‘Sharing the Same Roof’?: A Consociational Approach to the Compatibility of Cultural Identity Schools with Liberal Democratic Values

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‘Sharing the Same Roof’?: A Consociational Approach to the Compatibility
of Cultural Identity Schools with Liberal Democratic Values

Thomas Joachim Bohler

Abstract

This study critically examines the congruence of liberal democratic values with a conceptual framework for a national system of state-funded cultural identity schools. The study argues that the Modernist-Enlightenment response of difference-blind neutrality to the fact of social pluralism implicitly sanctions dominant socioeconomic structures. For this reason, the claim is made that the equal rights of citizenship justify cultural identity schools under a stance of difference-sensitivity. It is conceptualized that the existence of these schools benefit the liberal democratic state in two major ways. First, they incorporate non-Western immigrants into increasingly polyethnic societies as free and equal citizens. Second, in an era where deliberative democracy is threatened by global market forces, these schools serve as engines of healthy civil society by reinvigorating local voluntary associations.

The study looks to the state educational system of the Netherlands to empirically ground theoretical formulations. For almost a century, the government there has funded and regulated a diverse array of schools with considerable autonomy in pedagogical content and practices. In terms of group rights, the educational structure reflects the historical experience of pillarization, a form of legal pluralism which proportionately distributed resources and political representation to national subgroups. The thesis proposes educational pillarization has utility to the current problem of disaffected immigrant groups in Western democratic states.

Especially with regard to pleas for state-funded Islamic schooling, the study modifies consociational theory to reconcile imperatives for religo-cultural development and rights with those for liberal democratic principles. The study concludes that the consensus-making processes at the heart of legal pluralism encourage intercultural competence and reconfigure the meaning of citizenship to reflect the exigencies of the present day. Though many people see freedom from their childhood/received cultures as enriching, cultural attachments, provide the psychological terrain for evaluating the meaning of choice. However, a delicate balance exists. The study argues that cultural identity schools should not close students off from alternate life pathways since the right to exit or modify one’s culture is firmly embedded in liberalism.
‘Sharing the Same Roof’?: A Consociational Approach to the Compatibility of Cultural Identity Schools with Liberal Democratic Values

Thomas Joachim Bohler

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Declaration

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Whatever the context, state-sponsored compulsory education confronts a variety of challenges in accommodating religio-cultural minorities. What is taught, who teaches it and how it is taught provide insights into how a nation deals with intersectionalities of culture, class and colour. Discords within the larger society also appear within the intense social interaction of what Dewey termed the ‘special social environment’ of schools (1916/1966). And since schools mediate between the national interest and the cultural allegiance of families, they serve as bellwethers for socio-political change. More than any other institution of national life, schools are flashpoints for the problem of pluralism.

Traditionally, the Modernist-Enlightenment model of universal citizenship served as the default remedy to the challenges of pluralism. The logic of this model begins with the premise of state neutrality toward particularities of cultural identity. But neutrality remains a contested construct. Every Western democracy is the site of varying degrees of controversy over whether its public institutions actually treat minority groups as free and equal citizens. In particular, recent critiques of liberal theory question the primacy of the individual in Western jurisprudence and social policy (e.g., MacIntyre, 1984; Walzer, 1983, 1992, 1994). Broadly understood, these arguments contend that the values and practices of minority groups are disciplined and conditioned through Western cultural and economic practices under the guise of difference-blind policies (e.g., Kymlicka, 1992, 1995; Modood, 2005; Young, 2000).

Any response to the problem of pluralism must also account for how global market forces shape incongruities between the normative and organizational goals of democracy, citizenship and education. As demands for international competitiveness spur the reconfiguration of national educational systems, the conflation of public and private interest
threatens the egalitarian aspirations promised, if seldom delivered, by state-sponsored schooling. First, there is the concern about whether the market model reinforces and perpetuates social inequality. Second, there is the problem concerning how the penetration of the market model has altered the practices and perceptions of liberal democracy (Wolin, 2008). Through the conflation of individual freedom with market freedom, components of the modern civil liberties package became coupled to ideological imperatives for minimizing economic regulation. As a result, the ethos of late global capitalism reconceptualises traditional conceptions of liberty, justice and equality. However, the nature of resistance to transnational non-democratic entities such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) suggests globalization as an integrative phenomenon with cultural pluralism as counter-hegemony (Chan-Tibergien, 2006). This point will be developed further in Chapter Four.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

This study critically examines the congruence of liberal democratic values with the model of a national educational system affording the option of cultural identity schools, that is, schools premised in a particular religious, cultural or philosophical worldview. The purpose is to integrate key understandings into a conceptual framework from which to develop theoretical and practical possibilities. Toward this end, the study tests theories relevant to the question against the history, development and current form of the state educational system of the Netherlands. Here, the government funds and regulates a diverse array of schools with considerable autonomy in pedagogical content and practices. In keeping with liberal egalitarian principles, the progressive funding mechanism answers familiar equity concerns about school choice. Financial resources allocated to schools follow individual students according to a needs-based formula. In terms of group rights, the educational
structure reflects the historical experience of pillarization, a form of legal pluralism which proportionately distributed resources and political representation to national subgroups (Lijphart, 1968a, 1969, 1985). Broadly understood, legal pluralism refers to a condition in which a population observes more than one body of law (Shahar, 2008). It will be argued that a reconfiguration of this century-old arrangement provides a potential framework for alleviating problems attendant to non-Western immigration.

Liberal theory grapples with the problem of what special rights, if any, should be extended to satisfy religio-cultural group demands for equal recognition (e.g., Barry, 2002; Kymlicka, 1989a, 1995; Modood, 2005; Young, 1990, 2000). Liberal thought, admittedly, comprises a complexity of competing strands, where ontological formulations are contingent and contested. But three salient themes can be distilled from liberalism’s intellectual arc—neutrality, autonomy and equality. In broad terms, neutrality means the state actor refrains from interfering in private matters of the good. Autonomy signals a commitment to individual choice and action. Legal equality implies a polity animated by a commitment to fair access to the institutional machinery for participatory democracy. In assessing whether a template for cultural identity schools can satisfy these three touchstones, I weigh the arguments promoted by proponents of what McDonough (1998) calls ‘the cultural recognition thesis’ (e.g., Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994), and theorists tending toward traditional autonomy based individualism (e.g., Kant, 1785/1983; Locke, 1689/1988; Rawls, 1993). Through referencing historical examples and theoretical possibilities, I test the viability of an intermediary position of legal pluralism whereby financial support for cultural identity schools might be congruent with liberal politico-ethical values when certain precondition are satisfied through a state-mediated process of discussion and compromise.

The study assumes the desirability of the broadening definition of citizenship reflected in the growing body of Third Culture literature (e.g., Pollock & Van Reken, 2009; Zilber,
At the level of the individual citizen, this formulation provides room for individual growth and the postmodern reality of multiple cultural affiliations (e.g., Kubow, Grossman & Ninomiya, 2000). In this light, the stark choice between inherited culture and the opportunities of the larger society constitutes a false dilemma. Cultural identity schools would have the dialectical function of encouraging students to critically examine their own particular tradition. Difficulty occurs when groups with illiberal religio-cultural identities demand state support. Such demands require oversight and a system for continuous dialogue between state and school authorities. As strict isolation fosters parochialism and mistrust, a constructive relationship might be facilitated if the state acts as an ‘even-handed’ custodian of minority cultures, affording equal access for groups to attain financial support in exchange for a commitment to commonly understood human rights principles (Bader, 2003; Carens, 2000). This reciprocal arrangement has the effect of encouraging political participation around a set of shared principles. ‘The ideal model of deliberative democracy says that all those whose basic interests are affected by a decision ought to be included in the deliberative democracy process’ (Young, 2000, p. 27). Through these exchanges, formalized through state mediation, the airing of differences will be examined as a starting point for good faith deliberation, while also serving a safety valve function in quelling the frustrations that foment radicalism.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Today’s narrative of immigration and integration into Western democratic states occurs within the complex matrix of post-War decolonization, sectarian conflict and global economic integration. Former subjects immigrated to the lands of their imperial masters to find work in unskilled or semiskilled occupations. They were later joined by waves of

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1 Used in this sense, Third Culture refers to a term first employed by Ruth Hill Useem to describe the experience of children who accompany their parents into another societal culture (Zilber, 2009).
'temporary’ reinforcements, guest workers with little or no cultural or linguistic ties to their host nations. Faith in a harmonious multicultural future, vestigial colonial obligation and guilt encouraged governments to adopt family reunification policies. Ancient kinship networks re-established themselves after workers were joined by wives, children and parents. Many extended families settled permanently in parallel communities.

Economic and political immigrants, some scarred by violence, continue to find refuge within many of these self-contained enclaves, where the familiar sounds and smells of distant homelands waft through busy streets and along dark apartment corridors. These borderlands, often located at the periphery of urban areas, represent a psychological neither-here-nor-there for unassimilated outsiders caught between the old homeland that could not sustain them and the new homeland that will not accept them. Europe’s colonial possessions have now been replaced by a highly visible Muslim ‘internal colony, whose numbers are roughly equivalent to the population of Syria’ (Leiken, 2005, p. 123). Here, the interplay of transnational allegiances and post-materialist worldviews create fissures within the ontological framework of the liberal democratic state.

Recent anti-government violence in Swedish and French immigrant suburbs (banlieues) represents the frustrations of an underclass lacking opportunities in labour, education and housing. In Germany, a disproportionate number of immigrant children find themselves placed on the lowest rung (Hauptschule) of the tripartite educational system, or in special needs schools, Sonderschulen (Auernheimer, 2006; Friedemann, 2006). In Canada, long a model for immigrant nations, recent research finds the new wave of predominantly non-Western immigrants not faring as well as their predecessors. ‘Their incomes are lower, and they are having more difficulty getting established, even though they are generally well educated in their home countries’ (Levin, 2008, p. 394). In the Netherlands, a country with a long reputation for social tolerance, attention has focused on low academic attainment and
problems with the criminal justice system plaguing young, mostly Dutch-born Turkish and Moroccan males. This cohort is said to be less interested than were their fathers or grandfathers in adapting to Dutch society and accepting the types of jobs open to those with few formal qualifications (Wolfgram, 2009).

In the case of the Netherlands, frequent media attention has focused on ‘problem neighbourhoods’ (probleemwijken). These are housing developments constructed from the nineteen fifties to the nineteen eighties to accommodate the immigrant influx. Today, these neighbourhoods are beset by a breakdown in social capital, as measured by high crime rates and underperforming schools, the so-called ‘black schools’ (Crul & Pasztor, 2007). These areas have become known as Vogellaarwijken, after former Minister of Housing and Integration Ella Vogellaar. In 2007, she unveiled an ambitious plan to target forty of these areas with wide-ranging reforms, including beautification projects, injections of business capital and supplemental assistance to schools and social service providers. However, improvement in social indicators has proven elusive, and there has been a dearth in hoped-for private sector investment (Van Eerenbeemt & Rengers, 2009). The nearly one billion euro of public monies spent has become an ideological cudgel, a right wing leitmotif for attacking social spending in parliament and the press (Vermeer, 2013).

The tenor of debate around this issue is but one symptom of how the former Western confidence in a multicultural order based on harmonious coexistence has waned. Post-9/11 existential angst provides the subtext for a hardening in public attitudes and official policy around national identity concerns (Gudbrandsen, 2010). Sides and Citrin (2007a) suggest European Union citizens hold exaggerated beliefs about the number of immigrants in their countries and their drain on the social welfare system. These perceptions are reflected in government assessments that four decades of multicultural policies have failed (Herzinger, 2010). The electorate’s views on crime, terrorism and intergenerational dependence on
government assistance underpin the depiction of irredentist and disloyal minorities in the agendas of right wing political movements, including the British National Party, the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*), the Flemish Interest (*Vlaam Belang*) and the Party of Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) in the Netherlands (Stöss, 2006). Mainstream parties, sensitive to the electorate’s mood, have dutifully adopted anti-immigrant planks (Driessen, 2012). Not surprisingly, political clamour around the issue of non-Western immigrant populations increases during times of economic uncertainty (Sides & Citrin, 2007b).

In Marx’s formula, social class energized collective identity and human progress. However, with the loss of Marxism as a reference point, the politicization of group identities, where identity is claimed to be cultural, filled the ideological vacuum. This is exemplified in demands for the legitimization of difference through the legal extension of group rights, what Taylor calls ‘equal authenticity’ (1994). Huntington (1996) traces the cause of inter- and intra-societal conflicts to fundamentally opposed cultural values. The West won the world, not through superior ideas, but by ‘its superiority in applying organized violence’ (Huntington, p. 51). For Mill (1861/1972), the viability of the liberal state presupposes a degree of cultural homogeneity. ‘Among a people without fellow-feelings, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot exist’ (Mill, p. 230). As Western democracies confront ever-increasing levels of cultural pluralism, the discussion navigates two poles: On the one hand, there is concern that assimilatory projects carry the baggage of cultural imperialism, on the other, there is the concern about ghettoization and civic fragmentation.

Self-contained settlement patterns and imported civic structures provide communal anchors for uprooted groups. However, these collectives often present as cultural beachheads alien to the economic and intellectual dimensions of capitalist societies. Economic liberty includes the right to accumulate and protect property. Intellectual liberty includes what is now
recognizable as the contemporary civil liberties package, especially with respect to freedom of conscience (Locke, 1689/1988). Taken together, these liberties create the conditions for the antagonistic modes of decision-making at the definitional core of liberal democracy (Seligman, 1992). Here, the value of diversity must be measured against imperatives for social stability. Though reference to the constitutional order exerts a tempering effect on public discourse, intrastate violence arising from strident assertions of collective identity occurs within even the most mature of advanced democracies. Given that the rights and liberties underlying the liberal state may fuel the activities of illiberal groups, the fact of cultural diversity presents challenges for both the theory and practice of liberal politics (Talisse, 2005).

For Locke (1685/1983), neutrality meant that the state tolerate religious or philosophical impulses as long as they do not infringe on other citizens’ natural rights. Yet the modern focus on the individual creates inconsistencies insofar as the application of state neutrality and toleration are concerned. The French Revolution ushered in a new conception of citizenship which ‘codified individual rights and freedoms as attributes of national citizenship, thus linking the individual with the nation-state’ (Soysal, 1994). In this regard, the closed environment of schools poses special challenges. When state schools serve as fulcrums of a purportedly shared civic culture, the sphere of education may be neutral in theory but actually reinforce the position of prevailing hierarchies in the workforce and other social structures. As a result, the focus on individual rights threatens to legitimate inequality under the guise of equality (Young, 1990).

1.4 Significance of the Study

In the liberal democratic state, the centrality of individual autonomy to citizen self-understanding creates hard choices for members of de-territorialized religio-cultural groups.
Because the first and second generations negotiate between the cultural values and traditions of their families and those of their secular host nation, the state and orthodox groups situate themselves as natural competitors for the hearts and minds of children. When fundamentalists challenge the norms, customs and traditions of their new homelands, they test the forbearance of their hosts.

Today’s policymakers face difficult decisions when the cultural content of groups includes illiberal views. These views include what in Western democracies constitute abusive or subversive stances toward women, children and other faith groups and lifestyles. These stances cannot be reconciled with state schooling. This is especially true when states face types of diversity that privilege divine laws over those legislated through democratic processes and tested in courts. For the great majority of citizens in the West, values such as gender equality and the rights of apostates to leave their faith groups are non-negotiable. Indeed, the broad identification with these values contributes to the majority’s growing discomfort with visibly unassimilated groups (Merry & Driessen, 2005).

Contemporary liberals instinctively welcome the idea of cultural pluralism, even as they recognize the threat to individualism posed by communities ‘which do not favour or prioritize individual autonomy, but prefer to see the individual as closely bound within the traditions of the group’ (Burtonwood, 2000, pp. 269-270). Liberal states face the problem of how to define citizenship in light of what Kymlicka (1994) calls ‘constituent communities’; namely, when two or more groups share a national border but possess radically different beliefs. These sub-national groupings compete for the loyalties of citizens and may claim special rights or regional territorial sovereignty. As a consequence, the value cultural diversity brings to enriching the fabric of a nation must be weighed against two main points. First, the ability of states to ensure peaceful coexistence with subgroups possessing intense religio-cultural solidarity. Second, the ability of individuals to exercise free will and rewrite their life-
scripts in the face of constraints dictated by group membership. These points converge around the ability of citizens to agree on a common set of constitutional principles. In other words, public discourse must find some degree of intercultural resonance if basic agreement on the rights and obligations of citizenship is to exist. Without the shared vocabulary for forging a minimal level of consensus around shared rules and institutions, the institutional machinery of democracy may exist, but democratic culture will falter. For the terms of dialogue not to be co-opted by the ‘false generosity’ of elites (Freire, 1970/2007), requires formal acknowledgement of the differentiated social positions of citizens (e.g., Bader, 2003; Kymlikca, 1995; Young, 1990).

Can a model premised in educational free agency and broad curricular latitude resonate with liberal democratic values and gradually integrate vertically aligned religio-cultural groups into the national life as free and equal citizens? To address this question, the thesis takes a qualitative methodological approach, inductively testing conceptual possibilities around the following research objectives:

- To explore to what extent, if any, cultural identity schools act as counter-hegemony to the market model in education.
- To explore whether cultural identity schools might foster democratic dialogue and the associative networks underpinning civil society and participatory democracy.
- To explore whether cultural identity schools are a natural consequence for satisfying the requirement to the equal right of citizenship.

This line of inquiry is especially relevant today because states are challenged at the subnational level by the ‘efflorescence and revitalizations of solidarity groupings with multiple bases—regional, linguistic, religious, ethnic, and life-style—as well as a bewildering array of novel social movements that generate their own solidarity’ (Torres, 2013, p. 364).
These challenges to the continued relevance and legitimacy of the liberal democratic state play out at the school level.

1.5 Organization of the Study

The question of state funding to schools supportive of a particular religious, cultural or philosophical worldview was framed in terms of congruence to liberal politico-ethical values. The adequacy of the Modernist-Enlightenment response to questions of pluralism was reviewed. It was posited that today’s realities may demand a more expansive definition of citizenship and a reconfiguration of the relationship between state education and religio-cultural groups through some manner of legal pluralism. Beginning from these assumptions, the study progresses through three interwoven themes: first, the problem is defined; second, competing responses are tested; third, a remedy is proposed.

Chapter Two contextualizes the issues at hand: first, against the historical trajectory of how states engage pluralism; and, second, how the global penetration of late capitalism impacts the discussion. ‘It is now increasingly difficult to understand education in any context without reference to the global forces that influence policy and practice’ (Crossley & Jarvis 2000, p. 324). Though strands of liberalism are hospitable to group rights, the vocabulary of political liberalism has historically been employed to rally allegiance away from multicultural policies toward the dominant culture’s model of citizenship (e.g., Joppke, 2007a, 2007b; Young, 1990, 1999). In this context, group rights are examined as a means of expanding the definitional orbit of citizenship and enhancing the strength of the associative networks at the heart of deliberative democracy. These networks, of which schools are a lynchpin, engage citizens in the everyday experience of civil society, and theoretically provide a hyper-pluralist remedy to the social reproductionist tendencies inherent to the market model.
Chapter Three critically examines the idea of liberal neutrality. It contrasts three state responses consequent to cultural identity schools. The chapter looks into the proposition that claims to state neutrality may be hollow without a difference-sensitive framework for legal pluralism (Bader, 2003). Further, the chapter discusses how reciprocity might factor into acceptance of financial support.

Agreement on conditions assumes a process of consensus-making, whose challenges and opportunities are examined in Chapter Four. Negotiation and bargaining provide the conceptual underpinnings for the formation and sustenance of cultural identity schools, and provide insight into how their existence might represent an important contribution to deliberative democracy. This underscores the assumption that, by its own justifications, political liberalism requires these schools so long as human rights norms are respected.

Chapter Five empirically tests previous theoretical analysis. The chapter defines and historicizes Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) consociational model, providing an analytical framework for how religo-cultural aspirations and national cohesion might be achieved in difficult plural settings. With reference to the potential for cultural identity schools as a modus vivendi, the history of social segmentation in the Netherlands provides insights into how legal pluralism might assume a more inclusive character over time.

Chapter Six’s deconstruction of the school system in the Netherlands operationalizes elements relevant to the research question in terms of: 1) how mechanisms regulating school choice answer key egalitarian concerns voiced by opponents of educational free agency; 2) the increasing demand by Muslim groups for their own schools; 3) the long historical congruence of the educational system with subgroup autonomy; and 4) the high level of measured academic success enjoyed by students in the Netherlands relative to their OECD peers (Fuchs & Wößmann, 2007).
Chapter Seven extends the research objectives into a conceptual framework comparing cultural identity schools with government schools, that is, schools adopting a difference-blind approach to religio-cultural identity through uniformity in curriculum and teaching. The chapter evaluates moral justifications for educational pluralism on the basis of the equal rights to citizenship. Chapter Eight integrates analysis of issues to provide forward-looking theoretical and practical implications and limitations related to this framework.
Chapter 2: The Nature of Education in Plural Democracies

2.1 Conceptual Underpinnings

Section 1 of this chapter contextualizes the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the problem of cultural identity schools. I first outline the implications of the post-Reformation state’s strategy of controlling civil strife through privatizing religio-cultural identity. I then explore how the theoretical literature reconciles political liberalism with the challenges posed by pluralism, and how the resultant stances—from universalism to communitarianism—impact the discussion regarding schooling. This section anticipates Chapter Three’s examination of the application of state neutrality to the problem of cultural identity schools and Chapter Four’s discussion of consensus building models, especially in terms of the differences between Rawls’ (1993) idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ between competing doctrines and Kymlicka’s (1989a, 1989b, 1995) narrower group autonomy model.

In Section 2, I locate the problem of state schooling within today’s post-Marxist political nomenclature, where neoliberal understandings of individual responsibility and meritocracy provide the currency of the realm. To co-opt the positive historical resonance of liberty, the prevailing economic narrative of efficient market equilibrium acquired new heuristic devices, re-shaping the meanings and purposes of the civil liberties underpinning the plural democratic state. The linguistic fusion of capitalism and democracy equates ‘free markets’ with ‘free people’, with a resultant ruling principle that commands considerable traction in the popular consciousness. Neoliberal rhetoric celebrates the ‘freedom’ of material acquisition and the shedding of government responsibility for the lower echelons of the citizenry (Harvey, 2005). Similar discursive strategies were employed throughout the history of Western imperialism to justify mercantilist policies and ‘define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 27). Simply put, the near-
unassailability of market based policies shape rigid parameters for contemporary public policy discussion.

Taken together, these two sections provide the overarching definitional contours to the problem of cultural identity schools in the liberal democratic state.

2.2 Theoretical and Historical Perspective

After the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the appeal of doctrinal conformity as the only means to prevent civil strife was replaced by the idea of religious and philosophical toleration. As Western states replaced religious tenets with secular constitutional principles as the regulatory framework for their societies, the principle of tolerance was extended. The post-Reformation state was characterized by strong differentiation between the public and private spheres. Churches were deprived of their political rights and became private institutions. These anti-clerical tendencies were part of the liberal battle to negate group rights, a process which accelerated after the French Revolution. ‘Liberal democracy emerged in part as a reaction against the way that feudalism defined individual’s political rights and economic opportunities by their group membership’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 34). This early aversion to group right claims was reinforced in the Enlightenment project’s belief in a unifying doctrine around the precept that, since citizens embody a common humanity, government must be impartial and treat each citizen equally. Thus, by occluding classical republican virtues with the natural rights philosophy, the ancient understanding of individuals as part of community was displaced by the call of modernity. At base, this discussion concerns how to calibrate gradations of liberty with those of equality. ‘Too much liberty, or at least too much liberty in certain forms, may undermine equality. Too much equality, or at least too much in certain forms, may undermine liberty’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 346).
Kant (1785/1983) saw rational agency as the source of stability for the liberal polity, and Locke (1689/1988) argued state legitimacy must be premised in natural rights conferred by a higher power. However, the legal equality and neutrality underpinning ideas of unitary republican citizenship also provide a means of justifying political authority (Young, 1990, 1999). In other words, the construction of a superstructure for a unified civic culture diminishes subcultural practices and beliefs. To be sure, nation-states have routinely implemented cultural and linguistic policies in the effort to colonize group identities. In the post-Reformation state, religious doctrinal conformity was replaced by freedom of conscience, but only insofar as the values of the dominant culture allowed (Young, 1990). Citizenship thereby becomes an abstraction denuded of the emotional power of collective cultural claims (Kymlicka, 1995). The problem, then and now, becomes one of defining citizenship in the context of nation-states comprised of ‘constituent communities’ (Kymlicka, 1994, 1995).

In the Aristotelian conception, the purpose of education was to reproduce ‘the type of character’ necessary for the sustenance of a particular constitution (Walzer, 1983). The problem in plural societies resides in differing conceptions on what the constitution is or should become. ‘Democratic citizens may well disagree about what their children need to know’ (Walzer, p. 203). Further, the constitution ‘will probably require more than one character type; the schools will not only have to train their students, they will also have to sort them out; and that is bound to be a controversial business’ (Walzer, p. 197). By at least the start of the last century, progressive reformers promised equal educational opportunities in the industrialized West through the introduction of compulsory schooling. However, this goal has been undermined by such factors as residential segregation, inequitable funding mechanisms, the emergence of state-funded elite academies and the private option. Above all, not all students come to school equal in terms of access to cultural capital. ‘The formal equality
which governs pedagogical practice is in fact a cloak for and a justification of indifference to
the real inequalities with regard to the body of knowledge taught or rather demanded’
(Bourdieu, 1976, p. 113). In the Foucauldian (1977) sense, the ‘corrective technology’ used to
sort and grade students reinforces historical power structures because the one-size-fits-all
template hardwires social reproduction into the educational process.

In one way or another, the question of in whose image citizens should be moulded
stands at the forefront of education policymaking. Thomas Jefferson believed the sustenance
of democratic institutions required an educated citizenry to monitor the actions of their
representatives. He advocated three years of state-funded common schooling for all children,
but they were to be divided into those destined for labour and those destined for learning
emancipatory pedagogical models support the model of an active citizenry committed to the
principles of equal rights and social justice. Plato on the other hand responded to the
challenge posed by individualism to state cohesion (Bloom, 1968). In The Republic, his
theoretical state is characterized by unity and stability since citizens are taught the twin
virtues of loyalty and obedience. Indeed, nations have routinely charged schools with
controlling the lower ranks of society. Horace Mann, for example, pioneered compulsory state
schools grounded in the Prussian model of standardization and efficiency in order to solve
problems attendant to immigration and industrialization. To a large measure, his project was
animated by the desire to assimilate the mid-nineteenth century wave of immigrants to the
United States. ‘[F]ears about cultural heterogeneity propelled the establishment of systems of
public education; from the beginning, public schools were agents of cultural standardization’
(Katz, 1987, pp.18-19). To this end, state schooling was expanded, professionalized and
brought under centralized control.
The prescriptions offered for the complexity of today’s cultural conflicts tend to ignore the fact that Western democracies do not mirror the homogenous city-states of classical Greece (Kymlicka, 1995). Though ‘modern, secular, industrialized, democratic, and consumerist civilizations’ resemble each other more and more in their liberal cosmopolitanism, they are becoming increasingly culturally diverse (Kymlicka, p. 88). Liberal cultures are thin because what embodies the right and the good are not shared among all citizens. Social elites from one nation are likely to share core liberal values with similarly situated citizens from other nations (Walzer, 1994). However, policymakers steeped in liberal cosmopolitanism face difficulty managing demands for separate religio-cultural schools from thicker cultures within their national borders.

Sundered civic bonds concern liberals, and the argument that cultural membership is already protected through the universal rights of citizenship implies an integrative project. Groups might, for example, remove their children from a state school system they perceive as corrosive to their core beliefs. At least from the standpoint of traditional liberalism, such a stance undermines notions of a shared bond of citizenship. Because today’s protagonists move within particular political and cultural contexts, there can be no single response to the problem of group demands. Yet all remedies must address the stubborn question of what forms of pluralism are commensurable with liberal political values. Speaking broadly, there are two general schools of pluralist theory. Because ‘objective moral facts do not form an internally consistent set but are actually in conflict’, ontological pluralism explains the durability of conflict as arising from disagreement about the facts undergirding world views. Epistemic pluralism on the other hand ‘asserts that there is no single comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine upon which human reason converges’. Thus, the exercise of human reason may lead to ‘different and mutually exclusive, but nonetheless rational, answers to Big
Questions’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 60). While communitarians approximate the first category, Rawls’ (1993) political liberalism falls into the latter.

Rawls idea of ‘comprehensive doctrines’, or moral belief systems, introduces ‘into people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise’ (p. xxvi). Rawls’ (1993, 1987) argument, which will be further clarified in Chapter 4, revolves around the plausibility of forging consensus on political matters between diverse groups. But ‘critical pluralists’ and ‘difference democrats’ are suspicious of liberal consensus building models (Drysek & Niemeyer, 2006). Firstly, there is the chasm dividing the lived reality and worldview of marginalized groups from the experiences of dominant elites. Secondly, there is the problem of discursive mechanisms favourable to the powerful and privileged. For example, deliberative democracy’s appeals to consensus building might, in fact, be a device to confer legitimacy and stifle dissent (Young, 2000, 1996, 1990).

At least at the elite level, the range of deep doctrinal disagreements in Western plural states has narrowed. This is the phenomenon Huntington (1996) terms the ‘Davos Culture’ after the broad set of assumptions shared by the attendees at the World Economic Forum (p. 57). This includes, for example, agreement on the neoliberal principles underlying the Washington Consensus, a set of preconditions to developing countries in exchange for loans (Williamson, 1990). However, the process of decolonization illustrates the persistence of doctrinal divisions at deeper levels. Notwithstanding current pressures from new economic immigrants and political asylum-seekers, many industrial societies are coming to terms with the failure of the grandchildren of immigrants to assimilate. The familiar narrative of integration into the larger society, while struggling to maintain cultural practices, has been replaced by the second and third generation’s rejection of the animating principles of their liberal, secular birthplaces. Especially in terms of academic achievement, the dynamic is reflected in current European discussions concerning the scions of guest workers from Islamic
countries (van de Werforst, 2010). Yet, even in the United States, where the melting pot metaphor reigns, acculturation does not reflect reality within blighted urban cores or along the south-western borderlands. For groups that have been in the United States for many generations, the allure of the distant homeland still resonates. The few remaining cultural vestiges become amplified, a situation described by Ignatieff (1993) with Freud’s famous description of ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ (1929/2002). Though such symbolism might be dismissed as ‘play-acting’ (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 232), the attachment to heritage and culture, however distant and tenuous, underlies the attractiveness of a community to call one’s own beyond the thin veil of political community.

In abstract terms, the extension of civil liberties and the protection of civil rights characterizes the Western formulation of political community. The cultural community on the other hand is one wherein members share a bond formed by at least one of the following markers: ‘language, religion, ethnicity, history and tradition. In fact two other items can be added to this list—nationality and race—because there are compelling arguments that these should be considered cultural or ideological phenomena rather than biologically determined groupings’ (Halstead, 1995, p. 258). Since education ‘cannot be exercised in a cultural vacuum’, the political and cultural domains converge, and tension naturally arises between the commitments learned at home and the values transmitted by the dominant culture at school. When intermingled with the majority, cultural maintenance, especially for orthodox groups, may require official recognition and institutionalized protections from the influences of the dominant culture. For minority groups whose identities are threatened by liberal modernity, education is nothing less than ‘a program for social survival’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 197).

Liberal democratic regimes tend to manage religio-cultural pluralism in one of two different ways. Walzer (1992) distinguishes between what he terms Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2. Liberalism 1 approximates the United States’ model whereby the state officially
maintains a neutral stance in regard to collective cultural aspirations, and reserves most protections for the rights of individuals. (There are exceptions in terms of positive discrimination and Native American tribal sovereignty.) Liberalism 2 approximates the French model whereby the state actively intervenes in the social sphere to preserve a certain ‘cultural, linguistic or religious heritage’ (Walzer, p. 99). In theory, Liberalism 1 provides room for an educational system sensitive to pluralism. Rather than merely perpetuating the official culture, the system offers citizens the room to inhabit inherited collective identities. Though Liberalism 1 promises to afford children the freedom to make their own choices, cultural identity is nonetheless challenged by the liberal state’s civic theology and cacophony of opposing ideas.

Cultural maintenance competes not only with the broad marketplace of ideas, but also the degree to which dominant cultural norms pervade the educational firmament. For example, even in a system as decentralized as that of the United States, where education is a state and local responsibility, schools display remarkable homogeneity in curriculum, pedagogical practices and social rituals. Walzer’s formulation of Liberalism 2—again, the French model—may sometimes grant collective rights, but religious minorities are still vulnerable to the same erosion of their fundamental beliefs due to ‘sustained exposure to liberal values or to a more direct assault by liberal social policy. What Western educationalists see as universal liberal values may well be seen by others as secular and reductionist’ (Halstead, 1995, p. 266). Since liberalism has both political and cultural dimensions, centrally directed state education almost invariably diminishes the ability of minority cultures to transmit their values and beliefs. This is especially true in terms of fundamentalists whose doctrinal adherence informs every facet of daily existence. However, there are limits to what cultural practices the liberal democratic state can reasonably be expected to tolerate.
Mill (1861/1972) believed it not in the state’s interest to repress conduct perceived sinful or wrong except when it does so to prevent harm. Locke (1685/1983) asserted that any person exercising his innate reason should accept citizens’ right to freely practice their religion if it does not infringe on the freedom of others to do the same. Many contemporary liberals believe this a matter of justice and fairness. According to Rawls’ (1987, 1993) contractarian argument for toleration, citizens converse across conflicting ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Therefore, there must be rules of civility embedded within the constitutional framework, which mandate tolerance and equal respect for all. But there is a paradox to toleration: People only tolerate something to which they object (Walzer, 1997). A more symmetrical arrangement occurs when institutional arrangements encourage peaceful coexistence between different groups in relationships animated by respect. This requires an agreed-upon set of values; and, as will be clarified, the values commonly used as a societal adhesive favour liberal, rights-based individualistic cultures rather than those managing autonomy for collective ends.

Liberalism holds that the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or the nation or the religious group; analytically, because such entities do not really efface the separate reality of individual lives; normatively because the recognition of that separateness is held to be a fundamental fact for ethics, which should recognize each separate entity as an end and not as a means to the ends of others (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 62).

Thinkers in the communitarian vein (e.g., Sandel, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Walzer, 1994) believe liberalism espouses an exaggerated belief in individual identity, ignoring the constitution of the self through the psychological depth of cultural ties, ‘the way that individual values are formed in social contexts and pursued through communal attachments’ (Kymlicka, 1989a, p. 883). According to this school, the traditional liberal strategies of privatizing identity conspire against equal opportunity because neutrality tends to reinforce traditional power relations (e.g., Young, 1996, 1990; Modood, 2005). These thinkers believe a
nation’s institutions and policies should make provisions for the cultural fabric of its constituent communities. Conversely, a uniform educational policy constitutes ‘cultural invasion’, wherein ‘the invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group’ and impose their own worldview (Freire, 1970/2007). But states are challenged when ‘strong religious bonds and emblems’ drive groups away from participation in national life (Smith, 1991, p. 7). This is particularly evident when elements from within the political establishment, sometimes abetted by outside actors, create centrifugal forces inimical to social cohesion. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq are but recent examples of ‘hard cases’ where the discourse required for civil society falters because citizens, with the encouragement of ethno-political entrepreneurs, are unable to set aside differences. Here, subgroups construct the aggressively insular communities of ‘siege cultures’ (Bash, 2001). Since ‘liberalism generates a politics that renders its own requirements for legitimacy unsatisfiable’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 59), the rapid exposure to democratic institutions in developing democracies might aggravate this dynamic.

For Rawls (1993), deep sectarian divisions like those of religion can only be managed by a shared commitment to individual rights and liberties. For Kymlicka (1994, 1995), a liberal defence of minority rights rests on the belief that individual freedom is linked to group membership. Group-specific rights provide a means of promoting equality between the minority and the majority. Indeed, historical examples suggest social pluralism can be allied to imperatives for state cohesion through systemic group stabilization. The Habsburg and Ottoman Empires afforded their subjects a dual identity—one to their nation state, another to their ethnic and cultural identity. Rulers exercised restraint in asserting linguistic and cultural hegemony over their multi-ethnic subjects. Through ‘the millet system’, Ottoman administrators dealt with representatives from each cultural group separately (Kymlicka, 1992, 1994).
Though basic human rights are typically extended to individuals, they are formulated and actuated in communal transactions that reference religio-cultural allegiances. Therefore, ‘true equality’ means redressing disadvantages in the cultural marketplace through differential treatment sensitive to differential needs. Of these rights, none are more important than language. The language used in schools is vital in transmitting ‘associated traditions and conventions to the next generation. Refusing to provide public schooling in a minority language almost inevitably condemns that language to ever-increasing marginalization’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 111). Special rights, then, compensate for unequal circumstances. Rawls makes a similar argument regarding group rights in that justice necessitates negating ‘morally arbitrary’ disadvantages, especially when these are ‘profound and pervasive and present from birth’ (1971, p. 96). At base, equality requires ‘freedom from domination’ (Young, 2000).

For Barry (2002), the civil and political rights arising from the French and American Revolutions do not answer the problem of equality and ‘need to be supplemented by universalistic social and economic rights’ (p. 12). To this end, Rawls (1993) endorsed classical rights of liberal citizenship, but supplements his understanding of justice with a formulation of equality in the ‘difference principle’; namely, that society be first configured to improve the well-being of the least advantaged socio-economic groups. ‘Organizational and economic inequalities’ are permitted ‘so long as these improve everyone’s situation’ (Rawls, p. 282). This might justify, for instance, compensatory actions such as positive discrimination or the allocation of greater resources for schools serving disadvantaged populations. For Kymlicka (1995), group-specific rights, including educational autonomy, find support in liberal theory because equality can only be preserved through protection from majoritarian decision-making. Such a version of group rights is consistent with distributive egalitarianism in maximizing aggregate welfare.
Liberal thought from Mill to the present stresses that our ideas about the good life are fallible and subject to revision. In the liberal democratic state, the provision of free access to information advertises alternative modes of living and provides individuals a means of living outside of themselves, so as to question and revise life ends. Yet the freedom to make meaningful choices also involves a distinct cultural component, since it is ‘only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83). For this reason, cultural membership constitutes a primary good, something to which people are reasonably entitled (e.g., Kymlicka, 1994, 1995; Taylor, 1994; Young, 1990, 1996). Divorce from the religio-cultural context constitutes ‘a profound harm’ because this diminishes the range of an individual’s life options, reducing ‘one’s very ability to make meaningful choices’ (Kymlicka, 1994, p. 25).

On some levels, the terms of the debate between individualists and communitarians may be misinformed. Political liberals tend to neglect the group rights model of toleration. Rawlsian liberals assume the individual rights model as the only alternative to civil strife and ignore that religious communities peacefully coexisted in the Ottoman Empire ‘long before England’s Toleration Act’ (Kymlicka, 1994, p. 40). While Rawls’ (1993, 1987) model protects individual rights by separating church and state, the group rights model conjoins the two. The aforementioned millet system legally recognized diverse religio-cultural traditions as distinct groups with self-governing status (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 35). This system endured almost five centuries before collapsing after the First World War. Though limitations were placed on inter-marriage and taxes required in lieu of military service, non-Muslims exercised self-government, obeyed ‘their own laws and customs’ and could run their own schools (Kymlicka, p. 36). Kymlicka labels this a ‘hyper-communitarian model based on group rights’ (Kymlicka, p. 53). Though humane for its time, the construction limited civil liberties taken
for granted today. For instance, there was no right to dissent within the constituent communities.

There are many present-day examples of legal pluralism. Throughout the Americas and Oceania, First Peoples exert autonomy through tribal self-government and hunting and fishing rights. Canada and the United States afford exemptions from compulsory education laws to children from certain religious communities. From the Baltic to the Mediterranean, linguistic rights to national minorities means EU-sanctioned educational autonomy in the form of separate schools. Russian schools in the Baltic Republics, Danish schools in Germany, Italian schools in Slovenia and Hungarian schools in Slovakia and Romania indicate a commitment to group rights which generates little controversy. Beyond the scope of language rights, however, minorities may seek protection ‘not only from external opposition, but also from internal dissent, and this often requires exemption from the constitutional or legislative requirements of the larger society’ (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 39). In this case, special rights create special dilemmas.

The problem with group exemptions is that liberalism, as commonly understood, ultimately cares about how political rights create opportunities for free decision-making. Strict forms of legal pluralism such as the millet system threaten individual autonomy and efface individual identity. Liberals would have problems with the millet system’s internal restrictions on liberty of conscience. And strict legal pluralism might constitute social dynamite, since ‘a situation in which groups live in parallel universes is not one well calculated to advance mutual understanding or encourage the cultivation of habits of cooperation and sentiments of trust’ (Barry, 2002, p. 88).
2.3 Summary

The previous section described how social pluralism presents ontological challenges to state-sponsored schooling in the liberal democratic state. Traditional responses to the fact of pluralism include privatizing religious and philosophical difference. However, the construction of a national identity under the banner of political liberalism provides an avenue for dominant groups to rally allegiance and stifle dissent (Young, 1996, 1990; Modood, 2005). For example, the focus on headscarves in state schools through anti-veiling laws in France, Belgium and some German states heralds a shift away from multicultural policies towards a ‘new emphasis on shared citizenship and civic integration, whose backdrop is a perceived failure of Muslim integration’ (Joppke, 2007b, p. 336). In the French example, the secularization of the public sphere occurs within the historical context of tension between the Republic and the Catholic Church (Kerr, 2007). But what appears a reassertion of political liberalism in public spaces also provides a means for dominant cultural groups to deliberately quarantine and undermine specific minority groups (Laborde, 2005). To this end, ‘the nation-state has in fact appropriated an increasing amount of culture; with its very own way of classifying and interpreting reality’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 56). The millet system on the other hand sanctioned groups in their collective pursuit of the good. This institutionalization of difference suggests a means to afford group rights, but at the expense of weakening individual rights and development.

2.4 The Neoliberal Challenge

Schumpeter’s (1943) point of departure in defining democracy involved ‘the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (p. 269). Liberal democratic principles are, of course, more than procedural. For example, there are the
ontological realities of a constitutional framework formalizing the location of power for social elites—a ‘façade constitution’ whereby political institutions are not committed to defending fundamental laws (Lowenstein, 1957; Sartori, 1962). Because elections may merely legitimate governments that have learned to control the outcomes, there must be actuated components that together preserve human rights and dignities. These include deference to fundamental or inalienable rights in a social contract where citizens’ obligations are agreed upon and understood. The exercise of government power must be checked by overarching institutional safeguards. Democracy, after all, is not a default condition. At base, it is a civic discourse whose success is contingent upon balancing individual and group rights within the fundament of a stable polity in which citizens have achieved some level of economic and physical security. Because democratic principles must be supported and sustained indigenously, the polity is simultaneously contractarian and future-oriented. And, at least since Dewey (1916/1966), schools have been explicitly charged with shaping the dispositions required for democratic citizenship. Primary among these were the cooperative modes of decision-making necessary for ‘community life’. Today, this basic understanding of democracy has come under attack as globalization replaces ‘the universal ethics of the human person’ with those of the marketplace (Freire, 1998, p. 114).

When Fukuyama (1989) foresaw ‘the universalization of liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (p. 4), the future of cooperative modes of decision-making looked promising. But the heady days of post-Cold War triumphalism proved fleeting. The intervening years have witnessed atavistic religio-cultural self-assertion, including war and terrorism. The fears and anxieties of globalization filled the ideological void left by communism. Globalization implies a multiplicity of changes relating to the integration of political and economic systems worldwide (Levitt, 1983), with the result that the ‘world becomes smaller each and every day. We see it turning into a global village’ (McLuhan, 1964,
These tendencies accelerated as human and financial capital became transnational free actors, and policymakers in established democracies linked neoliberal economic policies with imperatives for democratic transformation abroad (Abrahamsen, 2000; Davies & Issitt, 2005). Recent failures, including those of the post-communist ‘third wave’ and Western nation-building projects, suggest liberal democracy requires a set of cultural preconditions and values (Huntington, 1979, 1991).

Within every state there are forces antagonistic to the core value of tolerance needed for stable democratic governance. These forces, notably the politicization of ethnicity and religion, are energized through the process of democratic political transformation (Carrothers, 1999). Yet even within mature democracies (e.g., Canada, Spain and Belgium) identity politics call for a reconfiguration of liberal democratic principles around the question of group rights. Furthermore, the nature of global market competition has pressurized the foundational institutions of the nation-state—religion, family and community. In response to today’s precarious economic climate, a tendency exists for citizens to retreat to their private interests and focus on financial security (Putnam, 1995, 2000). Familiar totems and traditions provide refuge from rapid social upheaval. Despite the reality that ‘the world has become tightly bound together in a single economic system with instantaneous communication between different sectors of the globe’, cultural and political boundaries increase (Basch, Schiller & Blanc, 1994, p. 29). Though geographic boundaries no longer regulate cultural exchange, ‘cultural differentiation within national societies is rising’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 58).

Political culture includes common arrangements for shared decision-making and accountability. Developing the character necessary to uphold these principles underpinned Dewey’s (1897) idea of education as ‘the fundamental method of social progress and reform’ (p. 93). Accordingly, the common good in a deliberative democracy could only be sustained through the maintenance of healthy local institutions. ‘The assumption was that if the
decision-making institutions of a community were left untended, all or most might suffer’ (Wolin, 2008, p. 138). Hayek (1944/1994) and Friedman’s (1962/2004) belief that political freedom depends upon economic freedom departs from this idea.

Whereas classical liberalism represents a negative conception of state power in that the individual was to be taken as an object to be freed from the interventions of the state, neoliberalism has come to represent a positive conception of the state’s role in creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws and institutions necessary for its operation (Olssen, 1996, p. 340).

Were it not for the durability of the Thatcherite and Reaganite projects, the terms of today’s discussion would be different. The resultant increase in inequality engendered through market-based policies energized social stratification and disintegration (Barry, 2002, 2005; Friedman, 2005). Declining birth rates, the dissolution of the welfare state and the fluidity of human and financial capital produced a climate wherein ‘the liberatory potential’ of democracy and capitalism grew stronger (Wells et al., 2002, p. 344). A new ‘political imaginary’ asserted itself, whereby political actors and citizens became habituated to ‘an antipolitical culture of competition rather than cooperation, of aggrandizement, of besting rivals, and of leaving behind disrupted careers and damaged communities’ (Wolin, 2008).

The market metaphor signals a paradigmatic reconfiguration of power relationships. Whether evidenced through direct outsourcing to private interests or a state-funded array of elite schools, market competition raises key questions about the role of schools and other public institutions in a deliberative democracy. Technologies of control, notably a mass media wedded to corporate interests, create conditions for political cynicism and demobilization. These technologies ‘camouflage a deeply manipulative politics’ with the effect that state and corporate power become amalgamated (Wolin, 2008). The fusion of democracy with market principles renders government the guarantor of property interests, a role which conspires against ‘the development of a fully inclusive democratic public which can command the service of its government for truly democratic ends’ (Sehr, 1997, p. 59). Instead of viewing
social problems as challenges to solve, they become profit-making opportunities for private capital. This tendency is aided and abetted by an indifferent citizenry. ‘In contemporary capitalist democracies there is almost no civic participation apart from voting, and even voting turnout is low’ (Torres, 2013, p. 368). The turn away from civil society and muted resistance to the transfer of public resources to private hands bodes poorly for the future of deliberative democracy.

Today, schools and other public institutions supportive of a shared political culture are discredited and dismantled by deliberate design (Apple, 2001). The ‘state is faced with a very real crisis in legitimacy’ when identifiable groups chronically underperform relative to their more affluent peers. Schools become standard-bearers for the problem, and a manufactured crisis shifts blame away from governing elites to teachers. This strategy minimalizes problems of chronic poverty, inequitable school funding, racism and lack of access to higher education. In short, the state exports the ‘crisis outside itself’ (Apple, p. 416). In this light, the clamour on the part of dominant economic groups for accountability and market freedom, including closing schools with ‘failing’ test scores or low graduation rates, represents a Trojan horse approach toward implementing market-oriented policies in the name of educational reform.

Markets ‘are said to be natural and neutral, and governed by effort and merit, and those opposed to them are branded as opposed to effort and merit. Particular kinds of students with particular characteristics are accepted, and particular kinds of students are found wanting’ (Apple, 2004, p. 413). The supposed objectivity of testing presumes a uniform ability and thereby sanctions ‘initial cultural inequalities’ (Bourdieu, 1976, p. 113). This process reproduces social elites by way of the phenomenon of ‘rationalization’, a systematized selection to perpetuate ‘the system that has made them possible’ (Wolin, 2008, p. 164). Market freedom in the cause of educational equity has proven fictive in practice (Bowe & Bold, 1992). Through curricular standardization and accountability mechanisms,
educational markets reproduce social divisions (Bernal, 2005; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; McNeil, 2000). Market-based policies favour established groups wielding economic and political power.

To train students to assume the same positions on the social hierarchy as their parents, schools legitimize social reproduction behind the meritocratic veneer of fair academic competition (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977; Bowles & Gintis 1976). Because the professional and managerial classes depend upon schools to ensure their children’s entry into the elite, schools transmit and assess this strata’s customs, behavioural norms, cultural preferences and ways of speaking (Olneck, 2000). Consequently, the elite’s ‘embodied cultural capital’, that learned primarily in the familial sphere, becomes institutionalized as the social standard (Bourdieu 1973/1986). Though purportedly neutral or difference-blind, rules of exchange strategically position affluent children for academic success at the expense of those lacking the cultural capital formally referenced and assessed at school. Consequently, social frontiers of exclusion become self-perpetuating constructs with cognitive and symbolic dimensions.

The conceptual link between problems of identity and inequality are clarified in the use of school metrics that stratify along predictable class lines in assigning ‘merit-based’ rewards. Thus, curricula and assessments become reflective of the socially constructed experiences of dominant classes. Thus, marginalized groups are subject to an ‘alienating rhetoric’ in which elites ‘impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression’ (Freire, 1970/2000, p. 152). Though it must be noted that the internal diversity of minority cultures resists reduction to clearly identifiable markers, these types of interchanges help explain why certain groups, at least through a Western lens, de-emphasise academic achievement (Barry, 2001). Since their culture is de-legitimized in the school setting, subgroups might contest a game without knowledge of its rules. Without possessing an entry ticket in the form of ‘embodied’ cultural
capital, low SES students face considerable obstacles in obtaining ‘institutionalized’ cultural capital—formal certifications of knowledge such as degrees and exam results (Bourdieu, 1976). Instead of neutrally distributing rewards, the assessment-based metrics at the heart of the neoliberal project privilege the socially advantaged. It is their definition of intellectual capital being taught and assessed.

2.5 Discussion

The rhetorical strength of civil liberties has been appropriated into a civic discourse sanctifying consumer choice, material acquisition and competition as the polity’s animating principles. This conceptual coupling is not new. Locke (1689/1988), after all, had placed the right to property on par with political freedoms. However, the cultural vacuum left by the purportedly neutral hand of the market, favours the norms and values of the dominant culture. Today, the power and penetration of late capitalism explains a global monoculture which dilutes the strength of minority cultural totems and traditions. ‘Production and distribution of mass culture are controlled largely by transnational companies not bound to specific locations’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 59). The lack of competition to this stateless ideology introduces new layers to the discussion of historical inequities in education. The reduction of more and more human transactions to the dictates of the market occurs against a backdrop accented by the retreat of social justice concerns from political agendas in the last three decades. Indeed, as inequality becomes rationalized as a permanent feature of Western life, it has become fashionable to blame the disadvantaged for their condition.

Equal rights and opportunities do not translate into equal outcomes because of differentiated starting positions (Bourdieu, 1973, 1976; Friere, 1970/2007). As school culture reproduces the zero-sum principles at the heart of competitive market economies (e.g., Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; McNeil, 2000), contemporary educational systems retain practices
where rewards are disproportionately distributed to those from the dominant culture (e.g., Apple, 1979, 1982, 1993; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). The curricula of most state schools, consciously or not, preserve an uneven societal playing field, reinforcing the dichotomy between the high status knowledge of the upper classes and the low status knowledge of minorities and other marginalized groups (Bourdieu, 1973). This sets the stage whereby ‘the markers of taste become the markers of people. The school becomes a class school’ (Apple, 1993, p. 223). Not only does the hidden hand of the market produce inegalitarian outcomes in terms of placing certain religio-cultural groups at an academic disadvantage, but, as formerly referenced, the state actor’s entanglement with majority norms and values undermines its function as a neutral arbiter of rights and implementer of policy. This is a powerful convergence. How this catalyst affects the discussion will be explained in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: The Problem of Liberal Neutrality and Cultural Identity Schools

3.1 Definitive Issues

This chapter explores the problem of state neutrality with respect to cultural identity schools. Historically, liberals have seen in neutrality an antidote to cultural difference. As mentioned previously, neutrality has become a central justificatory principle in implementing market-based solutions to social problems. Here, I discuss three stances to the question of financial support to cultural identity schools. Traditionally, liberal states exercise ‘benign neglect’ in reference to comprehensive moral-philosophical questions, that is, religio-philosophical beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad (Rawls, 1971, 1993). For Young (1990, 1996), claims of state neutrality constitute a ‘myth’ to mask elite political dominance. For Kymlicka (1989a), the dominant culture erases any pretence of neutrality since it infusion nationhood in areas such as language, holidays and school curricula. In fact, the selection of a postage stamp or the design of public buildings almost invariably reference a particular cultural backdrop. The presence of these cultural artefacts, however, does not preclude the state actor from adopting a policy of ‘even-handedness’ to the problem of pluralism (Carens, 2000). The challenge, then, becomes one of developing a position which respects both cultural identity and the sanctity of liberal values, an intermediary position Bader (2003) terms ‘priority for democracy’.

The standard liberal device of privatizing identity affords the cultural norms of the majority with the sanction of the ‘neutral’ public realm (Modood, 2005; Young, 1990). Neutrality may be inclusive in the sense that it allows minorities the right to ‘pursue their way of life as they see fit; but it may also be a device for exclusion, via strengthening the necessary particular boundaries and sense of collective self of the group that so excludes’ (Joppke, 2007a, p. 314). Far from approaching a position of equal respect to difference, the
‘deracialised discourse’ of policymakers can replace concerns about injustice and inequality with ‘racist constructions’ of ‘the nation’ and its ‘common culture’. The usual measures of student achievement complement this dynamic because they focus on the attainment of particular standards, ‘regardless of disparities between different groups of students (based on factors such as social class, gender and ethnic origin)’ (Gillborn, 1997, p. 350). Thus, the preservation of subgroup vitality requires commitment on the part of the state actor to a genuinely inclusive model. Once more, this is an important state responsibility because affirmation of cultural membership constitutes a primary good, a human right to which all people are reasonably entitled (Kymlicka, 1989a, 1993).

Most contemporary understandings of political liberalism privilege the status of individual autonomy. Essentially this means that democratic citizens have the ability to chart the moral course of their own lives (Rawls, 1971). As previously noted, the liberal emphasis on individualism was not always so clear (Kymlicka, 1989b, 1995). In the nineteenth century, freedom of conscience applied to the rights of individuals to worship in communities. As in the classical sense, the individual was defined by her community affiliation. However, in the post-War period the protection of individual rights moved to the forefront. The application of contemporary human rights standards recognizes the importance of community, but adds emphasis to the protection of the individual from her community. A consensus formed around the proposition that contingencies of birth should not subject individuals to what constitutes, at least from a liberal perspective, oppression from cultural collectives. This primacy of individual rights harkens back three centuries to the Enlightenment doctrine favouring the moral worth of individual agents. But the position contains the built-in paradox that if an individual becomes divorced from her culture, the array of her available life choices diminishes. Choice involves a complexity of cognitive processes which access a particular cultural context and web of experience (Kymlicka, 1995).
The autonomy-based liberal package accommodates a wide array of conceptions of the good. Though liberal political values do not encompass all religious values, they may, as will be amplified, not necessarily stand in opposition either (Kekes, 1995). The goal of liberal morality is that people live amicably within the public sphere while maintaining their own moral framework within the private sphere. Thus, public liberal morality and private cultural or religious morality can be complementary. The problem arises in the relationship between liberal morality and minority collectives. Since political liberalism commands that each citizen must respect the civil liberties of others, inconveniences arise when dominant groups refuse to acknowledge the significance of minority cultural assertions in matters such as the wearing of head scarves in public spaces. Legal-political symbolism of this type does not really address deeper concerns of how to engage groups who are not only convinced that their ultimate truth must be adhered to by members of their own community, but should set the moral standard for all citizens. Even a minimal liberal morality threatens some groups (Kymlicka, 1995; Strike, 1993).

Liberal theory supports the idea of the state creating conditions for groups to promulgate their version of the good, so long as the civil liberties of their members are protected. The state is responsible for directly delivering goods conducive to the common good, including collective security, infrastructure, healthcare and education. Education ideally creates the conditions whereby citizens form and reconsider values inherited by cultural and familial contexts. Traditionally, education was perceived a public good that should be delivered with public monies. In terms of neutrality, then, the question arises of whether cultural identity schools should be entitled public monies.

In the three sections that follow, I briefly outline potential responses to the problem of state neutrality with respect to cultural identity schools.
3.2 Strict Prohibition to Funding Cultural Identity Schools

This first stance finds liberal neutrality incompatible with cultural identity schools. These schools can be tolerated but cannot receive state support. Consequently, parents must use their own funds to send their children to these institutions. This argument rests on the premise that in plural democracies the doctrinal contours of the good life have a private meaning, so state schooling must be neutral in questions of the good (Strike, 1991). Thus, financial support would equate with state endorsement.

At least at the distinction between the right and the good, values are broadly seen as the province of the family unit. This line of thought confuses the introduction of values with the reception of values. In other words, values themselves are perceived as having an indoctrinating character with the end that group specific agendas are supported. The logic of this argument rests on the premise that controversial versions of the good life have no place in school. On the other hand there is a conceptual link between education and liberal autonomy (Gutman, 1987). For example, practitioners of critical pedagogy examine competing value systems toward the end of developing moral autonomy. But should parents be asked to accept moral autonomy as a goal? More pointedly, should parents be forced to expose their children to ways of thinking and manners of living inimical to their conception of the good?

3.3 Requirement to Fund Cultural Identity Schools

In the second stance, state support of group-specific schools is seen as an implication of state neutrality. In ostensibly neutral state schools, cultural values, customs and traditions invariably infuse educational processes. For this reason, parents should be free to select schools for their children based on group-specific criteria (Galston, 1995). A state that does not tolerate group-specific schooling violates the principle of separation of church and state. The same principle applies government sanction of group-specific education, but refusal to
pay for it. The latter position forces the economically disadvantaged parents to attend state
schools, whether they want to or not. A state which tolerates group-specific schools must be
consistent and pay for these schools.

This stance assumes parents have the general right to educate children in accordance
with their own religio-cultural values. To extend the argument, the maintenance of distinct
cultural groups requires that children be protected from conceptions of the good contrary to
their familial beliefs. Certain inconveniences exist within this logic. This stance suggests no
value education aimed at moral and philosophical autonomy, no confrontation with
philosophical diversity, no familiarization with controversial versions of the good and no
confrontation with philosophical expressions or activities which are contrary to the beliefs of
the parents. Because value education must solely be a family prerogative, state schools are
charged with an impossible task: The transfer of neutral knowledge and skills. However,
striving toward a one-size-fits-all schoolhouse creates the conditions for a ‘low doctrine’
learning environment, motivated by the principle of causing the least offense to the largest
number (Holmes, 1992).

Because educational practice is mediated by teachers and students, it cannot be
insulated from societal currents and controversies. For this reason, this stance suggests that
the state must pay for group-specific schools, but the design and interpretation of what is
taught and how is entirely left for parents and communities.

3.4 Financing of Cultural Identity Schools can Occur only if Liberal-Pedagogical


Conditions are Satisfied

The third stance argues that liberal neutrality requires state financing of cultural
identity schools, but with certain contingencies. The idea that cultural groups cannot assume
some control over schooling for their children assumes a too-restrictive and too-individualistic
definition of primary values. If one accepts the premise that the autonomy to make life decisions rests on accessing one’s cultural context (Kymlicka, 1989a, 1995), group-specific schools preserve a fundamental human right. Since cultural membership constitutes a primary good, the state does not have the ultimate right to make decisions about educational choice, as this would constitute an intrusion upon the rights of parents and communities. Culturally distinct societies should receive financial support, ‘but only if, and in so far as, they are themselves governed by liberal principles’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 153). If liberal principles are not transgressed, parents are entitled to select a state-funded educational environment supportive of what is learned at home. In a broad sense, education signifies both an initiation into a particular cultural membership and entry into national citizenship.

This stance assumes two essential stages in education. First, children are initiated into a conception of the good reflective of their cultural membership. At this stage there are reasons for group-specific education. Later in their development, emphasis is placed on the cultivation of the capacities and virtues which encourage people to form their own critical conceptions of the good independent of cultural group orthodoxies (Halstead, 1995). Seen in this manner, group-specific education need not preclude the development of the critical capacities for autonomous decision-making in a liberal democratic state. Both liberal-pedagogical influences and a particular cultural ethos inform educational practice.

3.5 Discussion

According to the third stance, state support for cultural identity schools rests on their conformity to political liberalism, a position that will later be developed in terms of ‘priority for democracy’ (Bader, 2003). For this to occur on a national level, there must be an agreed-upon framework from which diverse groups derive both their definitions of human rights and motivations to safeguard them. The required intercultural consensus could include groups not
conditioned to Western ‘rights talk because human rights take different forms in different cultures’ (Taylor, 1999). Thus, cultural identity schools might engage in substantive value education without violating liberal tenets. As will be further elaborated, these schools add value to the educational system because they provide alternatives to the prevailing movement toward neoliberal policies. The state actor’s function within such a system would be to ensure that the transfer of cultural values takes place within parameters respective of human rights and liberal values. The next chapter details strategies consistent with this understanding.
4.1 Definitive Issues

This chapter explores the functional steps necessary for achieving a consensus-based framework that reconciles individual and group rights. The viability of cultural identity schools requires a policy architecture fashioned through on-going dialogue between all stakeholders. Answers to the problem of education in the plural state require sensitivity to the psychological depth of cultural attachments and folkways in ways not captured through centralized curricula and management. As such, any model for cultural identity schools demands a commitment to fairness on the part of the state actor. Also, state support requires that schools respect commonly understood principles of human rights.

In both formal and informal terms, state schools engage in an enormity of complex and often contradictory functions. To various degrees, they serve as mediating fora: Safe havens where children re-examine the doctrines and commitments inherited from religio-cultural communities (Kerr, 2007). However, manifestations of state paternalism face opposition from ‘hard cases’ threatened by a civic ideology transmitted by a professional corps of teachers whose backgrounds and beliefs differ radically from their own. Efforts to locate consensus between schools and cultural communities revolve around the definition and application of curricula stressing competencies such as national identity, social justice, tolerance, multiculturalism and human rights (e.g., Kubow et al., 2000). But variations on the global village metaphor, so common in today’s school mission statements, cannot erase the paradox that state education, especially in an era of data-driven accountability, exerts downward pressure upon minority groups. The singular focus on the testable—the narrowing of ‘knowledge transmission’—validates dominant cultural capital and devalues the importance of minority cultural constructions (Au, 2007). Positivist and managerial
approaches explain ‘a narrower curriculum’, one which emphasizes ‘test-based instruction that ignores critical real world skills, especially for lower performing students; and to less useful and engaging education’ (Darling Hammond, 2004, p. 18).

There is little incentive to enrol students whose perceived test scores negatively impact an institution’s reputation or imperil its existence (McNeil, 2005). The desire to deviate from the body of testable material, so as to accommodate linguistic and cultural needs, must contend with possible negative consequences, including loss of funding, declining enrolments and closure. The current ideological climate creates and sustains the structural conditions for frontiers of exclusion, and since minority groups tend to comprise marginal political constituencies, they are disadvantaged in the policymaking process relative to questions of what is taught and by whom. On the other hand an education standardized through majoritarian decision-making theoretically provides subgroups with the skills and strategic understanding to access opportunities in their new homelands. Without some level of mediation, the alternative of strictly separate, culturally-specific training represents a potential recipe for parochialism and intolerance.

In arguing for parental choice over mandated enrolment at ‘government schools’, Chubb and Moe (1990) identify democratic politics as the central problem facing schooling. Majoritarian decision-making means ‘winners getting to exert their right to use public authority to impose their policies on the losers’ (Chubb & Moe, p. 28). In their view, school choice protects minority interests since power devolves from central authority to local stakeholders. As a result, community members gain the political efficacy to affect policies best suited to their particular needs. Schools benefit through an active and involved constituency—parents and students attach directly to the life of the school. At least in broad terms, the emphasis on local involvement over bureaucratic edict allies the idea of school choice with contemporary civil society theory (Putnam, 1995, 2000). Seen in this way, school
choice supports diverse networks of local voluntary associative structures over the alternative of regional or majority dominance of the policymaking process or the metrics favoured by neoliberal school reformers.

The model of Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) links the configuration of diverse cultural and national identities within the psychology of individual citizens through simultaneous commitments to divergent cultural identities (Kubow et al., 2000). Rawls (1971, 1987, 1993) deploys the idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ in developing a set of principles prescribing the bounds of politically permissible discourse. Citizens set aside ideological beliefs and adopt a common vocabulary anchored in ‘public reason’, a set of foundational principles to which all can agree. The model provides a theoretical pathway toward harmony and cooperation on matters pursuant to the common good. Kymlicka’s (1989a, 1995) narrower ‘autonomy-based’ model offers groups protection in maintaining their traditions and beliefs. His idea of multicultural citizenship does the most to contain the problem of ‘hard cases’, but at a risk to social cohesion due to the risk of a vertical alignment of separate cultural entities. Groups might also co-exist peacefully within a national border through simply agreeing to leave each other alone. Bader’s (1999, 2003, 2007) model of nonconstitutional pluralism (NCP) echoes much of Kymlicka’s thesis. However, he bridges the gap between cultural determinism and democracy by demonstrating how limited legal pluralism strengthens associative democracy and softens fundamentalist stances. The four frameworks detailed here provide the basis for a comparative theoretical and empirical template with which to gauge the utility of Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) ‘consociational’ response to pluralism, the subject of the following chapter.
4.2 Multidimensional Citizenship

The knowledge, skills and attitudes underpinning citizenship education have long been contested. Analysis of citizenship education in Australia, Britain and Canada suggest that national and provincial curricula submerge the critical understanding necessary for ‘citizen empowerment’ under orthodox agendas of cultural hegemony (Davies & Issitt, 2005). For example, there appears a reluctance to critically engage relations with indigenous people and minorities or question official versions of national history. There is also the problem concerning the relevance of centuries-old definitions of citizenship created to legitimate fledgling nation states (Bottery, 2003). Today, the focus on citizenship education in the developed world may simply have shifted from a concern with national identity—discerning oneself from ‘the other’—to one of encouraging national competitiveness in the global economy (Walker, 2000).

In the European context, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 8) that went into effect in 1993 broadened the compass of citizenship through granting European Union citizens free movement within the EU as well as political participation in local and EU elections. Against this backdrop, the Council of Europe’s Education for Democratic Citizenship Project seeks to create responsible and informed citizens. In light of the rapid changes wrought by identity politics, the influence of corporatism, immigration and the diminishment of the welfare state, the Project attempts to simultaneously promote local civic capital while conferring a transnational identity and a concern for human rights to EU citizens. Yet, as Audiger (1998) notes, Education for Democratic Citizenship faces challenges in application:

Even though human rights and democracy are shared references, they are expressed in particular state, national and cultural constructs. This situation, that we are constantly recalling, makes it particularly difficult to define the common framework necessary for activities intended to promote and support EDC (p. 6).
The question becomes one of whether the conceptual framework for European citizenship, rooted in Enlightenment precepts, provides the breadth to accommodate increasingly heterogeneous populations, including millions of third country nationals permanently resident in the EU (Hansen, 1998). Further, there are issues of residual distrust arising from millennia of conflict and the unresolved problems posed by the relationship between European and national identity, an issue implicit to Turkey’s bid to join the EU (Naval, Murray & Veldhuis, 2002).

The nine-nation consensus-building approach for ‘multidimensional citizenship’ (MDC) (Kubow et al., 2000) offers an alternative to the Western cosmopolitanism of the ‘Davos culture’. In this conception, schools are charged with developing critical and systemic thinking skills while ‘being sensitive to traditional values’ and local cultural considerations (Kubow et al., p. 135). Panellists from Asia, for example, favoured ‘the inclusion of notions of explicitly moral, ethical and spiritual elements’ within their understanding of citizenship to a greater extent than did their European and North American colleagues (Kubow et al., p. 134). There was agreement that specific courses or ‘exhortations to behave properly’ are ineffective if other social factors impacting the lives of students do not reinforce MDC. In line with classical political thought, the decision-making processes learned in school and community should develop students with the disposition and skills to become advocates for a just society. Against the backdrop of an ‘increasingly interdependent’ world, citizenship is thereby defined through allegiance to ‘overlapping communities—local, regional, national and multinational’ (Kubow et al., p. 137). Though the panellists recognize tension between regional and global allegiances, they posit that multiple identities can be reconciled.

One of the aforementioned hallmarks of globalization has been the remarkable resilience of local and regional identities premised in geography, language, religion and race. Demands rooted in identity politics for secession or devolution challenge even advanced
democracies; for example, the taut divisions between Belgium’s Flemish and Walloon communities or intermittent eruptions from Quebecois for greater autonomy from Canada. MDC’s idea of the harmonious coexistence of multiple identities answers these frictions through providing a framework reconciling commitments posed by culture and country.

The task is not to dismiss the claims of patriotism and national identity but to ensure that citizenship education also includes the realization that we live in an interdependent world and that nations, and the communities within them, must work together if the challenges of the 21st century are to be successfully overcome (Kubow et al., p. 138).

To be sure, the reality of ‘multiple identities’ creates inner turmoil for individuals and may lead to ‘hard choices’ (Kubow et al., p. 139). What is required is a capacity to develop what Hanvey (1976) calls ‘perspective consciousness’, the understanding that one’s worldview is not universally shared, that it is fluid and dynamic, and that others make sense of the world in profoundly different ways. This involves the ability to understand other cultures with an insider’s perspective. In the context of increasing cosmopolitanism, this suggests that individuals have a full menu of options, not merely a choice between their childhood culture and that of the larger society.

In contemporary Japan, a modern culture simultaneously exists within the scaffolding of traditional values, especially in terms of industrial relations (Satsuki, 2002). For citizens to understand that they are not defined by only one identity, EDC initiatives encourage schools to discuss and value forms of diversity within their enrolments. For these programmes to have effect, requires that they extend beyond the physical confines of schools and provide students with cross-cultural experiences. For students to recognize and understand ‘overlapping identities’, partner schools, exchange visits and correspondence might be arranged.

The normative appeal of EDC theory must ultimately be balanced with praxis. Since the framework’s competencies result from intercultural consensus, we are confronted with the potential for curricular dilution and reductionism. More specifically, these competencies
threaten a value-neutral, ‘low doctrine’ curricula supportive neither of critical reflection nor dialogue (Holmes, 1992). Of course, it should be added that any educational program relies more on the commitment of teachers charged with its implementation than on the program’s theoretical robustness. Some work from the field provides encouragement.

Over 200,000 students followed an EDC curriculum, *Project Citizen*, in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the Balkan Wars. ‘Active teaching methods’ by which students monitored current events, voiced their opinions, engaged in research and worked cooperatively were the strongest predictor of future political engagement. With the exception of this curriculum generated by an U.S. foundation, the Center for Civic Education, ‘all three groups [Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs] used separate textbooks with different versions of history’ (Soule, 2002, p. 4). According to Soule’s (2000, 2002) survey of participants, the curriculum proved a ‘significant predictor’ for increases in political efficacy and interest in terms of measures of intention to vote or participate in citizen action. However, scales of political tolerance saw no statistically significant rise (2002). Since ethnic homogeneity has increased since the Balkan conflicts, political tolerance faces obvious obstacles when undermined at the familial and community levels.

### 4.3 Rawlsian ‘Overlapping Consensus’

An egalitarian critique of liberalism reads that ‘the defence of liberty is a defence of the privileges of people with wealth or status’ (Lehning, 2002, p. 201). Rawls answers this charge by adjudicating between the poles of liberty and equality in creating the normative framework for a society premised on ‘justice as fairness’ (1971). The first element of this principle conforms to the post-Reformation state’s idea of equal civil and political rights for all citizens. The second element sets out to erase disadvantages of birth and status by replacing equality of opportunity with the distributive concept of justice contained in ‘equality
of fair opportunity’. In accord with ‘the difference principle’, social inequalities should only exist if they privilege the most disadvantaged. The original position from which these principles are derived begins behind the theoretical ‘veil of ignorance’. In essence, individuals enter the world without knowledge of their social status, familial wealth, connections and personal attributes. From this position of limited information, Rawls proposes that one would rationally opt to join a society favouring the distributive mechanisms of ‘equality of fair opportunity’. The original position, then, relates to the fair conditions by which to situate parties. From this position, citizens would support rational dialogue and just answers that can be endorsed by all citizens.

Rawls (1993) later confronts the problem posed by the fact of social pluralism. ‘How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (Rawls, p. 4). These doctrines result from the normal ‘exercise of human reason’ within free institutions. Their ‘comprehensiveness’ derives from a coherent set of principles that inform adherents’ worldviews and decision-making processes in all facets of their human experience. ‘A society united on a reasonable form of utilitarianism or on the reasonable liberalisms of Kant or Mill’ requires oppression because these philosophical positions conform to the comprehensive philosophical nomenclature (Rawls, p. 37). Rawls seeks to safeguard both social stability and individual freedom by excluding comprehensive doctrines from the arena of political debate: ‘no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime’ (Rawls, p. 137).

What is needed is a regulative political conception of justice that can articulate and order in a principled way the political ideals and values of a democratic regime, thereby specifying the aims the constitution is to achieve and the limits it must respect. In addition, this political conception needs to be such that there is some hope of its gaining the support of an overlapping consensus, that is, a consensus in which it is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive.
over generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of justice is that political conception itself (Rawls, p. 1).

To form this ‘political conception of justice’, requires citizens to avoid political decisions that others cannot ‘reasonably be expected to endorse’, the ‘principle of public reason’. This conception is freestanding, that is, independent of the divisive identities and communal attachments from which comprehensive doctrines and their conceptions of the good are derived.

Rawls’ theorizing is limited to what he calls the ‘domain of the political’ and its values. ‘The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and familial, which are affectional, again in ways the political is not’ (1993, p. 137). An ‘overlapping consensus’ exists when citizens agree on ‘principles of public reason’, even as they disagree about ideological issues.

Movement towards consensus begins with modus vivendi arrangements, which might result from groups strategizing out of Hobbesian survival. When citizens learn the ‘political virtues’ of ‘toleration and mutual respect, and a sense of fairness and civility’, these compromises evolve into the discursive foundations for first ‘constitutional consensus’ and finally ‘overlapping consensus’.

…once a constitutional consensus is in place, political groups must enter the public forum of political discussion and appeal to other groups who do not share their comprehensive doctrine. This fact makes it rational for them to move out of the narrower circle of their own views and to develop political conceptions in terms of which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public so as to put together a majority. As they do this, they are led to formulate political conceptions of justice. […] These conceptions provide the common currency of discussion and a deeper basis for explaining the meaning and implications of the principles and policies each group endorses (Rawls, 1993, p. 165).

By way of institutional arrangements operationalized around ‘the common currency of discussion’, the principles of political justice become ingrained in the social structure and over time provide the basis for an enduring ‘overlapping consensus’.
The idea of a society characterized by ‘fair cooperation over generations’ requires reasonable citizens to develop the civic tongue necessary for participation in deliberative decision-making. At its most elemental, this means that citizens do not try to impose their comprehensive doctrine on others. An inconvenience is the fact of social groups espousing ‘unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines’, which Rawls presumes will always exist (p. xvii). Fundamentalist religions are especially problematic because they introduce ‘into people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise’ (Rawls, p. xxvi). In the interest of avoiding ‘mortal conflict’, these unreasonable citizens must—‘like war and disease’—be contained (Rawls, p. 64).

Forcing citizens to at least partially compromise their comprehensive doctrines, highlights two potential problems with Rawlsian liberalism. First, the constitutional arrangement lacks durability since groups conform out of necessity, not because they want to. As a result, they might strategize until they have a majority with which to impose their will on others. Second, Rawls’ argument for reasonable pluralism is ‘comprehensively liberal’—not, as he claims, purely ‘political’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 64). Because a ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrine’ presumes a commitment to ‘liberal-individualistic values’, it is, in fact, ‘prototypically liberal’ (Barnhart, 2004, p. 264). Rawls’ requirement to suspend one’s core principles for the purpose of social tranquillity is as comprehensively liberal as the ‘comprehensive doctrines’ espoused by the consequentialism of Kant or the utilitarianism of Mill.

In order to accommodate such a move, a comprehensive doctrine must cede authority to what the individual behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ would choose in regard to political matters. It must concede its lack of authority in some area of life. A reasonable comprehensive doctrine is, in short, either a comprehensive liberalism or not a comprehensive doctrine in the sense of being comprehensive (Barnhart, p. 265).

The question of whether an illiberal comprehensive doctrine can actually be expected to cede to political liberalism in the public realm may be overstated. Politically liberal
societies tend to be culturally (if not comprehensively) liberal, in that groups are allowed to adopt non-conforming and unpopular beliefs and actions. Even if these groups exert little influence on the body politic, they enjoy significant liberty in pursuing their own version of the good. And even if they do not morally ascribe to political liberalism, the liberal polity allows them to intentionally isolate themselves from the greater society. But isolation cannot be absolute, and exposure to another tradition may cause a group to look outside itself and modify its practices (Walzer, 1990; MacIntyre, 1988). In fact, Rawls (1993) makes a similar claim. Through the exercise of ‘liberty of conscience’, political values fuse to values intrinsic to a group’s comprehensive doctrine. Citizens’ views, therefore, can be bifurcated into the comprehensive and political, ‘suitably related’ (p. 140).

Rawls’ (1993) political conception of justice purportedly functions as a freestanding element, one independent of any comprehensive doctrine. He claims the neutrality at the epistemological core of this conception works to join the allegiance of different comprehensive doctrines. Barnhart (2004) responds that such allegiance would instead arise from ‘an abstraction out of some, presumably local, comprehensive doctrine’. A conception ‘thin enough’ to gain adherence from diverse comprehensive doctrines would be denuded of any meaning and rendered ‘uninterpretable to the point of uselessness’ (Barnhart, pp. 272-273). In the sphere of education, this interpretation raises the spectre of an aggregation of platitudes masquerading as moral commitments (Holmes, 1992). For MacIntyre (1988), interpretations of justice cannot be freestanding, but require a particular tradition or cultural context as a moral anchor. According to Walzer (1994), a ‘thick’ morality is rooted in religion, custom and tradition, whereas a ‘thin’ morality strives for ‘universality’ and defines its terms broadly. For Rawls’ political conception of justice to have any utility beyond a slogan would ‘require thickening’ and, in a plural framework, this creates controversy and
conflict. This is not to say that Rawlsian conceptions are antithetical toward a framework for cultural identity schools.

Taylor (1999) finds promise in the application of Rawlsian overlapping consensus to groups with divergent comprehensive doctrines. Though he uses a similar consensus-based model, he broadens the orbit. Rawls examines the idea of overlapping consensus in terms of a liberal conception of justice within a particular society, while Taylor’s intent is to show how an overlapping consensus might be achieved in and around international human rights. Though particular features of ‘rights talk’ have roots only in Western history, the expression of human values by different cultural traditions manifest differently.

…what we need to formulate for an overlapping consensus are certain norms of conduct. There does seem to be some basis for hoping that we can achieve at least some agreement on these norms. One can presumably find in all cultures condemnations of genocide, murder, torture, slavery, as well as of, say, ‘disappearances’ and the shooting of innocent demonstrators (Taylor, p. 125).

An unforced consensus on human rights would arise when each group has its own way of justification from out of its profound background conception. They would agree on the norms, but disagree on why they were the right norms, and they ‘would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief’. Sometimes there will be ‘alternative, mutually incompatible justifications’ (Taylor, pp. 124-125).

4.4 The Communitarian Correction

Advanced democracies routinely appeal to the principle of toleration in managing their diverse cultural and philosophic strands. A more robust vision of community goes beyond toleration to describe a social order marked by free choice and joined together by obligation: ‘historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 62). On the national level, this arrangement suggests an amalgam of distinct communities flourishing
under a political umbrella ‘that is neutral of particular cultures or forms of power’ (Bounds, 1994, p. 370). The ‘communitarian correction’ of liberalism modifies the totally ‘neutral liberal state to better permit the flourishing of different traditions’ while affording a means to prevent groups from violating fundamental civil liberties. Simply put, ‘liberalism checks the conservative or exclusive tendencies of communitarianism, and communitarianism checks the rootless tendencies of liberalism’ (Bounds, p. 370). This formulation assumes a rights-based language privileging ‘voluntary association, pluralism, toleration, separation, privacy, free speech, and so on’ (Walzer, 1990, p. 14).

Liberalism cannot provide ‘neutral standards’ as the lynchpin for consensus between different traditions because the Enlightenment model itself constitutes a distinct, ‘albeit defective’, tradition (MacIntyre, 1984, 1988). Its lack of a coherent moral culture produces a climate inimical to the connective tissue of community. Today, liberal thought’s abstract emphasis on individual freedom and universalism has translated into a metaphor for the market economy, especially involving procedures consolidating hegemonic power structures. The attempt to step outside liberalism and adjudicate between rival traditions involves what MacIntyre (1988) calls ‘fictitious objectivity’, since interpretations of justice and rational inquiry are inextricably bound to particular traditions that provide the rational basis for thoughts and actions. For this reason, educational practice cannot opt for difference-blind neutrality, but must either choose between competing traditions or adopt a pluriform platform. ‘Education issues in a set of skills and preferences; it is as much a process of deprivation as of enrichment’. In regard to moral education, ‘which has always been a central role of schooling’, schools endorse and justify a set of moral values and have a hard time delineating between public and private morality (Crittenden, 1994, p. 295).

During a period when ‘modern states become increasingly heterogeneous and their citizens hold ever more divergent and incompatible identities, ideals, and interests’, basic
moral values informing life choices are increasingly incommensurable with each other (Bellamy, 1999, p. 1). Through dismantling collective structural and ideological frameworks against which individual choices are made, liberal autonomy militates against cultural groups thriving and flourishing within a single moral culture. Because culture implies a closed system, little moral basis exists for a uniform system of schooling. Instead, a constellation of different schools and educational approaches would best respect the plural state’s range of philosophic and cultural diversity. The state would provide funding and some level of regulation. Walzer (1990) and MacIntyre’s (1988) understandings of intercultural dynamics provide hope for increasing levels of cooperation between different tradition in this arrangement. Walzer proposes a process undergirded by ‘real talk’ through which individual’s received ideas and theories are critically challenged and, through a process of reflection, differences between traditions bridged. Through these interchanges, MacIntyre sees the possibility of traditions evolving toward greater openness.

Liberal states protect group members from communities that impose moral commitments on them, what Kymlicka (1995) calls ‘internal restrictions’. But policies referencing liberal autonomy implicitly sanction the destruction of group members’ ability to make individual choices accessing robust cultural traditions ‘to make sense of all the different pieces of their social life’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 319). However, choice may hold little meaning for economically vulnerable citizens. ‘What is the value of choice, if choice must be exercised in a social environment, such as the Hobbesian environment of some U.S. cities, in which there is little that is worth choosing?’ In this context, an illiberal regime which assures some level of economic security and protects ‘the everyday liberties’ of its citizens, ‘might legitimately be judged to satisfy the universal minimum better than some weak liberal regimes’ (Gray, 1995, p. 82).
Kymlicka (1989a) observes that some communitarian thinkers assume ‘society rests on an artificial social contract’, a notional sense of the common good, ‘with a coercive state apparatus needed to keep naturally asocial people together in society’. However, freedom of association actually encourages people ‘to naturally form and join social relations and fora in which they come to understand and pursue the good’.

The state is not needed to provide the communal context and is likely to distort the normal processes of collective deliberations and cultural development. It is communitarians who seem to think that individuals will drift into anomic and detached isolation without the state actively bringing them together to collectively evaluate and pursue the good (Kymlicka, p. 904).

The state may become progressively stronger the more dissociated citizens become, ‘since it will be the only or the most important social union’ (Walzer, 1990. p. 16). The common good, then, involves an aggregation of interests in pursuit of individual and group flourishing.

Group-differentiated rights were part of liberal theory and practice in the nineteenth century and during the interwar period, and the focus on individual rights a recent phenomenon. Group rights formerly incorporated a large range of liberal commitments and reflected the role of empires in suppressing minority groups’ national aspirations in places as diverse as Finland and Macedonia. In opposition to contemporary liberalism, cultural membership was not treated as a purely private matter. ‘On the contrary, liberals either endorsed the legal recognition of minority cultures, or rejected minority rights not because they rejected the idea of an official culture, but precisely because they believed there should be one official culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 54). For Kymlicka, the problem is that contemporary liberal doctrines make little provision for the question of group rights. The traditional recourse to majoritarian decision-making processes ‘render cultural minorities vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, and exacerbate ethno cultural conflict’ (Kymlicka, p. 5). To afford protections on a group basis, Kymlicka attaches a theory
of minority rights to traditional human rights principles. The defence of minority rights rests on the belief that individual freedom is linked to group membership.

To frame the problem of group rights, Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between two broad types of cultural diversity. First, there are ‘national minorities’ resident within a ‘multinational state’. These are previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultural groupings. They wish to recapture some semblance of autonomy and are concerned about their survival as a distinct society. Francophone Quebec represents one such example. Second, there is the case of cultural diversity resultant from individual and familial immigration to a ‘polyethnic state’. This type of cultural diversity tends to not enjoy the protections accorded to the former. Western democracies display increasing polyethnic characteristics. ‘Guest workers’ who were brought to Europe as temporary help during the post-War boom years have become permanent residents, as have their children and grandchildren. They are now joined by political and economic refugees. There are calls for greater recognition of their religio-cultural identity; with the desire to achieve this not through separation, but through modifying legal and institutional instruments.

Until the nineteen seventies, the United States, Canada and Australia followed what is termed the ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of immigration. This model affords immigrants the right to maintain their cultural heritage in the private sphere. It does not involve the establishment of ‘institutionally complete societal cultures alongside the Anglophone culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 78). In recent years, pluralistic policy has shifted to recognize the importance of customs and traditions to immigrant communities. In Canada, this is often referred to as the mosaic model (Kymlicka, p. 14). In contrast, the United States follows a civic model of integration, requiring that immigrants ‘not only pledge allegiance to democratic principles, they must also learn the language and history of their new society’.
Civic nations differ from ‘ethnic nations’ because they allow for anyone to integrate into the common culture, ‘regardless of race or colour’ (Kymlicka, p. 24).

4.5 Nonconstitutional Pluralism

There has been a tendency to respond to the problem of cultural diversity in one of two ways. There are those who support ‘accomodationalism’ or ‘structural pluralism’, and there are those who favour ‘separationism’ or ‘civil libertarian liberalism’. Bader (2003) believes these camps ignore the ‘full, reciprocal relationships between society-culture-politics-nation-state-and (organized) religions’. Beyond sanctioning group difference, states should formally incorporate religio-cultural groups within the political process and as social service providers. This stance stands in opposition to ‘the individual-state-market-framework’ where religion is privatized (p. 266). According to Bader, difference-blindness fails, not only for the practical consideration that no state can be completely neutral, but because strict neutrality towards religio-cultural pluralism does not meet its own criteria of fairness. Strict neutrality ‘would literally strip people and institutions of all cultural particularities, histories, religious traditions and practices’ (p. 267). Taken further, the ‘radical’ removal of religious rationale (nomos) from public debate and politics is ‘morally arbitrary, unfair, and practically counterproductive’ (p. 265). Not only does such a framework hinder fundamental freedoms of expression, but it establishes a double standard through sanctioning secular groups and organizations motivated by a host of business or ideological interests. Instead of ‘hands off’ neutrality, fairness requires ‘even-handedness’ on the part of the state actor to all participants in the political process (Carens, 2000).

Bader’s (2003, 2007) idea of ‘nonconstitutional pluralism’ (NCP) adopts a position of ‘relational neutrality’. Unlike the difference-blind approach, which has difficulty managing
the influence of (unofficial) state religio-cultural bias, relational neutrality addresses structural asymmetries (Bader, 1999, 2003, 2007; Carens, 2000).

Many feminists insist on a rigorously individualistic, secularist interpretation of human rights, particularly religious freedom. They fiercely attack all 'group rights', particularly any associational or collective autonomy for religions, and they proscribe all separate codes or systems of religious law, while insisting on a 'uniform civil code'. This strategy 'solves' the problem by denying it. The upshot of such a strategy is, of course, that it will work in favour of majorities and majority religions (Bader, 2003, p. 278).

As Young (1990) and Modood (2005) have also observed, difference-blindness tends to legitimate majority bias under the guise of ‘neutral public rules or modern professional requirements’ (Bader, 2003, p. 280). In opposition, NCP addresses minority disadvantage through a corporatist power-sharing relationship.

Co-existence and cooperation require empirically tested strategies that recognize the ‘nonideal’ presence of serious social inequalities which ‘have not been adequately dealt with’ (Bader, 2003, p. 266). To satisfy ‘institutional requirements of public debate and democratic decision making’, relational neutrality calls for religious groups to contest issues in the public realm. In this way, groups are ‘integrated in the political processes of problem-definition, deliberation, presentation of decision alternatives, and decision making’ (Bader, p. 269). Because access to the political process affords groups the legal means to protect their interests, NCP provides a safety valve that ‘may also help to prevent the development of religious fundamentalism in politics’ (Bader, p. 272). Neither strict church-state separation nor Rawls’ (1993) idea of defusing (or avoiding) divisive issues through appeals to public reason find support here. Neither strategy affords a clear avenue for disadvantaged minority groups to address inequality.

Democratic participation means religious minorities play a crucial role in mobilizing to address inequality, and it should be recalled that many Western civil rights movements were faith-based. That religious organizations are consulted on contested issues lays at the
The crux of NCP. In this way, the model nurtures and protects the associative structures underlying civil society and encourages engaged citizenship at the local level through ‘a fair amount of actual decentralization and de facto autonomy to decide on specific issues’ (Bader, 2003, p. 269). Institutional machinery consistent with NCP is evident in a variety of countries, including Belgium, India, Austria and Germany. Unlike the negative freedoms and non-intervention stressed by strict church-state separation, in these nations organized religions play an important role in social services, including education and healthcare. Faith-based organizations receive state subsidies. Freedom of religion, therefore, is conceived in terms of associational freedom. The participation of Christian democratic parties at the national and EU levels provide an example of how religious views may be tempered to appeal to broad constituencies. In terms of whether it is a good idea for religious groups to provide social services, Bader (2003) cites public trust theory, which states that groups authorize state regulation in return for accepting public money.

4.6 Discussion

This chapter elaborated on how moral and legal justifications for cultural identity schools, like religious freedom, must be balanced with other rights, notably non-discrimination and equal opportunity through dialogue and, finally, agreement on rules. In the face of the increasingly heterogeneous nature of Western societies, group-rights consensus-based frameworks insist upon the right of all to be heard. Kubow et al.’s (2000) multidimensional conception of citizenship captures how globalization’s creolization of identities informs the interior landscape of citizens. Along these lines, Walzer (1990) and McIntyre (1988) hint at the gradual impact of intercultural interactions on the principle of toleration. In Rawls’ (1993) idea of overlapping consensus, the bounds of political debate are proscribed by a set of ‘reasonable’ principles. In Taylor’s (1999) idea of an unforced
consensus, parties forge agreement from drawing upon deeper culturally-based epistemic roots. Bader’s (2003) idea of nonconstitutional pluralism operationalizes a policy framework around this idea. Since difference-blindness is inconsistent with associational freedom, the state adopts a stance of relational neutrality to financially support religio-cultural associations. In exchange, these associations protect the fundamental freedoms of their members. Negotiation and bargaining in the political arena moderate illiberal tendencies.

Whatever the means, the success of any consensus-based framework depends upon the social context. Societies with deeply-rooted liberal democratic traditions require different approaches than those where recent histories of violence stalk ethno-cultural and religious lines. Further, the nature of the power structures defining the relationship between majority and minority groups provide important considerations. In the next chapter, I will attempt to systematize these and other challenges through analysing the consociational model (Lijphart, 1968a, 1969, 1985).
Chapter 5: The Consociational Model

5.1 Definitive Issues

This chapter explores how consociational theory addresses the challenge of conjoining liberal democratic values and national cohesion with the model of a national system of cultural identity schools. Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) framework embeds strategies referenced in the previous chapter in a robust historical example. The theory is grounded in the rise and fall of pillarization in the Netherlands. In a nutshell, vertical group segmentation built fences between neighbours of competing ideological persuasions. At the same time, political processes and informal agreements protected group integrity. The historical model offers both an immediate means to manage contemporary fundamentalist groups and a gradualist avenue for their integration into the body politic.

The political good ‘no matter how important, can never in general outweigh the transcendent values—certain religious, philosophical and moral values—that may possibly come into conflict with it’ (Rawls, 1988, p. 275). But the plural state’s cacophony of cultural and social cleavages need not condemn nationhood to a patchwork of city-states or autonomous regions. The example of the Netherlands suggests a middle ground where national and cultural allegiances coexist in relative harmony. However, when viewed with the benefit of a longer historical arc, there are abundant examples of mature democracies descending into demagoguery and violence when fissures between rival traditions and philosophies erupt. In the plural state, the likelihood of violent religio-cultural conflagration might be a question not of if but when. If democratic values are to be enduring and penetrative of the body politic, there must be institutional remedies. ‘The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects’ (Madison, 1787).
One factor supporting the liberal democratic state’s durability resides in its multiplicity of associative groups (Tocqueville, 1835/2000). For not only do these networks condition citizens in modes of democratic thought and action, they guard against a unification or imbalance of political power. Yet there are dangers, too. Self-contained or parallel societies threaten ‘a situation conducive to sharp disagreements, extremist behaviour, and the possibility of disintegration’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 6). The social segmentation of what Rousseau (1762/1997) called ‘partial societies’ may distort the general will, since small groups might be coerced by larger groups to suppress minorities. Theoretically, hyperpluralism prevents the usurpations of a large group. ‘A greater variety of parties and interests make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens’ (Madison, 1787, p. 61).

The liberal democratic state’s heterogeneity conflicts with the Aristotelian ideal of a society composed of equals and peers. Lijphart (1968a) asks ‘how many and how deep differences can a democracy endure before approaching the danger zone of dissension, revolt, and dissolution (p. 4)?’ In the context of Western Europe, there are two important social cleavages. First, party politics reflect religious divisions in countries with sizeable Catholic populations, including Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Here, traditional wedge issues such as gay rights and abortion shape ideological fault lines distinguishing Christian-based political parties from their secularist cohorts. But increasing secularization and the primacy placed by party constituents on economic over moral issues has caused these divisions to abate over the last four decades. Today, an expanding Muslim population figures in the formation of a new religious cleavage, albeit one with little political power. The second significant social cleavage, a dynamic evident in all Western European countries, comes in the form of regional groups interested in defending their identities. This ‘center/periphery’ or ‘cultural-ethnic’ cleavage results from tensions between the centralizing forces of the nation-
state and groups seeking various forms of autonomy (Lijphart, 1999). Though separatist movements have all but abandoned armed struggle in Western Europe, bloodshed accompanying ethno-cultural cleavages plague much of the developing world.

In the post-War West, political theory has long asserted that national harmony is best facilitated by societies horizontally structured through ‘overlapping memberships’ (Truman, 1951; Bentley, 1955; Almond, 1956), what has become known as ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ (Lipset, 1960). Thus, when cleavages are cross-cutting, and not reinforcing, pluralism need not be incongruent with democracy. The conditions for moderation and consensus on both the mass and elite levels are thereby facilitated by shared or overlapping interests.

The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict (Lipset, 1960, pp. 88-89).

‘In the long run a complex society may experience revolution, degeneration, and decay. If it maintains its stability, however, it may do so in large measure because of the fact of multiple memberships’ (Truman, 1951, p. 506). In other words, the ‘puzzle of stable democracy’ is solved by centrifugal forces (social cleavages) ameliorated by the existence of centripetal forces (cross pressures) at the mass level (Andeweg, 2000, p. 510). Consociational theory runs counter to these propositions.

5.2 The Model

The theoretical basis for consociationalism originates from Almond’s (1956) typology of Western democratic systems: Anglo-American, Continental and that of the Scandinavian and Low Countries. ‘Almond’s typology derives its theoretical significance from the relationship it establishes between political culture and social structure on the one hand and political stability on the other’ (Lijphart, 1969, p. 207). Lijphart revises Almond’s typology to
include nations ‘fragmented into political subcultures, that is, pillars—the familles spirituelles of Belgium and Luxembourg, the zuilen of the Netherlands, and the Lager of Austria’. When Lijphart (1968a, 1969) originated consociational theory, all these nations had vertically cleaved political subcultures, yet enjoyed high levels of social stability.

According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobility and instability. But they do not. These deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies will be called ‘consociational democracies’ (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211).

In these ‘deviant cases’, the behaviour of political elites enhances stability. Subgroup leaders refrain from competitive behaviour and make ‘deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation’ (Lijphart, p. 212). ‘The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate effort by the elites to stabilize the system’ (Lijphart, p. 213). They understand the dangers of political fragmentation.

Lijphart (1968a, 1968b, 1969, 1999) cites the Dutch case as contrary to the crosscutting cleavages proposition, claiming segmentation between non-inclusive groups can provide social stability. The nation ‘is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social cleavage…on the other hand, Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 1-2). In opposition to what Lijphart (1999) later calls Westminster or majoritarian democracies, consociational democracies eschew competitive or majoritarian decision-making. Instead, Dutch politics was a politics of accommodation. In areas where little consensus existed, accommodation was used to settle differences.

Deliberations between ‘self-contained blocs’ sought pragmatic solutions, including those of a deep religious character. Though comprehensive political consensus was absent, minimal consensus existed in the sense of ‘weak and narrow’ consensus around ‘the crucial component
of a widely shared attitude that the existing system ought to be maintained and not be allowed
to disintegrate’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 103).

The effectiveness of the approach was contingent on bloc leaders’ ability to reconcile
serious disputes in ‘a largely non-consensual context’. Cross-cutting cleavages at the mass
level were replaced by ‘overarching cooperation at the elite level’. ‘Consociational democracy
means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political
culture into a stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). There were two further explanations for
stability in Dutch political culture. First, a sense of nationalism pervaded all blocs. Despite the
country’s egalitarian sensibilities, there has never been a serious republican movement against
the monarchy, the House of Orange. Secondly, the ‘mutually reinforcing’ nature of religious
and class cleavage meant religious pillars were made up of all social classes (Lijphart, 1968a).

When a high degree of group differentiation exists, segmental autonomy ‘can be more
conductive to stable democracy than a high incidence of overlapping affiliations’ (Lijphart,
1968a, p. 200). For example, a dual balance of power might encourage competition for
resources and recognition since ‘the temptation to shift from coalition to competition is bound
to be very great’ (Dahl, 1966, p. 337). But the existence of many distinct subgroups thwarts
dangerous competition since no one group can expect majority status. In a consociational
democracy, ethnic, social, cultural, religious or linguistic divisions are ameliorated by the
‘cooperative attitudes and behaviour’ of bloc leaders. These attitudes are formalized through
guaranteeing, in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, group representation. To this end,
proportional representation and a multiparty system strengthen the possibilities of
accommodation.

In terms of institutional characteristics, two attributes define consociational
democracy—grand coalition and segmental autonomy. Grand coalition, which implies a
power-sharing arrangement, means subgroup leaders govern the country jointly. Segmental
autonomy means that decision-making is delegated to the separate segments as much as possible. Proportionality is the basic consociational standard of political representation, civil service appointments and the allocation of public funds. Veto power guarantees minorities will not be outvoted by a majority when their vital interests are at stake (Lijphart, 1985). For social stability to be present in some sectarian contexts, ‘the realistic choice is between consociational democracy and no democracy at all’ (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238).

5.3 The History

Fifty years of Dutch history, roughly 1917 to 1967, provide the inductive underpinnings to consociational theory. Deep religious and class divisions separated distinct, isolated and self-contained population groups. Social communication across class and religious boundary lines was minimal. Each group had its own organizations such as political parties, sports clubs, labour unions, employers’ associations, farmers’ groups, newspapers, radio and television outlets and schools. The groups comprised four different social segments, or pillars (zuilen), representing Catholics, Protestants, Liberals and Socialists. Differentiation alone is not enough for pillarization; the definition references the comprehensiveness of separate social organizations. ‘[T]he blocs lived side by side, as distinctly separate subcultural communities, each with its own political and social institutions and with interaction and communication across bloc boundaries kept to a minimum’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 70). Separate social spheres helped ensure peaceful cooperation among the pillars (Bax, 1988). This system managed coexistence between incompatible comprehensive doctrines through keeping ‘ideological renegades’ at bay (Kruijt, 1957).

The roots of consociational democracy formed in the Netherlands during the period from 1878 to 1917. Three divisive issues confronted the blocs. First, the demand for public monies for state schools; second, the demand for the extension of the franchise; and, third, the
demand by labour for collective bargaining rights. The Education Act of 1806 ‘established a
virtual monopoly of religiously neutral schools’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 105). Private schools
could be established only by special decree, which were infrequently granted. Later, in 1857,
private schools could be funded, but without state financial support. 1878 marks the beginning
of the struggle by the religious blocs for this support. In 1917, a compromise was reached
around this issue. Elementary schools, state and independent, were to receive the same
financial assistance from the state in proportion to their enrolments. Universal manhood
suffrage would be implemented based on the system of proportional representation. Labour
unions were recognized. The nature of compromise for these agreements in the Pacification of
1917 established the consociational character of Dutch politics. First, elite representatives put
aside ideological differences to find pragmatic solutions. To the extent of rigging a national
election, rank and file members were left out of the process entirely. Second, representatives
from all four subgroups were involved in the settlement. Third, and most importantly, the
principle of proportionality was legitimized and later institutionalized.

Proportionality determined allocation of government resources to the blocs. All
schools, independent and state, would receive government funds in proportion to the number
of students enrolled. The same rule applied in determining levels of governmental assistance
to hospitals and other welfare functions. Proportionality applied to other areas as well.
Network time on the state-owned radio and television outlets was allocated to bloc
organizations roughly in proportion to their memberships. These policies ‘enabled the bloc
organizations to translate social cleavages into institutional boundaries and to achieve nearly
exclusive control within their own spheres’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 196). Today, the state
television and radio stations, national newspapers, major political parties and education retain
vestiges of pillarization, but ideological exclusiveness has weakened, when it has not
disappeared altogether.
To be sure, there were always factors encouraging inter-bloc cooperation. For one, the ‘class composition of each bloc is virtually identical to the class composition of the population as a whole regardless of whether class is measured in terms of income or in terms of socioeconomic status’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 90). Thus, the intersection of religion and class created a cross-cutting cleavage. A shared sense of nationalism also meant ‘group solidarities may be strong while overarching solidarities are also strong’ (Lijphart, p. 82). Symbols such as the national airline (KLM), the House of Orange and large-scale land reclamation projects created the symbols of unified citizenship. However, the strongest national adhesive were the elites.

Bloc elites navigated divisive issues in a minimally consensual context with a ‘results-oriented attitude’, an ‘attitude that doctrinal disputes should not stand in the way of getting the work done’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 123-124). Differences need not be respected, but they must be tolerated. Shortly after the Second World War, the controversial Indonesian War for Independence led to an ‘agreement to disagree’, an implicit gag rule referred to as the ‘icebox policy’ (Lijphart, 1966). Even with a legislative majority, concessions were made to avoid upsetting a bloc. The ‘politics of accommodation’ gradually grew more institutionalized. Serious political issues were handled through ‘summit diplomacy’. For example, state aid to religious schools and extending the suffrage were not solved through open legislative debate and vote, but by conferences attended by the top leaders of all parties. In this way, sensitive issues were effectively depoliticized through secrecy as well as rendering policy agendas incomprehensible to the rank and file through ‘the use of complicated economic arguments and the juggling of economic facts and figures’. Legal and constitutional references were used to the same effect (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 129). In a plural stated riddled with powder keg issues, an ‘information gap’ might prove desirable, even as it tests our liberal democratic instincts.
Secrecy is an important rule because concessions could be made to a bloc without invoking the ire of other blocs (Lijphart, p. 131).

The general population had little political interest because ‘the rules of secrecy, proportionality, and depoliticization keep much of the fire and excitement out of politics’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 137). Daalder (1966) described the ‘mixture of both deference and indifference which tended to characterize the attitude of most Dutchmen toward authority’ (1968a, p. 197). Much of policymaking occurred not in the legislature, but among technocrats in the non-elected Social and Economic Council. The SES provided an institutionalized forum for cross-cutting contacts where the leaders of all groups with a stake in the economic process met (Lijphart, p. 179). Here, the ever-present disintegrative tendencies inherent to the system could be monitored and checked. While elite communication tended toward the pragmatic, discourse between ‘the leaders and their followers tend to be couched in ideological terms’ (Lijphart, p. 140). The existence of small, fringe parties outside the four blocs provided outlets for dissatisfaction.

Education was an important element in perpetuating the bloc pattern. Students were physically separated and taught different values. This transcended the teaching of religious beliefs, since the standards emphasized in elementary schools were those of the separate subculture of the bloc rather than those of an integrated national culture. National history taught in elementary schools was merely the country’s past interpreted from each bloc’s point of view rather than a truly national history that formed a commonly appreciated and unifying background. ‘From kindergarten on, children are separated according to the bloc to which they belong, unless they live in a community where their bloc is so weakly represented that they have no special school. Friendships naturally develop within each bloc rather than across different blocs’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 53-54).
5.4 Analysis

Consociationalism should not be compared to an ‘ideal’ democratic model, but tensions between rival subcultures may prove too explosive for other alternatives. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ becomes the objective, which ‘may necessitate some deviations from pure democracy’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 179). Seen in this way, self-containment and a degree of isolation are not always negative values. ‘[I]n a society characterized by a very limited political consensus, stability will be enhanced if transactions between ideologically incompatible groups can be kept to a minimum’ (Lijphart, pp. 185-186). The argument does not favour apartheid because segregation ‘means self-imposed social isolation, whereas apartheid implies the imposition of segregation by a dominant group upon a less favored group’ (Lijphart, p. 186). What the Dutch case does show is that, despite the charged historical overtones, certain times and places support a doctrine of ‘separate but equal’.

Though we may favour an integrationist answer to the problem of social stability, consociationalism provides a historical alternative when groups adhere to conflicting dogmas or nurse historic grievances (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). Consociational democracy ‘opens up the possibility of viable democracy even where social conditions appear unpromising. For those committed to the democratic creed, this is an optimistic and happy conclusion’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 195). Though consociational procedures and practices contradict majority rule, most democratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of business, but extraordinary majorities or several successive majorities for the most important decisions, such as constitutional amendments. Deeply divided contexts demand different measures because there are more decisions involving high stakes. Indeed, ‘majority rule does not suffice in times of grave crisis in even the most homogeneous and consensual of democracies’ (Lijphart, p. 214).
Consociationalism need not be an end, but rather a means for dealing with contemporaneous challenges while encouraging growth toward a more inclusive democratic political culture. In time, this could lead to less institutional safeguards, greater transparency and more majority decision-making. For example, the demise of consociational democracy in the nineteen sixties and early nineteen seventies indicates how the pillar system became a victim of its own success. This occurred as much of the population adopted ‘diffuse and overlapping identities’ (Maris, 2007), and the ‘cooperation of minority groups muted the political impact of cleavages’ (Lehmbruch, 1993).

Critics attack Lijphart’s model based largely on his inductive methodology. Barry (1979) questions Lijphart’s examples of consociational democracy. In Switzerland, he argues cultural subgroups were not nearly as divided as Lijphart claims: ‘political parties cross-cut cleavages in society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus rather than highly structured conflict of goals’ (Barry, p. 501). Bakvis (1984) observes consociational theory found little outright support even among political scientists in Lijphart’s home country, the Netherlands. Van de Kaa (1980) and Van Schendelen (1984) assert the theory relies on cherry-picked examples from Dutch political culture. Both believe that in the post-War period the pillars were not as sharply defined as Lijphart supposes. While Lijphart (1968a) claims the Netherlands was a pillarized society from 1917 until 1967, Van Schendelen believes that de-pillarization was already occurring in the 1950s.

Not only does Lustick (1997) find fault with what he terms the empirical overextension of Dutch history, he also believes Lijphart’s methodology is shaky and his terms hollow. In short, Lijphart employs an ‘impressionist’ social science research approach with ‘expansive rhetorical opportunities to a research program with aspirations for near universal application’. Associated with this approach are ‘vague and elastic coding rules that permit extreme selectivity in the use of evidence’ (Lustick, p. 14). An additional criticism is
that, since introducing the theory in the nineteen sixties, Lijphart continually discovered new examples that fit the model but ignored inconvenient variables. Also, as the list of consociational countries increased, more factors favourable to consociationalism were found. Andeweg (2000) notes that social cleavages may not be pre-existing, and even if they are, domination by political elites perpetuates pillarization in the way of ‘social apartheid’ (p. 519). ‘Social differences do not become divisive cleavages spontaneously; they are made salient by political entrepreneurs who use them to mobilize support’ (Andeweg, p. 528). The elites ‘are the same ones who created the problem in the first place’. Thus, the theory is ‘a mere tautology’ because ‘both the problem and the solution are part of the definition’ (Andeweg, p. 520). Lustick (1979) concludes consociational theory gained currency mainly because the alternative model of authoritarian (‘control’) regimes has little normative appeal.

In later work, Lijphart (1985, 1999) explored the related idea of ‘consensus democracy’ or ‘non-majoritarian democracy’. Whereas majoritarian, or Westminster democracy, employs competitive decision making (a simple majority rules), consensus democracy involves institutionalized mechanisms based on a group rights formula. ‘Non-majoritarian decision making entails the use of qualified majorities, and hence minority veto power, instead of regular majorities’ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 4). These democracies are said to score higher on social indicators, with lower inflation, superior environmental stewardship, lower prison populations and less use of capital punishment. But in his data analysis of 22 OECD countries from 1971 to 1996, Armingeon (2002) challenges the claim of consociationalism as a ‘better, gentler and kinder’ democratic variant. Because of practices favouring closed decision-making and limits on popular influence, he questions the appropriateness of the democratic label. He does, however, believe the counter-majoritarian corporatist structures inherent to consociationalism have advantages in the integration of large minorities. In states so constituted, he finds higher rates of employment and less inflation.
5.5 Discussion

In the Netherlands, the pillars gave way to the social transformations of the nineteen sixties. The comprehensiveness of the consociational system ceded to inclusiveness. Even if consociationalism is indeed a transitory step necessitated by social exigencies, the model’s pervasive separation may prove inappropriate to the needs of today’s immigrants. The challenge, then, becomes how to reconfigure consociationally based educational arrangements so as to preserve the integrity of vulnerable cultural groups while also satisfying liberal democratic criteria.

The fact that state-funded Islamic schools can be established in the Netherlands, as well as some other countries, illustrates how limited forms of legal pluralism might integrate religious groups into the national life. The operation of these schools requires ongoing cooperation with the state. In the example of religiously-based political parties, participation in the competitive political process may have a transformative effect in ‘integrating huge masses of believers into the democratic polity, and even to liberalize and democratize the associated national churches’. By substituting reciprocal policies for enforced assimilation (or re-pillarization), ‘the chances will be minimized that minorities develop into isolated groups living from cradle to grave in separate institutions’ (Bader, 2003, p. 286). To further develop this position, I will next critically explore the development, structure and current issues confronting the state educational system in the Netherlands. The aim is to demonstrate how a consociational system developed for building ideological moats between adversaries evolved a commitment to egalitarian values and greater inclusiveness.
Chapter 6: The Dutch Educational Model

6.1 Definitive Issues

General agreement exists in liberal democracies that the state should subsidize compulsory education because it is seen as both a public and primary good, a benefit to society as well as to the individual. However, sharp disagreements exist over whether the state should financially support schools for cultural and religious subgroups. Yet for over a century such support generated little discussion in the Netherlands because it was seen as a natural extension of state neutrality. Today, the major political parties remain committed to the constitutional principle of ‘freedom of education’ (vrijheid van onderwijs).

In opposition to difference-blindness, the Dutch approach of relative neutrality operates in terms of difference-sensitivity. In this stance, the state remains ‘equidistant to both religious and secular worldviews and practices’ (Bader, 2007, p. 101). This policy addresses equality of opportunity through directly confronting educational inequalities. Only through sensitivity to actual differences can we hope that institutions and policies will, in the long term, become more neutral in relation to pluralism (Bader, 1999, p. 608). This chapter explores Dutch school system’s consociational and egalitarian character relative to liberal democratic values. First, the model will be described; second, its historical formation traced; third, current challenges relative to Islamic schooling explored.

6.2 The Model

A broad array of faith-based and secular schools with diverse pedagogical approaches represent the present-day reality of compulsory education in the Netherlands. The system combines centralized policy with decentralized school management. Nationwide school choice exists, and schools are permitted to maintain ideological criteria for admissions.
Despite the standardization imposed through the introduction of a core curriculum in 1993, schools enjoy a great degree of autonomy. Also, block grant funding affords schools fiscal flexibility. Due to the freedom to choose a school, an equitable funding mechanism and the traditional Dutch Calvinist aversion to flaunting wealth and status, a system of ‘explicitly elite schools’ has not developed (Dronkers, 1995). Because Dutch students rank among the highest in Europe in international comparisons, proponents of open educational markets have shown interest in the Netherlands (Auernheimer, 2006; Justesen, 2002).

Almost all four-year-olds (99%) attend primary school (basisschool), which is compulsory at age five. Early childhood education (peuterschool) is offered free or at a minimal cost for students from age two to four. So as to address educational disadvantage at an early age, students from disadvantaged backgrounds receive extra pedagogical attention at this stage. After completing primary school at approximately age twelve, students usually choose between four types of secondary education: pre-university, general secondary education (two levels) and lower vocational education. Education is compulsory until the age of sixteen. If students have not secured a basic qualification, education continues up to the age of eighteen. Pre-university education (VWO, 6 years) prepares students to enter universities or colleges of higher professional education. Senior general secondary education (HAVO, 5 years) is designed to prepare students for higher professional education. Junior secondary vocational education (VMBO) provides a four-year course of pre-vocational education. Schools usually accommodate these streams in the same building. It is not uncommon for a student to re-sit if her progress is not sufficient in a particular year (Eurydice, 2011).

Decisions on which stream to admit students are made by a national test given during the final year of primary school. Schools also have boards composed of school directors and teachers whose recommendations factor into the decision. Students who cannot complete the level of junior secondary vocational education (VMBO) receive practical training.
(praktijkonderwijs) to prepare them for entry into the labour market. There are also schools for special needs students (special voortgezet onderwijs).

Fig. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Education (Primair Onderwijs)</th>
<th>Age 5 to 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education consists of primary school (basisschool) and special needs school for primary education (speciale school voor basisonderwijs)</td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary Education (Voortgezet Onderwijs)</th>
<th>Age 12 to 18</th>
<th>Age 12 to 17</th>
<th>Age 12 to 16</th>
<th>Age 12 to 18/20</th>
<th>Age 12 to 18</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-university education, VWO (Voorbereidend wetenschappenlijk onderwijs)</td>
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<td>Senior general secondary education, HAVO (Hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs)</td>
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<td>Pre-vocational secondary education, VMBO (Voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs)</td>
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<td>Special secondary education (Special voortgezet onderwijs)</td>
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<td>Practical training (Praktijkonderwijs)</td>
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Students with a VMBO diploma can progress to applied jobs training, MBO (middelbaar beroepsonderwijs). If certain requirements are satisfied, they can also progress to higher education, as there can be lateral movement between streams. The system of higher education is binary. Typically, students with a HAVO diploma will attend higher professional education (HBO-hoger beroepsonderwijs). Those with a VWO usually chose to attend university (WO-wetenschappelijk onderwijs). Universities differ from institutions of higher professional education in that they are more research-oriented and do not specialize in one particular field. Teacher training traditionally occurs at institutions of higher professional education, but some members of the ruling coalition propose that VWO teachers should have university educations because their students go on to attend university (Schreuder, 2013).
Fig. 2

Ages are approximate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Bachelors, Masters</th>
<th>Bachelors, Masters, Doctoral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBO</td>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>WO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ages 12-16</td>
<td>Ages 17-20</td>
<td>Ages 18-21</td>
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<tr>
<td>VMBO*</td>
<td>HAVO</td>
<td>VWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 12-16</td>
<td>Ages 12-17</td>
<td>Ages 12-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elementary School (*Basisschool*), Ages 4-12

Pre-School (*Peuterschool*), Ages 2-4

* In place of VMBO, some students receive practical training (*praktijkonderwijs*) from ages 12-16/18.

6.3 The Consociational Evolution of Dutch Schools

Calvinism was the predominant religion from the sixteenth century until the first half of the nineteenth century. After the French invasion (1795), the state separated from the Dutch Reformed Church, though Calvinists retained positions of power. In the eighteenth century, orthodox Calvinists entered a period of religious awakening, rejecting the liberal tenor of the times. The Christian Reformed Church was founded as a more conservative response to the Dutch Reformed Church. Separate schools were founded alongside congregations. In accordance with the liberal Constitution of 1848, state schools were monitored for religious neutrality. Private schools could be established, but without state financial support.

Though the government was obliged to provide state education in 1815, it was not until 1917 that both state and independent education became a government responsibility. Religious schools were initially content to work without financial support, since this support would come with state intervention. However, after legislative requirements for schools appeared in the eighteen seventies, the stage was set for the ‘School War’ (*Schoolstrijd*).
Religious denominations demanded that their schools receive funding equivalent to state schools. Motivated by this demand, the four dominant pillars—the Protestants, Catholics, Liberals and Socialists—reached a logrolling arrangement. In true Dutch fashion, all groups secured concessions from the others. The Constitution of 1917 gave the Liberals leadership in the new government, the Socialist demand for universal male suffrage was granted and the Christians received parity in state funding for their religious schools. In 1920, Article 23 of the Constitution gave parents the right to choose state-funded independent or faith-based schools for their children (Sturm et al., 1998).

Today, state-funded schools are mainly Roman Catholic, Protestant and independent. To a large degree, Christian schools have lost their religious salience. However, even as church attendance has waned, enrolment at religious schools has remained constant. The main reason parents cite for selecting these schools is the belief that they offer a better education (Driessen & Van der Slik, 2001). With respect to the number of primary schools in 2012, Protestant schools represent thirty-three percent of the total, Roman Catholic schools thirty percent and a broad array of independent schools thirty percent. The remaining seven percent mostly comprise schools of Islamic, Hindu, Jena, Montessori and Steiner philosophies. In the nineteen seventies and eighties, catchment areas were abolished and choice was expanded on a nation-wide basis (Dronkers et al., 2001).

The Dutch method of ‘user-preference finance’ has been held as an international model for economically disadvantaged families to access high quality schools (Justesen, 2002; Venegoni & Ferrero, 2004). There are five per-capita funding formulas sensitive to pupil SES. Children from reasonably affluent families count for 1 point, working-class Dutch children for 1.25, and ethnic minority children for 1.9. Consequently, this formula is very favourable to schools with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. In fact, children of poor foreign-born parents bring their school ninety percent more in financial support than Dutch-
born children from reasonably affluent circumstances. The so-called ‘black schools’ receive almost twice as much financial support as would a school serving only affluent students.

- 1.25 students receive 25 percent additional funding. These are students for whom one parent has attained a vocational level of education.
- 1.4 students receive 40 percent additional funding. These are students in state care or members of ‘barge families’, that is, working and living on the inland waterways.
- 1.7 students receive 70 percent additional funding. These are the children of migrants.
- 1.9 students receive 90 percent additional funding. These are the children of poor immigrants whose father or mother has attained at best a lower vocational education.

To prevent schools from poaching teachers from other schools, salaries cannot deviate from the national scale. As in most other systems, salaries are determined by educational level and experience.

6.4 The Islamic Challenge

The Dutch term for society, *samenleven*, literally means ‘living together’. In the context of a small, densely populated country with a history of social segmentation, the word takes on special meaning. In the perennial battle against the sea, subgroups learned to set aside differences and work together. Massive tracts of land (*polders*) were reclaimed from the water. The term ‘polder model’ is used to describe the deliberative, collaborative and pragmatic nature of consensus decision-making in the Netherlands. Two grisly, high-profile murders early in the millennium sent shock waves through this political landscape.

In 2002, Volkert van der Graaf gunned down the flamboyant right-wing politician Pym Fortuyn. Fortuyn, who gave his name to a political party, called Islam ‘a retrograde culture’ and proposed ending immigration from Islamic countries (Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002). Van der Graaf claimed he killed Fortuyn to end his ‘exploiting Moslems as scapegoats’ and targeting ‘the weak parts of society to score points’ (Evans-Pritchard & Clements, 2003).
In 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, the Dutch-born son of Moroccan immigrants, murdered film director Theo van Gogh soon after the release of Submission, a provocative film about the treatment of women in Islamic societies. After the van Gogh murder, Islamic mosques and schools became targets for vandalism and arson. Former parliamentarian and van Gogh collaborator Ayaan Hirsh Ali went into hiding. In 2007, Ali published Infidel, an international bestselling autobiography. This book and her public pronouncements offended many Muslims and required her being assigned a protective police detail. More recently, the seemingly ubiquitous right-wing parliamentarian Geert Wilder’s strident criticisms of multicultural policy, and Islam in particular (he proposed levying a tax on the wearing of headscarves), have also necessitated police protection. In 2009, he was denied entry into Britain to screen his anti-Islam film, Fitna (2008).

The way a nation approaches questions of immigration and identity is historically conditioned. During the Second World War, 102,000 of 140,000 Dutch Jews were murdered. This equates to seventy-five percent, the highest of any Western European country outside Germany (Croes, 2006). Even now, Dutch complicity in the Holocaust is rarely discussed. The Dutch are sensitive regarding cultural difference. The journalist Paul Scheffer (2000) broke an unwritten taboo and turned multiculturalism into a mainstream political issue with his essay, ‘The Multicultural Drama’ (Het multiculturele drama). The piece, published in the respected national newspaper NRC-Handelsblad, charged Dutch politicians with wilfully failing to recognize that government immigration and integration policies were partly responsible for creating a permanent ‘black’ underclass.

The roots of these current controversies began as the pillar system was declining in the late nineteen sixties. The Netherlands experienced a massive influx of foreign workers. In 1971, a mere 1.6 percent of the population belonged to an ethnic minority group; in 2011, those numbers increased to 22.2 percent (CBS, 2011). High fertility rates and family
reunification policies combined with smaller family sizes on the part of the native population have meant a steady, visible growth in the population of Moroccan and Turkish origin. In Amsterdam over thirty percent of the population is foreign-born (CBS, 2011). Today, 17.5 percent of the inhabitants of the Netherlands were born abroad or have at least one parent who was born abroad (Vasileva, 2011).

Some commentators look back toward pillarization as a model for integrating ethno-cultural subgroups (Lijphart, 1995); others worry pillarization equates to ghettoization (Spiecker, & Steutel, 2001). Particularly in urban areas, immigrants cluster in tight-knit communities removed from the mainstream culture. With regard to the second and third generation of the immigrant wave, there are worries that cultural alienation and economic frustrations foment attraction to a more fundamentalist Islam than that held by their fathers and grandfathers (Scheffer, 2000). The current discussion revolves around how a pluriform nation that has historically privileged political equality and toleration can deal with robust expressions of cultural determinism. Reports that as many as eighty percent of Moroccan and Turkish marriages in the Netherlands are arranged stands in opposition to the norms and values of the dominant culture (Koning & Bartels, 2005). Moreover, many imported brides do not speak Dutch and have no desire to learn it (Kruijt, 2004). In response, the government created a mandatory integration process (inburgering), whereby immigrants take language and civics classes. Since 2006, prospective permanent residents must take these courses and, in some cases, pass a civics test at the Dutch diplomatic mission in their homeland before arriving in the Netherlands.

According to the Ministry of Education, intercultural education, a mandatory element in Dutch schools since the nineteen eighties, promotes mutual understanding between different cultural groups. For Leeman and Ledoux (2003), these programs have been largely ineffectual because of little public demand, vagueness on how to teach the curriculum and,
most importantly, reluctance on the part of teachers to acknowledge the relevance of ‘the intercultural’. ‘Culturalism’ reigns in Dutch classrooms because predominantly white teachers tend to perceive ‘people as members of an ethnic-cultural group and associate them with the cultural characteristics of that group’ (Leeman & Ledoux, p. 388).

Common ground could formerly be found across the traditional Dutch pillars through identification with Christianity, similar historical narratives and a shared language, ‘which implies common ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Metaphorically speaking, one could say that the pillars, however different their group cultures, shared the same roof’ (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 296). In the historical example, Catholics, concentrated in the provincial south and the urban worker class, were able to improve their SES through forming a powerful bloc, galvanizing around identity in the quest for emancipation. Characteristics of recent immigrant groups question the relevance of the historical analogy. New immigrants often come from the most undeveloped regions of their home countries and from tribal groups with the lowest status and poor schooling.

They speak their own native language, and, perhaps more importantly, they brought with them Islamic conceptions of government, law, marriage, and family life. Using the same metaphor again, one could say that the newcomers, unlike the pillarized communities that preceded them, do not and cannot share the same roof’ (Spiecker & Steutel, p. 296).

Lijphart’s (1995) answer of re-pillarization as a way to integrate new minorities may prove unrealistic for today’s challenges.

The liberal rights package can be explained in Rawls’ (1971) first principle of justice, the principle of greatest equal liberty. Citizens are free and equal because of basic liberties such as freedom of conscience and religion. Further there are political rights, including the right to vote and run for office, as well as legal rights such as due process and equal treatment. Without these safeguards, liberal democracy fails. In line with Rawls’ (1993) warning of a modus vivendi arrangement between parties with differing comprehensive philosophies, there
are concerns that an Islamic pillar would merely bide its time and pretend to abide by liberal
democratic principles until it possessed the strength to install a government conforming to
religious tenets (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 302).

Pillars are not fertile breeding grounds for the virtues implied in critical thinking. [...] an important function of the classical pillars has been the integration and emancipation of lower social classes. Indeed proponents of re-pillarization always highlight this particular function. Another well-documented function of pillars, however, is the preservation of their moral and/or religious foundation and the preservation of any ideological aberration of their members (Spiecker & Steutel, p. 303).

Integration would prove difficult if, in fact, ‘the face of Islam in the Netherlands is
predominantly illiberal, if not plainly fundamentalist’ (Spiecker & Steutel, p. 302).

Needless to say, the Islamic community in the Netherlands is not ideologically
monolithic. Immigrants come from a host of regions and backgrounds, and, reflective of the
many schisms and doctrinal debates, communities practice their faith differently (Saadallah, 2004). To accommodate these splits, many governing bodies exist. The three major Muslim communities in the Netherlands are Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. There are also sizeable Indonesian (Moluccans) and Pakistani populations. Yet, it is the Turkish and
Moroccan communities which attract the most attention from politicians and the media. Since
the nineteen sixties, labour migrants from these two countries left poor rural areas with high
levels of illiteracy. Compared to those who fled poverty on the Anatolian Plain, the Moroccan
immigrants were even more disadvantaged. Many of them spoke Berber, a language without a
written tradition.

The guest workers organized themselves around prayer halls and mosques. Today
there are approximately one million Muslims in the Netherlands (CBS, 2011). They comprise
almost seven percent of the population, and their members form a highly visible underclass
clustered in subsidized housing on the outskirts of metropolitan centres. In the vernacular,
these are ‘satellite cities’. The proliferation of satellite dishes on apartment blocks allow
inhabitants a degree of insularity due to twenty-four hour connection to the homeland. ‘A well-documented source of tension in these immigrant families is that the parents do not find the Netherlands a fertile soil for inculcating collectivistic values into their children’ (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 296). Poverty, limited prospects for advancement and conflicted identities have led some in the younger generation to embrace ‘new currents in Islam claiming to represent pure forms of belief of an outspoken illiberal character’ (Maris, 2007, p. 24).

Islamic schools cater to populations of either Moroccan or Turkish origins (Driessen & Merry, 2006). Out of approximately seven-thousand primary schools and seven-hundred secondary schools, there are only forty-six state-funded Islamic primary schools and no secondary schools. Secondary Islamic schools in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were closed within the last two years because of poor academic results, financial irregularities and a cheating scandal (Kasteleijn, 2013). Because thirty to forty percent of Turkish or Moroccan parents would select an Islamic school for their children were these schools available, demand far exceeds supply (Van Kessel, 2004). However, the cumbersome administrative process to create new schools poses a significant hurdle to the Islamic community (Driessen & Bezemer, 1999; Kouwenhoven, 2013). In 2004, the Ministry of Education issued a series of policy directives and accountability controls. Schools must provide clear guidance on how they support social integration, and all school board members must hold Dutch citizenship. The greatest impediment is the requirement that no more than eighty percent of students can be defined as belonging to a lower socioeconomic class. It is very difficult for Islamic schools to acquire the necessary twenty percent of students not from disadvantaged backgrounds (Merry & Driessen, 2005). There are concerns that the level of self-segregation and ‘white flight’ would increase were it not for bureaucratic impediments to the creation of more Islamic schools (Driessen & Merry, 2006).
Approximately seventy percent of teachers in state-funded Muslim schools are non-Muslims. National teacher licensure requirements apply to all subject areas except Minority Language and Culture and Religious Instruction. This group of teachers does not always speak Dutch. Because few school principals speak Arabic or Turkish, they had little knowledge of what these teachers are actually teaching (Driessen & Bezemer, 1999). Shortly after the 9-11 attacks, the Inspectorate of Education published a report highlighting perceived risks for radicalism in these curricular areas (Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 2002). In that same year, the National Security Service published a report on foreign influence in Islamic education. Twenty percent of schools were said to have received financial contributions from *Al-Waaf al-Islami*, an orthodox group critical of other religious groups, or had school board members connected to radical Islamic organizations. There were also reports of religious and language teachers opposed to the integration of Muslims in Dutch society (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 2002).

About half of the Turkish and Moroccan students attend private Qur’an classes after school. What is taught in these mosque-schools, where children might dedicate six to ten hours per week, has also come under state scrutiny (Maris, 2007). There have long been concerns that fundamentalist elements might co-opt these schools (Kabdan, 1992). Some imams openly preach against the integration of Muslims into Dutch society (Driessen & Merry, 2006). Because of fears of fundamentalism and threats to social cohesion, public opinion is strongly against the formation of more Islamic schools (Driessen, 2006). In short, the multicultural project has come under intense scrutiny. In many ways, current Dutch anxieties were anticipated by French politicians over a decade ago.

Since the revolution of 1789, French national identity revolves around the ideals of *Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité*. All citizens, including immigrants, are expected to assume these values. ‘Correspondingly, the state is not allowed to take into account any citizen’s
descent, religion, or ethnicity. Indeed, even the very notion of multi-ethnicity is seen as a threat to the ideological cement of the nation’ (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 293). Challenged by group assertions for greater rights and recognition, the French government commissioned the Stasi Commission in 2003 to report on questions raised by multiculturalism. The Commission explicitly rejected the Dutch idea of difference-sensitive multiculturalism in reaffirming the ‘integration as assimilation’ model of laïcité. There are three principles operant in this conception: freedom of thought and conscience, legal equality and state neutrality. Strict separation of church and state is seen as the best path toward social cohesion. This requires secularization of the public sphere. Further, the Commission’s report implies the incompatibility of some forms of Islam with the norms and values of Western culture. In terms of educational policy, this manifests itself in banning religious headscarves, which the report construes as a symbol of women’s subjugation, from state schools. The French model thereby excludes the role of religio-cultural groups in the state educational enterprise.

6.5 Discussion

During the nineteen sixties and seventies, Dutch political elites believed immigrant groups would integrate into an emerging multi-ethnic society animated by commonly-held liberal values. Today’s realities put the end goals of this project into question. Four decades ago, the dismantling of the salient features of the pillar system occurred alongside a Western movement toward greater individualism and demands for equal rights by women and cultural minorities. However, with the injection of new variants of collectivism into a social fabric strained by global market pressures, de facto re-pillarization on the part of immigrant communities creates fresh challenges for state schooling around problems of identity, justice and fairness. The applicability of the old answer of consociationalism to new problems comes with a host of ambiguities.
The struggle for equal recognition may be pursued through two avenues. First, there is the demand characteristic of the civil rights movement in the United States for full integration. The second demand involves legal pluralism, which carries the potential for ‘voluntary apartheid’. Self-determination means pursuing schooling sensitive to one’s cultural heritage, both as a means of reinforcing one’s identity and preserving group solidarity. In this respect, religious groups pose a challenge to the liberal democratic state if ‘their religious identity is something which they believe should permeate the whole of life’ (Halstead, 1995, p. 264). On the flip side, when schools animated by religious principles are not supported by the state, cultural collectives are not free to raise their children in accordance with their principles. For the liberal state to be sensitive to these concerns, requires a careful calibration of cultural demands with adherence to liberal democratic values. The next chapter integrates these issues into a conceptual framework defining cultural identity schools as a function of the equal right to citizenship.
7.1 Definitive Issues

Earlier in the study, the neoliberal ascension was connected to the Modernist-Enlightenment strategy of difference-blindness. That is to say, market competition, test-based instruction or calls for national allegiance define the permissible spectrum of human difference. Under a meritocratic veneer, this ideological convergence was posited as reinforcing educational processes hospitable to social reproduction. If cultural membership is indeed a human right, an imperative exists to protect this right. The claim is that cultural identity schools protect minority groups from majoritarian-imposed policies; and that culturally based learning improves student engagement and leads to better outcomes. On a broader level, the proposition was examined that decentralization and regulated school autonomy support innovation and create favourable conditions for citizen participation in the life of the school and the community. In the progressive tradition, schools are agents for democracy. This chapter presents a conceptual framework outlining how cultural identity schools are different from ‘government’ schools and how they theoretically deliver on the promise of the equal right to citizenship in a deliberative democracy.

7.2 ‘Government’ versus Cultural Identity Schools

The conceptual link between problems of identity and inequality are clarified in the increasing use of school metrics that stratify along predictable class lines in assigning ‘merit-based’ rewards. Foucault (1980) conceptualized power as a complex and unequal arrangement of networks across human activity with the state ‘superstructural in relation’ (p. 122). There is an ontological link between discourse and the exercise of power in modern society since ‘power is properly speaking the way in which relations and forms are deployed and given
concrete expression’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 86). ‘Discourse based on public right’ articulates the relationship between citizens to the state through the instrumentation of ‘a certain economy of discourses of truth’ (Foucault, p. 93). At an elemental level, state schools maintain orthodoxy through ‘technologies of power’ which regulate discourse ‘in its distribution, in what it permits and what it prevents, it follows the lines laid down by social differences, conflicts and struggles’ (Foucault, 1979, p. 46). Cultural identity schools on the other hand reference a framework ‘which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76). What this means is that parents select the kind of sub-community they wish for their children. Thus, they are relieved of ‘the conceptually dishonest task of developing subcultural continuity and building loyalty to some often vaguely enunciated national centre’ (Holmes, 1992, p. vi). They are positioned as equal citizens.

Government schools cling to a value-neutral ‘low doctrine’ curriculum. To avoid conflict, school authorities withdraw from moral areas where there is no consensus. As a result, these schools are characterized by curricula and pedagogical practices calculated to incur the least amount of offense. ‘It is very difficult for the genuinely heterogeneous school to go much beyond tolerance, non-violence and consideration for others’ (Holmes, 1992, p. 65). ‘High doctrine’ schools on the other hand are more than compulsory communities: They speak to the ‘substance’ of diverse groups. What is learned in school is mirrored on the familial and communal level. Consequently, the shared experience and consistent animating principles of cultural identity schools promise higher levels of student engagement. Moreover, removal of dominant culture control helps ameliorate the problem of oppositional stances toward state authority; namely, how the position of subcultures in social production processes
predict the nature of students’ experiences (Muga, 1984; Ogbu & Simons, 1998; Ogbu & Davis, 2003).

Internalization of class has complex explanations, which cannot be pursued here, but a tendency at state-sponsored reductionism reinforces the phenomenon. For example, when particular groups pose little threat to the privileges and immunities of social elites, cultural markers are apt to manifest at government schools as superficial concessions. Ethnic food days or world music celebrations come to mind. School leaders or curriculum developers rarely call for critical examinations of nation, culture or class in terms of asymmetric power relations or histories of oppression. These tendencies exert a homogenizing effect on pluralism, as they diminish the importance of minority experiences and legitimize the historical role and present status of social elites. Students outside the middle and upper classes are disempowered by a body of ‘institutional’ cultural capital ‘completely alien to [their] existential experience’ (Freire, 1970/2007, p. 69). ‘Our traditional curriculum, disconnected from life, centred on words emptied of the reality they are meant to represent, lacking in concrete activity could never develop a critical consciousness’ (Freire, 1974/2005, p. 33).

In opposition to government schools (Fig. 3), cultural identity schools (Fig. 4) explicitly preserve cultural identity. Rather than an anodyne ‘low doctrine’ curriculum, cultural identity schools create the conditions favourable to a ‘high doctrine’ learning environment, one enriched by deeply held values and traditions. Similar to the role of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s) during the long civil rights struggle in the United States, these schools deliver a platform for empowering their learners in a supportive environment—what might be called a secure cultural context—removed from majoritarian prejudices or expectations. One explanation for the continued relevance of HBCUs is that they offer a sanctuary, albeit temporary, from racial disadvantage. The principles of equality and respect animating these institutions provide a safe space where
future leaders receive the training and confidence to navigate the ambiguities and contradictions of the larger society’s supposed meritocracy (Boyd, 2007; Kim & Conrad, 2006).

Fig. 3

Government School
- "Low Doctrine"
- Competing Influences
- Vague Mission

![Diagram of Government School]

Fig. 4

Cultural Identity School
- "High Doctrine"
- Singular Influences
- Clear Mission

![Diagram of Cultural Identity School]
There are many examples of how the principles animating cultural identity schools add to the educational landscape and, over time, attract a heterogeneous enrolment. In Ontario, French language schools originated to serve the linguistic and cultural needs of the minority Francophone population. However, as second language acquisition developed a cachet among parents, a surge in Anglophone attendance changed the character of these schools. Today, these are the fastest growing schools in the province (Makropoulos, 2010). Elsewhere, schools intended for specific faith groups witnessed similar transformations when their enrolments became more inclusiveness. For example, many universities in the Anglo-Saxon world began with the mission of training clergy. Because of their low tuition and reputation for fostering academic achievement, urban Catholic schools have long been a popular choice for African Americans otherwise consigned to financially strapped and poorly performing state schools (Kozol, 1991, 2005). In fact, only twenty percent of the Black enrolment at these institutions self-identify as Catholic (Cattaro & Cooper, 2007). In the Netherlands, Roman Catholic schools are also a popular option for non-Catholics due to the perception that they maintain higher levels of discipline and academic standards than their secular counterparts (Driessen & Van der Slik, 2001). In Washington, D.C., President Barrack Obama's daughters attend the Quaker Sidwell Friends School. Of the four presidents whose children attended the school, only Richard Nixon belonged to the Society of Friends.

7.3 Discussion

Nations officially charge their schools with encouraging the intellectual potential of students while developing them for their future roles as citizens and workers. Though state education recalls liberalism’s fundamental tenet of equality before the law, implicit in the compulsory education project is the inculcation of a civic ideology. For this reason, schooling navigates a built-in dialectic: Plural democracies must reconcile the imperative of social
cohesion on the one hand with group demands for cultural development and rights on the other. This is tricky business in the liberal democratic state. For instance, state funding of cultural identity schools might be construed as antithetical to the individualism arising from Western political culture (Williams, 1998). Further, in the face of all-embracing group identities incapable of leaving religious obligations at the schoolhouse door, compromise in terms of curricular content or pedagogical approaches on the part of some orthodox groups represents a difficult proposition (Siddiqui, 1997).

In this chapter, I identified the framework for cultural identity schools as a function of the equal right to citizenship, what Taylor (1999) calls ‘equal authenticity’. The success of liberal democracy depends upon citizens who understand the issues of the day and participate in the political process. A pluriform system of schooling, at least conceptually, adds to the variety of learning methods engaging critical thought and problem solving. The model sets the stage for processes of negotiation and bargaining between political equals. Thus, the associative structures at the heart of participatory democracy are strengthened. For the state actor, the challenge resides in creating an environment where critical thinking and self-reflection coexist with the value of preserving cultural identity.
Chapter 8: Going Forward by Looking Back

8.1 Introduction

This chapter integrates analysis developed in the earlier discussion sections. First, concepts and issues relevant to the research question are synthesized. Second, inferences related to the research objectives are outlined. Third, theoretical and practical implications and limits are described. Fourth, further avenues for research are suggested. Fifth, concluding observations are made.

This study set out to critically examine the congruence of liberal democratic values with a national educational system affording the option of state-funded cultural identity schools. The question was framed within the challenges of today’s global conjuncture, where post-Cold War optimism has been replaced by strident assertions of religio-cultural identity. In the industrialized West, the response to increasing pluralism has been a hardening of attitudes and official policies toward multiculturalism and immigration (Chapter 1). The adequacy of the Modernist-Enlightenment difference-blind stance was evaluated in terms how the convergence of autonomy-based strands of liberalism and late capitalism produces conditions favourable to dominant cultural hegemony in educational practice and policy (Chapters 2 and 3). Difference-blindness was compared with difference-sensitivity (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). Through exploring theoretical possibilities and historical examples, consensus-building models were inductively tested to determine pitfalls and potentialities for how educational pluralism might not only conform to liberal principles, but also energize schools as agents for sustaining and deepening deliberative democracy (Chapters 4 and 5). Processes of negotiation and bargaining inherent to these arrangements were investigated as avenues for increasing intercultural tolerance and contemporizing the scope of citizenship (Chapter 4). To define challenges and opportunities, the study looked toward the historical example of the
Netherlands (Chapter 6). Understanding of issues was then operationalized into a conceptual framework for cultural identity schools (Chapter 7).

8.2 Addressing the Question

Three research objectives were investigated. In this section, claims and inferences relative to these objectives are systemized.

8.2.1 To explore to what extent, if any, cultural identity schools act as counter-hegemony to the market model in education.

This objective references an imperative to defend both cultural identity and liberal democracy from Third Way policies. Two lines of inquiry were pursued: first, the overarching effect of market competition on education in the liberal democratic state (e.g., Apple, 2004; Bernal, 2005); second, curricular narrowing through emphasis on test-based instruction (e.g., Au, 2007; Darling Hammond, 2004). Both tendencies privilege dominant and private interests over inclusive modes of decision-making. Both tendencies de-legitimize the knowledge and experiences of minority cultures.

The first line of inquiry posits that the heuristic coupling of neoliberalism with liberal core precepts around fairness, equality and freedom informs a narrative which rationalizes dwindling government commitments to vulnerable populations (Wolin, 2008). Because of differentiated starting positions, equal rights and opportunities do not translate into equal outcomes in educational processes (Bourdieu, 1973, 1976; Friere, 1970/2007). There are suggestions that school choice might exacerbate this problem (Bernal, 2005). The second line of inquiry posits that the regulatory effects of positivist and managerial approaches creates frontiers of exclusion in schooling. High-stakes testing curtails minority influence on educational content and processes. In effect, differentiation between the high status knowledge of the dominant class and the low status knowledge of minorities and other
marginalized groups becomes formally codified (Bourdieu, 1973; Apple, 1993). On a broader level, the near-unassailability of global market competition diminishes regional economies and cultures. Cultural pluralism was seen as counter-hegemony to global market forces (Chan-Tibergien, 2006). Placed in the current ideological climate, cultural identity schools were presented as countervail to the centripetal and homogenizing tendencies of marketization. At bottom, the pluriform platform of cultural identity schools was said to democratize teaching and learning.

8.2.2 To explore whether cultural identity schools foster democratic dialogue and the associative networks underpinning civil society and participatory democracy.

Cultural identity schools were conceived as a means of aligning citizens to their communities, so as to provide diverse foci for democratic participation and avenues toward greater political efficacy. Decentralization of policymaking and a resultant increase in local involvement finds support in civil society theory (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1989; Putnam, 2000). The developed conceptual framework safeguards religio-cultural identity and energizes the liberal democratic state at the local level. Legal pluralism institutionalizes continuous dialogue between the state and constituent communities. In return for state funding, communities pledge support for commonly agreed-upon principles of human rights, including the right of members to exit the community. The prospect of alternative explanations for the right and good foster educational creativity and innovation. Intercultural discourse reconceptualizes the philosophical foundations of the nation state around a fluid and dynamic definition of citizenship (Kubow et al., 2000). The nature of state schooling in the Netherlands displays how a sectarian system can aspire toward greater inclusiveness.
8.2.3 To explore whether cultural identity schools are a natural consequence for satisfying the liberal requirement to the equal right of citizenship.

The term equal right to citizenship references the principle of political and legal equality. The study proposed that the associational freedoms inherent to the political liberalism require protection of group rights. Modernist-Enlightenment strategies of privatizing religious and philosophical difference were portrayed as placing minority religio-cultural groups at a disadvantage relative to the dominant culture (Modood, 2005; Joppke, 2007a). In particular, the removal of religious rationale from public debate and politics was found ‘morally arbitrary, unfair, and practically counterproductive’ (Bader 2003, p. 265). Indeed, as exemplified by the issue of headscarves, states are inconsistent in how they deal with religious difference in schools. In short, difference-blind liberalism creates formidable obstacle for minority groups in their quest to be treated with respect or ‘equal authenticity’ (Taylor 1994). For example, Rawls’ (1971, 1987, 1993) principle of public reason as the framework for political discussion ignores the extent to which the sensibilities of the dominant culture have grafted onto political liberalism. That is to say, the political and associational cannot be separately as neatly as he suggests.

For religio-cultural minorities, cultural identity schools point toward higher levels of student engagement. Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s) provide an empirical example of empowering learners in an environment where the effects of discrimination are mediated. Students leave these institutions with the strength to succeed in the larger society, where their experiences contribute to a richer marketplace of ideas (Boyd, 2007). These schools embody a secure cultural context and reference a framework students can endorse and justify, that is, a ‘high doctrine’ learning environment enriched by deeply held values and beliefs. It should be recalled that the Dutch educational model originated from
a civil rights struggle. Subgroups demanded equal respect and proportionate state funding for their schools and other social service agencies (Lijphart, 1968a).

8.3 Implications and Limitations for the Study

The study has theoretical implications for understanding the nature of the compatibility of cultural identity schools with liberal democratic values. Also, there are practical implications for policymakers in formulating and justifying strategies to satisfy group demands for such schools. Especially regarding non-Western immigration, the model also has limits and ambiguities.

8.3.1 Theoretical Implications and Limitations

The primary argument for cultural identity schools rests on the premise that associational freedoms constitute a human right. Political liberalism’s commitment to individual rights and its susceptibility to capture by dominant socioeconomic interests creates conditions inimical to this right. As a moral imperative, the polyethnic state is responsible for accommodating reasonable group demands. The reasons are two-fold. First, there is the obligation to address lingering effects of colonial exploitation and dislocation on former subject people. Second, because difference-blindness privileges dominant socioeconomic structures, the stance runs counter to liberal democratic values insofar as associational freedoms and the egalitarian dimensions of equality of opportunity are concerned. Proponents of strict neutrality ignore how minority status all too often becomes a proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage and exclusion from decision-making on what matters most—the education of one’s children. The response of difference-sensitivity requires that group demands be heard and respected. The formation and maintenance of cultural identity schools
presuppose an institutionalized mechanism for speaking across religio-cultural demarcations as equals, engaging in what Walzer (1990) calls ‘real talk’.

Deliberative democracy requires that all stakeholders be heard. Though disagreeing on foundational principles, Rawls (1993) and MacIntyre (1988) both support public forum where traditions can argue in ways rivals can understand. Both stances suggest the possibility of moving outside the narrow circle of group affiliation toward a ‘second language’ of greater openness with new perceptions and beliefs. However, the rational basis underlying Rawls’ idea of the common good, the reference for all political dialogue, underrates the state actor’s role in defining and regulating permissible discourse. Also, the moral role of schools in a Rawlsian system would be ‘constrained to a strictly defined public domain isolated from any non-public moral values’ (Crittenden, 1994). The goal of consensus means a learning process ‘based on actual agreement rather than criteria of truth and rationality hardly deserves the name education’ (Crittenden, p. 314). Public reason, strictly defined, allows scant space for moral reflection.

The logic of Taylor’s (1999) idea of an ‘unforced consensus’ around human rights justifies the creation and maintenance of cultural identity schools around a shared reference to human rights. Citizens forge consensus despite ideological differences because, as in MacIntyre’s (1988) formulation, they find justification from within their own cultural understandings. Sometimes there will be ‘alternative, mutually incompatible justifications’ (Taylor, pp. 124-125). Even the most minimalist interpretations of fundamental freedoms or human rights condemn some culturally based practices (e.g., sati, genital mutilation or stoning).

The commitment to deliberative democracy may imply a nod toward the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* over Western constitutionalism narrowly defined. But some group demands for separate schooling cannot be accommodated, even when the orbit of rights
is extended. Especially in regard to gender, adherence to ‘religious private, personal law’ presents challenges to the framework (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 15). For hard cases, the reciprocal arrangement to respect fundamental rights and freedoms in exchange for financial support to their schools may prove unrealistic. ‘Even-handedness’ requires that group demands be heard and respected (Carens, 2000). ‘Priority for democracy’ means some demands cannot be fulfilled (Bader, 2003). The goal of semi-autonomous schooling, however, provides a strong incentive for groups to take a hard look at themselves and determine how they might soften demands and over time modify stances.

The thesis provides empirical support for the proposition that legal pluralism provides an avenue to integration and increased toleration. In the Netherlands, increasing secularization erased the potency of cultural markers and led to the decline of pillarization by at least the nineteen sixties (Lijphart, 1968a, 1969, 1985). However, citizens ‘shared the same roof’ of a common language and a Christian tradition (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 296). Further, the fissures between the four social segments may not have been as large as consociational theory asserts (Barry, 1979; van de Kaa, 1980; van Schendelen, 1984). The cultural and religious differences of the immigrants from Islamic countries are more profound, so the challenges to cultural identity schools as engines for democratic citizenship and civic integration are greater.

The question of what forms of Islam (or any other faith group) are incommensurate with the liberal democratic version of group rights defined in this study remains an open question. The recent closures of the only two Islamic secondary schools in the Netherlands provide an unfavourable indicator (Kasteleijn, 2013). Taken as a whole, the example of ‘black schools’ in the Netherlands suggests that, even when funding mechanisms sensitive to disadvantage are operative, separate schooling for some groups hinders inclusiveness and their positive interaction with other cultures (Crul & Pasztor, 2007). ‘If the government defers
to the wishes of the religious group, a vulnerable group of individuals will lose basic rights; if the government commits itself to respecting equal human rights of all individuals, it will stand accused of indifference to the liberty of conscience’ (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 187). In the consociational spirit of dialogue (Lijphart, 1968a), the emergence of a younger generation of Islamic leaders willing to work closely with the state provides some grounds for optimism. Nonetheless, the applicability of consociationalism might be most germane to nations where constituent groups are on a relatively equal footing or in plural emerging democracies with recent histories of sectarian violence. Again, it should be cautioned that generalizations are difficult owing to the internal diversity of minority cultures.

Cultural identity schools theoretically provide a basis for a educational pluralism which tests different educational approaches and stymies the introduction of fads aligned to questionable metrics. An equitable school funding mechanism reflects liberal egalitarianism’s commitment to authentic equality and merits attention in other industrialized states. Genuine commitment to equality of opportunity runs counter to policies treating education as a commodity whose price is determined by local taxpayers’ ability to pay for it. The requirement for critical reflection and intercultural dialogue spelled out in the conceptual framework supports the goal toward multidimensional citizenship (Kubow et al., 2000). Accessing the understanding of groups outside the Western tradition may draw from untapped cultural reservoirs to address the existential challenges of the twenty-first century.

8.3.2 Practical Implications and Limitations

Group demands for cultural identity schools should be taken seriously. The study demonstrated that satisfying these demands can be a logical consequence of liberal democracy. Democracy is ennobled through extending the full rights of citizenship to all. Rather than demand a consensus-based educational approach governing the content of all
schools, the model provides flexibility and innovation at the local level with broad oversight at the national level. Moreover, the regulatory framework controls illiberal tendencies as it institutionalizes dialogue and negotiation. The model satisfies core liberal precepts of justice and fairness in its stance of situating groups on equal terms. Also, the model’s progressive funding mechanism recognizes social disadvantage. However, there are cautions that need to be taken seriously.

First, the appropriateness of the historical example of the Netherlands. Beyond criticisms of consociational theory’s empirical over-reach (Andeweg, 2000), the example may have limited applicability to mature democracies. In the Dutch case, leaders from the various social segments secretly reconciled differences through summit diplomacy (Lijphart, 1968a). Though the means were opaque, they were peacefully bridging sectarian divides. However, the anti-democratic remedy of procedurally excluding citizen participation may perpetuate social segmentation, prolonging the problem with the solution (Andeweg, 2000). Corporatist power-sharing may have limited feasibility outside a system of proportional representation. For example, in a winner-take-all democracy, minority group demands may find little traction since there may be little incentive for established parties to negotiate. Furthermore, recent immigrants from non-Western cultures may not possess leaders with the knowledge and skill-set to engage in sophisticated legal bargaining. In this example, the state might develop emerging leaders from constituent groups. In the sphere of education, rigid separation might make sense only where the divisions between groups are jagged and raw. Even then, first steps towards some curricular commonality to foster intercultural competence seem appropriate. The aforementioned civic education project in Bosnia-Herzegovina provides an example of how deep divisions might be ameliorated through cooperative strategies (Soule, 2000, 2002). Ultimately, the comprehensiveness of the consociational answer may neither be
necessary nor desirable without a critical mass of ‘ideological renegades’ to mollify (Kruijt, 1957). Thus, a softer form of educational pluralism might be preferable.

Second, the problem of ‘voluntary apartheid’ (Halstead, 1995). Historically Black Colleges and Universities offered a way of coalescing around group solidarity to achieve emancipation. The metaphor may not be apt to today’s conditions. First, the HBCU’s were largely created because of legal segregation. Second, their end goal was integration. Legal segregation of public services no longer exists; and religious fundamentalists may use schools to promote insularity from a larger society composed of what they perceive as heretics and apostates. Since mandatory intercultural education in heterogeneous settings may have only limited effect, a gradualist approach might be desirable. At the primary level, education occurs within a cultural template; however, later schooling occurs within a heterogeneous enrolment divested from overt group influence (Halstead, 1999). With no secondary schools left operative, this describes the current condition of Islamic state-funded school in the Netherlands.

Third, the problem of structural inequality. Beyond questions of educational content, ethnic residential patterns and growing levels of economic inequality perpetuate school segregation in Western industrialized countries (Semyonov & Glikman, 2009). In 1988, thirty percent of Blacks and Hispanics attended an extremely segregated school in the United States, in 2010 that percentage exceeded forty percent (Kahlenburg, 2011). How much of this segregation is really voluntary? The framework’s reconceptualization of ‘separate but equal’ may not be appropriate for all contexts. Also, as has been the case in the Netherlands with Islamic schools, some groups may find they are unable to attract an inclusive enrolment (Merry & Driessen, 2005). Besides the moral dimension, a pluriform educational platform to accommodate minorities ‘may apply only to societies which are pluralist in the sense that no single cultural group forms a majority within the state’ (Halstead, 1999, p. 259). Population
density and settlement patterns would also seem to play a role, since concentrations of homogeneous communities would provide economies of scale for religio-cultural schools.

8.4 Recommendations for Future Research

First, the viability of legal pluralism in providing a platform for state-funded Islamic schooling in Western democracies requires further study. The fact that the last remaining Islamic secondary schools were closed in the Netherlands highlights the challenge this community faces in securing government support. Emerging cross-national research reveals Anglo-Saxon countries have had little success with multicultural policies for the socioeconomic and sociocultural integration of recent Muslim immigrants (Koopmans, 2013).

Second, the idea of cultural identity schools could be expanded in terms of studying their functionality as school-family-community partnerships. For immigrants, schools might promote community engagement through assuming a more active collaborative role with parents. Social capital might be improved by using schools after-hours for evening language classes and providing a liaison for answering inquiries about matters such as obtaining a driver’s license or paying taxes.

Third, further investigation of cultural identity schooling relative to legal-constitutional principles is required. Cross-national comparisons of equal protection statutes and rulings would yield answers to the questions of why some groups are able to form schools while others are not. For example, national minorities tend to have more rights to their own schools than immigrant minorities. The reasoning could be compared with the Universal Declaration of Rights: ‘Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’ (UN, 1948, 26.3).
8.5 Conclusion

Leaders from Western democracies display an increasing bent to proclaim the virtues of civil society. King Willem Alexander used the occasion of his first address to parliament to announce the birth of the *participatiesamenleving* (participation society) (Springer, 2013). In his annual Christmas message, Prime Minister David Cameron lauded the millions ‘playing their part in countless small ways to help build what I call the big society’ (Watt, 2013). At a recent forum, President Barack Obama reflected on his beginnings as a low-income community organizer to underline his message of the importance of governments working in partnership with civil societies (The White House, 2013). These remarks occur at the same time as their governments repudiate the welfare state and recalibrate their commitments to vulnerable social segments. The hope is that these are not mere rhetorical flourishes, but signal a commitment to engage with groups on equal terms. As I have argued, the validation of cultural commitments strengthens participatory democracy and increases the array of choices citizens have in forging their lives.
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