’s now well-known stance asserts that the only way to see insecurity diminish is through a radical change in the ‘attitudes and behaviour of governments’. Although providing valuable insight into the conduct of international relations, Booth and Chandler’s positions are radical; and it is this study’s view that they fail to be constructive. As in the discussion on governance, this study believes that despite the abuse of, co-option and problems of implementation with Human Security, positive normative pressures have also taken root. Human Security is a new concept, and given the complexities of world affairs, time and effort can be and have been invested to refine the concept. Progress is being achieved as states, international organisations and civil society actors are incorporating a new approach to development and security. It is becoming more and more difficult for states to justify ignoring Human Security.

270 Booth, 2007, p 327.
271 Ibid, p 324.
273 Tehranian, 1999, p xii.
274 Chandler, 2004, p 70.
275 Ibid, p 59.
277 Booth, 2007, p 324.
278 Booth, 2007, p 326.
Because of its analytical failings and its conceptual incoherence, many scholars – whether from critical security studies, the Copenhagen or the post-structuralist schools – have established that Human Security cannot amount to an international relations theory. However, proponents of Human Security claim that the concept is a policy-relevant one and is not intended for theoretical analysis. This being said, Neil MacFarlane conceded that Human Security could be a ‘useful concept’ but that it ‘risks losing its political salience’. As Krause and others suggest, some level of coherence is necessary not only for analysis but also for practical purposes. Furthermore, for the reasons mentioned, this study notes that Human Security falls short from the paradigm shift its inceptors envisioned. Nevertheless, this study, like others by many scholars, does not dismiss the concept. After re-evaluating some problems in implementing Human Security, the study advocates for the refinement of the concept and for the salience of the narrow approach. This approach is one which can yield concrete ‘wins’.

7) Salvaging a useful policy concept

Although there have been mixed responses to the emergence of the Human Security concept and to its application (broad or narrow), especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, optimism has also surrounded the concept. Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building missions based on the human security agenda contribute to the alleviation of insecurity for millions across the world. The UN family continues to pursue a broad Human Security approach because of the added value of coordination and

280 Rita Floyd states that ‘security analysis clearly is not the goal of the human security agenda’ and that ‘the human security approach though inadequate with regard to analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility’. Rita Floyd, "Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security and a Securitizing Move," Human Security Journal 5(winter 2007). p 43-44.
283 Including some of those mentioned here.
284 Most scholars have conceded to the contributions of the narrow approach. It has had substantial policy consequences and laid the groundwork for normative changes in global governance. This is visible in humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and sovereignty. That being said, MacFarlane and Khong argue that ‘insufficient effort has been made to (…) understand the negative consequences of such redefinition’ of sovereignty; it gives ‘justification of aggression’, but more importantly, it does not account for the negative outcomes that intervention may inflict on the local populations including ‘domestic disorder’. MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p 265.
cooperation between the realms of security and development. This cooperation has made the work of practitioners more efficient and more effective. In regards to its narrow approach, the Human Security Report of 2005, for example, notes that ‘the UN’s 17 peace operations cost less to run for a whole year than the US spends on Iraq in a month’.\textsuperscript{285} Narrowly targeted human security operations and projects\textsuperscript{286} therefore bring progress to a wider sample of people. Although individual states may at times suspend their commitment to the human security agenda, at least numerous international organisations have succeeded in promoting the ethical and practical utility of the concept. In this sense, it is up to the UN ‘to provide leadership on human security’; international and regional organisations or institutions, as well as NGOs and civil society, have an essential role to play in keeping the concept alive on the agenda of global governance.\textsuperscript{287} States do remain crucial to the application of the agenda of human security, both internally and in their foreign policy; their support is essential for the relevance of the concept.\textsuperscript{288} As a norm of global governance, it will be more difficult for states to justify the political and selective approach to human security.

Paris, quoted above in his Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? does not dismiss the concept; he sees its potential and suggests either ‘sharpen[ing]’ its definition or treating it as a ‘broad category of research – a distinct branch of security studies’.\textsuperscript{289} Critical security scholar Krause does not go as far as suggesting a human security branch, but contends that the concept is ‘an idea whose time has come’.\textsuperscript{290} However, he argues that a narrow definition can serve as a useful policy tool.\textsuperscript{291} This study supports Krause’s stance that it is necessary to find a balance between analytical coherence and practical relevance; this can be done using the narrow definition of human security.\textsuperscript{292} Indeed, in its narrow

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{285} Collins, 2007, p 101.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Such as de-mining, security sector reform, small arms and light weapons, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, and peacekeeping operations. See Keith Krause, "Towards a Practical Agenda of Human Security,“(The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{287} Falk, 1999; and MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p 268.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Ibid, p 106 and Falk, 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Paris, 2001, p 102.
\item \textsuperscript{291} Krause, 2004, p 367-368.
\item \textsuperscript{292} As ‘the indiscriminate expansion of the scope of security threats stretches the concept to the point of incoherence and meaninglessness’, MacFarlane and Khong also prefer ‘the narrower conception that focuses on protection of individuals from threats of organized violence’. MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p 264.
\end{itemize}
version, human security has been ‘a superb tool for addressing narrowly defined issues’.293
The human security agenda has led the way in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, protection of
vulnerable groups in conflict, banning the recruitment of child soldiers, adding sexual
violence to war crimes,294 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration of Combatants
(DDR), de-mining, and security sector reform (SSR).295 The narrow version therefore has
had a substantial and tangible impact on the lives and security of communities the world
over.

This study, hence, conceptualises human security as the protection of the individual
from threats of organised violence, but also from political oppression.296 And, the main
focus of the case study is for state security providers in Lebanon to enhance human
security.

Despite the previous discussion, human security has succeeded in redirecting attention
to the individual in mainstream discourses and in propagating to a large extent the norm of
democratizing the state. MacFarlane and Khong note that ‘there now exists a framework
for the international protection of human beings and for holding to account states that fail
in their responsibilities in this area’.297 While Newman notes that the state is ‘an
aggregation of capacity and resources’ and remains the central provider of security in ideal
circumstances’,298 MacFarlane and Khong confirm that human security ‘is not about
transcending or marginalising the state’. Rather, it is concerned with ‘ensuring that states
protect their people; when they do not, it is about ensuring that there are international
mechanisms that can fill the gap ad interim and redesign states so that they will fulfil their
purpose in the future’.299 Our discussions have given several examples of the changing
norms of the international system and the ways in which a bottom-up approach is
increasingly being promoted as a characteristic of the New Times; ‘people’s awareness and
expectations of rights […] is having an impact’.300 One could argue that human security
has and can still contribute to this evolution, crucially in ‘real’ policy terms. Given the

294 Including rape as a strategy of war.
295 See "Towards a Practical Agenda of Human Security." The Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007.
296 The demilitarisation, civilianisation and democratisation of the state would render the regime a
representative and responsive one.
297 This has been institutionalised in an ‘an impressive body of international legislation, from
conventions and treaties through Security Council resolutions, and in international law’. MacFarlane
pragmatic and less dogmatic stance *vis-a-vis* existing institutions of the broad school of critical security studies, it would be constructive to continue engaging with the narrowly defined version of this policy-concept.

As human security has established itself in the lexicon of security – particularly in the policy world,\(^\text{301}\) academics cannot afford to refuse to engage with it. Should they want their work to have impact, they must continue refining the concept.

As mentioned in the introduction, the final part of this chapter assembles a tool-kit that can be used to examine the situation in Lebanon.

\(^\text{301}\) MacFarlane and Khong confirmed that ‘there is evidence that the idea of human security is becoming embedded in international relations’. Ibid, p 268.
III. A Tool-Kit for Investigating Security in Local Contexts

This study espouses the progress achieved by the contributions of critical security studies, particularly in relation to the referent and the commitment to progressive emancipatory politics. From CSS it adopts the conceptualisation of an egalitarian, inclusivist, and reconciliatory security. It borrows pragmatism and engagement with the prevailing order from broad critical security studies; after all, as Krause and Williams note: ‘analysing state policy need not be tantamount to embracing the statist assumption of orthodox conceptions’.  

Security is a broader and deeper concept than claimed by the traditional approach. Despite acceptance of a wider security agenda, this study also remains cautious of the negative effects of a wider definition of security, which deflates its meanings and takes away its sense of urgency. Not all issues of concern to the individual can be considered threats to security. Bringing in such varied issues as disease, health, education, inequality and other development issues runs the risk of causing a loss of focus, and as a result targeted solutions become less feasible. According to Owen, this makes it harder to set priorities and weigh the urgency of challenges. Similarly, the traditional perspective shares the concerns of such a wide security agenda; Walt states that ‘defining the concept in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems’. Nevertheless, as Booth suggests, a wider security agenda does not prevent prioritisation and a division of labour. In addition, at the level of policy-making it is important to take a wider look at the challenges facing the well-being of societies and contributing to conflict; an overarching, comprehensive, long-term vision is necessary for sustainable progress to take place. However, this study judges that human security, in its narrow rather than its broad approach, can effectively operationalize security policy that is coherent and useful. A human-security orientation to security policy allows for balance between the necessities of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security including de-militarization, de-mining, DDR, SSR, peacebuilding, rule of law, access to justice, and respect of civil and human rights. In fragile and post-conflict settings in

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302 To be relevant to ‘real’ people.
303 Krause and Williams, 1997, p xvi.
306 Booth, 2005, p 159.
particular, human security is valuable in the support it gives to states which aim to ‘provid[e for] the interests of their citizenry’. In addition, this study judges that democratising and civilianising the practices of the state hold stronger than circumventing its role: after all, the state can be ‘both a source of insecurity and a provider of security to its citizens’. Furthermore, to a large extent, the state remains ‘the principal source of political legitimacy’. Although, as the case of Lebanon shows, local and informal structures may enjoy legitimacy, the state- if democratised- can provide a more inclusive option. That being said, as discussed in previous sections, the role of the state can no longer be performed in isolation from non-state actors; the bottom-up approach provides representation and sustainability. Therefore, despite examining the performance of the state in its security functions in Lebanon, this study emphasises the role of non-state actors in shaping security and the direction of progress.

Using the tools of governance, human security can increasingly assert itself as a global norm. Furthermore, the discussion on governance has allowed us to understand how the actors in and between international society and world society interact to formulate world policy. We can now piece together two conceptual components of the tool-kit to push for progressive change. Despite post-structuralist concerns of hegemony and neo-imperialism, we can give due credit to world society to keep shaping governance into more benign and ethical orientations. Indeed, the state can no longer discard what have been described as ‘cosmopolitan normative pressures’. This study uses this tool-kit for the Lebanon context, but since ground work discussions are covered, the approach can be transferred to other cases, and interestingly, it can be applied between cases.

This tool-kit provides for a thicker understanding and multi-layered explanation of issues. The governance component of the tool-kit allows this study to highlight local, institutional, national, regional and international actors as well as disparate factors, the relationship between them, and their contributions to conflict or progress. Human security

309 Dannreuther, 2007 p 49.
310 Ibid.
311 Williams, 2005, p 31-33. And Andrew Hurrell argues that despite the obstacles to a solidarist world society, the changes in international society suggest that retreating to a purely pluralist or state-centric system is no longer plausible. Andrew Hurrell, "The State of International Society," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Richard Little and John Williams (Hampshire and NY: Palgrave, 2006).
allows this study to focus its investigations on the narrow conception of freedom from fear, thereby investigating political and physical security. Critical security studies allows this study to constantly tap into the overriding concern for people-centred research that can contribute to progress. Critical security studies is the anchor of this research, which takes a pragmatic and practical approach by engaging in ‘real’ institutions that have equal leverage to undermine or promote human security.

This study has talked about emancipation, about human security, states and non-state actors, and a move towards a solidarist world society. However, to answer a question from the beginning of the chapter: how do we provide security? The institutional approach must provide space for protecting and empowering individuals, society and vulnerable groups. The international community has devised a policy concept called Security Sector Reform to turn security sectors into providers of human security. SSR is a policy that several actors of global governance have adopted in Lebanon, hence the added interest. The next chapter completes the tool kit by examining SSR as a governance tool that is intended to reflect human security.
Chapter 4: Security Sector Reform

One of the areas of global governance is security; Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one of several tools that actors of global governance have adopted to advance or operationalize the rising norm of human security.\(^1\) I have chosen SSR because it is a policy that donors seem to have adopted in Lebanon; I have traced it up to human security and up to global governance — hence the previous discussions on both. This chapter therefore moves deeper at the institutional level by discussing this policy-relevant concept.

From a post-structuralist point of view, like human security SSR may be a tool for security governance intended to contain the instability of the South; yes, as will be discussed, it may be hegemonic and may have been co-opted by governments. But, does it bring benefits in line with progress discussed in the previous chapters? This study believes so, particularly in terms of putting individuals to the fore, in terms of deepening and widening the programming of responses to insecurity,\(^2\) in terms of being more inclusive and responsive to vulnerable groups — in establishing more effective, efficient, representative, and accountable security sectors.

However, in terms of SSR’s relationship with critical security studies, one needs to admit that like human security, we need to rule out transformation of the social order.\(^3\) Nonetheless, SSR involves reform (or development or transformation) of the security sector so as to promote the security of individuals and society. I argue that SSR, if implemented appropriately, can lead to progress in favour of the individual by adjusting the asymmetric relation between the state and society. Promoting a security sector capable of protecting the different groups from the state as well as from other threats is a security sector that is advancing security that critical security studies can appreciate. SSR of course remains limited and partial in terms of its contributions to the vision of critical security studies. It provides a fraction of the progress aspired for; but even this fraction requires examination. As discussed in chapter 3, civil society and grassroots levels should inform and shape progress; equally however, the security sector needs to stay open and responsive to these voices. This study examines later whether the security sector in Lebanon is being

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\(^1\) Although, SSR has been adopted differently by different donors, reflecting either its narrow or its broad version.

\(^2\) Although, reflecting the discussion on human security, this study extends the same limitation to SSR by rejecting a conceptualization of security that extends to freedom from want.

\(^3\) Which would require multi-sectoral and multi-level transformations.
developed in a manner that can live up to this vision of a security sector. Is what is taking place in Lebanon contributing to progress (chapter 7), even if within a limited scope? Before answering this, this discussion conceptualises and problematizes SSR. Then in chapters 5 and 6 the study discusses the causes for, the waves of, and efforts to overcome insecurity in Lebanon.

The discussion on governance is also central to this chapter as the discussion on SSR needs to examine the emerging trend towards security sector governance. Security sector governance adopts a wide and a deep notion of security; it subsumes human security and recognizes the interdependencies between freedom from fear and freedom from want. Security sector governance suggests a particular normative framework, which SSR, as a strategic programme, is designed to promote.

I. Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform

1) Security Sector Governance

The previous discussions shed light on both the security and the governance components of the term security sector governance. They also highlighted that both these terms are contested ones. Thus, as Heiner Hänggi notes, security sector governance is, as a result, inherently contested as well. Although the ‘interconnectedness’, and sometimes interdependencies, between security and governance are progressively becoming understood’, the term security sector governance has not yet been universally recognized. Furthermore, Fred Tanner notes that security sector governance is still in its ‘formative stage.’ Despite this, security governance and security sector governance are increasingly becoming part of the discourses on governance, security and development.

5 Ibid, p 4, 9.
For the purpose of this study, security governance is understood as the governance of security at the international level.\(^7\) In contrast, security sector governance refers to a domestic process.\(^8\) It is increasingly accepted that domestic governance is of relevance to international governance. The fragmentation of authority that governance suggests involves a parallel process of integration between its dominant actors\(^9\) — a convergence or a ‘common language’ is being promoted.\(^10\)

Critics assumed that the move ‘from government to governance’ would not take place in the security realm; this is increasingly being challenged. The emerging norms of governance in the security sector are gradually gaining more ground; furthermore, in many countries — in ‘established democracies as well as developing countries, in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states’ — governments are already sharing their influence on security, whether by undermining or by providing it.\(^11\)

### a) Democratic and Good governance of the Security Sector

Good governance was developed by the donor community and rose to prominence in the 1990s ‘as a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the provision of public services in recipient countries.’\(^12\) The normative framework for good governance identifies five key principles: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness.\(^13\) Tanner offers a more nuanced version by emphasising ‘respect for human rights and rule of law’ and ‘efficiency in the use of public resources and the delivery of public services.’\(^14\) Definitions of ‘governance’ are diverse, but three key principles seem to be held in common: ‘accountability, transparency and participation.’\(^15\)

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\(^7\) Hänggi, 2003, p 6-8. See also Krahmann, 2003.
\(^8\) Hänggi, 2003, p 8.
\(^10\) Fred Tanner uses this term to refer to efforts to promote security governance. Tanner, 2003, p 2.
\(^12\) Emphasis added. Hänggi, 2003, p 11.
\(^14\) Tanner, 2003, p 3.
\(^15\) Hänggi, 2003, p 11.
As Hänggi notes, ‘it is not entirely clear what distinguishes good governance of the security sector from democratic governance’; nevertheless, the latter seems to ‘emphasise the regular holding of free and fair elections’ – a democratic system.\textsuperscript{16} The literature has come to accept the interchangeability of the terms ‘security sector governance’ and ‘democratic security sector governance’. A generic definition of good governance identifies it as ‘the efficient, effective and legitimate use of resources by governing elites.’\textsuperscript{17}

It is accepted that ‘governance also suggests a clear delineation within a government of responsibilities;’\textsuperscript{18} this prevents overlap of jurisdictions and allows for sound planning and tracking of achievements and of abuse. The availability of information, or transparency, is ‘a crucial condition for effective accountability’, and the ‘existence of mechanisms to call individuals or institutions to account,’ such as ombudsmen and audit offices, is also a precondition for accountability.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, accountability in domestic governance is to ‘government, (…) to the parliament and the public at large.’\textsuperscript{20}

Standards of good governance ‘apply to public governance in general’ and there were initially no specific references to security sectors.\textsuperscript{21} The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/47, subsequently adopted in General Assembly Resolution 55/96, was one of the first initiatives that called for ‘ensuring that the military remains accountable to the democratically elected civilian government.’\textsuperscript{22} Some years later, this idea was reinforced with the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, which strongly emphasised the centrality of ‘democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace.’\textsuperscript{23} However, by and large, ‘standards on good governance of the security sector have been set outside the UN system’;\textsuperscript{24} and although they represent an ‘emergent view of various communities’, the

\textsuperscript{16} Hänggi, 2003, p 13.
\textsuperscript{18} Tanner, 2003, p 3.
\textsuperscript{19} Hänggi, 2003, p 11.
\textsuperscript{20} Tanner, 2003, p 3.
\textsuperscript{21} Hänggi, 2003, p 12.
\textsuperscript{22} UNHCR, 2000.
\textsuperscript{24} Hänggi, 2003, p 13.
concept has not yet received ‘formal standing on a universal level.’ Having recognised this, several regional and international regimes have converged on the normative framework of security sector governance. The OSCE, NATO, EU, OAS, OECD, the Community of Democracies, and the Club of Madrid have introduced, to varying degrees, the language of democratic security sector governance to their guidelines and membership criteria. Furthermore, grouping most of the main actors and donors in world politics, these organizations are pursuing the promotion of security sector governance through both bottom-up and top-down approaches amongst members and with partner countries; these approaches involve both formal exchanges and civil society support.

Good governance can and should be extended to the security sector. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan notes that the security sector, as with any other public sector, should be ‘subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability.’ Nicole Ball argues that even transparency in the security sector is not unrealistic. Good governance of the security sector is essential for making sure that the state is responsive to people’s interests.

Security sector governance incorporates two aspects: a governance aspect and an operational aspect. Both of these suggest democratic control of the security sector. The governance aspect deals with accountability, transparency and participation. Tanner notes that security sector governance involves two forms of participation: one suggests political control of ‘civil authorities over defence budgets, security forces and military judicial system’; the other suggests public participation—‘political parties and civil societies’—in the formulation of defence and security policies. Democratic control requires, therefore, an ‘adequate constitutional framework’ that promotes ‘civilian leadership and civilian

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25 Tanner, 2003, p 3
26 i.e., a gathering of 110 governments.
28 This suggests the ‘widening of the marge de manoeuvre of civil society in security policy and expertise and capacity of national and international security. Future awareness building and civic, as well as, university education [that] concentrat[es] more on security policies and peace.’ Such courses are also to be offered to ‘media and parliamentarians.’ Tanner, 2003, p 6-7.
30 ‘Although there are some legitimate reasons to keep some information about the security sector confidential, basic information should be accessible both to the civil authorities and the members of the public’ says Ball. Nicole Ball, "Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP,"(NY: UNDP, 2002). p 5.
31 Tanner, 2003, p 3.
management of the defence sector,’ ‘parliamentary oversight’ and, ‘public involvement.’ However, good governance is about effectiveness and efficiency as much as it is about the control of institutions. Security sector governance, therefore, ‘enable[s] governments to provide for security and stability within policy and budgetary constraints that are consistent with national development goals.’ Thus, the principles of security sector governance can be grouped, overall, into three categories: capacity, cooperation, and control. Importantly, capacity involves security forces, institutions, and ministries — a ‘system of governance’ — capable of tasking, monitoring and implementing ‘the security policies of governments in efficient and effective ways.’ And, control involves:

- general adherence to the rule of Law – both domestic and international; making the security sector adhere to the same principles of financial management and transparency as the non-security sector; creating and embedding clear lines of authority which establish civilian government and civil society to scrutinize defence policy(...); creating an environment conducive to the participation of civil society in security matters; and ensuring that the training of professional soldiers is in line with the requirements of democratic societies.

The extension of good or democratic governance to the security sector is reinforced by the contributions that the process is expected to make. Democratic control of the security sector entails well-functioning civil structures, authorities and groups who can participate in the formulation of security policy, who can monitor the system, and who can hold parties accountable for abuse, mismanagement and mistakes. Alex Bellamy notes that the creation of strong civilian institutions such as parliaments, judiciaries and bureaucracies, which reinforce civilian supremacy over the military, ‘lock in’ the military’s subservience to civilian control.’ This equally implies that democratization and good governance in the security sector may be a ‘catalyst’ for further reforms which extend beyond the immediate security forces – allowing such norms and practices to ‘filter into other areas of government.’ Furthermore, good governance of security forces entails that resources and budgets are appropriately and proportionately distributed between the various sectors of government; it also entails that information is publically available, and

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33 Ibid.
35 Bellamy, 2003, p 112.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
that the public may oversee, participate and monitor the process of governance within the security sector and beyond. Crucially, security sector governance is therefore seen to contribute to human security, human development, democratization, and regional integration and stability.\textsuperscript{39}

These are of course laudable but also ambitious claims; they represent an ‘ideal-type’ which no state can claim to fulfil at all times\textsuperscript{40} – states are constantly expected to adapt and review their governance to accommodate for changing conditions.

Ball argues that ‘the ability to implement the principles of good governance in the security sector is reliant on the existence of well-functioning institutions and capable human resources.’\textsuperscript{41} In instances where the security system is ‘dysfunctional,’ Security Sector Reform has been devised to address this dysfunction.\textsuperscript{42} SSR is therefore partly an institution-building endeavour, but at the same time, SSR is linked to wider institutional and governance culture – an aspiration for a ‘changing political culture.’\textsuperscript{43} Finally, security sector governance ‘is a social process that may take a long, complex and uneven path’;\textsuperscript{44} therefore expectations of quick fixes should be set aside.

Before addressing SSR, this study must first answer an essential question: what constitutes a security sector?

2) Security Sector

In its broad version, SSR includes a range of actors beyond traditional security providers; in its narrower version, it focuses on immediate actors. A dilemma arises between the two spectrums of definitions: on the one hand, a narrow definition may not address the scope of the problem; while on the other hand, a broad definition is often

\textsuperscript{39} See Tanner, 2003, p 3, Edmunds, Bellamy, UNDP, 2002, Nathan and most sources referred to in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{40} Hänggi, 2003, p 17. See also OECD-DAC, "Security System Reform and Governance " (Paris: OECD, 2005).
\textsuperscript{41} Nicole Ball, "Democratic Governance in the Security Sector " in UNDP Workshop on 'Learning from Experience of Afghanistan' (2002b). p 13
\textsuperscript{42} Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
\textsuperscript{43} Tanner, 2003, p 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Hänggi, 2003, p 17. OECD-DAC, 2005.
associated with lack of coherence, clarity and priority. Experts, practitioners and policymakers are divided between the two; however, it is essential, as Herbert Wulf notes, that ‘institutions engaging in SSR should be clear about their vision (...), objectives (...), strategies (...) and implementation process[es] (...)’ because this sets the framework for their engagement – including actors and activities. Also because a number of cases have shown that the policy consequences can have detrimental impact on the shape and orientation of the security sector.

A generic definition of the security sector would incorporate ‘all those organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.’ This would involve the: ‘(a) military and paramilitary forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards and customs services; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and oversight of the above.’ This definition falls midway between the two ends of the spectrum; it ‘reflects a traditional governmental approach which is premised upon a state-centric view of security and the state’s monopoly of coercive force.’ Bellamy’s emphasis is very different, in the sense that he chooses a non-state-centric definition by referring to ‘political communities’; according to Bellamy, a security sector is made up of the ‘organizations that are able to employ lethal violence in a way considered legitimate by a political community and the mechanisms used to control those organization.’ Bellamy therefore opens up to alternatives present in traditional communities.

The OECD-DAC speaks of a system, this might be a better term to encompass the intricate spectrum of actors and institutions influencing security. A distinctive feature of

47 e.g. militarization and politicization of security forces in Palestine and Lebanon.
50 During the 1990s, in Cambodia and East Timor ‘there were many organizations that used lethal force in wartime and after that had legitimacy within a particular political community but were not state based.’ Bellamy, 2003, p 110.
51 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is composed of 24 member states. International financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, in addition to the UNDP, are observers. "OECD-DAC," http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm. (accessed on 12/9/2012).
the DAC definition is in the inclusion of ‘non-statutory security forces.’\textsuperscript{52} As for UNDP, it emphasises the essential role of non-state actors, including that of civil society.\textsuperscript{53} According to Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, ‘considering civil society actors and armed non-state actors as \textit{component parts} of the security sector (...) helps to transcend its essentially state-centric nature;’\textsuperscript{54} furthermore, this rightly underscores their role in the governance of security. Ball identifies a ‘security sector’ within a ‘security community.’\textsuperscript{55}

There is no formal consensus on the definition of a security sector, but there is a certain degree of convergence concerning the various actors that influence security. This study advocates for the inclusion of non-state actors in the governance of domestic security; however, for scope considerations this study examines the narrow definition of the security sector in Lebanon—understood as the institutions formally tasked with the provision of security as well as those in charge of their tasking, monitoring and control.

3) Security Sector Reform

\textit{a) Background}

The ‘building-blocks’\textsuperscript{56} of SSR are manifold; it was influenced by changes stretching from the 1980s to the late 1990s. These were changes taking place on a conceptual level, in policy circles, and on the ground.\textsuperscript{57} Bellamy notes that SSR ‘had its roots in development studies, security studies and practical policy and in the ‘new aid paradigm’ specifically.’\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{53} Such as ‘professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy organizations, non-governmental organizations, community groups.’ UNDP, 2002, p 87.
\textsuperscript{55} And Ball does not conform to the simple separation of state-armed actors from the rest of the security community. Ball, 2002b, p 1.
\textsuperscript{57} As seen in previous discussions on Human Security, Human Development, and governance.
\textsuperscript{58} Bellamy, 2003, p 105.
The Cold War reinforced a security culture fixated on state security, which came at the expense of people-centred security. In many cases, the security services and the regime developed a life of their own. The traditional security assistance mentality disregarded corruption, abuse, and bad governance. There was little consideration that security assistance might not conform to local needs, or that it was counter-efficient or counterproductive. It was not controversial for security assistance to contribute to the escalation of tension between states; to tightening the grip of states, regimes and security apparatus on power; or to undermining movements for reform, participation, and democracy. The international system was such that states were fixated on the wider security dilemma. The line separating the domestic and the international spheres were therefore clearly delineated; the concern of the international community rested in the international balance of power. This resulted in support to friendly regimes to ‘consolidate the influence of donor countries’ and their respective ideologies. The major powers even extended this policy to the economic sphere, whereby their support ‘reduced the economic burden of maintaining security services in states of high strategic importance.’ Security assistance or traditional ‘defence diplomacy’ was ‘aimed merely to strengthen or modernise the armed forces’ or, as Bryden and Hänggi put it, used for ‘beefing up’ the armed forces. This was done (and is still often done) ‘irrespective of governance considerations’, democratic control or domestic security needs.

Although debate over the role of the military took place, the norm was for development agencies not to get involved in the security sector. Furthermore, democratic governance had not made its way to discussions on the international agenda. Therefore, on

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59 What the previous chapter referred to as the ‘maximal’ state.
60 Wulf, 2011, p 341.
62 There were instances where major powers channelled this aid through their development agencies. Ball and Hendrickson remind us of the termination of ‘USAID’s Office of Public Safety (OPS), which provid[ed] training to foreign police services.’ Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 3.
63 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
64 Wulf, 2004, p 3.
65 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
66 Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 3.
67 The debate over the role of the military focused on ‘the consumption or wastage of resources,’ ‘the role of the military in nation-building’, and the role of the military as a pillar of modernization.’ Wulf, 2011, p 340-341.
68 Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 4.
one front, development donors were not willing to engage with the security sector; on another, security assistance did not engage with the governance aspect of the security sector. The result, as explained by Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, was that security sectors ‘absorbed a significant amount of state resources without being held to account for the use of those resources or necessarily being able to protect the state and the people from violence in its various forms.’\(^{69}\) These trends occurred, of course, at the expense of human security; however, soon the international community recognized that they also occurred at the expense of regional and international security.\(^{70}\)

By the 1990s, this approach was increasingly seen to be unsustainable. Firstly, the international community, as noted by Jane Chanaa, needed a response to the “new wars” and the “new” security threats.\(^{71}\) Furthermore, it was considered that ‘excessive, inefficient, and/or inappropriate security expenditure[s] reduced the resources available for development’\(^{72}\) and exacerbated regional instability.\(^{73}\) Faced with these realities, the international community’s response started with separate and \textit{ad hoc} projects. However, ‘approaches [were] remarkably convergent.’\(^{74}\) This convergence slowly took shape in SSR; its general principles were informed by the experiences of actors in development, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, peacekeeping, disarmament, DDR, SALW,\(^{75}\) access to justice, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention. Therefore, as weak states or ‘malign governance’ were ‘increasingly perceived as security threats of a global scope,’\(^{76}\) the international community was increasingly open to involvement in domestic governance.

This, therefore, ‘created space’ for discussions to revisit security assistance and the provision of security. It made it possible for non-traditional actors to take part in the discussions, and to build on the experiences of transformation taking place in the developing world.\(^{77}\) The military, which had long monopolized discussions pertaining to the provision of security, started to share the platform with other security actors –

\(^{69}\) Ibid, p 3.
\(^{70}\) See Duffield, 2001.
\(^{71}\) Migration, environment, terrorism, transnational crime, SALW, etc.
\(^{72}\) Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 4.
\(^{73}\) Tanner,2003, p 3.
\(^{75}\) Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).
\(^{76}\) Hänggi, 2003, p 3.
\(^{77}\) Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 1, 5.
particularly in internal security. Furthermore, development made a substantial leap towards security, and a ‘new aid paradigm’ emerged.  

An increasing amount of research in the late 1990s identified security as a ‘major concern for poor people’ and encouraged the donor community to make the leap in accepting the nexus between development and security. It was noted that ‘crime and violence, civil conflict and war, persecution by the police and lack of justice’ were identified as the main concerns of populations. The experience of development donors showed that no amount of economic development could be a ‘guarantee of peace and security.’ Moreover, weak, ‘repressive or corrupt security structures (…) undermin[ed] the stability crucial to maximising the benefits of aid programmes.’ Similarly, the lack of development gave rise to many forms of insecurity. In this sense, it was argued that ‘development assistance also had an important and direct contribution to make to conflict prevention, potentially strengthening peace and stability.’ Therefore, as discussed, development and security were recognized as sharing a symbiotic relationship. The unprofessional performance of the security sector and its consumption of state resources were recognized to pose just as much of a threat to security as a lack of development did. The security sector was in many instances part of the problem. Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh note that since this was the case, it needed to be part of the solution. The new paradigm recognized that ‘self-sustaining security depends upon the creation of a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector.’ The 1990s therefore brought the military and the wider security sector ‘into the mainstream of development policy.’ Furthermore, it would soon be recognized that the role of the security sector is ‘a legitimate development issue in its own right.’ Hence, increased

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78 See Duffield, 1999 and Duffield, 2001 for a critical depiction of the paradigm.  
79 For example, Voices of the Poor by the World Bank, which was an essential contribution that reinforced the donor community’s acceptance of that link noted that: ‘a lack of security was a major impediment to poverty reduction.’ Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 8.  
84 i.e. its oppressive behaviour or its incapacity to control violence.  
87 Wulf, 2011, p 341.  
88 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 15.
donor involvement in security sectors of developing and divided societies was registered to promote Human Security. The narrow and broad approaches were pursued. This study remains cautious about some of the correlations that this new aid paradigm makes; nevertheless at this point, this study is merely depicting the development of a new trend in the international system.

**Indigenous transformations**

Despite the prominence of SSR within the donor community, and although its framework is shaped along Western democratic models, several experts note that SSR has indigenous roots. 89 While, donors’ re-definition of existing polices only materialized in the late 1990s, since the 1980s, a ‘parallel process’ was taking place in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham argue that the transformations in developing and post-Communist countries were the ‘true progenitors of security sector reform’; they cite the example of South Africa as ‘the most outstanding’ one, where the transition was shared by a wide array of state and non-state actors who came together under a ‘shared interest’ and vision for reform. 90 The wave of democratization in parts of these areas inspired and encouraged the donor community to break with their traditional *modus operandi*.

The transition of former communist countries into Western democratic models is another factor which shaped the concept of SSR. The difference between the former Soviet states and the experiences of the developing world lies in the role of foreign actors; the process in former Soviet states was externally driven, whereas in developing countries it started domestically. Furthermore, while change in the former was led by political and security actors, development actors had a leading role in the latter. 91 Former Soviet states were incentivised by the carrot of membership of the EU and NATO; and, democratic civil-military relations were an integral part of the integration process. 92 NATO and EU enlargement have, therefore, played a large part in drawing attention to democratic


91 Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 6-8.

accountability of the security sector;\footnote{The ‘new defence diplomacy’ was promoted bilaterally and multilaterally; security institutions such as the OSCE and NATO were concerned with democratic civil-military relations, and when civilian organizations such as the EU and the Council of Europe joined these efforts, they expanded democratic control to include ‘non-military elements of the security sector such as the judiciary, police, and border guards.’ Emphasis added. Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 23.} this is a theme which, of course, ‘predate[s]’\footnote{Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 11.} the now widely recognized DAC SSR approach.\footnote{On civil-military relations and the professionalisation of armed forces see: Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottee, “The Professionalisation of Armed Forces: A Framework Paper,” TCMR Paper, no. 3 (2001).}

In both cases, civil society played an essential role in influencing and, to some extent, in shaping new security policies.\footnote{Through their research and practical work, ‘pro-reformers in civil society in the developing and transition countries helped to define what came to be known as the SSR agenda.’ Civil society groups were involved in activities ‘aimed at educating security-service personnel, civil authorities and members of civil society on their various roles and responsibilities in democratic societies and carrying out research on on-going political transition processes.’ In South Africa, experts from civil society were directly involved in the process of formulating security policy (Laurie Nathan, Mark Shaw and Gavin Cawthra). Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 5.} Some experts agree that pro-reformers in the developing world emphasised the “softer” and political aspect of reform before it was recognized by international security and development actors.\footnote{There was a recognition in countries undergoing transition ‘that the behaviour and attitudes of security personnel’ needed transformation; therefore democratic governance and the role of civil society were key for change. This would be incorporated conceptually in SSR; however, as the next discussions will show, operationally ‘tensions continue’ to exist between the soft and the hard sides of assistance. Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 7.} Aside from South Africa, other examples can be found in civil society groups in Chile and Ghana, who were at the heart of transformation; these examples ‘challeng[ed] the conventional assumption that the state should necessarily be at the centre of reform.’\footnote{Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, p 16-17.} At the time, this was still not common practice by donors; the international community in the early 1990s was reluctant to engage with the political domain. Development donors were still only:

focused on how much developing and transition countries were spending on the military (…) the rather simplistic view held sway that donors could pressure governments to change resource allocation patterns without tackling any of the deep-rooted and highly political reasons why resources are allocated as they are.\footnote{Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 8.}

This ‘simplistic’ approach eventually backfired; the trend towards severe cuts to security and defence budgets of recipient countries as conditions for aid by international financial institutions (IFIs) ‘aggravated the crises of fragile regimes.’\footnote{Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, p 16.} These were not provided
‘assistance on the management of the effects of such drastic restructuring’; therefore, in places such as in Sierra Leone and the DRC, ‘demilitarisation by default’ occurred.\textsuperscript{101} This resulted in governments failing to pay their security and armed forces; a portion of them resorted to alternative means of sustenance – both legitimate and illegitimate; the capabilities, professionalism, discipline, and therefore the performance of these security and armed forces severely deteriorated; finally, in some extreme cases, the security establishments subsequently disintegrated.\textsuperscript{102}

This was, therefore, a bottom-up process; civil society and experience eventually swayed donors into the political sphere. Beginning in the 1990s, it slowly became accepted by the donor community that a decent level of human security and good governance – at least in managing state resources – were necessary for development.

In brief, the new paradigm recognized a place for security in development work and vice versa; furthermore, first governance, then security sector governance, entered the development discourse; the pieces were falling into place, and as Michael Brzoska notes, ‘the time was ripe’ for the birth of a new concept.\textsuperscript{103} This study examines the concept for its contributions to raising the capabilities of and democratizing providers of human security.

\textit{b) Defining Security Sector Reform}

As can be seen, SSR is largely a concept that is institution-oriented. From a critical security studies perspective, it clearly stands inside the prevailing order; it also clearly subsumes the notions of governance and human security that are slowly acquiring the status of norms of the international system. In this study’s efforts to assess the norms and institutions of the \textit{status quo}, what does SSR offer? Although faced with many obstacles, the concept attempts to steer prevailing institutions into more progressive orientations.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
However, like Human Security, in the claim that it can establish a paradigm shift, as will be discussed, it cannot quite achieve this.

This study has noted that SSR is designed to assist dysfunctional security sectors in adopting the trajectory of security sector governance. If democratic security sector governance is the aspired model – ‘the objective that is desirable,’ then, security sector reform (SSR) is the process by which a security sector ‘com[es] closer to meeting this objective.’

SSR and security sector governance, therefore, share the same normative framework. SSR incorporates a wide and deep notion of security, particularly that of human security. Therefore, at the core of SSR is the concern to provide an inclusive, just and participatory security. The OECD-DAC notes that SSR is ‘people-centered, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear’ (which for development workers is a prerequisite for freedom from want). SSR involves the establishment of institutions that can guarantee the safety, rights and the participation of the wider population as well as control the ‘instruments of lethal force.’ Chanaa further clarifies that SSR ‘promotes not only civilian governance, but (...) democratic civilian control’; this is because, as Wulf argues, ‘democratic, civilian control over security forces is crucial for the provision of security in the interests of the population’ rather than in the interest of the regime.

As mentioned above, democratic governance of the security sector involves a number of elements. In practice to say that the security sector is democratically governed is to say, firstly, that ‘the executive determines security policy and exercises control over the security services’, and that the security services are ‘accountable to citizens, chiefly through parliament and regular elections but also through media scrutiny and public consultations and debate.’ Secondly, the parliament is tasked with approving ‘security legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and activities.’

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104 Hänggi, 2003, p 17.
107 Bellamy, 2003, p 112.
111 Ibid.
Thirdly, democratic governance of the security sector entails that the ‘security agencies execute government policy and carry out their mandates as prescribed by law.’ Fourthly, ‘independent courts perform judicial functions and various statutory bodies might have watchdog functions in relation to the security services.’ Lastly, it is expected that ‘individuals, the media and civil society organizations are free to engage in research, debate, advocacy and other activities’, even when they are critical of both the government’s and the security forces’ performance. This may seem self-evident to some readers but this conception of security sector governance is not universal. Also, all of this, of course, is in the abstract; the reality is that even where governments are strong, where state institutions are efficient and effective, where the separation of the three branches of government is clear, and where a healthy debate on security matters takes place, governments struggle with the very complex task of managing the different aspects of democratic security sector governance.

As discussed, the process of governance is one which involves a fragmentation of authority; therefore, governments are not in control of the entire process. Instead, SSR suggests a system of checks and balances from within and outside the confines of the executive. Such fragmentation, however, develops and spreads democratic norms across the system, which are hoped, in the long run, to lock-in stakeholders. The fragmentation of authority is met with cultural and normative integration – SSR is a ‘democratising project.’ Therefore, SSR aspires not to be limited to institution-building and the restructuring of the security system; many claim that it ‘promotes the strengthening of norms in relation to the proper relationship between the security sector and society at large.’

The dysfunction that characterises developing, post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries often consists of one of two possibilities: a security sector which does not provide security in an efficient and effective manner, or a security sector which is not accountable to the public.

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112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
118 These categories are in reality not as distinct: generically, they respectively suffer from a predominantly development deficit, a democratic deficit and a security deficit. Nicole Ball challenges this approach and suggests one that is based on 'contextual criteria rather than categories of countries.' Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 29. Nicole Ball, "Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform. Response to "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries"."(Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Aug. 2004). p 4.
‘deficient in terms of democratic governance.’ On this point, Edmunds notes that security sectors in need of SSR may suffer from ‘ politicisation (…), the absence of a clear delineation of security sector responsibilities and democratic, civilian controlled chains of command,’ as well as from a lack of capabilities to provide security ‘in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control’. The case study will show that this fits well with the state of the Lebanese security sector.

Broadly speaking, SSR is a concept that underscores a process of rebuilding, reforming or transforming a security sector to function in accordance with sound principles of governance. Hence, it involves a wide range of activities designed to foster a ‘well-functioning security framework.’

Security Sector Reform is a relatively new term that entered the development discourse in the late 1990s, when Clare Short, then UK Minister for International Development introduced it in her 1998 speech Security, Development and Conflict Prevention. It cannot be denied that Short and her team’s subsequent efforts at the UK Department for International Development (DFID) championed the concept and launched it onto the agenda of international development. At the policy level, therefore, DFID was first to capture the conceptual and normative shifts taking place in the widening and deepening of the development and security spheres. DFID’s 1999 policy statement argued for a ‘more holistic approach to development that incorporates security sector concern;’ DFID therefore ‘crossed an important threshold as a development agency’. Furthermore, DFID’s initial focus on the military as the key security sector actor – itself a venture into the Ministry of Defence’s sphere – later expanded to include the ‘whole’ security sector. Subsequently, several other actors followed suit and adopted SSR, which became a “buzzword” within the international donor community.

119 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
127 Wulf, 2011, p 339.
This ‘rapidly emerging’ concept was soon accepted by actors involved in development, security, human rights, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. SSR, therefore, ‘increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation, democracy promotion, and post-conflict peace building.’ However, its adoption by actors working in varied fields, some traditionally distinct, has given rise to different interpretations of the term – at least in regards to its scope, actors, activities and priorities. UNDP’s interpretation focuses, for example, on ‘strengthening governing institutions, enhancing public sector management, and promoting sound governance in conflict affected and transition countries;’ Ministries of Defence engage in, for example, operational training and doctrinal exchanges. SSR suggests that their work needs to be integrated and complementary, and is therefore concerned with the integration of ‘contributions of military, diplomatic, development and security actors’ at both the domestic and international level.

SSR has also been referred to as security sector transformation, development, reconstruction, or governance. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted the term Security System Reform; UNDP prefers a combined approach of Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR). While these terms might underscore certain nuances, they ‘are essentially the same’; they conform to the crux of SSR and are thereby often used interchangeably. As suggested above, definitions of SSR have varied, and have ‘ten[ded] to be dictated by the concerns of particular academic or policy communities.’

For Pugh and Cooper, SSR is a narrow term that does not encompass the wide range of important processes that have an impact on security. Their criticism is that SSR has mainly focused on disarmament and demobilization, on security forces and on civil servants, whereas in post-conflict settings or in war-torn societies, ‘the political economy of conflict, and (…) the socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations’ are at the heart of

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130 Ball, 2002, p iii.
131 Wulf, 2011, p 338.
132 To avoid the confusion of a security sector being confined to the armed forces. OECD-DAC, 2005, p 29
133 Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 1.
Therefore, positive change requires ‘transformative strategies’, ‘beyond reformism,’ that take into account the interconnectedness of sectors. Hence, Cooper and Pugh speak of Security Sector Transformation in order to underpin a wider process of change. Their distinct contribution, however, is in the argument that wider domestic, regional and international sectors, actors and structures need to be reformed. Security Sector Transformation is increasingly used in an African context to ‘underline the need for fundamental change in governance processes in the security sector.’ Hänggi suggests the use of the term Security Sector Reconstruction in post-conflict environments, reducing it to a specific context of SSR. The OECD-DAC, gathering the ‘world’s main donors’, defines SSR as the:

the transformation of the “security system” – which include[s] all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions– working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.

The UN takes a more flexible approach; the 2008 UN Secretary General’s report defined SSR as:

a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, (...) that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law.

This UN definition is one that is less “loaded” and less authoritative. It does not mention the term ‘democratic’ security sector governance, thereby avoiding some of the criticisms directed towards prescriptive Western-centric definitions. In addition, while donors and some countries in transition often want to emphasise the sweeping nature of the changes involved in the process through the use of words such as ‘rebuilding’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘reform’, or ‘transformation’, which underscore a break from an earlier era, others are

135 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 5-6.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 41.
142 IASSRTF, Definitions.
uncomfortable with these labels and prefer a more subtle depiction of the efforts to improve the security sector. Similar to Ball and Hendrickson’s warning against the ‘elevated benchmarks’ and the risk of ‘overkill’, there is a risk of antagonising key players; donors ‘should recognize that developing countries have been in the past and continue to be engaged in efforts to control and restructure their security services and agencies.’ In the case of Lebanon, for example, authorities were apprehensive about the use of the term SSR, particularly because the Arabic translation connotes a break from a past malign condition; as a result, they preferred to depict the efforts as a smooth progression in light of recently available resources — they preferred security sector development. Furthermore, changes and efforts underway, although made in the spirit of SSR, often do not amount to a transformative process. In this sense, the latter definition’s use of the terms ‘process’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘monitoring’ may be more widely received.

As Hendrickson and Karkoszka explain, SSR is contested because the actors, their relationships and the contexts differ from one case to another. Edmunds says that ‘arguments about the definitional issue in SSR can be unhelpful’ and therefore suggests replacing the definitional or ‘institutional-driven approach’ with a ‘problem-driven one.’ Similarly, David Chuter prefers that definitions not be ‘paralyzed by details’ and adopts a more flexible approach to objectives and aims. He notes that the security sector should ‘provide the security that people want, as effectively and efficiently as possible’ and that ‘it should be managed with procedures normally used in a parliamentary democracy’. He goes on to explain that if the security sector fails to fulfil the above expectations, efforts could be taken to redress the situation, thereby suggesting that SSR consists of ‘a generic name for measures which might be taken, often with international assistance, to improve the

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145 To the question of what term the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) prefers to use the communications department answered tatweer or ‘security sector development’ and emphasised that the LAF is continuously engaged in efforts to improve the institution. Media releases have often noted the frustration of the LAF directed at donors who are not willing to assist; therefore, the LAF believes it was not provided with the opportunities to develop. Lebanon’s primary police force also prefers the term development. Two interviewees confirmed this: Head of ISF Strategic Planning Unit, General Nassar and advisor to the Minister of Interior, General Salem, Communications with the LAF, Beirut, 11/1/2010 and Interviews held in Beirut on 7/1/2011 and 11/1/2011.
147 He suggests setting a ‘broad scope’ for the problem-driven approach ‘then uses elements of this that have relevance for the particular problem or context concerned.’ Edmunds, 2002, p 11-12.
effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, and to make its management more responsive to the requirements of a parliamentary democracy.\(^\text{148}\) Chuter’s lenient approach is not shared by many; Edmunds and Malcolm Chalmers insist that SSR suggests an ‘explicitly normative direction’ and ‘specific types of reform.’\(^\text{149}\)

Nicole Ball, a leading scholar on SSR, agrees with Edmunds on the need to adopt a context-driven approach, and has elaborated a wide customizable model to better suit the individualities of contexts.\(^\text{150}\) Moreover, she insists that SSR has three components. Democratic governance of the security sector is a core category in the SSR agenda, but it ‘does not by itself guarantee the existence of a safe and secure environment.’ Addressing the ‘operational effectiveness’ of the security sector and (for post-war countries) ‘the legacies of war’ are key elements in the security sector’s ability to provide security.\(^\text{151}\) Bearing in mind the piecemeal tendencies of domestic and international actors, Ball strongly emphasises that democratic governance is ‘the unifying factor.’\(^\text{152}\) SSR takes place in democratic governance activities and at the intersection of these three categories. The emphasis on the former is linked to the distinctiveness of the SSR agenda from previous security assistance: its main contribution is to ensure that the security sector is concerned with the security of the population – an area which has ‘historically been ignored.’\(^\text{153}\) Figure 1 illustrates the overlap between these factors and the core area of democratic governance.

Most development actors argue that ‘by definition, SSR-related activities must be aimed at improving the governance of the security sector.’\(^\text{154}\) However, others specify different priorities; Chuter notes the necessity ‘to recognize that not everything can be done at once (...) before you have oversight, you first have to have something to oversee.’\(^\text{155}\) Nevertheless, as Cooper and Pugh rightly note, we must ‘be guarded against’

\(^\text{150}\) It is based on seven ‘contextual criteria rather than categories of countries’: a political, psychological, normative, economic, institutional, societal, and geopolitical context for which several ‘possible approaches for enhancing security sector governance’ are identified. Ball, 2004, p 4-6.
\(^\text{151}\) Ibid, p 2.
\(^\text{152}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{153}\) Ibid, p 3.
\(^\text{154}\) Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
\(^\text{155}\) Chuter, 2006, p 21.
traditional military aid packages\textsuperscript{156} which often overshadow much smaller programmes of governance.\textsuperscript{157} This does not suggest dismissing aid and assistance to the armed forces, including at the operational level; instead, it suggests a deeper and more nuanced approach.\textsuperscript{158}

Security Sector Reform

\textbf{Figure 1: Security Sector Reform}\textsuperscript{159}

SSR is, therefore, concerned with the provision of security, but also with the ‘overriding’ concern of democratic governance.\textsuperscript{160} The effectiveness of the armed and security forces should not be pursued without consideration of the wider security and development contexts and, of democratic control and accountability. Civilian control has often failed to be a guarantee for fostering respect for the Rule of Law, Human Rights, public participation, development and human security. The experience from authoritarian

\textsuperscript{156} Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 19-20.
\textsuperscript{157} As the case on Lebanon will illustrate.
\textsuperscript{158} Bellamy based on several examples and literature on civil-military relations: ‘the military may actively contribute towards the internalization of good governance practices and democratization by local elites.’ Bellamy, 2003, p 111; Edmunds, 2002, p 11; Tanner, 2003, p 3.
\textsuperscript{159} Ball, 2004, p 3.
\textsuperscript{160} Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
regimes has shown that civilian control may very well mean regime security and the undermining of individual and socio-economic rights. Hence, as Bryden and Hänggi argue, ‘enhancing governance capacity should not be considered an option in the security dimension of the reconstruction effort.’\textsuperscript{161} And, activities aimed at enhancing the operational capacity of armed and security forces, on their own, cannot be considered SSR.\textsuperscript{162}

Having considered all of the above, SSR is undoubtedly complex; it ‘consists of a broad range of activities involving a wide variety of local stakeholders and external partners.’\textsuperscript{163} Donors may be engaged at various levels, with different actors and in different areas. Keeping in mind the governance and the operational aspect of SSR, as well as the legacies of conflict, activities may consist of: support to civil society groups in order to enhance their expertise in security matters; support to formal oversight mechanisms such as parliaments, audits and ombudsmen offices; support to the relevant civilian ministries or the armed and security forces. As mentioned above, however, it is essential that efforts in the three categories are integrated and complementary\textsuperscript{164} and that when multiple donors are involved, their efforts are coordinated. Information in figure 2 illustrates the range of SSR-related activities suggested by the OECD to development actors.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, p 40.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p 27.
\textsuperscript{163} Ball, 2004, p 2.
\textsuperscript{164} This should apply within each category and between categories. Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 28.
A. Enhancing state capacity and policy coherence
a) Security sector reviews
b) Management of security expenditure
c) Civilian expertise on security issues
d) Regional confidence-building and peace-keeping capacity

B. Reform and training of security forces
a) Military and police reforms
b) Training assistance

C. Demilitarisation and peace-building
a) Conversion of security resources to civilian use
b) Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
c) Regulation of small arms
d) Child soldiers

D. Strengthening democratic governance and the rule of law
a) Justice systems
b) Civil society

E. Building research capacity in developing countries

Figure 2: Areas of Security Sector Reform for Development Donors

Despite the great currency that SSR has gained, it has been faced with many challenges, both at the donor level and within states undergoing change. Having recognised this, SSR is still an evolving concept and practical experience is still ‘scarce’; however, as it is increasingly ‘embedded’ into donor programmes, both research and lessons learned will enhance its practical, normative and analytical coherence. The next few paragraphs discuss the principles and the main actors of SSR before problematizing this emerging policy concept.

165 Herbert Wulf, p 10.
c) Principles

*A political, context-driven, holistic concept*

SSR entails engagement with the domestic socio-political context. As discussed, for development donors, this was a radically new approach. However, SSR is ‘profoundly political’, as it deals with a fundamental public good – security, which is also ‘the most sensitive sector of the state.’ SSR brings together actors from the three branches of government as well as from the outside; it challenges existing ‘power relations, vested interests and dominant paradigms’; and affects the broader political, economic, and developmental environment. As mentioned, donors have resisted engaging with the political character of SSR, but this has often proven to be counterproductive, as it risks exacerbating tensions and undermining the reform process; therefore, donors ‘have to gauge the risks and dangers of their interventions.’ By doing so, their approach needs to be sensitive (to power dynamics), pragmatic and supportive. It was subsequently recognized that SSR can only be an essentially political concept and a political process. However, development donors struggle to appreciate the complexities of domestic politics, and therefore ‘the apolitical approach to security expenditures has not yet disappeared’. Examples regarding the work of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are cases in point.\(^\text{166}\)

Closely linked to the above is the pillar to be context-driven.\(^\text{167}\) As the Security Council emphasises, the situation and the needs for SSR ‘will vary from one situation to the other.’\(^\text{168}\) A political concept can only be context-driven as it engages with the individual realities of countries undergoing change. As such, SSR needs to surpass its institutional-building objective, support its ‘technical measures’ with ‘contextual analysis’ to understand the positions of stakeholders, and recognize appropriate means to incentivize them to join the change process.\(^\text{169}\)

\(^\text{166}\) Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 6.
\(^\text{167}\) The OECD-DAC 2005 Report has stressed the importance of ‘understanding the political and institutional contexts in which reforms are being promoted.’ OECD, 2005, p 59.
\(^\text{169}\) Ball, 2004, p 5.
SSR also suggests a holistic approach based on the overall context of a given country. A holistic approach integrates the governance and the operational aspects of SSR as well as the various actors involved in the security system.\(^{170}\) A holistic approach also requires that the political and socio-economic repercussions of any security reforms are recognized and addressed; this is particularly salient in disarmament and demobilization programmes requiring the reintegration of ex-combatants into the legitimate economy (DDR), or the reduction or increase in defence spending. Therefore, ‘close collaboration’ is needed between security and non-security actors: ‘no category of assistance, including security assistance, is able by itself to provide all the necessary inputs.’\(^{171}\) The holistic aspect of SSR is essential, as illustrated by the ‘ill-considered security sector reconstructing programmes [which] contributed to an increase in political instability and worsened civil-military relations (…) in Eritrea, the Central African Republic, the former Zaire and Sierra Leone.’\(^{172}\) Also, the holistic approach to SSR indicates that success in one area is dependent on success in other areas within the security system.\(^{173}\) For example, in the pursuit of human security, operational effectiveness is important, but it cannot be regarded as a success without democratic control, respect for human rights and an efficient use of state resources.\(^{174}\) As Edmunds notes, a holistic approach recognizes that the reform of the security sector is essential for wider political and economic reforms;\(^{175}\) Tanner speaks of a ‘triangular relationship between security, development and democratisation’, and argues that SSR should ‘go hand-in-hand with socio-political transformation’ in order to contribute to ‘conflict prevention and development.’\(^{176}\) In brief, a holistic approach situates SSR within a wider domestic context. Cooper and Pugh’s approach, however, is fundamentally more radical; they ‘recognize the interconnections between the security sector and other areas of the domestic, regional and global arena, most notably the economy’ and argue that only a more global approach at reforming the ‘global structures and agents that condition’ dysfunctional security sectors produces sustainable progress;

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\(^{170}\) This involves integrating reforms traditionally distinct such as intelligence, defence, police and judicial reforms as well as reforms in areas of governance. Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.

\(^{171}\) Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 12.

\(^{172}\) Chanaa, 2002, p 17.


\(^{174}\) This is because operational effectiveness might come at the expense of civil liberties or of development goals.

\(^{175}\) Edmunds, 2002, p 11.

\(^{176}\) Tanner, 2003, p 8.
therefore, their approach puts ‘as much emphasis on healing the physicians as well as the patients.’

Domestic ownership

There is widespread agreement that domestic ownership is ‘considered as a cornerstone of SSR.’ It is seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable process of change; however, experience shows that ownership has been ‘very difficult to apply.’ On the one hand, donors have not been as committed to local ownership as conceptually emphasised; and on the other, local ownership of reform has proved very difficult to spread.

Local ownership has been operationalised differently by different experts. Alex Bellamy notes that ‘for SSR programmes to be effective they need to be owned and internalized by the groups most affected by them.’ Others, like Laurie Nathan, add that ownership needs to extend beyond government actors in order to plant roots in society.

The donor approach to local ownership has been particularly problematic. Donors are constrained by their own agendas; they work within short timeframes and require fast, detailed and tangible results. They therefore have unrealistic and rigid expectations. Ball and Hendrickson confirm that donor involvement has been characterized by a sense of ‘urgency’ that overshadows and overrides domestic and local specificities and preferences. As Frene Ginwala, member of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence and the first Speaker of Parliament in South Africa’s post-Apartheid era, states: ‘even where there is a genuine desire to help, many donors are both ignorant and arrogant, over-confident, impatient and intent on solving problems and designing policies on behalf of local actors.’ However, Nathan’s title – No Ownership, No Commitment – suggests, efforts to adopt change will be in vain if local ownership is not fostered; in this sense, Bellamy notes that local actors would instead ‘pay mere lip service to reform.’

178 Wulf, 2011, p 348.
179 Ibid.
180 Bellamy, 2003, p 114.
184 Bellamy, 2003, p 114.
Ginwala furthermore argues that ‘where there is no national commitment, then government and society become lethargic and stagnate.’\textsuperscript{185}

Therefore, as Wulf notes, ownership ‘entails that the reform process is shaped and driven by local actors.’\textsuperscript{186} Similarly, Eboe Hutchful and ‘Kayode Fayemi note that ‘a set of more modest core goals, such as gradual and monitorable improvements in transparency, in sensitivity to human rights issues, and in the quality of defence and security management, would be more realistic’ and would be perceived as truly locally owned successes.\textsuperscript{187} One can thus speak of a ‘process-oriented’ rather than a ‘product-oriented’ approach.\textsuperscript{188} For Nathan, therefore, local ownership does not simply mean widespread agreement on the programme, but rather entails a democratic process whereby ‘free and open contestation of politics and interests’ is part of the process, and which is extended to state actors and non-state actors including ministries, the legislature, the judiciary, institutions, agencies, political parties, local, ethnic or religious leaders, NGOs, and academics. In this sense, ‘the overarching goal is national ownership rather than government ownership of security.’\textsuperscript{189}

The approach donors choose determines whether SSR will be locally owned or whether it will be seen as a neo-imperialist project, adds Chanaa. It is up to donors to identify opportunities and to ‘engage with the society to the extent that is possible.’\textsuperscript{190} It is also about ‘how to engage’ and how to ‘frame’ their engagement. Nathan suggests donors should ask how they ‘can (...) support local actors who want to undertake SSR’ rather than ‘how [they] can (...) undertake SSR in partner countries’.\textsuperscript{191} Ideally, donors should ‘support locally-led processes of fundamental political change’; success will rest on society’s desire ‘to support and maintain security change’.\textsuperscript{192}

For Nathan, a champion of ‘local ownership’, it specifically means that ‘the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors’. It should not be misconstrued to mean domestic support for donor efforts. Having recognised that, a

\textsuperscript{185} In Nathan, 2007, Forward.
\textsuperscript{186} Wulf, 2011, p 348.
\textsuperscript{187} Hutchful and Fayemi, 2005, p 8.
\textsuperscript{188} Nathan, 2007, p 3.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, p 5.
\textsuperscript{190} Chanaa, 2002, p 75.
\textsuperscript{191} Nathan, 2007, p 4.
\textsuperscript{192} Chanaa, 2002, p 75.
domestically crafted and driven process does not ‘preclude’ foreign influences, stimulation, encouragement, or participation.\(^{193}\)

It is thus accepted that SSR and the process of transformation require domestic initiative and sustained support, legitimacy, and commitment. In South Africa, the process ‘was driven by local actors without dictates from external actors,’ and the process was inclusive both horizontally and vertically.\(^{194}\) This meant that it enjoyed legitimacy and commitment which were in favour of sustainability and stability.\(^{195}\) However, the case of South Africa is one of very few examples where the process was locally owned in the sense suggested by Nathan. In fact, Nathan’s notion of local ownership seems to be radical; most donor involvement in SSR has been less concerned with a domestic agenda shaping or initiating a comprehensive process of change than with ‘outsiders (…) approach[ing] a situation with a set of preconceived ideas about what exists, how it functions, and what is required to ‘fix’ it.’\(^{196}\) However, if ‘the causes of insecurity are misperceived, then programmes or suggested remedies might be inefficient or even counterproductive.’\(^{197}\) Furthermore, international assistance programmes are often attached to packages ‘presented as a condition (…) for economic assistance,’\(^{198}\) thereby leaving less room for local ideas and structures.\(^{199}\) Of the many examples where a lack of local ownership has had negative effects on the SSR programme, one can cite ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo, Bougainville, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.’\(^{200}\) The chapter by Susan L. Woodward asking \textit{In Whose Interest is Security Sector Reform?} illustrates the detriments brought about by the absence of local ownership and the discrepancy between donor and local priorities.\(^{201}\) Domestic ownership can mend

\(^{194}\) Government branches, political parties, local community leaders, and civil society were included.
\(^{195}\) Nathan, 2007, p 2.
\(^{196}\) Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 26.
\(^{197}\) Wulf, 2011, p 353.
\(^{198}\) Ibid.
\(^{199}\) Ball and Hendrickson note that most countries ‘have been in the past and continue to be engaged in efforts to control and restructure their security services and agencies’, but that there has been no serious effort by donors to examine these and build on them. Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 26.
\(^{201}\) She argues that two interlinked pre-conditions for SSR were missing in the case of the Balkans in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War: regional stability and the domestic will to undergo change. Furthermore, the policies pushed by the international community exacerbated an already volatile situation, leading to further internal divisions and the weakening of state power and legitimacy. The transformation ‘all at once’ of ‘security structures (…), entire system of government, economy and society’ in such conditions proved to be overwhelming. Moreover, as donors were concerned by the lack of regional stability, the SSR programme and the liberal economic model did not address the insecurities of the citizens. According to Woodward, domestic concern had been for internal security
some of the factors that donors often identify as obstacles to SSR, including resistance to change, the lack of legitimacy, and support; for now, I conclude by noting that local ownership is an essential principle of the SSR agenda, but that its application has been problematic.

II. Problematizing SSR

SSR was received with much enthusiasm; it was seen to encapsulate the concerns of various actors and was quickly adopted, not only by academics but also by international organizations, IFIs, donor governments, and NGOs.\textsuperscript{202} The concept ‘moulds [these concerns] into a conceptually presentable package.’\textsuperscript{203} At the macro level, through its association with the liberal model,\textsuperscript{204} SSR attempts to foster harmonization and integration among the actors of the international system – a ‘common language’ for global governance.\textsuperscript{205} At the micro level, SSR is seen to promote human security and provide an environment secure for development. However, this does not take place without resistance, problems in implementation and negative repercussions faced by host countries. Furthermore, there are a number of conceptual issues to highlight. Therefore, advocates of SSR must realize that the concept is ‘not unproblematic’; it suffers from ‘endemic’ problems pertaining to ‘practical implementation but also generic conceptual problems.’\textsuperscript{206} With several cases behind them, there is a growing consensus among scholars as to SSR’s conceptual flaws and practical shortfalls, but practice continues to lag behind.

1) Challenges for donors

As the above demonstrates, SSR has been clearly recognized and endorsed by the international community. However, efforts to turn SSR into effective policy have been confronted by a number of significant challenges’,\textsuperscript{207} and the convergence mentioned above did not manifest as envisaged.\textsuperscript{208} At the donor level, the implementation of SSR has been confronted with departmental difficulties, disjuncture with other members of the donor community, and with partner countries.

\textsuperscript{202} Involved in development, security, human rights, democratization, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.
\textsuperscript{203} Chanaa, 2002, p 27.
\textsuperscript{204} Wulf, 2011, p 353.
\textsuperscript{205} Tanner, 2003, p 2.
\textsuperscript{206} Bellamy, 2003, p 119.
\textsuperscript{207} Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 14.
\textsuperscript{208} Chanaa, 2002, p 13.
Within governments, the holistic approach has highlighted the need to create new mechanisms – departments or bodies for coordinating efforts undertaken under the SSR agenda. What is new about the agenda of SSR is its “soft” side, present in the governing of the security sector; however, some actors in various departments or ministries are still not convinced of, or do not appreciate, the importance of the dual-pillar base of the concept. There are also differences in working cultures, agendas and interests, timeframes, and budgets between the different government actors involved in the SSR agenda. The UK example illustrates that; despite having made the ‘most progress in terms of a “joined-up” approach to security and development,’ there are still problems coordinating between government departments.\footnote{Take, for example, the coordination between DFID, FCO and MoD and with other departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).} Further difficulties arise in translating this to ‘in-country (…)’ defence advisors, diplomats, trade missions and DFID governance advisors, and other relevant actors.\footnote{Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 17-18.} Furthermore, hindrances to pursuing an institutional base for SSR have been linked to ‘potential conflicts of interest between donor policies and programmes for SSR and government support for commercial activities in conflict-torn states, like arms sales or extractive industries.’\footnote{Ibid.} Wulf notes that major donors still pursue distinct SSR and arms trade agendas: the former through foreign or development ministries, and the latter through the defence, ‘economic and foreign trade ministries.’\footnote{Wulf, 2011, p 351} The potential to work at cross-purposes is therefore a plausible expectation. These differences undermine the success of the SSR agenda.

The OECD-DAC SSR principles have not, therefore, been widely incorporated into security assistance and development programmes despite growing recognition and awareness of their importance. Moving from endorsement to implementation did not take place swiftly. Furthermore, ‘each country is at a different stage in developing national policy frameworks for SSR and is pursuing work in this area in different ways’; of the 22 member states of the OECD, many have not made the necessary arrangements to incorporate the SSR agenda – instead it ‘has barely penetrated even the development assistance ministries, let alone the foreign affairs or security-related ministries.’\footnote{Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 15.} As Wulf notes, ‘many governments are still grappling with the concept, terminology and its integration into their overall policies.’\footnote{Wulf, 2004, p 9.} Cross-departmental and cross-ministerial
cooperation and pooling remains difficult – not least between development, defence and security. Therefore, in the sense described throughout this chapter, donor ‘engagement in security sector reform is still relatively rare.’

The discussions below showcase the ways in which these challenges have distorted the implementation of SSR.

Hence, although donors have been ‘quick to embrace the paradigm of security sector reform,’ ‘its institutional development has so far lagged well behind the vision.’ Furthermore, ‘resources made available are still far from being sufficient’ to build the infrastructure necessary to support the adoption of the concept. SSR implementation has been slow and, as our discussions will show, it has been fraught with problems.

These complications are also relevant between the different donors. Governments, IFIs, NGOs, and international organizations have often competed rather than cooperated; Wulf even speaks of ‘turf wars’ between the different actors involved in SSR. The difference in priorities and interests ‘reflects the formidable difficulties of harmonizing the policies and programmes’ of actors, and has in some cases resulted in ‘discordant policy prescriptions.’ A clear case in point is the Palestinian example, where IFIs, the US and the EU have worked at cross-purposes. Other examples highlighting the ‘incoherence’ of donor approaches are presented in later discussions.

Ibid.
Wulf, 2011, p 354.
Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 17.
Ibid, p 18.
Wulf, 2011, p 353.
2) Challenges for host countries

The challenges facing host countries are of a different nature than those facing donors; more importantly, however, these two sets of challenges affect and often compound each other. Like in Lebanon, states with weak, corrupt or abusive institutions imply that ‘the government might lack legitimacy; local actors might lack the expertise to prepare sound policies and plans; and they might be too divided and disorganised to reach consensus on policies and priorities.’

Furthermore, it is likely that civil society will not be involved in security matters and the governance aspect of the agenda will not be a priority. In addition, there is likely to be an ‘absence of a democratic tradition’ and for ‘informal political and security actors’ to dominate the domestic environment.

In countries in transition and countries recovering from violent conflict, the SSR agenda is undermined by legacies of former eras. And, in countries undergoing reform there is an omnipresent problem of insecurity. The Lebanon chapters will show that the proliferation of weapons is one legacy and that Lebanon still undergoes waves of political violence. These legacies, therefore, consist of ‘continued strife, criminality, ethnic cleavage’ (in Lebanon’s case, sectarian cleavage), and ‘warlordisms’; furthermore, authoritarian tendencies undermine the security of (for example) vulnerable groups, activists, politicians, and journalists. The security vacuum in some settings gives rise to a militaristic society (state and non-state actors). However, although the security sector may be part of the problem, the governance and the capabilities of the security sector are not ‘sufficient’ to address core problems.

As argued in later chapters, it is essential to understand the root causes of insecurity; Nathan explains that ‘authoritarian rule, the exclusion of minorities from governance, socio-economic deprivation combined with inequity, and weak states’ – that is, a range of political, security, social and economic conditions – precipitate the rise of abusive, criminal, and violent options. Wulf notes that the security sector is ‘not a cause of violence but an instrument’; therefore, while it would be necessary to deal with the ‘symptoms’ of the problem, the long-term objective of

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227 Chapter 6 and 7 illustrate this.
228 Wulf, 2011, p 350.
229 Nathan, 2004, p 4-5.
security—a people-centred security—can only be achieved if the ‘underlying causes of violence’ are dealt with.\textsuperscript{230}

One factor associated with the legacies of past eras is the resistance to change. As mentioned earlier, SSR disrupts existing power relations; therefore, conservative actors are likely to obstruct and slow down the process.\textsuperscript{231} For example, in many cases where donor involvement is strong (such as in the former Soviet bloc), ‘political jargon is rich with imported donor phrases’, but the term is used without genuine commitment to reform.\textsuperscript{232} The 2005 OECD report \textit{Security System Reform and Governance} speaks of “cosmetic” reforms; many Eastern bloc countries have been concerned with accession to NATO and the EU, and have tended to focus more narrowly on quick fixes in areas such as ‘border security, regional stability and civil-military relations.’\textsuperscript{233}

As Nathan points out in many of his contributions, donors often do not understand the difficulties of reform.\textsuperscript{234} While the lack of political will is a viable impediment, donors ‘frequently underestimate the complexities and long-term nature of SSR in developing countries.’\textsuperscript{235} Governments with no, little or weak experience can be overwhelmed by managing a process of transformation which involves a number of policies simultaneously introducing radical changes.

Moreover, the ‘problem of complexity is compounded by a lack of organisational, managerial, planning, financial and policy expertise;’ this is relevant to ‘political decision-makers’ as well as parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{236} Wulf highlights the large expectations of SSR by asking: ‘how can a civilian government, which often lacks professional military or security expertise and experience, manage a professional military apparatus?’\textsuperscript{237} Nathan suggests in \textit{Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies} that, in order to limit reliance on

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{230} Wulf, 2011, p 350.
\textsuperscript{231} Nathan, 2004, p 4-5.
\textsuperscript{232} OECD, 2005, p 60.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{234} Nathan played an integral part in the transformation process of the South African security sector by taking the lead, among other things, in drafting the 1996 White Paper on Defence.
\textsuperscript{236} The lack of parliamentarians’ expertise in security and defence ‘undermin[es] their oversight and decision-making functions.’ The South African examples given by Nathan illustrate how parliamentarians could not ‘grasp the technicalities of defence budgets’ or the difference between the non-offensive defensive policy and the offensive force design. Furthermore, this lack of expertise undermines the relationship between the uniformed and the civilian side; one might be suspected of protecting the status quo, and the other of ignorance and incompetence in security matters. This tension obstructs the transformation process and needs to be addressed. Nathan, 2004, p 3.
\textsuperscript{237} Wulf, 2004, p 15.
\end{footnotesize}
‘conservative experts from the former regime’ and on possibly out-dated or regressive approaches, a number of domestic and/or foreign experts from governments, domestic and international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, centres and institutes, academics, and independent experts can be consulted. South Africa, for example, invited and set up a ‘British military advisory team’ to assist the Minister of Defence in transforming its existing defence policy; the International Committee of the Red Cross, academics, and civil society experts were also consulted.\textsuperscript{238}

Added to that is the issue of capacity; in the absence of ‘the most basic civil institutions capable of carrying out reforms’, implementing an SSR agenda is difficult and problematic.\textsuperscript{239} Nathan gives two examples which resonate with the case of Lebanon. First, he explains that the South African army has continued to be involved in internal matters because of the lingering problem of an ‘inefficient, corrupt and poorly trained police service, unable to cope with widespread violent crime.’ Second, the problem of small arms and light weapons cannot be resolved by governments ‘unable to control their arsenal and borders.’ Therefore, setting aside the issue of political will, the lack of capacity in developing countries hinder the implementation of security and defence policies, making the transformation a ‘long-term’ process.\textsuperscript{240} Furthermore, finding a balance between state institutions capable of providing security and institutions capable of democratically governing the security sector is very difficult. ‘Without the requisite institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot be ‘operationalised’’, states Nathan; therefore, when the ‘skills, expertise, infrastructure and resources’ are lacking, ‘militaristic’ approaches become prevalent.\textsuperscript{241} One cannot expect adherence to democratic and human rights principles and to rule of law when the security services are not trained in these matters; furthermore, one cannot expect adherence to the rule of law when there is no ‘competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system.’\textsuperscript{242} Therefore, security policies and legislation will not materialize if states do not possess the legitimacy, the power, the knowledge and the resources to implement them.

The obstacles facing countries undergoing Security Sector Reform can be summed up as problems concerning insecurity, complexity, expertise, capacity, resources, and the

\textsuperscript{238} Nathan, 2004, p 3.
\textsuperscript{239} Wulf, 2004, p 17.
\textsuperscript{240} Nathan, 2004, p3-4.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
resistance to change. Many of the principles, norms, capabilities, and expertise embedded in Western approaches are often taken for granted, but are in fact ‘radical’ to developing countries. Donors often do not appreciate the complexity of the tasks expected from developing countries. In light of this, experts have recommended ‘a gradual approach’ to prevent an ‘overkill.’

3) Challenges to transformation: SSR’s conceptual limits:

Advocates of SSR need to be cautious about the correlations that they draw and mindful of some of the pitfalls of their claims. As Alex Bellamy notes, while the contributions that SSR makes to democratization, human security and development may be significant, these contributions are ‘neither as self-evident nor always as wholly positive as [their] advocates suggest’.

There has been some concern over the juxtaposition of a human-centric notion of security with a state-centric policy (concern but not necessarily contradiction). Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye believe this to be ‘counter-intuitive to the idea of a “people-centred and locally owned approach” to providing security and justice’, the resulting problems in implementation due to this correlation are discussed below.

There are also concerns over coherence. The wide scope of SSR has allowed various actors in traditionally distinct fields to shape and implement the concept differently. Wulf notes that SSR became a ‘catch-all phrase’ and Chanaa adds that ‘suddenly, but conveniently, SSR meant everything for everyone.’

Furthermore, SSR is based on a flawed assumption that the insecurity which undermines both domestic and international peace and development is traced solely to security sectors in developing, weak and war-torn countries. Cooper and Pugh are the

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245 Bellamy, 2003, p 114.
247 Hänggi notes that ‘the cross-sectoral characteristics make the SSR approach (…) more demanding in terms of conceptualisation and actual implementation.’ Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 24.
foremost scholars who strongly reject this assumption; they have highlighted the intricate web of domestic, regional and (most importantly) international factors that contribute to the cycle of conflict, and have gone one step further in suggesting a number of measures which would transform international structures responsible for the cycle of conflict.\textsuperscript{250} SSR cannot be viewed as simply a domestic issue. Policies adopted by developed states are damaging and are part of the problem; they sustain ‘the current global political and economic order.’\textsuperscript{251} Efforts of donor countries have been contradictory and therefore self-defeating. Nathan explains that the legitimacy of donors is undermined by their own behaviour: in their support to authoritarian leaders or armed groups, they are themselves ‘over-armed’, and continue to ‘export armament in a highly irresponsible manner.’\textsuperscript{252} Furthermore, they have increasingly tended to prioritize the ‘Security First’ policy at the risk of ‘insecurity later.’\textsuperscript{253}

In its claim to foster a democratic environment, SSR, as argued Bellamy, can be linked to the Democratic Peace Theory.\textsuperscript{254} Indeed, the UNDP 2002 Human Development Report links the democratization of the security sector to Human Security and Human Development with reference to the Liberal Peace Theory.\textsuperscript{255} However, as Bellamy argues, criticisms of the latter apply to SSR. It is argued that the Democratic Peace Theory ‘simply does not exist’, and this assertion therefore challenges SSR’s ambitious claim to foster domestic, regional and international security.\textsuperscript{256} In noting many cases where non-

\textsuperscript{250} Among these measures, Cooper and Pugh suggest revisiting the role of IFIs (discussed briefly below); substituting ‘abstract’ policies in aid conditionality with more contextual policies; imposing ‘embargoes on irresponsible arms exports’; ‘tightening the regulations of arms trade and military aid to governments; and, imposing an arms sales tax to fund DDR programmes. This study notes, however, that progress has (not surprisingly) been slow; nevertheless, there is growing recognition of the harmful effects of the lack of regulation in the area of arms sales, and there have been efforts to build a more tangible response. For example, the latest UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of July of 2012 is part of efforts to prepare for a multilateral treaty to regulate arms trade. See Cooper and Pugh, 2002; and "The Un Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty," \url{http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/}. Accessed on 17/7/2012.

\textsuperscript{251} Ebo, 2007, p 35.

\textsuperscript{252} Nathan, 2004, p 6.

\textsuperscript{253} Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 34.

\textsuperscript{254} Bellamy, 2003, p 112.

\textsuperscript{255} UNDP, 2002, p 85-100.

\textsuperscript{256} With references to Bruce Russet, David Spiro, Christopher Lane, and Raymond Cohen, he argues that there has not been enough evidence to support the claim that democracies do not fight each other, that democracies are not less ‘warlike’ and that ‘the definitions of ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ are so vague that they can be manipulated to provide favourable evidence for any thesis.’ See: Christopher Lane, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," \textit{International Security} 19, no. 2 (1994). David Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," \textit{International Security} 19, no. 2 (1994). Raymond Cohen, "Needed: A Disaggregate Approach to the Democratic Peace Theory," \textit{Review of International
democratic militaries have impeded progress, Bellamy also cites the Turkish and Pakistani examples as ‘cases where non-democratic militaries that break international rules actually foster secularism, developmentalism, and at least a basic level of political and civil rights.’ Wulf agrees by noting that militaries have often ‘intervened due to the incompetence, nepotism or corruption of the political elite.’ There is, therefore, a need to start thinking ‘well beyond the classical understanding of civil-military relations’ and praetorianism, and to engage actively with the positive role the armed forces can play in societies—as even SSR claims. In addition, democratisation has been associated with high levels of violence and insecurity, leading in some cases to devastating circumstances; therefore, democratisation is not to be pursued above all other costs. Moreover, there is increasing agreement that the liberal model – in its economic and political dimensions has in many cases accentuated inequalities, has reshaped conflict and elevated it to the international level.

Linked to the above is SSR’s Western label. Wulf reminds that SSR ‘clearly has British roots which are viewed with suspicion by some states.’ Furthermore, Bellamy strongly notes that ‘SSR is an agenda imposed by the West and democratic ideals do not take root if they are imposed.’ As SSR has been incorporated into the structures of security governance, it has also been stained by its association with Liberal democracies, and can be viewed as an imperialist agenda aiming at ‘strengthening (…)

References:


257 Ibid, p 113.
258 Wulf, 2011, p 353.
259 Tanner, 2003, p 3.
262 Open markets and deregulation perpetuate the exploitation of the resources of the South, and such an environment strengthens undemocratic networks of governance, both formal and informal; on the political level, the structures of governance reinforce the hegemony of the North on the rest of the world. Thomas, 2000 and Duffield, 2001.
264 Wulf, 2011, p 351.
266 Aid conditionality by donor organizations and institutions, bilateral relations with donor states, membership to regional or security regimes, and though UN interventions. Wulf, Revisited, p 353
international capitalism and Westphalian society of states in a Western European image. Duffield famously critiqued the ‘new aid paradigm’ – a tool for the Liberal Peace – as a ‘political project in its own right’: a project with economic and political dimensions, intended to contain the instability stemming from the Global South while transforming it into a cooperative entity in order to protect the North’s politico-economic interests. In doing so, it also sustains the South’s ‘subordination’ and the North’s reassertion of authority. In addition, this association is reminiscent of colonialism; Bellamy refers to Barkawi and Laffey in arguing that ‘democratization and development processes (…) are intimately linked with colonization’; therefore, SSR is likely to be challenged by actors antagonistic to change into the Western model. The latter is not meant to argue that SSR, democratization and democracy are a “bad thing”, but that they are inherently tainted; and that, when presented as a packaged model, their credibility and appeal are undermined.

The acceptance or rejection of the SSR agenda as an attempt ‘to transfer Western values to the South’ will depend, as Tanner notes, on the way donors frame their support to partner countries: ‘its chances for success depend on the political subtlety of the initiatives so that they would allow various countries to position security governance in their historical, political and cultural context.’ However, Tanner here is not arguing for a transformation of donor approaches, but rather for a simple re-packaging of a one-and-only model. Having said that, if ‘SSR is sometimes imposed by Western donors, it also resonates strongly with’ domestic concerns and efforts. The security of individuals and communities alongside state security are not alien to people of the Global South. As Bendix and Stanley point out, ‘long before the concept of human security became common currency, a people-centred approach to security was being advocated in some African states that sought to distance themselves from the former colonial powers as well as from

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270 A comparison applicable on several levels: the imposition of Western values, the ‘web of political, social and, most crucially, economic relations that support capitalist power’, and the experiences in many developing countries of ‘one-party systems [that] evolved from the demands of fighting anti-colonial wars.’ Bellamy, 2003, p 113. Based on: Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalisation," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 4 (1999), p 411, 419.
the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War era." Donors can build on this platform. Domestic efforts by what Kaldor describes as ‘islands of civility’ need to be supported, and this support needs to accommodate indigenous structures within the confines of an egalitarian and participatory security.

The ‘Islands of civility’ as defined by Kaldor are groups committed to peace. However, Cooper and Pugh reject Kaldor’s dichotomy, which differentiates between groups engaged in violence and those that are not, because the reasons that such groups choose one side or the other are not based on simple preference. Therefore, their transformative approach to SSR suggests that conditions and opportunities are created to encourage people or groups to join the ‘islands of civility’; this approach invites stakeholders to engage in the process of reform, rather than excludes them. Furthermore, foreign impositions, or in other words, donors’ attempts to engineer the reform process, undermine the efforts of the ‘islands of civility’ and tarnish the image of the process by presenting it as a foreign agenda, and thereby discourage stakeholders from joining in. The role of donors should therefore be limited to expanding and ‘empowering the ‘islands of civility.” This approach, however, is not deeply reflected across donor approaches.

Having considered all of the above, it is this study’s view that existing security sector problems are caused by a combination of international liberal structures, regional circumstances, past legacies (colonialism, past-conflict, and authoritarianism), and attitudes of domestic actors. This study also argues that donor assumptions deserve to be re-defined. In addition, because of its conceptual and theoretical loopholes, SSR has been struck with harsh realities; therefore its success has undoubtedly been negatively affected. Furthermore, there are concerns pertaining to trends in the implementation of SSR.

4) Practical problems

The SSR agenda can be criticized as being artificial because donors’ statist approaches do not fit many of the contexts of host countries. Therefore, at the other extreme of its laudable contributions, SSR has been viewed as a foreign policy, alien to indigenous traditions, alienating indigenous structures, and in some cases reinforcing structural flaws. When necessary, donors must accept wider approaches that accommodate the conditions and realities of countries they are involved in.

In many developing countries, including Lebanon, state-centric models have been power-centric, exclusivist, and non-participatory (for and by the elites); practically, they have often been abusive, corrupt, and ineffective as well as lacking legitimacy and trust. An overview – although simplified – of the nature of the security sector in the African context is presented to illustrate the disconnectedness of and the challenges to SSR. Although the African example resonates elsewhere, notably in Lebanon, it is also hazardous to engage in generalization. Policy-makers as well as academics need to be vigilant against generic approaches which suffer from a shallow engagement with individual contexts. Nevertheless, one factor for endemic problems in the security sectors of many developing countries is the legacy of colonialism; Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley relate security problems to the fact that:

The colonial state never achieved the same depth of societal penetration and support as the European state, (...) serving simply to further the economic and political interests of the colonisers (...) it remained simultaneously distant and oppressive.277

Many states have preserved the colonial model: ‘the ruling political elites replicated the instrumental approach of their colonial predecessors to state power, and security forces continued to serve the interests of the ruling elites rather than the security requirements of the people.’278 Therefore, the security sector has often been ‘an object of fear and distrust; the view is widespread “that the security sector is incapable, useless and ultimately serves the rich”’.279 Rocklyn Williams notes security sectors’ ‘near mirror reflections of their former colonial security institutions (...) the doctrine has admitted to few indigenous

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278 Ibid.
revisions. To the detriment of over-simplification, this study notes that many developing and post-conflict states often maintain an elitist security sector which does not accommodate indigenous structures and grassroots. As in Lebanon, this implies that the security sector does not resonate in local communities; it does not fit the priorities and traditions of local contexts, nor do people trust and resort to it.

Indeed, looking closer, one can note that, like in Lebanon, a monopoly over the use of force is seldom achieved ‘nor [has] this indeed [been] necessary for the purposes of extraction and military and political control.’ Instead, an array of actors provides security in many developing and post-conflict countries; the state has been one and possibly the ‘minority provider of security and justice’. It has therefore, traditionally shared the role of providing security with ‘customary justice structures, informal anti-crime groups, religious groups, state approved work based associations, and commercial organizations’ but also with ‘local militias, guerrilla armies, warlords.’ The former category has often been ‘more accessible, fair, affordable (…), understandable (using local language and culturally appropriate methods) and effective.’ Uganda is one good example where ‘work based associations amongst taxi-drivers (…) are recognized by municipal authorities and are an important element of state approved civil guarding’; and in Rwanda, the ‘largely autonomous’ and ‘informal local government structures’ are considered a successful policing model and receive the support of the state and the police.

Through other examples, Baker and Scheye also consider the fallacy that states are capable of providing security: such as in Lebanon during the civil war or in ‘Mozambique, where in 2002 there were only nine lawyers posted outside of the capital Maputo’. In Liberia, where anti-crime groups were first created and encouraged by the minister of justice, they were subsequently shut down in 2006, but ‘armed crime rose again, and public support of the government declined.’ In many parts of the developing world, therefore, states simply have not had the resources, capabilities or the will to provide security.

These examples make a case for widening the donor approach to recognize and engage non-state actors more seriously in their role in providing security in fragile states.

282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
As Adedeji Ebo notes: ‘while the concept of SSR has evolved to reflect this reality,\textsuperscript{287} there has not been a corresponding change in practice on the ground’. This undermines rather than maximizes the efforts of donors, as ‘SSR programmes may improve the efficiency and governance of state security institutions and still have little impact, because these are not the sole security providers.’\textsuperscript{288}

Having considered this, as the case of Lebanon shows, in both non-state and state provision of security there has been a tradition of abuse and exclusiveness; security has been provided ‘as a club good available only to a certain clientele, while increasing insecurity for others.’\textsuperscript{289} This will remain an omnipresent concern when dealing with corrupt security providers.

As discussed above, SSR adopts a people-centric conception of security, but its approach remains largely state-centric. This contrasts greatly with the realities of non-Western countries, and a large gap has tended to develop between the design, the implementation, and the success of SSR. In addition, the reluctance to engage with domestic alternatives shows the persistent level of Eurocentricism in donor approaches.\textsuperscript{290} However, ‘the external origin and orientation of SSR needs to be supplemented by greater local ownership and inclusion in SSR conceptualisation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.’\textsuperscript{291} As a response to the ‘limitations’\textsuperscript{292} of the state-centric approach, experts have emphasised the need to go beyond it\textsuperscript{293} and have suggested a ‘multi-layered’ approach.\textsuperscript{294} Donors are encouraged to learn from and build on ‘successful SSR endeavours conceived and executed without foreign assistance.’\textsuperscript{295} The multi-layered approach suggested by Baker and Scheye ‘recognizes the complexity of security and justice provision’; it seeks to ‘target the multiple points where service occurs’, and reform them while ‘strengthening the links between state and non-state providers.’\textsuperscript{296} This approach first considers who and what structures are providing security and justice, then

\textsuperscript{287} Such as in the OECD-DAC definition.
\textsuperscript{288} Adedeji Ebo, "The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges," \emph{Conflict, Security and Development} 7, no. 1 (2007), p 47
\textsuperscript{290} Bendix and Stanley, 2008, p 31.
\textsuperscript{291} Ebo, 2007, p 28.
\textsuperscript{293} See Ebo, 2007.
\textsuperscript{294} See Baker and Scheye, 2007.
\textsuperscript{295} Bendix and Stanley, 2008, p 30.
\textsuperscript{296} Baker and Scheye, 2007, p 1.
looks into ways to support these alternatives, instead of automatically ‘presupposing that
security and justice can only be built through institutional capacity building.’

This is valuable when considering that institution-building and reform can remain stillborn when
exposed to other exacerbating factors, and when people continue to prefer local
alternatives. Having said that, the multi-layered approach is not centred on
circumventing the central role of the state; instead it is centred on a balanced approach
which aims to support existing formal and informal structures. This approach provides a
channel for donors’ efforts to trickle down to various segments of the population.

For example, when ‘95 per cent of people access justice through non-state systems’ in
South Sudan, there will be no viable ‘alternative to customary solutions’ in the near
future, and therefore the case for a parallel process is convincing. However, this study
also argues that the suggestion to widen the scope of SSR programmes complicates the
process further. It would require a substantial increase in the commitment and engagement
of donors; to what extent donors can afford this upgrade is a question to be asked.
Furthermore, many other fundamental issues arise; as Graham Thompson recognizes, there
are ‘many challenges and risks associated with supporting non-state providers.’

An extreme case example is the militia order in Lebanon in which local state-like services
were developed. Another example is the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, which were first popular
and filled the vacuum that local authorities could not; however, as Ball notes, there were
soon many ‘allegations of politically motivated activities’ and ‘increasing impunity.’

While recognizing that the same concerns apply to state actors, the support of non-state
actors raises many questions and new challenges. Would donors be sustaining a flawed
system? Would this prevent a transition to the modern state model? In addition, what about
safeguards against impunity and human rights violations? Do these models conform to the
value system promoted by donors? Are these models representative, democratic, and/or
inclusive? What about training, equipment, weapons and the right to use force and detain?
Regarding allegations of abuse and corruption – who monitors, controls and punishes?
While there may be answers to these questions, some within the multi-layered approach’s
suggestion to reinforce links between state and non-state actors, the task for all involved
becomes more complicated. From a donor perspective, the current Western model seems

297 Ibid.
298 for reasons such as culture, tradition, preference, effectiveness, proximity and cost.
300 Ibid.

easier and simpler to standardize; it also involves less controversy regarding what groups and mechanisms they support. Nevertheless, the price, in many cases, has been a disconnected programme which risks being resisted or made redundant. This study notes that while a radical change in approaches is unlikely, building on local ideas and structures as well as seriously engaging with them is a sound and reasonable suggestion. Therefore, donors need to support ‘islands of civility’ before creating, implanting or empowering foreign-designed structures; this is a key factor in promoting ownership and sustainability of reforms.

Furthermore, as mentioned, the tendency to focus on the ‘recipient’ country’s security sector weaknesses has tended to overstate its responsibility and to separate the security sector from wider factors affecting it. One example that builds on the previous discussions is the IFI’s approach towards developing and post-conflict countries.

It has been argued that neo-liberal economic policies have contributed to undermining security and SSR. Traditionally these have not taken into account the power relations within society; macroeconomic stabilization has provided opportunities for powerful groups to control social and power relations, and for individuals to resort to criminal and informal alternatives for sustenance. Donors underestimate the extent to which privatisation and budget reductions ‘can foster divisions in society and strengthen local rentiers and warlords’; therefore, policies and the conditionality of aid – particularly by IFIs– need to be readjusted to take into account ‘issues such as social justice and criminality’ by providing socio-economic alternatives that ‘emancipate the populations from clientalism and mafia welfare.’

Donors have often played a negative role in local political struggles; therefore, better arrangements need to be made to ‘sustain the most vulnerable parts of the population within the legitimate sectors of the economy.’ This has proven to be difficult to design as well as to implement. Burundi is one of several cases where the reintegration of former combatants has been fraught with trouble, as socio-economic variables have been underestimated.

Furthermore, donor engagement with excessive defence spending has been ‘simplistic’; both the IMF and the World Bank have identified spending ‘as a major barrier to development and democratization.’ However, firstly, as argued by Brian MacDonald, these institutions have not yet ‘identified what excessive military spending

302 Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 40.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid, p 15.
actually is’. Secondly, the reduction in defence spending, when not appropriately managed, has led to ‘domestic social and political problems’ and unintended instability. Thirdly, a generic defence reduction policy is not appropriate in countries with ‘relatively significant security concerns’. Fourthly, the common request for a professional but also smaller military has proved to be ‘more expensive than larger conscript-based forces,’ and therefore armed forces required to accomplish tasks more effectively but with fewer resources have put strains on institutions and government. Seen from this perspective, it is this study’s view that current donor approaches may ‘inhibit’ rather than contribute to development and democratization. In this sense, the argument for a transformative approach is solid and helps practitioners keep issues in perspective. Pressingly, donor approaches need to be re-visited and synergized.

In brief, to address the realities in host countries, the SSR agenda needs to be more flexible and pragmatic; it also requires wider as well deeper coordination between the various donors.

5) Implementation

While conceptually SSR suggests a comprehensive approach, examples from real cases illustrate otherwise. This is not to say all donor approaches are to be dismissed; however, there have been ‘considerable variations.’ SSR in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Liberia represent these variations. The Sierra Leone SSR programme has been externally led and funded, and has been the donor community—particularly the UK’s—proud contribution. This positive view stems from the comprehensive design of the programme and the responsiveness of stakeholders. The programme’s ‘holistic approach is clearly discernible’, it was ‘clearly coordinated, both among government departments and

Based on: Brian MacDonald, Military Spending in Developing Countries: How Much Is Too Much (Carleton, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996), Bellamy, 2003, p 114.
309 Based on: Brian MacDonald, Military Spending in Developing Countries: How Much Is Too Much (Carleton, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996), Bellamy, 2003, p 114.
306 Such as the ‘proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence.’ Ibid.
307 Such as the ‘proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence.’ Ibid. 308 The experiences of Hungary, Croatia and East Timor in accounting for wages, higher standards of living, equipment etc. Ibid.
311 The experiences of Hungary, Croatia and East Timor in accounting for wages, higher standards of living, equipment etc. Ibid.
donor nations’, and ‘local ownership in Sierra Leone includes group consultations, media coverage and broad citizen participation.’

East Timor is another example of a comprehensive SSR programme. In Liberia, however, the programme has been less glossy. Like in Lebanon, it was restricted to DDR, military, and police reform. Moreover, there has not been substantial coordination between donors, and therefore the programme was seen to be ‘fragmented’. Furthermore, ‘no public/private dialogue on the content of the security review’ took place. The donor community has, therefore, ‘performed unevenly’ in its design of, commitment to and implementation of SSR. As the DAC Report notes, a more common approach has consisted of ‘discrete initiatives focused on one element or another of the security system which have been influenced by SSR principles’; the cases of ‘Uganda, Mozambique, Serbia, and El Salvador’ as well as Lebanon are examples which ‘fall short of a fully-fledged SSR programme.’

Noting the absence of ‘government-wide’ mechanisms for cross-ministerial coordination in most donor countries, the ‘opportunities for being strategic (…) are missed’, and ‘much of the work carried out is ad hoc.’ A process-based approach is therefore often replaced with short-term project-based approaches that can offer ‘concrete outputs (e.g. a defence white paper or human rights training for police officers).’

Building on the above, a 2003 Global Survey prepared by Ball and Hendrickson found that governance has not received the seriousness it deserves. Instead, as in Lebanon, stabilization through the operational aspects of SSR has been prioritized over democratic governance. In addition, the tendency for the ‘piecemeal and uncoordinated approach (…) traditionally adopted towards defence, policing and justice reform’ has been replicated. Therefore, there have been concerns that the support provided to the security forces ‘may merely make them more efficient at repressing the population.’ As such, SSR programmes or projects have, at times, been compared to Cold War security assistance – the very policy SSR was meant to redress. The concern that SSR, like

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313 Ibid.
315 OECD, 2005, p 60.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
320 Ebo, 2007, p 43.
human security, may be co-opted or ‘hijacked’ for traditional Defence Diplomacy is therefore valid.\textsuperscript{322}

As discussed, experts have not only converged on the centrality of internalizing and institutionalizing SSR, but also on the need for wider popular participation and support.\textsuperscript{323} Nevertheless, as in Lebanon, Bendix and Stanley note, support for SSR remains elitist, as ‘local ownership is frequently reduced to (…) securing the agreement of local governments’ to donor-driven ‘projects’;\textsuperscript{324} deep civil and popular engagement remains very weak. Furthermore, aside from a sample of representative voices from the developing world such as Nathan Laurie, Eboe Hutchful, and ‘Kayode Fayemi, research has largely been commissioned and conducted by the donor side, and research has focused on donor priorities. As a result, there is a major ‘weakness of research capacity in reforming countries’,\textsuperscript{325} but also little exposure to SSR. It is this study’s view that a wider circle of experts is necessary to reinforce the governance aspect of the SSR agenda;\textsuperscript{326} this wider circle would also provide donors with access to empirical research and contextual analysis, and would widen popular buy-in in host countries. In this respect, stronger alliances between ‘researchers and advocacy groups, both within countries in the South and between South and North’ need to be developed.\textsuperscript{327}

SSR is intended to be context-driven; nevertheless, it is often the case that donor priorities have not converged with domestic ones.\textsuperscript{328} SSR has therefore been criticised as being ‘normative’ and ‘prescriptive’.\textsuperscript{329} Donors have approached countries undergoing change with ‘unrealistic benchmarks’ for progress,\textsuperscript{330} using “‘one-size-fits-all” approaches to countries facing very dissimilar situations.’\textsuperscript{331} Donors therefore still need to recognize the variability in situations, in means and in the pace of reform. As such, many experts have called for greater ‘synergy between donor priorities and interests on the one hand and local needs and priorities on the other.’\textsuperscript{332}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Bellamy, 2003, p 113. Also, see Cooper and Pugh, 2002.
\item See discussion on domestic ownership.
\item Bendix and Stanley, 2008, p 29.
\item Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 24
\item Ebo, 2007, p 46.
\item Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 2.
\item OECD, 2005, p 60.
\item The prescriptive approach is linked to the ‘weak empirical base’ of SSR. OECD, 2005, p 61-62; and Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 2.
\item Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 26.
\item OECD, 2005, p 62.
\item Ebo, 2007, p 47.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
On the whole, the interdependence of sectors, actors and factors has often been overlooked. Furthermore, the discrepancies between donor priorities and within host countries have resulted in flawed designs and implementation of SSR programmes. This has led academics to re-stress the importance of an integrated approach. Several recommendations to adopt an approach that reaches beyond stand-alone projects have been suggested by academics in order to internalize and sustain efforts at democratic or good security sector governance. These, as Ebo stresses, have also been recognized as challenges for a successful SSR agenda. Nevertheless, in the end, this study highlights five priorities for SSR programmes. Ebo identifies five priorities for successful SSR programmes. One, situating SSR in the regional context; in Lebanon’s case, this involves recognising the limits that the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional rivalry impose on the stability and ability of Lebanon to meaningfully engage in reform. Two, situating SSR in broader governance frameworks involves linking SSR to government or system-wide reforms; in our case, one needs to recognise that limited efforts are invested in this area. Three, situating SSR within the framework of human security, i.e. protection against threats to physical security and oppression; the study shows that the security sector is deficient in effectively protecting human security but that efforts to develop capabilities are underway. Four, linking SSR projects and programmes to popular and civil ownership; in Lebanon’s case this has been minimal. Five, engaging with existing formal as well as informal systems; in Lebanon, while engagement with the formal system is on-going, engagement with the informal system is more problematic and has not been formally or systematically adopted.

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335 Chapter 7 illustrates these statements.
III. Tying the knots

The previous discussions note that there are many conceptual and practical questions left unanswered, despite SSR establishing itself as part of the discourse of governments, development and security practitioners, as well as academics. Furthermore, efforts to mainstream SSR across the many actors involved, to adopt it and to implement it have been more difficult than anticipated. Enthusiasm has been bogged down with structural problems, coordination, and harmonization. Nevertheless, this study argues, as do Cooper and Pugh, that:

none of this is to suggest that security-sector reform should be rejected. When set against earlier Cold War approaches to military aid, it represents a significant evolution, and the fact that it may have weaknesses in both conception and implementation should not detract from its many strengths.\textsuperscript{336}

SSR as a policy and as a concept is still being shaped; it will most likely continue to be so. Possibly, it will even be re-invented when the time is right. For now, it is concerned with raising the capacity of state institutions to provide security and justice to the wider population, as well as continuously re-adjusting the security sector to be governed according to democratic principles. In this study, this is understood as efficient and participatory civilian governance which is anchored in internationally recognized human rights standards. As suggested by several specialists, this is a process relevant to most states, developing or developed, democratic or democratizing.\textsuperscript{337} This is a process that yields pragmatic and practical wins; the critical security studies stance would suggest that this is not a banal contribution and hence deserves continued attention while other transformative projects are being explored.\textsuperscript{338}

It is this study's view that the SSR agenda contributes greatly in refocusing attention on people-centred security; it also provides space for discussions on domestic as well as international structures, trends, and policies that contribute to the recurrence of conflict in various parts of the world. While the discussions also highlighted the need for a global transformative turn in order to effectively reduce the pervasiveness of conflict, and the

\textsuperscript{336} Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p 22.
\textsuperscript{338} E.g. revision to arms trade regulations, free trade, and IFIs’ roles.
lingering divisions between the insured and the non-insured, contributions in this regard have been limited.  

There is strong consensus within the donor community that the SSR agenda ‘redefines’ the traditional security agenda in several ways. Although it would be wise to be cautious of any concept that makes such ambitious claims and that empowers states, SSR has made valuable contributions. For practitioners and scholars involved in the reformist institutional approach such as Ball and Hendrickson, they note that the shift registered since the 1990s is a ‘significant departure’ from traditional agendas; the traditional approach is being replaced with a ‘broad-based, people-centred security.’ Along the same lines, the OECD-DAC’s Security System Reform and Governance (2005) maintains that security policy is increasingly ‘broadening beyond’ the narrow focus on state and regime stability; human rights and wider human security concerns have become part of the normative framework of security policy. Most notably, linking security and development has exposed security to public and political debate and ‘invited greater public scrutiny of security policy.’

The spotlight has extended beyond the military, and the array of ‘state institutions involved in providing security are being re-evaluated’ including ‘legal, social and economic instruments’. Finally, the impact of security policy on other sectors is being re-examined. Clearly, the debate mostly consists of (a) reforming (or developing and in some cases transforming) existing institutions and (b) takes place only within a particular sector; therefore, we cannot claim that, on its own, SSR can achieve the transformation and emancipation that CSS suggests. SSR can complete one part of the puzzle (so to speak). Like human security one element of SSR is inherently traditional: the reliance on the state (although not exclusively) to provide human security. However, although it may espouse a traditional approach, SSR should be judged on its ability to achieve concrete ‘on the ground’ progress in human security. It is not contestable to note that SSR has practical relevance and that it can positively affect the security of Lebanese and other people living under predatory or incapable security providers.

Having recognised this, the reversal to more traditional forms of assistance is a concern shared by many scholars. Wulf, Ball and Hendrickson, Tschirgi and others have all warned against the impact of the so-called “war on terror”; and this study shares their concern about the re-militarization of security providers. It can be argued that because of its

339 See criticisms of the Liberal model.
340 Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 3.
341 OECD, 2005, p16.
342 Ibid.
traditional statist approach, SSR can be co-opted and used for more malign purposes. However, in principle, when assistance does turn towards this direction, the process can no longer be called SSR. Having said that, when donors are involved in piecemeal assistance (as they are in many contexts including in Lebanon), military and hard security assistance will have a regressive impact if not balanced with soft reforms. This abuse hampers the SSR agenda. Although SSR takes a largely institutional approach, it is non-state-centric. The potential for abuse however, is omnipresent; the key is to exhort pressure to limit it.

This study suggests that critical security studies and human security can exhort this pressure. Furthermore, it seeks to explain how critical security studies and human security allow us to analyse SSR in general and in Lebanon. Both critical security studies and human security help make sure that SSR projects don’t turn into purely traditional security policies: militarized and oppressive, consumed with national defence and overshadowing other human security concerns. Instead, both remind us of the greater concern for security assistance or national security policy to promote a security sector that is inclusive, representative of society and vulnerable groups. Both critical security studies and human security help assess what kind of security is being advanced: regime, national, people-centred, sectarian (as in Lebanon), clan-based, or other? Is it at the expense of individual freedoms, civil liberties and human rights? Are the measures taken by SSR in supporting certain state security providers improving respect of rule of law and people’s security? Are SSR projects promoting space for individuals to contribute to the governance of security through oversight and accountability mechanisms as well through the provision of space for debating security issues?³⁴³ Crucially, the inclusive and responsive security sector that SSR envisages is not only committed to the security of the main segments of society (as is the case in Lebanon in securing confessional interests for example) but embraces vulnerable and marginalized groups. The provision of security for vulnerable groups takes place by providing space for the expression of their insecurities and by responding to their needs; this would require the enactment of favourable legislation, the development of mechanisms that protect the rights and address the security concerns of vulnerable groups, and the effective implementation of these mechanisms.³⁴⁴ Emancipation would require the ambitious aim of empowering vulnerable groups. From a human security perspective (the narrow), the state provides the first step in the process: it provides the safe space for

³⁴³ Space needs to be provided not only in parliament but in the wider public sphere e.g.: allowing for civil society groups, media, and academic to discuss security matters.
³⁴⁴ Legislation and effective mechanisms on the prohibition of torture, the protection of gay rights, the criminalization of domestic violence are examples relevant to the Lebanon case.
individuals and groups. Grassroots groups and movements, domestic and international NGOs, charities, the media, and higher education institutions are all key actors in empowering vulnerable groups. Chapter 6 highlights structural constrains imposed by the Lebanese system and efforts to achieving progressive change in Lebanon. In brief, while non-state progressive Lebanese actors documented in chapter 6 are drivers of transformation, state institutions such as those examined in chapter 7 are those that need to reflect and respond to the insecurities of people.

At the end of this first section, the reader is equipped with, at least, an institutional tool to advance a more ethical, people-centred, inclusive and responsive approach to world politics (by navigating between the local and the international or global). The tools that this study has so far advanced rest on adding a ‘twist’ on existing structures. The values driving this study have been drawn from critical approaches to world politics. In the absence of transformative alternatives, working with and steering existing structures fills the gap.

To sum up, actors of global governance have long and continue to play a central role in Lebanese politics and security. The next chapters illustrate this. It is in this study view that the international community, through global governance, can contribute more positively to security in Lebanon. Also, while much can be said in regards to the failings of human security and SSR in terms of genuinely advancing a transformative agenda, both need to be examined as both have made contributions to the lives of individuals the world over, including in Lebanon. Hence, through global governance, human security has become a doctrine adopted by major powers, NGOs and international organizations. Human security has been operationalised through, among other things, SSR. I am choosing SSR because it is a policy that seems to be followed in Lebanon. I would like to examine how this is taking place and assess how it can contribute to improved security for individuals and society.

The second part of this study therefore uses the tool-kit firstly to understand conflict and human (in)security in Lebanon and secondly to investigate and weigh what has been taking place in Lebanon against the conceptual claims set forth so far.
Chapter 5: Internal Struggles, Governance, and Human Insecurity in Lebanon

‘Pity the Nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation’

Lebanon is a small country of 10,452 km2 on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea; it shares its borders with Syria to the east and north and with Israel to the south. On the one hand, Lebanon is a country associated with Biblical references and modern ideals such as religious co-existence and democracy in the Middle East; on the other, however, the periodic crises that erupt in its territory tarnish its name with strife, civil wars and even ‘lost hope’. Conflict, violence and human insecurity in Lebanon have been the result of intricate factors, both internal and external, and one should be cautious of simplifying the causes of conflict in a country which mirrors so vividly both its immediate surroundings and the international environment. This study argues that the underlying causes of conflict in Lebanon have revolved around two key issues: a heterogeneous society which invites foreign interference, and the abuse of power which is associated with socio-economic disparity, exclusion, and weak state institutions. This chapter exposes structural constraints and flawed policies that have been replicated by Lebanon’s ruling elites; these have prevented positive change and have severely undermined human security. Using the tools set forth in Part I of the dissertation, this chapter is divided into three separate sections. Section one, explores the legacies of Ottoman rule. Section two explores the specificities of the Lebanese system with an emphasis on the fragmentation of Lebanese society, the weakness of the State, the failings of political leaders, and Lebanon’s wars. And section three summarizes regressive policies that have locked Lebanon in a cycle of insecurity. These three sections achieve three important objectives: exposing regressive assumptions

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1 Khalil Gibran, Garden of the Prophet, Alfred A. Knopf, 1933.
3 With ‘Lebanonization’ becoming an analogy for sectarian conflict and state-failure.
4 i.e critical security studies’ progressive and regressive policies, human security, and governance.
and problematic policies, illustrating the pervasiveness of human insecurity, and the role of governance in managing (or mismanaging) Lebanon’s conflicts.

I. The Seeds of Discord: Sectarianism and Foreign Governance as a Legacy of Ottoman Rule

Understanding the root causes of conflict in Lebanon is essential to transforming the Lebanese system. This study agrees with Fawwaz Traboulsi’s attribution of the origins of Lebanon’s chronic structural problems to the sixteenth century, when Mount Lebanon was first recognized as a ‘polity’ under the Ottoman Empire as the Emirate of Mount Lebanon. The two main communities in the Emirate were the Druze and the Christian Maronites. The history of Mount Lebanon would be marked with the struggles of these communities for internal power, independence from the Ottoman Empire, and expansion. Several characteristics that developed under the Emirate would greatly define its future. One such characteristic is a regionally unique role for its religious minorities; another is an economy based on products designed for international trade. Lastly, a close relationship with European and regional powers planted the seeds for a long tradition of foreign interferences and influences.

6 A denomination of the Shiite Ismaili school.
8 However, it is important to note that, while these were the two religious communities that played a significant political role in the birth of the Emirate, other religious communities inhabited the Mountain as well. The Shiite community was present in significant numbers, there were small Sunni pockets, and other Christian denominations lived on the Mountain such as the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics. Corm identifies these six religious communities as inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. George Corm, Le Liban Contemporain, Histoire Et Société(Paris: La Découverte, 2005). p 82.
9 Predominantly silk imported from across Asia and manufactured in Lebanon for European consumption.
10 Traboulsi, 2007, p 3-5.
1) The Iqtaa

As mentioned above, two confessional groups or sects\textsuperscript{11} established themselves as main actors in Mount Lebanon. The Ottoman Empire first ruled the Emirate through the Iqtaa or feudal system. Although under the overall control of the Ottoman Wali or governor, the Muqata’ji\textsuperscript{12} families were granted considerable autonomy in running their provinces.\textsuperscript{13} The Ottoman Iqtaa system had an important feature: divisions were drawn along religious lines. This Millet system\textsuperscript{14} established a hierarchy with the Muslim population occupying the upper level and ‘the ‘protected’ community’ of Christians and Jews occupying lower levels.\textsuperscript{15} Confessional groups, considered ‘the People of the Book’, enjoyed the freedom to run their affairs and practice their beliefs in exchange of a protection tax called the ‘Jizya’. These confessional divisions would play a key role in future revolts and in ‘transforming social and political conflicts into sectarian conflicts’.\textsuperscript{16} The power struggles amongst the ruling Muqata’ji families, or between these families and the Central Authority or with the commoners, would dominate the Emirate for generations to come.

Although the Millet system was applied across the Empire, it turned out to be more problematic in Mount Lebanon because of the size of the Christian community in the demographic distribution, their gradual empowerment and their slow rise to positions of power. While one community resisted the relinquishing of power, the other would ardently seek to amass it.

Three statements can be made regarding Lebanon’s Ottoman legacy: one, that the Ottoman Empire established Mount Lebanon as a unified semi-autonomous entity; second,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Helena Cobban refers to Fuad Khuri’s anthropological distinction between a ‘sect’ and a ‘minority.’ A sect is a ‘geographically compact group’ which maintains a level of autonomy from the sphere of influence of the state; it remains introverted, ‘well-defended,’ and prioritizes the interest of the sect over the state. A minority is a ‘dispersed group’ and more assimilated. In the case of Lebanon the former is the term that best describes the confessional groups. Helena Cobban, \textit{The Making of Modern Lebanon} (London: Hutchinson Education, 1985). p 15.
\item \textsuperscript{12} i.e. feudal lords.
\item \textsuperscript{13} As long as money and men were supplied to the Central Authorities in Istanbul and order was maintained, the Ottomans stayed at bay.
\item \textsuperscript{14} A Millet is a confession/creed. Under the Ottoman Empire, recognized confessional groups followed their empire-wide confessional authority. Unlike other Muslim denominations, the Druze community was considered a Millet thereby granted considerable internal autonomy. This system is often referred to as: rule by confessional feudal families—under the Iqtaa, it was led by Druze families.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Harik, 1968, p 16-22.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Traboulsi, 2007, p 3-5.
\end{itemize}
that sectarianism has since been institutionalized; third, that the tradition for requiring a foreign arbitrator emerged under the *Iqtaa* system. All of these developments can be traced back to the 16th century.

The rule of the Emirate moved from one family to the other until the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, its subsequent collapse, and its replacement by the French Mandate. The struggles over the governance of Lebanon during this phase are often recalled and romanticized as the ancestral sectarian conflict of Lebanon. However, this section tries to challenge the uni-dimensional explanations of conflict in Lebanon by highlighting other political and the socio-economic dimensions for political violence in Lebanon.

During the *Iqtaa* the silk industry was launched. It brought exposure and openness to the West, but it also meant that the West developed vested interests in the unfolding of crises in the *Emirate*, which explains their successive interventions.

Mount Lebanon had been going through a series of tribal rebellions throughout the Emirate, and the Druze had been fighting internally for successions. The first in a pattern of events took place: the first commoners’ uprising (1820) organized by representatives of the Christian, Druze, Sunni and Shia communities.17 The rebellion was led by *wakils*18 and represented an interesting milestone, whereby delegates were elected and could be held accountable by their villages.

An additional event which represents a sharp turn in the *Iqtaa* ruling system was Shihab II’s (the Emir) conversion to Christianity. For the first time, a non-Muslim would head the *Emirate*. The Maronite church was at first reluctant to support the rebellion because the idea of a Christian Emirate was too appealing. Furthermore, France was a supporter of both Shihab II and his ally Mohammed Ali *Pasha*.19 These two players, however, only delayed the inevitable. The situation in the *Emirate* had deteriorated to the extent that Ottoman, British and Austrian troops were sent to curb *Pasha*’s growing expansionist ambition. The community that gained most from the rule of the Shihab II and Mohammad Ali – the Christians – were a major player in their demise.20

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17 It is known as the *Antiliyas* Commune and it ‘signalled the introductions of commoners into the political life of the *Emirate* and constituted the first challenge to the old modes of political allegiance and alliance’. Traboulsi, 2007, p 9.
18 A *wakil* is a delegate or representative: ‘commoner chosen by a village people as their political leader and representative’. Harik, 1968, p xi.
19 Title for a Wali or Governor appointed by the Ottoman Empire. Mohammad Ali Pasha was the Wali of Egypt who had brokered an alliance with Shihab II.
20 Traboulsi, 2007, p 11.
was sent into exile in Malta, clashes over ownership of land broke out. However, Ottoman and British support for Druze rights put an end to the matter.\textsuperscript{21} The various crises that the Emirate underwent show that the intricate relationships between society and politics in Lebanon were complex and often underestimated.

By this time, the Christian community’s influence, particularly the Maronite Church, had grown remarkably. Trying to preserve some of the influence they had gained, Patriarch Hubaysh sent a list of reforms to the Porte in October 1840 which strongly aggravated tensions with the Druze community. In brief, the Patriarch had asked that ‘a Shihab Maronite Prince rule Mount Lebanon, that he be appointed for life by the Sultan and be assisted by a Maronite Mudabbir\textsuperscript{22} and 12 councillors representing the different sects, all elected for a period of three years’. More importantly, the Patriarch had asked for ‘the Sultanate to recognize France’s protection of the Maronite’.\textsuperscript{23} The reforms strongly belittled the historical role of the Druze and marked the official end of the Druze Emirate.

In 1841 the Druze took up arms against Bashir Shihab III and fighting broke out throughout the Emirate. Druze Emirate or Christian Principality, the events of 1841 brought about the end of the Emirate and ‘the end of the special status of Mount Lebanon’.\textsuperscript{24} These events represent the beginning of the sectarian discourse in Lebanon.

2) The Qa’im maqamiya

The Ottomans instated the Qa’im maqamiya in 1843 which divided Mount Lebanon in two. This phase is considered as the ‘troubled years’; it marked the pervasiveness of foreign governance and the introduction of the sectarian political representation.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, under the new system, the struggle for the identity of Mount Lebanon intensified. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich proposed the idea of dividing the Mountain between Christians and Druze in order to reconcile British and French interests

\textsuperscript{21} Daad Bou Malhab Atallah offers interesting insights into British interest in Lebanon for being the ‘key to Syria.’ Their influence only started in 1840 and their support to the Druze came following the failure to seduce the Maronites. Daad Bou-Malhab-Atallah, \textit{Le Liban, Guerre Civile Ou Conflit International?: A Partir Du Milieu Du Xixe Siècle}(Beirut: Al-Hurriyat, 1980). p 151.

\textsuperscript{22} i.e. ‘adviser and administrator’. In Harik, 1968, p x.

\textsuperscript{23} His programme, however, also tried to appease public concerns by addressing taxation issues, princely rule according to law, the abolition of torture, and the incorporation of elements of representation and periodic voting. Traboulsy, 2007, p 14-15.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} The transition lasted for 20 years: between 1841 and 1861.
in the area. As a result, two administrations were set up. However, this new system was doomed to failure, as the demographic composition of the Mountain was no longer statically divided. Kamal Salibi, George Corm and Traboulsi all agree that such a system could not have succeeded, particularly in the southern traditionally Druze district. Mixed villages had increased and the population in some villages had become predominantly Maronite. The appointed qa'im maqam was to be a Druze for the mixed southern area, while a Maronite was to be appointed for the northern district. Both communities opposed this new system.

Many historians have attributed the atrocities that were committed during these twenty years to the following mind-set: the Christians saw themselves as a threatened regional minority, whereas the Druze thought it to be outrageous to be ruled by a regional minority. Therefore they ‘considered themselves part of an oppressed Islamic majority in the Empire. The events of the 1800s have been portrayed as manifestations of the threat perceptions of both communities. However, widespread violence should not be attributed to sectarian tensions alone. As will be discussed, conflict in Lebanon is a result of a combination of factors – internal and external, political and socio-economic. Corm identifies the ethnic and sectarian ‘mosaic’ composition as a factor that is complemented by a rival tribal mentality, and a certain instilled defensive and introverted tradition in the communities inhabiting the Mountain which resisted the establishment of strong central authorities. Furthermore, Corm gives due attention to the poor socio-economic condition facing the masses, and attributes the exasperation of these tensions and the catalyst to the

26 As mentioned above, the British backed the Druze and the French supported the Maronites. See Bou-Malhab-Atallah, 1980, p 151.
27 Corm, 2005, p 81.
29 Each had two wakils, one a Druze and the other a Christian, with the role of exercising ‘judicial and fiscal’ jurisdiction over their co-religionists.
30 The Druze refused to relinquish their traditional role of ruling the entirety of the Mountain, while the Maronite Church wanted the northern qa'im maqam to have jurisdiction over the Christians living in the south.
31 They found it hard to have ‘become a minority in what was called not so long ago ‘the Druze Mountain’.
33 By the end of this chapter it becomes apparent that similar threat perceptions are expressed prior to the political violence of the twentieth century.
34 Corm argues that the “mosaic” characteristic is not specific to Lebanon, it is a characteristic found in other parts of the area; he names Syria, Palestine, Iraq and even Iran in which minorities and sects have survived for centuries. Corm, 2005, p 13.
35 Traced to the pre-Islamic Yamanite or Quaissite tribes.
36 Traced to their historical persecution and refuge in the Mountain.
violence to foreign meddling and sponsorship. Caesar Farah notes that, from the late 1830s, the European powers had developed a ‘protégé system that reached ludicrous proportions.’

From 1845 to 1858 a series of violent outbursts spread across the Mountain and villages were destroyed in reprisal attacks. The Ottomans had to intervene, again, to stop the fighting in the mixed areas, but as it became apparent that the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon would not be easily pacified, they sent Shekib Effendi ‘to establish order, confirm the Ottoman occupation of Mount Lebanon and disarm its inhabitants.’ In his attempt to bring order back to the Mountain, Effendi reformed the qa’im maqamiya. It is in the Règlement of Effendi that ‘the legalization of sectarian political representation in Mount Lebanon’ took place. Tensions rose as harsh economic conditions led to the commoners and muqatajis taking up arms against each other in both administrations; in the South, this meant a confrontation between the Christian peasants and the Druze muqatajis. The crisis was a revolt ‘against the ruling classes, on all sides’, but this also meant a sectarian civil war in the south. The ‘Events of 1860’ therefore took a sectarian rather than a socio-economic character.

For this and other reasons, these events are often compared to Lebanon’s 1975-1990 war. Violence spilled-over to Syria; the masses were also suffering from severe economic conditions and were angered by the Empire-wide Tanzimat, or the Ottoman reforms that established ‘equality between Christians and Muslims.’ The reforms marked new heights in European ‘penetration’, and Shehadi notes that they promoted separatism instead of loyalty to the Central Authority; they therefore defeated their own purpose. They were seen as a ‘European and Christian conspiracy against Islam’; after all, the Ottomans were meant to be representing a Muslim Empire. It was not until the Syrian ‘events’ took place that international actors decided to intervene. For fear of the riots getting out of control and

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37 He argues that the European powers over-emphasised the sectarian factor because of their vested interest in using Lebanon as their foothold in the region and to protect the road to India. Corm, 2005, p 75.
40 Ibid, p 29.
spreading across the area, the European powers pressured the Ottoman Empire to send in its troops, and those in charge were punished.\footnote{Salibi, 1998, p 16.}

As mentioned, Britain and France were the two main Europeans powers with direct competing interest in and influence on the events. While the British were interested in the area as a market for their goods and for access to the road to India, the French were interested in sericulture as a raw material to import. Furthermore, Napoleon III sent 6000 troops to contribute to the pacification of Lebanon. Interestingly, Napoleon’s emissary was tasked with ‘an assignment to investigate the country’s Phoenician past’ side by side with its military task to reinstate order in cooperation with the Ottomans, to protect the Christians, and of course to ‘get the silk workers back to work.’\footnote{Ibid, p 39.}

The end of the ‘events’ came about with the appointment of a new qa‘im maqam, with the leader of the rebels of the north –Shahin – fleeing to the French consulate, and with the withdrawal of the French troops.

The end of this civil war put the role of the great powers in governing the Lebanese crises at the forefront. The British, French, Prussian, Russian, and Austrian consuls, with the Ottoman Foreign Minister, formed an international commission in Beirut. Its proceedings lasted from October 1860 until March 1861 in order to oversee Mount Lebanon’s post-conflict reconstruction phase – political, social and economic. Even a ‘legal tribunal was set up’ to convict key individuals involved in the fighting.\footnote{Ibid, p 39.} Later discussions will show the similarities between the governance of pre- and post-independence Lebanese crises.

3) The Mutasarrifiya

The Ottoman Empire then instated a new system called the Mutasarrifiya. It ran from 1861 until 1915 and It was referred to as the ‘long Peace.’\footnote{Salibi, 1998, p 16 and Traboulsi, 2007, p 41.} The post-war environment allowed for economic and socio-political changes to take place. The Mutasarrifiya was
seen as the new age for Mount Lebanon and as an era of change and reform – but to what extent, and in whose favour?

The structural characteristics of the Mutassarifiya reflected the influences of foreign powers. The Mutassarifiya was to be governed by a Christian administrator, who was appointed by Istanbul ‘with the approval of the guaranteeing European powers.’46 The reforms of the ‘Règlement Organique’ of 1861 had merged the two qa’im maqamiyas to form the Mutassarifiya. Although under foreign sponsorship – France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Italy – it was granted a considerable degree of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The initial Règlement equally divided the councillors between the Christians and the Muslims.47 The Christians had lost militarily during the ‘events’ of 1860, but it was the intervention of the European powers that ‘transformed the Christians’ military defeat into a political victory.’48

However, while the sectarian discourse was becoming increasingly ossified due largely to foreign interventions, a parallel process of national identity formation was taking place. The Administrative Council49 would soon rise to become a hub of authority, and it would give birth to a new socio-political middle class. Members of the Council worked independently from the historical enclaves of power, whether the Maronite Church (backed by France) or the muqata’ji families (Muslim and Christian alike). Their positions in the Administrative Council allowed them to challenge the Mutassarif and the old muqata’ji families. Members of the Council pushed for more autonomy and for more reforms; according to Traboulsi, it is amongst their ranks that ideas of nationalism and independence grew.50

46 Ibid, p 16.
47 However, taking into consideration the demographic superiority of the Christians as well as the French influence in the Mountain, the 1864 version specified seven seats for Christians and five for Muslims.
48 At this point, the Maronites had officially acquired France as a political guarantor (although, as Farah notes, the Ottoman Empire recognized ‘France as the protector of Catholics’ in 1535). France’s interest in a “Catholic experience” in Mount Lebanon, which it hoped to be a model for the whole Empire was illustrated by its concrete support to the Maronites. Another one of France’s ideas, dating from 1902, over the possibilities in Mount Lebanon, was the creation of a ‘little France, free, industrious and loyal.’ The latter taken from: John Spagnolo, _France and Ottoman Lebanon_ (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), p163-4. Farah, 2000, p 17; Hirst, 2010, p 9; and Traboulsi, 2007, p 43-50.
49 The Administrative Council is a 12 member consultative council assisting the governors; members of the council were elected by the sheikh shabab of the villages which were themselves elected by the people.
50 Ibid, p 49.
Further, as mentioned, Mount Lebanon’s economic choices were problematic. As it built and expanded its sericulture industry at the expense of others, it became crucially dependent on the Syrian heartland for most of its subsistence needs. Mount Lebanon was not self-sufficient, it became dependent on the European market, and on Beirut as its sole outlet for export. Economic prosperity therefore came with a cost. The Mutasarrifiya developed the sericulture industry to new levels in terms of cultivation and production. Almost ‘half of Mount Lebanon’s population was engaged in the silk economy’ writes Traboulsi. However, while sericulture stimulated the economy, it was at ‘the expense of other sectors’ and it meant that Mount Lebanon had to depend on the Biqa’ and Syria. Furthermore, it soon became apparent that the local economy could not absorb the post-war ‘baby boom’ of the 1860s. Restricted employment options coupled with the new dramatic increase in population led to the first massive emigration wave. Mount Lebanon became largely dependent on remittances, but despite covering ‘some 45 percent of total revenue (…) [they] hardly covered the commercial deficit.’ As will be shown, these economic choices would leave legacies for the post-independence era. These legacies would contribute to the instability of Lebanon.

This first section was intended to highlight the recurrence and complementarity of political sectarianism, foreign intervention, and dire socio-economic conditions in Lebanon’s cycle of conflict.

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51 Ibid, p 41, 43, 46.
52 Which as mentioned earlier was under the authority of Damascus.
54 Almost one third of Lebanon’s population emigrated.
56 Most importantly: a uni-dimensional economic sector, dependence on foreign market/capital, and a dependence on remittances.
II- Threat Perceptions and Governance in Post-Independence Lebanon: A Recipe for Insecurity

While the Ottoman Empire weakened and became the ‘sick man of Europe,’ national aspirations for independence, as well as foreign aspirations into the area, grew considerably. As the Empire was on the brink of collapse, the allies devised a plan to split the Ottoman territories. Earlier, however, in 1915, Britain had concluded an agreement with Sherif Hussein of Mecca, to assist the Allies against the Ottoman Empire through an Arab revolt in exchange for an independent Arab Kingdom. With the assistance of France and Britain, Sherif Hussein and his sons kept their part of the bargain; in 1916 they ‘launched the Arab Revolt’, and in 1918 proclaimed the Arab Kingdom from Damascus. Soon, however, French troops landed in Beirut, marched to Damascus, defeated the army of Faysal (Hussein’s son) and instated the mandate.

The agreement in which the Ottoman provinces were distributed between France, Britain, Russia and Italy was called the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Russia and Italy were to take over the Turkish province, while France and Britain took over the Arab provinces. France took Syria and Lebanon; Britain took Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. US President Wilson’s grand ideals of self-determination and rights of peoples were gaining popularity; therefore, under the League of Nation’s sponsorship the mandate system came to replace or disguise the unpopular colonial system. Accordingly, these states were to be ‘subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they [were] able to stand alone.’

In 1920, France established Greater Lebanon under the mandate system. The tragedies of World War I, a famine, mass emigration, and the economic legacies of earlier rule had reinforced the need for expansion. France therefore annexed coastal and inland Syrian cities. The addition of Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli and the Beqa’a almost doubled the territory of Lebanon. Such additions were vital for the creation of a viable country,

57 Known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Britain had excluded the area which will become Lebanon from the agreement for the sake of France.
59 It was made public in 1917.
60 Although a Turkish resistance prevented this.
including both ‘the Mediterranean ports, vital for commerce, and the fertile inland plain, ensuring a measure of self-sufficiency in agriculture.’\(^{62}\) A few years after France had annexed Syrian territories to the former Mutassarifiya, in 1926, the State of Greater Lebanon was transformed into the Republic of Lebanon. Finally, in 1943, at the height of World War II, Lebanon gained its independence from France.\(^{63}\)

Lebanon is a republic with a parliamentary system.\(^{64}\) It does not have a state religion but recognizes 18 sects.\(^{65}\) Contrary to widespread opinion, ‘Lebanon is not the only country in the region with a rich religious diversity’. Each of the religious communities found in Lebanon has branches in neighbouring Palestine, Syria and Iraq. The difference however, lies in the absence of an overwhelming domestic sectarian majority.\(^{66}\) The Lebanese system is based on a balance of power between these main confessional groups.\(^{67}\) Furthermore, a particular custom, stipulates that the public service and high government functions, both civilian and military ‘are to be equitably distributed’ between the main sectarian communities.\(^{68}\) The sectarian distribution is further reinforced in the unwritten National Pact of 1943: the President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister to be a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament to be a Shia.\(^{69}\) The National Pact represented the consensus reached between the two main religious communities – that the Muslims would ‘renounce the aim of an Arab Union in return for Christian renunciation of Western Protection.’\(^{70}\)

Although the Lebanese political system was initially designed to ensure representation for a diverse population, it has many flaws and has prevented integration. The system periodically erupts into crisis; the most serious was the 1975 civil war that lasted almost 20 years. Like the pre-independence period, the cessation of hostilities has required a

\(^{64}\) Its constitution is inspired by the French constitution of 1875 and dates back to 1926. Corm, 2005, p 11.
\(^{65}\) Only seven of these play a significant political role. These are: the Maronites, Sunnis, Shia, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Armenians. Each of the 18 sects has its own court and applies its own Personal Status Law (Article 9 of the constitution).
\(^{66}\) Thereby having a Christian minority of a considerable size and power compared to other countries of the region. Corm, 2005, p 13.
\(^{67}\) Many scholars, such as Corm, note that ‘sectarianism is the basis of the political order in Lebanon.’ Ibid, p 91.
\(^{68}\) In 1990, it was codified in the constitution as article 95.
\(^{69}\) Ibid, p 90-92.
\(^{70}\) Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East(Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979). p 36.
negotiated agreement between politico-religious leaders under the auspices of foreign actors.

1) The identity discourse

Looking at the matter from a ‘conventional’ point of view, two main parallel identities have dominated the Lebanese discourse: what some prefer to categorize as a Christian vs. a Muslim identity, or what others refer to as a Lebanese vs. an Arab identity.

This traditional narrative explains that, on the one hand, the Maronites believed that Lebanon as we now know it – Greater Lebanon – was crafted by France for the sake of the Christians. In the words of Fuad Ajami: ‘Lebanon had always been, at its heart, a ‘Christian homeland’. Therefore, not only should Christians be rewarded for it, but it is also up to them to make sure that Lebanon maintains its individuality in the region. Furthermore, it was the Maronite presence in Mount Lebanon (with the Druze) that pressed the central government of the Ottoman Empire to grant non-Muslims equal religious status. Moreover, the ‘special status’ of Lebanon was believed to have been responsible for developing a culture of openness, coexistence, and an early form of democratic practice and representation. Accordingly, this attributed a pioneering role to Lebanon. However, the Maronites still felt threatened; they had been haunted by the fear of being sucked in the regional overwhelming Muslim majority; hence their traditional alliance to the Big Sister – France.

In the opinion of the Muslim population (and, also, other Christians such as the Greek Orthodox), Lebanon is an artificial colonial creation and ‘the French were latter day crusaders (…) they had torn them away from Syria.’ This partially explains the unrest that resulted from the occasions whereby the ruling elites broke with their neighbours and looked to the West. However, it was the combination of historical, regional, political,

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72 For France, interest in Lebanon had an economic and geo-strategic as well as a religious basis.
74 Khalidi, 1979, p 35.
75 Ibid.
76 In 1958, during the civil war and from 2004 onwards.
cultural and socio-economic factors exacerbated by exclusivist sectarian identities which proved to be dangerous. When France cropped and added the extra provinces from Greater Syria to Mount Lebanon to create an arguably viable entity, it joined together unwilling groups. It is important to note that, despite the mainstream sectarian narrative, this unwillingness was not only sectarian-based. It was also ideological and cultural: the rural and urban/coastal dichotomy is one example, and the Syrian National Party (SNP) is an ideological example. Furthermore, struggles have not only taken place between religious communities; internal struggles aimed at defining their own respective boundaries have repeatedly occurred. Examples such as those from the civil war of 1975 as well as from the commoners’ revolt of the 1820s are cases in point. This new and artificial union spurred threat perceptions similar to the pre-independence period: one group feared disappearing within an overwhelming majority and losing its political, historical and cultural heritage; the other, forcefully detached from its roots, feared and resented being brought under the authority of a minority and of foreign influence. As a result, while the one felt disoriented, the other looked for and took pride in a non-Arab ancestry.

The sectarian narrative is related to the dominant place sectarianism occupies in Lebanese politics, and to its place in constitutional as well as legal private matters. However, Ussama Makdisi contends that sectarianism is an artificial practice and narrative

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77 See Corm, 2005, p 42.
78 A party which gathers members from all sects.
81 There were many efforts to construct a non-Arab and a non-Muslim identity for Lebanon. Therefore, proponents of a non-Arab identity explored the Phoenician ancestry of Lebanon; for some time this identity gained support from a considerable section of Lebanese Christians. As Salibi notes, the Phoenicians, from whom some Maronites claim descendency, lost the autonomy of their Empire sometime during the sixth century B.C. with the Persian conquest of Syria; however, they managed to survive and pursue their trade under Persian, Greek and Roman rule until the Arab conquest of the seventh century AD. The Phoenicians were a trading civilization which flourished along the coast of Mount Lebanon, particularly in the cities of Tyre, Sidon and Byblos, but also in other parts of the Mediterranean such as the city-state of Carthage in Tunis; at some points they reached Barcelona, Marseilles and Sicily. However, Corm highlights that the Phoenicians inhabited the coast of Lebanon rather than the Mountain, and that the city-state of Carthage was as important as the Lebanese ones; therefore, if the same logic were to apply, Tunisians could claim Phoenician heritage just as equally as the Lebanese could. Therefore, according to Salibi, the history of the Phoenician civilization is a story ‘around which a superficially appealing Phoenicianist theory of the Lebanese past could be developed’. Since then, many have deflated attempts to construct an alternative and ‘special’ identity for Lebanon. Salibi, 1998, p 4; Corm, 2005, p 74; Salibi, 1998, p 170-1.
introduced under the Ottoman rule. The Ottomans, as well as the European powers, had transformed religion into the ‘only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic basis for political claims’ in the reforms of the Tanzimat.\(^{82}\) Domestically, sectarianism was locally adopted when ‘Lebanese society was opened, and indeed opened itself, to Ottoman and European discourses of reform’, and as the old regime, based on ‘elite hierarchy in which secular rank rather than religious affiliation defined politics, was discredited.’\(^{83}\) Nevertheless, the institutionalization of sectarianism outlived the Ottoman rule, the French mandate, and the first republic. It should also be noted that sectarianism has also often been overstated and abused.\(^{84}\)

This study has been cautious about reproducing sectarian discourse, because I feel it depicts Lebanese complexity in a reductionist and simplistic manner. Nevertheless, it must be examined in engaging with mainstream narratives.

Over the years, there have been many voices calling for the abolition of sectarianism. However, so far, academics have reported ‘Christians’ to have been against it – unsurprisingly, given the interest of some in preserving the status quo.\(^{85}\) Others have believed that sectarianism is the plague of the Lebanese system and had to be replaced by a secular one. Some have viewed these claims as intended to weaken the Maronite ruling establishment, particularly in the case of Muslim and Druze traditional leaders rather than the ideological parties such as the Syrian Nationalist Party and Communist Party members. The deep-rootedness of sectarianism may be traced to the Personal Status Law.\(^{86}\) Initially, this law was introduced to allow the Muslim communities to interpret the Sharia’ in personal and family matters, according to their respective sects, and by their respective courts.\(^{87}\) Personal status laws were then enacted by parliament for the Druze and the

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\(^{82}\) The reforms of 1839 included a decree ‘that all subjects were equal before the law regardless of their religion’; however, sectarian-based representation was introduced to implement this decree. According to Makdisi, these reforms were a response to European demands for protecting the Christians but also as part of the modernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire. Makdisi, 2000, p 3.

\(^{83}\) Ibid, p 2-5.

\(^{84}\) Corm, 2005, p 75.

\(^{85}\) That is, having become a minority, sectarianism guaranteed the Christians a place in power.

\(^{86}\) This deals with matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, birth & death certificates. Each sect refers to its own court. This is a feature inherited from the Millet system, which was discussed at the beginning of the chapter, and which was codified in the constitution under Article 9. See Corm, 2005, p 91 and Salibi, 2005, p 195.

\(^{87}\) As Salibi explains, the ‘Muslims could not accept civil intervention in matters relating to the only part of the sharia which they could still apply.’ Salibi, 2005, p 195.
Christians. Given that personal status matters can only be dealt with in religious courts, every citizen must be registered to one of the religious communities; otherwise no law would apply to him/her. Sectarianism is therefore at the core of one’s personal legal existence. For different reasons, Christian and Muslim ruling elites have not supported the abolition of sectarianism. Nevertheless, this study contends that the existence of sectarian personal status laws need not be an impediment to progress and assimilation if the option for a secular alternative is provided.

This study accepts that the dichotomous categorization often referred to in this chapter is problematic, and it is necessary to underscore the thinness of the sectarian narrative, as there are several factors that undermine it. First, most waves of violence which fit the timeframe of this study have also involved ‘intracommunal social violence;’ therefore, it would be a fallacy to treat the sectarian groups as ‘uncomplicated and pure sectarian identities,’ and for that matter, to assume that sectarian identities have been static. Furthermore, it is also a fallacy to assume that individuals would be willing to engage in what would be seen as an ‘explosion’ of social violence on solely sectarian grounds; as Makdisi argues, to do so is to assume that ‘sectarian identities and mobilization operate outside of history’ and social, economic, cultural and political realities. Having considered this, violence in Lebanon is often ‘treated as being the continuation of sectarian (confessional) politics by other means.’ However, this discussion is intended to warn against reducing conflict to one of its dimensions; the danger of doing so risks treating sectarianism as the ‘disease that prevents modernisation’ when there are other dimensions to be addressed—most notably, a static system based on rivalry and monopolization.

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88 However, it was only in the 1960s that the Christians and the Druze were referred to separate religious courts.
89 After much lobbying, this is an issue which has lately been referred to Parliament; and which has, at least, gained the support of President Michel Suleiman. See: Sleiman Endorses Civil Personal Status Laws, The. "The Daily Star (Lebanon)."
90 Makdisi, 2000, p 3.
91 Ibid, p 3.
92 Ibid, p 5.
94 Makdisi, 2000, p 3.
2) Weak state allegiance and the mirage of success

During the early years of independence, traditional leaders of rural areas actively sought to maintain the status quo.\(^95\) They were successful in rallying people against the government while posing as the voice of the underprivileged. However, the underdevelopment of the rural areas was as much the responsibility of the government as it was of the traditional leaders. Nevertheless, successive governments did not have countrywide development strategies or policies; they neglected the rural areas and left the matter to an ‘unbridled capitalist initiative.’\(^96\) This allowed traditional sectarian leaders to maintain their hold on their respective constituencies, to the detriment of state allegiance. Patron-client relations or clientalism has long flourished in Lebanon.\(^97\) Since independence, the state largely failed to replace patron-client relations as the main mode of ‘organization, interaction, and exchange’. Instead, the latter evolved and ‘crystallize[d]’ in more modern forms. In fact the political system in Lebanon reinforces clientalistic relations.\(^98\) It is a system which places leaders as politico-sectarian ‘local za’ims not national heroes (...) [that] serve the national purpose’,\(^99\) therefore, clientalism and favouritism underpin the system.

Having considered this, many scholars have argued that “on the surface”, Lebanon after independence and throughout the 1960s appeared as the ultimate success story. The freedoms in Lebanon’s economic system and society were unparalleled in the region; its economy was service-oriented and benefited from readily available, trained and educated workers. Taking both these factors into consideration, it served as a depot for Arab and foreign capital and investments.\(^100\) Furthermore, the Lebanese had a pioneering role in

\(^{95}\) ‘In rural and tribal areas, the traditional leaders had no interest in seeing their constituencies develop, fearing this would rob them of the mainstay of their power’. Salibi, 1998, p 190-1.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
\(^{97}\) A mutually beneficial but asymmetric (top-down) relationship in which the patron provides protection and services in exchange for loyalty and political support.
\(^{98}\) Nizar Hamzeh discusses the pervasiveness of patron-client relations and clientalism in Lebanon. It is a of course first a legacy of feudalism; patron-client relations then developed sectarian roots when sectarian identity was introduced to politics. Nizar Hamzeh, "Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 3 (Jul. 2001), p 168.
\(^{100}\) Ibid, p 190-1.
developing and promulgating the political trends that swept the Middle East.\textsuperscript{101} It also served as a hub for journalism, universities, trade and agricultural exports to the Arab markets, as well as serving as a primary tourist destination – Lebanon at the time was the uncontested \textit{avant-garde}.\textsuperscript{102} These successes had reinforced the idea of “Lebanism” over “Arabism.” It finally seemed that Lebanon was playing a bigger role than merely that of the protector of Christians; it now served as the ‘natural intermediary between the Arabs and the West.’ Lebanon acted as a gateway between the East and West whereby cultures and ideologies from either side were screened into moderation; it was the place where the West could be delicately introduced to the customs of the Arab world, and the Arab world’s first line of exposure to Western culture.\textsuperscript{103} The Lebanese were ‘exposed, at the popular level, to every new idea or ideology, every religious, political or cultural current that [arose] and [spread] across the region;’\textsuperscript{104} the different ideologies brought in from all sides resonated in its diverse society. Nevertheless, one could argue that the lack of cohesion and satisfaction with the existing model made the Lebanese look elsewhere for a better example. This has been both a virtue and a flaw, making it at the same time free and easily penetrable and vulnerable. The new role espoused to Lebanon, however, did not stand on strong pillars; the image that was portrayed was inflated, as it did not extend across Lebanese territory.

All in all, how long would this ‘success’ last? Many fundamental issues had not yet been addressed. How long could the government alienate the aspirations of the largest growing portion of its population? Although the fruits of this success were felt across sectarian lines,\textsuperscript{105} many felt they had been castrated from power and rallied their enclaves against the ruling establishment; taken from the sectarian angle, at the time, it was the Maronite elites. Relative stability had depended on the careful balance of the vital interests of the varied confessional groups. This meant that sectarian leaders (in the form of traditional families) rather than political parties had been the main actors in society, and consequently in the political system.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{101} Ranging from nationalism, Pan-Arabism, \textit{nahda}, secularism, socialism, communism, unionism, anti-imperialism etc. Hirst, 2010, p 3.
\textsuperscript{102} Salibi, 1998, p 190-1.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, p 192.
\textsuperscript{104} Hirst, 2010, p 3.
\textsuperscript{106} As mentioned, patron-client relations had long been a feature of Lebanese society; however, the introduction of political sectarianism during the Ottoman rule under Western pressure gave clientalism a
In this sense, despite the apparent cultural and socio-economic successes of the early independent years, grievances were growing underneath the surface. As will be discussed in the section dealing with the 1958 crisis, regional disparity and inequitable development were stark. Furthermore, a sense of political exclusion compounded the socio-economic factors and gradually mobilized people – alas on a sectarian basis. According to Salibi, a scholar of the traditional sectarian narrative, ‘Muslims rightly saw themselves as being grossly underprivileged[,] they certainly had a share in government and administration; just as certainly, they had no direct say in ultimate decision making.’\(^{107}\) The Muslim community, however, took stances that ‘frightened the Christians’. Their allegiance was perceived to be more Arab and Syrian than it was Lebanese, as they actively adopted pan-Arab causes despite ‘[compromising] the very sovereignty of the state, and even its territorial security and integrity’. This was illustrated by their vigorous desire in 1958 to join the Egyptian-Syrian union under Nasser; a decade later, in the Cairo Agreement of 1969 and their support for and joining forces with the PLO.\(^{108}\) From the Christian point of view, they were ‘irresponsible and blatantly unpatriotic’ and therefore could not be trusted with ‘their rightful share in national decision-making at the highest level’.\(^{109}\) However, the Muslims, who by now had reached a demographic superiority, could no longer accept such a settlement.

When, under the French mandate, the only census was taken in 1932, the Christians were the majority; and therefore, it was justifiable that at independence they were awarded with the presidency and other posts, such as command of the armed forces and a 6:5 ratio of parliamentary seats. However, by the 1950s that was no longer the case: the Muslim population was increasing at a fast rate while the Christians emigrated in large numbers and had a much lower birth rate. ‘Hardly anyone doubted’ that the Muslims outnumbered the Christians.\(^{110}\) According to Randal, this ‘further [eroded] their only marginal population edge, thus over time, the Christians began to wield a disproportionate amount
of power. In other words, Muslim dissatisfaction was growing and was paving the way for a crisis.

It was only a matter of time before the system needed to adapt or before a shift in power had to occur. The crisis developed into political violence, first in the 1958 armed revolt (or mini-civil war); then, almost two decades later, it developed into a full scale civil war in 1975. The latter would be the longest and bloodiest war that modern Lebanon went through; it involved many regional and international actors, to the extent that it was described as the 'the war of others on Lebanese land'. Nevertheless, it is important to be careful not to remove all responsibility from the Lebanese; Lebanon has not always been the victim, it has often been an ‘agent too’.

3) Governance and insecurity in the war order of 1975–1990

Although Lebanon has enjoyed the reputation of being a hub for religious, political, economic and personal freedoms, its post-independence formula proved to be problematic. As a result, Lebanon has suffered from waves of political violence. Lebanon’s 1975 internationalized war span a little short of two decades (1975–1990). In a territory no larger than a mere 10,452 km² and a population of about three and a half million (in addition to some 500,000 Palestinian refugees), the violence affected nearly everyone—civilian and fighters alike. The war has left a grave imprint on Lebanon’s history: of forced and systematic mass displacement, indiscriminate killing and reprisals, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearance, taking place on a sectarian, ethnic, and political basis. Estimates differ, but a reliable study by Lebanese statisticians Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou Rjeili notes that some 2.7% of Lebanon’s population was killed, 4% was wounded, 30% was displaced, and about one third of the population

112 Contended by the famous journalist, former minister, ambassador, and member of parliament Ghassan Tueini.
113 Hirst, 2010, p 3.
114 A system that is rigid, unjust, and based on sectarian power-sharing, or more aptly, on sectarian rivalry.
emigrated.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, 90\% of fatalities and 86\% of those injured were civilians; 0.36\% of the population was permanently disabled, and 0.75\% of the population forcibly disappeared.\textsuperscript{116} Reports have documented the dire human insecurity civilians have been subjected to from militias and armed groups, from Lebanese state actors,\textsuperscript{117} from armed Palestinian organizations, and from foreign state actors.\textsuperscript{118} The indiscriminate nature of war tactics and systematic targeting of civilians severely threatened individuals’ inalienable rights to life and physical integrity. War protagonists resorted to mass violence for revenge, for instilling fear and forcing inhabitants from the opposite camp to flee in order to homogenize areas;\textsuperscript{119} these were often described as necessary measures for self-defence.\textsuperscript{120} There is widespread consensus that numerous massacres were committed.\textsuperscript{121} Moreover, the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 is seen as the ‘single most violent incident of the war.’\textsuperscript{122} According to Theodor Hanf, it cost the life of at least 17,000 people and wounded some 30,000.\textsuperscript{123} Other tactics that indiscriminately took the lives of thousands of civilians became “habitual” forms of mass violence. ‘These consisted of ‘sniper fire, murder…kidnappings, road-block executions on the basis of people’s sectarian identity, revenge killings of civilians, torture, wanton shelling of residential areas’ and car-bombs or

\textsuperscript{115} The 2.7 percent of the population amount to 71,328 killed, the 4 percent amount to 97,144 wounded, the 30 percent to 800,000 displaced, and the one third to 894,717 of Lebanese emigrated. Boutros Labaki and Khalil Abou-Rjeili, \textit{Bilan Des Guerres Au Liban}, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993). p 37, 211-212.

\textsuperscript{116} The 0.36 percent amount to 9,627 permanently disabled and the 0.75 to 19,860 disappeared. However, government estimates were different, placing numbers at 144,240 killed, 197,506 wounded, including 13,455 with permanent disabilities; 17,415 missing, among whom 13,968 were ‘kidnapped and presumed dead’. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} i.e. the LAF and other security agencies.


\textsuperscript{119} Elizabeth Picard, \textit{Lebanon - a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities About the Wars in Lebanon}(New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 2002). p 110.


\textsuperscript{121} Such as the 1975 ‘Ain al-Rummaneh bus incident’, the 1975 ‘Black Saturday’, the 1976 ‘Maslakh and Karantina’ massacre, the 1976 Damour and Jiyeh massacres, the 1976 Tal al-Zatar Palestinian camp massacre, the 1976 Chekka and Hamat massacres, the 1978 Ehden and the 1980 Safra intra-Christian massacres, the 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres, the 1983 Shouf massacres of the ‘War of the Mountain’ and the 1985 Sidon massacres (for the large part one being a reaction to the other). Haugbolle provides a concise and useful summary of the different estimates provided by the main scholars writing on the war. Haugbolle, 2011, p 6-7.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, p 6.


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other planted bombs.\textsuperscript{124} Civilians were caught in the midst of fighting between and within the main camps. A notable example of this is the heavy loss of civilian life between 1985-1987 in the ‘War of the Camps’, which consisted of infighting between the former members of the opposition (see below LNM) to control the camps.\textsuperscript{125} Corm rightly therefore highlighted the difficulty to resist and escape the wars of the militias.\textsuperscript{126}

\textit{a) Going to War}

Oversimplification has often led to misunderstanding conflict in Lebanon. Nevertheless, an overview of the events leading up to the war is required. The root causes of Lebanon’s war have had varied dimensions. The years leading up to 1975 were enmeshed with socio-economic and political unrest. Domestic unrest revolved around the failure of the system to absorb pressure stemming from demographic changes, popular aspirations, and socio-economic realities. Domestic factors as well as the regional dimension polarized the Lebanese largely along sectarian lines.\textsuperscript{127} Demands (expressed through a series of strikes and demonstrations) revolved around exploitation, social injustice, and system-wide detachment from popular needs. Greek Catholic Bishop of Beirut, Gregoire Haddad, noted that ‘it was not change that threatened security; rather the current conditions constituted the gravest threat to it.’ Bishop Haddad called for secularism

\textsuperscript{124} Haugbolle, 2011, p 7-8. Also see ICTJ, 2013 and Hanf, 1993, p 341.
\textsuperscript{125} No less than 2,500. However, estimates cannot be accurate because a) there was no access to the camps until much later, b) thousands of Palestinian refugees living in the camps were not registered, and c) no estimates were taken of the human loss incurred on the adjacent areas that were affected by the war.
\textsuperscript{126} Corm, 2005, p 215-218.
\textsuperscript{127} Corm discussed an array of regional factors that affected the Lebanese political scene: Arab nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the rise of Islamic movements inflated the rift between the conservative political establishment and the marginalized and increasingly radicalized street. Farid Khazen emphasised the ideological wave that stimulated mass politics by students, political parties, labour unions, etc. Fawwaz Traboulsi’s chapter “From Social Crisis to Civil War (1968-1975)” emphasised the socio-economic crisis that had been accruing and that resulted in sectarian, cross-sectarian, and secular popular mobilization. In his discussion of ‘renewal and contestation in the religious institutions’, Traboulsi highlights the mobilization and activism of student and teachers’ movements, workers and trade movements: activists sought to reform or renew the Maronite Church, the Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church, and the Shia community. Traboulsi, 2007, p 156-183; Corm, 2005; Farid el-Khazen, \textit{Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967-1976}(UK: I.B. Tauris, 2000). P 73-86.
and reforms to reduce social inequality.\textsuperscript{128} Between pressures for reform and the status quo or aspirations for change and threat perceptions, the Lebanese system eventually broke.

A central factor in the unfolding of events was the Cairo Accord of 1969 which formally authorized the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese territory.\textsuperscript{129} Palestinians \textit{fida’iyn} (fighters) had been active in Lebanon. It was not long, however, until the conservative leadership grew increasingly anxious about the popular support for the Palestinian cause, calls for Lebanon to participate more actively in the Arab-Israeli wars, and Israeli reprisals.\textsuperscript{130} A number of confrontations between the Lebanese army and the PLO had escalated the tension on the streets. The government declared a state of emergency and the army clamped down on the Palestinian \textit{Fida’iyn} and the opposition leaving numerous casualties. Syria exerted pressure on the Lebanese government by closing its borders with Lebanon and imposing economic sanctions; an agreement was brokered by then Egyptian president Abd el-Nasser and was signed in Cairo between Yasser Arafat and General Emile Boustani (commander in chief of the LAF).\textsuperscript{131} The Accord was intended to regularize the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon,\textsuperscript{132} to appease rising tension as a result of the curtailing role of the Lebanese Army’s Intelligence Bureau (the ‘Deuxieme Bureaux’), and end the confrontations between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian fighters. The Accord also established a ‘form of extra-territoriality’ for the Palestinian camps, and as Corm notes, the Accord ‘served as a pretext for the state of Israel to hold the Lebanese government responsible for Palestinian attacks from Lebanon’ and to justify its reprisal campaigns and its invasions.\textsuperscript{133}

The Palestinian arsenal and the relocation of the PLO headquarters to Lebanon\textsuperscript{134} transformed the dynamic of confrontation between the conservatives and the opposition. As the latter forged an increasingly close relationship with the PLO, by the early 1970s it

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item His popular anti-establishment stance, however, led to his being ‘relieved of his bishopry’. Traboulsi, 2007, p 177.
\item The Accord was rescinded in 1987.
\item Such as when on December 28, 1968 an Israeli commando operation blew up 13 Middle East Airlines planes (Lebanese airlines) parked in Beirut airport in response to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) hijacking of an El-Al plane heading to Athens.
\item Apparently, no civilian leader was ready to sign the Accord. Furthermore, under the guise of confidentiality, the text was not circulated but parliament nevertheless ratified it. The Accord was repealed in 1987. Traboulsi, 2007, p 154 and Corm, 2005, p 114.
\item Specifically, allowing the \textit{fida’iyn} to move to and from the ‘arqoub region which is critical for fighting Israel.
\item Corm, 2005, p 114.
\item The PLO was expelled from Jordon following the 1970 events of “Black September” which put an end to a war pitting King Hussein against the PLO.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
became clear that the Phalange and the National Liberal Party\textsuperscript{135} were acquiring weapons and training—with knowledge of the army.\textsuperscript{136} Soon, the situation would spiral out of control.

The Palestinian issue, however, only exacerbated an already precarious situation. The power-sharing system that Lebanon had adopted at independence had not evolved with demographic and political changes. Power was monopolized, the authorities resisted regional political currents mobilizing the Lebanese youth, and the ‘\textit{Deuxieme Bureaux}’ was increasingly establishing a police state. Against this backdrop, the state was refusing calls for reform. The Palestinian question was but the tip of the iceberg.

That being said, two main camps developed in the years leading up to the war. The Lebanese Front formed the right-wing ‘Christian’ alliance and was led by the Phalange party; and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the leftist and ‘Muslim’ alliance, was led by Kamal Joumblat, head of Progressive Socialist Party. The two camps took opposing stances vis-à-vis the Palestinian armed presence. The LNM saw an opportunity to align Lebanon with the pan Arab Nasserite-Communist axis and to bring about long-awaited domestic reform. The Lebanese Front however saw the Palestinian presence as a threat to the \textit{status quo}: to a Christian-favouring distribution of power, dissociation from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a Westward-looking Lebanese identity. As of 1973 confrontations between the Lebanese army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the main Lebanese protagonists intensified.\textsuperscript{137} It was not until 1975, however, that polarization, mobilization, and political readiness to spread the fighting aligned. The spark came on 13 April 1975. What is known as the ‘Ain al-Rummaneh bus incident’ represented the official start of the Lebanese War.\textsuperscript{138} Members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) shot at a Phalange congregation leaving a church service in the eastern Beirut suburb of Ain al-Rummaneh, killing 3 persons including the bodyguard of

\textsuperscript{135} Of traditional Maronite leader and former president Kamil Chamoun.

\textsuperscript{136} The army’s perceived complicity with the conservative block and iron fist in dealing with the Palestinians while failing to take a strong stance against Israel was increasingly being resented by the leftist and nationalist street. Traboulsi, 2007, p 174, 182, 189.

\textsuperscript{137} Series of clashes between the Palestinian \textit{Fida'iyyin} and the Lebanese army had started in 1968. Ibid, 153.

prominent Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel.\textsuperscript{139} In what seemed to be a retaliation operation, Phalange gunmen gunned down a bus heading to the Tall al-Zaatar Palestinian camp killing its 27 civilian passengers. Soon after, fighting broke out between the two main factions and spread across Beirut. What became known as the ‘Ain al-Rummaneh bus incident’ represents the start of Lebanon’s 15-year war.

The war unfolded over a number of stages; actors multiplied and shifted alliances as the war progressed. The war consisted of ‘more or less related conflicts between shifting alliances of Lebanese groups and external actors’.\textsuperscript{140} An array of regional and international actors played an integral part in the conflict. Foreign protagonists consisted of the Palestinian factions, Israel, and Syria. International peacekeeping efforts consisted of a Multinational Force (MNF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); foreign support or even patronage extended from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, to the United States, France etc. This illustrates the role of regional and international actors in the ‘governance’ of the Lebanese conflict—much of which would exacerbate rather than contain or dissipate the situation.\textsuperscript{141}

\hspace{1cm} \textbf{b) Phases of the war}

Broadly speaking, the Lebanese war can be divided into five phases. The first phase, commonly known as the two-year war, lasted from April 1975 to November 1976.\textsuperscript{142} It was characterized by inter-sectarian violence. Following the “bus incident” indiscriminate collective punishment quickly spread. Checkpoints were mounted and sect-based killing terrorised the population. In addition, a series of sectarian-based massacres took place.\textsuperscript{143} During this phase, threats to physical security were most prevalent in mixed areas and in what would become border areas or the front lines. The violence took the form of ethnic/sectarian cleansing and resulted in mass displacement and forced homogenisation

\textsuperscript{139} Bashir Gemayel was son of the Phalange founder Pierre Gemayel, he later became the military commander of the Lebanese Forces and then president-elect of Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{140} Haugbolle, 2011.

\textsuperscript{141} Corm, 2005, p 119.

\textsuperscript{142} Also dubbed by Traboulsi as ‘reforms by arms’. Traboulsi, 2007, p 187-204.

\textsuperscript{143} Some of which are mentioned above: e.g. the Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp massacre and the Karantina massacre of Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians by the Lebanese Front and the Damour massacre of Christians by the LNM.
of regions. The ‘battle of the Hotels’ in central Beirut between the Lebanese Front and the LNM (with the PLO) resulted in demarcating the boundaries between the two main camps. These boundaries would last for much of the remainder of the war.

The second phase spanned from November 1976 until June 1982. It started with the entry of the Syrian forces at the request of then president Frangieh (and the approval of both the US and Israel) to prevent the defeat of the government (dominated by the Lebanese Front) by the LNM and the PLO. Further, in 1978 Israel launched ‘Operation Litani’, marking its first occupation of the south of Lebanon where it established a ‘security zone’ south of the Litani River of which its proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), was given charge. As a result, UNSC resolution 425 established the first generation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ‘confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon’. A series of mediations and cessation of hostilities failed. The Syrian intervention was legitimized as an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The Lebanese Front and Syria, however, broke their alliance, the ADF’s mission ended, and all out fighting resumed.

The third phase spanned from June 1982 to February 1984. It marked the substitution of Syrian governance of the Lebanese conflict for an Israeli one. The Israeli second invasion of June 1982 extended to a siege and a massive air raid campaign of West Beirut. The intensity but apparent futility of the violence prompted international action. US special envoy Philip Habib succeeded in August 1982 to negotiate the end of the Israeli siege and the withdrawal of the PLO. On 12 August 1982, the siege was lifted. On 21 August, a Multinational Force (MNF) was deployed to oversee a peaceful withdrawal. By the end of August, PLO forces had withdrawn from Beirut and the MNF had left

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144 Traboulsi, 2007, p 238.
145 Ibid, p 197.
146 The SLA used to be known as the Free Lebanon Army (before 1980); it is a splinter group of the Army of Free Lebanon which broke away from the regular armed forces in 1976.
148 See below.
149 The invasion came in response to the attempt of assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the UK; ‘it made little difference to the Israelis that the assassination had been carried out by a renegade Palestinian group (…) a blood foe of the PLO’. Israel used this incident as an opportunity to destroy the PLO ‘and putting in place a pliant government in Beirut that would (…) enter into a formal peace agreement with Israel’. Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007). p 33.
151 The Force consisted mostly of American and French but also of Italian contingents; a smaller British participation joined the MNF in 1983.
Lebanese soil. However, as the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel led to the massacres of Sabra and Chatila, the MNF was re-deployed. By the end of this phase the governance of Lebanese territory was effectively divided between the two, now opposing, spheres of influence: the Syrian and the Israeli.

The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beirut and later from the Shouf to the south was particularly violent. The violence that accompanied the retreat of the Israeli forces was intended to re-establish the status quo prior the invasion. Fighting between Lebanese groups was indeed intended to regain lost turf but also took the form of reprisal to the force imposed by the Israeli-Lebanese Front axis.

This period, however, also represented the start of a wave of attacks against Western targets. Most notorious were the April 1983 suicide attack on the US embassy in West Beirut, and the October 1983 twin suicide attack on the US and French headquarters of the MNF. As the presidential election of Phalange candidates was imposed by Israel and the US, the presence of the MNF, especially the American and French contingents, became

152 It wasn’t until 20 December that the PLO completed its evacuation to Tunisia and to other Arab countries like the Yemens.  
153 Bashir Gemayel (son of founder of the Phalange party, Pierre Gemayel and commander of the Lebanese Forces) and 26 other Phalangists were killed on September 14 in a bomb planted at the Phalange headquarters. The massacres took place between the September 16 and 18; the IDF had allowed members of the Lebanese Forces (joined with some members of the SLA) to enter the Palestinian refugee camps and massacre hundreds or thousands of men, women, and children for two days and nights (leaving on the third day). That said, it was Habib Shartouni, a Syrian Social Nationalist (also a Maronite) who was arrested and confessed to the assassination.  
154 Sabra and Chatila, Shouf and Damour massacres are cases in point. The IDF is criticized for failing in its 1982, 1983 and 1984 withdrawals/retreats to coordinate with the MNF or the Lebanese Army; instead it facilitated the entry of militias to the zones it previously occupied. Corm, 2005, p 211.  
155 In July 1983, the National Salvation front (NSF) grouping parties of the LNM, Palestinian factions, Amal, and Sulayman Frangieyh (meaning socialists, communists, Palestinians, Sunnis, Shia and Christians) sought Syria’s help to re-establish the pre-Israeli balance of power. Traboulsi, 2007, p 221.  
156 Attacks were conducted by what were yet unknown Shia fundamentalist groups sponsored and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Bequa’. These attacks were intended, according to Harik, to ‘disrupt Western intelligence networks and force them to look to their security’. Harik, 2005, p 36.  
158 Amine Gemayel showed little sign of compromise with the opposition (he instead took a militant aggressive approach to dominate the opposition, e.g. using the army to invade West Beirut). Further, parliament was forced to sign the ‘17 May Agreement’ ending the ‘state of war’ with Israel, giving ‘Israel the right to oversee Lebanon’s foreign policy’, and making Israeli withdrawal contingent to the Syrian withdrawal (note that Syria was invited in and had some legitimacy in Lebanon). The Agreement
associated with the Lebanese Front. It would soon get ‘embroiled’ in the war.\textsuperscript{159} The MNF incurred heavy casualties and between February and March 1984, troops of the MNF withdrew from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{160}

The fourth phase spanned from 1984–1988. It mostly consisted of intra-group wars which attempted to consolidate hegemony over respective cantons. The fighting in the final phase, spanning between 1989-1990 was intended to establish a favourable \textit{status quo} for the post-war period,\textsuperscript{161} and to expel the Syrian military presence.\textsuperscript{162}

c) Armed non-State Actors and the governance of Lebanon

As mentioned above, both camps gathered a number of political parties that soon turned into militias. The composition of the two camps changed as the conflict mutated and intra-group fighting eliminated some or spurred new groups. I will briefly discuss four main parties/militias.

The \textbf{Phalange}, one of the oldest ‘Christian’ parties of Lebanon, was formed in 1936 as a ‘paramilitary organization.’ It grew in reaction to calls for re-incorporating Lebanon with Syria; it militantly advocated the protection of a Lebanese identity and an independent Lebanon.\textsuperscript{163} In June of 1976, Lebanese right-wing ‘Christian’ militias of the Lebanese Front launched an attack on the Palestinian camps of Tal al-Zaatar and Jisr el-Basha. Following the attack, a number of these militias came together under the command of Bachir Gemayel\textsuperscript{164} and formed the \textbf{Lebanese Forces (LF)}. In its efforts to fight the clearly shocked the opposition. Tension grew and fighting intensified, further involving the Syrian forces to regain its influence in Beirut and Lebanon at the expense of Israel and its allies. In March, Gemayel and his government rescinded the agreement. Trabousli, 2007, p 223.

\textsuperscript{159} The French contingent attempted to disarm militias of the LNM while the Phalange and LF were unchallenged. In response to attacks on its personnel, the American Navy and Air force shelled Syrian, Shiite, and Druze targets, including the infamous shelling by USS New Jersey of the Shouf area in Mount Lebanon. Corm, 2005, p 123.

\textsuperscript{160} For a concise overview on the embroilment of the MNF in the Lebanese war and its problematic mandate see: George L. Sherry, "Book Review of International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force by Ramesh Thakur," \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 103, no. 1 (Spring 1988).

\textsuperscript{161} Mostly in the still contested ‘Christian’ and ‘Shia’ camps.

\textsuperscript{162} More information on both phases is covered below.


\textsuperscript{164} Son of Phalange founder Pierre Gemayel.
Palestinian factions and their Lebanese allies in the LNM, the LF like the Phalange, forged a close relationship with Israel. Both would become central actors in Lebanon’s war. Of equal importance, although on the opposite camp, is the **Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)** which was formed in 1949 by Druze leader Kamal Joumblat. Like the Phalange party, it advocated for an independent Lebanon, but with an ‘Arab face’. It challenged Maronite hegemony, and called for reforming the Lebanese system. At the onset of the war, the PSP was calling for secularism and for Lebanon to participate more actively in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**Amal** (or hope), the acronym for *Afwaj al-Mouqawama al-Loubnaniya* or the Regiments of the Lebanese Resistance, grew as the military wing of *Harakat al-Mahroumin* (or The Movement of the Deprived). Amal was formed by Imam Musa al-Sader in the 1970s. The Shia community had been traditionally politically marginalized, ‘impoverished and underdeveloped’. The Movement established a ‘network of schools, clinics, hospitals and charitable organizations’. As Sader challenged traditional Shia clergy and the traditional feudal *za’ims*, he would initially forge close relationships with personalities in the central authority. His discourse on the deprived and the marginalized initially gathered support from various confessional and social classes. The sectarian turn and regional-basis of his discourse, however, would mobilize and later radicalize the Shia community. Sader would ‘impose[ ] himself as principle spokesman for the south and the Shia community’. As the government failed to respond to Shia demands and redistribution in favour of the south, his discourse warned of revolution and threatened civil disobedience. Amal was initially trained by Fatah and at the onset of the war it aligned with the LNM coalition. Its relationship with both Fatah and the LNM, however, was complicated and short-lived.

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166 Sader is from Qom, Iran and is from a family of theologians. He came to Lebanon in the late 1960s to ‘launch social programs for the community’. Traboulsi, 2007, p 177-178 and Norton, 2007, p 16.
167 The Shia of Lebanon are predominantly spread over the south of Lebanon, Northern Biqua’, and the suburb of Beirut. Norton, 2007, p 12.
169 Which were linked to Najaf in Iraq not Qom in Iran.
170 such as President Charles Hilu, the Shihabist ‘services’ meaning the Deuxième Bureau ‘and Michel Asmar’s *Cenacle Libanais*, a think-tank of Lebanese nationalism, Maronite style’. Traboulsi, 2007, p 178.
171 Ibid, p 179.
172 Ibid, p 177-178.
The Shia ‘political awakening’ is largely attributed to Sader.\textsuperscript{174} In fact, in 1967, primarily as a result of his good relations with the ruling establishment, he succeeded in pressuring parliament to institutionalize the political presence of the Shia community.\textsuperscript{175} Article 1 of Law no. 72/76 of 19 December 1967, for example, ‘recognized the right of the representatives of the Shi’i community to act and express themselves “in conformity with the fatwas emanating from the supreme authority of the community in the world”’. This was not unprecedented as most other sects follow a “supreme” non-Lebanese religious authority.\textsuperscript{176} The ground-breaking development came in Article 5 for establishing the High Islamic Shia Council (HISC) with the role of ‘defending the rights’ of the Shia community and ‘improving its social and economic conditions’. Two years later, the HISC was created with Sader as its president and in 1970 the government ‘disbursed $10 million in aid for the south’.\textsuperscript{177} In 1978, on a trip to Libya for the commemoration of Gaddafi’s ascension to power, Sader disappeared and remains so till this day.\textsuperscript{178} His disappearance would cause splinters in Amal—over its leadership, ideology and role in the war. Despite starting out as an ‘adjunct militia’ and going through troubled years during the early 80s, Amal ‘expanded into a political reform movement’ which gathered mass support from Shia middle and lower classes that shared a disdain to traditional Shia za’ims (or leaders) and were looking for a place in the Lebanese system.\textsuperscript{179}

**Hezbollah**’s (or the Party of God) birth is often traced back to 1982—the year of the Israeli invasion and the start of attacks against Western targets. At the time, however, no coherent structure or organization grouped the founders of Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{180} Instead, a group of young Shia fundamentalists inspired by the Islamic Revolution, trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and disaffected by Amal’s moderate reformist approach,\textsuperscript{181} sought to launch military Jihad (or struggle) against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Both Iran and to a lesser extent Syria had strategic motives for sponsoring Hezbollah. For

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, p 20.  
\textsuperscript{176} e.g. the pope, Patriarch of Constantinople and the Levant.  
\textsuperscript{177} Traboulsi, 2007, p 177-178.  
\textsuperscript{178} As Norton notes, ‘Gaddafi is widely suspected of having ordered his assassination because, so the rumours have it, he viewed him as a political rival’. Norton, 2007, p 21.  
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, p 29 and Traboulsi, 2007, p 178.  
\textsuperscript{180} Norton argues that ‘Hezbollah did not exist as a coherent organization until the mid-1980s’. Norton, 2007, p 34.  
\textsuperscript{181} A leading cleric (Hussein Musawi) broke away from the group to form a more “Islamic Amal” that follows the teachings of Baqir al-Sader from the same seminary Ayatollah Khomeini studied in (in Najaf, Iraq). ‘Other fundamentalist splinter groups’ would join and later form Hezbollah. Harik, 2005, p 22-23.
Iran, the Party of God was an opportunity to spread the ideals of the Islamic Revolution to the Shia communities, acquire regional presence and front-line access toward fighting Israel. Syria used Hezbollah to score points against Israel and the US, and, when needed, to ‘keep its Lebanese allies (…) in line’. Syria’s support therefore ‘was ambivalent’.182 It wasn’t until 1985 that Hezbollah broke the cover of secrecy and shared its manifesto in an open letter emphasizing the groups’ association with the Islamic Revolution in order to liberate the oppressed from imperialism—whether it be from super powers, the corrupt international system, and the corrupt Lebanese system. Disenchanted with the prevailing system as it failed to end exploitation, occupation and violence, it stressed a self-help approach ‘under the banner of Islam’. It thought of the US and Israel as the main sources of ‘suffering’ for Lebanese. 183 Its aim was therefore to ‘expel the Americans, the French, and their allies (…) ‘putting an end to any colonialist entity’ in Lebanon.184 Theologically, it adopted Khomeini’s doctrine of the wilayat al-faqih (or the guardianship of the jurist). The combination of militancy and fundamentalism that Hezbollah called for have formed the basis for Hezbollah’s terrorist label.185 Judith Palmer Harik, however, stresses the need to forgo this ‘onerous’ label by differentiating the ‘unique politico-military situation’ in Lebanon and the tactics employed by Hezbollah (since its formal inception) from those employed by such groups as Hamas or the Islamic Jihad.186 Hezbollah showed pragmatism in choosing to participate in Lebanese politics. It would soon prioritize the fight against Israel and abandoned earlier discourses on an Islamic regime in Lebanon.187 At the end of the war, Hezbollah’s resistance role was legitimized by the Lebanese government, being the only group legitimately allowed to bear arms and fight the Israeli occupation. Between

185 Milton-Edwards notes that Hezbollah’s ‘links with revolutionary Iran, its attacks on Israel, and its alliance with nefarious terrorist elements such as the Islamic Jihad (…) would lead to the designation of the groups as terrorist’. Ibid.
the 80s and the 90s, Hezbollah therefore made the transition from a radical clandestine group to a mainstream movement, political party and a national resistance—a transition often referred to as ‘Lebanonization’. Although fears over radicalism remain, Hezbollah gathers much legitimacy in relation to its resistance and social roles.\textsuperscript{188} Hezbollah’s social services and successful reconstruction programs contrast with the corruption and incompetencies of the government’s efforts.\textsuperscript{189} That being said, Hezbollah remains a controversial actor to local, regional, and international stakeholders. In 2006, Lebanon saw deep polarization over Hezbollah’s operation against an IDF patrol which gave Israel reason to launch a devastating 33-day war—the July-War—on all of Lebanon.\textsuperscript{190} At the time being, Hezbollah is facing strong domestic opposition for its involvement in the Syrian war.\textsuperscript{191}

To return to the 1975-1990 war, both Amal and Hezbollah’s substantial military involvement in the war came late. While Amal first joined the LNM, it would later fiercely fight the PLO and the PSP. Hezbollah, for its part, limited itself to fighting the Israeli occupation and Western presence in Lebanon. Later in the war, Hezbollah and Amal engaged in intra-communal fighting. To this day, neither ‘can claim an overwhelming majority following’ among the Shia. But in the 90s, ‘Hezbollah was certainly the best-

\textsuperscript{188} Hezbollah’s resistance role is regarded as the only viable and so far successful option for regaining territory lost to Israel. Furthermore, as Milton-Edwards notes, ‘Hezbollah consolidated its reputation not just through its armed elements (…) but by addressing the pressing social and welfare needs of an impoverished community that had virtually been abandoned by the state’. Milton-Edwards, 2014.

\textsuperscript{189} Hezbollah runs an impressive and successful network of social and public services in the south, the Bequa’ and in Beirut’s Shia suburb (dahiyeh). It runs an elaborate network of education, healthcare, welfare, employment, development and reconstruction programs. For a discussion on Hezbollah’s social role see: Harik, 2005, p 81-94; Hala Jaber, \textit{Hezbollah: Born with a Vengence}(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997)., p 146-150; and Norton, 2007, p 107, 111.

\textsuperscript{190} The operation killed 3 Israeli soldiers and took 2 hostages. Hezbollah intended to use these soldiers to swap them with Lebanese fighters in Israeli jails (acting thereby on its \textit{wa’d al-Sadiq} or faithful promise to liberate detainees); in 2008 a German mediation led to this exchange: 5 fighters and the remains of another 200 Lebanese and Arab fighters were released. Although, during the war, Hezbollah and the population of the South received the support of the government and the rest of Lebanon, in the aftermath of the war, political divisions revolved around Hezbollah’s ‘provocation’ of Israel, unsustainable autonomy, alliance with Syria and Iran, and growing weight in the distribution of power. The war however, was ‘immensely destructive’ and weighed very heavily on human security. Some 1,200 were killed, 4,000 injured, and 1 million were displaced. Mary Kaldor and Genevieve Schmeder, “Human Insecurity in Lebanon: Consequences of War and Prospects for Peace,” in \textit{The European Union and Human Security: External Interventions and Missions}, ed. Mary Martin and Mary Kaldor(London and new York: Rotledge, 2010). p 77-78; for the divisions see: Norton, 2007, 132-136, 152-157.

\textsuperscript{191} The March 14 coalition (anti-Iran/Syria axis) has been vocal about it and has refused to participate in a government with Hezbollah, although it should also be noted that the same coalition has also played a big role in supporting anti-Assad groups. As a later discussion will show, Sunni fundamentalist groups have started staging suicide attacks against Hezbollah and Shia targets in response to Hezbollah involvement in the Syrian war.
organized political phenomenon and enjoyed the largest base of popular support’. Despite their rivalry, both converged on Hezbollah’s resistance role for the post-war era.

These are parties/militias that survived and retained a strong presence in the post-war era. It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the role of other parties/militias in the war and its aftermath. On the side of the Lebanese Front, other militias were the National Liberals Party, The Tigers, The Tanzim (the organization), and the Guardians of the Cedars. Although a loyal ally of Damascus and staunch opponent of the Lebanese Front, the Marada is a ‘Maronite’ party which survived the war. On the side of the LNM, aside from the PSP, ‘there was a plethora of other small Nasserist, Arab nationalist, and socialist organizations — and their ubiquitous splinter movements — whose patronage was divided among the various radical states (Syria, Libya, and Iraq)’. The Mourabitoun (financed by Libya), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Army of Arab Lebanon and the Populist Nasserist Organization (trained by the PLO) are such groups. In addition, the Communist Party and the Organization for Communist Action, played an integral part in the fighting. These are the fathers of resistance in Lebanon. Although active since the first 1978 Israeli invasion, in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 invasion, the Communist Party, the Organisation for Communist Action, and the Socialist Arab Action Party created the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) as ‘an umbrella for’ all groups fighting the occupation. As the influence and organization of these groups dissipated, the role of the resistance moved to Amal and eventually to Hezbollah.

It would of course also be wrong to underestimate the role of armed non-Lebanese actors, notably the various Palestinian factions, the Syrian forces and proxies, the IDF, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. That said, some scholars have disproportionately attributed the war to foreign actors, notably to the Palestinian armed presence and the role of regional and foreign powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Traboulsi, 2007, p 221-222.
197 They were instrumental in the militarization of Shia groups.
With respect to the Palestinian factions, their allegiances, their positions and role in the Lebanese conflict vary considerably. Broadly speaking, Fatah, the armed wing of the PLO constituted the biggest fighting force; the pro-Syrian Sa'ïqa came second. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its splinter group the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were radical Marxists. Another splinter group, the PFLP-General Command ‘was first under Libyan patronage, but then became a full-fledged Syrian proxy and remains so to this day’. Another group, the Arab Liberation Front was ‘pro-Iraqi’ and the Palestine Liberation Army’s units ‘were under the command of the respective Arab armies in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan’.

d) Assessing the role of armed non-state actors: forced cantonization and human insecurity

As the war increasingly entrenched the polarization between the Lebanese Front and the LNM, groups engaged in the purification of their areas of control from “intruders”. They soon succeeded in establishing separate cantons with more or less sectarian/ethnic homogenization. Fatahland, Marounistan, and the Druze Mountain are commonly referred to areas that witnessed the most severe homogenization—although West Beirut and some areas in the Bequa’ and south of Lebanon maintained some sectarian diversity. It has been argued that the proliferation of cantons or mini-states has been a reaction to post-1982 (Israeli invasion) Phalange hegemony over the state. Each camp endeavoured to strengthen its hold on power either to emulate the “successes” of, or to protect against the expansionism of, the ‘Phalange state’.

200 Badran, 2009.
201 Ibid.
202 This particularly happened where Sunni/Greek orthodox relations had been strong such as in West Beirut and where broad ‘Christian’/Shia relations such as in the south of Lebanon had also traditionally been strong. The neighbourhoods of Mazraa and Mousaytbeh in West Beirut, and southern border villages such as Deir Mar-Mimas, Alma al-Shaab are such examples. My personal and relatives’ experiences of the war are evidence of inter-sectarian coexistence during the war. See Hanf, 1993 and on Sunni/Greek Orthodox relations in West Beirut see: Michael Johnson, All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon (London: I.B.Tauris in Association With the Centre of Lebanese Studies, 2001), p 4.
Cantonization required that non-state actors develop an elaborate structure for ‘public and social services’ within their districts to replace the vacuum left by paralysed state institutions. For example, owing to cantonization, state employees and civil servants from outside certain districts could not make it to work and they could not be replaced. Law provides that a certain quota of government functionaries needs to be ‘Christian’, hence they could not be replaced by ‘Muslim’ functionaries and vice versa. Moreover, there was often no government to appoint new civil servants. Interestingly, many of the militias set up Popular Committees that paralleled that of the state’s service agencies to provide services such as civil defence, garbage collection, schools, ‘public security and law enforcement’, shelter and reconstruction. Health committees and judiciary committees were also created. Yet, the services the state could no longer provide were a result of the militias’ war. As the state lost its monopoly over the use of force and its functions were substantially reduced, effective control of territory was in militia hands.

These informal, yet state-like functions assured that some level of ‘normalcy’ in every-day life could be achieved, at least on non-violent days. Although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, informal traditional mechanisms of governance can be positive, this was not the case in Lebanon. Though Patron-client relations had always been a feature of Lebanese society, I suggest that militia governance is not an organic traditional feature. Rather than considering militia governance as informal, local, and traditional mechanisms of governance, the state functions of representation, security and welfare assumed renders them state-like entities (mini-states). The substitution of country-wide state governance with more local yet institutionalized forms of militia governance have taken form in the most regressive and predatory nature. It imposed an order where sectarian and national identities were exclusivist, defensive, introverted, militarized, and separatist. Furthermore, the imposed isolation of groups made sure these exclusivist sectarian identities are reproduced and ossified. In fact, soon after borders between the

204 In the case of the Shouf in Mount Lebanon the PSP established the Civil Administration of the Mountain (CAOM).
205 Ibid.
206 They insured that basic needs are meant, including access to food, water and electricity; that pursuing an education, engaging in business activities, and some means of subsistence are available; and that health, welfare, banking, and other services are available.
different militias were demarcated, violence turned inwards. This imposed yet again more threats to human security. Violence turned from expelling ethnic (Palestinian) or sectarian “intruders” to an internal ‘bitter struggle for power’ in order to monopolize control and to establish a ‘unique political and military representation’. Once that was established, violence was channelled deeper towards quelling any civilian opposition to the militia order. This order (imposed by foreign forces and militias) trapped Lebanese in a cycle of insecurity.

Commuting between the cantons was possible but difficult, as militias imposed state-like customs and border-control posts. This was clearly revenue generating but also a control mechanism. Further, ‘protection money and income taxes were imposed on economic activities such as agricultural enterprises, commercial and industrial firms, the liberal professions, and so on’; and consumer goods were taxed (from cigarettes to theatre tickets). The ‘militias took over most of the state’s income generating functions’. They taxed ‘the registration or transfer of land property, registration of cars, building permits, work permits and resident permits’. Furthermore, state ports were almost entirely or partially under militia control. Illegal ports that first served for arms smuggling, soon turned into private ‘militia-owned enterprises’. In 1983, the dozen cantons hosted some twenty ports. Militias soon controlled almost all trade and the distribution of essential goods such as fuel and flour. They became as indispensable as they were predatory. Organized criminal activity such as piracy, arms trafficking, drugs trafficking, contraband trafficking, pillage and thievery reached ludicrous proportions.

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209 Some of the ‘bloodiest confrontations’ of the war (not attacks on civilians) took place inside the broad group labels: War of the Camps, Amal vs. PSP in the LNM, Amal and Hezbollah, and fighting between the factions of the Lebanese Forces. Traboulsi, 2007, p 233.

210 Armed checkpoints on passageways between the cantons were mounted, and tolls were imposed on ‘passengers, vehicles and merchandise’. Ibid, p 233-236.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid, p 236, 288.

213 It was commonly known that ‘Afghan guerrillas, Yemeni tribes and the protagonists of the war in the former Yugoslavia were among their many customers’. Ibid, p 234.

214 Hashish was cultivated in more than 40 percent of the Bequa’ (heroin and cocaine production was also introduced). All militias collaborated in the trafficking and distribution networks. Ibid, 2007, p 234.

215 The biggest of which is believed to be the pillage of Port of Beirut by the Phalange militia. Corm, 2005, p 207.
As this new configuration of space was crystalized, militias, in the latter phase of the war, established cooperation networks between each other on profit-generating sectors and essential goods.\textsuperscript{218} This seems necessary to sustaining the militia order; but it also showcases the contradictions of the war order. As warlords they would fight each other. As politicians they would negotiate peace agreements. And as businessmen they would manage enterprises together. This class of warlords/bourgeois/politicians would form the ruling class of the post-war Lebanon.

Therefore, I contend that militia governance took patron-client relations to unprecedented regressive levels. By ossifying their exclusivist sectarian basis, Corm, rightly argues that the militia order attempted to destroy ‘the inter-sectarian social fabric’.\textsuperscript{219} While militia rule did not eliminate all forms of and aspirations to coexistence,\textsuperscript{220} I contend that the legacy of militia rule has been a major impediment to reconciliation in post-war Lebanon, locking society in a regressive zero-sum struggle for power.

e) Foreign governance of the Lebanese war

Israel’s ‘defence’ of the Maronite minority and the French protection of the Christians from the Palestinians and Muslims; Iran’s relationship with the Shia community and promotion of Khomeinism through their support of Hezbollah; Syrian intervention on all sides, as well as Saudi, Libyan or Iraqi support and finances to the various groups fostered an intrinsic relationship between local and foreign actors.\textsuperscript{221} This has meant that regional and international powers cherry-picked actors that suited their regional agendas. Taking into account the broader international environment (i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cold War, and the first Gulf War), agendas of foreign actors changed as the conflict evolved.

\textsuperscript{216} The biggest of which is believed to be robbery of the British Bank of the Middle East by a Palestinian group, which until recently was recorded in the Guinness Book of records as the world’s biggest robbery.
\textsuperscript{217} Corm, 2005, p 207-210.
\textsuperscript{218} Traboulsi, 2007, p 236-7.
\textsuperscript{219} Corm, 2005, p 199-204
\textsuperscript{220} See section III and Hanf, 1993.
\textsuperscript{221} Corm, 2005, p 209, 216.
As Corm points out both regional and international actors repeatedly chose militia representatives as interlocutors and partners.²²² By doing so, they repeatedly ignored and overlooked actors that had a wide popular base and that rejected the war-order. By alienating reconciliatory and reformist figures, they ossified the militia hold on power. For example, while the Phalange party only had 5 representatives in Parliament, they were treated as the sole representatives of the ‘Christian’ camp disregarding thereby the diversity and complexity of the situation, and adopting instead a very problematic ‘Christian’ label. Numerous ‘Christian’ leaders opposed the Phalange hegemonic agenda (e.g. Raymond Idde and Suleiman Frangieh). Also, figures in the opposition, for years, promoted cross-sectarian coexistence and/or secularisation (respectively Imam Musa al-Sader and Kamal Joumblat). Moreover, numerous Christian figures occupied high positions in the so-called ‘Muslim’ alliance (such as in the Marxist parties and the SSNP).²²³ For example, during one of the peace talks, the opposition presented a proposal to form a ‘civil administration’ headed by Albert Mansour (Christian and independent MP) that would introduce some reforms; but the proposal was refused by Arab regimes in favour of a military solution imposed by Syrian forces.²²⁴

Two main foreign state actors intervened directly in the conflict, essentially training, financing, arming and also directly participating in the fighting. Israel played a key role in supporting the Lebanese Front, acting as its life support for much of the war. It also fought the Palestinian factions across the Lebanese borders and launched reprisal attacks on Lebanese targets. It invaded Lebanon twice (in 1978 and 1982) which prompted the UN SC to establish the UNIFIL to confirm withdrawal and monitor the Blue Line separating the two countries.²²⁵ Since its two invasions, including after its withdrawal from Beirut to the south of Lebanon, Israel engaged in a protracted conflict with the Lebanese

²²² Ibid, p 219-222.
²²³ Ibid, p 115.
²²⁴ Traboulsi, 2007, p 199.
²²⁵ The Lebanese government contests the Blue Line and considers that some parts of south Lebanon remain under Israeli occupation (the strategic and water-rich Chebaa farms and Kfar chouba hills). After voiced objections from the Lebanese government, UN envoy Larson noted that the line does not hold any legal bearing and that the international border is a matter which should be negotiated by the two states. The Blue Line therefore legally only marks the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel."Jaysh Loubnan (the Lebanese Army).", p 47 ; Mounzir Jabar, "Min Khatt Al-Houdna Ila Al-Khatt Al-Azraq: Mou’dilat Al-Houdoud Al-Loubnaniya Ma’ Filastine Al-Mouhtalla (from the Armistice Line to the Blue Line: The Border Dilemma between Lebanon and the Palestinian Occupied Territories) " Ma’loumat no. 48 (Nov. 2007)., p 113; and UNIFIL website: http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11561&language=en-US (accessed on 10/11/2013).
resistance, which Hezbollah would soon monopolize. The occupation of the south remained until May 2000.

Following Israel’s invasion of 1982, the IDF imposed the election of LF commander Bashir Gemayel. After his assassination, the IDF presence also oversaw the election of his brother Amin Gemayel. The latter would use international military presence and the state to expand Phalange hegemony over the country. That being said, he would also return on his pledge to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Israeli retreats facilitated mass sectarian reprisals as seen in the massacres in Sabra and Chatila in 1982, in the Shouf in 1983, and in Sidon in 1984. In its withdrawal, in 2000, ‘after 18 years of struggle,’ Hezbollah prevented such sectarian violence from being committed against the communities that collaborated with the Israeli occupation or joined the SLA.

The Syrian army also acted as a protagonist during much of the war and imposed an iron fist on any opposition to its role or presence in Lebanon. Syria’s role in the governance of the Lebanese conflict was complex yet inescapable. Syria’s recurring “pacifying role” or its intervention on either side has largely been designed to maintain a favourable and strategic balance of power. It first intervened on the side of the Lebanese Front to counter the Palestinian and LNM expansion (by doing so effectively being on the side of the Israelis). In May of 1976 it forced the election of president Elias Sarkis—the candidate advanced by Syria, Saudi Arabia and the US. Its forces then entered Lebanon en masse in June 1976. Its intervention was legitimized by forming the Arab League’s lead contingent in the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to establish a cease-fire. As the cease-fire failed, and the Israeli invasion of 1982 followed, both forces shared the governance of Lebanese territory along the Litani ‘red line’. Then, as of 1987, its intervention was intended to stop the fighting between former allies in the LNM the PSP and Amal over the

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226 IDF tanks around the army barrack which housed the election made sure the elections took place accordingly.
227 Another interpretation is that he attempted to restore the authority of the state; however, as the events showed, the opposition did not perceive his actions to be legitimate or conciliatory.
228 Corm, 2005, p 204.
229 Members of Parliament were “escorted” by Syrian forces and there are reports that the CIA and Saudi Arabia bought MPs’ votes to ensure the election of Sarkis. Traboulsi, 2007, p 198.
230 In October 1976 at an Arab League summit, an agreement mediated by Saudi Arabia between Egypt’s Sadat and Syria’s Assad was reached regarding the ADF and a cease-fire. The bulk of if consisted of Syrian forces; Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates only provided ‘symbolic’ detachments; and Egypt did not participate in the peacekeeping operation. Ibid, p 201.
231 Each effectively occupied one side of the Red Line. The red line dates back to the 1976 Syrian intervention: the US had brokered an agreement with Israel for approving Syrian intervention so long as its forces do not cross the Litani river. Corm, 2005, p 121.
control of West Beirut.\textsuperscript{232} It then focused on neutralizing the ‘Christian’ opposition to the return of the Syrian forces.\textsuperscript{233} Finally, its intervention regained international coverage by forcing an end to the hostilities, demobilizing militias and implementing the terms of the regionally and internationally brokered Ta’if Accord.

Hence, the ‘governance’ of the Lebanese conflict was tossed between one or the other of Lebanon’s neighbours whilst regional and international stakeholders, on the ground or from a distance, fed the conflict. The international community took an irresolute\textsuperscript{234} stance \textit{vis-a-vis} an armed conflict that was marked with collective punishment, war crimes and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{235} Almost all UN resolutions were ignored;\textsuperscript{236} UNIFIL has been criticized for its weak and narrow mandate.\textsuperscript{237} Non-UN initiatives as well as Arab and American mediations failed.\textsuperscript{238} The ADF and the MNF failed.\textsuperscript{239} The international community was complicit on two consecutive occasions in the forced election of a Phalange warlord as president.\textsuperscript{240}

Also, both Israel and Syria were not held accountable for any of their international humanitarian law violations committed in Lebanon during the 1975-1990 war.\textsuperscript{241} For example, The Kahan Report of 1983 is the result of an Israeli Commission set up to investigate the IDF invasion of Beirut. It assigned direct responsibility to the Phalange

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Traboulsi, 2007, p 228.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Noting here that the LF and the PLO forged a new relationship whereby PLO fighters entered LF ports to assist against the now common Syrian opponent. Corm, 2005, p 132.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{235} For war crimes and crimes against humanity see: ICTJ, 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Such as Security Council (SC) chapter VII Resolution 425 of 1978 and other subsequent resolutions for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Harik, 2005, p 50.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Notably the MNF failed to protect non-combatant Palestinians. For a critique of UN and multinational peacekeeping in Lebanon see: Corm, 2005, 123-125 and Ramesh Thakur, \textit{International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force}(Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).
\item \textsuperscript{240} Corm, 2005, p 124
\item \textsuperscript{241} No effective investigation and prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity were undertaken; and responsibility for reparations to refugees and material damages was not upheld.
\end{itemize}
party and indirect responsibility over the Sabra and Chatila massacres to Israel. In addition, the UN MacBride 1982 Commission concluded that Israel’s actions during the invasion were ‘largely incompatible with the Geneva Conventions of 1949’. Other condemnations of violations by UN bodies failed to translate into action. Attempts to prosecute grave violations such as the Sabra and Chatila massacres under extraterritorial jurisdiction, failed. Similarly, violations of human rights law during Syria’s internationally brokered tutelage were disregarded.

The Lebanese war was inextricably linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cold War paralysis of the UN, and the international non-interventionist legal environment. Nevertheless, the international community repeatedly failed to respond effectively to a violent conflict that stretched over 15 years.

f) Ending the war and continued human insecurity

By 1989, the regional environment was such that it was time for the Lebanese war to end. Foreign stakeholders’ priorities largely converged and seemed adamant to conclude the Lebanese conflict. On 22 October 1989, Lebanese Members of Parliament gathered in the Saudi town of Ta’if, and signed the ‘Document of Lebanese National Accord’. Known as the Ta’if Agreement, the document laid the terms of the post-war phase and heralded the second Republic. The Accord was brokered by regional and international stakeholders.

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243 Likewise, the Report found that as the Occupying Power, Israel shared responsibility with the Lebanese militia over the massacres. Sean MacBride et al., Israel in Lebanon: The Report of International Commission to Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel During Its Invasion of the Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1983). p 117, 146.

244 For a very brief explanation of the international legal difficulties of prosecuting such violations at the time see: Smaira and Cassehgari, 2014, p 12. On the failure to prosecute the massacres under Belgian extraterritorial law (i.e. political pressure leading to legislative amendments) see: Chibli Mallat, "Special Dossier on the ‘Sabra and Shatila’ Case in Belgium," The Palestine Yearbook of International Law XII(2002/2003).

245 Syria imposed an iron fist in its governance of Lebanon in the post-war phase.

246 The war took place prior to the rise in special tribunals, humanitarian interventions, and the Rome Statue.

247 The Accord is often criticised as nothing more than a salad-bowl of failed war-time reform attempts; Tai’f takes elements from: the Constitutional Document accepted by then-President Franjiyyeh in 1976, proposals presented in 1983 in Geneva and in 1984 in Lausanne, the national unity governmental
international powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United States; it involved the heads or representatives of most main Lebanese factions. As no parliamentary elections took place during the war, the Parliament’s term had been extended; the MPs that signed the agreement were those elected in 1972 in addition to 40 members appointed by the government in order to ‘ensure the representation of all the war factions’. In November 1989, presidential elections and government formation took place under the Syrian forces’ guardianship and the approving eye of regional and international powers. General Michel Aoun, however, refused the terms of Tai‘f. In January 1990 he led a ‘War of Elimination’ against the Lebanese Forces to “reclaim the authority of the state” (commonly viewed as an intra-Christian war). However, the attention of the international community had diverted towards the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. They therefore refused ‘all discussions of the Taif Accord’ and almost all regional and international actors cut their ties with the only remaining obstacle—Gen. Aoun. Although the Syrian Forces had just played its ‘usual balancing role’ by ‘discretely’ helping the army against the LF, American and Israeli support would soon back a massive Syrian campaign to quell Aoun’s defiance of Ta‘if and remove him from power. Aoun’s ‘War of Liberation’ would end


249 First, Syrian forces ensured the election of president Rene Mouawad; then after his assassination, ensured the election of president Elias Hrawi. Note that elections in 1976 also took place under Syrian guardianship and in 1982 they took place under Israeli guardianship (for the Gemayel brothers).

250 Head of the LAF General Michel Aoun was appointed by outgoing President Amine Gemayel as interim Prime Minister (1988-1990) after parliament’s failure to elect a new president. He refused the Syrian tutelage and the re-distribution of power.

251 Meanwhile, the ‘Shia Muslim’ camp was also going through a final phase of in-fighting: Hezbollah and Amal were fighting for control over Beirut’s suburb (dahiyeh) and the south. On this front, it is the PLO that intervenes to put an end to the fighting (as noted above, the LF had encouraged the return of the PLO).

252 Aside from mass Lebanese cross-sectarian rallies in support of General Aoun’s stance (and war) against the Syrian presence, he received huge international media coverage and international support up until the Iraq war. Corm, 2005, p 142-143.

253 Importantly, Syria’ backing of General Aoun was intended to prevent the victory of the Israeli backed militia which could undermine Syria’s traditional role in Lebanon. Ibid, p 143.

254 Israel accepts a Syrian air campaign to support ground troops. A tacit agreement had been in place since the Israeli invasion of 1982 for Syrian planes not to fly over Lebanon.
on 13 October 1990. He would go on to find refuge in the French embassy before going to exile in France.  

The signing of Ta’if did not reclaim Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Syrian forces, which first entered Lebanon in 1976, left some 20,000 to 40,000 Syrian forces up until April 2005. Under Syrian tutelage, the Lebanese political scene was tightly controlled. Opposition was not tolerated; Gemayel and Aoun were exiled to France, and in 1994 the LF were banned. In 1996 demonstrations were banned. Arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearance were prevalent against activists. Furthermore, Israel and the SLA tightly controlled the south of Lebanon until May 2000. Israel and Hezbollah remained engaged in protracted conflict. On 25 July 1993, Israel led Operation ‘Accountability’, a seven-day war in retribution for Hezbollah attacks against Israeli and SLA targets in south Lebanon. Between the 11th and 26th of April 1996, Israel led operation ‘Grapes of Wrath’ causing mass displacement and severe civilian casualties as a result of air raids against, among other targets, the UNIFIL Fijian battalion. Further, between December 1998 and 5 May 2000, prior to the Israeli withdrawal, numerous raids and low-intensity cross-fires incurred civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as power stations, mobile telephone stations, and bridges. Finally between July 12 and 13 August 2006, Israel and Hezbollah fought another devastating war—the 33-days July War—leaving behind a high number of civilian deaths and injuries, one quarter of the population displaced, country-wide destruction of civilian infrastructure, and ‘a shocking scope’ of landmine and cluster bomb contamination in

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255 This period witnessed one of the fiercest and indiscriminate bombing campaigns between East and west Beirut.
256 Syrian tutelage or the Pax Syriana effectively began in 1987 when Syrian forces (re-)entered West Beirut; it was however institutionalized by Ta’if and the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination of 1991. For example: ‘the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State’. Ta’if III-second (D).
258 Johnson, 2001, Xviii.
260 The operation also involved a naval blockade of Lebanon’s Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre ports.
261 As mentioned above, 1,200 were killed, 4,000 injured, and 1 million were displaced. The rational was to rally the Lebanese against Hezbollah; the IDF therefore targeted roads, bridges, ‘power plants, telecommunications, water and oil installations, factories’ (dairy, pharmaceutical, steel, electric supplies
residential and agriculture areas. Therefore, even in the post-war period, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have faced human insecurity. The period following the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri and the ramifications of the Syrian war represent the newest phase of human insecurity for Lebanese.

The Lebanese war included an amalgam of actors, of changing alliances, and a series of interrelated conflicts. Aside from the humanitarian toll, the biggest loser was the state. It was side-lined, paralysed and overcome by the militias. Whatever legitimacy it had prior to the war (even if marginal) was lost. Ta’if was intended to restore the authority and legitimacy of the state. However, as protagonists formed the post-war political class, rivalries were reproduced. The allocation of top public positions to former warlords reinforced sectarian-based clientalism as the backbone of state-society relations. State institutions were linked to za’ims and sects; they were used for protecting or accumulating private and confessional interests. The state was hoped to reconcile warring interests and threat perceptions. No transformation of the Lebanese system, however, was undertaken. Instead, power was merely re-distributed, and Lebanon’s etc.), and of course residential buildings. For example the Shia Dahiyeh suburb was levelled to such an extent that it was referred to as: ‘ground zero’; also number of hospitals could not function because of lack of power and fuel. Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 77-78. For the intentional destruction of civilian industrial, agricultural, and commercial sectors see: Amnesty International, "Israel/Lebanon: Out of All Proportions - Civilians Bear the Brunt of the War."

262 One IDF commander reported to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz that they ‘covered entire villages with cluster bombs, what we did there was crazy and monstrous’. Israel launched some 1 million cluster munitions (which turn into almost 4 million sub-munitions) after the cease-fire had gone into effect: ‘that is more than twice as many submunitions used by Coalition forces in Iraq in 2003 and more than 15 times the number used by the United States in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002’. On landmine contamination during the 2006 war see: Human Rights Watch, "Flooding South Lebanon,"(Feb. 2008). Found at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon0208webcover.pdf (accessed on 20/5/2013), p37. Meron Rapoport, "When Rockets and Phosphorous Cluster," Haaretz 13/9/2006. From: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/when-rockets-and-phosphorous-cluster-1.197146 (accessed on 17/11/2013). And see ICTJ mapping report for violations committed during these conflicts.

264 i.e community leaders.
265 Picard, "The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias.", p 43-46.
266 In favour of the ‘Sunni’ block.
problematic system persisted. Ta’if’s cosmetic reforms, Syrian tutelage, and Israeli occupation of the south reproduced the 1976 status quo, instating a precarious peace.

4) The Post civil war phase: the unsustainability of the 2nd Republic

a) The post-war arrangement: Ta’if’s limited reforms

The provisions of the Ta’if Accord were incorporated into the Constitution on September 21, 1991. Most importantly, the Agreement ended the war and paved the way for the second Republic. The document has been revered by some; others, however, rightly argue that Ta’if’s contributions are exaggerated.

On the one hand, Ta’if recognized that abolishing political sectarianism should be ‘a fundamental national objective’ and requested Parliament to set up a ‘national council’ to formulate a ‘phased plan’ for that purpose. It proposed an interim period in which jobs in the public sector were to be allocated according to merit, but excluded top-level jobs which were to ‘be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect’. Also, Ta’if stipulated that the mention of sect and denomination on the national identity card be abolished.

On the other hand, in order to address the pre-war grievance of disproportionate power being held by Christians, executive power was transferred from the office of the president (traditionally held by a Maronite Christian) to the Council of Ministers (notably the Prime Minister, who is by custom Sunni). It also established parliamentary mounassafa (parity) between Christians and Muslims until an election law ‘free from sectarian restrictions’ is adopted, and until a Senate representing Lebanon’s sectarian groups is formed to deal only with ‘crucial’ matters. Koch explains that the replacement of ‘proportional’ with ‘equal’ representation of the communities is an agreement that the country would be shared by its two main religious groups, regardless of demographic

269 Ta’if II-G
270 Ibid. II-G (a)
271 Ibid. II-A (5-7)
conditions.\textsuperscript{272} Many, however, are concerned that the redistribution of powers was brokered between the Maronites and the Sunnis, without giving due attention to other denominations—including what was now the largest minority, the Shiite community.

In one sense, by adopting the equal division principle, the Lebanese elites committed themselves to coexistence. Having said that, the National Pact had informally specified which sects are entitled to hold specific posts. In doing so, the Pact classified the relative importance of not only the posts, but also the religious denominations entitled to occupy them. It is in this sense that one might say Lebanon ‘is the sectarian state \textit{par excellence}.\textsuperscript{273} Therefore, one may argue that the constitutional system in Lebanon has inherent contradictions.\textsuperscript{274} As Salim Al-Hoss had noted long before Ta’if: ‘the system has always had plenty of freedom but suffered from a lack of democracy.’\textsuperscript{275}

The document is thus insubstantial; the general principle to abolish sectarianism in time is present, but there are no authoritative clauses that lead in this direction. A secular election law has not been formulated, a Senate has not been formed, and no plan to phase out sectarianism is in place. While top-level jobs have been allocated equally between Christians and Muslims, they are allocated to specific sects, and the provision on public-sector jobs has not been adopted. One may therefore observe that Ta’if further reinforced and institutionalized sectarianism.

On another level, Ta’if recognized that ‘culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state’s unity and of the system’s stability.’\textsuperscript{276} So, in order to address pre-war grievances of social injustice, Ta’if provided for strengthening the ‘central authority’ in order to implement ‘a comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially.’\textsuperscript{277} Ta’if also stipulated administrative decentralization to strengthen the capabilities of local authorities in achieving development. However, decentralization has not been adopted,

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid, p 2.
\textsuperscript{274} The 1926 Constitution, the National Pact and the Ta’if Agreement.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid. I-F
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid. III-A (1-5)
local capabilities remain marginal, and cases of starkly inequitable regional development remain a regular feature of post-war Lebanon.

In the spirit of reconciliation, Ta’if included a provision on the right ‘of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted’. The post-war government set up a reparation program for the internally displaced: the Ministry of Displaced and the Fund for the Displaced were established to plan and fund the program. However, the program is known for its selectiveness, flawed implementation, corruption, and abuse for political gains. The reparation program also included a reconciliation package. The latter was put in place in some 20 mixed massacre-torn villages in Mount Lebanon; the numerous conditions imposed on individuals and communities undermined reconciliation. The outcome remains limited and fragile.

Similarly, Ta’if identified education as a means to foster reconciliation and a national identity. It called for educational reform to build national cohesion, and stated that: ‘the curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.’ However, scholars are not convinced that Ta’if provided for this clause to be implemented. The curriculum, for example, teaches ‘equal rights to hold a job with no preference being made except on the basis of merit and competence,’ as well as the principle of ‘democracy of the majority’. These foster a culture

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280 Ta’if II-D.
282 Community-based reconciliation was a condition for disbursing reparation funds, victims were often not involved, individual responsibility was not established, and litigation was not allowed; therefore, reconciliation was often fake. Aïda Kanafani-Zahar, "Displacement, Return and Reconciliation in Mount Lebanon," in Reconciliation, Reform and Resilience. Positive Peace for Lebanon, ed. Elizabeth Picard and Alexander Ramsbotham(London: Conciliation Resources, 2012). p 46-48.
283 See Appendix.
284 It was introduced in 1997.
of majority rule rather than consensus and power-sharing. Therefore, a gap is created between the realities pupils live in and the principles they learn in school. Maha Shuayb argues that ‘the Ta’if Agreement did little to tackle the authority of religious establishments in reforming education which is known to have contributed to the identity dilemma in Lebanon.’ Importantly, only the heads of the religious and sectarian communities can call on the constitutional council to arbitrate legal matters pertaining to ‘personal status, and freedoms of belief, religious practice, and religious education.’ It is clearly not possible for political and secular actors to present their cases. Ta’if thereby closes the door on attempts to restrain sectarianism. The government has long had little influence on what history of Lebanon is taught in schools; instead, by controlling curricula, religious authorities continue to shape identities. This argument is illustrated by the Lebanese Parliament’s rejection of a comprehensive draft educational plan in 1994 after pressure from the religious authorities. And, the new curriculum again failed to produce a ‘standardized history and religious textbooks accepted by confessional communities in Lebanon.’ This issue continues to impede efforts to foster national cohesion.

While Ta’if sought to address the major causes of the war and provide for urgent institutional reform, it failed to bring about the needed transformation. Ta’if failed to provide an authoritative plan to transform the Lebanese system and reconcile Lebanese communities: the reform plans were minimal, it failed to provide a timeline for reforms, and it conserved the problematic formula of sectarian power-sharing.

286 Ibid.
287 Article 19 of Ta’if created a constitutional council to ‘oversee the constitutionality of laws and to adjudicate the conflicts stemming from the presidential and parliamentary elections.’ The President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament can ‘petition the council’, and ten members of Parliament are also allowed to do so. In religious education and personal status matters, as stated above, only heads of sects can petition the council. Shuayb states that ‘in a state where a significant number of educational institutions are religiously affiliated, this puts them in a unique position to block secularization of education and thwart attempts to create a secular and unifying national identity.’ Ibid.
288 A study conducted in the pre-war period noted that schools have been referring to ‘twenty different history texts’, some were ‘contradictory’, and the ‘minister of education exercised his authority over their content only in cases of extreme abuse’. Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996). p 1.
That being said, Ta’if did provide general guidelines for reforming institutions that can help Lebanon address some of the lingering socio-economic and political causes of instability; but little progress has been achieved since the 1990s. However, these are areas in which the Lebanese authorities can achieve successes.\textsuperscript{291} Lebanon should, at the least, begin taking decisive steps to implement and build on these provisions.

\textit{b) Problematizing the Lebanese consociational model}

Lebanon has a long experience with consociationalism. It has been informally applied since 1943; however, the Lebanese version neither conformed to the consociational model nor to changing domestic conditions. Consociationalism is a tool for conflict regulation and power-sharing in heterogeneous societies.\textsuperscript{292}

Consolidated democracies such as Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands are considered relatively successful examples of consociationalism. However, in many other cases, it has proven much more difficult for protagonists to peacefully coexist and overcome past legacies. In explaining the different types of consociations, Brendan O’Leary qualifies the Ottoman rule after the \textit{Tanzimat} over the Middle East as an undemocratic consociation; one might argue that the same could be said regarding the subsequent Lebanese model. O’Leary notes that the model applied in Lebanon at the onset of the civil war was a ‘centrifugal democracy’ in which ‘politicians compete within a fragmented multi-cultural environment.’ The ideal consociational democratic model, however, requires politicians to ‘cooperate’ and accommodate.\textsuperscript{293} The previous two models are types of democracies identified by Arend Lijphart. By accommodation, Lijphart means ‘the settlement of divisive issues and conflict, where only a minimal consensus exists.’ The parties involved need not agree on the same vision, but must share the conviction that an absence of settlement is detrimental.\textsuperscript{294} The challenge in consociationalism is to improve

\textsuperscript{291} Such areas are: decentralization, equitable development, a history textbook, and preparing for a Senate and a secular election law.

\textsuperscript{292} Brendan O’Leary defines it as: a state or region within which two or more cultural or ethnic or national communities peaceably coexist (…) and in which the relevant communities cooperate politically through self-government and shared-government. Brendan O’Leary, "Consociation: What We Know or Think We Know and What We Need to Know," in Conference on National and Ethnic Conflict Regulation at the University of Western Ontario (Nov. 2002).

\textsuperscript{293} Competition within the blocs is advised, as opposed to competition between the blocs (whereby one tries to overcome the others).

\textsuperscript{294} See: O’Leary, 2002.
the system without threatening the vital interest of any of the parties—to forgo zero-sum games. Based on Lijphart’s model, consociationalism has four basic tenets. The first tenet is that minorities are represented in the executive and that the elites are committed to cooperation; Lijphart emphasizes the role of the elite in engineering the success of power-sharing. The second is that proportional representation, distribution of public offices, and allocation of resources are guaranteed. The third, that groups are granted the autonomy to run their own affairs. The fourth, the right of veto is granted to minority groups on vital issues. Michael Kerr further adds that a conducive regional and international environment plays a vital role in the success or failure of a consociational experience. While some claimed that the civil war in Lebanon was a result of consociationalism, it can be noted that the tenets above show that consociationalism in Lebanon has yet to be properly applied. Crucially, both elite cooperation and a supportive regional environment have often proved to be scarce in the Lebanese context; on such occasions, Lebanon fell into instability.

Although, consociationalism has had many merits including the guarantee of confessional freedoms, Lebanon’s version of power-sharing has institutionalized a problematic system. Samir Khalaf notes that Ta’if ‘consecrated’ the ‘sectarian and confessional logic’ above all other. Lebanon’s consociationalism has maintained the grip of politico-sectarian leaders on the masses; this has reinforced segregation and the identity crisis at the expense of an inclusive national identity.

296 Therefore, ‘even if Lebanon met all of Lijphart’s different criteria,’ and domestically succeeded in the bargaining game, Kerr argues that it would still fall under the will of the major world powers. Kerr, 2006, 40.
297 In addition to cooperation, proportionality and veto to minority groups have not been guaranteed in the Lebanese system. Veto is an issue which caused unrest political paralysis after the 2006 crisis in Lebanon whereby the majority resisted conceding to the opposition the right of veto in vital matters.
This study argues that consociationalism may be a valuable model in the short-term, because it addresses threat perceptions and provides for groups to practice power-sharing. Nevertheless, it remains a partial arrangement. This study is concerned that consociationalism locks groups in their differences without providing for long-term arrangements for integration.

5) Recurring crises and lessons (not) learned: The 1958 Rebellion and post-civil war era

In an effort to understand persistent instability and insecurity in Lebanon, this section takes a historical-comparative approach by shedding light on another crisis Lebanon underwent—the 1958 mini-civil war, which can be regarded as a prelude to the 1975 war. A simplification traces the causes of conflict to faults in the system exacerbated by unilateral decision making, bad policies, corruption, and regional/international influences.

The Rebellion took place during the term of Kamil Chamoun (1952-1958). His term was characterized by sharp contradictions: while on the one hand his policies were responsible for the famous clichés describing Lebanon as the Switzerland and the Paris of the Middle East, on the other hand he managed to alienate and upset most political and religious figures because of the rift he created between the different components of Lebanese society. As expected, the regional and international context played a significant role in the unfolding of the crisis. The international community was deeply sunk in the Cold War and regional events constituted its battleground. For the US, events in the area were particularly relevant for containing the Soviet threat. The rise of Abdel Nasser and the creation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, as well as the fall of the monarchy in Iraq, threatened the balance of power.

Many of the reasons behind the rebellion were structural: a ‘system (…) based on a static balance of power.’ They were exacerbated by other contemporary reasons: Chamoun turning his back on his Arab neighbours and aligning instead too closely with the

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301 As per the Eisenhower Doctrine.
West, nepotism, corruption, and individualism in a country based on the careful balance of power.

Several regional factors contributed to this period’s economic growth: the boom in the oil economies of the gulf and Saudi Arabia; the economic repercussions of the creation of the state of Israel; and the flow of Arab capital to Lebanese banks fleeing the first wave of nationalization in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Chamoun’s legacy was his success in turning regional circumstances to Lebanon’s advantage. His administrative and economic reforms laid favourable ground for foreign investment and a free market economy. However, this prosperity was only felt by a section of the population, in specific areas such as Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and in specific sectors. The tertiarization of the economy came at the expense of other sectors. To illustrate: the percentage of people working in agriculture fell from fifty to twenty percent between the late 1950s to the early 1970s. This in itself would not necessarily have been a dramatic transformation had it been spread to different communities. Odeh explains that the ‘laissez-faire [was] grafted on to a confessional polity.’ As social, sectarian and regional disparities increased, tension followed.

Therefore, as in the pre-independence period, although Lebanon’s economic model witnessed waves of prosperity, it was ‘extraverted’, ‘imbalanced’ and ‘fragile’, and disparities ‘amplified’ other political, structural and foreign factors.

Four decades later, as the ‘Sunni’ community gained the upper hand, similar policies were replicated by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in the post-civil war reconstruction

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304 Labaki, 1988, p. 166.
305 Traboulsi, 2007, p 128.
306 i.e. banking secrecy law etc. Labaki, 1988, p 166.
307 For example, only five families controlled half of the country’s export/import trade. Ibid, p 157.
308 i.e. commercial and financial.
309 Labaki, 1988, p 166.
310 Traboulsi, 2007, p 159.
311 In this respect, Gregoire Haddad (Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut) warned: If it were again a question of the liberal economy in which the strong oppresses and exploits the weak (...) if it were finally the case of the Lebanon of the privileged few, we shall quickly see the positive security of the majority threatened by the gravest dangers and face a catastrophe from which Lebanon will not stand up. Emphasis added. Traboulsi, 2007, p 156.
312 A study done by Yusef Sayegh demonstrates the Christian control over the economy: it showed that in the late ’50s the ratio of Christian to Muslim entrepreneurs working in industry was 10:2; in finance it was 11:2; and in services it was 16:2. Odeh, 1985, p 17; and Yusef Sayegh, *Entrepreneurs of Lebanon* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962). p 69.
period. Successive governments continued to emphasize an extraverted tertiarized economy at the expense of balanced sectoral, socio-economic and regional development.314

Moreover, Chamoun and Hariri, three decades apart, had both promised to fight corruption and to initiate administrative reform; both fell short of their pledges. The abuse of power by Chamoun was pushed to new limits.315 The president ‘exacerbated sectarian tensions as no other political leader had done before him,’316 He ruled through a consortium of friends, business men and ‘Nouveaux Riches’.317 With most traditional leaders left out, they started looking outwards.

In the post-civil war phase, most of the powers of the President were transferred to the Prime Minister. Unlike Chamoun, Hariri was in tune with regional dynamics.318 However, Walid Charara argues that Hariri chose to co-exist with the inherited system while creating his own ‘fiefdoms recruited from among his business associates.’319 The large support he received from Saudi Arabia and the United States allowed him to eliminate all competition and alienate traditional community leaders. As he ruled through a ‘new class of merchant princes,’ he can be reproached with some of the same vices as Chamoun: unilateralism and nepotism.320 Similarly, the electoral law of 2000 was a Syrian imposition and was designed to guarantee the election of a pro-Syrian, pro-status quo Hariri coalition.

314 ‘It was already clear from the start that Hariri’s rebuilding projects would focus primarily on Beirut rather than the country as a whole, put the finance sector before agriculture and industry, concentrate on economic and urban infrastructure at the expense of human capital, and in the short term be more interested in monetary stability than in overall economic growth’. Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, “Hariri’s Lebanon,” Middle East Policy VI, no. 2 (Oct. 1998).
315 According to Traboulsi, Chamoun had ‘pushed his exercise of power to the limits of autocracy’. Under Chamoun, Presidential control was extended to both the legislative and the executive branches: The daily newspaper L’Orient wrote that ‘the head of the state has become the entire legislature and the entire executive’. He chose weak Prime Ministers who lacked strong popular support; he also by-passed ministers and established instead direct working relationships with the Directors-Generals of the ministries. Furthermore, he chose an electoral law that guaranteed a friendly legislature. The law was based on small electoral districts which conveniently weakened traditional leaders’ alliances and holds over power. The amount of money poured in by external actors (notably the US) also guaranteed a subordinate Parliament.
316 Traboulsi, 2007, p 130.
317 Ibid, p 87.
318 At the time, regional and international priorities had converged: Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the US shared good relations.
In terms of foreign policy, Chamoun defied the National Pact by joining the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957, putting Lebanon at odds with its people and its neighbours.\textsuperscript{321} The last straw came when Chamoun refused to deny claims that he would not run for a second term.\textsuperscript{322} Therefore, the opposition (largely Muslim) rose up against him.\textsuperscript{323} In the aftermath of the civil war, the tables were turned; the so-called ‘reign’ of the Hariri family has left the Christian minority and many traditional leaders from across the spectrum marginalized and alienated.\textsuperscript{324} That being said, he accommodated well with the Syrian tutelage, with the Shia main parties, and Hezbollah’s resistance role; therefore, the ground was not yet set for another inversion of power. As the next chapter shows, the situation changed when regional and international dynamics changed.

This short exposé of the crisis is meant to illustrate the similarities between the wars and the continued precariousness of the Lebanese situation which, with the right combination of factors, can deteriorate into a renewed protracted conflict — as is shown in the spill-over of the Syrian war.

\textsuperscript{321} As mentioned, the National Pact entails that the ‘Christians’ renounce Western protection. Khalidi, 1979, p 36.

\textsuperscript{322} In Lebanon the presidential term lasts 6 years, and is un-renewable unless by an amendment and justified by national security considerations (for another 3 years).

\textsuperscript{323} As per Chamoun’s request and per the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, US Marines were deployed to protect the friendly regime against the Communist threat (the influence of and the support of Nasser and the United Arab Republic to the Lebanese opposition). Operation Blue Bat (Jul-Oct 1958) was the first military application of the Doctrine. See: Brands, 1987-1988.

\textsuperscript{324} Amine Gemayel (head of the Phalangist Party) did not attend the third 14\textsuperscript{th} of March General Meeting (14/3/2010) in resentment to the way decisions have been taken on behalf of the coalition. An Nahar Newspaper, 15/3/2010. From: http://www.annahar.com/print.php?table=mahaly&type=mahaly&priority=7&day=Mon&kind=article,(accessed on 17/3/2010).
III. Drawing Comparisons and Conclusions: Legacies from the Pre and Post-Independence Periods

Understanding the pre-independence phase allows us to understand the foundation for Lebanon’s post-independence situation. The aim of the previous discussions, therefore, was to highlight trends and characteristics which developed under the Ottoman rule and persisted into more contemporary times. The seeds of sectarianism might have been planted under the Ottoman rule, but it would grow to dominate the discourse on conflict in Lebanon.

The sectarian discourse notes that since the Iqtaa, the Druze supremacy was replaced by a Maronite monopoly over the mandate and early independence, but only until it was itself replaced by the new Sunni Majority at the end of the 15-year civil war. Since the Shia community has become the largest minority in Lebanon, are we to expect another turn of power? Many claim that the events of May 2008 were one such attempt or the start of the Shia rise to power.\(^{325}\) Having considered this, at present the religious communities in Lebanon have all conceded to the Lebanese identity – but what has it meant for each community to be Lebanese? Salibi notes in *House of Many Mansions* that ‘the Lebanese will first have to reach a consensus on what makes of them a nation or political community’.\(^{326}\)

Many of Mount Lebanon’s characteristics survived to become the characteristics of modern day Lebanon. Due to its strategic location, and the possibility to capitalize on its diversity, it has also been part of regional plans. As Makdisi argues, the sectarian discourse can only be understood by equally acknowledging domestic as well as foreign roles. Therefore, France’s ambition to turn Lebanon into a “Christian model”\(^{327}\) as well as the Ottoman Empire’s complacency in showcasing its modernization efforts under the *Mutassarifiya*\(^{328}\) bring to mind contemporary aspirations for turning Lebanon into a model for ‘confessional coexistence’, a battleground for regional rivalry, or the front-line for resistance.

\(^{325}\) Clashes resulting in Hezbollah taking over Beirut following the unilateral decision of the pro-West government to dismantle the resistance’s telecommunication network. See chapter 6.
\(^{326}\) Salibi, 2005, p 17.
\(^{327}\) Traboulsi, 2007, p 43-45.
\(^{328}\) Makdisi, 2000, p 5.
In addition to this geo-strategic consideration, the economy continues to cater to and depend on these foreign actors, to the neglect of comprehensive sector planning. It is striking how conflicts centuries apart can resemble each other. The need for a regional arbitrator and interferences of international powers repeat themselves in the unfolding of crises in Lebanon. The Ottoman Empire was replaced by Syria; and the role of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria or Iran, as well as international ones continues to be relevant. Public figures have fled to the French embassy; special commissions and tribunals were set up, and foreign troops have landed on Lebanese soil to pacify the country. Similar to the Mutassarifya’s dependence on sericulture and Beirut as its outlet, post-civil war governments have relied on the service sector with intense centralization in Beirut. This comes at the cost of diversification, sustainability and equality. In addition, the dependence on remittances, although they are no remedy for the large deficit, have made the two cases – two centuries apart – even more similar. As Lebanon remains plagued with severely uneven socio-economic development, this study argues that lessons could, and should, be drawn from Lebanon’s history.

Coupled with persistent disparity due to reproachable policy choices, the capabilities and legitimacy of state institutions remain weak. State authority and legitimacy remain weak as it largely fails in its three core functions of representation, protection, and welfare. Sectarian-based clientelism replaces the state in these functions. These conditions, in conjunction with these policy choices, have resulted in historical, social, ideological, political and cultural friction. This friction has been successfully capitalized on by regressive leaders, while nationwide societal cohesion remains fragmented. Odeh noted some time ago that the Lebanese model has ‘legitimized unequal relationships in politics and economics among the population and regions’; the staticness of the system continues to do so.

Some would argue that the Hariri rule (post-1990s) had finally managed to get rid of many of the regressive traditional leaders, but this is not entirely true. Many powerful names joined in, controversially including former warlords; father and son alike cast aside

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329 The leader of the commoners’ revolt Shahin in 1860 and General Aoun in 1990.
331 The Ottoman, British and Austrian troops during the Iqtaa; French and Ottoman troops in 1860; the American Marines in 1958; an Arab Deterrent Force in 1976; a Multinational force in 1982; and Syrian troops until 2005).
333 Odeh, 1985, p 17.
any old or new figures which had different façon de faire.\textsuperscript{334} This also took place in 2005, at the formation of the first government in the post-Syrian era.\textsuperscript{335} This trend illustrates how whenever the consociational tradition was abused, tension grew and eventually led to conflict.

Societal security is understandable, but a power-sharing system does not have to impede positive change and integration. As Ghassan Salameh notes, the system needs to be more flexible to allow for its own gradual ‘transformation.’\textsuperscript{336} In addition, the elite as well as its civil society must assume a more integrating role. Sectarian appeasement, however, is not the answer to conflict in Lebanon; the socio-economic and developmental dimensions of conflict need to be addressed concomitantly.

It is an illusion and a fallacy to attribute political violence in Lebanon solely to sectarianism. When comparing the pre- and the post-independence periods, this study highlighted policy trends which have been replicated over the decades and which have been detrimental to Lebanon’s interest. Importantly, this study emphasizes that the sectarian narrative has been thin and does not do justice to the complexity of conflict in Lebanon. The identification of broad religious communities is a reductionist approach, and does not take into account the diversity within these groups or the multi-layered interactions and relationships shared between them. This study therefore stresses that there has always been diversity within the broad sectarian groups that academics and mainstream narratives have portrayed. Anyone familiar with Lebanese politics would be able to name several outstanding public figures that have not confined themselves to a rigid exclusivist narrative.\textsuperscript{337} Indeed, the sectarian factor alone cannot explain political violence and civil war in Lebanon; it is the combination of manipulation or abuse of sectarian fears with various other factors that came together to escalate non-violent conflicts into armed ones.

\textsuperscript{334} Druze leader Joumblat and Shia leader Berri, as well as those who, at the time, were considered second-rate figures on the Christian side, joined the Hariri fever. Elie Ferzali and Farid Khazin are such examples (although they were not warlords, they are both from traditional “patron” families). In the aftermath of the war, high profile ‘Christian’ names that took part in the war were side-lined: Amine Gemayel and General Michel Aoun were exiled to France, and Samir Geagea was imprisoned. All were opposed the terms of Ta’if.

\textsuperscript{335} PM Siniora cast aside General Aoun while forming his government (biggest Christian force at the time) and took a series of unilateral decisions which led to the formation of a powerful opposition (traditional leaders such as Hoss, Karami, Frangieh, the Communist and the Syrian Nationalist Parties) joined by Hezbollah, the largest and most powerful party (the only one legitimized to bear weapons to fight Israel).


\textsuperscript{337} For example, Imam Moussa Sader and Ghassan Tueini were vanguards of coexistence even at the height of the civil war.
As I borrow some words from Augustus Norton, I contend that as long as ‘power remains in the grip of a coterie of politicians on good terms’ with the regional hegemons and the ‘government operates like a giant patronage machine’ rivalry and threat perceptions will block comprehensive reform.  

To conclude, Lebanon’s crises can therefore be broken down to identity, socio-economic, political, regional and international factors. The flaws in the system render the Lebanese domestic scene vulnerable to manipulation — to a regressive form of governance. The Lebanese system therefore requires deep revisions, instead of quick-fixes that have so far only postponed the next crisis. The above discussions have showed that the ruling elites have actively sought to maintain the status-quo; also, that they have failed to create a system pragmatic and flexible enough to adapt to changing environments. They have, however, succeeded in largely mobilizing their constituencies on a sectarian basis; this has tended to take place in volatile and tense times because of the fragility of the system. Meanwhile, traditional political parties and civil society groups have largely failed to offer healthy alternatives, and their contributions have fed the dominant sectarian discourse. Non-traditional actors discussed in the next chapter are key to galvanizing progressive change. Critical security studies helped us see the regressiveness of the prevailing system. It is a system based on top-down, exclusivist, power-centric, militaristic and rival attitudes which continuously threaten human security. Critically, it is unsustainable as it periodically erupts into political violence.

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339 More will be said on the role of political parties and civil society in a later discussion.
Chapter 6: Present-day Precarious Security in Lebanon

The discussions in the second part of this dissertation have so far examined the varied factors and players contributing to Lebanon’s precarious human security. This chapter extends the discussion to more recent times. The first section contextualizes Lebanon’s security environment since 2004, the year the international community underwent a shift in policy towards Lebanon. The second section looks at the various Lebanese positions towards the Arab uprisings and the manifestations of the spill-over of the Syrian war on human security. The third section gives a voice to non-traditional groups exhorting pressure for the transformation of the Lebanese system. It sheds light on structural constrains to human security of vulnerable and marginalised groups, and argues for the progressive transformation of Lebanon’s traditional system.

I- Post-2004 Security Environment: change and human insecurity

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the post-war phase was characterised with a Syrian tutelage and an Israeli occupation of the south of Lebanon.\(^1\) Largely, human security was threatened if one were active against the Syrian presence, if one resided in the south, if one were active against the Israeli occupation,\(^2\) or if one were caught in incidents of fighting between the various Palestinian factions or other armed groups.\(^3\) By 2004, Lebanon was still faced with the legacies of a fifteen-year civil war.\(^4\) However, aside from exceptional instances, a safe everyday life was common; human insecurity would escalate

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\(^1\) As mentioned before, the lingering dispute is over the Chebaa Farms and the Kfarchouba Hills, which are strategic and rich in water; Lebanon maintains its right to liberate the remaining occupied land.

\(^2\) Given the protracted conflict between the IDF and Hezbollah, as well as the landmine problem.

\(^3\) For example: 2003 fighting between Fatah and Osbat al-Ansar and 2008 fighting between Fatah and Jund-el Sham in the Ain el-Helweh refugee camp in Sidon (Fatah was fighting two fundamentalist groups). *Factions fight in Lebanese camp*, BBC, 21/3/2008. From: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7309079.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7309079.stm) (accessed on 10/1/2014)

\(^4\) Most notably: a Syrian military presence, an on-going military conflict with Israel and an armed resistance, a largely undermaraoted and porous border with Syria, a Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) problem across Lebanese society, armed groups in and outside the Palestinian camps, and weak state security institutions. *Ma’loumat*, 2007, p 47; Jaber, Nov. 2007, p 113; and Adib, 2012, p 9. Also see chapter 7.
as of 2004 as political violence returned to Lebanon with the deteriorating political situation.

1) Political violence since 2004

a) The context

Priorities of regional, international, and certain domestic players aligned in Lebanon since 2004 to mobilize against particular ‘threats’. These are the spread of terrorism and the containment of Irano-Syrian influence. This was evident in efforts by France, the United States and the United Kingdom to ‘cut Lebanon from what [they] saw as the Syrian-Iranian axis and to eliminate Hezbollah’. SC Resolution 1559 (2004) targeted Syrian presence and Hezbollah; it called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extending the control of the Lebanese government over all its territory—including along the Blue Line, as well as calling for ‘free and fair elections’. Resolution 1559 led to a snowball effect of consecutive security incidents and political crises. These materialized in large scale demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, a wave of political assassinations, bombings, clashes, and government deadlocks.

5 Seen by the US administration and its allies as a threat to their security and interests in the region. Hence, the US Congress passed in 2003 the ‘Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.’
6 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 89.
7 This and resolution 1680 (2006) were part of the escalating pressure on the Syrian government and its allies in Lebanon. In the words of the United States’ representative: ‘the Syrian Government had imposed its political will on Lebanon and had compelled the Cabinet and Lebanese National Assembly to amend its constitution and abort the electoral process by extending the term of the current President by three years.’ In addition, Resolution 1680 (2006) specifically requested the Syrian government to delineate its borders with Lebanon and establish normal diplomatic relations. As Russia, China, Algeria, Brazil, Pakistan, and Philippines abstained the resolution is seen as the start of Western pressure over and isolation of Syria. Russia and China also abstained in the vote on Resolution 1680. UN Press Release, SC/8181, 2/9/2004. From: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm (accessed on 24/4/2012) and http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8723.doc.htm (accessed on 1/8/2012). Also see: Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Stl): Impartial or Imposed International Justice?," Nordic Journal of Human Rights 31, no. 2 (2013). p182.
Following the Hariri assassination, attacks, mostly against anti-Syria figures,\(^8\) but also against pro-Syria ones,\(^9\) against Palestinian figures,\(^10\) and against purely civilian targets spread fear in society.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) These also took the lives of many civilians. On October 1, 2004 Marwan Hamedeh survived a car bomb but his driver didn’t. In 2005: on February 14, former PM Rafic Hariri and 22 others are killed in a huge blast in Beirut; on June 2, famous anti-Syria journalist died in a car bomb explosion; on June 21, George Hawi, former secretary general of the Communist Party died in a car bomb; on July 12, one civilian died but Defence Minister Elias Murr and nine civilians survived a car bomb; on 25 September, Journalist May Chidiac survived a car bomb placed under her car but lost her arm and leg. On December 12, famous journalist and MP Jibran Tueini, his driver, and a passer-by died in a car bomb. In 2006: on November 21, Pierre Gemayel, MP and Industry Minister and his bodyguard were shot dead; on June 13, MP Walid Eido, his son and eight civilians died in a car bomb; on September 19, MP Antoine Ghanem and five civilians died in a car bomb. In 2007: on December 12, General François el-Hajj (led the fight against the Fateh al-Islam fundamentalist group in and around the Palestinian camp Nahr el-Bared and was set to be appointed as chief of the army) and his bodyguard were killed in a car bomb. In 2008: on January 15 a car bomb targeting a US ‘diplomatic vehicle’ killed 4 Lebanese; on January 25, Senior officer at the Information Bureau of the ISF, Captain Wissam Eid and five civilians were killed in a car bomb. In 2012: on October 19, Head of the Information Department (Intelligence) at the ISF, Captain Wissam Eid and five civilians were killed in a car bomb. In 2013: on 27 December, Mohammed Chatah and eight civilians were killed in a road-side bomb. *Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005*, Al Jazeera, 19/11/2013. From: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/timeline-major-attacks-lebanon-since-2005-20131119152136545938.html (accessed on 14/2/2013).


\(^11\) Bombs in purely civilian targets took place in: New Jdeideh (March 19, 2005), Kaslik (March 23, 2005), Sad el Bouchrie (March 26, 2005), Broumana (April 1, 2005), Jounieh (May 7, 2005), Monot Ashrafieh (July 22, 2005), Zalka (22 August, 2005), Jeitawi Ashrafieh (17 September, 2005). These civilian attacks were against ‘Christian’ towns, possibly with the aim of instilling old sectarian strife. This failed, but antagonism between the two new main camps grew (pro and anti-Syria camps-See below). Later, two bombs went off in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli (August, 13, 2008 and September 29, 2008) against busses that were transporting a mix of civilian and army soldiers. More recently, on August 15, a car bomb in Dahiyeh killed 27 and wounded around 336; on August 23, a twin car bomb in front of two mosques in Tripoli killed 42 people; on November 19, a double suicide attack at the Iranian embassy killed 23 people and wounded some 150. *Timeline of explosions and targeted assassinations from 2004 to 2012*, The Daily star, 20/10/2012. From: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-20/192095-timeline-of-explosions-and-targeted-assassinations-from-2004-to-2012.ashx#ixzz2ucgSot4e (accessed on 10/1/2014).
Responsibility for many of the attacks since the Syrian war have been claimed by anti-Assad Al-Qaeda linked Sunni fundamentalist groups such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigade, Al-Nusra Front-Lebanon, and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A teenager, who had commented on Facebook about her escape from the previous three explosions in Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold-Dahiyeh, did not live to survive the fourth on January 2, 2014. Maria Hussein al-Jawhari had said: ‘this is the third bombing that I escape, I don’t know if the fourth will kill me – feeling sad’. Such explosions have been targeting Shia areas, the Lebanese army, politicians, and other civilian targets. The country is not in an all-out civil war but the arbitrariness of these attacks certainly poses a threat to human security.

b) UNIFIL II

Since Syria withdrew its forces in April 2005, the Lebanese security sector has had to deal with a very complex and volatile situation on its own for the first time in about thirty years. Meanwhile, the international community’s involvement in the governance of Lebanon has sharply increased. Following the July War, Resolution 1701 imposed a cease-fire and reinforced the mandate of UNIFIL. Pursuant to the Resolution, in August 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to the southern border region for the first time in 36 years. The war was intended to eliminate Hezbollah, however, its resilience forced the US and Israel ‘to dramatically scale back their demands and expectations for the war’s


outcome’; a seven-point plan devised by the Lebanese government ‘would decisively shape the cease-fire’ and prevent a resolution that would restrict the sovereignty of Lebanon.\textsuperscript{15} UNIFIL-plus or UNIFIL II was reinforced in number and weight.\textsuperscript{16} However, the force is prohibited from taking any action to disarm Hezbollah or other groups without the consent of the government.\textsuperscript{17} For UNIFIL or any peacekeeping force to succeed it must ensure it is not perceived as an occupying or biased force;\textsuperscript{18} the opposite would entail resistance from the local population and would put it in danger. Therefore, given Hezbollah’s popular support-base, it is unsurprising that UNIFIL’s mandate is not to disarm Hezbollah but to assist the Lebanese government in spreading its authority and to assist in making sure the area south of the Litani is free from weapons.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, as an institution, the LAF has long supported the “army, resistance, people formula”\textsuperscript{20} and almost half the LAF’s rank and file are Shia. Evidently, therefore, the LAF would adopt a non-confrontational policy in its deployment to the south. Therefore, what is actually taking place is all three main actors (UNIFIL, Hezbollah and the LAF) cooperating to make sure no visible display of weapons is tolerated. ‘Hezbollah has formally declared that any of its members who are found carrying arms may be detained and disarmed’ and in reality, a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy has been adopted.\textsuperscript{21}

UNIFIL-plus introduced the first maritime task force in a UN peacekeeping force. This ‘prompted Israel to lift its naval blockade’ on Lebanon;\textsuperscript{22} however, although one of the core aims of the resolution is that of human security,\textsuperscript{23} Realpolitik come into play: Germany insisted its role in leading the maritime force is the protection of Israel’s

\textsuperscript{15} Norton, 2007, p 140-141.
\textsuperscript{16} The force increased to up to 15,000 and involved ‘heavy’ European participation. UNIFIL had some 2,000 troops at the onset of the July War. However, at the moment it stands at a little more than 10,000.
\textsuperscript{17} Its mandate is to ‘assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. Emphasis added. UNIFIL website: http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11553&language=en-US (accessed on 28/2/2014).
\textsuperscript{18} In our case: towards Israel.
\textsuperscript{19} UNIFIL mandate is to establish south of the Litani river ‘an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL’. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} The ‘Resistance, which has been supported by the government, the army and the civilians’ is legitimized by ‘internal agreements and the universal declarations [which] give all peoples the right to resist occupation and aggression’ says the LAF. Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,”(Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), 2009). p 24.
\textsuperscript{21} Norton, 2007, p 141-142.
\textsuperscript{23} i.e. to ensure the peaceful return of civilians. UNIFIL Mandate.
security.\textsuperscript{24} That being said, UNIFIL II has more “teeth”, as it has been authorized to use ‘all necessary action’, i.e. force, to make sure the area of its ‘operations is not utilized for hostile activities (…); and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and (…), to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.\textsuperscript{25} The latter is an upgrade from UNIFIL I which on a number of occasions was unable to protect civilians and its facilities against Israeli strikes.\textsuperscript{26} However, these “teeth” are rather rhetorical as it is unlikely that UNIFIL would attack an Israeli target\textsuperscript{27} and unlikely that it would use force on its own to confront a local hostile presence. In both cases using force would escalate rather than defuse a tense and potentially violent situation.

That being said, UNIFIL has long and continues to be a major actor in the governance of security in south of Lebanon; furthermore, the south remains vulnerable to human insecurity.

c) Nahr el-Bared battle

The Lebanese Armed Forces led a three-month military campaign starting from May 19, 2007 against the Islamist militant group \textit{Fateh al-Islam} in Tripoli’s Nahr el-Bared

\textsuperscript{24} German Chancellor Angela Merkel ‘sparked controversy (…) when she cited Germany’s historic responsibility for Israel's existence and said Germany's contingent to the UN peace-keeping presence aimed to protect it’. In fact Merkel said: ‘If the commitment to safeguard Israel’s right to exist belongs to the German Reason of State, we cannot simply say: if Israel’s right to exist in this region is at stake—which it is—then we simply keep out’. Lucy Fielder, An unenviable task. The UN peace-keeping force in Lebanon finally receives its rules of engagement, to the disquiet of many Lebanese, Al-Ahram Weekly online, 12 – 18/10/ 2006, Issue No. 816. From: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/816/re52.htm (accessed on 10/3/2014) and Merkel’s quote in: Oz Aruch, Reevaluating Germany’s Commitment to Israel’s Security, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VII : 1 (2013), 45-57, p 51. Also, Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 91.

\textsuperscript{25} UNIFIL Mandate.


\textsuperscript{27} Also the force does not have air defence capabilities.
Palestinian camp. The armed conflict started as the ISF followed assailants of a bank robbery and fought in Tripoli what turned out to be *Fateh al-Islam*. From the Nahr el-Bared camp, other members attacked an LAF checkpoint outside the camp and took over the position. The LAF retaliated in force by attacking the group’s positions in the camp. As the LAF suffered heavy casualties and the group resisted, the battle intensified. The LAF pounded and took over the camp until the group announced a unilateral cease-fire on September 2, 2007. This was the LAF’s biggest military operation since the war. Although the operation rallied strong popular support, it brought to light the camps’ extraterritoriality and highlighted the weakness of the LAF in its ‘inability to quickly overcome a small, 200-strong jihadi group’. The LAF lost 169 men, much of the camp was turned into rubble and some 27,000 Palestinian refugees fled into neighboring areas. The LAF’s operation was viewed as an ‘aggression’ as violence was excessively and indiscriminately used; it also broke the long-standing non-intervention norm in the camps.

The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) has led the relief program. Reconstruction only started in 2010, and thus far only 600 families have returned. Funding shortfalls have complicated the process as some $157 million are still needed to complete the reconstruction. Moreover, the reconstruction process has been slow and corruption has impacted its delivery. UNRWA notes that the scope of the program offers unprecedented challenges for the agency.

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28 The camp site is at the outskirts of the northern city Tripoli.
29 It is argued that *Fateh al-Islam* is a result of the arch enemies Syria and March 14’s unintended policies: Syria’s traditional policy of supporting armed non-state actors and March 14’s support of Islamist groups in the north for winning elections; the group turned out to be ‘inimical’ to both Syria’s and March 14’s interests. Neguizian, 2009, p 13 and Bilal Y. Saab, "Al-Qaeda’S Presence and Influence in Lebanon," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 12 (Nov. 2008). p. 7.
30 Killing all 16 soldiers.
34 Which had been in effect since the 1969 Cairo Accord. Former LAF soldier justified this: ‘we had no hesitation about going into the camp because 25 soldiers had been killed. Every Lebanese saw the images of the slain soldiers on TV. If we did nothing about this, we never would have been able to go on another mission again’. That being said, such excessive and indiscriminate use of force is not condonable. Ibid, p 4.
Furthermore, Lebanese authorities have maintained a strict militarization of the camp; the camp has been declared a ‘military zone’ and since the conflict ‘scores of Palestinians have been victims of extended arbitrary detention and restricted movement by Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese Army. A 2010 study by Taylor Long and Sari Hanafi noted the increasing resentment among Palestinians towards this securitization and constraints imposed on their human security.

**d) 2008 Clashes**

Over the pro-West government’s unilateral initiative to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunication network, serious clashes erupted in the capital and across the country in May 2008. These threatened a relapse into civil war and required yet again foreign sponsorship for an accord between the Lebanese factions to end the crisis. As pro and anti-government forces fought each other and attacked civilian targets, some 110 people lost their lives. A National Dialogue session was held in Doha, Qatar between May 16 and May 21, 2008. In order to safeguard Lebanon’s coexistence formula and civil peace, participants pledged to end the political stalemate by forming a national unity government. They pledged to refrain from using sectarian rhetoric, from resorting to weapons to achieve political gains, and reaffirmed their commitment to respect the state’s sovereignty. The Doha Accord ended another round of fighting and renewed the commitment to power-sharing but it clearly did not reconcile the strategic interests of both camps or provide a transformative alternative.

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38 Ibid.
39 ICTJ, 2013, p 110.
41 Such as TV stations and civilians in busses.
43 The Doha Accord was formulated under the sponsorship of Qatari Prime and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem, at the Arab League Ministerial Committee.
2) The International Independent Investigation Commission and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

A non-military challenge which has exacerbated tension and polarization is the international community’s reaction to the Hariri assassination. While the assassination is a serious crime, the international community’s reaction contrasts with the passiveness it showed during much of the July War. The war had left landmine contamination that would probably take an estimated 40 years to clear, it destroyed much of the progress in terms of the previous post-war reconstruction, killed over 1000 civilians, injured and displaced several thousands, and destroyed the livelihood of many; nevertheless, it took 33 days for the UN to impose a cease-fire.

Unlike crimes committed during Lebanon’s civil war or its wars with Israel, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, the international community (more accurately the West) spearheaded a Security Council (SC) response and established international jurisdiction over this and other subsequent crimes.

First, SC Resolution 1595 (2005) established the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to assist the Lebanese government in its investigations. SC Resolution 1636 (2005) determined that the act was a threat to international peace and security; it therefore invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter. SC Resolution 1664 (2006) negotiated an agreement between the UN Secretary-General and the Lebanese government to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to prosecute perpetrators of the Hariri and related crimes. The agreement however was not ratified by the Lebanese Parliament because of political stalemate over the Tribunal. Then-Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, supported by 70 of 128 parliamentarians, signed a petition asking the SC to adopt the Tribunal; Chapter VII Resolution 1757 (2007) ‘authorize[d] the establishment’ of the STL.

45 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 90.

46 Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi identify four factors that came together for internationalizing the investigation and the prosecution of this case: the stature of Rafic Hariri as an international statesman with close connections to leaders in France, Saudi Arabia, the US and other countries; a targeted suspect (Syria); ‘an interventionist political climate’; and the ‘novel’ introduction of ‘internationalized tribunals’ to international criminal justice. Knudsen and Hanafi, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): Impartial or Imposed International Justice?", 183.

47 Fourteen other crimes found to be connected to the assassination of Hariri and/or found to be of a ‘similar nature and gravity’ were added to the UNIIIC’s jurisdiction.

48 Chapter VII allows the SC to take all necessary and enforcement measures.
The Tribunal is the first treaty-based tribunal established pursuant to a Chapter VII resolution; it is a hybrid (or internationalized) tribunal but with the ‘narrowest’ mandate among international tribunals.\(^{49}\) Controversially, it is the first and only tribunal established to try a crime of terrorism rather than international crimes.\(^{50}\) Furthermore, the STL adopts Lebanese criminal law, using the domestic definition of the crime of terrorism rather than an internationally recognized one. The STL’s Statute binds only Lebanon ‘to cooperate’ with the Tribunal; third-party state obligations for cooperation with the Tribunal are less explicit; however the Tribunal may refer to the SC to compel third parties into cooperating.\(^{51}\) That being said, the tribunal provides for victims’ participation and is the first international tribunal that establishes an independent Defence Office.\(^{52}\)

Many in Lebanon had originally assigned symbolic significance to the STL, particularly in regards to its role in curbing impunity. Nevertheless, the STL has also been a polarizing factor in Lebanese politics.\(^{53}\) Many are skeptical about the Tribunal’s legitimacy, objectivity, and purpose.

First, the STL was established by ‘bypass[ing]’ Lebanon’s legislature.\(^{54}\) Second, the STL’s limited mandate and jurisdiction are seen as an example of selective justice.\(^{55}\) Third, a portion of the public is weary of political intervention in the local judicial system, and is skeptical that the purpose of the STL is to end impunity.\(^{56}\) It is seen as a Western tool to further encroach on Lebanon: to pressure ‘Hizbollah, blackmail Syria and weaken Israel’s


\(^{50}\) International law recognizes four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.

\(^{51}\) Wierda et al., 2007, p 32-33.


\(^{55}\) AI, 2009.

enemies’. Furthermore, 49% of the STL’s expenses are borne by the Lebanese government, making Lebanon’s contribution ‘several million dollars more than the yearly budget of its entire Justice Ministry’. Fourth, the STL’s image has been tainted by ‘repeated leaks of confidential documents and witnesses interviews, and weak public outreach over false testimonies before the UNIIIC’. And the fifth blow is its association with the controversial performance of the UNIIIC, including the four-year detention upon the recommendation of the Commission of the heads of four security agencies. Their detention was considered ‘arbitrary’; and until recently, all of them had been denied access to information in regards to their detention. Having said that, ‘one of the first acts of the STL was to order the release’ of the detained Generals. Furthermore, several ‘safeguards for independence’ against domestic and international interferences were incorporated into the Statute of the court.

In short, the UNIIIC and the STL have been fraught with legal, political and procedural setbacks. However, the Tribunal is the first major effort to establish accountability for serious crimes in Lebanon. Proponents hope that the tribunal opens the door for future prosecutorial action in response to serious violations; that it invigorates Lebanon’s judicial system; and that its hybrid character contributes to the development of Lebanon’s judicial capabilities. As the STL raises awareness of the importance of accountability, it is hoped that pressure mounts on the authorities to provide justice for a variety of other cases.

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64 Wierda et al., 2008, p 15-17.
65 Ibid, p 45-46.
66 Ibid.
However, in the future, Lebanon will need to take a more comprehensive and de-politicized approach to providing justice to victims of political violence.\textsuperscript{67}

Since 2004 security challenges have been compounded and the role of foreign actors has been ambivalent. The main actors of global governance have been biased, confrontational, but also supportive towards Lebanese stakeholders. The implicit support of the Israeli assault on Hezbollah contrasts with the mobilization for aid and reconstruction. Similarly, the support for the 2006-2009 pro-West government and the creation of an international accountability mechanism contrasts with later support for a Hezbollah-dominated government and the current call for the formation of a unity government.\textsuperscript{68} That being said, global governance has made contributions in terms of human security;\textsuperscript{69} it is expected, however, to play a consistently more constructive role.


\textsuperscript{68} See for example below ‘understanding’ of Western powers for the positions of PM Miqati’s Hezbollah-dominated government.

\textsuperscript{69} See next chapter.
II- Lebanon and the ‘Arab Spring’: Syrian spill-over exacerbates human insecurity

The Arab uprisings have been received with enthusiasm, support and optimism across the whole spectrum of the Lebanese political leadership and society. Many have even gone so far as to say that the ‘Arab Spring’ had originated and was inspired by the 2005 Lebanese ‘Independence Uprising’ which successfully ended a 30-year Syrian occupation. Nevertheless, even in the earlier stages, voices of concern over minority issues were heard. While Lebanon had long been the centre of attention, it seemed to be watching the events sweeping across the region from afar. Was Lebanon to glide through the regional instability? and, was Lebanon not to have its own radical Spring? For some time, different media outlets hypothesised as to why Lebanon seemed to be unaffected by the regional events.

As the uprisings reached Syria, anxiety soon took over the political rhetoric in Lebanon. The uneasy relationship that binds these two countries would only aggravate an already precarious situation. The two leading political blocks in Lebanon had been in a stand-off since 2005. Simply put, Lebanon has been at a crossroads, and the direction forward has been fiercely fought over. As regional showdowns continue to be vividly mirrored in Lebanese politics, the Syrian events were seen as the perfect opportunity for the two leading blocks to entrench their positions and escalate their mobilization.

Repercussions of the regional situation were felt in Lebanon when the uprisings appeared to take over Syria; this section, therefore, focuses on the impact of the Syrian

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71 Particularly following the violence against Copts in Egypt, Lady of the Mountain Christian gathering announced their stance towards the Arab Spring. It reiterated their support for the quest for justice, freedom and democracy, reiterated their belongingness to and their role in the region, rejected their association with the ‘oppressive regimes’, and emphasised their common destiny with their Muslim compatriots. Lady of the Mountain Gathering Rejects ‘Bids to Link Christians Fate to Oppressive Regimes’. Naharnet. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/18308-lady-of-the-mountain-gathering-rejects-bids-to-link-christians-fate-to-oppressive-regimes (accessed on 27/10/2011).
events over Lebanese politics and security. In doing so, it highlights the mobilizing effect of religious identity; through the lens of critical security studies, it also highlights the intricate relationship between identity and security.

1) Background

As mentioned, the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri had seismic effects on a long-stagnant domestic political scene. Armed with international support, Lebanese marched the streets in protest at the prolonged Syrian presence. What was then dubbed the ‘Beirut Spring’ was soon met with counter-demonstrations in support and recognition of the stabilizing Syrian role and in rejection of Western influence. This created a schism in Lebanese society and gave birth to what would become known as the March 14th and the March 8th blocks. The Lebanese political scene has since been deeply polarized. This polarization has had important socio-economic, political and hard security effects; these have manifested themselves though one stalemate after another, government paralysis, politicization of every aspect of the public sector, and unresolved remnants of war and occupation. As the whole public service seems to have been put on hold, justice and development have slipped further down the priority list,72 and as illustrated above, clashes and security incidents have maintained a relatively steady presence in everyday life.

In the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal, several ‘historical’ and long overdue reconciliations necessary in war-to-peace transitions have taken place.73 The ‘Independence Uprising’ brought together an unlikely alliance between Hariri, Gemayel, Geagea, Jumblat, and for a brief period of time Michel Aoun.74 For many Lebanese, it finally seemed that the civil war was behind them. Moreover, in spite of the rift with other factions, the 2006 ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between Hezbollah and the Free

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72 There has not been an agreement on a national budget since 2004, appointments and promotions in the public sector have been suspended for months and years at a time, and the National Dialogue was suspended from 2006 until June 2012.
74 i.e. the heads of the major Sunni, Christian and Druze parties.
Patriotic Movement was another important step in this direction.\textsuperscript{75} Christian representation in both camps meant that the divide was no longer between Christians and Muslims as clearly as it had been in the case of the civil war; the tension was more visible in Shia-Sunni relations.\textsuperscript{76} However, that is not to say that the Arab uprisings did not spur old threat perceptions.\textsuperscript{77} The dividing lines were merely redrawn between two divergent political paths: those of March 14\textsuperscript{th} and March 8\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{78} That being considered, the concerns, representation and the mobilization remained largely sectarian.

By examining the different Lebanese reactions to the ‘Arab Spring’, this section highlights the endemic attitudes and fears which have prevented a break from traditional politics. Traditional politics in Lebanon have focused on sectarian identities\textsuperscript{79} and, as discussed, sectarianism has long been institutionalized.\textsuperscript{80} Security, for each of the communities, had been equivalent to a zero-sum game. Securing sectarian identity continues to be the main referent.\textsuperscript{81} However, since 2005, the reconfiguration of power conceded to alliances which recognized the dynamic between interests and identities. It has been argued that ‘identity and interests (…) are dynamically interrelated’ and ‘cause each other’;\textsuperscript{82} the new alliances illustrate this argument, as the rallying of different sectarian groups with some and against others consequently created new umbrella identities – March 14\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th}.

\textsuperscript{75} i.e. an alliance between the main Shia and Christian parties.
\textsuperscript{76} This is illustrated by the clashes in Tripoli as well as several quotes mentioned below.
\textsuperscript{77} Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi emphasised: ‘We are not with the ruling regimes, we are with the reforms that are essential for the Arab peoples.’ He also voiced his concerns ‘over a possible Sunni-Alawite civil war in Syria that “might lead to displacing the Christians from the region, like in Iraq.”’ Al-Rahi Fears Possible Syria Civil War, Displacement of Christians. Naharnet. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/18159-al-rahi-fears-possible-syria-civil-war-displacement-of-christians (accessed on 27/10/2011).
\textsuperscript{79} MP Nayla Tueini said: ‘the current system means I only represent my sect (…) I hope one day this would change’, and therefore represent my country and not my sect. ”Lebanon: The Familiy Business.,” in al-Jazeera Documentary and Nayla Tueini, “Interview with Marcel Ghanem,” in Kalaam al-Nass (Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC): Lebanon22/12/2012) From: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vesotnrAN5g&feature=channel (accessed on 10/2/2012).
\textsuperscript{80} Under the Ottoman Empire, the French Mandate and since independence.
\textsuperscript{81} As representation in the political system is on a sectarian basis, positions taken are viewed on a sectarian basis.
\textsuperscript{82} McSweeney, 1999, p 172, 197.
2) New Wars as old wars

Many scholars have spoken of Lebanon’s ‘mosaic composition’ and Corm has written of a ‘torn identity’. The fragmentation of the Lebanese identity has meant that allegiances and individual identities in Lebanon have been extensions of transnational regional ones. Hassan Krayem noted that ‘polarization among the Lebanese and their efforts to defend or promote their interests invited and facilitated external intervention.’ Throughout the years, it has required the intervention of the same foreign powers that supported the crisis in the first place, in order to put the ‘Lebanese “Humpty Dumpty” back together’. The different sects have required outside powers to support their position in the distribution of power, and have survived as extensions of larger regional and international forces. Since 2005 the cards have been reshuffled; as Lebanon is ‘in the middle of a showdown’ between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and most of the international community on the other hand, these unlikely alliances changed the face of the power composition – giving way to a more complex and diverse one. That is not to say that sectarianism is withering; Karim Knio speaks of neo-sectarianism where ‘it is clear that “old/new” cleavages that characterise Lebanese politics is omnipresent. Fawaz Gerges, however, disagrees with the one-layered depiction of Lebanese politics. He notes that ‘far from being sectarian-based or driven, the power struggle in Lebanon is multi-layered and

84 Corm, 2005, p 21.
85 Maronite Patriarch: ‘Pluralism is a big treasure for Lebanon (…)’But we have another illness (…). It is our loyalty to outside Lebanon,’ (…)’We can’t live and have loyalties abroad both in the East and West.’ *Al-Rahi: We Can’t Survive if we Have Loyalties Abroad*. Naharnet, 11/10/2011. From: [http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/17186-al-rahi-we-cant-survive-if-we-have-loyalties-abroad](http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/17186-al-rahi-we-cant-survive-if-we-have-loyalties-abroad) (accessed on 15/10/2011).
86 Krayem, 1997, p 419.
88 The Christians have traditionally looked towards the West, the Shia to Iran, the Sunnis first to Syria and now to KSA.
89 Corm, 2005, p 21.
90 He notes that ‘behind the simplistic and short-term distinction between an anti- and a pro-Syrian camp lies a clash of a multitude of different Lebanese national projects tailored around the interest of every sect respectively.’ Karim Knio, "Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo-Sectarian Partition?," *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no. 2 (2005). p 226.
complex. Sectarianism is used and abused to mask vested interests and differences. Nizar Abdel-Kader also underscores the complexity of the Lebanese system, but he reminds us of its duality: feudal and sectarian. In any case, sectarianism is undoubtedly part of Lebanese political discourse; as part of identity politics, since 2005, it has been fused with new political labels. Therefore, constellations of sectarian identities make up the two main factions struggling over the future of Lebanon: one representing the so-called ‘axis of moderation’, the other representing the ‘axis of resistance’.

In her discussion of the ‘New Wars’, Mary Kaldor sheds light on the manipulation of identity politics in the conduct of conflicts. This study argues that identity politics is an entrenched characteristic of the Lebanese context. We can appropriate her depiction of identity politics to conflict and mobilization in Lebanon. According to Kaldor, ‘New Wars’:

are fought in the name of identity – a claim to power on the basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels (...) Labels are mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security (...) They provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or capture power, (...) nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments (...) that is the immediate cause of conflict.

Conflicts based on identity are globalized and unregulated, dependent on ‘support from neighbouring states, diaspora groups’, and not bound by ‘time and space’ or actors. Therefore, as in the Lebanese case, they are protracted conflicts. Linked to this is the failure, as Saoud Al-Mawla says, of the Lebanese parties to break from the traditional feudal-sectarian system and to create a national project. Farid Khazen has the same view

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93 An increasing feature of world politics since the demise of colonialism and the Soviet Union.
95 Ibid.
regarding post-war political parties: that is, they contribute to the status quo and fail to provide alternatives to traditional politics. This opinion has spilled to grass-roots levels; despite the dynamism of Lebanese civil society, several groups have lamented that, many Lebanese ultimately still favour sectarian politics.

Despite the many years of conflict and the many attempts to patch the domestic ‘mosaic’, it is not contentious to note that the Lebanese domestic canvas remains incomplete. Pinning this to threats to identity is no novelty; nevertheless, this section examines how the ‘Arab Spring’ further exacerbates the already precarious stability of Lebanon.

3) Perceptions and the quest for power

There is a long-standing belief that Lebanon is ‘affected positively or negatively by the regional situation’; Interior Minister Marwan Charbel warned that the ‘repercussions [of the Arab Spring] will not be easy on Lebanon’. March 14th member and head of the Phalange Party Amine Gemayel distanced himself from the coalition by stating that ‘we sympathize with the Arab people calling for freedom, but we believe Lebanon should not be involved, other parties’ interferences in our affairs affect our country [negatively].’ There have been many positions of caution regarding the situation in Syria, expressing the idea that any spillover could spiral out of control. Charbel reminded both camps to be

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98 One activist maintained that ‘there is no silent majority in Lebanon (...) what we have experienced is that the majority of the Lebanese people have chosen to ally themselves with one political group or the other. Communal ties have become stronger and it is difficult to ignore their impact. This poses a serious challenge to our efforts.’ Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Lebanon’s Civil Society Says “No More Silence”," Carnegie Endowment. From: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2008/08/13/lebanon-s-civil-society-says-no-more-silence2uhs (accessed on 12/6/2012).

99 A term used by several Lebanese specialists (Corm, Michal Hudson etc.). For Halim Barakat, a mosaic society differs from a pluralistic one; as is the case in Lebanon, the level of integration between the different groups is considerably lower in the former than it is in the latter. Barakat, 1973, p 301,302.


‘aware that we are on the same boat together and if the boat sinks all of us will drown.’\textsuperscript{102} Weakness, orders, a political choice, or a security measure: the March 8\textsuperscript{th} government initially took several tangible steps to dissociate itself, as it claims, from any role in the Syrian crisis.\textsuperscript{103} However, these moves were not popular across the spectrum of Lebanese society – that is, the opposition,\textsuperscript{104} and a large portion of the Lebanese population – not the least for humanitarian reasons. Druze leader Walid Jumblat, although part of the government, has consistently condemned Assad’s regime and called to intensify assistance to Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{105} The scene in Lebanon is nuanced and complex and the dividing lines are unclear. It is worth to note that March 14\textsuperscript{th} initially took an opposite stance. For Sunni leader former PM Saad Hariri, the Lebanese have ‘a national duty and a responsibility’ to stand by the Syrian people. Furthermore, as he noted that the regime in Syria is ‘engaged in the last battle to defend a \textit{regional axis’},\textsuperscript{106} he called on the international community and Arab countries to ‘take practical steps beyond condemnation, and even beyond imposing economic sanctions.’\textsuperscript{107} His alliance recognized the Syrian National Council ‘as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.’\textsuperscript{108} March 14\textsuperscript{th} alliance was very optimistic as to the fall of the Syrian regime. Hariri believed that ‘the establishment of a pluralistic democratic system in Syria will give great immunity to the Lebanese democratic

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Arab unrest}, 2011.


\textsuperscript{104} In taking up this role, the government has been seen by some as an accomplice to the Syrian regime. For example, the deployment of the LAF along the border has received mixed responses, going as far MP Moein al-Merehbi condemning the deployment of the army as ‘Syrian orders to President Michel Suleiman, Prime Minister Najib Miqati, and Army Commander General Jean Qahwaji.’ \textit{Jumblat Asks State to Aid Syrian Refugees instead of Flexing Military Muscle in North.} Naharnet, 6/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29112 (accessed on 17/2/2012).

\textsuperscript{105} Jumblat Asks, 2012.

\textsuperscript{106} Emphasis added.


\textsuperscript{108} March 14\textsuperscript{th} alliance announced, at the 7\textsuperscript{th} commemoration the Hariri assassination, its alliance with the SNC. \textit{Hariri’s Murder Anniversary to be Marked by Announcement of Alliance with Syrian Opposition.} Naharnet, 14/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29972 (accessed on 17/2/2012).
experience.’ The head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, agreed; it ‘means a stable Lebanon that has demarcated borders and its arms limited to the state (…) ‘A democratic regime in Syria supports Lebanon’s independence.’\(^{109}\) However, Amal and Hezbollah, the two main Shiite parties, did not agree; they accused the international community of targeting Syria because of its support to the Palestinian and the Lebanese resistance.\(^{110}\) Furthermore, Hezbollah was convinced that March 14\(^{th}\)’s manoeuvring was aimed at changing the distribution of power.\(^{111}\) The two camps have taken two opposite but concrete stances; this reduces chances for near-term stabilization.

Media leaks exposed the concrete role March 14\(^{112}\) was playing in supporting the Syrian rebels.\(^{113}\) But, as the war in Syria progressed and optimism dwindled, the tables have turned. In an interesting turn of events, Hezbollah first interfered militarily in border villages to protect fellow Shia Lebanese from fundamentalist rebel groups; its involvement however has since expanded considerably.\(^{114}\) It is now focused on helping the Syrian regime fight the new takfiri\(^{115}\) threat in order to prevent chaos and violence from spreading to Lebanon as well as to prevent militant groups from sabotaging Hezbollah’s resistance project.\(^{116}\) March 14 is now calling for withdrawing all Lebanese involvement from the


\(^{111}\) Deputy Secretary General Qassem: ‘To the March 14 bunch I say: stop betting on regional developments to alter the balance of power in Lebanon, you betted on America, Israel, the West and all the outside schemes to no avail.’ Qassem to March 14: Stop Betting on Regional Developments. Naharnet, 15/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/30179 (accessed on 21/2/2012).

\(^{112}\) Mainly Hariri’s Sunni Moustaqbal or Future Movement.


\(^{115}\) i.e. apostasy—this is a term used to refer to Sunni fundamentalist groups that accuse other theological branches of Islam of apostasy and that condone the use of violence against other Muslims and non-believers.

Syrian war to deny these groups reason to continue targeting Lebanon.\textsuperscript{117} Both, obviously, claim that their positions are intended to bring security and stability to Lebanon; both accuse the other of using the Syrian war to hold power in Lebanon.

In brief, all parties were initially excited about the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{118} Categorization and the sectarian narrative are both too simplistic and reductionist a method. That said, mainstream assumptions identify Sunni-Shia tension as a standing issue;\textsuperscript{119} therefore, the Syrian events, and to a lesser extent those in Bahrain, have received contradictory responses. In addition, ‘Christians’ have expressed some concerns over unintended repercussions of the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{120} However, there have also been many reassurances. Hariri\textsuperscript{121} and Nasrallah\textsuperscript{122} reiterated their keenness for civil peace,\textsuperscript{123} and both singled out a common foreign enemy but no domestic one. Having said that, both camps continue to slam each other as the Syrian events magnify the political rift.\textsuperscript{124} Hence, in the face of regional changes, perceptions of identity threats are spreading.


\textsuperscript{118} Including Hezbollah. Nasrallah had differentiated between the popular uprisings and the “conspiracy” against Syria or the ‘injustice’ in Bahrain. He noted that ‘the Arab Spring was against the regimes run by (former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza) Rice, (Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey) Feltman and (U.S. Secretary of State Hillary) Clinton, the same people who were supervising you in 2006.’ Nasrallah Slams March 14, Says Hizbullah Won’t Kill ‘Ordinary’ Israelis to Avenge Mughniyeh. Naharnet, 16/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/30320. (accessed on 22/2/2012).

\textsuperscript{119} Both Hariri’s and Nasrallah’s statements quoted elsewhere have alluded to this.

\textsuperscript{120} Several Christians leaders have expressed this concern but also reiterated their Arab affiliation and integration to Muslim society. The Pro-March 14 Lady of the Mountain gathering and repetitive Al-Rahi statements of a common future and the fear of Christian displacement illustrate this.

\textsuperscript{121} In terms of Sunni-Christian relations, Hariri repeatedly reaffirmed his commitment to Mounassafa (equal division). As for Sunni-Shiite relations: ‘we do not hold our Shiite brothers responsible for the assassination of Rafic Hariri’, and that ‘Israel is our only enemy and let us defend our country together and be victorious for Lebanon.’. Hariri: I Will Bear Responsibility of My Solidarity with Syrian People. Naharnet, 14/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/30061 (accessed on 17/2/2012).

\textsuperscript{122} As mentioned in chapter 5, Nasrallah noted that: ‘It is true that in 1982 we had made speeches calling for the rise of an Islamic state in Lebanon,’ but that objective has long been abandoned just like others from the opposite camp have abandoned partition. Nasrallah Rules Out Govt. Collapse, Urges ‘Real’ Dialogue in Syria. Naharnet, 7/12/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29255 (accessed on 17/2/2012).


\textsuperscript{124} Nasrallah to March 14: ‘You are not in a position that allows you to put conditions (...).
4) The governance crisis and human insecurity

The heightened political tension has manifested itself on the ground through an increasingly worrying number of security incidents. Since the start of the uprisings, a number of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations have been staged and have gone through peacefully. However, in the South, Tyre has been the site of a number of bomb explosions; the UNIFIL force was targeted, a number of rockets were launched by unknown groups into northern Israel thus threatening the cessation of hostilities, and the Palestinian camps have witnessed a number of serious clashes. On the north-eastern borders, arms smuggling raised concerns over the role that Lebanese and non-Lebanese factions could be playing in the Syrian crisis; the Defence Minister’s warning that Al-Qaeda members have crossed over to Syria raised fury. Whether and to what extent these incidents were orchestrated one cannot say; nevertheless, compounded with a divisive and accusatory rhetoric, a large part of the population is increasingly mobilized along what seem like apocalyptic lines.

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125 Three times since the uprisings. UNIFIL Commander Major General Alberto Asarta noted his concern: “after I have praised for a year and a half the ideal security situation in the South, saying that this region is the most stable,” the situation deteriorated.’ Asarta Fears a Deteriorating Security Situation in the South. Naharet, 14/12/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/23244. (accessed on 20/2/2012).

126 A few days after his comments, 44 people were killed in Damascus bombings that the Syrian regime blamed on terrorist organizations’. Mansour: Ghosn, Charbel’s information on Al-Qaeda is not contradictory. NowLebanon, 2/1/2012. From: http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=348076 (accessed on 17/2/2012).

127 Nasrallah on March 14th rhetoric: ‘anyone keen on preventing Sunni-Shiite strife must right now stop the statements of their MPs and media outlets that are full of despicable sectarianism.’ Nasrallah Slams March 14, 2012.
Meanwhile, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s call for Muslims to support the Syrian revolution has received concerns despite questioning its timing and the possible role the Syrian intelligence might have had in it. The north of Lebanon, in particular, is mirroring a flared version of the domestic and regional political polarization. Fears that Syrian instability is spilling further into Lebanon have been escalating. ‘Residents [are] increasingly seeing themselves as part of the conflict’; in Tripoli, anti-Assad Sunnis and pro-Assad Alawites fought several rounds of armed battles along what is conveniently called ‘Syria Street’. Furthermore, a special report by Al-Akhbar newspaper has investigated border cities such as Wadi Khaled used as a safe house for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Arsal for fundamentalist groups such as al-Nusra. The issue of Syrian incursions into Lebanese territory, cross border shelling, Syrian defectors and refugees, kidnappings, and the extension of security events to various other parts of the country – including Beirut and the Palestinian camps – are also part of the polemic. Both blocks, March 8th and 14th, have called for the deployment of the army along the Lebanese borders. The request by the former was aimed at preventing arms smuggling, fighters crossing and

128 For a number of reasons, his message can be seen to be directly pertinent to Lebanon. One, the proximity of some of the Syrian resistance cities to Lebanese territory; two, political and sectarian affiliations match most of the Lebanese northern border area; three, cross-border smuggling has been an integral part of the informal economy of the two border areas; four, the historical conflict between the Sunnis and the Alawites in Tripoli has repeatedly escalated into armed clashes; five, the spread of weapons amongst the various Lebanese sides as well as the Palestinian camps continues to be a problem. Zawahiri: ‘I appeal to every Muslim and every free, honorable one in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, to rise to help his brothers in Syria with all that he can.’ Zawahiri Urges Lebanon’s Muslims to Help Syrian Rebels. Naharnet, 12/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29781-zawahiri-urges-lebanon-s-muslims-to-help-syrian-rebels. And Jumblat: Syrian Intelligence behind Zawahiri’s Support for Syrian Revolt. Naharnet, 14/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/30038 (accessed on 17/2/2012).

129 It is no longer possible to provide an accurate count of casualties of Tripoli’s clashes as they occur on an almost weekly basis. However, it is not contested that today ‘Bab al-tabbaneh (…) could be mistaken for a free Syrian Army enclave across the border: scrawled graffiti (…), the green, white and black flag of the Syrian opposition hangs on walls and bullet casings litter the street.’ Josh Wood, “Military in Lebanon Is Caught in the Middle,” New York Times 15/2/2012. From: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/middleeast/syrias-unrest-felt-by-military-in-lebanon.html (accessed on 17/2/2012).


132 Including the abduction of Lebanese, the disappearance of a number of Syrian opposition figures.
using Lebanon as a ‘launchpad’, while the latter’s request was aimed at protecting refugees, defectors, the FSA and preventing further incursions.

Now that involvement of both sides in the Syrian war has been made public and both camps’ positions have been reversed, but settled, the security situation is increasingly volatile. Lebanon has witnessed a return to a state of precarious human insecurity. Clashes in Tripoli and border villages have become a constant. More worrying in terms of civilian life are road-side bombs and suicide attacks against the army, Shia and Iranian civilian targets, as well as other public and political targets. These do not fail to take the life of innocent bystanders; embassies have issued travel warnings, and Euronews has dubbed this craze of terrorism as: “Messages by Bombs”. Hariri’s Future Movement initiated material support to rebel groups and facilitated the training and transfer of fighters to and from Syria; but since Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria, attacks in Lebanon have skyrocketed. Militant groups such as those mentioned above have announced Lebanon as a land of Jihad until Hezbollah withdraws from Syria; Hezbollah, on the

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133 Hezbollah deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said: ‘We reject to transform Lebanon into a launchpad for attacks against others, a place where to score political gains or implement the projects of the United States and Israel.’ Qassem Lauds Army Deployment in North, Stresses Government Provides Stability. Naharnet, 12/2/2012. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29798 (accessed on 17/2/2012).


138 Euronews, Lebanon news coverage, 27/12/2013.

other hand is relentless in quelling the spread of takfiri groups in the region and their taking root in Lebanon.\footnote{Nasrallah said that the ‘the battle in Syria, is existential’; they ‘are waging a battle for survival for the whole region’; their interpretation is that the war is not sectarian per se, rather, that ‘the takfiris pose a threat to Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and all Sunnis’—to all those who disagree with its project and the success of the resistance project. The threat existed before Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and will continue even if they withdrew. Therefore, the pressure that is being exhortd on Hezbollah (political and losses due to attacks and fighting) will ‘not change [their] position regarding Syria’. \textit{Nasrallah: Some Points of March 14 Tripoli Proclamation are Declaration of War}, Naharnet, 20/12/2013. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/110742} (accessed on 27/2/2014).} 

\footnote{\textit{Muslim-Christian Summit Urges Unity and Nationalistic Rhetoric}. Naharnet, 7/2/2012. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29163} (accessed on 17/2/2012).} 


\footnote{Both camps announced that they are in support of resuming the National Dialogue, but while March 14\textsuperscript{th} wants to restrict the discussion to Hezbollah’s arsenal, the latter refuses this condition and is in favour of discussing a general defence strategy. \textit{Suleiman: Lebanon in Dire Need for Dialogue}. Naharnet, 10/2/2012. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29644}. \textit{Accessed on 17/2/2012}. And, \textit{Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah}. NOWLebanon, 14/1/2012. From: \url{http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=352470} (accessed on 17/2/2012).} 

5) Formal alternative voices

As events are unfolding, and amid fears that the Syrian crisis further exacerbates Lebanese politics and security, there have been calls to renew dialogue between the two camps. The Muslim-Christian Summit urged ‘officials in Lebanon to be in agreement for the sake of peace and stability in Lebanon and the unity of the people’, and it called ‘for a unified stance and a nationalistic rhetoric at a time when Lebanon and the region are going through these difficult and complicated times.’\footnote{\textit{Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi called for a ‘new National Pact to neutralize Lebanon’, stressing that the ‘advancement of Lebanon is a joint mission’. \textit{Al-Rahi Preaches New National Pact to Neutralize} Lebanon. Naharnet, 9/2/2012. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29490} (accessed on 17/2/2012).}} President Michel Suleiman has tried to bring the two sides back to negotiation, noting ‘Lebanon is in dire need for dialogue.’\footnote{\textit{Suleiman: Lebanon in Dire Need for Dialogue}. Naharnet, 10/2/2012. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29644}. \textit{Accessed on 17/2/2012}.} Suleiman succeeded in sponsoring a dialogue session which led to the Baabda Declaration on 11 of June 2012 whereby all parties pledged to dissociate themselves from the war in Syria: ‘the country cannot be used as a base, corridor or starting point to smuggle weapons and combatants’
said the Declaration.\textsuperscript{144} Although initially endorsed by both sides, given the involvement of both camps in the war, the declaration is still-born.

While the Lebanese public seems to be divided along two broad lines, this study argues that the image is much more nuanced. There are voices trying to break free; left on their own, however, they might wither or be co-opted. Pockets of light can be seen in MP Tueini’s words: ‘it is time to start thinking of the rights of the individual ahead of the rights of minorities.’\textsuperscript{145} In a sense she is referring to human security concerns. Despite enthusiasm over the ‘Cedar Revolution’, Lebanese youth have not emulated their neighbours in standing up \textit{en masse} against socio-economic development as well as political injustices. Sectarian mobilization continues as a manifestation of segregation, underdevelopment and manipulation. That being said, the next section discusses some of the progressive contributions of a growing number of grassroots groups from outside the traditional establishment.

\textbf{6) Reinventing identity and security: a domestic and international challenge}

Over the past few years, Lebanese society has been involved in many forms of resistance and protest, ranging from the armed to the peaceful. However, authority and power in Lebanon are fragmented; therefore, aside from the Syrian occupation or the Israeli occupation, the Lebanese have not had a centre to rally against. There has not, therefore, been a unified large-scale movement for change in Lebanon.

For most Lebanese, threats to identity\textsuperscript{146} or societal security\textsuperscript{147} are the main impediment to organized and wide-scale calls for change. Lebanese society remains highly

\textsuperscript{144} The Baabda Declaration is found at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65B65BFC9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S%202012%20477.pdf (accessed on 10/10/2013).

\textsuperscript{145} Tueini, "Interview with Marcel Ghanem."


\textsuperscript{147} Identified by Barry Buzan and defined by the Copenhagen School as the 'the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.' Societal
entrenched in a traditional security discourse that has monopolized Lebanese politics since and before independence. Despite widespread acceptance of the unsustainability of the system, Lebanese society remains subordinate to traditional leaders and imprisoned by a stringent identity discourse. It is in this respect that Samir Khalaf reiterated the central feature of primordial ties in Lebanese society. While they have provided a safety net or a ‘cushion’ for members of society, these ‘ties that bind’ have increasingly become ‘ties that divide’ and have increasingly enclosed confessional groups. As such, one recurring theme in political discourse is societal security; in Lebanon, sectarian identity—neither ‘national nor civic’ identity—continues to be the main referent to secure by the prevailing system.

Needless to say, a state as weak as the Lebanese one struggles in managing a common national identity when its legitimacy and its monopoly over the use of force is contingent on sectarian leaders. Although, as some claimed, ‘the very weakness of the centre has protected the country from replicating the regional unrest’, it could also be argued that this same weakness hampers genuine progress and replicates survivalist strategies and threat perceptions.

May Chidiac said ‘today’s protests across the Arab world echo the spirit of the Lebanese model’; that is fair until she alluded that Lebanese, like ‘Arab youths have abandoned traditional ramblings (...) for legitimate demands: economic opportunities, political freedom, and an end to corruption and regime exclusivity.’ Sadly, the day has not yet come where Lebanese youth put these ‘legitimate demands’ ahead of their sectarian and political affiliations. In the February 2005 demonstration, in a bid to showcase the diversity of groups taking part against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, ‘sending out “shout outs” to the shiites, the Sunnites, the Druzes, the Maronites, and the Greek Orthodox Lebanese’ was part of the rally. While noting that the masses remarkably and unprecedentedly rallied around a common cause, their identification remained sectarian,

security referred to the perceived threats to societies rising from migration and European integration in the early 1990s. Waver et al., 1993, p 23.


149 Khalaf, 1968, 243.


151 A vocal anti-Syrian and pro-West journalist who survived a targeted car bomb in September 2005.

and when leaders diverged, so did the youth. It is the construction that the different groups are a threat to each other’s existence that is hampering progress towards a common goal and identity.

Fear or insecurity is not unjustified given the history of conflict in Lebanon. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that identities are social constructs, and even though they seem to transcend other considerations, they are not the only value worth securing. Although they seem structural and embedded in the system, they can be deconstructed and reconstructed, and eventually reinvented in an inclusive and comprehensive manner. Identities and security that refer to the individual do not have to be individualistic, exclusivist or restrictive. Such an approach emphasises the reciprocity of rights and the reverence of the individual above all. The corollary to this is that the security of other collectivities – society, groups, minorities and the state – can be guaranteed. Drawing from critical security studies, it is possible to put forth a vision of security that is deeper, wider, and non-deterministic.

The role of international and regional powers is essential. The Lebanese cannot do it alone. As in the Northern Ireland peace process, and in European integration in the aftermath of WWII, they will require an enabling environment. Instead, Arab action has intensified pressure on the government’s stance; it also contributed to fears that the situation in Lebanon is increasingly volatile and that there is danger of a vacuum resulting from the government’s failure to cope with the crisis.

\[153\] ‘The constituents of identity (…) are not given by nature or fixed by history;’ identity is fluid, changeable and adaptable. McSweeney, 1999, p 211.

\[154\] Ibid, p 70.

\[155\] Within the constraints of ‘history, ignorance and the imbalance of power.’ Ibid, p 216.


\[158\] Believing in the duality of identity and interest, McSweeney argues that ‘it is idealistic to imagine individuals or collectivities, socialized by habit and history into a particular sense of self, will choose to change without the incentive or pressure of self-interest’. He therefore spoke of a seduction model, which encourages actors into a ‘new school of learning’ to forge a ‘cooperation habit’ or a ‘coordinated reflex’. He illustrates his argument by referring to EU integration and the Belfast Agreement. Emphasis added. McSweeney, 1999, p 172, 197, 210.

\[159\] Such pressure comes from both sides: from Syria (shelling of border villages and military incursions into Lebanon) and from Arab regimes that sponsor the Syrian opposition (and other Lebanese groups).

immediate regional situation to unfold. These steps, however, remain symbolic in light of the larger regional context. The international community needs to take a more coherent and supportive stance in favour of stability in Lebanon: the international community can no longer ‘take the side of one of the camps to the detriment of the other’. On the regional level, the international community cannot continue to support Israel while at the same time supporting the reconstruction of Lebanon; it cannot expect concessions if alternatives do not exist, and if ‘the prospects of genuine gain are not offered’. As long as regional and international powers do not support, push, finance, and provide the appropriate atmosphere to dissuade tension, the Lebanese quest to climb out of the cycle of identity threats will remain a marginal effort. International pressure was instrumental in 2005 in pressuring Syria out of Lebanon. Subsequently, however, foreign intervention aggravated the rift between the Lebanese and created two opposing blocks contending for the future of Lebanon. A different type of regional and international role is required: not impositions or Chapter 7 resolutions, not isolation or an ultimatum between a Western vs. an Iranian axis, and not a widening of the divide between the two groups by setting them against each other. The strategy currently adopted is reminiscent of the Cold War— one of standoffs and proxies. It is unsustainable but unlikely to change in the near future. This study instead advises engagement, rapprochement, incentives and a common vision – ‘a seduction model.’ This new strategy needs to address deeply rooted fears and identity threats, while identifying common interests and shared values for the purpose of reconstructing a common national identity. Instead, Lebanon is locked in the midst of a fierce regional and international showdown – even construed as an existential one – which places the prospects of such a project one step further away.

This being said, the domestic scene is dynamic, and there is room for continued effort at the individual, societal, and state levels. Initiatives at the grass-roots level contribute to the transformation of society, making sure that the time is ripe for change and that the social infrastructure is receptive and capable of supporting a new vision for security. Eventually, it will rest on, not the state as such, but on individuals in the ruling establishment – both sectarian, state, and social – to champion this cause, for it might be

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161 Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab and West confrontation with Iran, and the Syrian war.
162 Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 92-93.
163 Whether in relation to the Middle East Peace process or the war in Syria.
164 Ibid.
165 McSweeney, 1999, p 172.
166 Deconstruction ‘expose[s] the contingency of all social arrangements, and the human choice and interests which gave rise to them, thereby advancing the possibility of constructing alternatives (…).’ Emphasis added. Ibid, p 219.
the least costly path to sustainable security. The most difficult task, however, is for the youth of Lebanon to liberate themselves from the grips of traditional leaders, and to recognize that their interests are intertwined. Bill McSweeney noted that ‘security depends on how we choose our identity and interests’; the Lebanese can choose a more inclusive conception of security, based on a long-term vision that their future is shared and their security mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Change can start through a bottom-up approach until leaders are convinced there is no safer or long-term alternative. This study does not claim to suggest a detailed plan to overcome some of the structural and historical obstacles to stability in Lebanon; however, it suggests a ‘process by which participants (…) come together actively to transform it, and in the process transform themselves.’

7) Running the extra mile

The Arab uprisings have exacerbated an already precarious situation by providing the two political camps in Lebanon with more reasons to ossify their positions. In light of the two camps’ fixation on political gains to secure their separate identities, the Lebanese system is unsustainable. The current situation prevents wide and narrow human security concerns such as development, access to justice, rule of law, social injustice and security from being addressed. Having considered all this, the Lebanese experience is not one to dismiss entirely. Lebanon remains the most democratic state in the region, with periodic elections, free media and an open opposition. Furthermore, the system has been flexible enough to thwart several near fatal relapses. UK ambassador to Lebanon—Tom Fletcher—tweeted that the Lebanese experience could be seen as ‘an enabler for the region rather than a disabler’. Those who are optimistic, such as another Western diplomat in Lebanon, noted that the Lebanese are used to grey shades rather than black and white.

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167 He stresses human agency and the choice to defy determinism. Ibid, p 214.
170 Clashes associated with the Syrian events have been largely contained to Tripoli.
171 January 2012.
172 Informal interview with Western Diplomat held as a follow up for a first formal interview in Beirut on 25/8/2010.
Lebanon’s power-sharing experience and its relatively consensus-based approach constitute a valuable base.\textsuperscript{173} Some of the pillars for cooperation and integration are there; now the Lebanese need to run the extra mile.

\textsuperscript{173} Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 92.
III- Progressive and Emancipatory voices: The Struggle for Human Security

In the midst of this polarization and resurgence of sectarian politics, the landscape at the grassroots level is not uniform. This section sheds light on non-state actors that are engaged in a struggle to foster human security.

As mentioned, since independence, sectarian groups have been identified as the main referent of security in Lebanon. In attempts to, at the same time, construct a republic that is “progressive” by identifying liberal and democratic ideals as the backbone of the republic, Lebanon’s constitutional arrangements have been contradictory; Traboulsi even goes to say schizophrenic. The problem lies in the priority given to confessional groups’ interests and their considerable autonomy from the state. While the Constitution tandem or guarantees confessional personal status laws and confessional groups’ interests, it also commits to universal human rights regimes, equality before the law and non-discrimination, and in 1990 it committed to abolishing the confessional system. However, while existing personal status laws and confessional interests restrict personal freedoms and the civil rights of certain groups in society, universal human rights regimes set out to protect them. Lebanon’s confessional system, as will be illustrated, has proved to be a hegemonic one as vulnerable groups face numerous structural constraints on their human security.

174 According to Traboulsi ‘Lebanon suffers from constitutional schizophrenia’ because ‘while the Constitution makes the abolition of the confessional system a “basic national goal”, other parts of it tend to protect that same system’. Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012, p 29.
175 From civil and criminal codes. See for example below provisions on the criminalization of homosexuality and non-criminalization of domestic violence.
176 Article 9 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution maintains that the state ‘guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected’. However, the preamble of the Constitution, as amended in 1990 (following Ta’if) stipulates in paragraph H that ‘the abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a staged plan’. Paragraph C notes that Lebanon is a ‘parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination’. And, article 7 of Chapter 2 notes that ‘All Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction’. Emphasis added.
177 See for example below women’s right to nationality and the criminalization of homosexuality.
As discussed, sectarian-based clientalism has been made the basis of state society relations. One can only resort to the state as a member of a sectarian group thereby excluding all other facets of one’s identity. Since the primary concern has been the defence and accumulation of confessional and personal interests, non-confessional and non-profit aspects of public and private life remain ostracized.\textsuperscript{178}

As a result of the State’s bias towards sectarian politics, it has largely been unresponsive to and even oppressive of vulnerable groups and non-confessional interests. Secularists, workers, women, the LGBT community, refugees, migrant workers, persons with disabilities, and victims of the war are all groups that have been marginalized by the state.

However, the space is always available, as Booth says, to challenge mainstream regressive and hegemonic policies.\textsuperscript{179} With globalization the space has increased; and in Lebanon, as will be illustrated, activism to pressure for a more inclusive and responsive system is clearly visible.

Voices that challenge the prevailing Lebanese system have long been present in Lebanon; since the end of the war these have increased especially as phases of insecurity subsided for a while, as opportunities to draw new policies for post-war period arose and as awareness in society grew. These voices have particularly increased in the last few years as society has been disenfranchised by the transition period; it has had time and opportunity to mobilize and amass support against the system but also as the country seems to be falling back into instability. While failing to transform the system; small scale successes have been accomplished. This section demonstrates the efforts and the achievements of these emancipatory voices.

Civil society in Lebanon has long been vibrant.\textsuperscript{180} On the one hand, traditional civil society has long contributed to and fed the status quo;\textsuperscript{181} on the other hand, counter-
hegemonic civil society has also long denounced and challenged the system. This study does not argue that traditional groups based on feudal, sectarian, or clientalist loyalties no longer mobilize the Lebanese public; as Richard Norton noted back in 1993, ‘they are not about to be eclipsed’. However, all efforts mentioned in this section are by grassroots Lebanese groups; they are non-traditional or non-mainstream in the sense that they are non-confessional and not affiliated to traditional parties, families, religious institutions and other charitable associations. Instead, all these groups challenge, in one way or the other, the traditional discourse and the traditional Lebanese system; all these groups voice emancipatory objectives—seen as freedom from structural injustices and empowerment of vulnerable groups. These groups are the key to transform the Lebanese system into a more inclusive, egalitarian, tolerant, reconciliatory and just system—a more progressive system.

1) Activism during and since the war

Lebanese war has often been reduced to a war between irreconcilable sectarian identities (Muslims vs. Christians). Popular perceptions have often been quick to assume that these identities largely define Lebanon’s public sphere; and more so, that the Lebanese individual can be solely defined by his/her sectarian identity. Of course, these popular perceptions have been challenged in certain academic circles but generalizations and stereotypes of the war and of Lebanese are common.

As of 1985, civil society started successfully mobilizing against the war. In 1985 the Women against War movement marched to parliament; then, in 1986, a demonstration by ‘the secular and multi-confessional trade union confederation’ followed. A lasting example of Lebanese overcoming sectarian identifications during the war is the coming together of university students from across Lebanon’s social and sectarian backgrounds to form in 1986 the PPM - Permanent Peace Movement which grew to become a prominent

notes that civil society in Lebanon has acted as ‘as patronage vehicles to protect community interests’. Amy Hawthorne, "Middle Eastern Democracy. Is Civil Society the Answer?," (Carnegie Papers. Middle East Series #4, March 2004.), p 13 and Kingston, 2001, p 56.


Not by international organizations or NGOs.

See Corm, 2005, 219-221.

NGO promoting reconciliation and peace in Lebanon and throughout the region.\(^{186}\) Then, more protests were organized in 1988 by the trade unions.\(^{187}\) In 1992, also ‘secular strikes and demonstrations’ were organized to protest the ‘currency crisis and inflation’; they toppled the government and the protests developed into a political ‘popular uprising with, in many places, anti-Syrian slogans’.\(^{188}\) One can note that anti-war movements developed quite late.\(^{189}\) Theodor Hanf and Michael Johnson noted that this happened when the Lebanese finally realized the futility of the war. The popular movements were facing an estimated 10 percent of the population\(^{190}\) which held on to the violence because of their continued motivation by vengeance and victory.\(^{191}\) They reflected the Lebanese proverb *Ad-Dam ma bisir may* (blood doesn’t turn into water); the anti-war movement was also facing those domestic, regional or international actors benefiting from the instability and the war economy. Together, they hijacked everyday life with their funding of militias, with the proliferation of weapons, and with the fighting. For the rest of us (or the Lebanese) the situation was often different. We were of course threatened, influenced, shaped, and trapped by the conflict which pervaded almost every aspect of life, but there were also common peaceful intra-communal interactions in many spheres, ranging from the personal, social, educational, business, public and political.\(^{192}\) Hence, as Norton argues, despite the reign of sectarian militias, ‘participants in civil society (…) resisted (…) the war system and worked to thwart the fragmentation of Lebanon into sectarian enclaves. Large-scale public demonstrations for peace challenged the militias’ claim to represent authentically


\(^{188}\) Ibid.


\(^{190}\) Ibid.

\(^{191}\) Fighters were estimated to form between 1.23 and 3 percent of the population. An example of trying to suppress rejection to the war: in 1984 the militias launched a bombing campaign when a mass anti-war demonstration was organized where tens of thousands ‘of Muslims from West Beirut and Christians from East Beirut were meant to march to and meet at the crossing point’. Corm, 2005, p 204. Percentages: Dima DeClerck, "Ex-Militia Fighters in Post-War Lebanon," in *Reconciliation, Reform and Resilience. Positive Peace for Lebanon*, ed. Elizabeth Picard and Alexander Ramsbotham(Accord issue 24. Conciliation Resources, 2012)., 24.

\(^{192}\) Corm for example talks about the ‘heroism’ of civilians in ‘silently’ resisting the cantonization imposed by the militias; he cites the individuals that continued commuting, despite the danger, between the different sectors (e.g. taxi drivers, nurses, civil service employees etc.). Corm, 2005, p 203-204.
the Lebanese’.  

Some even go as far as to argue ‘that only the resilience of civil society during the war saved the future existence of Lebanon as a country’.

Jumping in time, between 2012 and 2013, despite the intense polarization that has paralyzed public life, the Union Coordination Committee (UCC) grouping workers from all of Lebanon’s social, sectarian and political affiliations have organized demonstrations then an almost two-months-long strike calling on the government to adopt the wage scale. The UCC and its usual foe, the controversial Economics Committees (ECs) coordinated a strike in the name of ‘civil peace’ and ‘national unity’; they called on political leaders to overcome their political differences and for government to address the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of Lebanese people. After months of efforts, the government accepted to adopt the wage scale. Unfortunately, the new wage-scale law still includes controversies over the rights of workers and given the political stalemate, it is unlikely that parliament will adopt the law and that Cabinet implements it. The government has since resigned and political leaders have failed to agree on the formation of a new one—Prime Minister Miqati is currently the longest serving acting prime minister. Progress in the matter is pending, that being said, the UCC has ‘succeeded in building a movement that could become a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon’.  

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197 The EC launched an ad campaign in print Arabic-speaking newspapers with the slogan: ‘We won’t fight. Will you?’ An Nahar Newspaper, 6/9/2013, p 13.  
200 The government resigned on March 22, 2013.  
Since 2005, following the March 8, March 14 mass demonstrations, and the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, activism seems to have been revived.\textsuperscript{202} Local groups representing causes from across the spectrum (new and old issues) seem to have been given a new lease on life. Although renewed international interest in Lebanese stability undoubtedly encouraged and supported the rise of many such groups,\textsuperscript{203} many have had a purely Lebanese genesis and have grown independently from foreign donors.\textsuperscript{204}

Emancipatory voices have taken various forms, ranging from grassroots groups loosely expressing their concerns to others making the leap to becoming NGOs and cooperating with state institutions. A case in point for critical voices is the feminist collective Nasawiya (feminists). Nasawiya has been a forerunner in introducing critical and emancipatory activism in Lebanon. Nasawiya is self-funded and its members refuse to turn into a ‘traditional NGO structure of boards, staff, and volunteers’; its mission revolves around social justice and gender equality: its members strive against ‘sexism and all other forms of exploitations and discrimination.’\textsuperscript{205} Nasawiya has had a leading role in voicing foreign domestic workers’ human insecurity and has excellent outreach in Lebanese universities. Its large and active base of young volunteers and the campaigns on Lebanese streets, universities and social media have turned the collective into a visible actor in Lebanon’s emancipatory movement.

Other voices remained even looser as they have consisted of campaigns that spurred organically on social media. As in countries across the world, social media has become the first medium for the youth to express themselves. Groups and activities are organized on Facebook pages, reactions and opinions are voiced on twitter etc. Although, traditional voices are ever-present on social media, this study is interested in critical voices that are calling for change—voices that are self-reflective, inclusive, tolerant and progressive. One such campaign is \#NotAMartyr campaign. An increasing number of bombings and suicide attacks in the second half of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 have taken the life of many Lebanese. Dead civilians are usually referred to as ‘martyrs’. Following the December

\textsuperscript{202} Under Syrian tutelage, demonstrations were banned and troops were deployed to repress political activism in 1996. Johnson, 2001, Xviii.
\textsuperscript{203} Through UN resolutions, EU and other donor interest.
\textsuperscript{204} see below Hurriyat, Nasawiya, Ana.
\textsuperscript{205} They see ‘classicism, homophobia, racism, sectarianism, etc. (...) as interrelated and equally oppressive, and [they] insist on addressing them a progressive feminist perspective’. See Nasawiyya facebook page and website: https://www.facebook.com/nasawiya#!/nasawiya/info
\textsuperscript{206} Chatah is former Finance Minister and advisor to Saad Hariri.
2013 explosion that targeted and took the life of a prominent politician Mohammed Chatah and a number of civilians, a group of young Lebanese started a campaign expressing their outrage at dubbing a dead 16-year-old passer-by ‘a martyr’. Hamed Sinno, lead vocals for a Lebanese rock band and outspoken homosexual, explained the frustration: ‘I think it’s really important that we stop referring to political victims as martyrs, because I think the label almost resolves any criminality about the murder and reduces it to this political abstraction, which isn’t the case. You have real people dying for absurd reasons.’ The campaign is about a portion of Lebanese society that is fed up with the normalization of violence but also about the denial of agency, and the normalization of passiveness. Instead of submission to the status quo, they are calling on others in Lebanon to reject the prevalent fatalism and inaction of the majority of Lebanese. Most Lebanese when asked about the explosions, suicide attacks, assassinations, clashes, even electricity cuts, inflated mobile bills, and corruption, they respond: ‘this is Lebanon’, ‘it has always been like this’, ‘nothing new’, ‘we are used to it’, ‘it makes us stronger’. While all these excuses reflect genuine attitudes, including a desire to escape or deny some of the dark realities of Lebanon, these attitudes have locked Lebanese in a dangerous standstill. Many young Lebanese are increasingly outraged with the fatalism that is preventing progress. The campaign asks Lebanese to start reflecting on our situation, express frustrations, and take pro-active stances against the regressive assumptions in society and the regressive policies of our leaders. The campaign involves young students, artists, young university professors etc. and has recently gone viral on social media.

A more issue-specific and action oriented recent campaign is Ana (me). A group of young Lebanese set up a platform on social media to advocate for individual rights. Ana, again, is rightfully concerned that a growing number of people in Lebanon are not heard as they are constantly overshadowed by strategic zero-sum sectarian battles. Like many frustrated Lebanese, Ana members want ‘tangible, feasible change in everyday Lebanese citizens’ lives, and [they] want it now’. Ana aims to be ‘truly secular, truly independent,

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206 Chatah is former Finance Minister and advisor to Saad Hariri.
208 Twenty four years after the war some areas in Lebanon only get electricity from the state for 4, 6, or 12 hours a day—including where I live—and hence resort to private neighbourhood-sharing arrangements.
209 Including the predatory behaviour of state institutions and absence of rule of law.
and will care about the issues that matter to (...) normal people’. Ana is not an NGO, not a political party; it is a movement ‘for everyone and by everyone’ calling on Lebanese to exert pressure where possible on changing regressive policies. Ana’s mission statement clearly reflects an alienated youth; it is a ‘reaction to the age-old excuse of "now is not the time" or "we'll talk about this when the situation is better"’. For some, its aims might seem naïve or ambitious but if the platform is on social media and as Nasawiyya proved, activism can take place without the institutionalisation that NGOs require, Ana and others like it will form a valuable platform for critical and emancipatory politics to spread in Lebanon.

It is the interest of this study to show that Lebanese progressive activism challenging the mainstream discourse—Lebanon’s confessional, patriarchal, and hegemonic system—existed during and has increased since the end of the war. More importantly, it is the interest of this study, through the voices of these activists, to uncover some of the structural injustices of the Lebanese system, to adopt their plight, and advocate for transformation. The next few pages continue with documenting issue-specific efforts.

2) The Missing and the Forcibly Disappeared

Alternative voices and groups representing vulnerable and marginalized groups have repeatedly succeeded in overcoming sectarian and social cleavages in their struggle to instil progressive change in Lebanon’s system. Notably, the members of the Committee of the families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon have tirelessly joined their voices since 1982 to pressure the authorities to acknowledge their plight. Later, another group SOLIDE – Support of the Lebanese in Detention and Exile was formed in 1990. The two groups have partnered with the Lebanese NGO Act for the Disappeared to pressure governments to establish independent commissions of inquiry to investigate the whereabouts of their family members and to take measures to release the detainees or their...

211 Emphasis added. Ana is open to represent concerns expressed by the public but have so far identified the following issues: ‘civil marriage, women's rights, cutting down on police corruption, revamping our drug laws, making telecoms cheaper, freedom of speech expansion, a real traffic law’ etc. See Ana’s facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/analebanon/info (accessed on 17/1/2014).

212 Ibid.

Remains. Ten years after the end of the war, the government set up in 2000 the first
commission of inquiry. The findings of the commissions however have been rejected by
the families. In 2005 a mass grave close to the Ministry of Defence was exhumed and 18
remains were identified. With the assistance of an international NGO (the International
Centre for Transitional justice-ICTJ) and Lebanese human rights lawyers, a law on the
missing and the forcibly disappeared has been drafted. The government has pledged to
finally seriously address the issue but instead of adopting the draft law, the minister of
Justice has drafted a less comprehensive decree which is awaiting the end of the political
stalemate to be discussed in cabinet. To date, however, the state’s ‘handling of the matter
(…) has been characterized by reluctance and concealment’.

Like calls for a broader truth commission on the causes and the events of the war, ‘it is
unlikely that current political leaders, who are allegedly responsible for some atrocities,
would establish a commission to look into their own acts’. Lebanon instead has
repeatedly failed to deal with the legacies of the past conflict: amongst other things, it has
failed to establish a historiography of the war including the events that took place,
discussing the different perspectives of the war, and engaging in meaningful reconciliation.
Lebanon’s approach to transition has instead marginalized victims and exacerbated popular
mistrust in state institutions.

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214 All armed groups that took part in the Lebanese war practiced systematic ‘enforced disappearance’. The practice extended until 2000 the year of the Israeli withdrawal and until 2005 the year of the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanese and non-Lebanese fighters as well as civilians went missing as a result of the violence. Many are believed to be in mass graves across the country, others were detained in Israeli, and some are still held in Syrian prisons. The fate of thousands remains unknown. See Act for the Disappeared: http://www.actforthedisappeared.com/mission.php (accessed on 17/1/2014).
215 In 2001 and 2005 two other commissions were set up to follow up the issue.
216 Only the first commission conducted investigations; it claimed that remains could not be identified and that there were no more Lebanese detainees. Both claims were falsified: Israel and Syria both released Lebanese detainees and experts confirmed the possibility of identifying remains two decades post-mortem.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 For a critique of Lebanon’s transition and recommendations for moving forward based on a transitional justice approach see: Smaïra and Cassehgari, 2014.
Grassroots efforts from outside the ruling establishment have already led to tangible change. Following intense lobbying and a popular ‘National Campaign’ beginning in 2009, the Lebanese gained the right to remove their sect from their identity cards. This is an achievement that should not be underestimated in a context where confessional politics occupy such a long-standing primordial position. An article in NowLebanon captures sentiments shared by a growing number of Lebanese: ‘I’m here today to say that I am aware of what sect on ID means’ said 87-year-old Nader Jaafar. The campaign, however, has not been received with much optimism: ‘some saw the move as purely symbolic, others saw it as the beginning of a wider change in Lebanese attitudes, conceding that it will take time for the full benefit to be felt.’ Even this campaign was eventually politicized as groups affiliated with different coalitions refused to work together.

Another symbolic voice comes from the popular movement ‘Laique Pride March’. It is an annual march held since 2010 in protest against Lebanon’s sectarian system. As one journalist said, ‘you probably didn’t hear news of this demonstration, though.’ A number of reasons can explain this: no violence ensued from either the state or demonstrators, and it did not represent any of the major and traditional parties, oligarchs or leaders. Although phrases such as “revolution against the regime” and “people want the

221 With 18 recognized sects, there are 15 religious personal status codes. A person only exists in Lebanon as a member of a sect.
222 Also a clause in the Ta’if Agreement. See Appendix 2 (II-G-b).
223 Marc Daou explained that ‘that during the civil war, several people were killed because they carried their sect on their identity cards. They were stopped at checkpoints of opposing factions and were killed for the simple reason that they belonged to a certain sect and had that sect stated on their ID cards.’ Nader Jaafar, 87 years old: ‘I’m here today to say that I am aware of what sect on ID means, and I have been putting all effort to keep myself away from it(...).’ ‘I’m doing it to encourage the younger generation to do so(...)’ Hani Adada, 21: ‘I’m here to fight the war that is living in us and among us (...).’ Likewise, as Jaafar noted: ‘It was built on sectarian differences that serve only those in power, who keep on fuelling it.’ Nadine Elali, Politics Split Anti-Sectarian Memorial. NowLebanon, 14/4/2009. From http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=88812# (accessed on 17/2/2012).
224 Ibid.
225 Laique meaning secular.
fall of the regime” were chanted, as in Egypt and elsewhere across the region, it was not seen as a threat to the ruling establishment.

That being said, in April 2013, the Ministry of Interior finally succumbed under the pressure of civil society, the President, and a small number of progressive MPs. The first civil marriage was formally recognized in Lebanon. While there is still a long way to go for a civil personal status law to be formulated and adopted, one can appreciate the progress.

4) Women’s rights

Although Lebanese women gained the right to vote in 1953 (19 years prior to Switzerland) and many have been fierce advocates of social change, progress in terms of women’s rights has been limited.

Despite hopes for transformation, the post-war transition process did not incorporate a gender dimension either in its process or its content, missing an opportunity to bring about institutional, political and societal change, and entrenching Lebanon’s broader patriarchal and sectarian tradition. As a result, women still occupy a subsidiary place in Lebanese politics and society; they are seen as second-choice political candidates. Women have taken part in public office but as mothers, sisters, daughters or wives of men from long established political families; they have generally been advanced as candidates when the male option was not available. Further, although the Association of Banks in Lebanon

228 Ibid.
229 Harsh resistance from all sides of the ruling establishment remains a major impediment. Furthermore, we are a long way from a law to regulate such matters as inheritance, custody, divorce etc.
232 Khalife, A Woman’s’s.
233 E.g. MP Nayla Tueini is daughter of Late Jibran Tueni, Strida Geagea is wife of head of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea, and Bahia Hariri is sister of late Rafic Hariri. To date, only 17 women have served in parliament.
began allowing Lebanese women to independently open bank accounts for their minor children in 2009, only a few private banks have since adopted this policy.

Unsurprisingly, women’s rights are closely linked to the primordial preoccupation in the mainstream discourse: sectarianism. As personal status laws in Lebanon are regulated by religious courts, they resist civil encroachment. As a result, draft laws on issues such as violence against women and nationality have been unable to get through parliament. Moreover, women’s issues have been secondary to concerns of maintaining the sectarian balance. It is safe therefore to say that progress in women’s rights has been hindered by the sectarian scarecrow.

A more inclusive and responsive democratic system in Lebanon requires that women’s rights be advanced by (among other things) fulfilling Lebanon’s legal human rights obligations, by establishing a parliamentary quota, by supporting women’s associations, and encouraging candidacies in local and municipal elections. These will be stepping stones for women to fill positions with higher decision-making responsibilities, and to transform socio-economic and attitudinal obstacles to gender-sensitive governance; this institutional approach would contribute to the empowerment of women. Civil society has long only taken a soft approach to activism, and many women’s groups have long been co-opted; it is high time for civil society to adopt a more critical approach to induce rather than wait for transformation. As evidenced by the next discussions, new women’s groups seem to have stepped up to the task; domestic violence and the nationality campaign are cases in point.

235 As explained, these deal with birth and death certificates, marriage, divorce, adoption, domestic violence, etc.
236 For example, granting nationality to a Lebanese women’s spouse or child is perceived to facilitate plans for the naturalization of Palestinian refugees and therefore threatens the sectarian balance (see below).
238 Critical voices have agreed on the complacency of civil society and the failure of women’s groups to provide a counter-hegemonic alternative; they have since been trying to challenge this. See two interesting empirically strong MA theses criticizing co-option techniques and complacency of women’s groups: Sandy S. El-Hage, "Transnational Activism in Lebanon’s Women’s Movement: Between Fitna, Fawda, and Feminism" (Lebanese American University, 2013). From: https://ecommons.lau.edu.lb:8443/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10725/1551/Sandy_S_El_Hage_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 1/7/2014) and Lara Khattab, "Civil Society in a Sectarian Context: The Women’s Movement in Post-War Lebanon" (Lebanese American University, 2010). From: http://www.academia.edu/1650678/Civil_Society_in_a_Sectarian_Context_The_Womens_Movement_in_Po
a) The Nationality Campaign

Lebanon has long prided itself for being the region’s forerunner in adopting liberal and democratic ideals. Upon and since independence, consecutive governments have reiterated Lebanon’s commitment to individual freedoms, social justice, and equality of rights.\(^{239}\) In addition, since its independence, Lebanon has committed itself to international human rights regimes: ‘Lebanon is (…) a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception’.\(^{240}\) This as well as article 2 of the Civil Procedures Codes establish ‘the supremacy of the provisions of international treaties over those of ordinary law, international treaties ratified by Lebanon are considered as applicable laws, upon publication in the Official Gazette’\(^{241}\).

Within this framework, Lebanon has long been considered a pioneer in women’s rights in the region.\(^{242}\) However, the “emancipation” of the Lebanese woman is deceiving. Lebanon has legal obligations to all international regimes governing the rights of women. Aside from the UN Charter and the Universal declaration of Human Rights (1948) establishing equality between men and women, Lebanon has ratified in 1972 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) without reservations.\(^{239}\)

\(^{239}\) As mentioned above, Lebanon’s constitution (paragraph C of the preamble) states that ‘Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination’. Furthermore, article 7 of the constitution reiterates the equality of all Lebanese before the law; ‘they shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction’. Emphasis added. "The Lebanese Constitution. Promulgated May 23, 1926. With Its Amendments," (1995). From: http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf (accessed on 17/1/2014).

\(^{240}\) Preamble, paragraph B. Lebanese Constitution, 1995.


\(^{242}\) As noted by Maya Mansour and Sarah Abou Aad, advancements in women’s right have included: ‘granting political rights to women in 1953, giving married women the right to choose their citizenship in 1960, allowing women to be elected in local councils in 1963, abolishing the requirement of a husband’s permission to travel in 1974, establishing equal retirement ages and social security benefits for men and women in 1984, allowing women to practice commerce without the husband’s permission in 1994 and lately, repelling honour crimes in 2011’. Maya Mansour and Sarah AbouAad, "Women’s Citizenship Rights in Lebanon,"(Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, Working Paper Series #8, May 2012). P 4.
Lebanon therefore is legally committed to grant ‘equal enjoyment by men and women of all civil and political rights set forth in this covenant’ and has obligations to protect ‘the family as the natural and fundamental group in society’. 243 Lebanon also ratified in 1972 the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) undertaking therefore to ensure ‘equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights’. 244 Linked to women’s rights is the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which Lebanon also ratified in 1991. 245 Lebanon thereby committed to guarantee children’s ‘right to acquire nationality’, to preserve family relations, and to recognize the responsibility of both parents in raising a child.

Lebanon also ratified but made reservations to the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 246 The reservations pertained to ‘equal rights for men and women with respect to citizenship and nationality’ and to state responsibility to ‘eliminate discrimination against women in matters of the family and marriage’. 247 These reservations clearly need to be rescinded.

This study argues that what is seen on the street is merely a façade. 248 The problem lies in Lebanon’s Nationality Law. 249 The latter severely undermines gender equality and has had negative impacts on various levels: education, work and residence permits, healthcare, inheritance, and socio-economics. 250 In Lebanon, the ‘bond by blood’ is restricted to men. 251 The Nationality Law (1925) in Lebanon is shameful and regressive: a women married to a foreigner cannot extend her nationality to her spouse or children but a foreign woman can become Lebanese one year after marriage. Women married to foreigners are stripped of some of their entitlements as Lebanese citizens as they cannot

243 See the ICCPR at: http://www.un-documents.net/iccr.htm (accessed on 17/1/2014).
244 Lebanon ratified it without reservations. See the ICESCR at: http://www.un-documents.net/a21r2200.htm (accessed on 17/1/2014).
249 This Law is traced to the French mandate. It replaced a more progressive Ottoman version (from the 1800s) which ‘had consecrated the principle of full “jus sanguinis”’, allowing the citizenship to be inherited from both the mother and the father’. Mansour and Abou Aad, 2012, p 9.
250 See Mansour and Abou Aad, 2012.
provide the safe environment of basic rights to her family. Foreign husbands and children of Lebanese women have no access to public education, to public healthcare, to political rights, and require residency and work permits even if the children were born and have lived in Lebanon. Basically, this law tells women that it is best to stay abroad should they marry a foreigner. Not only does it ‘plac[e] women in a subordinate “second class” position’, it also ‘undermines access to all other rights’, ‘has direct impact on children, spouses, voice and political representation’, ‘leads to marginalization and social exclusion’.  

A 1994 amendment of the law had opened up a small window for children to acquire Lebanese citizenship. However the condition remains appalling: ‘the child must marry a Lebanese citizen and live continuously in Lebanon for at least five years, including one year after marriage’.  

In an unprecedented move, in 2009, in a lawsuit against the state, a number of judges, referred to the Lebanese constitution and the interest of protecting the integrity of the family unit by ruling in favour of granting the children of a Lebanese woman, whose foreign husband had died, Lebanese citizenship. The Judges’ decision was based ‘on the fact there was no law prohibiting a Lebanese mother from passing on her nationality to her children after the death of her husband’. The judges capitalized on this legal loophole by interpreting the law in this favourable manner. However, in this and other similar cases the ruling has been overturned. That being said, the judges’ rulings have pierced the wall imposed by the authorities and the complacency of public opinion. The injustices of this law are increasingly being publicized and pressure is mounting on the authorities to respond to the voices of the many families, organizations, associations, and movements calling for the review of the law.

Hence, a ministerial commission was set up on March 21, 2012 to review the Nationality Law. Not surprisingly, the commission refused to amend the Law. It justified the failure to comply with Lebanon’s human rights obligations on the basis of protecting the country’s ‘supreme national interests’; it is believed that the current but discriminatory

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254 Articles mentioned in above footnotes.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.

Sectarianism and obsession with confessional interests have therefore been the root impediments to advancement in women’s rights and particularly in abolishing this discriminatory rule.

...to stay in the country even if it is the only country they have known”. To further compound the discrimination against women, on December 12, 2011 the cabinet approved a draft law granting Lebanese

It is believed that the naturalization of Palestinian refugees would fatally undermine the Palestinian struggle for the right of return. More importantly, as discussed, Lebanon’s stability rests on a delicate balance between its confessional groups; as Palestinians are predominantly Sunnis, it is feared that their naturalization would tilt the balance in the favour of the Sunni minority. It is commonly feared that reforming the Lebanese Nationality law would pave the way for thousands of Palestinians married to Lebanese women to be naturalized and would provide an option for Palestinian men to abuse the law for acquiring citizenship. Hence, Lebanon’s constitution, as amended in 1990 in the aftermath of the war, states that ‘there shall be no (...) settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon’.

The Lebanese authorities have introduced “facilities” for children and foreign spouses of Lebanese women. Decree 4186 of May 31, 2010, ‘grants courtesy residence’ consisting of ‘a three-year residence permits, provided they have been previously living in Lebanon for a year’. Furthermore, Labour Regulation 122/1 of September 23, 2011 grants spouses and children ‘work permits without the need of a sponsor’ and allows them to ‘renew their residence permits without having to pay fees, even if they hold no job’. But as mentioned above, ‘if the children born to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers subsequently marry non-Lebanese citizens, they are not permitted to stay in the country even if it is the only country they have known’. To further compound the discrimination against women, on December 12, 2011 the cabinet approved a draft law granting Lebanese


Paragraph I of preamble.


Ibid.

Ibid.
citizenship to ‘descendants of expatriates of Lebanese origin with documents supporting their Lebanese ancestry’; this was of course to be restricted to ‘patrilineal descent’.\footnote{Many have never been to or know very little of Lebanon. Ibid.}

Crucially, the status of women can only be transformed when Lebanon finally rescinds its reservations to CEDAW, reforms its Nationality Law, and conforms to its legal obligations towards human rights treaties. The pressure of civil society is pushing in this direction.  

*My Nationality is a Right for me and My Family* Campaign has led the way in trying to change public perceptions and in mounting pressure on authorities to consider a revision of the law.\footnote{The Lebanese NGO Collective for Research and Training on Development-Action (CRTD.A) has been involved in advocacy on gender and nationality rights since 2001 (in cooperation with UNDP). In 2006, it launched the above campaign. Ibid, 2012, p 14.} The Campaign is engaged in promoting ‘active and inclusive citizenship’ and at ‘mobilizing interest and concern in women’s right to nationality’; it of course aims at ‘reforming’ Lebanon’s nationality law; but although the campaign started as a Lebanese grassroots movement, it has as embraced transnationalism by extending its activities to Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Bahrain.\footnote{Nationality Campaign website: http://nationalitycampaign.wordpress.com/ (accessed on 17/1/2014).} Notably, the campaign mirrors the bottom-up, inclusive, egalitarian, emancipatory, and transnational conception of security discussed under CSS.

\textit{b) Domestic Violence}

Domestic violence is another issue that human rights and feminist activists have taken to heart in the last few years. Groups from both sides of the spectrum have amassed support to maintain the momentum of their pressure.\footnote{From traditional actors (for example MP Strida Geagea representing the Lebanese Forces) and critical ones (for example Nasawiiyya).}

*Kafa*(enough) Violence and Exploitation is one organization that had a leading role in this. Kafa is a Lebanese ‘non-profit, non-political, non-confessional civil society organization’ that works ‘towards the eradicating all forms of gender-based violence and exploitation of women and children’. Kafa advocates for legal reform and change of policies and practices, influencing public opinion, and empowering women and
It has set up a helpline—a first in Lebanon, and provides social, legal and psychological services for women. KAFA’s intense and now famous lobbying and advocacy efforts have led to the group being invited to join the ISF in launching the women-specific campaign: “We have a mission. If you’re threatened, do not hesitate to call 112”. Notably, it also led the campaign to lobby for removing domestic violence from the realm of the private and from the authority of the various religious courts. It is increasingly accepted that although these sectarian codes claim to protect the sanctity of family life and the integrity of the family unit, they fail to guarantee the protection of women. The publicized statistic/slogan that at least one woman in Lebanon dies every month from domestic violence and the long rejection of parliamentarians to challenge religious authorities in adopting a national law criminalizing domestic violence have mobilized grassroots women’s movements.

On KAFA’s initiative, the drafting of a law for the protection of women from domestic violence started in July 2007; 41 organizations later joined KAFA’s initiative and formed the “National Coalition for a Law to Protect Women from Family violence”. Although cabinet had approved on April 6, 2010 the Law to Protect Women from Family violence, progress towards parliamentary adoption faced a three year standstill. However, civil society’s consistent activism raised the pressure. On July 4th, 2013, KAFA organized a press conference ‘to launch the campaign "I haven't died, but many others have"'; the dramatic testimonies of two women, ‘survivors of murder attempts by their husbands’, directly called on the speaker of parliament to place the law on the parliamentary agenda.

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267 112 is the ISF’s number. See the campaign at: http://www.kafa.org.lb/kafa-news/68/launch-of-the-campaign-we-have-a-mission-if-youre (accessed on 17/1/2014).


A day later, the law was placed as the first item on the agenda. And, on July 22, 2013 the joint committees in parliament approved "The Bill for the Protection of Women and Family Members against Domestic Violence". Progress was certainly made. However, problematic amendments were introduced to the draft proposed by civil society. The Bill fails to criminalize marital rape and fails to include minor children under the protection order; these amendments therefore constitute dis-incentives for women to report abuse and constitute impediments for the effective protection of women. It is clear that without the efforts of grassroots women’s movement, domestic violence would have remained the taboo it has long been in Lebanese society. Member of the joint committee studying the law, MP Shant Janjanian, admitted that ‘NGOs and activist work had played a key role (…) the demonstrations and all the pressure have made an impact.’

5) Migrant domestic workers

Migrant domestic workers constitute a sizable vulnerable group in Lebanese society that has, for decades, been exposed to unnoticed legal, social, economic, and physical discrimination and abuse. Lina Abu-Habib wondered back in 1998 ‘why their increased vulnerability does not appear to be a cause for concern on the part of local or international NGOs.’ The International Labour Organization (ILO) published in 2013 a study rightly titled *Tricked and Trapped. Human Trafficking in the Middle East* to document (among

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271 In terms of moving, to a large extent, the issue into the realm of the criminal and in delineating the powers of religious and criminal courts.
272 Ibid.
other things) the exploitative situation migrant domestic workers face in the region. Domestic workers are often faced with ‘deceptive recruitment in the country of origin’ whereby ‘agents, relatives, and friends (…) mislead them about the nature of the job’; if they are aware they are signing up for domestic work, they are often also simply deceived by the exploitative working and living conditions. These include ‘forced overtime, lack of rest periods and severe limits on communication and freedom of movement’, being ‘prevented from leaving by various forms of penalty and threats, including the retention of passports, the withholding of wages, and the use of psychological, physical and sexual violence’.

The Kafala or sponsorship system adopted across the Middle East (including in Lebanon) entails that the employer is legally responsible ‘for the residency and employment of their domestic workers’. The visa is therefore only granted for one specific employment. Migrant domestic workers therefore are restricted to this one employer: should the conditions not suit them, only should the employer accept to forfeit his/her legal right and financial investment, can the worker leave before the end of the contract. Note however that staying in the country would still incur legal responsibility on the employer; hence should the worker decide not to complete his/her contract they are usually sent off back to the country of origin. But, this only happens in rare situations as employers make a ‘significant cash outlay (…) to recruit’ them.

The domestic worker rarely has access to the outside world, hence rarely has access to justice. They are often isolated ‘in private homes, which are not inspected by labour inspectors or social workers’. In Lebanon, domestic workers are not covered by Lebanon’s Labour code meaning employers do not have to abide by the minimum wage, maximum working hours, social security benefits etc. It is therefore safe to say that migrant domestic workers are extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Because the recruitment fee, the wages, and the maintenance fees are incurred on the employer; in addition, because of the legal responsibility for the migrant worker’s residency and work permit, the Kafala system breeds a ‘sense of entitlement over the worker’ that produces a master-slave like

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277 Ibid.
278 Ibid, p 42.
279 Ibid, p 42.
280 Ibid, p 42.
281 Averaging between $3,000 and 4,000.
282 Ibid, p 42.
relationship. It is in this respect that Ray Juriedini and Nayla Moukarbel argue that Lebanon goes as far as ‘meeting the conditions of modern slavery, and more particularly of contract slavery’, which is defined as ‘a person held by violence or the threat of violence for economic exploitation’.  

The phenomenon of employing migrant domestic workers can be justified. On the one hand, ‘many of the families who employ domestic workers in the Middle East are of very limited means, but where public, affordable support for the care of children and elderly relatives is lacking they have little choice but to hire external help’. Furthermore, migrant domestic workers ‘provide an indispensable contribution to society that allows many Lebanese women to leave their homes, gain economic independence and develop their careers’. On the other hand, there are numerous ‘positive effects whereby individuals, families and the country of [domestic migrant workers] as a whole benefit from the improved financial opportunities afforded by the incomes remitted from these workers’; that is why countries like Sri Lanka, for example, have ‘actively encouraged the ‘export’ of domestic labour as it has become the largest single source of foreign revenue for the country’.  

However, the exploitation of domestic workers and the lack of access to justice mechanism that the Kafala system supports violate numerous basic human rights.  

Five groups—KAFA, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre, Insan Association (or Human), Amel International, and the Anti-Racism Movement coordinated to Launch a campaign Fi Shi Ghalat (there is something wrong) calling for the ‘abolishment’ of the sponsorship

284 Harroff-Tavel and Nasri, 2013, p 42.
285 OHCHR, 2011.
287 e.g. withholding passports and wages or confinement for fear of the worker running away.
288 The Kafala system supports the violation of such basic rights as the right to freedom of movement, to own property, the freedom from slavery, servitude or forced compulsory labour. It is also worth noting that Lebanon and other Middle Eastern Countries are not party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) which reiterates a State’s responsibility to guarantee basic rights and stipulates in articles 25, 27 and 35, 39 for example, the fair and equal treatment with nationals with respect to remuneration and other conditions of work such as social security, overtime, holidays, and to be temporarily absent for family reasons or other obligations etc. See the Convention on: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm (accessed on 17/1/2014).
The sponsorship system places the employer in a position of power that is not counter-balanced by rights and effective mechanisms to protect the migrant worker from abuse. The *Fi Shi Ghalat* campaign indeed recognizes that ‘there is something wrong’ and insists that ‘the law and the mentality have to change and that starts with the individual and then the government, we must change the Kafala System’.

The campaign is therefore lobbying for granting domestic workers ‘basic labour rights, particularly to guarantee a day off outside the house and set hours of rest, the right to break their contract, and change employers’. In addition groups are rightfully calling for the government to ‘review and increase monitoring of the current processes of recruitment (…) and decrease recruitment fees’; crucially, ‘the employer’s responsibility for the legal presence of the worker’ should be removed. The campaign is increasing awareness by publicizing heart-breaking testimonies of migrant domestic workers’ verbal, physical, sexual abuse leading up to suicide from desperation and entrapment.

After a number of countries temporarily banned their nationals from travelling to Lebanon, the Lebanese government signed memorandums of understandings with several of these migrant-worker exporting countries. In 2009, the Lebanese government introduced a standard contract for migrant domestic workers which guarantees respect of such basic rights as ‘weekly breaks, private rooms, a minimum wage, and freedom from physical or emotional violence’.

Deputy Director of Human Right Watch’s Beirut office, Nadim Houry recognized ‘slight increase in sensitivity toward the issues migrant domestic workers face’. For example, the union of workers’ recruitment agencies have reached out to civil society groups to consider ways to improve the recruitment process; and, recently a number of employers have been tried after their physical abuse was recorded and went viral on social media. That being said the migrant domestic workers have little access to justice and the Penal code is still not widely upheld in cases of abuse. Houry strongly emphasises that no

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291 This by organizing conferences, marches, festivals, film screening etc. to shed light on the injustices of the *Kafala* system. See facebook page for some of these stories.
294 For example, ‘the syndicate has adopted a new code of conduct, drawn up with the ILO’s help’. Slemrod, 2013.
‘real structural progress’ has been made. These recent changes are only cosmetic because the *Kafala* system is still in place and because no monitoring mechanisms have been established.

Progress in the conditions of life and work for migrant domestic workers remains piecemeal as it fails to redress the master-slave relation that the *Kafala* system instils. Nonetheless, this vulnerable group has finally been given a voice by a coalition of human rights groups.

6) Refugees and migrant workers

a) The Syrian refugee crisis

Lebanon has long been a host for refugees. Aside from the historical Palestinian refugee presence, in 2012 for example, 80 percent of non-Palestinian refugees registered with the UNHCR were Iraqi. However, it is the influx of Syrian refugees that has been stirring tension. ‘One of five people living in Lebanon’ is a refugee from the Syrian war said the UNHCR; up to January 23, 2014, it registered 841,892 Syrian refugees. Of course not counting the almost 50,000 awaiting registration and thousands of other non-registered Syrian refugees. WHO is expecting an additional ‘1.5 million refugees’ to enter Lebanon in 2014. This influx is increasingly becoming a burden that Lebanon struggles to manage with. The UN has ‘announced its biggest ever appeal’, just the same,

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295 Ibid.
Lebanon appealed for ‘a record amount of cash’. Many pledges have been made, but funds are failing or are slow to arrive; UNHCR feared funding shortfalls may lead to a ‘breaking point’. Severe repercussions on the humanitarian, socio-economic, and political levels have piled up both on the refugees and the Lebanese population. Strain and competition over the infrastructure, the health sector, the education sector, and the labour market are taking their toll. The Lebanese government refuses to set up formal camps; the Syrian refugees live on 1,588 locations across Lebanon. Aside from the minimum requirements of humanitarian relief, the Syrian presence is increasingly facing opposition from the Lebanese population. Syrian refugees are faced with xenophobic reactions from both the political elite and the wider public. Some of Lebanon’s ‘Christian’ parties have expressed their rejection of a prolonged presence of the refugee population. Jebran Bassil, caretaker energy minister and Free Patriotic Movement MP, has been particularly vocal of his movement’s concern over the refugee crisis: with ‘more than quarter of the Lebanese population’ as of August 2013 made out of foreigners, he repeatedly argued that the high influx of refugees is an ‘existential matter’ that ‘threatens the Lebanese entity’. He has been arguing that the services provided ‘encourage them to’ keep on coming to Lebanon and he has been calling on the government to accept only ‘extraordinary cases that need healthcare to enter the country’. Bassil proposed a comprehensive plan to deal with the influx: he called on the government to stop its open door policy and (in cooperation with the Syrian regime and international organizations) to create facilities on the Syrian side of the border to contain and secure the presence of refugees rather than allow a scattered presence in the country. Furthermore, Bassil suggested that municipalities adopt a ‘unified guiding policy to count the number of refugees, watch their movements, locate

304 Naharnet, 16/12/2013.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
their whereabouts and control any suspicious acts or violations they might commit'.

Bassil’s statements have been dubbed as racist and xenophobic by many; nevertheless, speaking for a party with the largest predominantly ‘Christian’ base, his statements do resonate popularly. That being said, the Lebanese government has sent out warnings to the international community that it is no longer capable of managing the continued influx of refugees. Prime Minister Mikati recently called on the UN, regional and international powers to ‘step up’ and assume a more proactive role; he described the crisis as ‘not an internal Lebanese crisis’ rather ‘a universal disaster and a threat to regional stability’. He emphasised that the international community needs to react to ‘prevent the collapse of a small country’. Aside from the strain on the various sectors and the political tension, he warned of serious ‘risks of epidemics of waterborne disease, measles and tuberculosis’ which at least should be cause for serious action. Although, originally apprehensive of Bassil’s rhetoric, the government is finally calling on the international community to help secure ‘safe zones for refugees within Syria’ to avoid another case of ‘permanent camps in Lebanon’. ‘The big dilemma in Lebanon is how can a resource-poor, debt-ridden and cash-strapped country cope with the impact of the refugee tragedy that has hosting communities under immense economic and social stress?’ asked the World Bank. In cooperation with UN agencies, the EU and the IMF, the World Bank has prepared an Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon showing the ‘alarming’ strain imposed on Lebanon; the International Support Group for Lebanon

308 Emphasis added. Ibid.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
(ISG) was subsequently formed; Lebanon has set up a Crisis Management Strategy; pledges have been made, but progress will rest on the international community.

**b) Discrimination, Syrian refugees and migrant workers**

The political and crisis management aspects aside, a campaign was launched in July 2013 by the Anti-Racism Movement aimed at challenging racism directed against Syrian refugees in specific and migrant workers in general. Migrant workers in Lebanon constitute a ‘massive presence’. Migrant workers amount to almost 5 percent of Lebanon’s population; 92 percent of them have no qualifications. Aside from female domestic workers discussed above, migrant male workers are predominantly from Syria, Egypt, and Sudan, and they are mostly involved in construction and other low skilled jobs. They have long been subjects of exploitation and discrimination; however, the Syrian crisis has stimulated civil society to respond to regressive attitudes and policies they are faced with. The Anti-Racism Movement is ‘a grassroots movement created by young activists in Lebanon, in collaboration with migrant community leaders’ from across the spectrum. For example, in the midst of discriminatory reactions to the influx of Syrian refugees, activists hung huge posters on bridges across Beirut saying: ‘Welcome to Lebanon Syrian brothers’, ‘We shall not forget the support the Syrian people provided to Lebanese during the 2006 war’, ‘Welcome to the Syrian refugees and workers-

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315 It is dependent on political negotiations and on fulfilment of pledges.

316 See the Facebook page of the Anti-Racism Movement for the campaign: https://www.facebook.com/ARMLeb (accessed on 15/1/2014).


318 Ibid, p 2.

319 Such as ‘janitors, cleaners and porters in buildings and commercial establishments’ and ‘construction, farming, road construction, car-servicing, cleaning and garbage collection, repair and maintenance workshops, and as peddlers and porters’. Ibid.

apologize for the actions of the racists amongst us’. This campaign came as a response to certain towns implementing curfews for migrant workers such as Sin el-Fil, Kahhaleh, and Mkalles. The movement has been engaged in ‘documenting, investigating, exposing and fighting racist practices and mentalities, through various initiatives and campaigns’; along with other groups involved in human rights activism, more light has been shed on these and other issues related to structural as well as societal injustices imposed on Lebanon’s non-Lebanese population. The efforts of the Anti-Racism Movement and other groups remain very limited; however without such grassroots efforts, migrant workers would have remained voiceless and the injustices imposed on this faction of society would not have been exposed. Awareness is slowly rising. By pressuring for necessary institutional and legislative change, the work of these groups slowly builds the groundwork for the progressive emancipation of vulnerable groups in general in Lebanon.321

c) Palestinian Refugees

The Syrian refugee crisis is a serious manifestation of the spill-over of the Syrian war to Lebanon and is exacerbating the precarious instability in the country. But it can only be read in light of Lebanon’s experience with the Palestinian refugees.

The situation of Palestinian refugees is a complex and controversial topic. In the interest of space and scope, this section only briefly documents the legal discrimination that marginalizes the Palestinian community.322 Although the status of Palestinian refugees occupies a central place in domestic politics, the humanitarian side of Palestinian refugee crisis is still on the margins. The issue of naturalizing Palestinian refugees haunts political actors from across the board.323

321 Including Syrian, Palestinian and other refugees, domestic workers and other migrant workers.
322 For a comprehensive but concise overview of the legal texts regulating the presence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon see: Jaber Suleiman, "Marginalized Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,"(Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, Apr. 2006).
323 whether in relation to impeding negotiations on the right of return or in relation to disturbing the already delicate sectarian balance—although hardly a balance anymore.
According to UNRWA, there are some 404,170 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,\(^{324}\) about ‘11.5 percent of Lebanon’s population’.\(^{325}\) Most of the refugees live in 12 refugee camps across the country. Lebanese lawmakers and governments have long taken many measures to prevent the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Lebanon therefore institutionalized the marginalization of the Palestinian community. As mentioned, The Lebanese Constitution bars the *Tawteen*—the nationalization or permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.

Lebanon has chosen a stance that on the one hand denies Palestinians born and living in Lebanon basic rights accorded to it nationals, and on the other hand refuses to guarantee them refugee rights. Lebanon is also not a party to the refugee Convention and Lebanon chooses to consider Palestinians as foreigners not refugees. Furthermore, despite a ‘protracted residence in the country’ Lebanon’s Labour law does not offer ‘separate’ or ‘preferred’ legal status to ‘foreigners’ (or Palestinians) that ‘have resided in Lebanon for more than three years’.\(^{326}\) Being considered foreigners, Palestinians have to obtain a work permit (competing for low skilled jobs with Syrian workers that do not require a permit), and are barred from jobs that are restricted to Lebanese nationals. They are barred from some ‘25 professions requiring syndicate membership, including law, medicine, and engineering’ and do not enjoy social security benefits.\(^{327}\) Palestinians ‘have no access to Lebanese government hospitals or other related health services’\(^{328}\) but they have access to public schools and the Lebanese University.\(^{329}\) Palestinians are also barred from registering property.\(^{330}\)

In doing so, Lebanon deliberately marginalizes the Palestinian community and has imposed dire humanitarian conditions on a population that has lived in Lebanon since 1948.

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\(^{324}\) Although some claim that this is an over-estimate as many Palestinians registered with UNRWA have left Lebanon.


\(^{326}\) Ibid, p 16.

\(^{327}\) HRW, 2012.

\(^{328}\) UNRWA and other NGOs have taken over the health services. ICG, 2009, p 16.


\(^{330}\) Such as land, houses, shops. Law 296 stipulates that ‘It is prohibited to any person who is not a national of a recognized state, or anyone whose ownership of property is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution relating to ‘*Tawteen*’ to acquire real-estate property of any kind’. Suleiman, 2006, p 18.
In doing so, Lebanon also violates a number of its international legal obligations. When in 2011 the ‘UK-based lobby groups the Palestinian Return Centre and the Council for European Palestinian Relations’ visited three camps in Lebanon, British MP Michael Connarty noted that he has been ‘in many camps (…) but none which gave [him] such a feeling of unease as those [he] saw in Lebanon’. And Sir Gerald Kaufman described one of the camps as ‘the worst single place [he has] ever seen’. The situation of the Palestinian refugees is worse in Lebanon than in any other host country.

MP Mikati had expressed the government’s willingness to amend legislation to alleviate the situation for Palestinians should the Palestinian Authority issue ‘passports or equivalent identity papers’. But the ‘Palestinian factions rejected any suggested improvement that was likely to diminish leverage of the demand for the right of return’. Although cautious about this generalization, it is safe to say that the continued victimization serves both the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. From the Lebanese side, we have repeated confirmations; for example in 2008 MP Ghassan Mokhayber candidly noted that the ‘official policy is to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalisation or permanent settlement. Our economic and security measures are guided by this’. That being said, the authorities increasingly accept that the situation is unsustainable. Former PM Hariri had asked: ‘should we deprive Palestinian refugees in Palestinian camps of their rights, so that they become terrorists in the future?’

Hence, the challenge is how ‘to reconcile rejection of naturalisation and acceptance of the need to grant Palestinians their rights and improve their living conditions’.

Lebanese parliament passed a law that, as Ziad Sayegh noted, ‘for the first time (…) gives [Palestinians] some legal rights’. The law would allow Palestinians to ‘claim

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331 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
335 ICG, 2009, p 16.
336 Charles, 2011.
337 ICG, 2009, P 16
338 Sayegh is the 2005-2009 policy advisor to the president of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee-LPDC.
free work permits’ for the private sector, ‘claim cover for work-related accidents and retirement indemnities from their own social security fund, to which they will pay contributions while working’. The law certainly does not grant Palestinians their full basic rights, but it does address some of the criticisms the Lebanese government is bombarded with. The law does not lift the Palestinians from the abject situation they are faced with, however, as Sayegh pointed out, as rudimentary as it seems, if treated badly, a Palestinian employee ‘can now go to the court and complain’. The Centre Libanais des Droits Humains (CLDH) which ‘fights against enforced disappearance, impunity, arbitrary detention, and racism’ confirms that the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon is ‘a vulnerable group’. The Centre has documented widespread systematic ‘discrimination and racism’ as well as a particular vulnerability to arbitrary detention and torture by Lebanese security agencies; this is based on the prejudice that Palestinians are associated with armed groups. CLDH’s work is not restricted to Palestinian refugees; it has opened a rehabilitation centre for victims of torture—The Nassim Centre; it often however provides legal representation to Palestinians.

Aside from piecemeal initiatives by international organization, NGOs, and the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee marginal progress has been achieved. Given the complexity and strategic importance of the Palestinian refugee file, issues pertaining to the status of Palestinian refugees have simply been shelved. And, voices challenging this stance remain dim. Although awareness is increasing along with human rights campaigns, this issue has yet to reach the high profile others have achieved.

340 Although Palestinians would still be barred from the public sector, from Lebanese public hospitals, from registering property, and from syndicate professions. Muir, 2010.
341 Ibid.
343 Treatment of Palestinian Refugees, 2011.
345 To the domestic and to the Arab-Israeli conflicts.
In Lebanon homosexuality is criminalised. Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code stipulates that ‘sexual intercourse contrary to nature’ is punishable by a prison sentence of up to one year. This has been interpreted as applying to same sex relationships. Like the Nationality Law, this article conflicts with Lebanon’s obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Like the Nationality law, article 534 is a legacy of the French mandate. But this law also reflects cultural, societal, and religious condemnation of homosexuality. Societal rejection and article 534 have imposed a repressive reality on the LGBT community: it is faced with discrimination, marginalization and societal exclusion. The LGBT community has also been a target for abuse by the security forces. A 2013 Human Rights Watch report documented that vulnerable groups such as homosexuals (but also sex workers and drug users) being subjected to mistreatment including physical violence and torture. That being said, ‘homosexuality is generally only prosecuted in cases in which it is otherwise morally difficult to mount a defence’, and while harassments and raids often take place, no legal proceedings usually follow. Nevertheless, until recently, the LGBT community has therefore only existed underground.

Helem (dream) is the Arabic acronym for ‘Lebanese protection for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders’. This Lebanese NGO has been formally active since 2004. The NGO is the ‘first above-ground LGBT association in the MENA’ region.

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346 Acronym for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender persons.
350 Following its ‘notification of association to the Lebanese ministry of Interior on 4 September 2004’. The Lebanese Law of Association stipulates that NGOs simply ‘register through providing a notice of association to the Ministry of Interior’. The Law stipulated that the Ministry provides ‘a receipt with a
While homosexuality has long been a taboo, it seems that the situation is changing. Partly due to the campaigns launched by this and other human rights groups, above the ground activities are multiplying and there has been a visible rise in the number of people participating in public events organized around LGBT rights. The periodic organization, popularity and coverage of these events are testimony that the public sphere is opening up to voices from the margins. Public perception is increasingly accepting that the legal and violent discrimination against the LGBT community is unjust and contravenes human rights.\(^{352}\)

Given the positive albeit challenging and controversial contributions of Helem, its work has recently received support from various directions.\(^{353}\) Helem is now expanding beyond the Lebanese borders; the organization for example ‘is launching the “Homophobia Monitor”: an online tool which collects information and resources related to the conditions and situation of homosexual community across the Arab world’.\(^{354}\)

Helem is raising awareness and is involved in advocacy campaigns;\(^{355}\) it operates a community centre and a helpline offering services to ‘LGBTIQs and other persons with non-conforming sexuality or gender identity’.\(^{356}\) Its goals is the decriminalization of homosexuality, ‘countering the AIDS epidemic and other sexually transmitted diseases’, and ‘combating stigma’. Notably, it is also engaged in activities that promote reforms for ‘a legal framework that protects the personal freedoms of individuals’; to that end it participates in other campaigns related to human rights, individual freedoms, equality, social inclusion, and empowerment of vulnerable or marginalized groups.\(^{357}\)

\(^{351}\) Helem website: http://helem.net/node/60 (accessed on 3/2/2014).

\(^{352}\) Ibid.

\(^{353}\) Support from Lebanese private contributions, from international organizations, and ministerial support related to its work on AIDS.

\(^{354}\) Ibid.

\(^{355}\) Through ‘lectures and workshops, original publications, media outreach, and awareness campaigns and events’ as well as lobbying. Helem: http://helem.net/node/62 (accessed on 3/2/2014).

\(^{356}\) Ibid.

\(^{357}\) They support women’s nationality right, a secular or civil personal status law, rights of migrant workers, rights of people with special needs, rights of sex workers, rights of drug users, fighting discrimination and hate speech. Helem: http://helem.net/node/59 (accessed 3/2/2014).
Helem started prudently as a grassroots local group raising awareness and giving a voice to the LGBT community in Lebanon. Its campaigns were first received cautiously by the media and society in general; although public perception remains largely hesitant in embracing the LGBT community, support for the group slowly escalated. Notably, given Helem’s high profile and outreach, The National AIDS Control Programme and the Ministry of Public Health also cooperate with Helem in the area of HIV prevention.

_Hurriyyat_ (liberties) is another Lebanese NGO worth mentioning that advocates for individual rights and challenges the Lebanese regime which ‘interfere[s] in private affairs while restricting participating in public affairs’. Hurriyyat is broadly involved in human rights issues. It has tended to subtly introduce gay rights alongside other issues; for example under the topic of marginalized identities, both war victims and homosexuals are discussed. Its members are high profile human rights lawyers, activists, journalists and artists. Following a successful conference on human rights in Lebanon, they have been invited to send recommendations for reforming the penal Code to the parliamentary Human Rights Committee. Nizar Saghieh, famous human rights lawyer and founding member of Hurriyyat talks of an emerging gay subculture; given the absence of a local or regional alternative, this emerging subculture is largely influenced by the West. However, this leaves the gay community in Lebanon excluded from society and deepens the internal struggle between the gay identity and other facets of the individual’s identity. Hurriyyat wants to reconcile homosexuals with their society and vice versa; the group believes therefore in developing a local gay subculture that can support the gay community. The group is also ‘very concerned with its independence vis-à-vis all kind of power, in particular the problem of donor-driven agendas’; so although they do not rule out cooperation with foreign groups, Hurriyyat is primarily concerned with the local context and with creating ‘a network for private liberties in the Arab world’.

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358 This can be seen by Helem’s concern not to shock society with their new presence as it was explained for example in its choice to open office in a non-residential area of Beirut. World Bank, 2008, p 20-21.
359 They have been receiving popular and private support from local and international organizations. See World Bank, 2008.
360 Scalenghe, MER 230.
361 Ibid.
362 Apparently the confessional, Lebanese and Arab facets of identity remain prominent.
363 Starting by and building on Arab history, literature, proverbs, music, ‘laws, practices, poetry’. Ibid.
364 Ibid.
On the one hand, there has been outrage from religious institutions and calls to shut down the organization; on the other hand, there has been increased interest in speaking about and understanding issues related to homosexuality.\textsuperscript{365} At the time of writing, a judge made an unprecedented ruling in favour of a transgender woman on the basis that law does not clearly specify what is considered “unnatural” and that gender is much more complicated to be based on ones ‘personal status registry documents’.\textsuperscript{366} This was made possible by relying on a 2009 ruling that dismissed article 534 on the basis that ‘man is part of nature (…) so it cannot be said that any of his practices (…) goes against nature.\textsuperscript{367} There is a chance, like the nationality case, that this ruling will be reversed by the court of appeal. Also, there are still numerous legal, institutional and societal hurdles for the emancipation of the LGBT community in Lebanon. However, this is still a breakthrough as the judiciary is increasingly taking stances in favour of individual rights. Hence, work in this realm contributes to the emancipation and empowerment of the LGBT community. More generally, it promotes and expands the values of toleration, diversity and individual freedoms in society; in addition, it builds up pressure on the state to open up and respond to marginalized groups in general.

Looking at their respective mission statements, it can be noted that most of the above groups support each other. Although there is inherent friction between groups representing the same or different causes, to a large extent their campaigns have complemented each other. We can see support between the campaign for secularism, civil personal status code, women’s rights and empowerment, nationality campaign, anti-discrimination, migrant workers etc. Vulnerable or marginalized groups and human rights organizations have to a large extent often joined forces and formed a common front. This may very well explain the increasing number of people that initiatives attract.

IV- Conclusion:

Grassroots efforts to limit the hegemonic sectarian grip on society have always had a place in Lebanon; and recently, more efforts advocating for a wide array of progressive issues are burgeoning. Such groups pushing for change are slowly attracting attention; they should be given more exposure and a bigger role to promote a reformist, pacified and tolerant public opinion. Many of the issues raised by these groups are recurring themes in this section of this study, showing that a growing number of Lebanese converge on peaceful activism, individual rights, and secularism. A critical, counter-hegemonic, and progressive sub-culture is slowly mushrooming.

In keeping with critical security studies, this section provided space for progressive and emancipatory voices. They are voices that are often, in the midst of Lebanon’s complexity and volatility, overlooked by other studies. However, they are a positive sign: they are evidence of movement and progressive change. These voices and the pressure they exhort on the prevailing system are the key to change in Lebanon, particularly in order to achieve tangible, albeit slow and limited, improvements to everyday lives of marginalized groups. By providing this platform, this study embraces the political agenda that underscored critical social research and joins voices with these groups in calling for the transformation of the Lebanese system into a more inclusive and responsive system.

Using the tools of governance, human security and critical security studies, these two chapters deconstructed and clarified many factors responsible for the precariousness of Lebanese security. Chapter 5 attempted to expose flaws in the Lebanese system as well as recurring regressive policies. Chapter 6 presented a brief overview of the current security and political situation in Lebanon for the purpose of contextualising the next chapter – the Lebanese security sector. Importantly, this chapter shed light on alternative voices struggling for progressive change and for the transformation of the traditional Lebanese system.
Chapter 7: Lebanon’s Security Sector: Dealing with Change, Governance, and Human Security

The previous chapters have shown the persistence of conflict in Lebanon and the precariousness of human security. The weakness and militaristic tendencies of Lebanon’s security sector have been a factor in the pervasiveness of human insecurity. Its inability to guarantee freedom from fear by protecting society from threats of political violence and by guaranteeing human rights undermines human security. However, it is this study’s view that the weakness of the security sector is a symptom of Lebanon’s precarious political environment. The extension of political crises into the security sector has prevented the latter from developing into a capable and people-centred service. That being said, there is value in addressing this symptom; this chapter is a good first step to suggesting tangible and real changes to individuals facing insecurity in Lebanon. This chapter takes an institutional approach by weighing the performance of the security sector; a critique from within will help us build on and move beyond the prevailing conditions.

Non-state actors have often been covered by academic studies; however, state security providers have until recently been largely overlooked. Given the recent heightened donor attention to Lebanon’s main state security providers, the role of these state actors is brought to the fore. This study attempts to assess the contributions of these state security providers and of donors to human security. It is interested in examining how the security sector can be more effective and people-centred. This chapter therefore examines Lebanon’s security sector from the prism of SSR. It starts with contextualizing the governance of security in Lebanon by discussing the role of state and non-state actors. It moves on to mapping the security sector; it then discusses the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in more detail. The chapter ends with a discussion of observations and some suggestions for the process of positive change.

1 Particularly those that have built over the years a more developed structure and an elaborate network of services such as Hezbollah, Amal and the PLO, even the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange. More recently, Islamist social movements and Jihadi groups have also received attention. See: Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2007).
I. The Governance of Security in post-war Lebanon: State and Non-State Security Providers

Post-war Lebanon saw the dissolution of mini-states, the re-unification of the country (except the south), and the reconstruction of state institutions. Following Ta’if, parliament ratified a General Amnesty Law on August 26, 1991.2 The Amnesty law pardoned all political crimes committed prior to March 28, 1991. It thereby legitimized the transformation of former warlords into Lebanon’s post-war political class. As noted by then president Elias Hrawi, this was necessary for achieving peace.3 That being said, 2 articles in the General Amnesty Law are worth highlighting. Article 3.3 stipulated that political crimes committed against political and spiritual leaders, foreign diplomats, or those referred to the Justice Council are not covered by the Amnesty law.4 Also, Article 2.3 stipulated that amnesty is not granted for ‘continuing crimes and crimes repeated by perpetrators after the date of the promulgation of the law’. Article 2.3 was seen as a legal window for the families of the missing and forcibly disappeared to acquire information on their loved ones. However, both articles failed to establish justice for victims and their families. Article 3.3 is discriminatory as it blatantly placed crimes committed against political and sectarian leaders above of those committed against “ordinary” citizens. Furthermore, the judiciary largely failed to interpret article 2.3 in favour of victims.5 The two articles would also legitimize the only prosecution of a former warlord: the head of the LF Samir Geagea who had taken a stance against Tai’f and against the Syrian tutelage.6 Hence, as ICTJ notes, ‘the amnesty law was shaped in such a manner that prosecutions were still possible and were indeed practiced against those who were deemed threats to the newly established order’.7 In addition, the near blanket Amnesty did not include provisions

4 Justice Council is one of three special courts in Lebanon (the other two being the Military Tribunal and the High Court of Justice). The Justice Council only tries cases pertaining to national security, it only tries cases that the Cabinet of Ministers refers to it, and its decisions cannot be appealed. Mansour and Daoud, 2010, p 32.
6 For the assassination of Prime Minster Rashid Karame in 1987 and for a number of crimes committed after March 1991.
7 ICTJ, 2013, p 177.
for acknowledging responsibility, for apology, or for establishing the events of the war. The approach adopted has been referred to as a “state-sponsored amnesia” whereby political elite and consecutive governments evade inclusive and serious debates and investigations into the war. Lebanon chose immediate peace at the expense of justice. While the political elite reached a consensus — a consociational pre-requisite — meager efforts were made to reconcile society and to address the sacrifices of the thousands of victims.  

Ta’if stipulated ‘spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories’, disbanding all militias, as well as strengthening the ISF and the LAF. As most militias complied with the deadline set by the state, civilian life soon resumed. However, the official disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) program in post-war Lebanon would turn out to be partial and weak.

Although heavy weaponry was ‘officially handed over’, several Lebanese groups ‘hid’ weapons. Palestinian groups retained their weapons in the camps, the SLA was still operating in the South, and Hezbollah was recognized as the de facto resistance against the Israeli occupation. That being said, Hezbollah returned barracks in Baalbalk to the army, training took place ‘in remote valleys’, and in Beirut’s suburb—Dahiyeh, ‘weapons were no longer visible’. An offer to re-integrate into the LAF was also extended to the SLA; however, as the Israeli occupation persisted, the SLA’s role in “securing” the security zone south of the Litani continued. Hence, demobilization was certainly incomplete. Not only would Hezbollah and the South Lebanon Army not be part of the process, but as Picard notes, ‘all continued to shelter ex-militiamen with a suspect past, all persisted in training

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8 The study conducted by Smaira and Cassehgari shows how a subordinate judiciary failed to effectively prosecute cases of enforced disappearances (as per article 2.3 of the general Amnesty law pertaining to ‘continuing crimes’) and failed to try cases of massacres referred to the Justice Council. In addition, consecutive governments failed to effectively investigate the whereabouts of thousands of missing and forcibly disappeared, failed to establish an inclusive narration of the war to balance selective and bias alternatives (memory initiatives by the main political parties remained exclusivist and politicized), the reparation process in Mount Lebanon failed to provide effective remedy to victims and to achieve popular-based reconciliation (the process was fraught with problems and conditions), and reconciliation was limited to political and community leaders.


10 The streets were cleared from militia checkpoints or weapons.


12 And in a few remote locations outside the camps on the Syrian-Lebanese eastern borders.

13 Ta’if maintained Lebanon’s right to fight the Israeli occupation by all necessary means and Hezbollah was the only militia that was not asked to disarm. Ta’if, Third(C).

fighters - scouts, vigilantes or 'karate teachers' - and all continued to adopt their own local strategies for self-defence in an uncertain domestic and regional environment’.\textsuperscript{15}

Some 40,000 fighters were expected to be re-integrated into the public service;\textsuperscript{16} that being said, the government had pledged to rehabilitate some 20,000 fighters. Law 88 of 1991 only integrated some 6,000 fighters into the ISF and the LAF;\textsuperscript{17} later another 2,000 were integrated into the civil administration. The state therefore only rehabilitated some 8,000 fighters. Given estimates that place the percentage of militia fighters between 1.25 percent and 3 percent of the population,\textsuperscript{18} one can argue that the formal DDR was minimal. In addition, restricting the formal approach to assimilation into state institutions limits the scope for rehabilitating fighters into civilian life and into the formal economy. Also, the program was politicized; groups such as the Lebanese Forces were soon ostracized.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, the LF’s re-integration was most problematic. The process first faced resistance from the militia; then the state antagonized and excluded LF fighters.\textsuperscript{20} Hundreds of fighters, who could not benefit from the Amnesty, left Lebanon. The majority stayed; through its network of supporters and contacts, the militia tried to arrange for work placements for its former fighters.\textsuperscript{21}

Fighters that were integrated into state institutions owed their positions to militia leaders’ success in negotiating a share in the deal. The rest either benefited from militia services or had to transition on their own—many therefore did not take part in the process. In any case, state allegiance did not substitute traditional or militia allegiance. I would argue that rehabilitation and civilianization were relinquished and that, implicitly, militancy endured.

While Ta’if stipulated spreading the authority of the state, it also instated an open-ended tutelage. Syrian tutelage or the \textit{Pax Syriana} was institutionalized by Ta’if, the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, and the Defense and Security Agreement of 1991. Ta’if stipulated that the ‘Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p 25.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p 8.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Percentages taken from: DeClerck, 2012, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Picard, "The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias."p 20-26.
\item \textsuperscript{20} See Picard for military and political obstacles to re-integrating the LF. Ibid, p 21-26.
\item \textsuperscript{21} It established ‘an employment agency that canvassed friendly businesses (…) for assistance in placing militiamen’. Furthermore, in a phone interview conducted in Beirut on 24/5/2013 for another study, Toni Darwich, Head of Martyrs, Casualties and Detainees of the Lebanese Forces confirmed that the LF continued providing social services and work placement for fighters injured or detained during the war; and in 2006 Cross Roads Association was formally established for that purpose. Picard, 1999, p 23.
\end{itemize}
of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State’. It also stipulated that the Syrian forces shall re-deploy to the Beqa’a within two years but left full withdrawal to be later agreed by the two governments; this did not take place. The Treaty of Brotherhood emphasized the ‘common destiny and common interests of the two countries’. Article 1 stipulated that ‘the two States shall endeavour to achieve the highest degree of cooperation and coordination in the political, economic, security, cultural, scientific and other fields’; article 3 emphasised the interdependence of the two countries’ security and article 5 stipulated they coordinate foreign policy. Given the power relations between the two countries it is not difficult to identify which held the upper hand.

The association of the state with the repression and abuses of the Syrian tutelage would further reinforce distrust in state institutions. Both the judiciary and security forces were seen to be subservient to Syria. In 1994, the LF were disbanded by the post-war Hariri government, its leader Samir Geagea was sentenced for crimes committed during and after the war, and he was jailed in solitary confinement until his release 11 years later. Although Geagea is responsible for numerous crimes (including war crimes) and this study in no way advocates impunity, it is also important to note that the trials have been considered as unfair and politicized. Opposition to the terms of Ta’if and the Syrian tutelage was not tolerated; many would agree with Bassel Salloukh in saying that opposition ‘was smashed’. Former president and head of the Phalange Amine Gemayel and General Michel Aoun were in exile in France; Syrian and Lebanese security forces harassed, detained, tortured, transferred to Syrian detention centres, and in some cases

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22 Ta’if III—second (D).
23 Article 5 (2).
24 The document notes that ‘the interdependence of the security of the two countries shall require that Lebanon shall not, under any circumstances, be made a source of threat to the security of Syria, or Syria to the security of Lebanon’. The English version can be found at the UN treaty series: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf.
25 Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Geagea was released by special presidential amnesty. The amnesty was made possible by an outrageous deal to liberate Geagea in exchange for a similar amnesty for the Dumnieh and Majdal Anjar group, a militant Sunni Islamist groups which had clashes with the LAF between December 1999 and January 2000 taking the life of 14 soldiers and 24 militants.
In 1992 the main Christian figures boycotted the elections and in 1996 demonstrations were banned. The gerrymandering of elections between 1992 and 2000 ‘served to manufacture a political class subservient to Syrian dictates’. This phase was referred to as the Ihbat (depression or despair); it lasted until 2001 when the opposition revived its defiance to the Syrian presence.

In the post-war phase, Syrian and Lebanese authorities repeatedly denied that Lebanese were detained in Syria. This claim was falsified in 2000 when 48 Lebanese detainees were released from Syrian jails; since 1998, records have shown that ‘more than 150 Lebanese detainees have been released from Syrian prisons’. Reliable information indicates that while many died, some are still alive. The families want information as to their whereabouts and have led a relentless effort since 1983 to pressure the authorities for serious investigations. The judiciary and security forces were clearly seen to be complicit in the Syrian oppression. Even in the aftermath of the Syrian tutelage, the media, human rights activists and vulnerable groups continue to be subjected to maltreatment by security forces. Human Rights Watch has documented the abuse of homosexuals, sex workers, drug-users, and migrant workers by the ISF. The Custom Service has recently shown the security sector’s militaristic and authoritarian colours by assaulting a group of reporters calling over a megaphone for an interview over corruption charges. The LAF has been accused of harassing and abusing Sunni Islamists; and the Judiciary has been seen as

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28 ICTJ, 2013, p 177; AI, 2005; and HRW, 1997.
29 Salloukh, 2010, p 137-138
30 The term was coined to refer to ‘Christian’ Ihbat.
31 Salloukh, 2010, p 139.
35 Prisoners have reported being beaten ‘with fists, boots, or implements such as sticks, canes, and rulers’ they reported being denied ‘food, water, or medication (…) reported being handcuffed in bathrooms or kept in extremely uncomfortable positions for hours at a time (…) forced to listen to the screams of other detainees’. Women reported being subjected to ‘to sexual violence or coercion, ranging from rape to offering them “favors” (…) in exchange for sex’. Other violations consist of denying detainees ‘phone calls to family members, access to lawyers, and needed medical care’. HRW, 2013.
37 Omayma Abdel-Latif notes that the LAF’s ‘continued targeting, arrest, and torture of young men in the north under the pretext of tracing extremists’ has increased ‘the sense of victimization and persecution among these groups’. Famous hardline Sunni cleric with a big following in Tripoli, Sheik
complicit in clamping down on Islamists. Bernard Rougier explains that Islamists increasingly resent their political and strategic exclusion as well their stigmatization as Lebanon’s main internal threat. This marginalization has been seen as discriminatory. Other groups have maintained some of their arsenal and the Shia, through Hezbollah, have been assigned the prestigious and exclusive role of fighting Israel. In addition, unlike Islamized Sunni communities, Hezbollah has been able to freely ‘develop its “Islamic society” (…) beside—state institutions’. The repeated clashes have indeed exposed the limitations of Lebanon’s transition. The prevalence of sectarian politics mixed with the weakness of Lebanon’s central institutions have allowed political violence to resurge and have severely undermined human security. The string of terrorist attacks since 2005, the 2007 Nahr el-Bared conflict, the clashes of May 2008, the spill-over of the Syrian war, and the kidnapping “spree” that has swept the country illustrate this.


The strategic exclusion refers to Hezbollah monopolizing the front with Israel and the Sunni Islamists’ ‘access [being] blocked by two regional powers, Iran and Syra’ that use their networks of influence to close down on Sunni Islamists’ Jihad efforts not only against Israel but also in Chechnya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Rougier, 2007, p 242-246.

In the form of clashes, incursions, cross-border shelling, bombs, and targeted assassinations. The string of kidnappings has been linked to simple financial gains (ransom), to the Syrian war, and other disputes. The Lebanese Miqdad clan for example kidnapped some 20 Syrians and a Turkish businessman as leverage to release a family member that had disappeared in the Syrian war. Also, the families of 9 Lebanese Shia pilgrims kidnapped by a rebel group in the Syrian town of Azzaz (on the border with Turkey) abducted 2 Turkish pilots in August 2013 to pressure the authorities to exert their influence in releasing the pilgrims. A Qatari mediation led to the release of the pilgrims in November 2013, the Lebanese families released the Turkish nationals, and the Syrian authorities agreed to release 61 female detainees. See: Human Rights Watch, "Lebanon: Tit-for-Tat Border Kidnappings. Civilians Describe Experiences; Meager Government Response,"(2/5/2013). From: http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2013/05/02/lebanon-tit-tat-border-kidnappings (accessed on 10/11/2013); Report: Robbery, Kidnap-for-Ransom on the Rise in Baalbek, Naharnet, 8/3/2014. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/121710-report-robbery-kidnap-for-ransom-on-the-rise-in-baalbek (accessed on 8/3/2014); Radwan Mortada, “The Business of Kidnapping in Lebanon,” Al-Akhbar 30/3/2013. From: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15394 (accessed on 10/11/2013); and Turkish pilots
Predictably, Hezbollah’s arsenal and role as the sole ‘resistance’ actor has led to opposing factions justifying their own need to maintain arms. Fuelled by the conflict in Syria, Hezbollah’s sectarian basis and role in Syria has reached its toll with certain communities. Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmad Assir's call to his supporters to take up arms is one example. In June 2013, clashes between Assir’s supporters and the LAF in Sidon led to the death of 16 soldiers and 20 gunmen.\footnote{Army Storms Asir's Security Zone, Cleric Disappears after 16 Troops Martyred, Naharnet, 24/5/2013. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/87984} (accessed on 17/8/2013).}

In this context, state security forces are inherently fragile, and without the necessary political coverage from Lebanon’s openly sectarian leadership, they are unable to act decisively. Concerns of disintegration and relapse into civil war prevent the state from intervening effectively or disarming factions. The cessation of hostilities hence continues to depend on the informal approach of “consensual security” between politico-sectarian leaders. However, in post-war Lebanon, since the Syrian withdrawal, as domestic polarization increased, state authority and monopoly over the use of force are once again challenged. This being said, vigilantism and groups claiming “self-defence” have proliferated.\footnote{Adib, 2012, p 44} As a result, lawlessness is increasingly rampant in the country.\footnote{Aside from the above security incidents, of the many examples, one can mention the daytime assassination of a father of a suspect in the bombing of two Tripoli Mosques (twin bombing on August 23, 2013) which lead to sniper and rocket propelled grenade attacks between the two infamous Tripoli neighborhoods. The army intervened by evacuating children from schools. Arab Democratic Party Official Shot Dead in Tripoli amid Flare up, Naharnet, 20/2/2014. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/119446} (accessed on 20/2/2014).} The protracted armed conflict is increasingly visible and hundreds of civilians have fallen victims. “Consensual security” has entailed elite consensus, however it has also entailed impunity for acts of political violence and no grassroots reconciliation. Sadly, as noted by late Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah, the price for the failure to effectively deal with these events has been to ‘la[y] the ground for all the violence that we see in Lebanon’.\footnote{Author’s extrapolation from Sheikh Fadlallah criticism of the General Amnesty Law quoted in Wierda et al., 2007, p 1071.} In other words, while elite may temporarily reconcile, society has remained fragmented and mobilized—leaving the door open for resorting to violence when tension rises.

The discussions so far show that the security sector in Lebanon suffers from two problems pertinent to human security: it is too weak to effectively protect society against
major threats to physical security but it also abuses the “legitimate” use of force. In light of this, what can the security sector do to improve human security? Given the political deadlock, conflict in Lebanon will persist; it is unlikely that the state can curtail the proliferation of weapons and disarm Hezbollah, the Palestinian factions, and other groups. Therefore, this study argues for an institutionally limited approach. It argues for transforming the security sector into a people-centered, efficient, and effective service that protects society against threats to physical security and that guarantees human rights.

Two factors have prevented the Lebanese security sector from maturing: the country’s history of conflict and its government policies. Nevertheless, the Lebanese people have also inherited a number of characteristics that challenge allegiance to a central national authority. Lebanese society has traditionally relied on informal channels for the provision of security. In fact, a long tradition in Lebanon has been informal local rule by qabadayat or ‘strongarm men’ which serve as the middlemen between community leaders and the public.46 These qabadayat are the basis of patron-client relations as they enforce the authority of leaders. However, while they would distribute patronage they would also use force and engage in illicit activity; nevertheless as they guaranteed the well-functioning of the system, they ‘received protection from the security agencies and the justice system, forming an entire social group that was, to all intents and purposes, above the law’.47 The state had long acquiesced the role of the qabadayat as it maintained the informal power-sharing arrangements between traditional community leaders. In that respect, aspects of the rule of the militias—use of force, protection, services—was not alien to Lebanese society, nor is post-war clientalism and informal local governance.

Local- and community-level mechanisms therefore have long replaced and continue to replace state authority in many parts of Lebanon. Many Lebanese communities are closely knit through clan ties or ‘extended families’ and are feudally based; they are also traditionally ‘defensive’48 and militaristic.49 Although these characteristics are no longer at

48 Historically, at various stages, Mount Lebanon served as a refuge for the Christians, Druze, Shia, and Arab farmers and nomads fleeing the Roman conquests; they have traditionally been ‘conservative and on the defensive’. Picard, 1996, p 3.
49 Massoud Daher notes that the militaristic tribal and feudal system preceded but was reinforced under the Ottoman rule: ‘feudal families and at their head the Emir did not resort to the Ottoman forces to
the peak they reached during the civil war when they produced sectarian-based mini-states, it is not contentious to note that communitarian, political, and tribal allegiances overshadow state allegiance. In fact, the state continues to take a secondary role in the various Mouraba’at Amniyeh (security quarters). This takes place in the Druze enclave in the Shouf, the Maronite enclave in Becharreh or Ehden. More infamously, this takes place in Tripoli’s Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods,\(^{50}\) and in border towns such as Wadi Khaled and Arsal;\(^{51}\) the district of Akkar\(^{52}\) and the city of Sidon\(^{53}\) have also witnessed armed resistance to state security forces.\(^{54}\) Of course, in Hezbollah’s strongholds in the suburb of Beirut Dahiyeh, the south or the Bek’a the group has long taken primacy over the state. The non-state actor with the more elaborate state-like functions developed in the aftermath of the 2006 war a corps called Indibat (discipline) in charge of public order.\(^{55}\) Furthermore, since the string of attacks against Shia targets in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah stepped up security measures in and around Dahieyh.\(^{56}\) In an interview with Marcel Ghanem, Hezbollah MP Fadlallah explained that given the state’s capabilities, the measures they are collect the taxes but to their own forces’ (this was a privilege granted to the feudal families of Mount Lebanon). And, Elizabeth Picard adds that ‘the Mountain culture formed by a solidarity of clans politically organized by family hierarchies combines with the culture of the cities that it both fears and scorns.’ Recently, the tribal and militarised nature of parts of Lebanese society resurfaced when the Al-Meqdad clan uncovered its ‘Military wing’ and announced a ‘military operation’ to free an alleged detained family member by the FSA in Syria. Massoud Daher, "Ta’assassa Al-Jaysh Fi A’m 1945 Kharij Al-Nizam Al-Tawazini Al-Ta’ifi Wa Najaha Fi Tanzim Hiyadihi (the Army Was Created in 1945 Outside the Sectarian System and Succeeded in Establishing Its Neutrality) ” Ma’loumat 48(Nov. 2007). p 79; Picard, 1996, p 4-5; and, Al-Meqdad Clan Announces Halt of All Military Operations in Lebanon, Naharnet, 16/8/2012. From: \url{http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/50264} (accessed on 17/8/2012).

Mentioned before as a site for clashes between pro and anti-Assad clashes.

These villages have turned into enclaves for anti-Assad Lebanese and non-Lebanese militants.

Although Akkar is home to villages from most sects, it is predominantly Sunni. Akkar is one of Lebanon’s most deprived regions and is an emerging bastion for Islamic movements. On deprivation in Akkar: Makdisi and el-Khalil, 2013, p 16.

Clashes between Sheikh Assir and the LAF are mentioned above.


55 Indibat became a phenomenon as Hezbollah’s reconstruction wing Jihad al-Bina planned and implemented the massive reconstruction of Dahiyeh post 2006 war. Indibat is an informal parallel form of community policing but very little is written on it therefore further research would certainly be valuable.

56 It manned check-points, searched cars, and registered vehicles entering the area; however, the post-war policy of no public display of weapons was followed.
taking are merely meant to fill the vacuum.\textsuperscript{57} However, as tight measures started causing tension between inhabitants of Dahiyeh and Hezbollah, it “invited” the state to fulfil its duties. The Ministry of Interior has devised a security plan for the ISF, the LAF and other security forces to take over the security of Dahiyeh.\textsuperscript{58} That being said, clearly, there are informal “red lines” for what access security forces have in Dahiyeh.\textsuperscript{59} As General Pierre Nassar, head of the ISF Strategic Training Unit noted: coordination takes place to a certain extent, then they draw a line.\textsuperscript{60} In Lebanon, it is not uncommon for the state to coordinate its presence and operations with local actors and politico-sectarian leaders;\textsuperscript{61} it also often mediates the resolution of conflicts between these actors.\textsuperscript{62} In such cases the state is


\textsuperscript{58} The 200-men ISF force increased to a mixed-force of up to 1,000 men. Mohamed Nazzal, "Lebanon: The State Returns to Dahiyeh," \textit{Al-Akhbar} 23/9/2013. From: http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-state-returns-dahiyeh (accessed on 11/12/2013).

\textsuperscript{59} And elsewhere as was seen in Hezbollah military response against the government’s unilateral decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunication network (May 2008 clashes briefly discussed in the previous chapter).

\textsuperscript{60} General Nassar was referring to the first and more limited deployment of the ISF in Dahiyeh in 2009 to regulate criminality and traffic. Hezbollah had launched a campaign called “Order is of Faith” encouraging people to abide by the law and accept the ISF’s greater presence. Nassar’s personal view is that the spread of drug abuse was the basis for “inviting” the ISF to increase its presence. Indeed, around that time, Secretary General Nasrallah emphasised on several occasions his concern over the spread of drug use (i.e. pills) in schools and universities. On November 11, 2009, on martyr’s day, Nasrallah recalled religious fatwas forbidding drug trafficking even to the enemy’s (Israel) community, and stressed on the ‘duty to cooperate with the Lebanese government and security institutions to fight drug trafficking’ irrespective of the traffickers’ tribal, sectarian and other affiliations. See Nasrallah’s “drugs” speech with English subtitles at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn7SMvQvDKU (accessed on 3/2/2013).

\textsuperscript{61} The security forces usually broker their missions with local and politico-religious actors. For example the Minister of Interior affirmed that in the Dahieh-specific security plan the state has been coordinating with Hezbollah. Also, the Minister of Interior coordinated the terms of the Tripoli security plan with Mufti Sheikh Malek al-Shaar. Naharnet, 23/9/2013 and \textit{Charbel, Shaar Set Security Plan Guidelines, Say Army to Deploy in All Tripoli Regions’}, Naharnet, 7/11/2013. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/104879 (accessed on 20/12/2013).

\textsuperscript{62} The LAF has traditionally taken the task of mediation. Over the summer the LAF mediated a peaceful resolution of a conflict that had turned violent between a Shia town and a Sunni town in Akkar, north of Lebanon; on the eastern borders with Syria, it negotiated the release of 5 Lebanese and Syrian nationals between a Lebanese and Syrian village to end a ‘tit-for-tat’ string of abductions. See: \textit{Army wraps up mediation between Akkar villages}, The Daily Star, 26/8/2013. From: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-26/228638-army-wraps-up-mediation-between-akkar-villages.ashx#axzz2vBm5SULe (accessed on 3/2/2014) and \textit{Army Supervises Release of Captives Held in Counter Lebanese-Syrian Abductions}, Naharnet, 15/8/2013. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/94228 (accessed on 3/2/2014). Also see LAF’s traditional role in conflict-resolution in Barack, p 52.
viewed as an impartial third party. Against the traditional sectarian exclusionary non-state actors, the state can be an inclusive and reconciliatory alternative. However, as will be shown below, state security providers are increasingly seen as biased; the positive role the state can play is therefore seriously undermined. Nevertheless, this study intends to suggest developing the constructive and positive role these actors can play.

Lebanon’s security predicament is not one which can be blamed entirely on recent events and regional or international actors. The failure of Lebanese politics to overcome the feudo-sectarian system, with its by-product of feudo-sectarian competition, and the fatalistic attitude of the political leadership towards regional and domestic unrest has led consecutive governments to adopt a policy of “negative neutrality”. Threat perceptions and rivalry had prevented the elite from agreeing on a precise role for the military and the security organizations. Consecutive ‘policies of neglect’ have resulted, since independence, in the failure of Lebanese governments to adopt a strategy to develop a capable and effective security sector, one capable for the least of curbing threats to physical security and respecting political rights and individual freedoms.

In short, the 1989 Ta’if Agreement included provisions to unify and reinforce the security sector and subsequently spread the government’s authority over all Lebanese territories. Equally, however, it instated fragmentation and subjugation to Syrian tutelage. And although the latter prevented the development of the Lebanese security sector, as will be discussed, subsequent Lebanese leaderships also failed to overcome the legacies of weakness.

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63 On the one hand, leftists resented the submission to the Maronite establishment, and on the other, conservatives feared dragging Lebanon further into the Arab-Israeli conflict.

II. Mapping Lebanon’s Security Sector: a proliferation of state security providers and the fragmentation of authority

This study espouses the wide definition of a security sector and will briefly highlight what Nicole Ball referred to as the ‘security community’—actors that contribute in one way or the other to the governance of security in Lebanon. However, for scope considerations, the focus of the following discussions will be restricted to the two main state actors mandated with providing security—the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Limiting the discussions to these two actors is a limit to the scope of this study but this allows us to have a deeper understanding of their role in the governance of Lebanon’s security.

1) Governance by state actors

In regards to state actors: three ministries and two offices are directly concerned with the Lebanese security sector. The Ministry of Defence houses the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities gathers the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the General Security (GS), and the Civil Defence. The Ministry of Finance has the Customs Services under its jurisdiction and is further involved in security sector governance through its role in elaborating the state budget. The Office of the President heads the High Council on Defence, and the Office of the Prime Minister has jurisdiction over the State Security (SS).

As an extension of the political system, the leadership of the security and defence forces is traditionally distributed between the main sects. The LAF is traditionally headed by a Maronite; although the General Security Directorate is traditionally headed by a Greek Orthodox, a Shia General Director has become the norm in post-war Lebanon. The Internal Security Forces is headed by a Sunni Muslim, and the State Security Directorate was formed to appease Shia demands.

65 Ball, 2002b, p 1.
66 See figures 4 to 7.
The High Council on Defence: Article 6 of the National Defence Law (section 2) stipulates that the Council of Ministers formulates, decides and oversees the implementation of the Defence and Security Strategy. However, Article 7 stipulates the formation of a High Council on Defence—headed by the President and with the Prime Minister as its Vice President—to ‘decide on the necessary measures to implement the strategy as specified by the council of ministers,’ to ‘distribute tasks on the relevant ministries and agencies,’ and ‘to monitor implementation.’ The High Council on Defence clearly is intended to guarantee civilian involvement in the Defence and Security Strategy. However, the delineation between the role of the President and the Cabinet in the implementation of the Strategy is not clear.

The General Directorate of State Security (SS) is in charge of protecting security and public institutions. It is ‘a mixed organization consisting of 1,226 officials transferred from the Internal Security Forces, General Security and the Ministry of the Interior.’ It is tasked with ‘intelligence gathering related to the security of the state,’ ‘the surveillance of foreigners as to activities that touch upon state security,’ and ‘counterintelligence’ as well as periodic reporting to the High Council on Defence. The State Security is ‘the executive body’ of the High Council on Defence; it is directly linked to the President’s office but is headed by a Director appointed by the Prime Minister. The National Defence Law stipulates information sharing and coordination with the other agencies, but the specificities of this need to be decreed by the council of ministers. The reader will notice that many of the functions of the State Security are also performed by the bigger and older agencies like the ISF, the LAF and the General Security Directorate. The State Security can be seen as a redundant agency created in 1985 to appease Shia demands. Furthermore, like the High Council on Defence, the dual authority of the President and the Prime Minister is potentially problematic.

73 On being considered a ‘Shia’ agency: Elias Hannah interview, 14/9/2010.
The General Security Directorate (GS) has a threefold role; it is in charge of applying laws pertaining to immigration, the media, and intelligence gathering on political, economic and social matters.\textsuperscript{74} However, with a force of 3,600 personnel, it is ‘understaffed’ and largely ‘fulfils a bureaucratic role.’\textsuperscript{75} The GS was the forerunner among the internal security agencies in accepting women. While the latter was a progressive move taken by the agency in the late 1990s, the agency is infamous for its political intelligence, media and cultural censorship.\textsuperscript{76} Also, note that this is second intelligence service so far, and that like the State Security, it is in charge of monitoring foreigners.\textsuperscript{77} Its role in political intelligence has allowed the agency to overstep onto the ISF’s internal security and policing mandate.\textsuperscript{78}

The Civil Defence is tasked with the protection of people and property; it prepares for and responds to natural or man-made disasters.\textsuperscript{79} It is the smallest and the least funded of the agencies—with 270 men and 4,700 volunteers.\textsuperscript{80}

The Customs Services is another severely understaffed and underfunded organization. It is tasked with ‘surveying the borders to prevent human and goods trafficking;’ but given cross-border villages with Syria, ‘82 illegal crossing points,’\textsuperscript{81} and cross-border

\textsuperscript{74} Kahwaji, 2009, p 26.
\textsuperscript{75} Adib, 2012, p 3.
\textsuperscript{77} Although the GS is the primary agency in charge of monitoring foreigners
\textsuperscript{78} For example, the GS’ arrest of an Islamist Shadi al-Mawlawi in Tripoli in May 2012 was seen as ‘usurping the functions of the police’. The GS’ unilateral decision (i.e. without coordinating with the LAF or the ISF) in an area hostile to the GS and witnessing heightened tension and protest over the lengthy detention of Islamists and the war in Syria forced the LAF to face the violent repercussion of such a move. See: Paul Salem, "Lebanon Edges Closer to Syrian Crisis," Al-Monitor 12/5/20012. From: http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=48148&reloadFlag=1 (accessed on 10/12/2013).
\textsuperscript{79} France is funding a $2 million project by the UNDP; it has granted the Civil Defence equipment and runs training course (mainly in the realm of fire-fighting). Embassy of France in Lebanon, http://www.ambafrance-lb.org/Organisation-et-mission. (accessed on 10/6/2012).
\textsuperscript{80} "Lebanon General Directorate of Civil Defence," http://www.lebanesecivildefense.com/
\textsuperscript{81} Adib, 2012, p 3.
paramilitary pro-Syrian Palestinian infrastructures, the Customs agency finds itself severely restricted to the four official northern crossing points, the airport and the port.

The Lebanese security sector is characterised by a proliferation of intelligence services: The GS, the ISF, the LAF, and the SS have their own intelligence services. There are also secondary intelligence services within the Airport Security, the Presidential Guards, and the Government Guard (office of the Prime Minister). The most significant is the Intelligence Directorate of the LAF; more recently the Intelligence Branch of the ISF has emerged as a contending actor. However, my observation from the National Defence Law and the mandate of the respective agencies is that no overarching or coordinating authority regulates their activities. Executive Director of CESMO, Mrs Flavia Adib, confirms by adding that there is no ‘information showing cooperation’. Also, the norm of each being tied to different politico-sectarian affiliations is enshrined; Adib and Senior Advisor at NICO Jonathan McIvor confirm. McIvor highlights that Lebanon’s ‘confessional consociationalism’ has embedded a ‘client-centred’ approach to the functions of the agencies.

As noted in the ISF’s 2008 Strategic Review, since 1958, the LAF has been given ‘primacy’ over internal security and law enforcement including ‘border protection, conventional police patrols as well as criminal investigations’. This is attributed to LAF’s better ability to ‘police areas where the ISF cannot, to better resources, to being a more acceptable organization to the public’. However, by mandate, the ISF is the main agency in charge of internal security and policing. Furthermore, the State Security is mandated with protecting against threats to national security (this would include internal security and terrorism). In addition, the GS, the ISF, the SS, and the LAF (and subsidiary agencies) all engage in internal intelligence. Tai’if stipulated that military intelligence should be ‘reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively,’ and the Strategic Review

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83 The Customs agency benefits from the German run integrated border management pilot project.
85 Interview held in Tripoli, Lebanon on 17/9/2010.
86 Interview held in Beirut on 17/9/2010.
88 Ta’if, Second, C (5)
emphasised that the ISF’s Information Bureau (Intelligence) should be limited to criminal intelligence only. 89 Both reforms have not been adopted.

Lebanon has no border strategy, no border force, and no institutional mechanism for an integrated or a coordinated approach to border management. 4 agencies share the responsibility of border: these are the LAF, the ISF, the GS and the General Customs. As mentioned above, on its territorial borders with Syria, Lebanon has 4 formal and some 82 illegal crossing points. Pursuant to article 14 of Resolution 1701 calling on the Lebanese government to ‘secure its borders and all entry points to prevent the entry (…) without its consent of arms’ and at the request of the President of the SC to ‘dispatch at the earliest (…) an independent assessment mission to fully access the monitoring of the border’ a Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) was dispatched to Lebanon between May and June 2007. The ‘UN team of border police experts’ found that little ‘cooperation and coordination’ took place between the agencies in charge of border control; they had little experience in border management and that little ‘inter-agency information sharing and joint planning’ took place. It also found that the ‘traditional military’ border doctrine was inappropriate;90 it was noted that ‘not a single on-border or near-border seizure of smuggled arms had been reported to the team’ and that several improvements could be made with and without international assistance.91 Soon donors rushed to assist the Lebanese government in controlling its borders. The Northern Border Pilot Project led by the German Border Police Mission in northern Lebanon trains and equips the forces controlling the 4 official border crossing points.92 In the aim of preparing for an integrated border management plan, the UK funded a Common Operation Centre and a multi-agency mobile force was formed.93 Multi-agency mobile units were a central element in the project’s aim ‘to restructure and institutionalize a cohesive Lebanese civil

89 ISF Strategic Review, 2008, VI.
90 Observation posts and checkpoints’ did little to prevent smuggling.
93 Other donors (Denmark, Canada, and the US) funded refurbishment, equipment (e.g. scanners and visa checks devices), vehicles and communications material. Ibid.
police border force’. However, despite the many contributions, the project has had limits. Although as EU delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché Duccio Bandini notes, the agencies overlap, the agencies overlap, UK Stabilization officer confirms that it was ambitious to expect ‘4 agencies that never worked together’ to overcome the legacies of poor coordination, cooperation and communication as well as competition; donors were putting forward recommendations that were ‘closer to a European rather than a Lebanese model’.  

In terms of lessons learnt, from the perspective of the LAF, it is best to ‘reconsider the structure of the joint task force (...) as it is best for each agency to work within its responsibilities and coordination could take place in a joint operations room.’ From conversations with Mirco Hintz, advisor to LIBAT from the German police mission, it seems that the task is rather enormous. He highlights the difference between the area of the Northern Pilot project and the eastern border region. In the former, the border is shorter, largely demarcated, and villages on either sides share the same confessional denomination. The eastern border is very different; the population is not homogeneous, the border is not demarcated, and the socio-economic landscape is complex. The informal economy sustains the border villages; further, they rely on Syria for services such as electricity and healthcare. Therefore, a border strategy needs to take into account the socio-economic realities of the border region; ‘work, hospitals, schools, services’ and livelihood need to be secured on the Lebanese side before a change is imposed on the people.

A border strategy requires a multi-sectoral approach and a long-term commitment. Aside from the need for equipment, training, decisions on technical and doctrinal issues as well as the structure of the force, demarcation and the socio-economic infrastructure are key standing issues. Are Lebanese stakeholders and foreign donors capable and willing to invest multi-dimensionally and long-term? The political stalemate and deteriorating Syrian crisis have shelved advancements in border management.

As can be noted, the Lebanese security sector has blurry distinctions between its various security agencies. Head of the Strategic Planning Unit at the ISF, General Pierre Nassar for example, noted that there is ‘no overlap in responsibilities between the agencies

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94 Interview held in Beirut on 17/8/2010.
95 Interview held in Beirut on 25/8/2010.
96 LAF communications, 2010.
97 Interview held in Beirut on 15/9/2010.
98 At least in terms of formulating and adopting a strategy, in terms of negotiating with Syria on demarcation, in terms of addressing the socio-economic requisites for success, and overall, in terms of civilianizing the border management approach.
in texts’ but admitted that it does happen ‘in practice’; however, he insisted that this is ‘sorted by coordination’.\(^99\) Also, the Communications Department of the Ministry of Defence insisted that there is ‘no overlap or conflict between the mandate of the LAF’ and other agencies.\(^100\) Observations made by studying the texts refute these claims and assert instead that opaque boundaries, overlap, working at cross-purposes and rivalry underpin the relationships between the different agencies. Duccio Bandini uses the terms overlapping, duplication, conflicting, and confusion to describe the relationship between the agencies. McIvor in the Strategic Review notes that ‘there are clearly overlapping mandates and reporting chains’.\(^101\) Bandini, Adib and UK Stabilization Advisor all agree that the agencies ‘compete not share info’,\(^102\) the latter confirms a similar observation I make regarding the legacies of the Syrian tutelage: that competition is expected as the agencies were ‘created to compete against each other’.\(^103\) Belloncle also notes that by ‘dividing and ruling the Lebanese intelligence apparatus, Damascus had a priceless tool of control over Lebanon’s political life.’\(^104\)

The justice sector is a key actor within the security sector. A well-functioning justice sector upholds human rights, the rule of law, and the constitution. The judiciary includes the courts, prosecutors, and defence lawyers; the penal system and the Ministry of Justice are also part of the justice sector. The latter shares a symbiotic relationship with the security sector, and controls the military and security forces by being part of the system of checks and balances. An effective justice sector provides impartial resolution of disputes; it sentences offenders, prevents impunity, and protects the vulnerable; it contributes to fostering a secure environment.\(^105\) Approaches to SSR increasingly adopt a combined security and justice approach; the UNDP and more recently DFID have adopted this approach. Ta’if sought to enhance the judiciary’s independence by establishing the High Judicial Council (HJC) mandated with trying presidents and ministers and specifying that a number of its members be elected by the Judiciary; it also established the Constitutional

\(^99\) Interview held in Beirut on 7/1/2011.
\(^100\) LAF communications, 2010.
\(^102\) Bandini notes that the ‘first objective has been competition’ not citizens. UK Stabilization Advisor and Bandini interviews, 2010.
\(^103\) UK Stabilization Advisor interview, 2010.
\(^104\) Belloncle, 2006, p 9.
However, Ta’if’s plan for empowering the judiciary is minimal. Only two out of the HJC’s 10 members are elected by the judiciary and few opportunities were provided for the justice sector to develop its capabilities. Indeed, experts and NGOs have noted the lack of institutional arrangements to uphold respect of human rights; they deplored the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, the problem of excessively lengthy pre-trial detention, and the untenable conditions of the prisons system. Number of experts, including from within the judiciary, have themselves lamented political interferences; the first president of the HJC, Judge Antoine Khair noted the ‘subordination to politicians’ and, former president of the HJC, Judge Nasri Lahoud noted that the judiciary’s ‘independence (...) is a pure utopia’.

The legislature may include ‘national, provincial, and municipal legislatures/assemblies, their committees and commissions.’ It is a key actor in the successful control and monitoring of the security sector; and the Lebanese parliament should be involved in a number of ways in the governance of the security sector. It has the duty to debate and investigate security matters in both general sessions and the Committee of National Defence and Interior; it approves relevant legislation; its role spreads over the defence and security forces as well as the relevant ministries. The Parliament voices the concerns brought by parliamentarians’ constituencies; it votes on the state budget, and thereby on the resources allocated to the security sector; and it ratifies treaties and aid agreements. However, ‘it can only exercise these responsibilities if it has access to information, the necessary technical expertise and the power and intention to hold the

106 Ta’if III-B (1-3).
107 The ISF review conducted by NICO notes that the military court’s jurisdiction over terrorist crimes pursuant to a 1958 law has developed a ‘parallel legal system’ where the ‘demarcation’ between the prosecutor general and the military court is ‘unclear’. Although as the review notes this has negative ‘implications for crime scene management’ it also has broader human rights implications. The military court tries civilians suspected of terrorism or threats to security of the state but there are concerns ‘with regard to their independence, the guarantee of fairness in judgements and the rights of the defence’; Mansour, Maya and Carlos Daoud contend that ‘the jurisdiction of these courts and the way they work violate the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ to which Lebanon is party to. ISF Strategic Review, 2008, p 3-4 and Maya Mansour and Carlos Daoud, “Lebanon: The Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary,”(Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Feb. 2010),P 30. Found at: http://www.euromedrights.org/files/emhrn-publications/Justice_report_Liban_ENG_for_web_202742898.pdf (accessed on April 20, 2013), p 17.
110 Ibid.
That being said, the legislature has not performed [its] constitutionally assigned tasks and jurisdiction over the security sector; political as well as technical considerations underpin this failure. Lebanon has not had a Defence and Security Strategy for it to be approved or overseen by the parliament. UK Stabilization Advisor notes that the parliament effectively does not oversee security policy. Although political interference has a ‘long tradition’ as admitted by General Nassar, political leadership, as UK Stabilization Advisor notes, is too ‘fragmented’ and partisan. Each agency develops its own direction and priorities. Therefore as McIvor notes, the LAF for example is ‘its own boss’; in order to perform its mandate it tends to insulate itself from political rambling. Of course, this means that the various state actors may work at cross-purposes, compete, and duplicate resources and efforts. Although used in a slightly different context, we can appropriate the argument made by the ISF review by noting that the lack of unified political direction exacerbates the above mentioned lack of clarity in the mandates of the agencies. It has led to ‘competition for the policing functions which often leads to confusion, duplication and ineffective investigation’. This confusion is an impediment to accountability and the agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness in protecting human security.

I add the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) to the security community as it has been tasked with government-wide governance reforms, including but not limited to: e-government and access to law, modernization of legal texts, automated system for the customs services as well as for the courts, and a government

112 Abdel Kader speaking on the parliament and government’s failure to oversee the role of the army. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 149.
114 See below.
115 McIvor interview, 2010.
117 The opaque separation between the jurisdiction of the LAF and ISF.
118 ISF Review, 2008, II.
119 As discussed, a clear separation of mandates is necessary for control of the agencies. Tanner, 2003, p 3; Bellamy, 2003, p 112; and Ball, 2003, p 3.
wide anti-corruption role. Although OMSAR is not part of the security sector, it is involved in institutional modernization, management and civil service training, thereby it enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of relevant ministries. In this sense, OMSAR is part of what Ball and her colleagues call the ‘economic managers’ within the security community. I would argue that OMSAR’s recent work has opened access to legal texts: to the rights of citizens and the duties of state institutions. OMSAR bring transparency to the public service; and through the automation programme, it also provides easier and efficient access to public services including security and justice-related ones. This puts the security sector in the public eye and acts as a reminder that it remains just as much a public service as any other state institution.

Lebanon has made little progress in terms of establishing independent mechanisms for oversight. In 2005 parliament passed Law 664 of 4/2/2005 on the establishment of the position of a National Ombudsman. Law 664 intends for the ombudsman to be an ‘independent figure that does not receive instructions from any authority’ (article 1). Number of articles show that an attempt was made for the position to be autonomous, protected from political interferences, and accessible to the public. However, his/her findings are not authoritative as the ombudsman only formulates ‘recommendations’. Also, despite overcoming the initial phase of formulating and adopting the law, no consensus

123 He/she cannot be prosecuted for views provided in the conduct of the mandate (article 4) and the position’s authority extends to all state departments and the term is for four years non-renewable (article 2-1). In addition, any person can file a request (article 5-1) for free (article 5-5). Although there are conditions that apply: for example, cases filed to the judiciary cannot be considered and the applicant needs to have filed ‘formal requests at the relevant administrations and have not received a response for 3 months’ (article 5-2).
124 See previous note and: the ombudsman is required to file annual reports to the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of parliament; the report is also published in the official gazette (article 9-2) providing therefore a measure of transparency; Article 8-3 requests relevant departments to provide the ombudsman with a ‘report within a 2 months deadline of measures taken in light of the recommendations made’ and confidentiality only applies to information that ‘the law prohibits from disclosing or information related to security and national defence’ (article 8-2).
over a candidate has been reached. Nine years later, Lebanon still does not have a national ombudsman.

In brief, so far one can argue that the confusion, competition, fragmentation, lack of leadership, and oversight undermine the aim of developing a security sector more effective and efficient in protecting human security.

2) Governance by non-State actors

Many of the non-state actors that play a role in the governance of security have already been discussed. To briefly reiterate, the governance of security is shared between the state and a number of armed and non-armed actors. On the one hand, in the south, the ISF only has ‘minimum deployment’ for criminal activities. Resolution 1701 stipulated the deployment of the LAF to the south and the upgrade of UNIFIL; with the presence of 12,500 troops in 2010, UNIFIL is a major security actor in the south of Lebanon. As UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer, Omar Abboud notes, the ‘very high level of cooperation and coordination’, and the joint-activities between the LAF and UNIFIL make the force the second formal provider of security in the south (after the LAF). Hezbollah, on the other hand, as mentioned before, maintains an informal although largely uncontested presence. In the rest of Lebanon, Hezbollah, other political parties or ‘former’ militias, and social movements maintain informal authority in their respective enclaves. Traditional Sunni Islamic movements also have long had a following in Lebanon. The stricter Salafi movement has consisted of ‘a loose grouping of religious, social, educational, and charity organizations that focus on the Islamization of society’. The movement has tended to peacefully coexist with the system; although it ‘operates only tangentially in politics’, it

126 See figure 9.
127 Joint activities have consisted of: joint patrols, ‘co-located check-points’, ‘counter-rocket launching operation’s, training and shooting exercises etc. Interview held in Beirut on 24/8/2010.
128 Amal, SSNP, PSP, Arab Democratic Party (pro-Syria Allawite party) in Tripoli’s Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood, Marada and LF.
129 Traditional or mainstream Islamist movements are Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, Jamiiyat al-Mashari’ al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya, Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami, and Hizb al-Tahrir.
130 Salaf is the Arabic word for predecessor. Salafis believe in a return to the more pious teachings and lifestyle of Prophet Mohammad’s companions — the predecessors, literal interpretations of Sharia’ law.
has developed ‘into a significant political force’.\textsuperscript{131} That being said, several militant groups have developed from the Salafi movement;\textsuperscript{132} the more radical, al-Qaeda inspired Jihadi groups, have engaged in terrorist activities and clashed with the authorities.\textsuperscript{133} These have converged ideologically and practically with some militant groups in the Palestinian camps.\textsuperscript{134}

In relations to the Palestinian armed presence, following Ta’if, weapons outside the camps were turned in except for the military bases of Syria’s proxies the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada. The Lebanese government did not endeavour to confiscate arms inside the camp.\textsuperscript{135} That being said, three categories group the Palestinian factions. First, the PLO led mainly by Fatah, then the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (and a number of other smaller factions). Formal relations between Lebanon and the PLO ‘were restored in May 2006’.\textsuperscript{136} The second significant coalition of forces is Tahaluf al- Qiwa al-Filastiniyya or ‘the Alliance of Palestinian Forces’. They oppose the terms of the Oslo Peace Accords and the PLO’s recognition and negotiations with Israel. The factions that make up the Tahaluf are close to Syria and they are: ‘Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), Fatah al-Intifada, al-Saiqa (Lightning), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party’. The third category is made up of Islamic Jihadi groups; they are loosely organized groups and accommodate with the other factions and the Lebanese authorities; such groups are as ‘Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida (Fighting Islamic Movement) and Ansar Allah (God’s Partisans)’. The more radical of these groups such as Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Greater Syria) and Usbat al-Nour (The League of Light) have been more problematic as they ‘reject dealing with Lebanese institutions or Fatah’.\textsuperscript{137} Conflict within and between these categories is not uncommon and often leads to the use of force within and on the outskirts of the camps. In efforts to improve relations between

\textsuperscript{131} Abdel-Latif, 2008, p 1.
\textsuperscript{132} Most notably, in the Palestinian camps (especially in Sidon’s Ain el-Helweh camp which hosts groups such as Usbat al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham), in Tripoli, in Akkar, and the Biqa’a.
\textsuperscript{133} These groups have led attacks against foreign embassies and civilian targets and clashed, as mentioned above for example, with the LAF in Dunniah and Majdal Anjar in 1999-2000. For the Jihadi al-Qaeda linked groups see: Rougier, 2007; Abdel-Latif, 2008; Saab, 2008; and Nerguizian, 2009.
\textsuperscript{134} Rougier, 2007, p 245.
\textsuperscript{135} The peace was too fragile and the LAF too weak to challenge the factions.
\textsuperscript{137} ICG, 2009, p 1.
the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian factions, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) was formed in 2005;\(^{138}\) it is an inter-ministerial committee tasked with ‘achieving progress on all levels related to living conditions, legal issues, security, services and development in order to enhance the living conditions of Palestinian refugees and strengthen the brotherly relations’ between the two people.\(^{139}\) As Resolution 1559 called in 2004 for the disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and in 2005 Syria withdrew its forces, the issue of Palestinian weapons was placed on the negotiations table. In 2006, in a National Dialogue meeting, political leaders agreed on the ‘need to remove military bases run by pro-Syrian factions outside the camps and “reorganise” the arsenal of weapons that exists within them’.\(^{140}\) However, no action or progress has since been achieved. Although, the LPDC has acted as a successful channel for lobbying for refugee issues, its achievements have been limited as its work has been ‘significantly hampered by both Lebanon’s political instability and Palestinian divisions’.\(^{141}\)

All of the above, in addition to Private Security Companies and self-defence groups, make up the bulk of Lebanon’s armed non-state actors.\(^{142}\)

It is important to remember that civil society, community leaders, sectarian and political leaders are part of the wider security community. Civil society is understood as voluntary associations, activities and groups that function outside the authority and the control of the state.\(^{143}\) Civil society, from the Western donor perspective, helps ‘develop norms of democratic behaviour’, it provides ‘technical input’, and acts as a ‘watchdog’.\(^{144}\) Despite the contributions of such groups (mentioned in the previous chapter) and other international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, experts such as Abdel Kader express their frustration with the neglect of the intellectual elite and their inability to address security matters seriously in the decades leading up to our day.\(^{145}\) My own field-work has also shown that only one Lebanese civil society group (CESMO) is

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\(^{138}\) It was formed by government Decision No. 41/2005.


\(^{140}\) ICG, 2009, p 7.

\(^{141}\) Notably, it was hampered by the 2006 war, the 2007 armed conflict with Fateh al-Islam in the refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared, and government paralysis. Ibid, p 10.

\(^{142}\) A number of experts also speak of an ‘intelligence struggle’ involving the services of states participating in the UNIFIL as well as other states with an interest in the region. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 133.


\(^{144}\) Ball et al., 2006, p vii.

\(^{145}\) Abdel Kader, 2009, p 126.
dedicated primarily to the study of the security sector. The Stimpson report also notes that the military and security establishments have restricted their discussions to closed elite circles and are reluctant to seriously engage with civil society groups. As experts note, this is not uncommon. However, the civilianization and democratization of the security sector will require the engagement of and debate between all these actors. If and when stability returns to Lebanon, an inclusive transformative political process will require the participation of all these actors in formulating a security strategy. This chapter however does not discuss options for a comprehensive political process. This is a limitation that has been recognised in the methodological chapter and justified at the start of this one.

Below I provide a graphic illustration of Lebanon’s security actors:

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146 Although of course others address security matters in their work on human rights, the role of the state, political parties etc.
147 Emile El-Hokayem and Elena McGovern, “Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform,” (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008). p 23. Also, my discussions with number of Western Diplomats emphasised the lack of trust and the meagre working relationships between state institutions and civil society. To illustrate, at a conference by the Lebanese Centre for policy Studies and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung I attended in Beirut between 7-8 July 2006 on SSR in the Arab World, an attending ISF officer (from the ISF delegation which by the afternoon had been reduced to 2) asked at the end of the proceedings: ‘so what can you civil society groups do for us?’ An awkward silence followed. It seemed to me that the conference experience was relatively futile.
State actors I: The Executive:

Figure 3: The Executive

For a close up on some of the relevant ministries and offices:
Figure 4: High Council on Defence and the General Directorate of State Security

Figure 5: The Ministry of Interior
Figure 6: The Ministry of Finance

State Actors II: the Legislature:

Figure 7: The Legislature
State Actors III: The Justice Sector:

Figure 8: The Justice Sector

Justice sector

- penal system
- Judiciary
- Ministry of Justice

Non-State Actors:

Armed non-State Actors
- Hezbollah
- UNIFIL
- Palestinian Authority
- Palestinian Factions
- Private Security Companies
- Other arm bearing groups

Civilian Non-State Actors
- Civil society (Academics, experts, NGOs, Media, charities etc.)
- Religious/sectarian and community Leaders
- Parties

Figure 9: Non-State Actors
The following few sections will further argue that the security sector in Lebanon is impaired because it suffers from an entangled constitutional framework. Security organizations are ‘subject to multiple and potentially conflicting authorities’.\textsuperscript{149} This is seen by the dual authority of the President and the Prime Minister in the High Defence Council and the Directorate of State Security, in the dual authority of the President and the Cabinet over the LAF,\textsuperscript{150} and more broadly in the different politico-sectarian affiliations of the agencies. Furthermore, mandates overlap (in the realms of internal security, public order, investigations, intelligence and border management), and the constitutional framework fails to provide provisions or mechanisms for information sharing, cooperation and effective tactical coordination (notably between the ISF and the LAF). Lebanon has also inherited a fragile security sector which is based on an equally fragile balance of power. Following the Syrian withdrawal, the Lebanese security sector has been overcome by the consecutive crises and has struggled to maintain and provide security. Lingering issues have resurfaced as the struggle for the future of Lebanon has prevented the political leadership from agreeing on a National Defence and Security Strategy to set parameters for the post-Syrian phase. This has had ‘deep repercussions on the security sector and its development.’\textsuperscript{151} Saoud al-Mawla agrees, and adds that without a domestic Lebanese project, ‘there will not be a National Defence Strategy’.\textsuperscript{152} Elias Hannah, retired General in the LAF and independent researcher laments the absence of a sector-wide strategy;\textsuperscript{153} on the donor side, so does Bandini.\textsuperscript{154} However, a national Defence and Security strategy ‘is needed to restructure the sector in order to perform its role.’\textsuperscript{155} Flavia Adib stresses the negative implications of an absence of a ‘global strategic vision’;\textsuperscript{156} the absence of a strategy undermines the efforts at developing the desired capabilities of the agencies and at seeing human security improve. Abdel Kader also notes that Lebanon is facing a ‘serious security predicament, and the most serious is the lack of vision and decision to deal with the issues of sovereignty and national security in all their facets, domestic and external’.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{149} Also corroborated by: Adib, 2012, p 2, 4, 9.
\textsuperscript{150} See below.
\textsuperscript{152} Al-Mawla, 2009, p 162-163.
\textsuperscript{153} Interview held in Beirut on 14/9/2010.
\textsuperscript{154} Bandini interview, 2010.
\textsuperscript{155} Boustani, 2009, p 191.
\textsuperscript{156} Adib interview, 2010.
\textsuperscript{157} Abdel Kader, 2009, p116.
Advisor to now former Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Gr Pierre Salem confirms that ‘the essence [for sustainable progress] is in a strategy’.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{158} Interview held in Beirut, on 11/1/2011.
III. The Lebanese Armed Forces

1) The governance of security and the LAF: colonial legacies and national assertion

The roots of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are traced back to 1916, when the Allies formed the Legions of the Orient to fight against the Ottoman Empire. The French bankrolled the forces until 1924, when Lebanon and Syria started contributing to the expenses. In 1943, the Lebanese Special Forces were separated from the Syrian forces; and on August 1st, 1945 the French completed the final stage in the transfer of authority to the Lebanese government.

The forces formed under the mandate did not constitute a national army; the French would have been cautious against an alliance with domestic political oppositions. Therefore, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, their role was seen as repressive. That being said, the Homos military school had a significant role in training a number of Lebanese and Syrian generals who would play an important role in the struggle for independence. These generals would be tasked with the formation of the Lebanese army at independence. Colonel (at the time) Fuad Chehab, for example, was head of the Lebanese Special Forces at their separation from the Syrian Forces, and later led the army in its support for the politico-civilian struggle for independence.

The 1936 treaty with France stipulated the formation of a Lebanese army under the supervision of a French commission in charge of its training and equipment. As Hassan Mneimneh notes, the French authorities resisted and postponed the transfer to the Lebanese authorities.

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159 These were disciplined forces led by the French and formed from Armenian, Moroccan, Senegalese, Cherkess (originally a north Caucasus ethnic group displaced by the Russian conquests to the Ottoman Empire), and other units. In 1919, the Allies divided the Legion of the Orient into a Syrian unit and an Armenian unit, the former consisting of Lebanese and Syrian troops. In 1920 the French authorities restructured all the military forces in the Levant, forming the Auxiliary Forces of the Levant which was comprised of the previous Syrian unit (Syrians and Lebanese). Ma’loumat, 2007, p 11 and Daher, 2007, p 80.

160 Ma’loumat, 2007, p 11.


162 He would later play an important part in Lebanese politics (1952 and 1958) and would be elected president in 1958.

163 From 1937, this French commission formed new Lebanese units, until it separated the Syrian from the Lebanese units.
When the Second World War broke out, the Forces fell under the authority of the Vichy government and fought the allied forces of the British and the Free France forces. However, beginning in the 1930s, the political struggle to achieve independence had now taken root. When news broke out that the French planned for the Lebanese national forces to fight in Europe, the Lebanese Generals held a meeting in Zouk Mkayel in 1941 and issued what was known as the ‘Historical Document’; the Lebanese Generals pledged their ‘refusal to obey any authority other than the Lebanese’, ‘swore not to fight under any banner (…) other than the Lebanese’, and ‘refuse[d] for the Lebanese army to play any part in the war between the Vichy government and the Free France and its allies’. It was argued that the document came to ‘support and complement’ the political efforts for liberation. Two years later, a similar stance was taken. In 1943, the struggle between the French authorities and the Lebanese political leadership had intensified; the president, the prime minister and a number of ministers were detained in Rachaya. The Lebanese Generals held a secret meeting and decided to march to Beirut, in order to support the people and join the national government. The Generals’ stance, Lebanese popular and political pressure, as well as international opinion, forced the French to release the Lebanese leaders and to ratify the Lebanese Constitution. The separation of the Lebanese forces from the French army was finalized on August 1, 1945; the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were born and the complete withdrawal of the French troops took place in 1946.

The LAF therefore played a significant and symbolic role in Lebanon’s independence. This role gave the LAF lasting credibility and legitimacy. It is argued that the ‘architects of the army’ sought to overcome some of the negative legacies of French and Ottoman rule. They rejected the idea of regional, sectarian, ethnic and tribal units, which were promoted under the Ottoman Empire and the French and endeavoured to form a “national” representative army. It has also been noted that the architects of the army ‘refused to employ the army in internal political feuds.’ Indeed, General Chehab is quoted to have reiterated: ‘this is none of our business. Let [the politicians] wrack their brains!’

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164 Hassan Mneimneh, “Mawakif Fi Tarikh Al-Jaysh Al-Loubmani (Highlights into the History of the Lebanese Army),” Ma’loumat, no. 48 (Nov. 2007), p 83-84.
165 Ibid.
166 Daher, 2007, p 80.
167 On the credibility of the LAF see: Barak, 2009.
168 Although it wasn’t until the 1990s that the ratio between Muslims and Christians was adjusted.
169 Daher, 2007, p 80 and Ibid.
It is widely accepted that the army’s neutral stance spared Lebanon from deterioration on a number of occasions. Most notably, the army remained impartial during the ‘white revolution’ which overthrew the rule of Beshara el-Khoury in 1952 and during the ‘mini-civil’ war of 1958.\(^{170}\) As a result, the army built a reputation for impartiality; it was perceived as a “national” army concerned with national unity, ‘as holder of the balance’, and a guarantor of the power-sharing system.\(^{171}\) The army had, in fact, recognized the fragility of its composition. Indeed, the army in Lebanon is ‘not homogeneous and is linked by kinship ties’ to the various confessional groups.\(^{172}\) Taking sides in political disputes would risk rebellion, defection and civil war.\(^{173}\) Widespread perception also maintained that the heads of the military institution steered away from military coups, which were common in neighbouring countries. Aside from the isolated attempt by a number of politically affiliated officers in 1961, there is no established tradition of military coups or rule.\(^{174}\)

When General Fuad Chehab was elected president following the 1958 crisis, the move even appeased many concerns and brought relative stability. Chehab’s term is known for its far-reaching political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms. Unlike previous presidents, his term was characterised by a comprehensive and coherent program based on good regional relations, social justice, and modernization says Corm;\(^{175}\) his term reflects the role of militaries in state-building. However, that soon came at a cost; the military’s Deuxieme Bureau would develop a pervasive political role.\(^{176}\) The Lebanese soon objected to the implicit military rule, therefore, opposition to what became known as Chehabism developed.\(^{177}\) Chehab would not attempt a second term; during the 70s, governments

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\(^{170}\) President Bechara el-Khoury planned to stay in power and refused calls by the opposition for his resignation. The army did not accept to crush the opposition, the president resigned and Camille Chamoun was elected as the new president. Again, in 1958, General Chehab refused to put down the uprising. Mneimneh, 2007, p 85 Daher, 2007, p 81.

\(^{171}\) Barak, 2009, p56.

\(^{172}\) Ibid, 2009, p 57.

\(^{173}\) This is what happened during the civil war when the army was seen to have abandoned its neutral stance.

\(^{174}\) Mneimneh, 2007, p 86. Also note that he civil war situation is different: although the army disintegrated, its factions did not establish sole military rule.

\(^{175}\) Corm, 2005, p.

\(^{176}\) Daher, 2007, p 81-82.

\(^{177}\) Chehabism has political, military but also socio-economic facets. The opposition also rallied against the growing role of the state in the economy and redistribution (which challenged the traditional system).
slowly dispensed with Chehabi remnants in the administration,\textsuperscript{178} and a return to traditional civilian rule subsequently took place

Having said that, between 1960 and 1975, the army was too weak to face domestic and regional pressures. It failed to maintain a monopoly over the use of force and widespread insecurity became prevalent. As mentioned before, domestically, the leftist and Muslim parties were in support of the Palestinian role against Israel, and thought of it as an opportunity to challenge the state; there was also Arab pressure to transfer and restrict all Palestinian resistance to Lebanon.\textsuperscript{179} In addition, the government did not provide the army with political or budgetary support. Had it done so, it is not certain that the army would have reacted more firmly; the concern over its unity has long paralyzed it – the mixed sectarian composition of the army threatens disintegration should it decide to challenge popular demands from either end of the spectrum. However, in the years leading up to the war the LAF diverted from its traditional neutrality. While it used force against the Palestinian and leftist forces, it turned a blind eye to Christian militias’ weapons smuggling and training.\textsuperscript{180} This led to antagonism from the Muslim and leftist street and to numerous casualties as confrontations turned violent.\textsuperscript{181} A year after the civil war broke out in 1975, and under domestic, Israeli, Palestinian and Arab pressure, the army disintegrated for the first time in 1976.\textsuperscript{182}

It was reunified in 1977 after the intervention of the Arab Deterrent Force, but it was clear that the situation would not allow a strong military to develop. Some organizational adjustments were made pursuant to Defence Law No. 3/97 but as the governance of Lebanon’s security was shared between the Palestinian factions, the Israeli and Syrian forces, and Lebanese militias, the LAF did not withstand the pressure.\textsuperscript{183} As the LAF was further used to crush the opposition,\textsuperscript{184} it disintegrated again along sectarian lines.\textsuperscript{185} In 1988, the split was between loyalists to the appointed head of the transitory

\textsuperscript{178} Although the ‘LAF was effectively a shadow government’ throughout the 70s. Nerguizian, 2009, p 8.
\textsuperscript{179} Abdel kader, 2009, p 119.
\textsuperscript{180} Traboulsi, 2007, p 182.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, p 175-183.
\textsuperscript{182} It split between the Lebanese Arab Army and the Army of Free Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{183} Following the withdrawal of the Israelis from Beirut and the PLO, a multinational force was sent to fill the vacuum. Also, a US commission was sent to prepare a study on re-organizing and equipping the army. It was known as the Bartlet Report but its mission failed as the situation further deteriorated. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 121.
\textsuperscript{184} Traboulsi, 2007, p 225.
\textsuperscript{185} Barack, 2007, 93-110.
Despite that, in the post-war period there was consensus to reunite and reinforce the army at the expense of “self-security”. In 1990, the LAF was finally re-united.

Back in 1946, Lebanon had inherited from the French a force of 2,676 men; by 1975, despite the numerous upheavals it had witnessed and escalating regional pressure, the force had not surpassed 20,000 at the onset of the civil war. Furthermore, ‘its equipment and armament had evolved very little, and in a way that did not match all the challenges and the threats it was facing.’ This, as many argued, was a political choice rather than a financial or an economic one. Although a heavy price was paid, the LAF had been intentionally paralysed: on the one hand, this prevented the ‘Christian’ ruling establishment from monopolize power by force, and on the other hand, ‘Christian’ elite sought to avoid effective participation in the Arab-Israeli war—‘negative neutrality’. As long as no monopoly over the use of force is established, the local context would entail that the military stays deployed outside the barracks. The militarization of Lebanese society suggests that the LAF is needed to prevent political violence from escalating and to act as a broker as it often does. I would argue that the LAF is therefore indispensable at this stage for maintaining a level of freedom from fear. Indeed, as McIvor notes, the priority is for stabilization.

2) Contemporary obstacles to an effective and efficient force:

The Ta’if Agreement stipulated the strengthening of the Lebanese security sector. It called for the reunification of the LAF, which took place in October of 1990. Ta’if was thought to have ‘opened the door for the 2nd republic to modernise and reform the

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187 Even if covertly, all had contingencies and relied on Syria to play the usual balancer.

188 Abdel Kader, 2009, p 118.

189 As in the South African context, the proliferation of weapons but also the ‘inefficient, corrupt and poorly trained police service, unable to cope with widespread violent crime’ suggests that the LAF’s internal presence continues to be needed. Nathan, 2004, p3-4.

190 Although McIvor was referring to ISF reforms. McIvor interview, 2010.

191 Ta’if stipulates that ‘the armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained’. See Appendix 2: Ta’if, second, C(3).

security sector’ said Abdel Kader. However, in regards to the LAF, ‘post-war reconstruction of the Lebanese military [simply] focused on making it more representative of Lebanon’s socio-political and sectarian make-up.’

Ta’if stipulated that the president be the ‘supreme commander of the armed forces’ which are subject to the authority of the cabinet. The dual authority in this provision, in line with Ta’if’s redistribution of the powers of the president, could be seen as an impediment to decision-making and a ‘potential source of deadlock.’ Ta’if also reiterated that:

the fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland and, if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own

that

the armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet

And that

When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks

Ta’if therefore reiterates that the LAF would temporarily support and assist the ISF. However, it is not clear at all how the LAF supports rather than takes primacy over the ISF (as is the case) and how the LAF cooperates and coordinates with the ISF and other agencies. No timeline, criteria or mechanisms are specified for when the LAF no longer needs to support the ISF; instead it is clear this is a political decision to be taken by the cabinet in negotiation with the security forces. This open-ended mandate is problematic; further clarifications and stricter criteria are needed to delineate its role from that of the other agencies. The ISF Strategic Review suggests protocols for cooperation in crime scene management and public order to prevent confusion in responsibilities and

194 This meant a shift to a 47% Christian and 53% Muslim composition of the officer corps; although the post of the commander remained a Maronite post. Nerguizian, 2009, p 19.
195 Ta’if, first, II (B).
196 Ta’if, first, D(3).
198 Ta’if, second, C(1).
199 Ta’if, second, C(2).
200 Ta’if, second, C(4).
competition.\textsuperscript{201} Over the years the LAF has become the \textit{de facto} state security actor, and its Intelligence directorate has been known to ‘impinge[e] upon the civil domain.’\textsuperscript{202} As noted above, Ta’if stipulated that its intelligence be restricted to military matters but no such redirection has been taken.

The LAF has received the largest share of state attention within the security apparatus. Nevertheless, consecutive governments have not adopted serious defence policies and budgets.\textsuperscript{203} Only one attempt to do so took place. In the immediate aftermath of Ta’if, under President Elias Hrawi, General Emile Lahoud (commander of the LAF) appointed Riad Kahwaji as head of a military committee to prepare a plan to reconstruct the army.\textsuperscript{204} The submissiveness to Syrian tutelage led the Lebanese government to forego the plan. Abdel Kader talks of a ‘strategy aborted by the state.’\textsuperscript{205}

The LAF subsequently received (‘old’) weapons from Syria;\textsuperscript{206} afterwards, between 1991 and 1994, ‘all foreign assistance to Lebanon was frozen,’ Syria was the only partner to the LAF.\textsuperscript{207} Some security assistance resumed, but the army stayed in this state for another decade and a half, and did not exceed a force of 50,000 at any stage.\textsuperscript{208} Currently the LAF is a force of 72,000; however, it has limited capabilities due to a shortage in funding, in armament and equipment\textsuperscript{209} – many of which are dilapidated, and for which spare parts are too costly or difficult to acquire.\textsuperscript{210} Omar Aboud, UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer confirms that some of the main challenges that the LAF faces is lack of equipment; some are as basic as a shortage in means of transportation and supply.\textsuperscript{211}

Nevertheless, the LAF (and its Intelligence Directorate) has long proved that it was the only capable state security institution.\textsuperscript{212} However, since the withdrawal of the Syrian troops, the LAF has been severely over-stretched and has had to deal with numerous

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[201] ISF Strategic Review, 2008, p 10.
\item[203] From the pre-civil war, post-civil war, and post-Syrian periods. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 142, 147.
\item[204] The plan was formulated under the title of “Army of 2000.” Ibid, p 137
\item[205] Ibid, p 123, 137.
\item[206] Ibid, p 142
\item[208] Abdel Kader, 2009, p 142.
\item[209] Boustani, 2009, p 192.
\item[211] e.g. food and fuel. Interview held in Beirut on 24/8/2010.
\item[212] Notwithstanding the civil war. See Abdel Kader, 2009, p 147; and Hokayem and McGovern, 2008, p 13.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
internal and external threats. Communications with the LAF emphasise the ‘increased burdens’ on the LAF. As Aboud notes, most armies focus on training and defence whereas the LAF is also deployed for internal security and performs policing functions. The deployment to the South and recent deployment over the borders with Syria, in Dahiyeh, as well as its needed presence in Tripoli, in Beirut, and around certain Palestinian camps have highlighted the need for outsizing. Furthermore, in its ‘first military operation in 60 years’ against the militant group Fateh al-Islam in Naher al-Bared, the ‘weaknesses in capabilities, training, coordination and intelligence etc. were unravelled’; the Naher al-Bared events were a “wake-up call” to the need for reinforcing the army.

That being said, the LAF is ‘operating on a shoestring budget’ says Aram Nerguizian. Between 90 to 98 percent of its budget is allocated to salaries, pensions, medical expenses and maintenance. This leaves little room for equipment, training and operations, a situation which has prevented modernization and development of the army. The LAF admits that the impediments to development are financial; budgetary constraints have prevented the LAF from fulfilling mandate. However, it should be noted that the LAF is already the public institution that receives the largest share of public funds for wages and salaries; given the public debt, it is unlikely that the LAF will receive a bigger share of state funds. Therefore, the LAF is highly dependent on foreign assistance. However, even if the LAF receives newer systems, at this stage, it does not have the funds to maintain them.

Since 2006, donors have adopted an ‘an informal “division of labour.”’ Nerguizian’s 2009 article conveniently summarizes some of the aid and assistance

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213 Bandini and UK Stabilization advisor confirm. Interviews held in Beirut on 17 and 25/8/2010
214 Letter from the Communications Department of the LAF dated 1/11/2010,
215 This occurred in 2007 and lasted three months.
217 For the phase between 2007 and 2010, the different sources consulted for this study diverged between identifying a 80% or a 99% share of the LAF budget allocated for running costs; and the Defence budget was estimated between ‘less than 5%’ or up to ‘8.6%’ of the state’s budget. Boustani, 2009, p 192; Nerguizian, 2009, p 51; Kahwaji, 2009, p 23. And, Adib, 2012, p 10.
218 Abdel Kader, 2009, p 143.
220 LAF communications, 2010.
221 LAF communications note that the institutions receives some 8% of the annual state budget. LAF communications, 2010.
223 LAF communications, 2010.
224 Boustani, 2009, p 52.
225 Ibid, p 53.
provided for the LAF. The US, the bigger contributor, has focused on transport vehicles, training, ammunition, and ‘fighting capabilities.’ US aid has been ‘crucial’ in revitalizing the LAF. France has been offering training to the LAF since the end of the Civil War; it continues to do so and has occasionally provided equipment.\textsuperscript{226} Germany has focused on improving the LAF’s ability to manage the maritime and territorial borders;\textsuperscript{227} its contributions have been particularly significant in the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project, which is preparing for an integrated border management.\textsuperscript{228} Belgium contributed tanks and vehicles.\textsuperscript{229} The UAE has focused on pilot training, and offered 9 \textit{Gazelle} helicopters and 10 patrol crafts. On a different front, Russia has focused on the Engineering Support Brigade.\textsuperscript{230} Syria has long shared a close relationship with the LAF, and was the main provider of ammunition and parts during the 2007 battle with the group \textit{Fateh Al-Islam}.

Having said this, aid has been very slow to be delivered, some pledges were not met, there has been hesitance, reluctance and conditionality – especially by the US\textsuperscript{231} – and concerns have been voiced over the suitability of some of the aid.\textsuperscript{232} Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that the amount and type of aid provided cannot incur substantial changes, and donors are reluctant to answer some of the LAF’s ‘immediate needs’.\textsuperscript{233}

Another underlining issue is internal governance. Given the privileges granted to the higher ranks of the LAF and budgetary constraints, it is unreasonable for a force of 72,000 to have 400 generals.\textsuperscript{234} As one expert noted, the command structure is ‘overly generous’ and the entitlements provided border on corruption. Aid alone, therefore, will

\textsuperscript{226} Such as \textit{Gazelle} helicopters offered by the UAE. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} Germany has provided training and offered three large patrol crafts. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} A common Border force and a Border Security Committee have been established between the LAF, the ISF, the GS and the General Customs. See "Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II," (2008). Found at: www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/.../LIBAT\%20II\%20Report.pdf.
\textsuperscript{229} 40 Leopard tanks and 32 armoured infantry fighting vehicles. Nerguizian, 2009, p 56.
\textsuperscript{230} It has donated mobile bridges, trucks and bulldozers and training in the disarming of IED’s and traps.
\textsuperscript{231} Although also by France, US ambivalence has been linked to the close relationship between Hezbollah and the LAF, to US ‘domestic wrangling’ and to other major events such as outcomes of elections, the Naher el-Bared fight with Fatef al-Islam, and stances of governments towards the STL. Sayigh, 2009, p 9-10.
\textsuperscript{232} Compatibility with existing system, heavily used, difficulty to acquire spare parts, high cost of maintenance etc. See Kahwaji, 2010.
\textsuperscript{233} Nerguizian, 2009, p 56. Also see Kahwaji, 2010.
\textsuperscript{234} While the US army has about 400. The numbers are contested but the argument is accepted by a number of other experts. Interview held in Beirut on 23/8/2010 with Mr Ted Kontek, Director of the US Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programs.
not solve the LAF’s weaknesses. As number of experts noted, Good governance is central for the development of the security sector in general and the LAF in particular.\textsuperscript{235}

Over the years, the institution has grown more autonomous. On several occasions, both as mentioned above and when accounting for another two contemporary occasions,\textsuperscript{236} the LAF ‘did not carry out orders from the civilian authorities.’\textsuperscript{237} However, that is not to say that these decisions have been malign. Nevertheless, the LAF has not been able ‘to act decisively’;\textsuperscript{238} the failure of the political leadership to back the LAF and continued political coverage of security incidents has inhibited the LAF from clamping down on protagonists involved in the latest clashes. The LAF instead has tended to broker cease-fires and separate belligerents.\textsuperscript{239} Mustafa Adib notes that since 2008, the LAF has been losing ‘the confidence’ of some communities, which have increasingly turned towards arming themselves and to forming self-defence groups and militias.\textsuperscript{240} As mentioned above, the LAF is seen to be unjustly targeting Sunni Islamists and is increasingly seen to be subordinate to Hezbollah.

Noting lingering issues in the mandate of the LAF, resource allocation, the availability of resources, and its structure, it is safe to say that the reform process will require political, governance, ‘legislative, organizational and structural changes.’\textsuperscript{241} This is confirmed by Ted Kontek (Director of the US Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programs), Bandini and Adib.

3) Prospects for a more effective role in the governance of Lebanon’s security

This discussion notes that the LAF historically enjoys credibility; it is perceived to be the most ‘reliable and competent national institution’\textsuperscript{242} and is uniquely considered a

\textsuperscript{235} Adib, Kontek and Bandini interviews, 2010.
\textsuperscript{236} Namely, in 2005 during demonstrations following the death of former PM Hariri, and in 2006 during the year-long March 8 demonstrations in central Beirut.
\textsuperscript{237} Nerguizian, 2009, p 9.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{239} Referring particularly to the intermittent fighting that erupted in the North of Lebanon since the uprisings in Syria.
\textsuperscript{240} Referring in particular to Sunni communities threatened by Hezbollah’s power. Adib, 2012, p 2, 5.
\textsuperscript{241} Abdel Kader, 2009, p 147.
\textsuperscript{242} Hokayem and McGovern, 2008, p 13.
unifying national symbol. All interviewees accept that the LAF is the most capable and popular security actor. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the civil war, and even after the Syrian withdrawal, Lebanese governments did not make serious attempts at developing the security sector. Abdel Kader describes governments’ approaches to the security sector as ‘policies of neglect.’ These have damaged the ‘readiness and the authority of the armed forces.’ Therefore, the LAF is also recognized to have weak capabilities because of the legacies of war, governmental neglect, bad governance, and foreign pressure. Aboud and Hintz both converge on this. Furthermore, the LAF is inherently fragile; this is inescapable given its reflection of Lebanese society. However, I argue that given the symbolic role it plays in Lebanese society, there is good cause to develop the institution that successfully unites the different Lebanese communities. Even Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly affirmed that his party is ‘with arming the army’; as the only remaining unifying national institution, should support for the army wither, ‘everything would be lost’. Despite the inherited challenges, most experts have argued in favour of this. At a workshop organized by the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), which gathered a number of Lebanese military and security experts, participants agreed that the legacies of neglect do not suggest that Lebanon is incapable of building an army capable of implementing an ‘effective’ and ‘reasonable’ defence strategy. Proponents suggested formulating a mid to long-term Defence and Security Strategy to face domestic and even foreign threats. This will of course entail a political decision, to be followed by brave action as well as foreign assistance. The last few years have witnessed emerging discussions and suggestions by both military experts and a

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243 E.g McIvor, Nassar and Salem interviews, 2010 and 2011.
244 Abdel Kader, 2009, p 144.
246 Aboud and Hintz interviews, 2010.
247 Nasrallah said: ‘We are with everything that can strengthen the army in terms of equipment, personnel and advanced weapons that can protect Lebanon (…) I want to reiterate that we hope to see the day when the army becomes the sole force that shoulders the responsibility of defending Lebanon’. Nasrallah Says Hizbullah Seeks Dialogue in 'Settlement Cabinet', Offered Portfolio Concessions for Country's Sake, Naharnet, 16/2/2014. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/118996 (accessed on 16/2/2014)
249 Abdel Kader, 2009, p 144.
250 With no hopes or plans to defeat Israel, but the option for decent defensive capabilities is plausible.
very small niche of civil society groups. Georges Boustani, former ISF Brigadier General and current consultant for the Interpol, notes that:

reforming the security sector requires a thorough understanding of the politics and the dynamics of security in Lebanon; this requires setting a new framework which defines security in a wider manner, reinforcing the image of the people in the sector, specifying its mandate and tasks better, re-assessing the resources and the sectors, and making real efforts in military, budgetary planning and better management.

Boustani rightly stopped at four aspects to the reform process. His emphasis on wider security can be read as human security rather than traditional regime and state security. Improved popular perception and trust in the sector are preludes for a more inclusive and responsive security sector. The clarity of mandate establishes clear lines of responsibility and enables accountability. Finally, better governance promotes a more efficient allocation of resources for a more effective security sector. Boustani is essentially describing a democratically governed security sector. Informed and coherent voices like Boustani’s are few; however, they reflect well the vision of security outlined in previous chapters.

The catalyst for this revival was the withdrawal of Syrian troops, which also exposed Lebanon to a multitude of threats and foreign interests. In addition, although ‘the doors for dialogue are practically shut,’ there are two factors to consider. Firstly, relative to the pre-Syrian withdrawal phase, there is common ground to work on. Secondly, while comprehensive reform of the security sector is unlikely in the near future, there are continuing threats to national and human security which require capable security institutions and considerable work can be done to enhance the performance and the image of the LAF and the rest of the security sector.

In the past, parties had long disagreed over the doctrine of the LAF and over its domestic role. This had obstructed the adoption of a ‘clear defensive strategy’ and a capable army. Nowadays, this disagreement has disappeared. Based on this “national consensus,” I argue that efforts to strengthen the army can be hastened and can serve as a

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251 See Kahwaji for suggestions on procurement, restructuring, re-organization of the security sector, and resources. Kahwaji 2009 and 2010.
253 Abdel Kader, 2009, p 134.
255 Stance vis a vis the Arab Israeli conflict, widespread consensus that Israel is Lebanon’s enemy, and comfort in the domestic role that the army has adopted. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 146.
basis for a future strategy. However, this consensus is ‘fragile.’ The role of Hezbollah in and Lebanon’s relationship with Syria are current contentious issues; these would preclude a DDR approach to organized and unorganized armed groups. It is therefore unlikely that the state will be able to achieve monopoly over lethal force or that it will be able to regain unconditional cross-sectarian popular support. That said, incremental development and balanced de-politicization of the role of the LAF are immediate priorities. In light of the many obstacles to comprehensive SSR, Adib for example, talked about a ‘Strategic Management of Security’. In that same respect, McIvor, UK Stabilization Advisor, and Bandini reaffirmed the importance of stabilization at this stage. However, in the interest of human security, stabilization should not come at the expense of democratic governance.

256 Ibid, p 147.
257 In operational capabilities, in governance, and in promoting respect for civil liberties and human rights.
258 Kahwaji, 2009; Hokayem and McGovern, 2008; Adib, 2012; and interviews.
261 More on this below.
IV. The Internal Security Forces

Although the Internal Security Forces (ISF) shares its role with a number of other actors, it remains the main policing agency in Lebanon. The ISF has been a hot topic in Lebanon since 2005. It has inherited endemic weaknesses, which have helped shape an image of corruption and irrelevance that a large part of Lebanese society shares. Since the Syrian withdrawal, however, it has received increasing support from international and regional actors. This section attempts to problematize government, institutional and donor approaches to the reform process. This study argues that the changes the institution is undergoing are considerable and have yielded some positive results; nevertheless, the process has also played a part in exacerbating existing tensions. For many, the ISF has become an actor in the domestic divide. Therefore, it will also be argued that in light of the domestic deadlock, donors need to revisit and re-adjust their approach to supporting the ISF.

The Internal Security Forces is considered one of the oldest Lebanese public institutions. It was first institutionalised in 1861 when Mount Lebanon became a Moutassarifiya under the Ottoman Empire. However by the time the French mandate was instated, the duties of the force were still not prescribed by law, it was unorganized and its number had declined. The French set up a special committee to re-structure the force; in 1920 the Darak or Gendarmerie ‘was identical to the regional French Gendarmeries of the time.’ By 1943, at independence, ‘the Darak was at its best condition in terms of organization, discipline and effectiveness.’ Since independence, the Darak has suffered a series of setbacks. It has had to share the responsibility of internal security with a number of agencies, most notably the Lebanese Armed Forces. Furthermore, it has been negatively affected by successive government policies, as well as domestic and regional crises.

Law No. 17 of 1990—passed at end of the civil war—determined the new mission and the structure of what is now called the ISF. It falls under the authority of the

263 From 1500 to 800.
265 Its mission consists of maintaining order, the protection of people and property, the protection of civil liberties, as well as implementing judiciary judgements. Furthermore, it is expected to assist the
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and is composed of 10 main bodies;\textsuperscript{266} a number of them have a role which will be highlighted.

The Command Council is linked directly to the Minister of the Interior and Municipalities. According to article 20 of law 17/1990, it is in charge, among other things, of establishing new departments and formulating plans for increasing the number of the force and for the purchase of arms and equipment. Strategies and changes within the ISF are therefore decided by the Command Council.

The Inspector General is also directly linked to the Minister (article 12). It is tasked with monitoring the service and investigating complaints transferred by the Minister (article 13).

The Council on Internal Security is a permanent council within the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, headed by the Minister to oversee the work of all agencies involved in internal security. As mentioned above, there is also the High Council on Defence, which is directly tied to the Office of the President. Both allow for periodic reporting to and involvement by the President or the Minister in security matters. Therefore, civilian control is taken into account.

One may assume that Lebanon’s security sector is ‘relatively developed (…) in terms of formal legal framework and institutions, established chain of command, and subordination (…) to civilian government.’ Nevertheless, I argue that there are indeed many loopholes, and as Sayigh notes, ‘reality is different.’\textsuperscript{267}
1) Flaws and realities

   a) Flaws

   Many have criticized law 17 as a reason for the weakness of the ISF. As mentioned above, it came into force in 1990, which is at the start of the Syrian tutelage. Law 17 can be viewed as intentionally designed to impede decision-making. Since the Syrian withdrawal, it has proved to be extremely difficult to pass any decisions or make any changes; the Command Council was paralyzed from the second half of 2005 until 2011. Law 17 prescribes for decisions in the command council to be passed either unanimously or by a vote of 8 out of 11 – requiring more than a two-thirds majority. The ISF is the only security institution in Lebanon with such a rule. The Director General of the ISF expressed his frustration by noting that ‘constitutions are changed by a two-thirds majority and laws by simple majority,’ he wondered how ‘amending a constitution is easier than taking decisions in the Command Council?’ Indeed, the Strategic Review noted that ‘the Council cannot and does not function effectively as a strategic command team’. Despite the 6 year paralysis however, many changes have been adopted de facto. The Command Council has been side-lined by the General Director in order to accept aid and to introduce changes to the structure of the force. However, the General Director’s unilateralism has been equally problematic.

   In regards to the Inspectorate, its role is undermined by the fact that the Inspector General is also a member of the command council; therefore, he is not ‘independent from the leadership of the institution he is supposed to inspect.’ A 2005 French report emphasised the need to reinforce the Inspectorate in order to effectively sanction corruption and misconduct, and to build a culture of accountability within the institution.

   268 It is the ‘weak point’ of the institution. Kahwaji, 2009, p 25.
   271 See below.
In short, one can say that decision-making mechanisms and those set up to guarantee accountability are by default self-defeating and simply ineffective.²⁷⁴

b) Realities

While viewed as one of the oldest public institutions, the ISF is also considered one of ‘the most neglected security agencies during the first 30 years of independence and the Syrian tutelage.’²⁷⁵ The subsequent creation of the LAF, but also government policy of cantoning it to internal security because of the regional environment,²⁷⁶ meant that the LAF would take over the role of internal security and policing.²⁷⁷ Two things resulted from this: that the ISF has been considered a second rate agency, but also that the ISF was dealt with as an ‘auxiliary force of the army.’²⁷⁸ This reinforced its links with and its dependence on the latter. The ISF is therefore highly militarized, and has adopted a model similar to the LAF in terms of structure, personnel, and training.²⁷⁹ The ISF Review indeed notes that the agency does not have adequate training facilities and that officers are trained in the military academy for 3 years.²⁸⁰ The militarization of the ISF is also visible to the public in the personnel’s behaviour, uniforms, vehicles and weaponry.²⁸¹ These are clearly ‘limitations’ to civilianizing the police.²⁸²

²⁷⁴ Salem, Nassar, and McIvor all confirm the lack of accountability in the institution. Interviews, 2010 and 2011.
²⁷⁶ As mentioned above, the policy of ‘negative neutrality’ adopted by governments entailed that the LAF is not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli wars.
²⁷⁷ Belloncle reiterates a point made earlier in the chapter: ‘better staffed, equipped, and informed,’ the LAF, therefore, ‘never allowed space for a substantial police institution to fulfil its mission’. So, the LAF has the ability to deploy more rapidly than the ISF. In addition, the fact that it is seen as a ‘Sunni’ institution has meant that the LAF rather than the ISF is deployed in Shiite areas. Ibid and ISF Strategic Review, 2008, p 5.
²⁷⁹ In addition, ‘high ranking officers all have a military background, the organization of the ISF is close to that of the army, [and]police training takes place in military schools.’ Belloncle, 2006, p 7.
²⁸⁰ ISF Strategic review, 2008, III, 27.
²⁸¹ Nashabe notes that: ‘officers wear military uniform and military boots. The ISF uses large military battalion trucks to transport police officers. The weapons used by the ISF are M16 and AK47 army machine guns. They are also requested to line up as an army battalion and give tribute during formal ceremonies.’ Nashabe, 2009, p 5, 7
The withdrawal of the Syrian forces left a serious vacuum which the security agencies could not fill. The aftermath of the withdrawal was characterised with stark political instability, a wave of political assassinations and bombings. As explained by the General Director of the ISF, they ‘tried to the best of [their] ability to face these terrorist incidents (...) unfortunately [they] did not get to the result [they] wanted (...) [their] resources were hardly sufficient to deal with normal criminal activity, let alone with organized or terrorist crime.’\(^{283}\) The ISF was a ‘traditional police’\(^{284}\) that did not have the capabilities to perform its tasks; so as it was custom, the ‘LAF and its intelligence Directorate held centre stage in the national security duty.’\(^{285}\) Most experts agree that the ISF is undertrained, ‘underresourced and underequipped’\(^{286}\) Nassar, Salem, Bandini, and Kontek confirm that the agency was overstretched and lacked both the capabilities and expertise to react.\(^{287}\) The agency was on the doorsteps of a new phase; but the ISF’s inherited weaknesses prevented it from performing its mandate so it turned to Western and Arab donors.

2) Post-2005 changes

Since 2005, donor support has ‘increased in quantity and quality.’ The ISF currently receives assistance from the US, France, Germany, UK, the EU, UAE, KSA etc. The General Directorate had identified two immediate priorities: increasing the number of the force and fighting terrorism.\(^{288}\) As Nassar notes, in four years, from 2005 to 2009, the force increased by 10,500.\(^{289}\) In addition, there has been a concerted effort both by donors and the ISF leadership to develop its intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities by

\(^{283}\) Rifi, 2009, p 186.
\(^{284}\) Ibid.
\(^{285}\) Abdel Kader, 2009, p 118.
\(^{286}\) Sayigh, 2009, p 8. Also admitted by the head of the ISF: ‘we didn’t have the number, our training was not at the required level, and our infrastructure was suffering.’ Rifi, 2009, p 187.
\(^{287}\) Interviews, 2010 and 2011. Also, a 2006 US assessment of the ISF found that it was ‘below the minimal level in personnel (...) when measured against conventional police to population ratios (...). Additionally it found its personnel to be largely poorly trained and lacking experience and depth of knowledge in their fields. Facilities and equipment were near to crisis levels and it lacked a communications system, had little conventional transportation and required large amounts of basic equipment and resources to perform even rudimentary police functions’. Found in ISF Strategic Review, 2008, p 7.
\(^{288}\) Nassar interview, 2011.
\(^{289}\) From 13,000 to 23,500. Nassar interview, 2011 and Rifi, 2009, p 185.
reinforcing particular units such as the Mobile Forces (SWAT team in charge of counterterrorism and public order) and its intelligence service.\textsuperscript{290} The rapid expansion of the IB and the Mobile Forces has ‘been at the expense of effective training and organization’.\textsuperscript{291} Kontek agrees; hence, the US increased its funding of training.\textsuperscript{292} However, expansion, allocation of resources, and donor attention came at the expense of other units, which led to ‘resentment in other departments’.\textsuperscript{293}

The ISF’s internal intelligence service, called the Information Branch (IB), is at the heart of the controversy surrounding the ISF. In light of the priorities identified, an existing intelligence bureau was expanded into a branch. The move was taken despite the failure of the Command Council to agree on it; this led to the subsequent deadlock of the Council. Furthermore, given the sectarian affiliation of the agency and a trend in recruitment for the Branch, the ISF has increasingly been viewed as ‘a pseudo-Sunni militia.’\textsuperscript{294} MacIvor confirms this public perception; he notes that the IB is perceived as ‘partisan’.\textsuperscript{295}

Moreover, most aid provided by donors was not based on a plan which laid down the needs of the various departments; instead, projects were launched and aid dispersed in an \textit{ad hoc} manner. Aside from the pouring of aid into the field of intelligence and specialized forces, other departments received ‘whatever was made available’ said Nassar.\textsuperscript{296} The ISF found itself to be a passive recipient and much of the aid was disconnected from actual needs. This meant that there was a considerable amount of duplication, waste, and gaps.\textsuperscript{297}

Soon, therefore, a strategic plan seemed essential. With the support of the UK, this decision initiated a limited yet unprecedented process of consultation and discussions. A public survey was commissioned in 2009 for ‘the first time in the history of the Lebanese

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Kahwaji, 2009, p 26.] These two areas were identified as particularly weak in the ISF Strategic Review of 2008, VI.
\item[294] On the sectarian take and the claims that the ISF is supporting armed Sunni extremist groups such as \textit{Asbat-al-Ansar}: Timor Goksel’s comments in \textit{Lebanon builds up security forces: The move is seen as a bid to counter Iran and Shiite ally Hezbollah}, The Los Angeles Times, 1/12/2006. And, Seymour M. Hersh, "The Redirection: Is the Administration's new policy benefiting our enemies in the war on terrorism?" \textit{The New Yorker}, 5/3/2007. From: Peter Ajemian, "Lebanon's Internal Security Forces in a Politicized State of Transition," \textit{Mideast Monitor} 3, no. 3 (Dec. 2008).
\item[McIvor interview, 2010.] Nassar interview, 2011.
\item[e.g.: a number of donors offered the same training courses and some officers were trained twice in similar courses. See ISF Strategic Review, 2008.]
The survey was an important wake up call for the ISF, as only 13% of Lebanese voiced their satisfaction with the performance of the ISF. Salem notes that the results were ‘very disappointing’ and the institution set a goal to improve its image as a policing service. The agency hopes to be able to deploy across Lebanon without resistance and the need to use coercion to perform its role; it also hopes to become the primary security provider at incidents of public disorder and at usual policing tasks. Since then, a Strategic Planning Office was established and a Draft ISF Strategic Plan was formulated. Furthermore, a Traffic Division was created, and a newly formed Human Rights Department oversaw the formulation of the first Code of Conduct. Also, the Review had criticised the absence of women in the ISF; in 2012, the first all-women police unit was launched. This represents important progress: it promotes gender sensitivity and encourages wider accessibility to the police. It is interesting to note, however, that 60% of the sample surveyed chose “improved police conduct and integrity” as a driver for satisfaction, but counter-terrorism remains, in effect, the agency’s and some donors’ priority.

298 The Survey was conducted by an independent consulting company Ipsos (a representative sample of 6000 Lebanese was selected). Draft Strategic Plan of the ISF (2010-2013) and Nassar interview, 2011.
299 Salem admits that the results of the survey (and focus groups) showed that Sunnis were more favourable to the ISF, Christians were largely indifferent or preferred the army but that Shia were completely dismissive of the LAF. Salem interview, 2011
300 Ibid.
301 The Draft Strategic Plan has not been formally adopted yet because of the deadlock in the Command Council.
303 Aside from 2 who apparently were accepted “by mistake”. ISF Strategic Review, 2008, p 18.
305 This can be seen in the agency’s and donors’ ’skewed’ attention to the IB and mobile forces. Term used in: ISF Strategic Review, 2008, III.
3) Problems

   a) Problems at the institutional level

A number of institutional flaws can be noted, and the legal aspect is one which should be strongly emphasised. The ISF and its Information Branch are overstepping legal boundaries to an unprecedented extent. The efforts invested in the changes within the ISF are taking place outside the Command Council; these unilateral decisions are therefore in violation of the ISF law. The status of the IB is unlawful; people are being arrested by a Branch non-existent under the law and evidence against them is accepted by the judiciary. McIvor, confirms, it ‘has no authority to hold people but does so’. 307 The legal status of the ISF needs to be addressed if the reform campaign is to gain any legitimacy. One might concede to the argument that the combination of insecurity and political deadlock dictate such a response; but it remains to be said that such an aggressive, imbalanced and partisan approach is counterproductive in the long run. It undermines the democratization and civilianization process; it also reduces buy-ins to “democratic” security sector governance.

In addition, Lebanese security personnel working with Western donors are ‘talking the talk,’ 308 but they have yet to ‘walk the walk’. As one of the critics of the Community Policing project in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared has noted: ‘community policing and human security, the two buzz words, (...) the people who use these terms don’t exactly know what they mean.’ 309 Community Policing in Nahr el-Bared is a pilot project funded by the US following the 2007 clashes there. 310 Rifi confirmed his willingness to extend this approach to the rest of Lebanon. However, what I gather from Kontek’s interview is that Lebanese stakeholders have failed to commit to their end of the bargain: the ISF has not yet defined the scope of its mission in the camp, the LPDC has taken a back-seat role, and no public outreach to prepare the community for a Lebanese police presence has been

307 McIvor interview, 2010.
308 An impression gathered from some of my interviews: those who are involved with donors are talking about reforms, rule of law, respect of civil liberties, wider security, and human security concerns whereas those who haven’t are very apprehensive about any sort of openness and change. Colonel Moussa Karnib at the ISF, whom I mention in the methods chapter for refusing to give information on donor aid, is a clear illustration of traditional antagonism to transparency and the role of donors.
310 The plan suggests that the ISF has a presence inside the camp (police station being built in the ‘new camp’ and a field office in the old one) and the LAF stays around the camp.
Instead, the strict militarization of the camp by the LAF has soared tension rather than promoted acceptance of Lebanese authorities.  

Furthermore, although donors have been providing human rights training and have been engaged with civil society, Human Rights Watch noted that ‘France, the US, and the European Union (…) have not fully used their leverage to push Lebanon to adopt concrete measures to improve its human rights record.’ Lebanon has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture but has not made much progress in establishing mechanisms to curb abuse. Instead, there have been an increasing number of reports of security forces using torture techniques on detainees as well as increasing incidents of harassment of activists. Furthermore, the condition of prisons has become an untenable and a highly publicized matter: ‘prisoners rioted on multiple occasions to protest their conditions of detention,’ the authorities have failed to manage the Islamist detainees, and a number of prison-breaks have been reported. Another issue that the government has failed to deal with is ‘lengthy pre-trial detention.’ There are therefore several problems to focus on: the lack of institutional arrangements to uphold respect of human rights by the security forces, the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, and pre-trial detention.

311 Kontek Interview, 2010.
312 ICG, 2012.
314 The Protocol was ratified in 2008 and requires the Lebanese government to create ‘a national preventive mechanism to visit and monitor places of detention’. Ibid, p 1.
315 Furthermore, the continued heavy reliance on confessions as evidence encourages the use of torture. Individuals suspected of collaborating with Israel and members of Islamist and Jihadi groups are main targets for security forces. These reports accuse the Information Branch of the ISF as well as intelligence service in the ministry of Defence of torturing detainees. Ibid, p 1.
316 ‘Saadeddine Shatila of the international human rights group Alkarama (…) documenting torture by security forces’ was investigated by a military court for “publishing information harmful to the reputation of the Lebanese Military.” Another example is the detention of musician Zeid Hamdan for several hours for his song ‘President, go home.’ Ibid, p 2.
318 Reports have noted the detention of all Islamist suspects on one separate flour with minimal contact with or interference from the guards. It took one month for the authorities to realize that three prisoners had escaped. See: Prisons' General Chaplain: Roumieh Prison Security Cannot Invade Fatah al-Islam's Privacy. Naharnet. From: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/56910 (accessed on 13/10/2012).
319 In 2011, ‘the Interior Ministry stated that the country’s main prison in Roumieh, a facility built for 1,500 inmates, held 3,700. Of those, 2,757 were awaiting trial.’ The lengthy detention of Islamists has mounted pressure on the authorities and has recently escalated to accusations of intentional repression of Sunnis by a Hezbollah led government (Sheikh Ahmad al-Asir’s month-long sit-in July 2012 is one example of the mounting discontent). Nevertheless, in 2011, Parliament approved a proposal to build additional prisons, and in 2012 approved the reduction of the prison year from 12 to 9 months. In addition, there has been a commitment to transfer the jurisdiction over the prisons system to the Ministry of Justice, thereby alleviating the responsibilities of the ISF; but this of course depends on the development of the capabilities of the Ministry of Justice. Quote from: HRW, 2012, p 1.
fair and capable justice system is an indispensable aspect of law enforcement and the reform of the security sector. Given the track record of intelligence and security services in human rights, the donor-approach needs to be re-evaluated and adjusted.

b) Problems at the donor level

As discussed, critics of donor approaches have talked about cherry-picking, lack of coordination, piecemeal and short term projects.\textsuperscript{320} In the Lebanese case, the imbalanced support given to particular units within the ISF allowed the agency to play an increasingly political role. It has empowered the agency enough to challenge civilian authority and has contributed to the erosion of the agency's legitimacy.\textsuperscript{321} Furthermore, the emphasis on counter-terrorism and militarization have become a threat to human security and civil liberties.\textsuperscript{322}

As noted by Bandini, ‘the technical aspects of the reform process are favoured to the detriment of more political/reform-oriented dimensions.’\textsuperscript{323} Nassar and Salem also converge on this.\textsuperscript{324} However, although the priority since intervention has been for stabilization,\textsuperscript{325} by 2009, donors slightly shifted their approach. This is particularly clear in the EU Security and Rule of Law project (SAROL), which focuses on the Judicial Police and has led to the formulation of the first comprehensive Practical Guide for Criminal Investigations by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with the ISF.\textsuperscript{326} Another example is the 2009 public survey and Review of the ISF that the UK commissioned. This initiative led to the creation of a Strategic Planning Office, the Draft Plan, and a number of other achievements mentioned above. All of these changes might be basic, but they are essential elements in developing a people-centric agency. Having considered this, if one looks at the

\textsuperscript{320} See chapter 4, for example: Ball, 2004, p 4-6; Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 15 or Bendix and Stanley, 2008, p 29.
\textsuperscript{321} This led at one point to the resignation of Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud following the refusal of the Head of the ISF to implement the former’s order to close down a controversial informal mobile network (see below).
\textsuperscript{322} As mentioned above, the IB is engaged in political intelligence, it has been involved in the harassment of and torture of civilians, and is highly militarized.
\textsuperscript{323} Bandini Interview, 2010.
\textsuperscript{324} Interviews, 2011.
\textsuperscript{325} This has been noted by the Strategic Review, McIvor, and Bandini.
funding of the different projects, the EU’s $4 million SAROL project contrasts well with the US $80 million in support of the ISF, focused on training, equipment and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{327}

That being said, Bandini, strong advocate for wide SSR, argues that that donors need to ‘broaden the spectrum of [their] interlocutors’.\textsuperscript{328} It is important to stress that the reform campaign needs to reach out more actively to the political class, civil society and the wider population. As in other SSR contexts, the efforts that the donors have put in to encourage popular buy-in have been minimal, if worth mentioning at all. The discussions remain elitist and behind closed doors.\textsuperscript{329}

c) Problems at the political level

The ISF is caught in the domestic struggle between pro- and anti-Western forces. These forces compete for the security sector and paralyze decision-making.\textsuperscript{330} This constitutes an obstacle for change and progress, as it ‘undermines the formulation of policies and sector-wide planning’ as well as the adoption of policies.\textsuperscript{331} Therefore, ‘assistance is of limited value so long as the political authorities are unprepared to devise [and adopt]’ strategies.\textsuperscript{332} Two words sum up the attitude of the various stakeholders towards the effects of the political crisis on the reform of the security sector: frustration and hopelessness. Nevertheless, the key to the deadlock and in seeing a capable people-centric security sector develop remains political.\textsuperscript{333}

\textsuperscript{327} Amounts are available on documents shared in interviews but also in media coverage of both projects.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{329} Only CESMO, a local NGO, and a regional one, the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis-INEGMA (headquartered in Dubai) are involved in the process.
\textsuperscript{330} Competition and paralysis are recurring themes in the interview material.
\textsuperscript{331} As is seen in the Command Council’s paralysis, the Nassar and Salem interviews (2011), Maouad interview, 2010 and others. Abdel Kader, 2007, p 12, 24 and Sayigh, 2009, p 8.
\textsuperscript{332} Sayigh, 2009, p 8.
\textsuperscript{333} All interviewees converge that the political paralysis (at the national level but also its reflection at the institutional level) is the main obstacle to reform.
4) Conclusion

To sum up, the legacy of institutionalized sectarianism present in Lebanon since the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire lives on; therefore, the sectarian politicization of the ISF is an inherited problem. Lebanon also maintained the militarized model passed on by the French, and the Syrian imprint has been the proliferation but also the castration of the security agencies. In addition, the Lebanese government has not, since independence, produced any strategy to develop a strong security sector.\(^{334}\) The political dimension and the prospects for comprehensive change are the responsibility of the civilian authorities, and therefore many elements remain outside the control of the ISF.

However, in terms of its future model, the current leadership does not seem to be aiming for a transformation of the force. Rifi’s public statements have stressed that one of the institutions’ objectives is ‘complete harmonization with the LAF’—there is certainly urgency for coordination and cooperation between the two main agencies tasked with internal security, but this is also indicative that the militaristic character of the force will persist. Furthermore, to many of its high-ranking members, militarization remains an important asset to gain ground in what could be viewed as its turf struggle with the LAF.

One must admit that, without US assistance and without the contributions of other donors, there would not have been a revival of the security institutions in the post-2005 era. The donors have, to some extent and after revision, divided the labour amongst them;\(^{335}\) and no doubt this assistance has been valuable. Now that things have jumpstarted, however, ideally Lebanon needs to take better ownership of the process.\(^{336}\) Moreover, the next phase is critical to overall prospects for democratization; there should be a concerted effort for the security sector in Lebanon to be governed in accordance with democratic principles. SSR, despite its many flaws,\(^{337}\) can support a participatory and inclusive model which balances hard security priorities with soft ones. The security agencies should not be further empowered and militarized without a parallel process to the relevant ministries, the judiciary, the legislature and civil society.

\(^{334}\) See Abdel Kader, 2009.

\(^{335}\) Seen in the informal donor coordination groups established by donors and the reliance on the UK sponsored ISF Strategic review. Bandini interview, 2010 and Nassar interview, 2011.

\(^{336}\) This starts with adopting, disseminating, implementing, monitoring, and committing to reforms and values (including the Strategic Plan, the Code of Conduct etc.). It also involves widening the debate on security matters to include non-state actors.

\(^{337}\) Including being Western-centric, prescriptive and largely institutional.
Therefore, in light of the domestic actors’ failure to agree on a national strategy, it is up to donors to emphasise the governance aspect of the security sector and to strengthen their coordination.
V. Reform and Aid: Observations and Recommendations.

Resolution 1559 provoked a string of security events in Lebanon. These highlighted the precariousness of Lebanon’s security. The 2006 war, culminating in resolution 1701, came to solidify the renewed interest in Lebanon’s stability. The international community has since made efforts to fulfill its obligation to assist the Lebanese government in spreading its authority over its territory by raising the capabilities of state institutions. Since 2006 the efforts to develop the Lebanese security sector have multiplied. However, the track record has been inconsistent. Based on interviews conducted for this study, it can be concluded that many aspects have been valuable but the reform process has been fraught with problems. The main actors involved in Lebanon’s security sector development—the UK, the US, France, the EU and the UN—are main actors in global governance and in mainstreaming SSR. Looking at their projects in Lebanon tell us the extent of their commitment to SSR.

There is widespread convergence that donors’ substantial involvement in Lebanon is traced to resolution 1701 which focused on the Lebanese government’s control over its territory and controlling the flow of weapons beyond its consent. Indeed, UK Stabilization Advisor, Aboud, Kontek, Bandini, Hintz, the LAF, confirm that donor involvement is in line with their obligations towards Resolution 1701;\(^{338}\) that ‘stabilizing the Lebanese state is key for regional stability’.\(^{339}\) As can be noted, the rationale for intervention is driven foremost by strategic interest not human security concerns. Despite that, their involvement is shaped, according to Maouad, Kontek, and UK Stabilization Advisor, by the concern to promote the democratization of the sector and respect for human rights.\(^{340}\) Bandini, alone, stresses that his institution’s revised programme is led by the concern to promote human security.\(^{341}\)

Although the framework for involvement has often been labelled as SSR, the different actors converge that what is taking place in Lebanon does not amount to it. Each, instead, presents his/her own preferred label of security sector activities in Lebanon. UK Stabilization Advisor notes that SSR is possible ‘only under certain conditions’. However, ‘a robust political process that absorbs the tension and energy of SSR programmes’ is non-

\(^{338}\) Interviews, 2010.
\(^{339}\) LAF communications, 2010.
\(^{340}\) Interviews, 2010.
\(^{341}\) Bandini interview, 2010.
existent in Lebanon'; in fact, ‘there is no political will, no parliament to oversee, and no grassroots asking for reform’. Although, ‘the process’ is not present, both donors and agencies are involved in projects that may fall under SSR.\(^{342}\) Passoti is less dramatic but still critical. Simply, he does not consider that the Lebanese sector is necessarily in need of “reform”. The ‘pillars exist whereas reform suggests creating new ones’; generally ‘the infrastructure is present and good (…) therefore what is needed is modernisation’. From his perspective, 90% of what is taking place is ‘normal formation’ and 10% is reform. In terms of reform, it is applicable in limited cases such as: the creation of a crisis room at the Ministry of Interior for the management of elections, the central traffic management room at the ISF, the transfer of the prisons system from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, the on-going digitization of the judiciary. Otherwise however, we are looking at ‘train and equip’ kind of assistance. For the French embassy, training has focused on such activities as interrogation techniques, the riot police, mobile forces, detection dogs, demining dogs, aerial control, airport security, and fire-fighting. The other aspect has consisted of equipping units they work with, refurbishing and modernizing facilities.

Local stakeholders agree with Pasotti, especially in terms of the deadlock preventing the creation of new structures. They also agree that the term ‘sounds negative’;\(^ {343}\) therefore, the government and agencies strongly oppose the term “reform”.\(^ {344}\) The LAF prefers the term Tatweer or development.\(^ {345}\) The ISF agrees; General Nassar notes: ‘we improve, we develop’ therefore as an institution the preferable term is SS development. He jokingly commented that the term ‘reform’ suggests mistakes whereas the ‘mentality does not permit to admit’ that.\(^ {346}\)

It is therefore, also safe to note that transformation is not on the table. An overhaul of Lebanon’s security sector is not seriously debated and is currently not realistic. Although, since the Syrian war, calls for integrating Hezbollah’s forces into the LAF have intensified, both local and foreign stakeholders do not see a political will or a need for sector-wide transformation.\(^ {347}\) Passoti insists that Lebanon needs modernisation more than reform or

\(^{342}\) UK Stabilization Advisor interview, 2010.
\(^{343}\) Pasotti Interview, 2011.
\(^{344}\) UK Stabilization Advisor interview, 2010.
\(^{345}\) LAF communications, 2010.
\(^{346}\) Nassar interview, 2011.
\(^{347}\) Integrating Hezbollah’s armed wing into the LAF is usually not seen as a transformation of the security sector. Also, before the Syrian war and Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, calls for integrating Hezbollah forces into the LAF were present but dim, especially as the President supported the ‘people, state, resistance’ formula. On suggestions for incorporating Hezbollah infrastructure into the LAF: Elias Hannah, Security Sector Reform in Lebanon. How? When? By Whom?, Paper presented at the Security
transformation, and insists that the general legal and institutional infrastructure is sound. Independent expert/researcher Hannah to a certain extent agrees; ‘it is all there (...) the problem in Lebanon is in politicizing security, in individualizing the agencies, and in implementation’. McIvor, however, rightly disagrees by arguing for a need to clarify the constitutional mandates and for re-organizing the agencies. Although reform and even transformation are recommended, at the moment, stabilization should remain the priority; instead protocols that do not require legislation can fill the gaps in the realm of cooperation and coordination between the agencies, especially between the ISF and the LAF. Bandini on his part suggests that while at the moment the format is restricted to security sector governance or development, ‘the future is for broadening engagement’ and talking about Lebanon’s ‘system’ rather than ‘sector’. Representing the EU, Bandini certainly mirrors the OECD broad approach. Similarly, Adib does not refer to any ‘transformation’; and while substantial reform is ‘unfeasible’, she suggests continuing with a ‘security sector management’ approach.

In short, the situation does not allow for a comprehensive SSR programme in Lebanon. As UK Stabilization advisor notes, SSR should not be pursued if it leads to deterioration and insecurity. However, all actor involvement is shaped by the SSR ‘doctrine’. SSR is also certainly part of the discourse. While actors disagree on the label, they agree on the essence of a security sector that is effective, efficient and democratically governed. Also, while strategic priorities underscore donor involvement, most affirm that their work promotes a people-centred sector. Having said that, the below observations will show that despite the good intentions, donors, like Lebanese stakeholders, have learned to talk the talk but not so much walk the walk.

Sector Reform in the Arab World, 7-8 July 2006 workshop by the Lebanese Centre for Policy Study and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

348 Hannah Interview, 2010.


350 Ibid.

351 Dandini Interview, 2010.

352 Reform is not possible at a time of domestic polarization and insecurity. Hezbollah’s weapons, the war in Syria, clashes and terrorism, as well as the struggle for power prevent meaningful negotiations on reforms to the security sector.

1) General findings and remarks

a) Lebanese Stakeholders

The process of development that the Lebanese security sector is undergoing has been chaotic. Both UK Stabilization Advisor and McIvor note the ‘mess’ within the agencies and in receiving the aid. Indeed, in the absence of a plan and ‘with the rush of donors’, the Director-General of the ISF has tended ‘to say yes to all’; the concern was to say no to one of the donors but then needing them a few months later.

Also, many efforts have been stand-alone projects and have suffered from a lack of continuity;354 indeed, advisor to former Minister of Interior, General Pierre Salem notes the lack of commitment and ‘enthusiasm that quickly fades away’ as was seen in the plan to create a crisis management room.355

The political paralysis has been obstructing intentions and the solidification of efforts. Therefore, security institutions suffer from a lack of an overarching vision and strategy;356 and although a draft plan was elaborated for the ISF, no long-term strategy has been adopted yet. Hence, local stakeholders’ approach to reform or development has been one of short-term ‘patching’ rather than sustainable change as noted by Salem.357 Notably, as change threatens the delicate balance, Nassar, Bandini and Adib note that, institutionally, there has been a fear of and resistance to change.358

The institutions and agencies however still suffer from long-standing governance-related (organizational and managerial) and institutional weaknesses.359 They are understaffed and suffer from a lack of resources and equipment, and a lack of modernization.360 They suffer as well from lack of adequate training and expertise.361 All interviews and many secondary sources mentioned throughout corroborate this observation.362

355 Salem Interview, 2011.
356 For the border, for defence, for internal security, and for policing.
357 Salem interview, 2011.
358 Adib and Bandini interviews, 2010 and Nassar interview, 2011.
359 E.g. McIvor and Maouad Interviews, 2010.
360 E.g. Kontek Interview, 2010.
361 Ibid.
Furthermore, there has not been proper coordination and cooperation within and between the agencies; there is therefore an overlap of efforts and a waste of resources. As discussed, the mandates of the security agencies overlap, leaving room for increasing rivalry and duplication. They are therefore in need of further clarification.

Moreover, professionalization, respect for human rights and a culture of accountability are still missing. In fact, there are no effective institutional mechanisms for monitoring and holding security forces accountable. Existing mechanisms—the ISF inspectorate, national ombudsman, and the military tribunal—are largely a façade. Although the military, more than other agencies, sanctions and tries its men for abuses and mistakes, there is a general atmosphere of deference towards the LAF and a complicity not to tarnish its image. Recently, attempts to question the LAF over its operations in Sidon against Sheikh Assir were met with concealment and reluctance. Harassment, arbitrary detention, and torture are still applied by the security forces with impunity. Civilian ministers have limited authority over their institutions, and as UK Stabilization Advisor notes, the parliament does not effectively oversee the work of the security sector. Former Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud promised accountability and meritocracy. But as Nassar notes these ‘were big promises’ that could not be fulfilled; Salem, the minister’s advisor notes that ‘there is no discipline within the institution’ (i.e. the ISF) and that ‘authority is almost non-existent’, except to politically backed individuals.

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368 This is reported to take place in ‘detention facilities, including in the Ministry of Defence and the Information Branch’ of the ISF. HRW, 2012.
370 Nassar Interview, 2011.
371 Salem Interview, 2011.
end of his term, the Minister found his authority being side-lined by the director-general of the ISF.\textsuperscript{372}

To illustrate: in May 2011 an incident between the head of the ISF Ashraf Rifi and the Minister of Telecommunications Charbel Nahas led to the resignation of then Minister of Interior Baroud. The Telecommunication Minister decided to shut down an informal mobile network used by the IB. The network had been donated by Japan but was not meant to be functioning. The ISF prevented the Minister from entering the building and dismantling the network despite repeated attempts by the Minister of Interior (then by the president) to order the ISF’s IB to stand down. The minister of Interior subsequently resigned for refusing to ‘be reduced to a minister that signs mail’ and despite the reporting of the incident no measures were taken against the head of the ISF.\textsuperscript{373} Another incident involving the ISF’s IB and the Minister of Telecommunication is the refusal of the Minister to grant the agency full open access to the national telecommunication data after attempts on the life of a number of March 14 members. Although the Minister’s stance was backed by a decision from a judicial committee, the stance of the ISF and its supporting block maintained: ‘what is more important, people’s security or privacy?’ These stances highlight the fragility of rule of law, accountability and democratization in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{374}

The lack of central political direction and positive contributions to push the process through continues to be a major impediment to setting strategic objectives, to maximizing both domestic and donor efforts, and to establishing civilian control over the agencies. Most importantly, political interference and politicization of the agencies is prevalent. As Maouad notes, political intervention traps the security sector in a vicious circle; it ‘kills’ positive efforts and prevent institutions from maturing.\textsuperscript{375} Salem and Nassar, on their part, lament the individualization of the agencies and therefore the fragility of progress.

Abdel Kader blames the authorities for not acting at the ‘required level of responsibility’; their ‘partial plan’ to support the security sector ‘ended with a series of administrative nominations and an increase in the number of personnel.’ He goes on to argue that ‘the authorities hid behind international decisions, the Investigative Commission

\textsuperscript{372} He was backed by the politico-sectarian authority of Saad Hariri, head of the largest Sunni party.

\textsuperscript{373} Subtitled resignation speech can be seen on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZCvnSwyQdg (accessed on 10/3/2013).


\textsuperscript{375} Maouad interview, 2010.
and the project of the Special Tribunal.’ A recurrent theme in Abdel Kader’s work is the
division, weakness and fatalism within Lebanon’s political leadership.\(^{376}\) One may talk
about a lost opportunity as a result of the ‘aborted’ reforms.\(^{377}\) McIvor agrees; ‘agencies
and ministers can do more’ without touching on controversial political issues.\(^{378}\) Boustani
however, is more positive as he focuses on the improved ‘capabilities of the security
agencies and the deployment of the LAF to the South in 2006 after an absence of 30
years.’\(^{379}\) One can also add the 2009 ISF deployment to Beirut’s southern suburb\(^{380}\) to the
list of positive developments. Kontek shares this, as he notes a visible improvement at the
level of ‘no go areas’.\(^{381}\) Nassar, despite the obstacles, is not entirely pessimistic. He is, at
least, proud of setting the building-blocks of strategic planning. McIvor, Nassar, Abboud
and Maouad emphasise the role of ‘champions’ in spearheading reform within the
institutions.\(^{382}\) Indeed, there is perceived enthusiasm by figures in key positions, as well as
by lower-ranking personnel eager for progress. Aside from individual champions, public
statements from a few of the highest political figures have been supportive of reform (the
President and Ministers of Defence).\(^{383}\) Despite ‘some discouragement’ from the political
deadlock, these champions have been ‘creatively’ working around the obstacles and the
challenges within the security community—what Pasotti described as ‘bricolage’.\(^{384}\)
Moreover, there have been several success stories, and the number of projects is
increasing. The move towards more strategic planning on behalf of the agency receiving
the bulk of the aid and in its cooperation with donors has already achieved sustainable
wins.\(^{385}\) In brief, there is a growing will to achieve progress. As Maouad notes, the ‘tools
are here, now we are waiting for action’.\(^{386}\)

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\(^{376}\) Abed Al-Kader, 2009, p 135.

\(^{377}\) Talking about the ‘Defence Strategy’ but his use of word fits here too. Ibid, p 137.

\(^{378}\) Instead of terrorism and Hezbollah they can focus on setting objectives, improving accountability,

\(^{379}\) Boustani, 2009, p 192.

\(^{380}\) The suburb or \textit{Dahiyeh} was mentioned above as Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold.

\(^{381}\) Kontek interview, 2010.

\(^{382}\) Interviews, 2010.

\(^{383}\) President Michel Suleiman, for example, has made the Defence Strategy a key priority. Adib, 2012,
p 1, 9.

\(^{384}\) Pasotti Interview, 2011.

\(^{385}\) i.e the Code of Conduct and the Human Rights Department at the ISF.

\(^{386}\) Although Maouad seemed pessimistic about the prospects for progress. Maouad Interview, 2010.
b) Foreign Stakeholders

As the Strategic Review notes, donor support has been somewhat fragmented.\(^{387}\) Adib and Nassar also note donors have tended to compete and their efforts overlapped.\(^{388}\) Donors have been criticized for their inconsistency, piecemealing, cherry-picking and *ad hoc* approaches.\(^{389}\) Indeed, Nassar criticises the lack of ‘follow up’ and ‘continuity’ with certain donors.\(^{390}\) Furthermore, as UK Stabilization Advisor notes, donors have tended to ‘tick items off a shopping list’ but despite their good intentions they have tended to make the situation worse.\(^{391}\) This, either by providing equipment without training, equipment that requires costly maintenance, aid which has been provided by others (e.g. training), or even aid that reinforces the militarization of the force. Nassar confirms: donors have often given ‘what excess they have (e.g. vehicles, chairs and computers) but this has not always coincided with our needs’.\(^{392}\) McIvor notes that donors have ‘wanted to contribute what they do best but this has not always been what is needed. For example: the ISF review stressed that in the realm of public order there has been a substantial increase in personnel, however, the units lacked training and ‘non-lethal force equipment’.\(^{393}\) This, clearly, should be a priority for donors. Should they not be able to provide such equipment, then it ‘may be sensible to fund other areas thus releasing the small discretionary budget the ISF currently has for such purchases’.\(^{394}\)

Observations made in Lebanon have shown that, like the OECD-DAC Survey had noted, donors have mostly prioritized operational assistance at the expense of the

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387 ISF Strategic Review, p 32.
388 Adib interview, 2010.
389 In the words of the ISF Strategic Review: ‘donor support has been somewhat fragmented, that there has been duplication, that the problem identification process has sometimes been truncated in the interests of expediency’ However, ‘the absence of a plan means that the ISF tends to find itself reacting to the international community’s offers of assistance rather than proactively seeking specific assistance in particular areas in a coherent fashion’. ISF Review, 2008, III. And aside from primary sources see: Sayigh, 2009.
390 Nassar Interview, 2011.
392 Nassar interview, 2011.
393 ISF Review, 2008, III.
governance aspect of reform. However, success in one area is contingent on success in others. Both Nassar and Salem criticised the emphasis on al-Hajjar la al-Bashar, on stone rather than human beings. UK Stabilization Advisor notes that the ‘shopping list’ approach is easier, and as McIvor notes, even profitable for donors. However, while ‘boots and machines are needed (…) this approach does not change much in terms of the overall capabilities of the agency’. Indeed donors are encouraged to invest more in softer issues related to governance such as strategic planning, management, institutional capabilities for independent analysis, leadership, transparency, accountability, and human rights; most of all in human-centric values. As argued, democratic governance ‘should not be considered an option’. Indeed, a security sector that is effective but that is not participatory, transparent, and accountable to the executive, the legislature, and the wider public does not fulfil the normative criteria of security sector governance. Not only should we be ‘guarded against’ traditional aid packages that overshadow the civilianizing aspects of SSR, but ‘activities aimed at enhancing the operational capacity of armed and security forces, on their own, cannot be considered SSR.’ Mirroring some of the literature on learning-by-doing rather than prescription, UK Stabilization Advisor, McIvor, and Maouad note that the ‘process’ is more important in order to promote local ownership and for Lebanese stakeholders not to be vulnerable to ‘solutions imposed’ from outside. The convergence of these 3 interviewees may reflect the UK’s sponsorship of the ISF’s Strategic plan but it is also shared by domestic stakeholders. That said, Nassar notes that the ‘human component’ has been mouhmal or overlooked. Salem emphasises the need to enhance confidence in the ISF and Nassar stresses that 86% of people thought the human variable is key for satisfaction in the ISF. Salem therefore insists that the ISF

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395 i.e. civilian capabilities, accountability, transparency, de-politicization and human rights. Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 15.
397 Nassar extract from an Arab proverb. Interview, 2011.
398 In terms of competing for and meeting outcomes for short funding cycles.
399 Aid brings money & employment home (parts, more cars, weapons, trainers, consultants). McIvor interview, 2010.
400 UK Stabilization Advisor, 2010.
401 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
403 Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 27.
405 UK Stabilization Advisor, McIvor and Maouad interviews, 2010.
406 Nassar interview, 2011.
407 As mentioned above, 60% of people interviewed thought ‘improved police conduct and integrity’ and 26% thought improved professionalism would enhance trust in the ISF; whereas only 12% of
needs to promote 4 values: respect for human rights, justice and equality, leadership, and layaka (courtesy or professional behaviour). With McIvor, both agree that change ‘trickles down’; while donors are expected to sponsor champions in key positions, they are also expected to further sponsor projects that promote rule of law and human rights.  

Donors have tended to fund particular agencies and units at the expense of others. Donors prefer the ISF because it is the primary policing agency and because of its daily interactions with the people. This was the explanation provided by Kontek, Adib, Salem, and UK Stabilization Advisor. However, as Bandini, rightly and rhetorically asks what is the value of focusing on one agency when ‘it is not the only player’ on the scene? For example, the GS receives hardly any donor attention; however, through its political intelligence and censorship mandate the agency repeatedly threatens human security and freedom of speech. To illustrate, on March 14, 2014, on a live morning show called Naharkom Sai’d on the Lebanese Broadcasting Agency-International (LBCI), the presenter Dima Sadek staged a scene whereby she kept interrupting her guest Imad Bazzi at every attempt to start talking about the 9th anniversary of the Independence Uprising. At every interruption she asked—satirically—first not to criticize religious matters, then religious institutions, the judiciary, the President, MPs, ministers, certain political parties, Hezbollah’s weapons, security services, etc. arriving to a stage where there was nothing to talk about. In protest of the political pressure imposed on the media by number of political figures and state institutions, the show ended only a few minutes later with the following slogan covering the screen: ‘this is the image they want, this is the

people thought that the ability to maintain stability and 2% thought better equipment would enhance trust in the ISF.

Such as the Code of Conduct and the recent project to prepare the ISF for the protection of women suffering from domestic violence. The project is in association with KAFA, it is funded by the UN Population Fund, the Italian and the Norwegian embassies, and was launched in May 2013. KAFA, The ‘We Have a Mission Campaign’ in association with the ISF. From: http://www.kafa.org.lb/kafa-news/671%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84 (accessed on 10/3/2014).

Bandidni interview, 2010.

Although the French embassy has a working relationship with the GS (particularly at the airport).

Above I noted the GS’s role in harassing and detaining journalists and activists.

I.e. have a good day.

Bazzi is a journalist and an activist who has been repeatedly harassed, detained, and sentenced for his critical views.

i.e. the demonstrations that formed the March 14 coalition.
image we refuse".\textsuperscript{415} That being said, continuing to support one agency at the expense of the many other actors of the security system will not improve human security for a wider range of people. It would instead reinforce claims of partisanship and politicization.

Donor involvement has, however, been largely revisited; an Informal Security Sector Donor Group chaired by UNIFIL has been set up.\textsuperscript{416} Donors have recognized the need to readjust their approach; so there has been increased attention to softer issues.\textsuperscript{417} Nevertheless, lack of coordination with Arab donors continues; selectiveness and duplication are still setbacks, and, the governance aspect of the process remains underfunded.

In retrospect, SSR in Lebanon has had mixed outcomes: many contributions have been made but many gaps and mistakes have surfaced. Trial and error largely underscore donors’ and local stakeholders’ approach to reform or development. This is unsurprising, since, as mentioned previously, SSR is a concept-in-the-making; furthermore, SSR is shaped by local specificities. Donors and local actors share therefore the responsibility to positively shape SSR or security sector development. Given the experience gathered in Lebanon since 2006 (but also experiences of other countries), the direction forward is clearer. Many contributions to human security can be made should the security sector be more effective, efficient, inclusive, impartial, civilianized, and democratized.

\textsuperscript{415} The show can be seen on: \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ant9XPOu_KU} (accessed on 15/3/2014).
\textsuperscript{416} As well as 3 sub-groups on border control, rule of law, and the LAF. Aboud interview, 2010
\textsuperscript{417} Bandini interview, 2010.
2) Some recommendations

This previous discussion is a critique for understanding what is taking place in Lebanon and for suggesting (below) concrete measures for improving the capacity of the security sector to provide human security.

- Despite the recognition of its slim chances, the foremost and most obvious recommendation is the agreement on a National Defence and Security Strategy. The Strategy should set a clear people-centric framework and a long-term vision for the steps that have been taking place, as well as for the steps that need to be taken in the future.

- A clearer constitutional framework could be the first step to regulate the entangled and opaque responsibilities of the security sector. This would entail detailed and distinct mandates for the security agencies, provisions for independent and civilian mechanisms of oversight and control, and stricter criteria for the role of the army in internal matters.\(^\text{418}\)

- A government coordinating body could be created to manage and channel the aid according to prioritized and balanced needs. This could take place within the President’s or the Prime Minister’s Office, or even the High Council on Defence. Alternatively, this task could be assigned to a Minister of State (a similar arrangement to the Minister of State for Administrative Reform). Nevertheless, in considering inherited bureaucratic and institutional obstacles in the Lebanese public sector, as well as sectarian political considerations, this suggestion may need to be studied with caution.

- The support for the capabilities of the civilian authorities (in the ministries of Defence and Interior) in organizational, planning and managerial, leadership, and security matters will allow them to perform their oversight role and will allow the security establishment to perceive their civilian partners as legitimate partners.

- It will be important to widen and increase the scope of engagement with other state actors, including the justice sector, the Parliament, and the Ministry of Finance. The clarification of mandates would stop confusion and overlap (pertinent to effectiveness and efficiency); it would also establish clear lines for accountability.\(^\text{418}\)

\(^{418}\) The clarification of mandates would stop confusion and overlap (pertinent to effectiveness and efficiency); it would also establish clear lines for accountability.
latter has been receiving consistent support, but support to the judiciary as well as the Parliament is lagging far behind.  

- The support, activation and empowerment of the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee needs to become a priority. The legislature needs to fulfil its oversight and monitoring roles. Therefore, support staff, experts, facilities and capabilities need to be provided.

- Investment in civil society is necessary in order to prepare for future civilian involvement, monitoring, participation, and deliberation in security matters, as well as to inform the civilian authorities of grassroots concerns.

- Maintaining consistent efforts to modernize the ISF are important, but it is equally essential to make efforts to transform the ISF into a non-militaristic and a non-politicized institution.

- In the long term, as the capabilities as well as the legitimacy of the ISF slowly increase, the LAF would need to retreat to the barracks as stipulated by the Ta’if Agreement.

- The LAF requires the collaboration of the international community in order to facilitate its upgrade into a strong national defence institution which could replace traditional and competing informal and militaristic security providers. This would also garner legitimacy for the institution as well as the state.

- Although this study recognizes that intelligence reform is the most resilient of reforms in the security sector, the number of intelligence services and most notably their mandates would need to be addressed.

These recommendations can develop the three essential components of a democratically governed security sector: capability, cooperation, and control. Having

\[\text{\footnotesize 419} \text{ Bandini interview, 2010.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 420} \text{ See Appendix.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 421} \text{ Abdel Kader notes that the failure of the state to provide security further erodes its legitimacy. Abdel Kader, 2009, p 146.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 422} \text{ ISF Review, 2008, p 7. An option on the table is the suggestion proposed by Riad Kahwaji to form a central intelligence agency in order to pool information. Kahwaji, "Mougaraba Jadida Li-Mafhoum Al-Amen Al-Watani Wa Moutaratibataha Al-Mouassasatiya (a New Approach for National Security and Its Institutional Requisites) ", p 197.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 423} \text{ As discussed in chapter 4 by Ball, 2002 and Bellamy, 2003.} \]
said all this, this study recognizes the enormity of such a reform process given limited donor engagement, regional circumstances, and the domestic divide.

Therefore, waiting for these three priorities to align has been like waiting for Godot.\textsuperscript{424}

\textsuperscript{424} A play by Samuel Beckett (1949) in which the two main characters wait in vain for Godot to arrive.
VI. Conclusion

In light of this study’s quest for security as established in critical security studies, SSR is one policy-option that can be studied in its claim to promote human security. It helps us see how actors of global governance (those of which have espoused human security and SSR), engage in security governance in recipient countries. Crucially, SSR can make contributions to security in Lebanon as it promotes an inclusive, accountable, and people-centred alternative to formal and informal exclusivist security providers.

A limitation of this study is the failure to empirically address armed non-state actors. This is justified by a post-field-work shift in the theoretical framework, which was followed by constraints in scope, time, and accessibility. However, the focus on state-actors still fits within critical security studies’ pragmatic approach to engaging with existing structures in order to expose structural constraints and suggest alternatives for change. Critical security studies is after all about achieving progress in the life of ‘ordinary’ citizens; if SSR claims it can achieve that, it therefore is a legitimate subject of study.

In conclusion, SSR as prescribed in the literature is not the exact umbrella for what is taking place in Lebanon.\(^\text{425}\) It also cannot engender a system-wide transformation that can dissipate conflict in Lebanon; conflict in Lebanon is attributed to deep rooted structural, political, socio-economic and identity problems. However, SSR is one of very few options available to critique what is taking place in Lebanon in order to shape or steer towards progressive change. SSR provides us with a pragmatic approach to achieving tangible successes in promoting human security. As discussed in chapter 4, the label SSR may be abused for regressive policies;\(^\text{426}\) it can, therefore, exacerbate rather than alleviate freedom from fear. That risk is present in Lebanon. However, SSR has also led to substantial progress both in terms of the involvement of donors and in terms of setting the building blocks for a more people-centred security sector. That said, the security sector in Lebanon is overburdened by lingering security challenges. There is no process of political transformation and no stability to transform the security sector. An opportunity arose in 2005 with the withdrawal of the Syrian troops but that soon turned into another governance crisis. Indeed, since 2005, donors have surged to support state security institutions but the process has been controversial and at times part of the domestic crisis.

\(^\text{425}\) Broadly, as a comprehensive process of reform or transformation.
\(^\text{426}\) i.e. top-down, militarized, bias, exclusivist, and abusive.
In short, this study finds that Lebanon’s security sector maintains weak capabilities; yet, it remains largely militarized, politicized, and authoritarian. The process of change needs to move towards a more effective, efficient, representative, civilianized, and accountable sector. Although, SSR is limited in its transformative claim, it has merits in terms of improving human security. Therefore, donors and Lebanese actors need to further commit to the soft aspects of SSR.
Conclusion

1) An SSR Approach for Lebanon

This study clearly set the case for the need for a wide approach to understanding the security sector and Security Sector Reform. Nevertheless, in its Lebanon case, it only empirically examined the ISF and, (to some extent) the LAF. Therefore, on some levels, it falls short of its stated aims. The initial rationale behind choosing the ISF and the LAF was linked to where the highest level of foreign engagement was and to the formal and popular constructions that these two institutions are the main actors charged with providing security in Lebanon. However, this is not a strict prioritization, as other state and non-state actors contribute in providing security in diverse contexts and areas. The intention, therefore, was not to argue for the restriction of security providers and security sector governance to specific state institutions. Donor involvement and the high profile of these two institutions encouraged this study to begin there, but time and other constraints restricted further investigation. As a result, this study admits to being partial in examining Lebanon’s wider security sector and is aware that it has had to confine itself to a relatively narrow examination.

Having considered this, there is a strong need to continue work started in this study. This entails studying the remaining state actors – notably those organizations tasked with security – and also those civilian and judicial authorities responsible for their management and control. Furthermore, this study recognizes the role of non-state actors as legitimate participants in security sector governance. This includes non-state actors such as civil society (media, academics, experts, & NGOs), but also the various informal security providers such as Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, and other arms-bearing groups. However, engaging with the latter will require radical regional as well as domestic changes which address the status of the Palestinian refugees, the war in
Syria, the conflict with Israel, as well as the divide between the two main domestic and regional axes.

This study has set out to weigh the performance of Lebanon’s security sector. By examining the reform process and showcasing the prevalence of human insecurity, this study has shown that the security sector fails to effectively reflect and respond to people’s security. Domestic obstacles to SSR, as depicted by Nathan, resonate as factors which have hampered progress in the case of Lebanon. The ‘lack of vision, expertise and resources; an abiding tendency to view security in an authoritarian, militarist and secretive fashion; resistance to reform from politicians and/or security officers; manipulation by foreign powers and neighbouring states; and the on-going politicisation of the security services’ describe well the challenges facing the reform process from the domestic side. Furthermore, the emphasis on stabilization in response to, among other things, the ramifications of the events taking place in Syria, has shown that ‘the higher the level of instability and violence in the national or regional arenas, (…) the less likely it is that reforms with an anti-militarist orientation will be introduced.’

However, these remain symptoms of a deeper problem: the lack of a common identity for Lebanon and the ensuing problematic socio-political system, a system which has been moulded, adapted and reshaped since independence but which requires radical transformation.

A transformation encapsulates economic, social, judicial, and political dimensions. However, this study cannot comprehensively address these issues, because its remit is the security sector in Lebanon and therefore it should not overload its claim.

Furthermore, transformation is a complex process, and it cannot be claimed that a study or a strategy can articulate a specific, comprehensive and successful programme for change. The actual process will undoubtedly diverge from a prescriptive document. The process will be challenging, long, and non-linear. No

2 Ibid.
matter to what extent the literature stresses normative dimensions, reality will show a wide disjuncture between conceptualization or generic policies and the actual process. Despite successful efforts for progress illustrated in the chapters system-wide transformation remains unlikely.

Research led this study to accept that the precarious status of the security sector is a symptom of a dysfunctional political system, which can itself be traced to wider and deeper core issues. Further research, as well as future strategies and policies, could deconstruct divisive assumptions and construct integrative ones. The cycle, which has prevented Lebanese politics and security from overcoming polemics instated since the 19th Century, needs to be broken. Nevertheless, the ground is not yet set for such change; as mentioned, forging a better future will require a concerted effort from the top and from below in order to reformulate popular attitudes and identities—notwithstanding regional and international influences.

a) In light of this, what does the future hold for Lebanon?

The future of Lebanon will remain largely the same so long as the Lebanese continue to support existing power structures at the social and political levels, and as long as regional confrontations are mirrored in Lebanese politics.

Nevertheless, there is a valuable role for SSR despite the stagnation of the overall situation. But since the dysfunction of the security sector is a symptom of a larger political crisis, SSR in the Lebanese context is inherently restricted to patching rather than curing the main issues.

Many view SSR as an entry point for peacebuilding, democratisation, and wider good governance. This can be true where a parallel process of reconciliation and transformation is taking place; this is clearly not the case in Lebanon. Therefore,

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3 This is in term of the number, the sensitivity of the tasks involved, and the timeframes. We can extrapolate from Ball and Hendrickson’s as well as Nathan’s SSR experiences to the wider context: the former note that it is ‘important to be realistic about what can be achieved’ and the latter argues that managing a radical transformation often proves to be ‘overwhelming.’ Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, p 16; and, Nathan, 2004, p 2.

4 Bellamy, 2003, p 109-110, also OECD, 2005 etc.
this study is not convinced that SSR can fulfil peacebuilding and transformative goals without a wider political process of change.

That said, as ‘unprofessional or poorly regulated security forces often compound rather than mitigate security problems,’ SSR can contribute to enhancing security. Such efforts are much needed given the endemic and inherent weaknesses of both security and civilian institutions. More importantly, security assistance outside the framework or spirit of SSR may have been exacerbating authoritarian tendencies and contributing to tension. Therefore, an SSR programme or simply projects in the spirit of SSR (the latter not being the ideal option) are useful.

This study, does not envisage an externally-driven SSR approach as in Sierra Leone; it supports a process similar to that of South Africa, whereby domestic actors invite foreign ones to assist them in the transformation. In Lebanon, it can only be a domestically- rather than a donor-driven process; to do otherwise would suggest a deteriorating situation, the need for intervention by the international community, and the de-legitimization of local actors. In the current atmosphere, any large-scale foreign intervention would receive harsh and even violent opposition.

But a comprehensive approach cannot take place in light of the severe political schism, the stringent legacies of conflict, the on-going state of war with Israel, and the nearby civil war in Syria. The Arab Spring certainly revitalized populations across the Arab world, including in Lebanon, and the changes that the uprisings will incur may change the landscape of the region, which may allow for positive progress. Nevertheless, time is not yet ripe for change in Lebanon; it will require brave stances by the ruling elite and by the wider population which, at this point, neither seem ready for. Therefore, there is currently no tangible hope for a national transformative process or simply for security sector transformation.

The absence of a government strategy has been a setback to domestic and donor-driven efforts to improve the performance of the Lebanese security sector and to establish ownership. Bryden and Hänggi note that ‘comprehensive and inclusive

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6 These include threats and confrontations with organized crimes such as drug and human trafficking, kidnappings, terrorism, controlling or managing demonstrations, security incidents and clashes, criminality etc.
national security reviews [are] a precondition and a catalyst for successful SSR.\(^7\) This has not taken place in Lebanon; instead, efforts have thus far grappled with a lack of coordination, planning and direction. Due to the lack of political direction, the security agencies have filled the vacuum and acted as autonomous institutions, while the civilian ministers either play along or have been at odds with the heads of the security agencies.\(^8\) However, as Bellamy notes, ‘an illegitimate, non-transparent, politicized or cadre-controlled armed force acts as a powerful impediment to progressive change.’\(^9\) In that respect, Edmunds’ depiction of security sectors in post-conflicts societies well describes the Lebanese case. Aside from problems in effectiveness, the security sector suffers from the ‘politicisation of security sector actors’, lack of democratic civilian control,\(^10\) and lack of legitimacy.

The biggest challenge is for the security forces (referring particularly to the ISF) to ‘accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian and democratic) government.’\(^11\) As professional and accountable security forces, they need to be open for dialogue with civil authorities and society.\(^12\) In addition, it is necessary for the civilian authorities and civil society to develop the knowledge and expertise to participate in security debates and the democratic governance of the security sector—the LAF, the ISF and beyond.

Insofar as the military and security forces are ‘outsized and a substantial drain on state resources,’\(^13\) the Lebanese case is nuanced. With the expansion of the military presence over the entire Lebanese territory since the Syrian withdrawal and since the Israeli war in 2006,\(^14\) as well as the increasing role of the ISF in domestic security, there was a need for outsizing. Having said that, the security and armed forces need restructuring, better financial management and efficiency. Together with the redundant security agencies, they do cause a drain on state resources.

\(^7\) Bryden and Hänggi, 2005, p 28.
\(^8\) Former Interior Minister Baroud resigned whereas current Minister of Defence Ghosn and Minister of Interior Charbel are viewed to be weak. Adib notes that ‘Ministries of Defence and of the Interior have great difficulty in imposing their will upon the different organizations, the army less than others.’ Adib, 2012, p 6.
\(^9\) Bellamy, 2003, p 110.
\(^12\) Ball et al., 2006. p vii.
\(^13\) Ibid.
\(^14\) Pursuant to Resolution 1559 and 1701.
It cannot thus be claimed that SSR is the answer to Lebanon’s security, but the search for better security is after all a process; with SSR, this process can move forward towards a more effective, efficient and democratically governed security sector.\(^{15}\) This study also emphasises that SSR needs not conform to the prescriptive and demanding static model often offered by donors; rather, it suggests modest and gradual progress at a pace set by local conditions.\(^ {16}\)

In the absence of the conditions for comprehensive SSR – a national consensus over a process of change – Lebanon could still benefit from projects in line with the SSR spirit. SSR could be a ‘catalyst’, at least, for democratization and good governance.\(^ {17}\) At the micro level, this would require number of achievements: a clearer constitutional framework, capable and strong civilian authorities,\(^ {18}\) and oversight mechanisms. This would also require the restructuring and professionalization of the armed and security forces as well as the internalization of democratic values and human rights. In addition, this would require training of civil society in security matters, and its active participation in oversight. Alongside all this, a well-functioning justice and penal system would complement the work of the security sector.

In brief, the above feed into the objective of fostering an effective, participatory, and responsive security sector. In that sense, SSR can have positive effects on human security.

\textit{b) What role for donors?}

The case of Lebanon tells us that even when there is no comprehensive SSR initiative, subtle donor engagement can be valuable. Donors have been able to identify

\(^{15}\) At least in the every-day sense and in dealing with security incidents.
\(^{16}\) This has been suggested by a number of sources but has not been reflected in many prescriptive approaches to SSR. Furthermore, in Lebanon’s case this was seen in the unsuccessful experience of the Northern Border Pilot Project. See chapter 6 and for literature on the prescriptive approaches see: OECD, 2005, p 62; Nathan, 2004, p 5 and in Hutchful and Fayemi, 2005, p 83.
\(^{17}\) Bellamy, 2003, p 109
\(^{18}\) This involves efficient planning and management – including financial – by civilian authorities.
pro-reformers and work within the system carefully without stirring much trouble.\textsuperscript{19} The observations made by this study allow us to argue that although the benefits of donor efforts may seem minimal to an outside set of eyes, they are contributing in building the groundwork for positive change. Most notably: the creation of a Strategic Planning Department, a Human Rights Department and human rights training, the formulation of a Code of Conduct, the introduction of women to the ISF, ID numbers and badges for ISF members, a crime scene investigation laboratory, professionalization etc. Having said that, as the previous chapter shows, the process has also been fraught with problems; immanent balance and coordination of the aid provided to Lebanon is essential to avoid the traditional approach to security assistance and the overriding prioritisation of hard over soft security. The Lebanese security agencies have a long way to go in terms of democratic governance, i.e. transparency, accountability, participation of, and subordination to civilian authorities. Likewise, the security sector needs to build a culture of respect for civil liberties and human rights, and to promote human security. SSR can help in this regard, but donors need to revisit their approaches to strengthen the soft and governance aspects of the security sector.

While discussing Palestinian state-building efforts, Beverley Milton-Edwards early on noted that ‘militarization (…) [is] to be avoided at all costs.’\textsuperscript{20} The price is for the ‘“culture of violence” [to be] perpetuated’.\textsuperscript{21} Donor engagement has at times been problematic but SSR can still contribute to the desired ‘civilianized, accountable and open internal security.’\textsuperscript{22} The reward is people-centred security and the cultivation of process-based rather than violence-based coexistence. Donors have a key role to play in this and in helping legitimize the state, but more importantly in readjusting the relationship between the state and the people.

As mentioned, some projects in Lebanon are in the spirit of SSR; others focus too narrowly on traditional assistance. The Lebanese experience shows that standalone projects may be useful in themselves at the very micro level; but their contribution may not add to the overall picture at the macro level – in some cases they

\textsuperscript{19} Except, occasionally, the US.
\textsuperscript{21} Sayigh, 2009, p 25.
\textsuperscript{22} Milton-Edwards, 1998, p 118.
might even detract from the overall progress. In this sense, success in one area is dependent on success in other areas within the security system, in order to fulfil the essence of the security we aspire for. Operational effectiveness is important, but is not a success without democratic principles in our pursuit of an egalitarian, just, and inclusive security.

Equally, improvement in operational effectiveness should be accompanied with a parallel process in the judicial and penal systems. The ‘parallel process’ needs further attention in Lebanon. The UK involvement is the closest to security sector governance or to the SSR spirit, and small projects by France, the US or the EU within the Justice sector are valuable; but these do not balance the substantial projects the US and other donors are investing in the realm of operational and professional support to the LAF or the ISF.

A comparison with other contexts is applicable: emphasis has been on stabilization, therefore, the ‘defence and police reform are given more attention than other sections of the security sector’ while ‘transparency and accountability are not, in practice, treated as centrally important.’ Furthermore, local ownership ‘is frequently reduced to (…) securing the agreement of local governments’ to donor-driven’ projects. Effective ownership will require that the civilian authorities, the legislature, the judicial system, and even civil society play a more proactive role in the governance of security; nevertheless, they lack the expertise to do so. Therefore, donors need to expand their engagement in order to ‘enlarge the space for participation in security governance’; they need to provide the opportunities to expand and ‘empow[e] the ‘islands of civility’.’ Extending donor engagement beyond the state would be essential in promoting a participatory and responsive security sector.

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24 The UK sponsored the ISF Review, the Code of Conduct etc.; it supports a local research centre—CESMO, and plans for a Master’s degree in Security Sector Management at the Lebanese University.
26 Ibid.
27 Ebo, 2007, p 46
Lastly, this study reminds both domestic and foreign actors that the process for improved security will remain suspended if Ball’s third category of SSR is not addressed. The legacies of war in Lebanon have not been seriously dealt with. In the aftermath of the civil war, of the 2006 war with Israel and the 2007 internal war with Fateh al-Islam, a number of measures have been taken; nevertheless, these remain partial. The camps and their vicinities are still highly militarised and grievances are escalating; furthermore hostility between Lebanese groups is steadily intensifying. While acknowledging that the spread of weapons is a highly contentious issue at the time being, the soft and human aspects of the legacies of war need to be addressed. A policy of ‘state-sponsored amnesia’ was imposed in the aftermath of the civil war, but if hearts and minds are not reconciled and trust is not fostered at the popular level, Lebanon will fail to move from ‘negative’ to ‘positive peace’, progress made and measures taken can be reversed. Having considered this, a report by Conciliation Resources argues for a move towards conflict-prevention instead of post-conflict recovery — an approach which is increasingly accepted as essential for dealing with the instability in Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanon is undergoing a phase of human insecurity by witnessing various manifestations of political violence. In fact, as Kaldor and Schmeder noted back in 2010:

risks of new conflict are very real. Almost all conditions that can be identified as increasing the susceptibility to conflict are present in Lebanon: previous

\[29\] A partial DDR programme took place.
\[31\] This includes clearing and rebuilding the Naher al-Bared camp.
\[33\] See ICG, 2012.
\[36\] Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012.
conflict, weak state, availability of weapons, social divisions, frustrated groups and youth, financial support from outside support and the diaspora.\(^{37}\)

A peace-building effort is needed, one which is not strictly elitist. Aside from the socio-economic, political and security aspects of peacebuilding, the ‘psychosocial’ dimension needs to be given due attention.\(^{38}\) Donors and local actors need to make tangible efforts to halt the escalation of tension in order to move towards a more “civilianized” society. Although this study examines a largely institutional approach to providers of security, in order to move forward, it is essential that a parallel non-state process continues to address long-standing as well as recent structural and socio-political constrains on human security. Engaging with progressive voices outlined in chapter 6 is a good starting point. These are supported by solidarist and emancipatory pressures on the rise in world politics.

2) Assessing the tool-kit for progress

This study is concerned with security in Lebanon. This concern has led to two research questions: What is the debate on security? And how can it be linked to, or how can it contribute to Lebanon’s security? To answer these questions, a tool-kit was constructed for studying security from a theoretical, conceptual, institutional, and practical perspective. This concern first led this study to a theoretical discussion on security and subsequently to choose the individual as its referent. It is this study’s view that the provision of security for the individual is not only an ethical choice, but also the base for the security of communities and societies – even the state and, to some extent, the international system.

Then, the previous discussion was situated within the context of world politics; hence the chapter on governance, which highlights a changing environment and changing norms. This chapter helped me understand the complexity of governance, mainly the nexus between the global and the domestic, the formal and the informal. Governance, in other words, helped me understand power dynamics and the relationships between the different actors at different levels. The governance of

\(^{37}\) Kaldor and Schmeder, 2010, p 92.
\(^{38}\) Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005, p 2.
security in Lebanon cannot be understood without taking into account the role of the main actors of global governance. They are not only mainstreaming human security and SSR but they also shape Lebanon’s security.

Once security was contextualised and discussed at the theoretical level, the discussion moved on to the concept of human security – a concept which, since the 1990s, has become a key topic in policy circles and has mirrored – not without problems – the widening and the deepening of security. Human security is the closest translation to the policy world of the vision of security envisaged. This study chose the narrow (more coherent) version of human security as a lens for security in Lebanon. Hence, this study looked at freedom from fear as a framework for its analysis. From this lens, this study found that Lebanon’s post-war transition has been problematic and that human insecurity persists.

The study then moved to discuss Security Sector Reform as a tool for governing the security sector at the domestic level. SSR has been conceptualised as a programme for achieving good and/or democratic security sector governance – bridging therefore our discussions on security and governance. Both SSR and security sector governance hold a specific normative framework – a civilianized and democratically governed effective and efficient security sector. This study maintained that such governance of a security sector can promote human security. It does so by promoting an inclusive, non-militaristic, and non-authoritarian security sector. The discussion in the first part of this chapter summarizes the Lebanon-relevant findings.

As discussed, the theoretical framework chosen for this study—critical security studies—strongly bases the referent of security on the ‘ultimate unit’ – that is, the individual rather than the state. Also, both the discussions on security and SSR emphasised the role of non-state actors and bottom-up approaches in the governance of a people-centred security. Critical security studies exposes and challenges regressive assumptions and structural constrains, which are based on competition, confrontation, and exclusiveness. It instead argues for an egalitarian, just and reconciliatory security, and suggests that a bottom-up approach to changing exclusivist and power-centric systems can, in time, shatter regressive policies. Indeed, as was shown in chapter 6, the Lebanese system exacerbates the human insecurity of

39 However, not in an individualistic sense. Booth, 1991, p 318.
marginalized and vulnerable groups but bottom-up pressure has succeeded in achieving landmark wins. In the realm of women’s rights, the missing and the disappeared, secularism, LGBT rights, and domestic workers, civil society has forced the system to open up to these voices.⁴⁰ These are key to transforming Lebanon’s regressive traditional system, which is based on top-down, power-centric, confrontational, clientalistic, and exclusivist policies. What I called progressive emancipatory voices can pressure for a more inclusive, reconciliatory and just system — the vision of security set by critical security studies.

In terms of weighing the contributions of the constituent parts of this tool-kit: although SSR claims to adopt a deep notion of security and calls for the participation of the wider public, including minorities and vulnerable groups, it falls short of Critical Security Studies’ aim of emancipating the individual from power-centric structures. SSR is simply an attempt by the international community to pursue human security; despite problems in implementation and the conceptual flaws stemming from its ambitious comprehensive approach, it represents the closest effort to translating the widening and the deepening of security into practice. Recalling the discussion on global governance, post-structuralists have noted that the international community follows a power-centric system which governs populations of the world and tries to engineer societies into the “liberal” model. Therefore, there is some tension between the theoretical framework chosen by this study and the policy discussion.⁴¹ Nevertheless, this study holds onto the pragmatism of critical security studies. It borrows its approach to immanent critique by examining concepts against claims they set. The critique is not intended to entirely dismiss concepts and policies. Rather, through praxis, critique refines concepts and engages with reconstruction. This was done by arguing for governance according to world society ideals, the narrow version of human security, and governance-centred SSR. On the practical level, the study finds that actors of global governance remain ambivalent towards implementing human security and SSR. However, it argues that while the concepts discussed do not

⁴⁰ Sadly less so for refugees.
⁴¹ Without dismissing them, Krause speaks of a ‘paradox’ between the objective of empowering the weak and policies, such as human security and SSR, that reinforce the state and the powerful. Krause, 2005b, p 65.
achieve emancipation, they contribute to ‘reshap[ing]’ the relationship between states and their citizens’, in favour of the latter.\footnote{Ibid.}

The discussion of Lebanon highlights endemic socio-political and structural problems that have obstructed the break from traditional politics. Despite the thinness of the sectarian narrative, the masses continue (to a large extent but not exclusively) to be mobilized along sectarian lines. This study regrets the failure of the majority of Lebanese youth and political parties to construct alternative, inclusive and reconciliatory identities, and integrating programmes. Equally, however, this study acknowledges the diversity and the dynamism of Lebanese society. It strongly supports the efforts of civil society groups that do not confine themselves to the two main political blocks; and supports grassroots efforts to widen the pursuit of human security and to challenge regressive politics. Having said that, this study is aware that regional instability and the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict will overshadow domestic efforts to insulate Lebanese society and politics. Sadly, this will be at the cost of stability and human security in Lebanese society – both in its narrow and broad notions. However, this study finds that actors of global governance can and should play a more constructive role in Lebanon.

This argumentation was made possible by examining concepts that stand at different levels and at different ends of the study of politics. This ‘tool-kit’ linked the discussions on governance, security, human security and SSR to Lebanon – a case representing a fragile post-conflict state from the Global South. In doing so, this study made a threefold contribution to the study of world politics. It tested the applicability and the implementation of policy-relevant concepts, it tested the relevance and usage of a school of thought in security studies, and it critiqued the international system of governance. On the one hand, therefore, this study weighed debates on timely subjects such as security and governance, as well as concepts such as human security and SSR. On the other hand, it contributed to the Lebanese case by deconstructing historical, structural and current policies, and by offering a direction for future course of action – at the academic, policy and practical levels. Lastly, at the micro level, this study’s contributions lie in its examination of Lebanon’s main security organizations and in
adopting the plight of marginalized and vulnerable groups as a basis for progressive change.
Appendix 1

Interviews

Western stakeholders:

1. Mr Omar Abboud (UNIFIL, Political Affairs Officer)
2. Mr Mirko Hinz (German Embassy, Advisor to the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team)
3. UK Embassy Stabilisation Advisor.
4. Mr Duccio Bandini (EU delegation Security Sector and Stabilisation Attaché)
5. Mr Ted Kontek (US Embassy INL Director- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs)
6. Mr Marc Passoti (French Embassy Stabilisation Advisor)

Lebanese stakeholders:

7. General Pierre Salem (Adviser to the Minister of Interior and Municipalities Ziad Baroud)
8. Major Antoine Frangieh (ISF-off record)
9. General Pierre Nassar (ISF Head of Planning and Organisation)
10. Communications with the LAF Communication Department.

Civil Society:

11. Retired General Elias Hanna (academic/ MTV News advisor)
12. Mr Marc Maouad (NICO Senior Advisor)
13. Mr Jonathan McIvor (NICO Senior Advisor)
14. Mrs Flavia Adib (Executive Director) and Ms Nivine Abbas (CESMO-Centre d’Études Stratégiques pour le Moyen-Orient)
Appendix 2

‘The Taif Agreement

This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.

First, General Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles

A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.

B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.

C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.

D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.

E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.

F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability.

G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.

H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].
I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies:

The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.

2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber may vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.

3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.

4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.

5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:

   a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.

   b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.

   c. Proportionately between the districts.

6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic:

The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.

11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.

12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.

13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.

14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.

15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.

16. Grant special pardon by decree.

17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister:

The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

a. Head the cabinet.
b. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.

D. Cabinet:

The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

The following are among the powers exercised by it:

1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and its abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister:

The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government’s general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him individually.

F. Cabinet Resignation:

Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:

   a. If its chairman resigns.
   b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.
   c. If its chairman dies.
   d. At the beginning of a president's term.
   e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.
   f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism:

Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.

To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies election the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:

a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.

b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.

2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the
highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.

3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.

4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.

5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.

2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.

3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:

   a. The president of the republic.
   b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
   c. The prime minister.
   d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.
[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.

[3] To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law:

Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development:

A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.

G. Information:

All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:
   1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.
   2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.
C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.

2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.

3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.

4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.

5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces’ relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist.
The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

**Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:**

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

**Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:**

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and
unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.²₀⁶⁸


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