

ABSTRACT

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The philosophy of Martin Heidegger has been very influential on nursing practice for the past decade, but how would his philosophy effect the nursing curriculum? If we follow Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology it could be used as a philosophy to underpin a nursing curriculum, especially a mental health curriculum.

To explore this issue the thesis will look at how Heidegger's phenomenology is in opposition to Husserl's descriptive phenomenology which developed an account of man as essentially consciousness with self-contained meanings, which he called intentional content. According to Husserl, this mental content gives intelligibility to everything people encounter. Heidegger argued that there was a more basic form of intentionality than that of a self-sufficient individual subject directed at the world by means of its mental content. Since Descartes, philosophers have been stuck with the epistemological problem of explaining how ideas in our mind can be true of the external world. Heidegger shows that this subject/object epistemology presupposes a background of everyday practices into which we are socialised but that we do not represent in our minds; and it is this background of everyday practices which contains an ontology and gives us intelligibility. Hubert Dreyfus's and Richard Rorty's interpretations of Heidegger will then be examined within the latter context.


Nursing curricula approach the practice of nursing through an epistemological framework of usually a mixture of nursing theory, psychology, sociology, and physiology; which are then represented in the mind and supposed to apply to practice. But if the curriculum follows an Heideggerian philosophy, it would have to start by examining what it means 'to be' a nurse in the context of nursing practice with no representation in the mind. The consequences of an Heideggerian curriculum will be explored in the thesis.

HEIDEGGER AND NURSE EDUCATION

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1 INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I want to explore how Heidegger's philosophy of *Being and Time* can be applied to an educational context, especially the education of Mental Health Nurses, and to do this I am going to approach Heidegger's *Being and Time* by looking at two contemporary highly influential expositions of the work. First of all through Hubert Dreyfus's interpretation and then through Richard Rorty's interpretation, both of which have been very influential. During the early exposition I will point out the crucial areas where Rorty disagrees with Dreyfus, but I will not explain Rorty's interpretation until much later on.

The reason that I have chosen Dreyfus's and Rorty's interpretations is that they both take from Heidegger his criticism of the notion of truth as an accuracy of representation; and also his critique of subjectivism and the priority of social practice over the individual and over theory; these arguments I am going to use in the development of a practice based curriculum. They disagree on Heidegger's fundamental ontology, Dreyfus defends it, and Rorty agrees with the later Heidegger that it should be abandoned. Rorty also criticises Heidegger for overrating philosophy above society; again, a close look at these arguments can be used to develop a practice based curriculum.

After the initial introduction to Heidegger I will then look at the more technical aspects of his phenomenology by comparing it to Husserl's phenomenology. This will then be followed by an analysis of Being-in-the-world looking at circumspection and its relationship to the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand; I will then concentrate on Dreyfus's detailed discussion of the change-over from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand. The notion of Being-with and the concept of solicitude will then be looked at very closely, and this will be followed with a close analysis of Rorty's interpretation.

An Heideggerian framework applied to education generally, and then nurse education will be explored in the next section, and this will be looked at within the context of curriculum planning and the implementation of the curriculum. The change-over from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand, and the concept of solicitude will be looked at again, but this time within the context of teaching.

The final sections will also look at the work already done on Heidegger by nurse theorists, and therefore will concentrate on the academic nursing literature that has been influenced by Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger.

2 INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER

What I intend to do is to look at Heidegger's conception of Being and how different writers tend to interpret this difficult concept in different ways. To do this properly I need to carry out an exposition of the first part of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, look at some of the problems that are generated and then look at Hubert Dreyfus's very influential interpretation of Heidegger's conception of Being and where Richard Rorty disagrees.

Heidegger states that the question of Being has today been forgotten, and that even though Plato and Aristotle wrestled with the problem it was soon pushed to one side. This had the consequence that the interpretation of Being became dogmatic.

It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it.¹

Heidegger then explains that when the ancients studied Being they found that the meaning of it was obscure and hidden, but modern philosophers paradoxically find no problem with the concept, they even see a clarity about it. Then interestingly he says that the cause of this is due to presuppositions and prejudices, and to get to the root of the problem one has "to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed..."². What Heidegger wants to do here is to reverse the Cartesian 'Cogito ergo sum' to 'Sum ergo cogito'; which means reversing 'I think therefore I am' to 'I am therefore I think'. The Cartesian starting point is epistemological, a search for knowledge which deals with entities (beings); Heidegger's starting point is ontological, which deals with Being, and this is a more "primordial" philosophy.

He then looks at three main presuppositions about Being and rejects them all. Each of the three presuppositions originates in Aristotle and they still remain unclear to this day. The first one he tackles is that 'Being is the most universal concept', and he concludes that if this is so it does not mean that one has to stop the discussion, in

contrast one had to do the opposite. Being does not name an entity, but only the analogous condition all beings share; and it is the sharing of this condition that remains unclear. Secondly, he argues that the concept of 'Being' is indefinable; it is not an entity, but he disagrees that this eliminates the question of its meaning. Thirdly, 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self-evident, this he rejects.

Heidegger then turns his attention to the 'Formal Structure of the Question of Being'. He argues that: "Every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought."³ He goes on to explain that what is asked about is usually determined and conceptualised, thus the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way: "...we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being."⁴ Out of this vague understanding arises the question of the meaning of Being and a pointing to its conception, but what we are unable to fix conceptually is, what 'is' signifies. "We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed."⁵ If this is indeed the case then Heidegger is warning us that a conceptual understanding of Being is one of the hardest things to attain to, and also, it is at this point multiple interpretations of Being can be spawned because not every thinker is going to agree on what the concept of Being is. He is often misinterpreted because of his lengthy discussions of Being. An example is that Heidegger says that Being is hidden and covered up, which can be interpreted as saying that Being has a mystical element, but even though Heidegger wants to clear up the mystification, he is not always interpreted this way. The logical positivists have seized upon this because Heidegger states that Being is not an entity, they have used it as an example of metaphysics getting out of hand. If it is not an entity, then what is it? Some mysterious 'nothing' floating about in some platonic universe? This is a total misunderstanding, because no matter how vague the understanding of Being is, Heidegger insists that it is still a fact even though it may fluctuate and grow even dimmer. But the above quote that "we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being" is going to be very

important when we look at Dreyfus's interpretation of what Heidegger means by Being.

From here the concept of Being must be developed, and Heidegger warns that this vague average understanding of Being is infiltrated with traditional theories. Being determines entities as entities, but the Being of entities is not itself an entity. Heidegger argues that the meaning of Being has to be conceived in a way of its own, which must contrast with the concepts which determine entities; but he concludes that the entities themselves have to be interrogated as regards their Being. The question now becomes which entity?

But there are many things which we designate as 'being' ["seiend"], and we do so in various senses. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being, and so is how we are.⁶

Heidegger wants to find out the meaning of Being, and what is interrogated to find this out is a particular being or entity, the human being. Why he chooses the human existence as the object to be investigated requires a consideration of the term Dasein. The term consists of two parts - da, meaning "there" and sein, "to be". Thus the etymologically derived translation of the term is "to be there". It is thus incorrect to translate Dasein as "human being" because the latter refers to an actual entity or existence, with reference to its genus and species. To inquire about a "human being" would be to engage in an ontical inquiry. What Heidegger means by an ontical inquiry is any inquiry that is scientific and deals with entities as objects. Thus Heidegger chooses Dasein as the entity to be interrogated.

In the section titled the 'Ontological Priority of the Question of Being', Heidegger states that Being is always the Being of an entity, and he goes on to argue that the totality of entities are subdivided into different areas of subject-matter, and that these areas are studied by different disciplines, i.e. physics, mathematics, history. He argues that the important area for any discipline is its 'basic concepts', the positivistic aspect of any discipline is the collecting of facts to build up a

knowledge base and then creating theories to interpret these facts. But what Heidegger is interested in are the 'basic concepts' of the disciplines.

Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. Only after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and grounded.⁷

The basic concepts employed determine the possibilities of progress in science; but if the Being of these entities is itself obscure, then the basic concepts cannot be properly clarified. According to Heidegger the regional ontology of a science "...remains itself naive and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general."⁸ The particular sciences are devoted to areas of Being or regional ontologies, they depend upon certain basic ways in which the individual science is structured. Chemistry studies the properties of matter and physics of energy, but if the foundations are questioned, the discipline will find itself in crisis. Relativity theory precipitated such a crisis in physics. The question of Being has a clear theoretical priority over all other questions. Thus all ontology is blind if it has not previously clarified the meaning of Being in general, so to clarify the meaning of Being ontology must take precedence over other forms of enquiry; especially the above scientific investigations into the nature of things which is ontic. Harries argues that Heidegger interprets Kant "as an ontological inquiry into the being of 'Nature' that exhibits the foundations on which the 'ontical inquiry' of the natural sciences rests."⁹ Thus the meaning of Being in general is in need of a foundation and Harries argues that fundamental ontology addresses the latter.¹⁰

Therefore the meaning of Being in general is to be dealt with by ontology; but this ontology has to be prepared beforehand by a 'fundamental ontology' through the existential analytic of Dasein's being which is grounded in being-in-the-world. Hence an inquiry about Being is ontological and an inquiry about entities is ontic, and this has the consequence that Being cannot be analysed ontically. What is asked

about is Being, but what is interrogated to find the answer is a particular being or entity called Dasein which is a reconceptualisation of self and subject, and what should be gained is the meaning of Being. The question of Being is possible only because Dasein can reflect upon its existence. Ontical knowledge and methodology cannot examine such a question. We ourselves are; but the knowledge we have of our own being because 'we are it' is only implicit, but this implicit knowledge guides us to an answer.

Since Dasein has a vague implicit understanding of Being, this understanding is 'preontological', and it needs to be made explicit by ontological clarification. This 'preontological understanding' is grounded in Dasein's average awareness. The move from 'preontological understanding' to ontological clarification is seen by Heidegger as circular, and this is because ontological inquiry begins in and ends in an understanding of Being. The preontological understanding we begin with is implicit and the understanding produced by the ontological inquiry will make it explicit. It is for this reason that Heidegger attempts to show that ontology takes precedence over other ontical forms of inquiry, especially science. The particular sciences are only devoted to areas of Being, and this is why fundamental ontology is primordial. Thus what Heidegger's inquiry presupposes is a vague preontological understanding of Being that Dasein possesses, and through this he will attempt to gain an explicit grasp of Being in general.

The question also has a concrete priority which Heidegger calls ontic, when Dasein expresses its concern about its existence, it is ontically distinguished from other entities because its being has become an issue. Dasein has become concerned about the status of its being; and this is the ontic priority of the question of Being because of the grounding of our 'preontological understanding' in everyday existence. This is an important point in the argument because the ontic conditions of our everyday lives can be interpreted in many different ways.

Traditional ontology must lack a foundation as long as it seeks to exhibit the structures constitutive of the things man encounters, while taking for

granted a particular interpretation of that encounter, which gives priority to detached observation, without questioning the adequacy of that interpretation.¹¹

The right interpretation is the 'existential analytic'. Dasein is not an entity in the world, human beings are entities in the world. Psychology and anthropology deal with human beings as if they were entities in the world, and the understanding of entities in the world is just one way of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Dasein is the same for every human being, not Dasein's ways of being. It is therefore Dasein which is generalisable. This is an important point in Heidegger's argument because he has often been accused of doing philosophical anthropology rather than philosophy, so it may well do to pause and reconsider this position because it has an important bearing in Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger.

The inquiry about Being through Dasein is ontological and general for every Dasein, whereas an inquiry about modes of Dasein's which are entities is ontical; and Heidegger emphasises that one cannot inquire about Being in the ontical way. Also, the terms that describe ontological investigations are called 'existentials', and terms which describe ontical investigations are called 'existentiell'.

But the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately *existentiell*, that is, *ontical*. Only if the inquiry of philosophical research is itself seized upon in an *existentiell* manner as a possibility of the Being of each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence and to undertake an adequately founded ontological problematic. But with this, the ontical priority of the question of Being has also become plain.¹²

Therefore ontically Dasein is characterised by existence even if it has no explicit conceptual understanding of its Being; and this is an *existentiell* grasp of existence. Hence, to get to an ontological *existential* understanding of Being means a disclosure of the ontological structure of existence. This is what fundamental ontology, the existential analytic aims at: a radicalisation of a certain mode of questioning and an intensification of our own mode of being. What Dreyfus calls an 'understanding of being'. But the problem Heidegger has is: do we ever leave the ontical *existentiell* mode of being and gain entrance to the ontological *existential* mode of being? He goes on to say:

So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic.¹³

Thus enquiring into Dasein is logically prior to enquiring into other entities because it carries an awareness of Being which is the pre-ontological understanding of Being, which is nevertheless implicit. But because it is situated in the ontical structure of Dasein, in other words the existentiell mode of being, this is the point where there are a lot of complaints that even though Heidegger says that he is going to analyse Being, he is instead doing philosophical anthropology. We need to look at this problem much closer because this is one of the crucial points where Dreyfus and Rorty disagree, and the interpretation that we take will have an incisive effect when it is applied to the philosophy of education.

The problem is that, in analysing man, which is called the existential analytic, is Heidegger doing ontology or anthropology? Critics say that the existential analytic is philosophical anthropology and not ontology which Heidegger says that it is. Gelven argues that Heidegger refuses to separate the study of Being from the study of man.

Thus, to the critic who asks: Is Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* really a theory of Being, or is it only a study of man? The answer is that Heidegger thinks there is no difference; that one cannot have the one without the other.¹⁴

Gelven thus concludes that in reading the existential analyses one should never lose sight of the fact that it is both an analysis of man and an inquiry into the meaning of Being. Heidegger's ontological inquiry therefore begins with Dasein through the pre-ontological understanding of Being which is implicit, and the understanding that will be produced by the existential analytic will make it explicit. This circular move is from an average everyday awareness which the pre-ontological understanding is grounded in. Interestingly, Biemel seems to support Gelven's argument in the following quote.

Heidegger's inquiry into the meaning of Being is presented as fundamental ontology. This fundamental ontology is not intended to work out a

particularly comprehensive concept of Being but to offer an analysis of the mode of being of the inquirer - that is, of those basic structures which Heidegger calls "existentialia".¹⁵

He goes on to argue that Dasein always moves within a specific comprehension of Being, which is obviously the implicit pre-ontological understanding; but that even so, Dasein understands itself in an ontical way and this understanding has served as the model for Dasein understanding itself in a non-Dasein way. It is thus important that Dasein starts in its everydayness.

This satisfies the phenomenological requirement that we should not start out from any ideal image of man but grasp him in the mode of being in which he ordinarily is. But this is not to be done in such a way as to lose ourselves in the description of these modes of behaviour and attitude, but in order to bring to light that which underlies this behaviour, that is, the essential structures, or existentialia.¹⁶

The crucial point in the argument seems to be the essential differentiation between the 'everyday modes of behaviour' which can differ from culture to culture and are on the existentiell level, which can be studied by anthropologists; and the underlying existentialia which are on the existential level and can be studied by philosophers.

It is important to realise that the argument is on two levels. The level of the interrelatedness between Being and Dasein, and this is because it is to Dasein only that Being appears; and this appearance which is under the guise of the pre-ontological understanding is only implicit. The other level is that of the 'existential analytic', the difference between the everyday modes of behaviour and the underlying existentialia. At this point it will be fruitful to bring in Dreyfus to see how he attempts to solve the problem.

Dreyfus opens up his second chapter by stating that Heidegger wants to avoid the problems of traditional ontology which grounds all kinds of being into one source. But Heidegger still "...proposes, nonetheless, to show that all beings gain their intelligibility in terms of the structure of one sort of being."¹⁷ The latter statement does seem to be a right interpretation because as Heidegger says himself:

So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an understanding of

Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception.¹⁸

He goes on to argue that even if we do not know what 'Being' means we do have a vague understanding of it which we are not able to 'fix conceptually'. Now what is important here is that Heidegger argues that our understanding of Being 'may fluctuate and grow dim' and 'may be so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood'. This means that there is a context which Heidegger wants to open up where the understanding of Being and its meaning seem to be 'free-floating'; Heidegger wants to fix the meaning of it within a certain context, and it is this context that Dreyfus wants to explain.

Dreyfus argues that "...we are not to think of Dasein as a conscious subject...Dasein must be understood to be more basic than mental states and their intentionality."¹⁹ Thus an individual Dasein is not a self-sufficient source of all meaning and intelligibility, there is something else from which such a Dasein gains its preontological understanding of Being and this something else is more primordial than the understanding of theoretical knowledge; and this something else is the context of shared social practices. In other words, Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger is that the context of Being will be disclosed within the background of shared social practices; the way of being that human beings, cultures, and institutions share. Again, it is worth pointing out at this point that Rorty once again disagrees with Dreyfus regarding this interpretation of Heidegger which we will look at in more detail later. But for Dreyfus Dasein is always 'thrown' into a world of cultural meanings, and this makes up the horizon of which everything is made intelligible. In some ways this seems to agree with Heidegger, because when he is discussing the question of Being he says.

One may, however, ask what purpose this question is supposed to serve. Does it simply remain - or is it at all - a mere matter for soaring speculation about the most general of generalities, *or is it rather, of all questions, both the most basic and the most concrete?*²⁰

If we are immersed in Being in our background practices then this makes it near and concrete, but if this nearness of our background practices is hidden by theories then it becomes general and speculative. It is at this point that Dreyfus attempts to theorise for Heidegger in his different accounts of Japanese and American babies; he is attempting to bring generalities down to a specific level and it becomes very difficult. The Japanese child rearing practice is one example of an *existentiell* understanding of being, and the American child rearing practice is another example of an *existentiell* understanding of being. This important point we will come back to later.

Thus for Dreyfus, Heidegger reverses the Cartesian tradition by making the individual subject dependent upon shared social practices, and the shared agreement in our practices as to what entities can show up is called our pre-ontological understanding of Being. But Dreyfus warns that we cannot make this pre-ontological understanding explicit and he uses the following quote by Heidegger to support this.

("Dasein is ontically closest to itself"), but we cannot explicitly grasp this stand (it is also "ontologically farthest") - and yet has a dim understanding that it is interpreting itself and entities ("preontologically it is surely not a stranger").²¹

Dreyfus goes on to argue that we can only 'light up' preontological understanding, we cannot 'spell it out'; and most importantly, it is not a network of beliefs that we have to 'spell out', it is only skills and practices. Hence, we can only give an interpretation of the interpretation already in the practices. According to Dreyfus Dasein is what, in its social activity, it interprets itself to be. To exist is to take a stand on what is essential about one's being and to be defined by that stand. Human Being is essentially self-interpreting, and human beings begin to exist as they are socialised into the understanding of what it is to be a human being that is already contained in social practices. To support this argument, Dreyfus uses the following quote.

This common world, which is there primarily and into which every maturing Dasein first grows, as the public world, governs every interpretation of the world and of Dasein.²²

There is still a problem that Dreyfus has got to overcome, and this is the problem that we looked at earlier about whether Heidegger is doing philosophy or anthropology. To look at this problem more closely we need to acknowledge that what Heidegger is doing is questioning the primacy of epistemology. The guiding aim of *Being and Time*, Heidegger says, is "to work out the question of Being in general". Heidegger believes he can turn directly to this ancient metaphysical question and ignore modern epistemology's injunction to first clarify our mode of access to Being, because he maintains that "'the question of Being' is prior to any other area of philosophical concern."²³ The question of Being is ignored and covered up because epistemology begins with the problem of knowledge, and as Guignon argues; by turning directly to Being Heidegger bypasses the tradition. He sees that the attempt to provide epistemological grounding for our beliefs and practices cannot avoid dealing with the ontological status of the entities posited in such grounding. Epistemological problems must be given a conceptual foundation which is more fundamental than Cartesianism, thus Dasein is always thrown into a world of cultural meanings from which everything is made intelligible. This is an important point for the debate whether Heidegger is an anthropologist or not, because he argues that anthropological relativism can be overcome by discovering an underlying structure of Dasein which will be present in all human cultures at all times. Dreyfus agrees with Heidegger at this juncture, but as we will see, Rorty disagrees.

Thus, from Heidegger's perspective, the Cartesian subject trapped within its subjectivity presupposes an epistemologically biased approach to interpreting the world. It ignores the totality of man, and this is the reason why he bypassed the tradition. This is also why he starts with a description of our everyday situations, and in this everydayness he wants to find the underlying structure of Dasein.

In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit - not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of Dasein's everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion.²⁴

Just to recapitulate what we have discussed. The inquiry into the Being of entities in general Heidegger calls ontology in the widest sense.

But such an inquiry itself - ontology taken in the widest sense without favouring any particular ontological directions or tendencies - requires a further clue.²⁵

Ontology in the widest sense therefore requires a more fundamental exploration, and this exploration into the meaning of Being is fundamental ontology. "Therefore *fundamental ontology*, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*."²⁶ The analytic of Dasein begins by working out the pre-ontological understanding of Being. We now need to look closer at what Heidegger exactly means by 'pre-ontological'.

Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological.

Here "Being-ontological" is not yet tantamount to "developing an ontology". So if we should reserve the term "ontology" for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have in mind in speaking of Dasein's "Being-ontological" is to be designated as something "pre-ontological". It does not signify simply "being-ontical", however, but rather "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being."²⁷

Heidegger goes on to explain that Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence and the possibilities that this existence can throw up, but usually Dasein grows up into a particular understanding of Being from whichever culture it grows up in. It is through its existence that Dasein will find the clues to its basic ontological structures, but: "This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent."²⁸ Thus the ontological existential analytic of Dasein is embedded within Dasein's ontical constitution and this has the consequence that all the different cultural understandings of Being which are all pre-ontological should have the roots of the basic ontological categories. But Heidegger has a problem here, he himself says:

Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of *doing violence*, whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquillised obviousness.²⁹

This leads him on to conclude: "Unless we have an existentiell understanding, all analysis of existentiality will remain groundless."³⁰ The existential analytic therefore starts from our existentiell activity in the world, and our existentiell activity in the world varies from culture to culture, but it is from this starting point that we have to grasp the underlying fundamental structure. If he fails to do this, which Rorty says he does, and stays on the existentiell level, then he is just doing anthropology. This is what Dreyfus has to say:

To arrive at a description of the basic structures of the way of being called existence, shared by cultures, institutions, and human beings, Heidegger proposes to describe in detail the various activities of Dasein that are specific manifestations of these general existential structures.³¹

The basic structures are the existential ontological categories which the existential analytic wants to spell out, and the specific manifestation of these unchanging ontological categories, because they contain an understanding of Being must be studied as an interpretation. The different ways that the Japanese and the Americans bring up their children are the examples that Dreyfus uses as two different understandings of Being which are both specific manifestations of the underlying existential ontological structures. Also, both the latter are on the existentiell level, but they also both embody an understanding of what it is to be.

To be sure, its ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme.³²

Dreyfus uses the latter quote to support his argument that the Japanese and American child rearing practices are just two different understandings of the Being embodied in Dasein.

Thus Dasein is always thrown into a world of cultural and historical meanings which makes everything intelligible, and whereas our interpretations of these worlds are different and constantly shifting from culture to culture, Heidegger believes that the structure of interpreting itself is constant. Dasein's Being is where the structure of interpreting is to be found through the existential analytic. But because our self-understanding is mediated by the culture and history in which we find ourselves Dasein always grows up into a traditional way of interpreting itself; and what is given is often corrupted and distorted by the cultural and historical situation in which Dasein finds itself.

Yet that which remains *hidden* in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets *covered up* again, or which shows itself only '*in disguise*', is not just this entity or that, but rather the *Being* of entities,....This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning.³³

Heidegger wants to use the description of the existentiell everydayness which manifests different understandings of Being as a route to the existential background which is hidden behind..

Now what Dreyfus wants to do is to give examples of the activities which are the specific manifestations of the underlying existential structures. He wants to prove that the understanding of being human is grounded in an individual's activity, and that this activity has come about from being socialised into human practices. In other words, we do not imitate a set of beliefs or models, but other people's actions; and all of these add up to an interpretation of what it is to be a person. In this anti-Cartesian interpretation of Heidegger Dreyfus argues that an ontology need not be represented in a mind and this leads him to the conclusion that.

....Dasein's shared ways of behaving are not mere facts to be studied objectively by a "scientific" discipline such as anthropology or sociology (although they are that too). Rather, because they contain an understanding of being they must be studied as an interpretation.³⁴

But as we have seen above, the shared agreement in our practices is the preontological understanding of Being, and because our shared skills and practices

do not arise from beliefs or models there is nothing to make explicit. Thus Dreyfus argues that we can only give an interpretation of the interpretation already in the practices, and this is the reason that our understanding of Being can never be complete because we dwell in it. Hence, according to Dreyfus, Heidegger is not interested in what specific understanding of Being a particular Dasein gets; this is the reason why he does not give any examples and Dreyfus attempts to do it for him with the specific cases of Japanese and American babies which are on the existentiell level. What Heidegger wants is to describe the structure of the self-interpreting being that we are.³⁵ Dreyfus admits that this is a forced reading of Heidegger, and it is here that Rorty disagrees with Dreyfus regarding there being an understanding of Being in the pervasive background of shared cultural practices. This we will come back to later on.

That an ontology need not be represented in a mind is very important for Heidegger's argument and for our future discussion regarding an Heideggerian philosophy of education; it therefore needs to be looked at much more closely. To do this we need to look at in more depth what Heidegger means by phenomenology and how it differs from Husserlian phenomenology because this will give us more insight into Heidegger's ideas. We therefore now need to look at the more technical aspects of phenomenology.

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3 HEIDEGGER AND HUSSERL

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

A good introduction to Husserl is his criticism of 'psychologism', which states that logic is an empirical science, which is to be found in the first part of the *Logical Investigations*.¹ Logic, according to psychologism is not about ideal Platonic objects, it is a branch of psychology about how we think. Husserl wanted to create a theory which was more coherent than psychologism and less fantastic than Platonism. Crudely put, there are generally three positions in the history of philosophy, the first: Platonism, states that essences subsist in a supersensible world of platonic forms, so the essence of the dodo still subsists when the dodo dies. The second: Aristotelianism, states that there are essences, but not in such a supersensible realm, they are in the world; the essence of the dodo ceased to exist when the dodo became extinct. And thirdly: Empiricism, there are no essences in either the sensible or supersensible realms: rather, they are mental concepts or meanings of words, we just use words a certain way: and psychologism is a branch of empiricism.

If consciousness was what the psychologists of the time said it was, just another describable fact, then the concepts and ideas of consciousness could only themselves be facts also. This then has the consequence that if ideas are facts, then they are contingent with no necessity. Husserl wanted true knowledge, he thus had to eliminate the factual; but if consciousness and its ideas belonged to the factual realm then they would have to be eliminated as well. Hence, consciousness would have to be separated from the world of fact if it is to be the seat of true knowledge. If one can purge consciousness of all its contingent facts then what is left can truly be called knowledge which will be 'being' in the true sense. According to Husserl a mathematical formulation is true whether or not it had ever been thought of by a

consciousness, in fact it was true before consciousnesses existed and will still be true if there were no more consciousnesses to think it. This kind of truth must then be independent of the factual psychological function of man, and if this truth which is in consciousness is independent of the psychological functioning of man, then consciousness itself must also be independent of psychological functioning. Thus in opposition to psychologism, a mathematical formulation is true, not because a mind functioned properly in thinking it, but because it has validity; it is not dependent on the minds who think it. It is at this point where Husserl is more precise than Plato.

These essences...were conceived as having a being independent of existence, but who could be so foolish as to conceive of them as having an existence independent of existence?...He sees in them not an existence but a *Geltung*, which is to say a validity...That which is valid can be thought of...with truth, even though it may be impossible to point out any correspondence between the thought and some factual reality.²

Lauer goes on to say that its being as an object of thought is 'other' than the operation of thought itself, it transcends the thinking that produced it. Thus the content of philosophy belongs to a different world than the empirical sciences, and it is ideal, not factual.

A strict science of philosophy was possible, not because philosophy could be reduced to an empirical science, but because it was possible to attain to a scientific knowledge of the ideal objects which belong in consciousness and in consciousness alone - objects, which in other contexts, Husserl calls "essences".³

If Husserl thus concentrated on the essences which were in consciousness he would have to purify all the factual empirical things which cluttered it up.

Husserl wants to describe consciousness and find out all that we know about the world from within experience, he wants to explain everything without moving out of experience.

Husserl's famous slogan, "Back to the Things Themselves," emphasises the aim of dealing only with what is given in direct experience.⁴

His plan is simple. First he will suspend judgement upon or bracket the un-empirical assumption of a world existing independently or externally to our conscious experiences as the (unchanging self-identical) cause of those interrupted

and different conscious experiences. Then he will seek to show that everything remains as before. If Husserl can achieve the latter and show that we are still able to distinguish, on the basis of experience itself, between conscious experience and the objects of such experience, between the cogito and the cogitatum, then he will have demonstrated that there is nothing external about objects at all or that reality in its entirety can be reduced without loss, to experience. Hence, from within experience we can distinguish the experiencer and the experienced, we can thus stop talking about things inside and outside consciousness. This leads, as we have seen, to the famous bracketing of the world because all the questions are now focused on experience.

....the phenomenological reduction is Husserl's way of describing the turning of attention away from both objects in the world and psychological activity to the mental contents which make possible the reference of each type of mental state to each type of object.⁵

The question now becomes: is it possible from within experience to give an adequate account of all our experiences? From within pure experience can I make the distinction between dreams, fantasies, memories, and physical objects. Husserl wants to show that everything still remains the same without moving out of experience; thus from within the world of our immediate experience are we able to make adequate distinctions. If we can make a distinction between consciousness and object from within experience, do we need to posit an outside world beyond experience? If we can do it between the act of dreaming and dreaming itself (the content of dreaming), why can't we do it with physical things? A lot of commentators question whether Husserl actually succeeds in explaining physical objects as they really are from within experience. How does Husserl go about distinguishing between the experiencer and the experienced? It is at this point that we will have to start using technical language, and another problem is that Husserl's ideas change as his thought develops; also, a lot of the major commentators disagree about what Husserl actually means. But one thing is certain, he has to analyse the signification which the mind grasps in its view of the objects given to it. However,

to find an answer to this we need to look more closely at Husserl's theory of intentionality.

For Husserl, intentionality is the defining feature of consciousness, and the technical language he uses to describe consciousness are noesis and noema. Noesis is the act of consciousness, and the noema is the 'content' of the act of consciousness; other terms used for noema are its meaning or its sense. But we have to be very careful in the use and meaning of this terminology.

...it is by virtue of the noema that consciousness relates to objects, but the noema is not itself the object of consciousness. This point is often obscured by Husserl's characterisations of the noema as the "noematic" or "objective content" and the ambiguous relationship between the noema, the noematic "correlate," and the intentional object. The noematic correlate is something more than the noema, yet less than the object. Furthermore, there is some confusion regarding the relationship between the noema, the object, and the noematic *Sinn*. At times it appears that the "full noema" is equivalent to the object; other times it is only equated with the *Sinn*. Sometimes the noema is said to be a *Sinn*; elsewhere it *has a Sinn*.⁶

It is worth mentioning now that historically there have been two main opposed interpretations of what Husserl meant by the noema. Simply, Follesdal interprets the noema as an abstraction of a concept; and Gurwitsch interprets the noema as a percept. But before we look more closely at this we need to a more general introduction to the noema.

The noema does not belong to the real world of objects or the temporal psychological world of the acts of consciousness or noesis. The essence of meaning is in the 'content' or the noema of the act of consciousness and it is in contrast to the multiple acts of consciousness or noesis. To get to this noema we have to do a special act of reflection, because in our ordinary everyday attitude it is the object which we have before our mind.

In this logical reflection we become aware of what we do not ordinarily notice....Between our thinking and the object or referent of our thinking lies the sense, which, as Frege puts it, "is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself."⁷

In other words we have objectified what was ideal through a special act of reflection. We can think about the noema which is intended by our act of

consciousness. It is worth noting here the ambiguity regarding object. Even though we have made the noema an object by thinking about it, it is not really an object. But it was there all the time even though we may have not been conscious of it, to become conscious of it we needed to do the special act of reflection. By reflecting I can distinguish between subject and object but I cannot separate them. I cannot have a conscious act without it being directed at an object, all consciousness is consciousness of an object, also; the object remains the same, but the acts of consciousness can change. On the one hand there are consciously changing acts, but on the other hand the object remains the same. Thus Husserl posits his special type of reflection.

It is a special act of reflection, in which we turn our attention *away from* the object being referred to (and *away from* our psychological experience of being directed toward that object), and turn our attention *to* the act, more specifically to its intentional content, thus making our representation of the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state our object.⁸

Every signifying act of consciousness thus has its own content (noema, sense, meaning, intentional correlate) whether it is fulfilled or not.

Before we carry on it is going to be fruitful to explain how Husserl came to his theory of meaning to explain the term fulfilment. As we have hinted, in his analysis of language he comes to the conclusion that to mean, signifies to intend: a meaning is an intention of the mind.

....Husserl begins by distinguishing the physical manifestations of linguistic expressions (noises, marks of paper etc.) from the acts of consciousness which give them meaning. Then, turning to an analysis of the meaning conferring act, Husserl notes that such acts are always correlated with a meaning or sense. It is by virtue of this sense that an expression intends or means an object, regardless of whether the object aimed at is actually present in a fulfilling intuition. Since the meaning does not depend on the existence of anything beyond the act itself, Husserl calls the meaning the content of the act. This ideal content,....does not belong to the real world of changing objects....⁹

In other words, language analysis reveals that expression is made up of two elements, one is the physical configuration and the other is its meaning. The world of physical configuration is the world of fact, whereas the world of meaning is the world of intentions. One can, by a physical operation, write or speak a word; but

only by an operation of consciousness can one give to it a meaning. But it is quite possible for the mind to intend something without there being any justifiable correspondence between the meaning and the way things actually are. Thus the signifying noema is not just filled. If a meaning is to be a true meaning, it must be more than merely an intention of the mind; it must be a fulfilled intention.

But it is when Husserl generalises his analysis of signifying acts of consciousness to perceptual acts of consciousness that he runs into trouble argues Dreyfus.¹⁰ He must show that there is a perceptual noema which is a correlate of the perceptual act just as he did for a signifying act of consciousness. Dreyfus argues that Husserl is not convincing.

....when a sense-fulfilling *act* has an object, "object" can mean one of two things: on the one hand, it can mean the referent, or "*more properly*," it can mean "the objects ideal correlate in the acts of meaning-fulfilment: *the fulfilling sense*."¹¹

Dreyfus says that Husserl does not explain how we know there is such a fulfilling sense or why it can be called the noema of the perceptual act of consciousness. He just assumes that it is filled like a signifying act of consciousness is. And here again lies an ambiguity with the term object, Husserl uses it to mean two things. But Dreyfus argues that it is the relationship of perceptual fulfilling acts to their objects where the problem lies for Husserl.

A fulfilling act seems to go directly to its object. This difference in function between signifying and fulfilling acts is so fundamental that it remains to be shown that there is any fulfilling sense at all.¹²

Husserl has serious difficulties in explaining how a fulfilled act has an intentional correlate according to Dreyfus. Or in other words, Husserl has difficulty explaining that consciousness grasps the noema in a perceptual act, it is as though it goes straight to the object; and even a special act of reflection has difficulties finding its quarry, unlike the signifying conceptual acts.

Dreyfus goes on to argue, that for Husserl, when we perform an act of perception we are directly aware of a perceptual object. Also, since a perceptual act is a fulfilling act then its object must have two characteristics, firstly it must have a

signifying intention, and secondly it must be sensuously given. This is because a signifying intention merely points to the object, but an intuitive intention gives the object a presence. Thus Dreyfus points out that for Husserl a perceptual act, 'the filling act par excellence,'¹³ has to have two components which are the signifying and the intuitive. The intuitive act is the act that supposedly presents the object which will either be fulfilled or not. So if the noema of these two acts correspond there is a unity between what is taken and what is given. "We must show that each component act has an ideal correlate which it retains, whether there is a corresponding perceptual object or not."¹⁴ It is between what is taken and what is given where Husserl has a problem. Dreyfus argues that the intentional correlate of the act of taking, like any conceptual act, can be directed at an object whether there is one or not. In other words it is interpretative. But the intuitive act must also have an intentional correlate, if it didn't 'we could never tell whether our anticipation had been fulfilled.'¹⁵ Dreyfus points out that if the intentional correlate of the intuitive act is described in the same way as the intentional correlate of the signifying act and it can then either be empty or fulfilled, Husserl has a problem.

The intuitive act will indeed have its own intentional content, which can be entertained independently of whether this content is fulfilled or not, but then an act having this content is not necessarily a fulfilling act. And we will have to seek again for an act which necessarily supplies the filling.¹⁶

As Dreyfus points out, there is an infinite regress where sense coincides with sense indefinitely and there is no sensuous filling, all that happens is that meaning is superimposed upon meaning. To get round this problem and end the regress he argues that "we must introduce an incarnate meaning, a meaning which is not abstractable from the intuitive content which it informs."¹⁷ Hence, unlike the signifying act and its noema, the noema of the intuitive act would be dependent upon there being something to intuit. Dreyfus calls this intentional correlate of the intuitional act the 'intuitive sense', and it would be inseparable from the intuitive content of the object whose sense it was. This would lead to the conclusion that perception would not be a purely passive act in which something is given, nor a pure

act of taking in which nothing is given. There would still be an act of interpretation based on the conceptual signifying act, but there would have to be a new intuitive act.

This may be the view which Husserl eventually adopts, but it is not the position he holds in the *Logical Investigations*. In this work there is no mention of the intuitive sense, nor could there be, for Husserl has no way of generalising his conception of a nonspatial, nontemporal, universal, abstract sense to cover a *concrete* "form" which is *inseparable* from the sensuous content it organises.¹⁸

What is unclear, Dreyfus points out, is the relation of the intentional correlate of the fulfilling act to the fulfilment itself; and this is because phenomenological reflection is grounded on the claim that one can isolate the intentional correlate or noema. He thus fails to account for the interpretation of the content of the intentional correlate and the content of the sensuous presentation, which would alone count for knowledge. Dreyfus argues that Husserl assumes that the appearance of the objects is unaffected by the meaning which is superimposed. Thus he would not allow an intuitive sense because of his assumption that the content of the intentional correlate can be separated from the content of the filling in every act.

For if even in perception one must always separate the act of meaning from the act of intuition which fills that meaning, it follows that one can have an account of the interpretative sense but no account of the corresponding intuitive sense. One can have an account of what the mind takes the object to be but no account of our bodily interaction with the object in perceiving it.¹⁹

Thus, because he wanted to save the generality of intentionality, Husserl abandons an account of outer perception, and Dreyfus points out that perception must confine itself to what we take there to be rather than what is given. Hence, phenomenology is transcendental; which is a theory of how objects are taken to be or intended, not on how they are given or presented; and as Dreyfus highlights, Husserl does have a problem with how the intuitive acts can be filled; and this juncture is the beginning of the road for Heidegger's ideas.

HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Heidegger followed Husserl in his rejection of psychologism and studied his phenomenology, and Frede argues that he used the conceptual framework of phenomenology in his early study of Duns Scotus; and by looking at this closely we can begin to gain insight into where Heidegger begins to differ from his mentor.

....the categories of reality cannot simply be *read off* nature,....but they are obviously also read *into* nature by us...The "question of being" becomes then the question of the givenness of the object to the subject....therefore, the conditions of *subjectivity* (how does the subject grasp or interpret its objects?) attain central importance.²⁰

This, as we saw earlier is a crucial point, because Husserl confines himself to 'what is taken' rather than to 'what is given'. Frede goes on to argue that: "If all 'objects' depend on the meaning that is bestowed on them by the subject,....then it must be the philosopher's task to work out in what sense there is a *structure of meaning* that stands in relation to or conditions what one might call the *structure of reality*."²¹ This is the point where Husserl's noema or intentional correlate relates to the object, but because Husserl only 'takes away' from the object he does not have the problem of the 'connection' between noema and object that he would have had if something was being 'given' to the subject. Frede points out that if something is being given then the question whether language "imposes a definite analysable form on our thinking acquired special importance,....since it provides the basic concepts that hold together the different realms of reality, of all that 'can be experienced and thought.'"²² Frede explains the latter quote by stating that the meaning of the name "Socrates" and how it is referred to by the speaker are interdependent. Socrates could be regarded as a living individual, a figure of history or any other things. She goes on to explain the different meanings of 'Socrates'.

The example makes clear why the "being" of the subject matter is in each case determined by the *mode* in which it is referred to in a judgement: only the whole statement determines in what sense and whether we are in fact referring to the individual Socrates at all. "Being" then means "object-givenness," the aspect under which the entity is understood ("It is the function of the form in the complex of meaning to give the object its being"). The meaning of the

concepts employed, the formal structure of judgements as a functional whole, reveals the givenness of objects.²³

Frede argues that following Scotus, whatever is intended by the subject cannot be identical with the empirical reality of what lies outside the realm of meaning; Heidegger rejected all mirror theories of language. "The categories of 'all that is' become the categories of our *understanding of being*: the categories become the 'elements and means of the interpretation of the meaning of what is experienced.'"²⁴ Frede concludes that what Heidegger got from Scotus was that objective reality is determined by the thinking subject's understanding, and for Heidegger this is the thinking subject's understanding of being; and this is the overall order and structure underlying all object-givenness. "The interconnection between meaning and the intended object also drew Heidegger's attention to the question of what constitutes the 'fitting' between the realm of meaning and the real object in the world."²⁵ Again, we see how Heidegger wants to pursue the relationship of how consciousness relates to the world of objects.

Thus, because the world is the context in which we encounter beings, we can see why it is important for Heidegger to find out the fundamental relationship between Being and the world; and thus why he rejected Husserl's bracketing of the world.

For Husserl, phenomenological reduction,...is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being...to the understanding of the being of this being.²⁶

Heidegger moved phenomenology into the everydayness of 'lived experience' where he thought that the understanding of all intentionality must be grounded. Hence, according to Frede, the existential analysis consists of a two-pronged investigation that elucidates not only in what sense we encounter entities in the world, but also; what *in us* constitutes such encounterings, what in our understanding makes it possible to disclose the entities to ourselves in this way.²⁷ Hence, the

phenomenologist has to trace the different ways in which we deal with the "given" and bring them to articulation.

We meet with a being's being in the understanding of being. It is understanding that first of all opens up or, as we say, discloses or reveals something like being. Being "is given" only in the specific disclosedness that characterises the understanding of being.²⁸

Heidegger's move into 'lived experience' is to find out what sort of experience makes theoretical intentionality possible, is there an intentionality which is more primordial? As we have seen, the stance taken in theorising allows the thinker to have a detached point of view from the world. The thinker can treat the objects of his investigation as, what Frede calls "indifferently occurring" things that exist independent of observation.²⁹ If the subject and the object of his thought "indifferently occur" alongside one another then there is no involvement in the world. As Dreyfus argues: "the detached, meaning-giving *knowing* subject, still at the centre of Husserlian phenomenology, must be replaced by an involved, meaning-giving, *doing* subject."³⁰ This is because of Husserl's insistence that all objects be treated as intentional objects, that is, as objects represented in consciousness; and this 'representation in consciousness' is crucial for contemporary debates around Husserl and Heidegger. As we have already seen in our discussion of Husserl, if subject and object occur side by side, the question of how contact is possible between the thinking subject and independently existing objects remains an insoluble problem; and this is why Husserl posited an intentional content which was a representation of the object. There is no way to get beyond the split between what occurs inside us and what occurs outside so long as "occurrence alongside" is the only available ontological category.³¹ It may be worth mentioning, to avoid confusion that 'occurrent' is Dreyfus' translation for present-at-hand. Heidegger argues that the theoretical stance is just one perspective, there are other perspectives of interpreting in which ways things are "given" to us.

The ontology of "merely occurring things" is therefore cut back by Heidegger and relegated to the scientists' special point of view as a "founded mode" or derivative understanding of being. This derivative point of view, which treats

us as initially *worldless* subjects who somehow establish cognitive contact with separate objects, ought rather to be understood as a special version of the more original way of understanding ourselves as beings *with a world* that is characterised as a "being-among" or involvement in the world of the ready-to-hand.³²

Frede argues that the gravest consequence of the omission of a proper understanding of "being" in the ontology of occurrence or the present-at-hand is that it does not permit the development of what one might call a *dynamic* rather than a *static* ontology.³³ This point is going to be important when we look at Heidegger's philosophy in the context of education.

Dreyfus argues that there is much more at stake between Heidegger and Husserl than the relationship between theory and practice.

Heidegger does not merely claim that practical activity is primary; he wants to show that *neither* practical activity *nor* contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content and an independent object.³⁴

Dreyfus points this out because he argues that a lot of thinkers mistakenly assume that Heidegger argues that the intentionality of action is more fundamental than the intentionality of thought, when he is arguing that there is an intentionality that does not involve intentional or representational content at all.³⁵ Hall argues that there are three types of intentionality discussed in Heidegger: Husserlian intentionality; the intentionality of the practical world; and a more primordial intentionality which cuts out the subject/object model.³⁶ It is Husserl's insistence on the representational or intentional content of consciousness, which as we have seen, Heidegger thinks gets in the way of the world, that he wants to bypass.

Husserl defined phenomenology as the study of the intentional content remaining in the mind after the bracketing of the world, i.e., after the phenomenological reduction....Heidegger opposes the claim underlying this method - the claim that a person's relation to the world and the things in it must always be mediated by intentional content, so that one can perform a reduction that separates the mind and its content from the world.³⁷

Dreyfus states that it is important that Heidegger is not seen as claiming that mental states get their intentional content by a connection with the external world because he wants to avoid mental content altogether, and this is the point where Heidegger

goes his own way from Husserl. For Heidegger there is no mediation between mental content and the world.

The subject has to relate in some way to the object, and Descartes initiated the first modern argument as to how this can be done. The mind, through reason, can directly apprehend objective truths and clear and distinct ideas. The empiricists challenged this view with Hume's ultimate scepticism that the mind knew nothing but relations between ideas and impressions which included mathematical truths; he was hostile to Locke's substances and argued that we can have no acquaintance with anything that transcended immediate experience. It was left to Kant to synthesise the two opposing viewpoints. Objective reality is the spatio-temporal world that we perceive and through this we gain a certain kind of knowledge; but the thing-in-itself as Kant called it is not knowable as an external appearance; the subject's own structure affects the object by means of the mind's own categories. But even if one accepts this, are there activities of the mind which do not see things as objects, and hence do not use the categories? Heidegger may well agree with Kant about the latter, but he questions, as we have seen, whether this is the only way that one relates to the world.

Dreyfus describes Heidegger's viewpoint in a succinct way. He explains that traditional philosophy from Plato to Descartes maintained that knowledge is gained by means of a detached inquiry. Therefore, if one steps back from a situation as a detached observer and reflects upon the situation, it is inevitable that we will see ourselves as a subject contemplating objects. Heidegger wants to expose the latter to show the limits of subjective consciousness, Dreyfus argues:

To break out of the epistemological tradition, we must begin with everyday involved phenomenon and then see where consciousness and its intentional content fit in. Heidegger holds that human experience discloses the world and discovers entities in it - and yet this does not entail the traditional conclusion that human beings relate to objects by means of their experiences, that is, by way of mental states.³⁸

Dreyfus concludes his exposition by explaining that there is a practical "know-how" that cannot be accounted for in terms of theoretical knowledge, and that theoretical knowledge depends upon practical skills.

Dreyfus argues that Heidegger focuses on action, because if we look closely at the experience of action, it is the easiest to see that this experience need not involve a subject/object split. He therefore looks at the work of John Searle who presents an intentionality of action which Heidegger would oppose; he looks very closely at how Searle's subject/object split is built into the experience of acting. Dreyfus thus argues that for Searle: "An action is a bodily movement which is understood as having been caused in the right way by something mental."³⁹ And for the latter to happen there must be two intentions: there must be a "prior intention" before the initiation of motion and a representation of the goal of the action must exist throughout the motion and must play a continuing causal role in shaping the action which is called the "intention in action".⁴⁰ But more importantly,

Searle maintains that the subject must experience the causal connection between the intention in action and the bodily movement continuously. Indeed, according to Searle, the experience of acting is just the experience of the bodily movement being caused by the intention in action.⁴¹

What is important is the differentiation between the experience of acting and the cause of this experience; this is what Heidegger is questioning. Also, Dreyfus points out that for Searle both the prior intention and the intention in action are causally self-referential. Heidegger argues that self-referential content is a derivative mode that occurs only when there is some disturbance; and it presupposes being-in-the-world which is a more primordial intentionality.⁴² Heidegger would agree that we do seem to know during an action that we are acting:

...but he would point out that only in *deliberate* action is the experience of acting an experience of one's intention in action causing one's movement. In everyday absorbed coping, the experience of acting is instead the experience of a steady flow of skilful activity in response to one's sense of the environment.⁴³

If there is no self-referential experience in a situation but just a steady flow of skilled activity, Dreyfus uses the example of 'what athletes call flow, or playing out

of their heads'⁴⁴ then one is so immersed in the situation that one does not have time to reflect upon it at all. Dreyfus uses a very pertinent quote by Gurwitsch:

[What] is imposed on us to do is not determined by us as someone standing outside the situation simply looking on at it; what occurs and is imposed are rather prescribed by the situation and its own structure; and we do more and greater justice to it the more we let ourselves be guided by it, i.e., the less reserved we are in immersing ourselves in it and subordinating ourselves to it. We find ourselves in a situation and are interwoven with it, encompassed by it, indeed just "absorbed" into it.⁴⁵

If we are so absorbed into a situation, no matter what it is, how can we be taught how to react to that situation without beforehand experiencing it? "We experience the situation as drawing the action out of us".⁴⁶ There is no representational content which is telling me how to act. Thus our relationship to the world is a two way process.

Common sense maintains an unstable mixture of a first-person and a third-person - an internal and an external - account of perception and action. A *private* experience causes or is caused by something in the *public* world. This ontologically unstable idea is expressed in our everyday concepts of perception and action.⁴⁷

Hence, as we have already seen, there can be an ontology which is not in the mind.

Dreyfus also points out that Heidegger would also object to "Searle's claim that the intentional content of the experience of acting is a representation of the action's conditions of satisfaction, viz., a representation of my bringing about the state of affairs I am trying to achieve."⁴⁸ Or in other words, there is a representational content which has goals about what the action is going to achieve. He gives examples of brushing one's teeth or driving to work. He also stresses that we are in this 'immediate coping mode' a much more larger amount of our lives than in the 'subject/object' mode. But if what we are doing is not based on the inspection of the representation of an internal mental state, what is it based upon? The answer is comportment.

As we have seen, Frede argued that Heidegger wanted to move phenomenology into the realm of the everydayness of lived experience, he wanted to move the roots of it from consciousness and ground it in lived experience.

We will try to show that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences as such and not a co-ordination relative to other realities, something added to the experiences taken as psychic states.⁴⁹

Heidegger goes on to examine very closely Husserl's phenomenology and to do this he gives the example of how we naturally perceive a chair, and he argues that it is how I live and move about in the world and "not a detached observation..., but is rather absorbed in dealing with the matters at hand concretely and practically".⁵⁰ Thus the application of the concept of intentionality to the comportment of perception is doomed from the start. What we have to understand with Heidegger is the importance he attaches to: "*Intentio* literally means *directing-itself-toward*."⁵¹ If we attach intentionality to perception it spawns all the theories related to Cartesianism and the problems with representation.

When all epistemological assumptions are set aside, it becomes clear that comportment itself - as yet quite apart from the question of its correctness or incorrectness - is in its very structure a directing-itself-toward. It is not the case that at first only a psychic process occurs as a non intentional state (complex of sensations, memory relations, mental image and thought processes through which an image is evoked, where one then asks whether something corresponds to it) and subsequently becomes intentional in certain instances. Rather, the very being of comporting is a directing-itself-toward. Intentionality is not a relationship to the non-experiential added to experiences, occasionally present along with them. Rather, the lived experiences themselves are as such intentional. This is our first specification, perhaps still quite empty, but already important enough to provide the footing for holding metaphysical prejudices at bay.⁵²

Heidegger argues that previous philosophers ignored the way that comportment is built into the structure of lived experiences. Husserl was the only one who looked at the phenomena themselves and argued that *perceiving is a directing-itself toward*. But the latter structure cannot be disregarded in the case of other forms of comportment. Heidegger argues that Rickert makes this mistake and argues that intentionality is for the comportment of judgement and not the comportment for representing. He argues for this because representing does not get out to the object, it remains in consciousness, hence representing is not knowing. The transcendence of judging whose object is a value is identified with the mental in consciousness thus it is immanent; I do not move outside of consciousness.

What is characteristic is that, in spite of all the sagacity, the most primitive of requirements is nevertheless missing: admission of the matters of fact as they are given. The thinking thus becomes groundless. The constraint of the facts cannot in one case be heeded and in others not; heeded when they fit into a preconceived theory and not heeded when they explode it.⁵³

Heidegger's point is that Rickert takes from Brentano the definition of judgement as acknowledging, hence when we judge we agree with the representations or disagree. But because the object of judging is a value, then only in relation to values does approval or disapproval make any sense. When I perceive a chair and say, "The chair has four legs," the sense of this knowledge according to Rickert is the acknowledging of a value. Even with the best of intentions one cannot find anything like this in the structure of this perceptual assertion. For I am not directed toward representations and less still toward value but instead toward the chair which is in fact given.⁵⁴

What is important is that for Heidegger perception does not need an intermediary between itself and the world, be it a sense datum or a noema. If you focus on the object itself you won't be tempted to move onto a representation of the object. In the case of Rickert representing is not a direct representational comportment because the representations are themselves represented. What Heidegger wants us to see is that whether intentionality directs itself toward a real material thing or towards a value, whether it is a judgement or a representing,

the first thing to see is this directing-itself-toward as such...When it comes to comportments, we must keep a steady eye solely upon the structure of directing-itself-toward in them. All theories about the psychic, consciousness, person, and the like must be held in abeyance.⁵⁵

The structure of intentionality must be seen "without the background presence of any realistic or idealistic theories of consciousness."⁵⁶ This is because the background presence is the world, not consciousness. It must be seen as directing itself toward pure and simple, and Heidegger refines it down even further from the directing itself to the *toward-which*, or in other words to the perceived.

If I answer without prejudice, I say the chair itself. I see no 'representations' of the chair, register no image of the chair, sense no sensations of the chair. I simply see *it* - it itself. This is the most immediate sense that perceiving offers.

More precisely, I must ask: *What* do I see in my 'natural' perception, in which I now live and dwell and am here in this room; what can I say about the chair?⁵⁷

Heidegger uses ordinary language to describe the chair and states that it is an 'environmental thing': is in a room, it is painted etc. Thus one can see the perceived as an 'environmental thing' and a 'natural thing.' He wants to put the latter in opposition to studying it as a scientific thing. If we see it in its pureness "then we also understand and have no difficulty in taking the immediately given just as it shows itself."⁵⁸ The real important point is that Heidegger substitutes the 'world' instead of 'consciousness' as the context for intentionality.

What is important now is how Heidegger distinguishes between what he calls the perceived *entity* in itself from the *perceived* entity insofar as it is perceived, as it shows itself in concrete perception. He is looking at the structure in which the chair is perceived. "The way and manner of how this chair is perceived is to be distinguished from the structure of how it is represented."⁵⁹ The perceived thus does not refer to the entity which is being perceived but to the *structure* in which the entity is being perceived. Using Heidegger's example he argues that the *being-perceived* of the chair does not belong to the chair as chair, just as the *being-perceived* of a stone, the *being-perceived* of a house, or the *being-perceived* of a tree do not belong to the objects themselves.

Being-perceived and the structure of perceivedness consequently belong to perceiving as such, i.e., to intentionality. Accordingly, we can distinguish along the following lines: *the entity itself*: the environmental thing, the natural thing, or the thingness; and *the entity in the manner of its being intended*: its being perceived, being represented, being-judged, being-loved, being-hated, being thought in the broadest sense. In the first three cases we have to do with the entity in itself, in the latter with its being-intended, the perceivedness of the entity.⁶⁰

Thus the perceivedness of the entity and the entity itself can be distinguished as two different structures. Also, which is very important for Heidegger; *being-perceived* is more primordial than being represented, being judged, etc. Being-perceived underlies all the latter. Hence, he argues that we should not look at the chair itself as it is *intended in perceiving*; we should look at it *in the how of its being-intended*; and when we do this what shows itself in the perceived is *bodily presence*.⁶¹ This

has the consequence that because Heidegger is not focusing on what he calls the *intended in perceiving* which is Husserl's noema; he does not perform the phenomenological reduction because he is concentrating on the *how of being-intended* which gives bodily presence.

It is at this point that we have to follow Heidegger very closely because he makes some very subtle distinctions, the first one is when he is describing being bodily-there: "Not only is it given as itself, but as itself in its bodily presence."⁶² Thus being *given as itself* and being *given in its bodily presence* is a distinction. 'There is a distinction in mode of givenness to be made between the *bodily-given* and the *self-given*.'⁶³ He clarifies this distinction by looking at how something is represented.

Representing is here understood in the sense of simple envisaging, simply bringing something to mind.

I can now envisage the Weidenhauser bridge; I place myself before it, as it were. Thus the bridge is itself given. I intend the bridge itself and not an image of it, no fantasy, but it itself. And yet it is not bodily given to me. It would be bodily given if I go down the hill and place myself before the bridge itself.⁶⁴

As we can see, by envisaging something and bringing it to mind, the bridge is itself given or self-given, but it is not bodily-given until I can actually physically see it. Consequently, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that bodily presence is superlative to the self-givenness of an entity. He also distinguishes between self-givenness and empty intending.

Empty intending is the mode of representing something in the manner of thinking of something, of recalling it, which for example can take place in a conversation about the bridge. I intend the bridge itself without thereby seeing it simply in its outward appearance, but I intend it in an empty intending [which in this conversation is left intuitively unfulfilled]. A large part of our ordinary talk goes on in this way. We mean the matters themselves and not images or representations of them, yet we do not have them intuitively given.⁶⁵

We can, therefore, talk about the bridge without having any images or representations about it, in Heidegger's words we talk 'about the matters themselves' without 'seeing' it in its outward appearance. One has to take note that he opens the latter quote by stating that 'empty intending is the mode of representing something

in the manner of thinking of something' which is unfortunate, he could have done without the use of the term 'representing'; but I take him to mean that we can talk about the bridge without it being self-given or envisaged because he goes on to say.

In empty intending as well, the intended is itself directly and simply intended, but merely emptily, which means without any intuitive fulfilment. Intuitive fulfilment is found once again in simple envisaging; this indeed gives the entity itself but does not give it bodily.⁶⁶

Thus, to move from an empty intention to an intuitive fulfilment, one has to carry out a simple envisaging, which as we have seen above, is simply bringing something to mind. Consequently, empty intending is having a conversation without bringing the object of that conversation to mind; when one does this empty intending becomes an intuitive fulfilment; but, an intuitive fulfilment which has no bodily presence.

This distinction between empty intending and intuitive representing applies not only to sense perception but to the modifications of all acts. Take the sentence: $1+2$ is $2+1$. One can repeat it thoughtlessly but still understand it and know that one is not talking nonsense. But it can also be carried out with insight, so that every step is performed by envisaging what is intended.⁶⁷

What Heidegger means here is that one can on the surface say that $1+2$ is $2+1$ without consciously thinking about it, it is only when we stop and reflect about it that we start to envisage $1+2$ is $2+1$ and bring it to mind, the former was not brought to mind.

In the first instance it is uttered to some extent blindly, but in the second it is seen. In the latter case, the intended is envisaged in an ordinary envisaging, in that I make present to myself $2+1$, i.e., all determinations in their original meanings. This mode of intuitive thinking demonstrates the determinations in the matters themselves. But it is only on rare occasions that we operate in this mode of intuitive thinking. For the most part we operate in foreshortened and blind thinking.⁶⁸

For Heidegger, how the being-intended of an entity is related to that entity remains puzzling. But one cannot cover up the problems with theories for and against intentionality. He wants to follow intentionality in its concretion. To do this he looks at Husserl's discovery of *categorial intuition* in the sixth investigation of the *Logical Investigations*: "The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous

and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the manifold meaning of being."⁶⁹

Heidegger tackles categorial intuition by treating "*intentionality* as a structure....*Intuition* means: simple apprehension of what is itself bodily found just as it shows itself."⁷⁰ This simple apprehension he calls *categorial intuition*, and it is grounded in everyday experience. Thus by treating intentionality as a structure, and by looking at the categorial intuition very closely he wants to "bring it to givenness as intentionality, and to make clear *what* is intuited in it and *how*."⁷¹ Kisiel⁷² points out that the categories are not seen as pure categories because the object of perception is absorbed in them, and this absorption of the categories and object is what Heidegger means by categorial apprehension. Hence categorial intuition is an intuition of the pure categories grasped in themselves, and these are the a priori structures of experience, in other words the 'existentials'; and the objects which are absorbed in them are the 'existentiells'.

To recapitulate, for Heidegger:

Perception, or *what* it gives, *points out, de-monstrates*. The empty intention is demonstrated in the state of affairs given in intuition; the originary perception gives the demonstration....In such a demonstrative fulfilment the emptily intended and the originally intuited come into coincidence. This bringing-into-coincidence - the intended being experienced in the intuited as itself and selfsame - is an *act of identification*. The intended identifies itself in the intuited; self sameness is *experienced [erfahren]*.⁷³

Thus for Heidegger, what was before only presumed, is now given in the insight of its groundedness; and this "act of obtaining insight, as identifying fulfilment, is called *evidence*."⁷⁴ He comes to the conclusion that when an intentional act identifies the presumed and the intuited then 'evidence' becomes part of the structure of the intentional act. Evidence is an intentional act which is a directing-itself-toward, hence it has to have an intentional correlate; and the identification of the presumed and the intuited is "the intentional correlate of the act of identification."⁷⁵

To reiterate what we have just discussed, we should not focus on the chair as it is intended in perceiving but: we should focus on *how it is intended* in its bodily presence; which is the *structure* in which the chair is being perceived. Hence, if we focus on the structure in which the chair is being perceived in its bodily presence, then we are moving on from the noema. It is at this point that Heidegger looks at this *structure* of intentionality in more depth. The *simple apprehension* of what is bodily found and which is grounded in everyday experience he calls categorial intuition. The categories have the objects of their simple apprehension *absorbed* in them in their bodily presence and this is categorial simple apprehension. In other words, if the empty intention is *demonstrated* in the state of affairs *given* in intuition, and if this intuition is bodily given and has bodily presence it is categorial intuition which is a simple apprehension grounded in everyday experience. If the empty intention and the categorially intuited come into *coincidence* then there is an *act of identification* which is called *evidence*, and this *evidence* becomes part of the *structure* of intentionality; and evidence is an intentional act which is a directing-itself-toward, hence it has to have an intentional correlate which is the identification of the empty intention and the categorial intuition. In other words, if the empty intention and the categorial coincides, there is an act of identification which is the evidence. This evidence becomes part of the structure of intentionality and is the intentional correlate of the act of identification. For Heidegger we have the first concept of truth which refers to the intentional correlate of the act of identification which is the 'subsistence of the identity of presumed and intuited.'⁷⁶ Kisiel⁷⁷ explains that 'subsistence' is the translation of 'Bestand' which can etymologically point to a background presence that 'stands under' what is overtly present which in this case is the being-identical of presumed and intuited which is an intentional correlate.

It is very important to note here that Heidegger states that the concrete perceiving and the demonstration of what is presumed 'lives in the apprehension of the matter as such, in the performance of the act.'⁷⁸ When the intentional act which

includes the presumed identifies with the intuited the 'evidence is experienced in this apprehension of the intuited matter itself.'⁷⁹ The crucial point is that in this correlation "something is experienced but not apprehended"⁸⁰ Thus the simple apprehension of the chair as it is bodily found and grounded in everyday experience originates in the world and not the noema: 'So it is really only in apprehending the object as such, which amounts to not apprehending the identity, that this identity is experienced.'⁸¹ Heidegger argues that the act of bringing into coincidence the presumed empty intention and the categorial intuition 'is in touch with the subject matter'⁸² and:

....it is precisely through this particular intentionality of being-in-touch-with-the-subject-matter that this intentionality, itself unthematic in its performance, is immediately and transparently experienced as true.⁸³

What is important is that if it is transparently experienced as true, then it 'slips' through conscious awareness, or to use our earlier quote of Heidegger: 'something is experienced but not apprehended'.

The categorial intuition apprehends the chair, but the intentional correlate which is the 'evidence' and part of the structure of intentionality, is experienced but not apprehended. Heidegger argues that this intentional structure of evidence is not thematically studied for the truth of the perception because I "live *in* the truth. Being-true is experienced as a distinctive *relation*, a *comportmental* relation between presumed and intuited specifically in the sense of identity."⁸⁴ Hence, for Heidegger: what he terms 'being-true' is this relation between the empty presumed intention and the categorial intuition which is the correlatio of the act of identification which is a comportmental relation. He also calls it a 'truth-relation' which is "by way of intentionality with reference to the intantum."⁸⁵ He also separates out another concept of truth which does not look at the content of the act but the structure of the act by which he means "the structural relationship of the acts of presuming and intuiting, the structure of the intentionality of evidence itself. *adaequatio* understood as *adaequare*."⁸⁶ He explains that this old Scholastic

concept of truth is double edged in that on the one hand it is the bringing into coincidence which creates the act of identification and on the other hand it is the very *act* of bringing into coincidence. He argues they are both incomplete and that there is a third concept of truth if you look in more depth at the intuited object.

The true can also be understood in terms of the very object which it is. As the originally intuited it provides the demonstration, it gives the identification its ground and legitimacy. Here, the true amounts to that which *makes* knowledge *true* [i.e. the true-making matter, the entity itself as intuited matter]. Truth here comes down to being, being-real.⁸⁷

Thus the object itself, the chair, grounds the identification and gives it legitimacy. Here Heidegger is getting much closer to introducing the importance of the sense of being. He argues: "The first concept of truth understood as the subsistence of the identity of intended and intuited - truth as being-true - at the same time also provides us with a specific *sense of being, being in the sense of being-true*."⁸⁸ Thus in the intentional act of evidence there is a subsistence, a background presence where there is a *sense* of being. This is an important point for Heidegger because when he looks at the proposition: "The chair is yellow", he stresses that what is asserted is the "being-yellow of the chair" which is a state of affairs.⁸⁹ But this "being-yellow of the chair" can be separated into two different meanings of truth and also of being. "I can stress the being in the *being-yellow*"⁹⁰ which as we have seen, truth here is an identity between the presumed and intuited which subsists. "Being here means something like the *subsistence* of truth, of the *truth-relation*, subsistence of identity."⁹¹ He then looks at the opposite meaning: "In other words, in the emphasis of *being-yellow* 'being' refers to the *being of the copula* - The chair is yellow."⁹² This meaning of being and truth is "the structural moment of the state of affairs itself."⁹³

This is the crux of Heidegger's disagreement with Husserl's phenomenology: "Indeed, it was via the problem of truth that Heidegger departed from Husserl's phenomenology."⁹⁴ According to Dahlstrom,

Heidegger's criticism is that Husserl, despite broaching their primary significance as *Wahrverhalt*, characterises both truth and being literally,

substantially, and fatally as a *Sachverhalt*, a fact or state of affairs that, in Husserl's terminology, is the objective correlate of a "categorical intuition," specifically, a judgement.⁹⁵

This does seem to be borne out, given that Heidegger argues that "since these two meanings have never been worked out phenomenologically, constant confusion reigns in the theory of judgement, in that such theories have been constructed without having separated these two senses of being."⁹⁶ He goes on to argue:

Only by way of such a separation can one see how these two senses condition each other in their structure and what possibilities of expression exist in the proposition as proposition... The phenomenal connection in the structure is this: a true state of affairs which has this 'is' in its structure, this 'being' within itself, is itself the correlate [of the act of identification, its *intentum*], the single correlate in the state of affairs. Put another way, the state of affairs as merely presumed is true as demonstrated in that very state of affairs. The truth-relation thus subsists, the truth-relation *is* true.⁹⁷

The important terms for Heidegger are assertion and expression and how they are related to propositions and truth. "The term 'truth' is originally and properly attributed to intentionality, but this is done on the basis of its being composed of both the *intentio* and the *intentum*."⁹⁸ And as we have seen, Husserl interprets truth and being as a "structural moment" or a "relational factor in a state of affairs", and Heidegger argues that because of this Husserlian interpretation: "Traditionally, it is attributed in particular to acts of assertion, that is, relational acts of predication."⁹⁹ Heidegger is going to question whether Husserl's interpretation of truth can be "originally conceived in the context of assertions."¹⁰⁰ He separates out non-relational acts and argues that they can also be true or false even though they are acts of simple apprehension but what is important is:

While truth is traditionally linked to the relational acts of judgement, the term 'being' is readily attributed to the correlate of non-relational, single-rayed acts, as a specification of the object, of the subject matter itself.¹⁰¹

This is the point where Heidegger understands phenomenology differently from Husserl and 'widens' the concept of truth to something much more primordial. He argues that the same 'widening' has to be done to 'being'.

Heidegger goes on to argue that when he was looking at the truth of a state of affairs, it was interrogated by examining propositions and assertions in perceiving

a chair as a thing "and assertions in the sense of a formulated proposition are only specific forms of expressness, where expressness has the sense of expressing lived experiences or compartments through meaning."¹⁰² When he looks closer at this expressedness he claims that even our simplest perceptions are already expressed and interpreted in a certain way: "we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what *one says* about the matter."¹⁰³ This simple apprehension through expressness he wants to spell out in the structure of the categorial intuition because the world is apprehended through expressedness and an expressedness which goes beyond predicative propositions. Thus categorial intuition is implied in the expressedness of each apprehension:

The question now is how we can call an assertion true when we make it within a concrete perception. Can the assertion which I make in a concrete and actual perception be fulfilled in the same way that an empty intention corresponding to the concrete perception is fulfilled?¹⁰⁴

As we have already seen, Dreyfus pointed out this problem that Husserl has with his phenomenology. Heidegger explains that when I give expression to my perception with the assertion "this chair is yellow and upholstered" I am given a clue. Giving expression, as well as announcing the act of perceiving, it also communicates what I perceive; this is also the case for representing, judging, etc. This is what is called "announcing the presence of an act."¹⁰⁵ But this is not the whole story of giving expression to a perception, it may also be giving "the communication of what is perceived in the act."¹⁰⁶ Here, one is not announcing the presence of an act nor confirming the perception of a chair, the assertion is now concentrating on what is apprehended itself. This type of expression is within all acts which for Heidegger "give the object".

Thus, in emptily intending, merely thinking of something, I can make assertions about it. I then do not make an assertion about a mere representation, about something subjective, but about what is itself presumed, but of course in a way such that I do not intuitively demonstrate in it the individual steps of that about which I say something.¹⁰⁷

Thus for Heidegger: "A perceptual assertion is a communication about the entity perceived in perception and not about the act of perception as such."¹⁰⁸ This is

where Heidegger's phenomenology goes further than Husserl's and spells out the problem earlier quoted: "Can the assertion which I make in a concrete and actual perception be fulfilled in the same way that an empty intention or presuming is fulfilled by a concrete perception?" If the evidence of an act of fulfilment as coincidence is a demonstration:

is the perceptual assertion which gives expression to perception demonstrable perceptually?...Are the 'this,' the 'is,' the 'and' perceptually demonstrable in the subject matter? I can see the chair, its being *-upholstered* and its being-*yellow* but I shall never in all eternity see the 'this,' 'is,' 'and' as I see the chair. There is in the full perceptual assertion a *surplus of intentions* whose demonstration cannot be borne by the simple perception of the subject matter.¹⁰⁹

Heidegger argues that what is perceived falls short of what is asserted because the assertion expresses something which is not found perceptually. When he looks closer at the unfulfilled: the 'this,' the 'is,' the 'and,' he argues that I can see the yellow colour of the chair but not its *being-yellow*. "Colour is something sensory and real. Being, however, is nothing of the sort, for it is not sensory or real. While the real is regarded as the objective, as a structure and moment of the object, the non-sensory is equated with the mental in the subject, the immanent."¹¹⁰ This is the point where Heidegger uses the categorial intuition to argue that the non-sensory is not to be identified with psychic consciousness which is always the case when intentionality is not taken into account. Using quotes by Husserl who argues that it is not in the *acts as objects* but in the *objects of these acts* where we find the ground of being, Heidegger argues that:

The category 'being,' 'and,' 'or,' 'this,' 'one,' 'several,' 'then' are nothing like consciousness, but are correlates of certain acts.
If I want to form the concept of aggregate, I find this phenomenon of aggregate not by reflecting upon the psychic process of bringing together a + b + c + d...but by referring to what is presumed in this act of assembling, not in the direction of the act but of what the act gives.¹¹¹

This is the crucial point between 'taking' and 'giving' that Dreyfus argued earlier. Even though being is in surplus to the sensory, the expressions far from expressing subjective data, express "a special kind of objectivity."¹¹² Although being cannot be

shown is a sensory intuition, it can be demonstrated in a categorial intuition which is an intentional act which apprehends a category.

The moments in the full assertion which did not find fulfilment in sense perception receive it through *non-sensory perception* - through *categorial intuition*. The categorial are the moments of the full assertion whose mode of fulfilment has not yet been clarified.¹¹³

For Heidegger "even simple perception, which is usually called sense perception, is already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition."¹¹⁴ As we have seen, it is by concentrating upon sense perception that Husserl characterised truth and being as a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) which is the objective correlate of a categorial intuition. But what is decisive for Heidegger is the non-sensory perception, because:

...by way of understanding what is present in categorial intuition, we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing. and what is more, that the reality of a thing is comprehensible in its structure only on the basis of the full objectivity of the simply experienced entity.¹¹⁵

Hence, simple acts of intuiting are called sense intuition and founded acts of intuiting are called categorial intuition. For Heidegger, the intentions of an assertion of a state of affairs based on a sense intuition are not fully fulfilled, but nor are the categorial acts of 'is' and 'and' fulfilled.

The full composition of the intentions of this assertion instead takes place intuitively only in a founded act, in a sense perception pervaded by categorial acts. This means that concrete intuition expressly giving its object is never an isolated, single layered sense perception, but is always a multi-layered intuition, that is, a categorially specified intuition. It is just this full, multi-layered, categorially specified intuition which is the possible fulfilment of the assertion giving expression to it.¹¹⁶

If one thus looks for the composition of acts which give their objects then one is looking for the sensory, Heidegger will not reduce categorial acts to psychic processes just because the correlate is not found in the sensory; and if he is right, then the assertions contain an adequate fulfilment. By looking at the truth as a coincidence of the presumed and intuited Heidegger argues that this unearthed 'the composite existence [Bestand] of categorial acts',¹¹⁷ the act of asserting reveals an underlying presence.

Now that we have looked at the technical aspects of Heidegger's phenomenology in depth, and seen that he argues for a much more fundamental phenomenology than Husserl; indeed, a phenomenology which is anti-representationalist, we now need to look at how he develops Being-in-the-world, and also start to look much closer at how we can use his framework to develop a philosophy of education.

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²⁴ IBID, p49.

²⁵ IBID, p49.

²⁶ Heidegger, M. (1988) *The Basic Problems Of Phenomenology*, translated by Hofstadter, A. Indiana University Press, p21.

²⁷ Frede, Dorothea (1993) op. cit. p56.

²⁸ Heidegger, M. (1988) op. cit. p18.

²⁹ Frede, Dorothea (1993) op. cit. p58.

³⁰ Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1993) 'Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality'. *Social Research*, Vol. 60, No. 1.

³¹ Frede, Dorothea (1993) op. cit. p61.

³² IBID, p62.

³³ IBID, p62-63.

³⁴ Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1993) op. cit. p19.

³⁵ IBID, p18-19.

³⁶ Hall, H. (1993) 'Intentionality and world: Division 1 of *Being and Time*', in Guignon, C. (Editor), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, p124.

³⁷ Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1993) p19.

³⁸ Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991) *Being-in-the-World, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. p45-46.

³⁹ IBID, p21.

⁴⁰ IBID, p21.

⁴¹ IBID, p21.

⁴² IBID, p22.

⁴³ IBID, p24.

⁴⁴ IBID, p24.

⁴⁵ IBID, p24.

⁴⁶ IBID, p25.

⁴⁷ IBID, p26.

⁴⁸ IBID, p27.

⁴⁹ Heidegger, M. (1992) *History of the Concept of Time*, translated by Kisiel, T. Indiana University Press. p29.

⁵⁰ IBID, p30.

⁵¹ IBID, p29.

⁵² IBID, p31-32.

⁵³ IBID, p32.

⁵⁴ IBID, p33.

⁵⁵ IBID, p36.

⁵⁶ IBID, p36.

⁵⁷ IBID, p37.

⁵⁸ IBID, p39.

⁵⁹ IBID, p40.

⁶⁰ IBID, p40.

⁶¹ IBID, p40.

⁶² IBID, p41.

⁶³ IBID, p41.

⁶⁴ IBID, p41.

⁶⁵ IBID, p41.

⁶⁶ IBID, p41.

⁶⁷ IBID, p41.

⁶⁸ IBID, p41.

⁶⁹Heidegger, M. (1972) *On Time And Being*, translated by Stambaugh, J. Harper Torchbooks, p78.

⁷⁰ IBID, p47.

⁷¹ IBID, p48.

⁷² IBID, footnotes bottom of p48.

⁷³ IBID, p49.

⁷⁴ IBID, p50.

⁷⁵ IBID, p51.

⁷⁶ IBID, p52.

⁷⁷ IBID, footnotes bottom of p51.

⁷⁸ IBID, p52.

⁷⁹ IBID, p52.

⁸⁰ IBID, p52.

⁸¹ IBID, p52.

⁸² IBID, p52.

⁸³ IBID, p52.

⁸⁴ IBID, p52.

⁸⁵ IBID, p53.

⁸⁶ IBID, p53.

⁸⁷ IBID, p53.

⁸⁸ IBID, p53.

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⁹¹ IBID, p54.

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⁹⁴ Watanabe, J. (1993) 'Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger', in Sallis, J. (Editor) *Reading Heidegger*, Indiana University Press, p113.

⁹⁵ Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (1994) 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl', in Kisiel, T. and van Buren, J. (Editors) *Reading Heidegger From The Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, State University of New York Press, p235.

⁹⁶ Heidegger, M. (1992) op. cit. p54.

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⁹⁹ IBID, p55.

¹⁰⁰ IBID, p54.

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¹⁰⁹ IBID, p57-58.

¹¹⁰ IBID, p58.

¹¹¹ IBID, p59.

¹¹² IBID, p59.

¹¹³ IBID, p60.

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¹¹⁵ IBID, p60.

¹¹⁶ IBID, p68.

¹¹⁷ IBID, p68.

4 BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

What I intend to do in this section is to analyse closely what Heidegger means by the 'The worldhood of the World', and explore as we go along how he develops his notion of being-in-the-world. Heidegger begins his 'existential analytic' of Dasein in its everydayness to tease out the meaning of Being in general.

And this means that it is to be shown as it is *proximally and for the most part* - in its average *everydayness*. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit - not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of Dasein's everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion.¹

Thus as Heidegger examines the particular manifestations of the everyday conditions he is looking for clues to the underlying existential structures which determine the character of Dasein's Being. The expression Being-in-the-world is not meant to be interpreted as if it is spatially contained in the world. When Heidegger says that Dasein is "in" the world he means that Dasein dwells in the world. Thus Dasein is not:

Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with in the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "*categorial*": they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein.²

Therefore the present-at-hand has a different kind of Being to that of Dasein. Dasein's Being is 'Being-in', or in other words; the being of Dasein is Being-in-the-world.

Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existiale.... "*Being-in*" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.³

Heidegger is not interested in the physical world of the physicist because he thinks it is derivative, thus he wants to look at a more primordial interpretation of Dasein.

"Being-in" and "world" are not two distinct entities; they intermingle so thoroughly that they are one structure. To help us understand this more it is worth looking at Duns Scotus's 'formal distinction': A real distinction is, for example, between two things which are physically separable, but a purely mental distinction is one made by the mind when there is no corresponding distinction in the thing itself. Thus a formal distinction is not physically separable, it is when the mind distinguishes in an object two or more distinct parts which are physically inseparable from one another. And the best way of arriving at what Heidegger means by being-in-the-world is a description of our everyday relationship with entities in the world.

In these analyses the issue is one of *seeing* a primordial structure of Dasein's Being - a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated; because of this, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories, this 'being-alongside' must be examined still most closely.⁴

What Heidegger means here, is that the existential structure of Dasein cannot be grasped by the use of what he calls traditional ontological categories which relate to the world in a spatial sense. He wants us to *see* "Being-in" in a much more primordial sense of relating to the world. Dreyfus illuminates how the former is the dominant way of relating to the world in his own translation of Heidegger.

[Dasein] has a tendency [to understand its own being] in terms of that being toward which it comports itself primarily and in a way which is essentially constant - in terms of the "world" [the totality of objects]. In Dasein itself, and therefore in its own understanding of being, the way the world is understood, as we shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted.⁵

Consequently, because Dasein comports itself to the present-at-hand, it tends to interpret itself as present-at-hand. Descartes, who is dominated by a geometrical/spatial theoretical interpretation of the world overlooks the more fundamental experience of what Dreyfus calls *involvement*. Dreyfus argues that in English we can distinguish two senses of "in". One is the spatial sense of "in a box", the other is the existential sense of "in love", and the latter conveys the sense of involvement. Heidegger himself argues that Dasein itself, with certain limits, can be

taken as present-at-hand such as when it is interpreted as a biological organism, but "To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in."⁶ One could argue that nurses can see the patient as just a biological organism and miss the existential state of 'involvement', and this we will come back to later. He goes on to explain that just because Dasein can mistakenly be taken as something present-at-hand, this must not be confused with Dasein's own presence-at-hand. In other words, Dasein understands its own Being as a 'factual Being-present-at-hand'; but this factuality is ontologically different from the factual occurrence of anything else. To differentiate this Heidegger calls it Dasein's "facticity".⁷ This does not mean that Dasein is a being that is present-at-hand, if you look at a human being as present-at-hand then it is no longer Dasein that is being looked at but the biological organism. This can only be grasped when Dasein's existential structures have been analysed.

It is this facticity of Dasein's that explains why Dasein can interpret Being-in in many different ways. "All these ways of Being-in have *concern* as their kind of Being..."⁸ He thus uses the expression 'concern' as an ontological term and refines it down to the ontological structural concept of care. Heidegger goes on to argue that Being-in has always been interpreted by philosophers as knowing the world in a theoretical sense.

This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is '*non*-theoretical' and 'atheoretical'. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its ownmost kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential 'modality' of Being-in.⁹

The latter quote is an important crux in Heidegger's argument, because the reason why practical behaviour is seen as not being theoretical is because of the epistemological subject/object description of knowledge.

But no sooner was the 'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial', formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a 'relation between subject and Object' - a procedure in which there lurks as much 'truth'

as vacuity. But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world.¹⁰

If human experience discloses the world, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the only way human experience discloses the world is through consciousness relating to objects by means of those experiences. Hence we need to look very closely at what Heidegger means by the term 'world'.

There are important ramifications here of the age old problem of the relation between theory and practice, and these questions and the effects that Heidegger's thinking could have on the philosophy of education will be looked at later. If knowledge is gained by a detached inquiry, as traditional philosophy holds; if one steps back from a situation and reflects upon that situation; is one moving further away from Being-in, from one's primordial roots? To answer this question we need to look at what Heidegger means by the term 'world'.

Heidegger opens up his chapter on the 'worldhood of the world'¹¹ by stating that the 'world' as phenomenon shows itself in 'entities': and his examples are houses, trees, people, mountains, and stars. This description is pre-phenomenological and it is ontical. To give a phenomenological description of the 'world' one will have to show the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand. He goes on to explain that those entities are Things of Nature and the characteristic of these Things of Nature is substance; and modern epistemology has been founded on the notion of substance. But he asks where is its ontological meaning? He argues that even if the Being of Nature is successfully exposed in its purest manner; Nature is only itself an entity within the world and it can be discovered in various ways and at various stages. It only dwells with Dasein in-the-world.

Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the 'world'. In both of these ways of access to 'Objective Being', the 'world' has already been 'presupposed', and indeed in various ways.¹²

Heidegger then explains that he will use the term "world" in an ontical sense, not for present-at-hand entities but for something which is factual Dasein; and "world" meant this way has a pre-ontological existentiell signification. It also has different

possibilities for it may stand for the 'public' "world" or the 'subjective' "world"; and Heidegger's term for the latter is *environment*. When he wants to use 'world' for an ontical description of present-at-hand entities he uses single quotation marks.¹³ All past ontology interprets "world" as 'world', thus not as a state of Dasein. But if "world" is interpreted as a state of Dasein in its everydayness, then what is closest to Dasein is its *environment*.

We shall seek the worldhood of the environment (environmentality) by going through an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-*environment* which we encounter as closest to us.¹⁴

The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us within the environment of Being-in-the-world are the things which we manipulate, and these things which we manipulate which Heidegger calls our *dealings in* with the world is:

The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'.¹⁵

In other words, there is no representation or noema of the environment of the "world" like there is for the present-at-hand 'world'. Now if the environment of the "world" has got its own special kind of knowledge it is going to be a different type of knowledge to what is found in the case of the 'world'. "Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the 'world' theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth."¹⁶ Dreyfus illuminates this point by using a quote by John Dewey who is explaining the difference between knowing-how and knowing-that.

We may... be said to know how by means of our habits... We walk and read aloud, we get off and on street cars, we dress and undress, and do a thousand useful acts without thinking of them. We know something, namely, how to do them... If we choose to call [this] knowledge... then other things also called knowledge, knowledge of and *about* things, knowledge *that* things are thus and so, knowledge that involves reflection and conscious appreciation, remains of a different sort.¹⁷

Now if we look closer at this type of knowledge that does not have to involve thinking about what is situated in the "world", we can tease out some very important

points regarding how we come about this knowledge; especially if it is a different type of knowledge to knowledge about the 'world'.

What is closest to a nurse, using Heideggerian terminology, is her 'environment'. But if she is going to be a detached observer and step back from the situation to reflect upon it then she will relate to it in a present-at-hand way and think about the 'world' in a theoretical way. But when say, a general nurse is in a practical situation with a piece of equipment such as a sphygmomanometer for measuring blood pressure, or a thermometer for measuring body temperature; how do they learn how to carry out these tasks? It is certainly not by stepping back and thinking about it: to actually 'use' the equipment the nurse has to become immersed in the situation and dwell in the "world" so she can have dealings with equipment. We need to look more closely at Heidegger's argument to help us.

He calls the entities which we encounter in a concerned way 'equipment', and he gives examples such as doorknobs and latches; in the nurses case these are sphygmomanometers and thermometers. He goes on to argue that there is no such thing as *an* equipment, equipment belongs to a totality of equipment: "Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to'."¹⁸ He expands on the latter structure as a structure which has a reference of something to something and the examples he gives are ink-stand, ink, pen, and so on, which all have a reference to a room. But we encounter the room not as something spatial in a geometric sense but as something with equipment residing in it which can then show itself individually. However, what is important for Heidegger is that the totality of equipment has shown itself before the individual items of equipment. Moreover, what is even more important is that any one of the entities is not thought about in a theoretical 'worldly' present-to-hand way. To use Heidegger's own example: "The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer's character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable."¹⁹ Our concern is more primordial to the practical 'in-order-to' structure of the "world" rather than the theoretical 'world' which is derivative to the former. This equipment

Heidegger calls ready-to-hand in contrast to present-at-hand. Thus in a nursing context the ready-to-hand equipment would be, as we have seen, such things as a sphygmomanometer or thermometer. But what is important for the theory/practice divide is:

If we look at Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is *circumspection*.²⁰

It is now important to look a lot more closely at what Heidegger means by the terms 'using' and 'manipulating' equipment and the *sight* of 'circumspection'. As we have seen, the situated use of equipment in the context that it is going to be used is more primordial than a detached thinking about it.

...the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment.²¹

Also, as we have seen, equipment is always set within a context of other equipment in which it relates too. The basic way of understanding equipment is to 'use it'; and this mode of understanding he calls 'manipulating'. But when we are using equipment it becomes transparent. As Dreyfus explains:

When an expert carpenter is hammering - if the hammer is working well, and he is master at what he is doing - the hammer becomes transparent for him. He does not have to think about it at all. He might be paying attention to the nails, but if he is really good and the nails are going in well he does not have to pay attention to them either. He can think about lunch, or he can talk to some fellow carpenter, and his hammering simply goes on in a 'transparent coping' mode.²²

Thus the nurse who is learning how to take blood pressure, or doing any other practical thing is better able to learn how to do this by 'using' the equipment or manipulating it. She needs to relate to the "world" in a ready-to-hand way. If everything is going okay the nurse is functioning in the transparent coping mode. But paradoxically, when we use the equipment it has a tendency to withdraw or disappear.

The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.²³

We make use of things, but we do not notice them. The nurse who is taking the blood pressure is carrying out the procedure to get the work done, she does not need to be thinking theoretically about the physiology of blood pressure which is not situated in the environment of the "world". Our attention is directed toward what we are doing and seems to go through the things that we 'use' or manipulate. And the reason for this is:

That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work - that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.²⁴

For example, it would suggest that the culture of a clinical environment is tied up in the referential totality within which the equipment is encountered. As we have seen, equipment is 'something in-order to'; we understand the equipment in terms of a certain purpose; there is always an 'involvement' with the equipment in its 'towards which'.²⁵ When we see some hammer as a hammer, it is because we are already familiar with its function, but this involvement to a towards-which is only one among a number of involvements in terms of which we grasp the ready-to-hand. We always understand an entity by reference to several other relationships it enters into. Thus there is an involvement with the totality of equipment, hence a student can only understand a practical situation within the whole context 'holistically'. But it has to be stressed that this is the whole context of the "world", not the present-to-hand 'world' what the student has been taught in College.

This can be illuminated further when Heidegger argues that some equipment has an assignment to the materials that it has been produced out of and so on. The examples he gives are that hammers, tongs, and needles refer to steel, iron, metal, mineral and wood.²⁶ But what is important is that 'Nature' is discovered by this use.

Here, however, "Nature" is not to be understood as that which is just present-at-hand, nor as the power of Nature. The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock;.... As the 'environment' is discovered, the 'Nature' thus discovered is encountered too. If its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this 'Nature' itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which 'stirs and strives', which assails us and enthrals us as landscape, remains hidden.²⁷

If we relate the student nurse's situation to the latter quote, we can say that in the *environment* of the ward and all the *equipment* that goes with it, there is another 'Nature', which needs to be studied by the use of circumspection of the surrounding environment. And this 'Nature' is a different type to the 'Nature' that she has been studying through the present-at-hand 'world'. Therefore the nurse whose attention to the elderly clients is to 'use' and 'manipulate', rather than study the Nature of the present-at-hand 'world', needs to study the 'Nature' of the ready-to-hand "world" of the surrounding environment to gain insight into the culture of the clinical environment. In other words, she needs to be circumspective.

Heidegger goes on to explain that the work produced refers not only to the "towards which" of usability, but it has a reference to the person who is to use the equipment. He is there along with the work as it emerges.

Our concerned absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending upon the way in which we are absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along in the work with it (that is to say, in the assignments or references which are constitutive for it) remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying circumspective penetration.²⁸

This means that any nurse in a practical situation needs to be taught the skill of 'circumspective penetration' so that they can *see* the *environment* of the "world" around them; and with this they can see the culture which creates the conditions of using elderly clients as pieces of equipment to be used and objectified. Consequently, if the nurse is very circumspective, the environment she is working in will become more explicit. Also, circumspection has its own kind of sight.

'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of "sightlessness". The way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one *acts*, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact

that action has *its own* kind of sight. Theoretical behaviour is just looking, without circumspection.²⁹

What Heidegger is arguing, is that practical behaviour has a distinctive relationship to its environment of its "world" of the ready-to-hand; which is circumspection. There is knowledge embedded in its "world" of equipment which has a different kind of Being to the theoretical present-at-hand 'world'. If one is to 'think theoretically' then this is about the 'world' and not the "world". As he says, action has its own kind of sight which is circumspection.

We now need to look at what Heidegger means by circumspection more closely. When things go wrong in the ready-to-hand world, the examples Heidegger uses are when the doorknob comes off or the head flies off the hammer. In such circumstances, what Dreyfus called the 'transparent coping mode' ceases. There is a breakdown which he calls the 'unready-to-hand'. It is then that we suddenly see the totality of equipment in the context in which we are using it. For a nurse this would be the clinical situation that she is working in. The elderly client is suddenly 'seen' within the surrounding environment.

Heidegger is careful to avoid the term "perception" even when discussing the kind of looking around that is sometimes necessary in practical contexts. The term he prefers is "circumspection", a term referring to the kind of looking around that makes sense only against the practical background or world, and that is always guided by our practical interests and concerns.³⁰

If a nurse is doing a dressing and there is something missing, she could search the clinical environment for a suitable alternative to the missing entity, she would be 'looking around'. If the thermometer was not working she would look for another one. At no point would she be a detached observer. Thus circumspection is a worldly activity and practical, and for the nurse to be competent she has to be circumspective. The nurse looks around to be sure that her tools are in order, or to select the best one suited to her task. All this concerned looking around and doing displays another feature, which Heidegger calls *desevering*.

He argues that when we attribute spatiality to Dasein, it is not the spatiality of Being-present-at-hand nor Being-ready-to-hand. Both of these are entities

encountered by Dasein within-the-world. But Dasein is also 'in' the world, and as we have seen, it encounters other entities 'in' the world concern fully, it has concern for them. Heidegger argues that Dasein's spatiality has the characteristics of de-severance and directionality.³¹

De-severing amounts to making the farness vanish - that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a determinate categorial characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of Dasein.³²

Things which are in the environment of the "world" of the ready-to-hand are close to us even though they can be the remotest. The distance of things ready-to-hand is not measurable lengthways, the spectacles worn by a man are further away environmentally than the picture on the opposite wall,³³ they are more remote than the picture even though they are at a nearer measurable distance. The distance is determined by circumspective concern.

Proximally and for the most part, de-severing is a circumspective bringing-close - bringing something close by, in the sense of procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand.³⁴

By doing this he argues that we are 'bringing-close' the equipment for further use, thus de-severing is a preparatory stage; the spectacles are left at the side of the bed in preparation for being worn the following day. When the nurse arranges her equipment for accessibility she is de-severing. She 'brings close' the entities with which she is concerned. It is not a diminishing of measurable distance, it is the availability for use and manipulation. remoteness never gets taken as a distance. Heidegger uses the terms to go "over yonder", "a good walk" or "a stone's throw" to spell out that the entities referred to are not to be measured by distance, but that "remotenesses are estimated proximally by circumspection".³⁵ The distances of entities which are present-at-hand can be mathematically measured because they "do not coincide with the remoteness and closeness of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world".³⁶ The knowledge of the present-at-hand 'world' does not circumspectively

bring close the environment of the ready-to-hand "world". A nurse can have a good theoretical knowledge base, but can be lost in the clinical situation.

We need to study these difficult ideas more closely and put them into a nursing context. We have already seen that circumspective concern decides the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally, and whatever circumspective concern dwells alongside is what is closest. What is important is that for Heidegger, what is closest is not something fixed in a spatial position, it is what is proximally within range in the ready-to-hand "world" for circumspection. From this it follows that Dasein's spatiality is not to be fixed as that of some corporeal being.³⁷ But he argues that Dasein does occupy a place.

Occupying a place must be conceived as a desevering of the environmentally ready-to-hand into a region which has been circumspectively discovered in advance. Dasein understands its "here" in terms of its environmental "yonder". The "here" does not mean the "where" of something present-at-hand, but rather the "whereat" of a de-severant Being-alongside, together with this de-severance.³⁸

So if circumspective concern dwells *alongside* what is closest which is the 'whereat' of the ready-to-hand and not something fixed spatially present-at-hand; it has to be something proximally within range of circumspective concern. Richardson uses a good practical example: "When we wash, dry, and stack dishes we are desevering this equipment, by readying it for a later use;..."³⁹ The nurse is being circumspective regarding the proximal ready-to-hand environment and concentrating on anticipating what is going to happen. But if Dasein's spatiality is not to be occupying a place either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand but has the characteristics of de-severance and directionality then the consequence for Heidegger is that...

Dasein, in accordance with its spatiality, is proximally never here but yonder; from this "yonder" it comes back to its "here"; and it comes back to its "here" only in the way in which it interprets its concernful Being-towards in terms of what is ready-to-hand yonder.⁴⁰

The nurse comes back to the "here" of the elderly client because of the "yonder" of breakfast, but it is the Being-towards of breakfast that is being desevered and focused upon. It needs the nurses act of attention to bring out what was already

there; the lived world is structured by Dasein's activity within it. By its active attention Dasein brings something close through the two existential structures of de-severance and directionality.

Heidegger also argues that through modern appliances such as the radio Dasein has expanded its everyday environment through de-severance.⁴¹ But what is important is:

As Being-in-the-world, Dasein maintains itself essentially in a de-severing. This de-severance - the farness of the ready-to-hand from Dasein itself - is something that Dasein *can never cross over*.⁴²

Dasein cannot cross over into the "yonder" of entities ready-to-hand because it carries its "here" with it, it is always beyond the present moment or situation because it de-severs. Dasein can be spatially near to what is farthest, and far from what is nearest, which is impossible to categorise in the normal conception of space.

As de-severant Being-in, Dasein has likewise the character of *directionality*. Every bringing-close has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close, so that one can come across it with regard to its place. Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives directionality.⁴³

A region has direction and a range within which a tool is allowed to function, and the actual use of a tool shows that it has already been oriented toward something therefore the region has been set up by Dasein. The environment of the equipment reveals a region which is constructed out of a multiplicity of places.

By a "region" we have understood the "whither" to which an equipment-context ready-to-hand might possibly belong, when that context is of such a sort that it can be encountered as directionally de-severed - that is, as having been placed.⁴⁴

The assignment of a particular place for different equipment is preceded by an acquaintance with the region, therefore Dasein situates the equipment. The nurse situates everything within the region of that particular environment.

In this concern - that is, in the Being-in-the-world of Dasein itself - a supply of 'signs' is presented. Signs, as equipment, take over the giving of directions in a way which is explicit and easily manipulable. They keep explicitly open those regions which have been used circumspectively - the particular "whithers" to which something belongs or goes, or gets brought or fetched. If Dasein *is*, it already has, as directing and de-severing, its own discovered region. Both

directionality and de-severance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by *the circumspection* of concern.⁴⁵

For the nurse, the equipment in their clinical environment are signs which give them direction. Items of equipment point to each other, therefore they become easy to use and manipulate in that particular region. But what is really important is that Dasein "...is in a world already and must be in it to be able to orient itself at all."⁴⁶ The clinical environment is a given for the nurse, and it is in this clinical environment that they have to practically orientate themselves before they can even begin to theorise.

Thus for Heidegger: "*With* anything encountered as ready-to-hand, there belongs a spatial involvement which has the character of a region,"⁴⁷ and as we have seen, the spatiality of Dasein is de-severance and directionality. But what is important is that we can also "make room" and "give space" to entities which are ready-to-hand and this "consists in freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality."⁴⁸ The ready-to-hand has its own spatiality which is different to the spatiality of Dasein. But if Dasein is using and manipulating the ready-to-hand entity, as we have seen, it becomes inconspicuous for Dasein along with its spatiality because it becomes absorbed in the entity in concerned circumspection, thus Dasein's spatiality (de-severance and directionality) comes to the fore. But the opposite can also happen.

The spatiality of what we proximally encounter in circumspection can become a theme for circumspection itself, as well as a task for calculation and measurement, as in building and surveying....The space which thus shows itself can be studied purely by looking at it, if one gives up what was formerly the only possibility of access to it - circumspective calculation.⁴⁹

Heidegger wants to "establish ontologically the phenomenal basis upon which one can take the discovery of pure space as a theme for investigation, and work it out."⁵⁰

For Heidegger, when circumspection is not being used then the environmental region of the spatiality of Dasein gets overlooked and the spatiality of the ready-to-hand is replaced by the spatiality of the 'world' of the present-at-hand. The space is mathematically calculated.

The homogenous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand gets specifically *deprived of its worldhood*.⁵¹

The nurse in the clinical environment needs to focus upon the "world" of the ready-to-hand and ignore the quantifiable 'world' of the present-at-hand when she is being practical.

We are now at the crux of the problem between theory and practice, we have access to both the latter worlds; and we encounter the Being of both present-at-hand and ready-to-hand objects. What nursing education needs to do is develop the ready-to-hand "world". The circumspection of looking around only makes sense in the practical background of the "world" of the clinical environment. The 'world' of the theoretical present-at-hand which has been taught in the College has been over-emphasised. To stop the nurse concerning themselves with the *work* of dressing the elderly client and 'using' them as equipment, the nurse needs to develop the circumspection of 'looking around' the practical background of the "world". The 'using' and 'manipulating' of equipment without the skill of circumspective penetration is blind. One could argue that circumspection is a type of reflecting, but it is a reflecting of the practical background that the nurse dwells in and is immersed in; not the detached reflection of Husserlian phenomenology.

As we have seen, Heidegger argues that the present-at-hand 'world' is derivative from the ready-to-hand "world", hence if the practical "world" is the one we inhabit first, before theorising, then we can make sense of the theoretical 'world' only from the context of the practical "world". But to make sense of the practical "world" from the context of the theoretical 'world' is doomed to failure according to Heidegger. It is worth mentioning that some commentators have argued that Heidegger says that the ready-to-hand "world" is more important than the present-at-hand 'world', but Brandon argues that he only says it is more primordial, not more important.⁵² Now what is important regarding nursing, is that the curriculum states that theory should be taught first and then applied to the practical situation, but if Heidegger is right this is impossible. The Being of the theoretical present-at-hand

'world' is a different understanding of Being to the practical ready-to-hand "world". The student has to switch from looking at something as 'present-at-hand' to looking at it as 'ready-to-hand'. The problem that student nurses have if Heidegger is right, is that they are trying to apply theories from the present-at-hand into the domain of the ready-to-hand. Let us look closer at his argument within a nursing context. He goes on to explain how we encounter things in the ready-to-hand "world".

This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door for instance, I use the latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which conceal not only the phenomenon of such 'concern', but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them.⁵³

The important concepts here are 'thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies'. As he says, we have to 'thrust aside' our interpretative tendencies. The phenomenological access to the ready-to-hand "world" of the thermometer is buried by the sheer weight of the theoretical 'world' of the present-at-hand. Thus when a nurse is using some practical equipment such as the thermometer, they are not seeing it circumspectively. They are not looking around at the practical background "world". If they started to think theoretically and keep interpreting the situation they would get nothing done, or more importantly, they would not see the relevance of the theory they were thinking about.

The view in which the equipmental contexture stands at first, completely unobtrusive and unthought, is the view and sight of practical *circumspection*, of our practical everyday orientation. "Unthought" means that it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our bearings in regard to them. Circumspection uncovers and understands beings primarily as equipment.⁵⁴

Thus it is no wonder that any student working in a practice based discipline will have difficulties in applying theory to practice. As we saw earlier, the kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use has its own kind of 'knowledge' which is different to the 'knowledge' that involves reflection and

conscious appreciation. The nurse is taught the knowledge of the present-at-hand 'world' and then expected to apply it to the ready-to-hand "world".

In the curriculum that she has studied the nurse would certainly have covered such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and physiology. Each of these disciplines has its own way of tackling the questions it identifies (just like mathematical problems are tackled differently from historical problems), and as they became more separate the less the links between them could be explored. But in the ready-to-hand "world" a situation or problem just exists: the thermometer, say, doesn't work. Thus the students find it almost impossible to integrate and apply the disciplines and although they often knew a lot in theory they couldn't apply it in practice. The students were not taught circumspective penetration which applies to the ready-to-hand "world". The problem seems to be concerned with the whole idea that the best way to learn how to do something rationally and effectively is to study some 'theory' and then try to 'apply' it. But if the theory that is studied is based in the present-at-hand 'world', then it is certainly not going to apply to the ready-to-hand "world".

We can refine this problem even further. All the latter disciplines are knowledge bases, and each of the knowledge bases will have either one or more theories to interpret it. For example, the knowledge base of sociology has the theories of Functionalism, Marxism, Symbolic Interactionism, and Ethnomethodology to choose from. The crucial point here is that none of these theories or knowledge bases will help the student to think and interpret the breakdown in the practical situation as it is happening. It will most probably take them even further away from the ready-to-hand "world" as they grapple with all the problems of the discipline in the subject/object dichotomy of relating to the present-at-hand 'world'. Also, this present-at-hand relationship to the 'world', if it dominates, as it so often does in curricula, can block out the ready-to-hand way of relating to the "world".

When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it

rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those 'primordial' sources from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand.⁵⁵

The present-at-hand interpretation of the knowledge base of the 'world' is concealing the more primordial state of Dasein in its everyday "world". An example here would be of a nurse who is carrying out the procedure of 'doing' a penile shave for a patient before an operation, the nurse could make sense of the situation by theorising about sterile procedures or the anatomy and physiology of the reproductive system; she could use countless theories as the base of a rationale for making sense of that particular situation from the present-at-hand 'world' without achieving access to the ready-to-hand "world". The nurse, to help her make sense of the situation must *see* to the "world" in a much more primordial sense (ready-to-hand). She would need to look for what Dreyfus says is a much more fundamental experience of involvement. She must *know* the world differently from knowing about the present-at-hand by way of the 'ologies'. But what we now need to concentrate on is where practice ends and theory begins.

Heidegger takes great care in exploring the whereabouts of the emergence of the theoretical attitude from the practical attitude.

In characterising the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a 'practical' way, to 'theoretical' exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern *holds back* from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the 'emergence' of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the *disappearance of praxis*.⁵⁶

So if one stops being practical, then the theoretical attitude is bound to emerge, one has to stop and 'think' about things. If the nurse stops using and manipulating the elderly client they can then start thinking about theories of gerontology. This situation could happen if the client became disturbed and stopped the nurse from dressing them, but if the elderly client did become disturbed, thinking about theories of gerontology would not help the nurse in that particular practical situation, they

would have to deal with the disturbed elderly client. They are thus still tied to the practical situation. "But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concerned dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder."⁵⁷ For Heidegger, circumspection is much more precise than just manipulating and using, so our nurse who is just using and manipulating the elderly client needs the skill to concentrate on circumspective concern much more.

Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around. But this is by no means the way in which the 'theoretical' attitude of science is reached. On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as 'inspecting', checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the 'operations' which are now 'at a standstill'.⁵⁸

Consequently, 'tarrying around' still continues when the nurse stops manipulating and using the client if they become disturbed. In fact, when manipulation and using ends, circumspection becomes much more precise, we do not switch into the theoretical mode and have to give a rationale for why the elderly client is disturbed which is what tends to happen.

Dreyfus⁵⁹ argues that circumspection is a mode of awareness and experience which opens up the world and the things in it, and even though circumspection takes account of the environment without recourse to mental states, it is not mindless robotic action; it is a form of open experience, not private subjective experience. It follows that a nurse has to take into account the surrounding practical environment of the clinical situation she is in, she has to become immersed in it to achieve the state of circumspection. He also argues that 'comportment' is very adaptable and copes with situations in a variety of ways. He stresses that in such coping one responds on the basis of a vast past experience which one brings to the situation. One could argue that this vast experience goes beyond anything that could be articulated by a theory of the present-to-hand 'world'. If the nurse has got a vast amount of past experience, then when things begin to break down the experience of the ready-to-hand environment opens up and circumspection becomes more precise.

Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer 'theory' that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers', remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned.⁶⁰

The nurse, to analyse the situation by the use of circumspective penetration has obviously got to 'consider' the situation. But does this 'considering' involve mental content? According to Heidegger: "'Practical' dealings have their *own* ways of tarrying."⁶¹ What is this practical 'way of tarrying' for Heidegger? He argues that scientific research needs 'manipulations' for it to succeed and uses the example of archaeological excavation, he also argues that the most abstract research has to 'manipulate' writing equipment. It is as if circumspection and theorising are so close, but he warns:

The explicit suggestion that scientific behaviour as a way of Being-in-the-world, is not just a 'purely intellectual activity', may seem petty and superfluous. If only it were not plain from this triviality that it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary between 'theoretical' and 'atheoretical' behaviour really runs!⁶²

It is difficult for us to pinpoint where the ontological shift from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand is. But what is important for Heidegger is that: "If we are to exhibit the existential genesis of science in accordance with the priority of 'seeing', we must set out by characterising the *circumspection* which is the guide for 'practical' concern."⁶³ According to this, circumspection guides practice, but what we have to take into account is that:

Circumspection operates in the involvement-relationships of the context of equipment which is ready-to-hand. Moreover, it is subordinate to the guidance of a more or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the current equipment-world and of the public environment which belongs to it.⁶⁴

Circumspection is thus subordinate to the context in which it is working in. When Dasein surveys its whereabouts it is locked in the totality of the equipment that it is working with. In other words, the 'equipmental totality' will determine what the circumspection will use and manipulate; it is the environmental "world" of equipment that is the starting point for Dasein; this is what is *given* and where it *starts* from. This is also the starting point of the nurse in the clinical situation.

Heidegger refines this 'surveying' further.

In one's current using and manipulating, the concerned circumspection which does this 'surveying', *brings* the ready-to-hand *closer* to Dasein, and does so by interpreting what has been sighted. This specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively, we call "*deliberating*".⁶⁵

Thus 'deliberating' takes place when circumspection *interprets* an object from the environment of the "world" which it has been concerned with and brought close after it has 'surveyed' the situation from the 'totality of the equipment'. The framework, or scheme in Heidegger's words, which opens up this scenario much more:

...is the 'if - then'; if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed.⁶⁶

Heidegger is here elaborating on how the ready-to-hand "world" is opened up to Dasein and how "Circumspective deliberation illumines"⁶⁷ the environment of the ready-to-hand. It is through circumspective deliberation that Dasein stays within the confines of the ready-to-hand and does not make an ontological switch to the theoretical present-at-hand 'world'. But what is important is that:

deliberation can be performed even when that which is brought close in it circumspectively is not palpably ready-to-hand and does not have presence within the closest range. Bringing the environment closer in circumspective deliberation has the existential meaning of a *making present*; for *envisaging* is only a mode of this.⁶⁸

For Heidegger, envisaging goes beyond the local situation, it is a form of deliberation which takes into account what is not tangibly there. As we saw earlier, the schema is the 'if - then'; 'if one wants to use a nail to hang a picture on the wall 'then' a hammer is *needed*, but if there is no hammer in the local environment:

In envisaging, one's deliberation catches sight directly of that which is needed but which is un-ready-to-hand. Circumspection which envisages does not relate itself to 'mere representations'.⁶⁹

So even in the situation where there is no equipment and there may be a breakdown in the ready-to-hand "world", there is still no mental representation or Husserlian noema invoked in order to make sense of the situation.

Dreyfus attempts to describe the beginnings of this breakdown in much more detail than Heidegger does, and he argues that it is only when things begin to break down that we switch to the subject/object mode of the present-at-hand 'world', and it is this switch which Dreyfus describes in detail that I want to examine closely.

Dreyfus argues that Heidegger's new kind of intentionality which he calls absorbed coping is not that of the Husserlian mind with a content directed towards objects. The latter has been introduced too early in the analysis, but Dreyfus's problem is that Heidegger does not give an account of the emergence of the subject/object dichotomy, so he has to look for it himself. He thus uses suggestive passages from Heidegger,⁷⁰ focusing on the circumspective absorption where Dasein can lose itself in the world. It is when a breakdown occurs such as when the head flies off the hammer, or the doorknob comes off in ones hand where traditional subject/object intentionality comes into the picture.

Once ongoing activity is held up, new modes of encountering emerge and new ways of being encountered are revealed....According to Heidegger three modes of disturbance - conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness - progressively bring out both Dasein as a thoughtful subject and occurrentness (present-to-hand) as the way of being of isolated, determinate substances.⁷¹

In other words, all the latter three modes bring out the characteristic of the present-at-hand from what is already ready-to-hand. But what is important for Dreyfus is that when equipment malfunctions (which he uses as a synonym for conspicuousness), if we can repair it or replace it very quickly, we do not begin to theorise about it. Dreyfus uses the following quote by Heidegger to support his argument.

When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This *conspicuousness* presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand....Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something....when we put it back into repair.⁷²

Dreyfus argues that we can move into ways of coping very quickly. He gives the example of a hammer being too heavy, all we have to do is exchange it for another

and we are back into the transparent coping mode very easily.⁷³ And all this happens before we even start to sit back and theorise.

It is only when the malfunction lasts and we cannot repair or replace the equipment quickly that what Dreyfus calls a *temporary breakdown* occurs, again this is his synonym for *obstinacy*. When this happens there is a move from absorbed coping, to deliberate coping, and then to deliberation.⁷⁴ The equipment, which was transparent when things were going smoothly, becomes explicitly manifest (this would be the case with the elderly client who becomes disturbed); and it is at this point that we act *deliberately* and have to pay attention to what we are doing says Dreyfus. We have to pay attention to the hammer and to the nails. If this *deliberate activity of paying attention* gets us nowhere then Dasein moves into another stance of *deliberation* which Dreyfus argues involves reflective planning.

In deliberation one stops and considers what is going on and plans what to do, all in a context of involved activity....Deliberation can be limited to the local situation or it can take account of what is not present. Heidegger calls such long-range planning "envisaging."⁷⁵

Where Heidegger differs from the tradition, for Dreyfus, is that he does not assume that mental representations are special entities in the mind that are independent of the world. They cannot be analysed without reference to the world, and if this is the case Dreyfus points out that deliberation is not pure detached theoretical reflection because it always has to refer to the world, that is to the ready-to-hand "world". He uses this quote from Heidegger to support his argument.

Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer 'theory' that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers', remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned.⁷⁶

Hence, for Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger: *deliberate action* and even theoretical contemplation takes place on the background of the world. There is no mental representation or content 'in' the mind which we then act upon. He does accept that temporary breakdown introduces mental content, but what is important is that it originates from the world and not from consciousness; therefore reflecting upon experience is different to reflecting upon theories. Consequently, circumspection

can be defined as reflecting upon the experience of the practical situation of the environment of the ready-to-hand "world" that the nurse dwells and is immersed in; not a detached reflecting *away* from the ready-to-hand "world" towards the Husserlian present-to-hand theoretical 'world'.

If we just recapitulate, what Dreyfus is arguing is that when temporary breakdown occurs, what the tradition calls the 'subject' emerges from the transparent Dasein, and the 'object' emerges from the transparent equipment. But what is crucial is that neither of them are isolated, they are both involved in the world; and to make this point Dreyfus uses a quote by Heidegger when temporary breakdown occurs.

But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just *observed* and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Such equipment still does not veil itself in the guise of mere Things.⁷⁷

Thus if the present-at-hand is still bound up in the ready-to-hand and reveals itself in the context of a practical situation, then the mental content which is generated owes its origin to the environment of the practical world.

This flies in the face of the tradition which argues that mental content originates in the mind and then represents the action that is to be taken. Dreyfus uses the following example to prove the latter.

To say that the radio does not work is to say that it has ceased to function with respect to Dasein's dealings. The electrons, however, continue to function perfectly; that is, they continue to obey the laws of nature. Mere careful listening cannot determine that the static coming out of the radio does not fit into Dasein's everyday activities.⁷⁸

It is only when circumspection becomes deliberate that the transparent equipment starts to reveal characteristics which are present-at-hand. But Dreyfus wants to differentiate between the characteristics of equipment which are situational; and the properties of equipment which are present-at-hand.

When the hammer I am using fails to work and I cannot immediately get another, I have to deal with it as too heavy, unbalanced, broken, etc. These characteristics belong to the hammer only as used by me in a specific situation. *Being too heavy* is certainly not a *property* of the hammer,....⁷⁹

If a much stronger person was using the hammer then the characteristic of 'being too heavy' would cease to have any meaning. Dreyfus calls the situational characteristics *aspects*, to differentiate them from what he calls the decontextualised 'fixed logical relations', which he argues do not capture the practical situations and are part of the present-at-hand world which the tradition calls properties.

We now need to look at Heidegger more closely again to identify the switch between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand.

Circumspective making-present, however, is a phenomenon with more than one kind of foundation. In the first instance, it always belongs to a full ecstatical unity of temporality. It is grounded in a *retention* of that context of equipment with which Dasein concerns itself in *awaiting* a possibility.⁸⁰

As we have seen, circumspection is subordinate to the totality of equipment because it is grounded there. It retains the equipment that it is going to use and manipulate. Also, as we have seen, deliberative making-present or envisaging involves long range planning, especially if things break down, or are missing, which creates the state of unready-to-hand.

But if deliberation is to be able to operate in the scheme of the 'if - then', concern must already have 'surveyed' a context of involvement's and have an understanding of it. That which is considered with an 'if' must already be understood *as something or other*. The deliberation which brings it close must, in the schema of making present, be in conformity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is to be brought close.⁸¹

Thus when Dasein envisages, it is within the context of the ready-to-hand; and this is why Dreyfus insists that there is no mental content, noema or representation involved. If Dasein is being circumspective regarding the 'if', and if it has already 'tarried around' and 'surveyed' the situation, the 'then' is still going to be within the non-mental realm of the "world" of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger argues that one has to elucidate this situation of circumspective deliberation to find out were it changes over to the theoretical present-at-hand.

We may then try to analyse this change-over itself by taking as our clue an elementary assertion which is circumspectively deliberative in character and the modifications which are possible for it.⁸²

The important concept here is 'assertion', because for Heidegger assertion is a derivative mode of 'interpretation'.⁸³ He argues that "if we stick to certain limiting cases of assertion which function in logic... 'The hammer is heavy'... 'This thing - a hammer - has the property of heaviness'" he is obviously talking about the present-at-hand. But he argues that there is another type of assertion.

In concerned circumspection there are no such assertions 'at first'. But such circumspection has of course its specific ways of interpreting, and these, as compared with 'theoretical judgement' just mentioned, may take some such form as 'The hammer is too heavy', or rather just 'Too heavy!', 'Hand me the other hammer!' Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern - laying aside the unsuitable tool....⁸⁴

The present-at-hand is discovered in the 'if' and 'then' of how the ready-to-hand is interpreted. 'If the hammer is too heavy 'then' it can either be interpreted as a hammer with mass, which is present-at-hand; or 'if' the hammer is too heavy 'then' it can be interpreted as 'too heavy' and get me a lighter one, which is ready-to-hand or if there isn't a lighter hammer then the situation becomes unready-to-hand. When the situation is interpreted as present-at-hand "...it is no longer spoken within the horizon of awaiting and retaining an equipmental totality and its involvement-relationships."⁸⁵

For Heidegger, the ready-to-hand is being looked at in a different way, but he questions very closely whether the 'scientific attitude' has been generated in this 'switch over' from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand. "The ready-to-hand can become the 'Object' of a science without having to lose its character as equipment."⁸⁶ Economics is the example that Heidegger gives for the latter. But he does argue that this 'modification' opens up the door to a "basic way of theoretically grasping entities within-the-world."⁸⁷ What is important for him on the route to a theoretical understanding of the present-at-hand is the equipment's *place* in its ready-to-hand environment; its place becomes a generalised 'spatio-temporal' position.

This implies not only that the multiplicity of places of equipment ready-to-hand within the confines of the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity of positions, but that the entities of the environment are altogether

released from such confinement. The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme.⁸⁸

The confinement of the ready-to-hand "world" is broken, and the equipment is not seen as a tool for use and manipulation. Also, "the releasing from such environmental confinement belongs to the way one's understanding of Being has been modified;...".⁸⁹ The breakout from the ready-to-hand "world" is due to releasing the entities from their *place* in that environment. The entities start to be seen as a totality and "something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time)".⁹⁰ As we have seen, the totality of the entities in the horizon of the present-at-hand is then subdivided into different areas of subject-matter, and the basic concepts of these disciplines have to be worked out.

When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the ways in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated - all these will be Determined. The totality of these items constitutes the full existential conception of science.⁹¹

To arrive at this scientific outlook Dasein does not look at the ready-to-hand environment of 'equipmental totality' in a multiplicity of places; but at the present-at-hand 'world' of an aggregate of positions which leads to the basic concepts of the discipline. This does not quite fit in with Dreyfus's position of a 'total breakdown' which is a synonym for 'obtrusiveness'. This, he argues, is where the move from 'involved deliberation' to 'theoretical reflection' on objects happens.⁹² When temporary breakdown becomes total breakdown Dreyfus argues that we can either stare at the equipment or take a new detached theoretical stance and try to explain their underlying causal properties.

To begin with, theory requires decontextualising characteristics from the context of everyday practices. For example, we move from encountering the hammer's *aspect*, heaviness, to encountering what philosophers call the *property*, heaviness.⁹³

In our terminology, this means that we move away from coping with the elderly client's ready-to-hand environment to a reflection on the theoretical present-at-hand 'world', in the form, say, of theories of gerontology which take us away from the practical context.

When Dasein reflects on the present-at-hand 'world', theory begins to look at objects away from their context, but Dreyfus points out that there are three important points for Heidegger. The first is that one has to move beyond our practical environment in order to encounter mere objects out of their context; secondly, the 'bare facts' of the present-at-hand world have to be isolated by 'selective seeing' which is different to being simply found; and thirdly, scientific facts are not removed from their context by selective seeing because they are theory laden when they are recontextualised in the present-at-hand world. Also, this theory of looking at objects away from their context requires a special attitude called *objectifying thematising*.⁹⁴ This is what Heidegger says after the basic concepts of a discipline have been worked out:

- all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality is what we call "*thematizing*". Its aim is to free the entities we encounter within-the-world, and to free them is such a way that they can 'throw themselves against' a pure discovering - that is, that they can become "Objects". Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character 'Objectively'.⁹⁵

Thus the Objects are freed from the confinements of the ready-to-hand "world", and Heidegger argues that this thematising "is characterised by a *distinctive kind of making-present*" which differs from the making present of circumspection because it:

awaits solely the discoveredness of the present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the 'truth'.⁹⁶

It changes from the ready-to-hand *awaiting a possibility* to the present-at-hand *awaiting a discovery*. For Heidegger "the thematising of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein."⁹⁷ In other words, Dasein is already in the world before it begins to thematise, that is, in the ready-to-

hand "world". Thus the 'thematising' of the present-at-hand 'world' is "the scientific projection of Nature"⁹⁸ for Heidegger. This is where the genesis of science is born, but he also argues that "*Dasein must transcend* the entities thematised"⁹⁹ and this transcendence is presupposed by the Objectifying Thematising.

If, however, the thematising of the present-at-hand within-the-world is a change-over from the concern which discovers by circumspection, then one's 'practical' Being alongside the ready-to-hand is something which a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie.¹⁰⁰

As we have already seen, Heidegger argues that the change-over from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand does not guarantee the scientific attitude. The ready-to-hand can still keep its character as equipment, and it is only when it is not seen as a tool for use that we follow the route of the scientific attitude. But all the same, the transcendence of Dasein is underlying all along.

But if Dasein is to be able to have any dealings with a context of equipment, it must understand something like an involvement, even if it does not do so thematically: *a world must have been disclosed to it.*¹⁰¹

It is this world that has been disclosed to Dasein which is usually hidden and covered up by the thematising present-at-hand world. But the understanding of Being which underlies the ready-to-hand "world" and present-at-hand 'world' can remain neutral and in "that case readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished; still less have they been conceived ontologically."¹⁰² This is where transcendence becomes important for Heidegger.

And if Dasein's Being is completely grounded in temporality, then temporality must make possible Being-in-the-world and therewith Dasein's transcendence; this transcendence in turn provides the support for concerned Being alongside entities within-the-world, whether this Being is theoretical or practical.¹⁰³

For Dreyfus the scientist dwells in the world of his discipline which is situated in the present-at-hand world and is detached from the ready-to-hand world; but the hermeneutic ontologist dwells in the ready-to-hand world which has a shared background understanding from which he is not detached. Thus Dreyfus comes to the conclusion that Heidegger distinguishes the involved thematic analysis of the existential analytic from the objectifying thematisation of science.

We are going to look closely again at circumspection and the problems of the change-over from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand in a nursing educational context in the chapter on teaching, but we now need to explore Heidegger's concept of Being-with as we develop his framework for a philosophy of education.

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5 BEING-WITH

Heidegger opens up chapter four of *Being and Time* by explaining that up to now, his analysis of being-in-the-world has revealed that the phenomenon of the world itself has been much more distinct than Being. Now he wants to concentrate on other people and the problem of other minds. Also, the ontological interpretation of the world via what is ready-to-hand has come first because Dasein, in its everydayness, comports itself to the ready-to-hand. But he now wants to analyse 'who' Dasein is?

Dasein is thus absorbed in the world; the kind of Being which it thus possesses, and in general the Being-in which underlies it, are essential in determining the character of a phenomenon which we are now about to study. We shall approach this phenomenon by asking *who* it is that Dasein is in its everydayness.¹

He wants to open up the domain of Dasein's everydayness by concentrating on the "who", and he says that this will lead us to certain structures of Dasein which he says are 'equiprimordial' with Being-in-the-world. These structures he calls Being-with (*Mitsein*) and Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*)² and grounded in these structures is the subject of everydayness; what Heidegger calls the "they".

Heidegger then goes on to explain that Dasein is an entity whose Being is in each case mine: I myself. This does no more than indicate an ontologically constitutive state, but at the same time it ontically tells us that an "I" and not Others is the entity. He then says that the "who" is the "I", the subject, or the "self".

The "who" is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.³

We thus ontologically understand it as something present-at-hand, yet the present-at-hand has the character of something which is not of Dasein. Nevertheless, Heidegger asserts that it has the character of the self, but he warns that even though the I is ontically obvious; it does not mean that this is the route to an ontological interpretation. This is an important point because Heidegger questions his method

in stating that the givenness of the "I" is primordial even though it is indeed indubitable. He is warning that even though the givenness of the "I" does look to us primordial, we must not therefore disregard other things that seem to be 'given', such as the 'world' and other "I"s. What Heidegger is getting at, is that the givenness of the "I" in this situation is only "the mere, formal, reflective awareness of the "I";.... This affords access to a phenomenological problematic" which provides a "framework as a 'a formal phenomenology of consciousness.'"⁴. But Heidegger is saying that even though this phenomenological investigation is a valid one, it may be the wrong route for the existential analytic.

In this context of an existential analytic of factual Dasein, the question arises whether giving the "I" in the way we have mentioned discloses Dasein in its everydayness, if it discloses Dasein at all. Is it then obvious *a priori* that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the "I" of actions? What if this kind of 'giving-itself' on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself?⁵

Heidegger goes on to argue that when Dasein is closest to itself it mistakenly addresses itself in the latter way as the ontical "I" of the self. That is why the above self-interpretation of Dasein leads the existential analytic in the wrong direction. He argues that even though it may be ontically correct to say of Dasein that "I" am it, this is only to be understood as a non-committal *formal indicator*⁶ which may turn out to be wrong in a particular context of Being.

He concludes that it is wrong to start with the formal givenness of the "I", because, as he has shown; Being-in-the-world is not a bare subject without a world. An isolated "I" without Others is flawed.

If, however, 'the Others' already *are there with us* in Being-in-the-world, and if this is ascertained phenomenally, even this should not mislead us into supposing that the *ontological* structure of what is thus 'given' is obvious, requiring no investigation. Our task is to make visible phenomenally the species to which this Dasein-with in closest everydayness belongs, and to Interpret it in a way which is ontologically appropriate.⁷

Heidegger is thus led to an analysis of the "who" of everyday Dasein. In this analysis he says that in our description of the environment we encounter 'Others' in-

the-world with us, and these 'Others' are encountered in a ready-to-hand environmental context of equipment. But he points out that, earlier, he had narrowed down what Dasein encounters in the world to equipment which was ready-to-hand and Nature which was present-at-hand, and shows that these entities had a character which was other to Dasein. Hence, this has the consequence that the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein of Others differs from the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand.⁸ This means that Dasein is not a tool or equipment, thus other Daseins should not be treated as such like the elderly clients in our earlier examples.

Heidegger spends some time on the problem of starting with the Other. Is it not the case that one must somehow get over to the Other from an isolated subject? To avoid this problem he makes us look at the sense in which we talk about 'the Others'; and by Others he does not mean everyone else but me, he means we are one of them too. "This Being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of a Being-present-at-hand-along-'with' them within a world."⁹ He then analyses the 'with', which he says characterises Dasein, and the 'too', which means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned. Both are to be understood existentially and not categorically. Thus Being-there-too with them in the world is what I share with Others. But the world of Dasein is a with-world, a Dasein-with.¹⁰ He argues that Others are essentially encountered environmentally.

This elemental worldly kind of encountering, which belongs to Dasein and is closest to it, goes so far that even one's *own* Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally 'come across' only when it *looks away* from 'Experiences' and the 'centre of its actions', or does not as yet 'see' them at all. Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*.¹¹

In other words, reflecting upon our experiences alone is not enough; if we do this we are in danger of making the same mistake as we did with the environmentally ready-to-hand world; of interpreting Being-with in a theoretical present-at-hand way and thus distorting it. It is when you look away from your experiences that you then grasp who you are: you need to look at what you do and the world around you. It is when you see how you engage in the world that you gain understanding of yourself,

and it is important to understand that this is not at all a process of introspection. It is important, too, that the Dasein-with of Others is encountered in the ready-to-hand world. We meet them at work in the ready-to-hand world, although it is crucial to grasp that "...those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of *solicitude*."¹²

Heidegger separates out two kinds of encountering, which is a very important point if we are to relate it to nursing. There is the *concernful* relationship to ready-to-hand equipment, which in the realm of nursing could be using the equipment to take blood pressure or take someone's temperature. But we also encounter other Daseins in the ready-to-hand world which have a different kind of Being to equipment, and we relate to other Daseins, as we have just seen in the last quote, through *solicitude* (*Fürsorge*). For the context of nursing we need to look closer at what Heidegger means by this concept.

Even 'concern' with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, are forms of solicitude. But we understand the expression "solicitude" in a way which corresponds to our use of "concern" as a term for an *existentiale*. For example, 'welfare work' ["Fürsorge"], as a factual social arrangement, is grounded in Dasein's state of Being as Being-with. Its factual urgency gets its motivation in that Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude.¹³

This social and communal aspect of Dasein is very important and something which I want to come back to later. But it is the deficient modes of solicitude which we need to look at more closely.

Once again for Heidegger, solicitude is generally inconspicuous for Dasein-with, just as the readiness-to-hand of the tools and equipment was. But the crucial point is that there is an ontological difference in the "essential distinction between the 'indifferent' way in which Things at random occur together and the way in which entities who are with one another do not 'matter' to one another"¹⁴ In other words, we encounter others predominantly in the deficient mode of solicitude:

...passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another - these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterise everyday, average Being-with-one-another.¹⁵

This quote could well be explaining the care in the psychiatric mental health institutions; it was just as if the clients were treated like equipment and tools to be manipulated. But there are two positive modes of solicitude for Heidegger. One is to 'leap in' (*Einspringen*), and the other is to 'leap ahead' (*Vorausspringen*).¹⁶ In a significant footnote,¹⁷ Macquarrie and Robinson discuss the different ways in which '*für ihn einspringen*' can be translated. They chose 'leap in' because of the etymological connection, but they say that a much more idiomatic translation could be either 'intervene for him', 'stand in for him', or 'serve as a deputy for him'. The first two of the latter translations fit more easily into an adult nursing context. Heidegger himself goes on to say: "This kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away 'care',....pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand."¹⁸ This quote fits in well with our earlier explanation of the elderly clients. This is important, because if the patient is being related to as if he were a piece of equipment such as the ready-to-hand, then he will become very much dependent upon the nurse through what Michael Haar calls the 'substitutive-dominating solicitude'.¹⁹

In contrast to this Heidegger suggests 'a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as *leap ahead* of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a "*what*" with which he is concerned.' Haar calls this the 'anticipatory-liberating solicitude'.²⁰ Heidegger says 'it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it.'²¹ This kind of solicitude fits in to what modern mental health nursing should be all about.

Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude - that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps

forth and liberates [vorspringend-befreienden]...to describe these and classify them would take us beyond the limits of this investigation.²²

This maintaining itself between the two extremes of solicitude is very important for nursing, especially with respect to the difference between patients who need life-saving care and those who need rehabilitation.

Thus Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, not the Being of the ready-to-hand; but Others *are* encountered in the ready-to-hand environmental context of equipment. What is crucial is that Dasein, in its everydayness, naturally comports itself to the ready-to-hand.²³ It is at this ready-to-hand level that nurses can tap into their practical encounters whilst working with equipment. But this level of encounter becomes flawed when dealing with the Being of Other Daseins; it becomes a 'substitutive-dominating solicitude', as in the case of our example of the nurse dealing with the elderly clients. For it to become an 'anticipatory-liberating solicitude' Being-with has to encounter Others in a different way from that in which it encounters equipment: but also in a different way from that of 'substitutive-dominating solicitude'. The Dasein-with of Others belongs to Being-with which implies an understanding of Others. "Knowing oneself [*Sichkennen*] is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially."²⁴ In a footnote²⁵ Macquarrie and Robinson point out that '*Sichkennen*' ('knowing oneself') is to be distinguished sharply from '*Selbsterkenntnis*' ('knowledge of the self'). But if this knowing oneself is lost then a deficient mode of solicitude happens.

But because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the Indifferent modes (in the indifference of passing one another by), the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest, demands that one become acquainted with oneself. And when, indeed, one's knowing-oneself gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or even to 'see through them'.²⁶

To enter into authentic solicitude one has to 'know oneself' according to Heidegger, and this authenticity is an existential character of Dasein. To get to what he calls "the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest" one has to become uncontaminated from how the Others get to knowing-oneself which crudely put is

through a kind of socialisation process. There is a kind of paradox here because "even the explicit disclosure of the Other in solicitude grows only out of one's primarily Being with him in each case."²⁷ If solicitude enters Dasein's awareness through Being-with, then knowing-oneself is contaminated right from the beginning of one's awareness of it because as one can see from the above quote "solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the Indifferent modes." If this gets taken as primordial then the deficient modes of solicitude such as "hiding oneself away" or "putting on a disguise" become the norm. Authenticity has to start from inauthenticity, thus knowing oneself begins from the inauthenticity of the everyday Dasein (*das Man*) of Being-with.

This phenomenon which is none too happily designated as 'empathy', is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge from one's own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is proximally closed off.²⁸

Heidegger argues that 'empathy' is not the primordial constitution of Being-with. It is because of the primordial Being-with that empathy becomes possible at all. He argues that Dasein's authentic knowing of itself gets suppressed and becomes inauthentic because empathy is taken as primordial. The empathy model, which suggests that I need to get inside your head and project myself into your situation to really understand what you are about, is a bad one. Empathy reinforces a bad mode of understanding which is hooked on the idea of a mind being 'behind' behaviour. There is a more primordial understanding before we even begin to empathise. You need to look at what the other does, not try and get inside his head.

We need to reinforce at this point that the 'liberating solicitude' is the one that is authentic.

This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a "*what*" with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it.²⁹

His description of liberating solicitude as being authentic care is very important. What, however, does he mean by helping "the Other to become transparent to himself"? It is as though someone helps Other Daseins to look at themselves to

achieve 'knowing oneself', thus we come to know ourselves through Others: "Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with".³⁰ It is only by knowing an Other that I come to know myself, and only by knowing myself that I come to know the Other. It is as though one individual Dasein and other Daseins require one another. One's own Dasein and the Dasein of Others is encountered in the with-world.

When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern - that is, at the same time as its Being-with towards Others - it is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over Being as everyday Being-with-one-another?³¹

One gets the impression from the above quote that there has been a 'take-over' of the individual Dasein. The individual Dasein and the Dasein of Others which are both absorbed in the with-world need each other and can't be separated, but one of them is dominating the other.

The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the "they"* [*das Man*]...This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more...In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded....The "they" which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.³²

We need to look closer at how Heidegger develops these concepts and what he means by this 'prescribed everydayness'.

As we have seen, the 'substitutive-dominating solicitude' is characteristic of the inauthenticity of everydayness in the "they". Dostal³³ challenges the translation of *das Man* as the "they" because *das Man* means an impersonal "one" and not the alienated "they". He argues that the individual Dasein is absorbed into *das Man* and not alienated from it, and this does seem to fit in with Dasein being absorbed into the world. Heidegger argues that the "they" maintains itself in 'averageness' and that "Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the "they" constitute what we know as 'publicness' ["die Öffentlichkeit"]".³⁴ He goes on to explain 'publicness' as follows:

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right... By publicness everything gets obscured,

and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.³⁵

Thus the inauthentic everydayness of Dasein is tied to the concept of publicness. He argues that the particular Dasein in its everydayness is "disburdened" and "accommodated" by the "they", which also makes things "easy" for a particular Dasein. What is pertinent for Heidegger is that "Neither the Self of one's own Dasein nor the Self of the Other has as yet found itself or lost itself as long as it is in the modes we have mentioned".³⁶ He argues that in all the modes of averageness, levelling down, publicness and so on "lies that constancy of Dasein which is closest to us. This 'constancy' pertains not to the enduring Being-present-at-hand of something, but rather to Dasein's kind of Being as Being-with".³⁷ The search for the Being of Dasein has to start in the inauthenticity of the Being-with of averageness. These modes cannot just be "pushed aside".

Hence the search for the Being of Dasein has to start in the inauthentic "they": "The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of its own way".³⁸ This quote reinforces the 'take-over' of the authentic self by the inauthentic they-self mentioned above. "As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the "they", and must first find itself".³⁹ It must find itself in the inauthenticity of the modes of 'averageness', 'distantiality', and 'levelling down' as mentioned above. The authentic Self is "disclosed" and there "is a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities"⁴⁰ of the everydayness of the "they". It is worth reinforcing at this point that the Being-in of the present-at-hand world covers up and conceals the Being-with of Others, so one has to clear away the present-at-hand world before one starts clearing away the everydayness of the "they" of Being-with-Others. Being-in and Being-with are equiprimordial. For Heidegger, what usually gets misinterpreted is:

Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an *existentiell modification of the "they" - of the "they" as an essential existentielle*.⁴¹

There are two important points here. The first is that Heidegger develops his concept of authenticity out of the inauthentic ground of *das Man* (*the "they"*); in other words, inauthenticity is the possibility of authenticity. The second is that Sartrean existentialism should not be read back into Heidegger. *Dasein* may be alienated, but it is not the alienation of the individual from the group. As we have already seen above, it is the alienation of the individual from himself because of his absorption into the "they". The 'subject' or 'self' is not primordial in the way it is for Sartre: rather the authentic Self has to be disclosed from the they-Self. If we bring solicitude (which is the care that we have for others) back into the equation, Dostal argues that this brings about a 'social' and 'communal' aspect of *Dasein* which he argues is often overlooked because Heidegger insufficiently develops it.⁴²

We now need to look at the 'social', 'communal', and 'public' concepts within *Being and Time*. As we have seen, authentic *Mitsein* is a solicitude which 'leaps ahead' for the other and allows him to assume his own care and responsibility, but inauthentic *Mitsein* 'leaps in' for the other and takes away his care and responsibility. Dostal argues that the latter is the stance of mastery.⁴³

Dostal looks at the notion of authenticity and inauthenticity very closely, because it is here that people look for the roots of fascism in *Being and Time*. This is because Being-with in the form of living together is so central for Heidegger, and this is where some critics detect the roots of his political philosophy.⁴⁴ But Dostal suggests that "*Mitsein* is communal but insufficiently political".⁴⁵ What is important, as we have seen, and something which Dostal picks up on using his own terminology, is that communality and individuality need one another. Dostal also points out that there is no Husserlian transcendental solipsism or Sartrean individualism to be found in Heidegger. He argues that what is troublesome in Heidegger is his treatment of human interrelationships in the solicitude of authentic Being-with. This treatment is brief and sketchy, but Dostal argues it is what is implicit in the sketch that causes all the problems.⁴⁶ Dostal takes Heidegger to account for the implicit 'ethical background' to Being-with and how the notion of

'friendship' does not fit into his account of solicitude. He argues that we have to be careful here because Heidegger is not presenting an ethical treatise but a fundamental ontology, and for this reason he does not have to give a full anthropological account of human development. But here lies a problem. Heidegger "is attempting to provide a framework for thinking about what it means to be human, authentic and inauthentic".⁴⁷ He does not rule out others developing a philosophical anthropology. Dostal also argues that even though Heidegger warns us not to read Being-with ethically, there has got to be 'good' in authenticity, thus there is an ethical ideal presupposed in his account of Dasein. For Dostal this is where it ends in *Being and Time* and he admits to presupposing that there is a background assumption that politics requires ethics in *Being and Time*. But that is as far as he goes: Heidegger's framework only provides the conditions for an ethical ideal (with the consequence of a political ideal), it does not spell it out. He argues that the spelling out of ethics is for the later Heidegger of the *Letter on Humanism*, where thinking takes its measure from poetry, but this is not to be read into in *Being and Time*.

There is still the basic problem of Heidegger's sketch of human interrelationships. We need to look closer at his two kinds of solicitude, that which 'leaps ahead' and that which 'leaps in'. Dostal argues that the latter is inadequate for friendship, but the former is only appropriate for certain types of friendship, such as that of the teacher for a student. As we have seen, inauthentic solicitude deprives the other of responsibility, while authentic solicitude gives responsibility back to him. Dostal concludes that the existential framework of *Being and Time* makes possible 'love' and 'friendship', but that is all. But that same existential framework also makes possible the basis of a political theory. If Being-with is basic, sociality and communality are constitutive of Dasein:

Rather than speak about sociality, Heidegger uses the simple neologism of *Mitsein* (Being-with). "Being-with," by implication, can be either social or communal - *Gesellschaft* or *Gemeinschaft*, inauthentic or authentic.⁴⁸

Dostal is suggesting that people read too much into the social or communal aspects of Being-with, but again one sees the tantalising ethical or political background in the existential framework. Dostal argues that the social and the political should be distinguished, but if the 'public' is to be identified with the 'political', and for Heidegger the public is clearly inauthentic; then politics would be inauthentic as well. Dostal argues that this is the route that Bordieu⁴⁹ and Wolin⁵⁰ take when they attempt to look for the seeds of Heidegger's nazism, but if politics is not identified with the public then their argument is flawed. Dostal argues that it is clearly the public or 'the they' (das Man) that the authentic self is absorbed into. We lose our distinctive self, give up responsibility for ourselves and live inauthentically, and this corresponds to the solicitude of 'leaping in'. Dostal argues:

Consider the following simplistic syllogism. Democratic politics rely on the public. The public is of necessity inauthentic. Therefore democratic politics are necessarily inauthentic. It follows that fascism is the authentic choice. There is, of course, a large leap from the conclusion of the syllogism as to the inauthenticity of democratic politics to the claim that authentic politics are fascist. Monarchism, anarchism, and socialism would be three quite different alternatives to modern mass democracy.⁵¹

Dostal's point is that it is flawed to give a fascist label to someone who is critical of modern society because lots of left wing critics are also critical of modern society.

We now need to look at how Dasein finds "itself from its lostness in the 'they'".⁵² Heidegger argues that Dasein has got to be 'shown' to itself through "the voice of conscience" and this conscience is to be investigated within the context of fundamental ontology. It is therefore "prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience,..."⁵³ He goes on to explain that the 'calling' is a mode of discourse which "gives us something to understand."⁵⁴ It follows that there has got to be something that 'hears' the call, and the something that hears 'the call of conscience' is "Dasein itself."⁵⁵ As Heidegger argues:

But it is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always *understands itself*. The call reaches Dasein in this understanding of itself which it always has, and which is concerned in an everyday average manner. The call reaches the they-self of concerned Being with Others.⁵⁶

So the call reaches out to Dasein's primordial understanding of itself. Thus, as well as the world of the present-at-hand and the world of the ready-to-hand being disclosed to Dasein, there is also an *understanding of itself* which is disclosed. Heidegger then separates the they-self and argues that the call is to "one's *own Self*."⁵⁷ The call is to Dasein's primordial existential understanding of its own Self, not to the 'they' of the they-self. What is crucial for Heidegger is that: "The appeal to the Self in the they-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 'external world'."⁵⁸ The call "*passes over* both the "they" and the manner in which Dasein has been publicly interpreted,.."⁵⁹ and "it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities."⁶⁰ Thus for Heidegger the call is a summons and it says nothing.

Heidegger next explores the question of "who" does the calling and his answer is that Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self functions as the caller."⁶¹ Dasein's potentiality "summons Dasein's Self from its lostness in the 'they'."⁶² Heidegger's point is that Dasein has already been "thrown" into existence and its "state-of-mind" brings it authentically face to face with its own potentiality. He then begins to build up the existential context.

For the most part, however, its mood is such that its thrownness gets *closed off*. In the face of its thrownness Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of the they-self. This fleeing has been described as a fleeing in the face of the uncanniness which is basically determinative for individualised Being-in-the-world. Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety;...Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being...The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the "not-at-home" - the bare 'that-it-is' in the "nothing" of the world.⁶³

For Heidegger, the caller of the call of conscience in its primordial uncanny worldless state is so alien to the they-self which is lost in the public world. This uncanniness in its basic primordial state has been covered up by the they-self and it is: "Out of the depths of this kind of Being itself, Dasein itself, as conscience calls."⁶⁴ For Heidegger, Dasein in its state of uncanniness pursues itself as the very same Dasein which has fallen into the they-self. What is an important point is that

"Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being."⁶⁵ Dasein "cares" and is anxious about its own potentiality because "Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care."⁶⁶

Heidegger now looks at what the call gives to Dasein to understand. His answer is that "any experience of conscience... addresses Dasein as 'Guilty!'...a possible 'Guilty!'... or no guilt."⁶⁷ He argues that whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all our experiences agree on this 'Guilty!' Even if everyone agreed on one interpretation of 'Guilty!', the existential Being-guilty would still remain obscure, he points out. To get at the root of the ontological investigation Heidegger starts as ever, with Dasein's everyday interpretation of guilt. Dasein's everyday inauthentic interpretation has the primordial interpretation of 'Guilty!' revealed along with it, he explains. He points out that everyday Being-guilty is usually interpreted in the sense of 'owing' or 'having a debt' to an Other in the public world. Heidegger argues that primordial guilt has to be thought of "in terms of Dasein's kind of Being."⁶⁸ He thus asks "what kind of experience speaks for this primordial Being-guilty which belongs to Dasein?"⁶⁹ His answer is:

And only because Dasein is guilty in the basis of its Being, and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling, is conscience possible, if indeed the call gives us *this Being-guilty* as something which at bottom we understand.

The call is the call of care. Being-guilty constitutes the Being to which we give the name of "care". In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially.⁷⁰

Dasein has to summon itself "from its lostness in the 'they', and this means that it is guilty."⁷¹ In its uncanniness Dasein is anxious and cares about its potentiality-for-Being, and it is also Being-guilty about its lostness in the "they". Heidegger argues strongly that conscience is an attestation which is in Dasein: "Conscience attests...by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty."⁷² What is important is that one is always guilty even when one is living authentically. It is just that you recognise your guilt in the mode of authenticity and you don't recognise it in the mode of inauthenticity. The summons to guilt is a recognition. The understanding of the call

is a mode of Dasein's Being and it is only when this is authentically interpreted that the phenomenal content of the call is disclosed. "Wanting to have a conscience is, as an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a way in which Dasein has been disclosed."⁷³ Dasein has been disclosed as wanting to have a conscience, but what is important is that the structure of the disclosure "is constituted by discourse and state-of-mind, as well as by understanding."⁷⁴ Understanding the call is understanding Dasein in its uncanniness, the state-of-mind is anxiety which belongs to the understanding and the discourse is one of reticence. "Only in reticence, therefore, is this silent discourse understood appropriately in wanting to have a conscience. It takes the words away from the common-sense idle talk of the 'the'".⁷⁵ The "they" covers up the silence by idle talk.

All the latter disclosedness collectively is called "resoluteness"⁷⁶ by Heidegger. This is what he means by the 'primordial truth'. "Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others."⁷⁷ But it is how it pushes itself into solicitude which is important.

Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others.⁷⁸

This is the authentic care we mentioned earlier, because Being-in and Being-with are disclosed equiprimordially, and because the Being-with Others is in the ready-to-hand context. Dasein naturally comports itself to the ready-to-hand concernfully; but if it relates to Others in the same way, the solicitude is of the 'substitutive-dominating' type if 'Knowing oneself' is then grounded in the "they" of the public world and not in 'resoluteness'. When Dasein 'knows oneself' in resoluteness this is when he can help "the Other to become transparent to himself" by becoming the 'conscience' of the Other. Thus this authentic self-relation makes possible 'liberating solicitude'.

What is crucial is that this resoluteness "is always the resoluteness of some factual Dasein at a particular time."⁷⁹ Heidegger asks the question what the resolution is to resolve? How does a particular Dasein resolve its resolution? His answer is: "Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself."⁸⁰ He wants to get across the point that resoluteness does not involve "taking up of possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them."⁸¹ This is very important for Heidegger and is crucial to his fundamental ontology.

What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concerned solicitude.⁸²

What has been proposed and recommended by the public "they" is not taken up in Dasein's resoluteness, instead Dasein is summoned out of its lostness in the "they".

We now need to look more closely at what Heidegger means by saying that when "Dasein becomes resolute, it can become the conscience of Others," and how this "authentic self-relation" makes possible 'liberating solicitude'.

This potential for an authentic 'self-relation' is obviously part of the existential framework, which means that one should be able to relate to people from a different culture. Vogel argues that this 'self-relation' which he calls a 'moral conscience':

...does not involve a subordination of self and others to a common standard that would provide a decision-procedure telling anyone what he ought to do in a particular situation; rather, it involves an attunement to the particularity of others, to others *as truly other*, stemming from an awareness of the singularity of one's own existence.⁸³

The authentic self-relation makes one aware of one's individuality so as not to get lost in the "they". It also means questioning the "theys" theories of how to go about doing things in particular situations. What is also important is that

Such an attunement would not evidence itself in a preoccupation with adopting an *impersonal* stance so as to apply without prejudice universal rules to particular circumstances; rather, it would manifest itself as an *interpersonal* orientation motivated by one's desire not to incorporate others into "the universal" but, rather, to "let others be" in their freedom for their own possibilities and to allow one's own self-understanding to be informed by theirs.⁸⁴

The interpersonal orientation is very important, especially if you think of how the staff in the old mental hospitals related to the clients in a very impersonal stance. But the interpersonal relationship in which one lets 'others be' is what Heidegger means, argues Vogel, by a liberating solicitude made possible by the authentic self-relation.

We can now answer our earlier question of what Heidegger means by helping "the Other to become transparent to himself?" The solicitude of authentic care should focus upon the Other's existence so that he might become free for his potentiality, it should not focus onto that of the "what" with which the Other is concerned within the public world of the "they". Thus helping the Other to become transparent to himself means that one has to "play the role of conscience for another...As 'his conscience' I must help to heighten his awareness that his possibilities are ultimately for him to resolve upon alone."⁸⁵ This is the liberating solicitude of leaping ahead. Vogel, like other commentators, uses the analogy of the relationship between a good teacher and his student. The teacher encourages the student to think for himself. The other example he uses is the relationship between the therapist and his client. The therapist should help his client to work through his own problems. The teacher and the therapist in being the conscience of another should never "'leap in' for the other's good, assume too much responsibility for the other's welfare and thereby deprive him of the freedom to determine and pursue his own possibilities."⁸⁶

Vogel goes on to argue that provoking the general question of one's potentiality-for-Being is too abstract. He argues that "To 'think for oneself' or 'work out one's problems on one's own' demands that one engage with the concrete situation one faces."⁸⁷ The 'situation' that one faces is a topic I want to come back to, but before we leave Vogel it is worth looking at his interpretation of Heidegger's concept of 'authentic communication'.

The goal of authentic communication is not to get the other to abstract from his particularity so that he can follow the pure rationality of an argument but to

lead the other to question and reflect upon the hypostatizing interpretations of the pale public world in such a way that he is freed to interpret the meaning of his existence for himself.⁸⁸

In being the conscience of another which leads to a liberating solicitude the teacher or therapist must play the role of the facilitator. The facilitator cares about the other's freedom by helping him to think for himself, he is not concerned about the other's welfare which would be the solicitude of leaping in. But from a nursing perspective:

It is one thing to leap in for the sake of the other's welfare in a particular instance, another to consider him incapable of taking care of himself. When one loses sight of the other's potential for authenticity, one subjects the other to a kind of humiliation in the guise of helping him.⁸⁹

One can look at the different types of nursing in the latter quote. To leap in and help someone in an acute situation is right and proper, but when one continues in the latter mode it becomes questionable, especially when the patient is recovering. Adult nurses are now beginning to look at this question, especially that of interpersonal relationships with patients when they begin to recover. Mental health nurses can also be accused of leaping in for their clients in the old mental hospitals, and our earlier example of the elderly clients is also relevant here. But what must also be borne in mind by all nurses is that: "In this regard, it might be argued that leaping-ahead, even if it is not equivalent to acting out of concern for the other's welfare, constitutes the core of what it means to treat another as an *end-in-himself*."⁹⁰ This is exactly what our nurses in our earlier example of the elderly clients did not do.

We now need to come back to our earlier discussion regarding Vogel's point about the general question of one's potentiality-for-Being being too abstract, and his insistence that working out one's problems and thinking for oneself is to engage with the concrete 'situation' one is confronted with. To recapitulate, when Dasein 'knows oneself' in resoluteness and is thus summoned out of its lostness in the "they"; it can become the conscience of others by making the Other transparent. But what is crucial, and this is where Heidegger differs from Sartre, is that "Even resolutions

remain dependent upon the 'they' and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to Dasein."⁹¹ The important point is that because Dasein's resolution is dependent upon the "they" and its world in a parasitic sense:

Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factually possible; and does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the "they".⁹²

We can now see the reason why Vogel insists that the general question of one's potentiality-for-Being is too abstract. The reason is that the potentiality-for-Being is grounded in the "they". We can now understand Heidegger's earlier quote above that the reason that "Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" is that "in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the "not at home" - the bare 'that-it-is' in the "nothing" of the world" it is not grounded in the "they". But because it is grounded in the "they" Dasein has to engage with the concrete 'situation' and not with the abstract "not at home" and "nothing".

Here we need to look more closely at what Heidegger means by a "situation". This will have important implications for a practical philosophy of education. First of all he recalls the notions of 'deseverance' and 'directionality' which we have considered earlier. He then looks at the spatiality of Dasein and argues that it is this spatiality of Dasein which determines its location and grounds Dasein in Being-in-the-world: the "there" of Dasein. It is in this groundedness of the spatiality of the "there" of Dasein in which "disclosedness" is constitutive and "the Situation has its foundations in resoluteness. The Situation is the "there" which is disclosed in resoluteness - the "there" as which the existent entity is there."⁹³ The "Situation" is disclosed through resolution and what is important for Heidegger is that:

Resoluteness brings the Being of the "there" into the existence of its Situation. Indeed it delimits the existential structure of that authentic potentiality-for-Being which the conscience attests - wanting to have a conscience.⁹⁴

Dasein is called from its lostness in the they-self of the public world to its uncanny worldless state, and because it has had to be summoned it is 'Guilty'. Also,

understanding Dasein in its uncanniness is the state of mind of anxiety, and it is this resoluteness which pushes Dasein into solicitous Being-with-Others. But all this is manifested in a concrete "Situation" because "it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but *calls us forth into the Situation*".⁹⁵ Heidegger always talks about "the" situation, he never talks about situations in the plural. "Situations" are for Heidegger crucially important. One has to properly understand and confront one's situation, also; looking for the appropriate response is crucial. We are now coming to an important point regarding the relationship between theory and practice because for Heidegger:

Resoluteness does not first take cognisance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already *taking action*. The term 'take action' is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly that "activity" will also embrace the passivity of resistance.⁹⁶

In being resolute Dasein is already "in" a concrete "Situation" and this "Situation" is already in a state of "activity". There is no time to have a theory beforehand and then control the "Situation" by taking action. The reason that Heidegger uses the term "taking action" is that resoluteness is not a practical faculty to be contrasted with a theoretical faculty. The circumspective concern of "deseverence" and "deliberation" of the ready-to-hand world would be a practical faculty but what is important is that:

Care, however, as concerned solicitude, so primordially and wholly envelops Dasein's Being that it must already be presupposed as a whole when we distinguish between theoretical and practical behaviour: it cannot first be built up out of these faculties by a dialectic...⁹⁷

Thus "Care", in the mode of liberating solicitude is what theory and practice must be built up from.

Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care, and which is possible as care - the authenticity of care itself.

To present the factual existentiell possibilities in their chief features and interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existentiell structure, falls among the tasks of a thematic existential anthropology.⁹⁸

If one abandons Heidegger's fundamental ontology then the latter anthropology prevails: and this is a possibility that we can explore regarding using Heidegger to inform a nursing curriculum, and to help us to do this we need to investigate Richard Rorty's pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger.

To summarise this chapter in an educational context, Being-in-the-world has two understandings of Being: the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, and Dasein comports itself to the ready-to-hand which is more primordial than the present-at-hand. What has been dominant in western thinking has been the ontological understanding of Being of the theoretical present-at-hand. For a practical discipline such as nursing the different ontology of the practical ready-to-hand needs to be approached first, and a curriculum and its teaching methods needs to take this into account. What happens in nursing curricula is that the ontological approach of the present-at-hand has been used for practice.

Also, we encounter other people in the ready-to-hand world, and Heidegger warns us that we should not start with the formal "I" because Being-in-the-world is not a bare subject with an isolated "I" but an "I" which is with other people. This has the consequence that Being-with is just as important as Being-in, and just as Being-in-the-world is grounded in the structures of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand; Being-with is grounded in the structure of the "they". So just as Dasein encounters equipment which is ready-to-hand and Nature which is present-at-hand which are both different to Dasein, the Being which belongs to the Dasein of 'Others' differs from the Being of both the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. Here again we have a different ontology.

What we also need to take into account regarding education, is that even though the Dasein-with of Others is encountered in the ready-to-hand world where equipment is encountered in a relationship of concern, Others are encountered in a relationship of solicitude, and this solicitude can take the form of 'leaping-in' which takes care away from the individual; or it can take the form of 'leaping-ahead' which

gives care back to the individual in an authentic way. Both types of care can be appropriate in different nursing contexts.

The different ontologies or understandings of Being of the present-at-hand of Nature, and the ready-to-hand of equipment of Being-in-the-world; and the different ontology or understanding of Being of the solicitude of Others all need to be taken into account in any curriculum which is practice based. But what has happened has been a levelling out of the understanding of Being of the present-at-hand.

All the latter will be explored in the forthcoming chapters but we now need to look at Rorty's influential interpretation of Heidegger.

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6 THEORY AND PRACTICE: RORTY AND DREYFUS ON HEIDEGGER

In this chapter I am going to look at Richard Rorty's interpretation of Heidegger and how it differs from the interpretation of Dreyfus. The reason being that Rorty uses Heidegger's priority of social practice over theory as a weapon in his own priority of 'holism' and 'epistemological behaviourism'. The latter two notions are important in how Rorty discusses the priority of practice over theory, which in turn is important for nurse education.

For Rorty, Heidegger was right to criticise the history of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche. But he criticises Heidegger and questions whether he is not himself entering into the same mode of arguing. He uses this quote by Heidegger who is attempting to justify why he differs from the tradition:

The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a *techne*, a process of reflection in service to doing and making. But here reflection is already seen from the perspective of *praxis* and *poiesis*. For this reason thinking, when taken for itself, is not "practical." The characterisation of thinking as *theoria* and the determination of knowing as "theoretical" behaviour occur already within the "technical" interpretation of thinking. Such characterisation is a reactive attempt to rescue thinking and preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing. Since then "philosophy" has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its existence before the "sciences." It believes it can do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a science. But such an effort is the abandonment of the essence of thinking...Can then the effort to return thinking to its element be called "irrationalism"?¹

For Heidegger the essence of thinking is more rigorous than the "technical interpretation" of thinking in the above quote. As we have seen, 'fundamental ontology': "strives to reach back into the essential ground from which thought concerning the truth of Being emerges,"² and the tradition fails:

...not because it thinks the Being of beings and thereby reduces Being to a concept, but because it does not think the truth of Being and so fails to recognise that there is a thinking more rigorous than the conceptual.³

What Rorty wants to question is what exactly does Heidegger mean by a more 'rigorous thinking', and whether he actually succeeds in overcoming the tradition of Western metaphysical thinking. For Rorty's Heidegger, the tradition has certain rules and "philosophy should deal only with problems formulated in neutral terms - terms satisfactory to all those who argue for competing solutions. Without common problems and without argument, it would seem, we have no professional discipline, nor even a method for disciplining our own thoughts."⁴ Heidegger wants to break free from the latter rules which are dominated by the 'technical interpretation of thought' and finish in the deadend nihilism of Nietzsche.

To understand this properly one has to see that for the later Heidegger "metaphysics no longer appeared as the question of being, but rather as the...*obscuring* of the question of being; as the history of that forgetfulness-of-being which began with Greek thought..⁵ It is this metaphysics which has led to the modern 'technical interpretation of thought'. It is this claim of Heidegger's which Rorty attacks. He thinks it is false in "suggesting that our present troubles are somehow due to the Plato-Nietzsche tradition."⁶ He argues that Heidegger's attachment to the idea that when metaphysics fails something called "thought" remains is a pathetic notion.⁷

Rorty looks more closely at what 'thinking' is for Heidegger and how he stands up to the criticism that the content of his thinking has been diverted from the 'tradition' to mysticism or poetry. He argues and agrees with Heidegger that it was a grave mistake of the tradition to deem that Being was unchangeable, and also that it can be known metaphysically or ontologically with mathematical certainty.

Heidegger sees the distinction between action and contemplation not as Dewey does, as reflecting the gap between the freeman and the slave, but rather as arising out of an initial diremption of an original united consciousness - a diremption which is presumably to be viewed as a fatality, one of the words of Being, rather than explained causally as a product of some natural environment or social arrangement.⁸

This is where Rorty disagrees with Dreyfus. He believes that Heidegger should have abandoned the quest for Being through the route of being and Dasein and been

satisfied that: "Philosophy at its best, clears away what impedes our delight, and is not the discovery of a correct representation of reality."⁹ It is at this point where the later Heidegger differs from *Being and Time* in the fact that he leaves out the quest for Being via being and "sees both poetry and philosophy as taking place where the distinction between contemplation and action does not arise, and as diminished and made pointless when this distinction is drawn."¹⁰ Rorty argues that both Heidegger and Dewey see Nietzsche as the end of the philosophical tradition if "we take Being as presence or as representation."¹¹ Thus unlike Dreyfus, Rorty argues that Heidegger was right to abandon the quest for Being via Dasein, but he also argues that Heidegger should have abandoned the quest for Being per se and taken the position of Dewey who:

When he tells us about the consequences of the Greek separation of contemplation and action he does not think he is recollecting the words of Being - but rather, in Wittgenstein's phrase, "assembling reminders for a particular purpose."¹²

For Rorty there is no quasi-mystical Being. He agrees with Versenyi who argues that Heidegger charges the metaphysics of Being with being so "preoccupied with beings....and *their* Being that it fails to think of Being as such." This, Rorty argues, is what the Heidegger of *Being and Time* attempted not to do with the failed quest for fundamental ontology. But Versenyi also points out that Heidegger avoids the opposite criticism of "the exclusive preoccupation with Being as such that fails to think of beings...and of Being as the Being of *beings*."¹³ This is what Rorty claims the later Heidegger does. Versenyi goes on to argue that if philosophy becomes preoccupied with the beings of everyday experience; then that philosophy becomes obsessed with diversity and multiplicity and ignores the underlying unity of Being. But the opposite can occur with a preoccupation with the one Being and an ignorance of the multiplicity and diversity of beings.

The closer one approaches either one of them and fails to think of the other, the more one relinquishes philosophy in favour of something else: an all too empirical, possibly technological, allegedly practical thinking (the danger Heidegger emphasises), or an all too empty and formal, though often

emotionally charged and mystical-religious, thinking of absolute unity (the danger Heidegger is oblivious of and consequently succumbs to).¹⁴

Rorty absolutely agrees with the latter quote and taking his cue from Dewey advocates the former approach of the latter quote: "Dewey thinks that the moral of the story is that metaphysics, having exhausted its potentialities, leaves us with nothing except an increased appreciation for our concrete problems - for beings;" and the destruction of metaphysics and ontology leaves a vacant place which "For Dewey, it is to be filled in with concrete attention to beings - to the strip mines, for example. For Heidegger, it is a clearing for Being." The one proviso is that the metaphysical 'technical interpretation of thinking' does not need to be adhered to.¹⁵

To recapitulate, Rorty argues that Heidegger cannot separate Being and beings, and therefore cannot change the meaning of Being from the ancient metaphysical one.

Rorty develops his argument and replaces the space that is created by the destruction of metaphysics and ontology with what he calls 'epistemological behaviourism'.¹⁶ Rorty is arguing, following on from Heidegger, that there are no privileged representations of reality. There is nothing to look for behind behaviour, no inner states which give meaning.

More broadly, if assertions are justified by society rather than be the character of the inner representations they express, then there is no point in attempting to isolate privileged representations.

Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call "epistemological behaviourism,"...This sort of behaviourism can best be seen as a species of holism - but one which requires no idealist metaphysical underpinnings.¹⁷

Rorty argues that the nature of knowledge is just the study of certain ways human beings interact and does not require any ontological or epistemological foundations, and this leads to a pragmatic theory of truth. What is important for education is that philosophy helps to sort out alternative points of view and as Rorty argues "a necessary truth is just a statement such that nobody has given us any interesting alternatives which would lead us to question it."¹⁸ For Rorty, an holistic approach to knowledge is a "distrust of the whole epistemological enterprise."¹⁹ There is no

permanent neutral matrix to measure alternative points of view. The only measure is for a point of view to be able to cohere with other points of view at that particular historical moment. Rorty is not arguing that there are no objective standards for measuring better or worse points of view. Rather, he is arguing that there is no other way to measure knowledge claims than by appealing to the social practices of the day which have been argued out. He does not mean 'anything goes'.

Rorty, like Heidegger, rejects a representationalist theory of knowledge; but to see where he differs from Heidegger, we need to explore how he develops epistemological behaviourism which is a move away from foundationalist epistemology, a move which leaves a space to be filled. He puts forward hermeneutics but he does not envisage it as replacing epistemology and filling the space, but holds that "hermeneutics is an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled..."²⁰ He rejects the epistemological notion of a neutral framework common to all discourse as commensurable. Hermeneutics is a struggle against the latter. By commensurable Rorty means "able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict."²¹ This is characteristic of epistemology. The distinction between commensurable and incommensurable he takes from Kuhn and the philosophy of science, but Rorty generalises it and applies it to all types of discourse. Epistemology for Rorty "is to find the maximum amount of common ground with others" and an "assumption that such common ground exists."²² We thus obtain knowledge by deducing conclusions from central principles which lie within a common ground, and these conclusions are true for everybody. It is what Rorty calls the holistic, antifoundationalist, pragmatic interpretations of knowledge which "abandon the quest for commensuration" and "deny that there are foundations to serve as common ground"²³ for knowledge claims.

Rorty agrees that on some occasions we do argue from central principles which lie within a common ground, but epistemology is flawed when it generalises

from these special cases. This is where Rorty uses Kuhn's concepts of 'normal' and 'abnormal' discourse. Discourse is normal when people share central principles and common ground, but when people do not share central principles and common ground discourse is abnormal. It is during periods of normal discourse when epistemology thrives and commensuration is possible, but this is only possible within one domain. It is when commensuration from one domain is extended to all domains that epistemology falls down. For instance, the commensuration which applies to the domain of science where the discourse is normal should not be applied to the domains of literature or ethics where incommensuration thrives and the discourse is abnormal. Also, where cultures differ, the discourse between the two cultures cannot always be governed by a common ground. Common ground may overlap at certain points between two cultures, but not always. Even within the same culture a common ground may not exist as between different generations for example. It is in the abnormal discourse situations where hermeneutics prevails over the epistemological model. "Hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers."²⁴ It is where the hermeneutic model prevails that philosophy is to be done for Rorty. The philosopher is to be the "Socratic intermediary between various discourses."²⁵

What is interesting regarding the relation of theory to practice is Rorty's argument regarding the connections between holism and the hermeneutic circle. He backs up his criticisms of epistemological foundationalism with the holistic argument that one cannot "isolate basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which these elements occur."²⁶ He argues that our choice of elements which will go to making up a theory will be:

dictated by our understanding of the practice, rather than the practice's being "legitimated" by a "rational reconstruction" out of elements.²⁷

He argues that the latter holistic argument will never be able to avoid the hermeneutic circle. This notion of understanding for Rorty is closer to getting

acquainted with another person, which is similar to Gadamer's²⁸ perspective; rather than following a rule or a demonstration. One gets a 'feeling' of the situation by being immersed in it rather than approaching the situation with a rational theory beforehand. He points out that we have to manoeuvre between the particular situation and the whole situation until we feel at ease in what was to begin with, strange. This fits nicely into nursing situations. Rorty even argues that the notion of culture is a process of conversation; it is not a structure, which he sees as a product which is built on foundations. He sees the former hermeneutic notion of knowledge as getting into a conversation with strangers, as the same of that of acquiring a new skill, which is got by imitating models.²⁹ A mental health nurse learns how to be a nurse by imitating role models rather than having a representation of what it is to be a nurse in their consciousness. Thus Rorty adopts a pragmatic view to the effect that we do not represent the world but cope with it, and it is interesting that commentators disagree whether Heidegger was a pragmatist or not.³⁰ But what is the measure of a successful coping? His answer is that we should turn Whiggish.³¹ We are entitled to use our own standards as the measure by which others are to be judged. The reason being that where standards are incommensurable, there can be no measure of which are superior. The line between epistemology and hermeneutics is not the difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences nor between theory and practice, but one of familiarity for Rorty. We are epistemological when we understand what is happening so that we can codify it, we are hermeneutic when we do not understand what is happening. What is important for Rorty is that we become epistemological when we are used to a practice and we have conventions about it, not because we have discovered something about the nature of human knowledge.

We now need to look at the problems concerning the differences of the natural sciences and the social sciences and what Dreyfus calls theoretical and practical holism.³² He argues that theoretical holism is an interpretation which involves translation. The old argument was that the strict logical empiricist

scientific method of the natural sciences should not be transferred over to the social sciences which use the method of hermeneutics. The battle lines were drawn in the social sciences between the proponents of the scientific method who wanted the social sciences to emulate the methods of the natural sciences, and the ones who followed Dilthey and claimed that there was a difference in kind between the two sciences which forbade the use of the scientific method in the social sciences. But as Taylor argues, this century has seen an attack on logical empiricism and the "Old-guard Diltheyans, their shoulders hunched from years-long resistance against the encroaching pressure of positivist natural science, suddenly pitch forward on their faces as all opposition ceases to the reign of universal hermeneutics."³³ Thus the arguments for hermeneutics as being the right method for the social sciences now applies to the natural sciences because there is no more scientific objectivity in the natural sciences than in the social sciences. This is further reinforced by the philosophers of science who argue that scientific facts are 'theory laden' with the consequence that there is an hermeneutic circle between hypothesis and data and back again. Hence, what Dreyfus calls theoretical holism, he applies to Rorty's hermeneutics whenever there is a breakdown of communication due to a lack of understanding between different cultures or conflicting paradigms as can be the case between the natural and the social sciences. One can therefore abandon hermeneutics when two competing theories have been translated into one another or one has destroyed the other.³⁴ Dreyfus comes to the conclusion that it is the latter hermeneutic translation between theories that led Rorty to the conclusion that there is no important difference between the natural and the social sciences. He argues that this is mistaken because Rorty treats "all understanding as theoretical"³⁵ and consequently as an epistemological problem.

Dreyfus contrasts the latter theoretical holism with what he calls Heidegger's practical holism which is holistic in a much different way. As we have already seen 'practical understanding' involves beliefs and hypotheses which only make sense in a contextual background of shared practices which we are brought up in. These

shared cultural practices are not beliefs but are skills which cannot be spelled out in a theory, and these skills embody an ontology of what it means to be. The term for this totality of cultural practices of Heidegger's is *Vorhabe* which is usually translated as 'fore-having', and it is this level of *Vorhabe* which is ignored by theoretical holism according to Dreyfus. This is the point where Rorty rejects the Heidegger of *Being and Time* and criticises Dreyfus.

....I entirely agree with Dreyfus that one should not try to reduce *Vorhabe* to *Vorurteil*, knowing how to knowing that. But I don't think that this pre analytic *Vorhabe* embodies a "meaning of Being" which a discipline called "hermeneutics" might explore. I don't think that one should try to find numinous depth in the pre reflective consciousness any more than one should try to find absoluteness in the in-itselfness of the atoms.³⁶

The latter quote shows that Rorty accepts the Heideggerian pervasive background of shared practices, thus the difference, if there is one, between theoretical and practical holism must be much more complex. If we look closer at Dreyfus he argues that the critics of Heidegger argue that if the background of practices is pervasive and involves skills then it can be made an object of theoretical analysis; the background itself can be made an explicit object.³⁷ As Dreyfus points out, this is Husserl's critique of Heidegger.

Dreyfus argues that Heidegger's practical holism does not attempt to theorise the lifeworld because this background is not beliefs but "habits and customs, embodied in the sort of subtle skills which we exhibit in our everyday interaction with things and people."³⁸ But as we have seen, Rorty rejects Dreyfus's accusation of him being a theoretical holist and forces Dreyfus to reevalulate his own position in which he argues that there are now three possibilities. These possibilities are theoretical holism, which takes the holism of the natural sciences very seriously and wants to extend it to cover all knowledge; what he calls Rorty's pragmatism which holds that there isn't any important difference between theory and practice and therefore between kinds of discipline; and lastly, Heidegger's practical holism which takes theory very seriously and admits it works very well for natural science but not for the understanding of human beings.³⁹ The latter indicates an important point

because Heidegger does argue that the ready-to-hand is more primordial than the present-at-hand, but he does not argue that it is more important, and some commentators argue that the primacy of the ready-to-hand is overemphasised.⁴⁰ What Dreyfus and Rorty both agree on is that one cannot have a theory about practice, of the kind which Husserl attempts, because the pervasive background of skills is unquantifiable. What we do have though, is a practice of theorising.⁴¹ What they disagree on is whether there is an ontological break between the natural and the human sciences, and whether Heidegger was right in his grounding of fundamental ontology, and as we have seen, Rorty thinks that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* was wrong to look for the meaning of Being in the pre-reflective consciousness. In his support, Dreyfus does argue that the Social Sciences cannot afford to stand back from the activities which make them possible, they are obliged to give an account of them; whereas the Natural Sciences do not have this obligation.

To summarise, we have seen that Rorty agrees with Heidegger that there are no privileged representations of reality. Assertions should be justified by society rather than the character of inner representations which become privileged. For Rorty, there are no epistemological, nor even ontological foundations to knowledge, he agrees with the later Heidegger that the quest for fundamental ontology should be abandoned. This is one of the areas where Rorty and Dreyfus disagree. Also, for Rorty, an holistic approach is a distrust of the whole epistemological approach, there is no neutral permanent grand narrative or metalanguage to measure alternative points of view. There is no way to measure knowledge than by appealing to the social practices of the day, and within a nursing context, this means the social and therapeutic practices of the day. Rorty then develops epistemological behaviourism and hermeneutics, which argues that we do not represent the world but cope with it. The line between epistemology and hermeneutics is not the difference between the natural and the social sciences, nor between theory and practice, but one of familiarity. We are epistemological when we understand and can codify the

knowledge. This debate of the different interpretations of Heidegger by Dreyfus and Rorty now needs to be discussed within an educational context.

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7 HEIDEGGER APPLIED TO EDUCATION

To begin the investigation of an Heideggerian philosophy applied to education I am going to look at the work of Bonnett who starts his critique by stating that one of the important aspects of education is "how we are to think the relationship between the mind of the pupil and that which he is to learn."¹ He begins his argument by looking at how Peters criticises the two opposing views of the 'traditional' and 'progressive' view of education. The former views the mind as passive and empty which is to be filled with content via the traditional teaching of formal instruction; and the latter views the mind as inquisitive and the teacher is more of a facilitator who creates the context for learning to happen. This perspective straightaway opens up the dichotomy of inner and outer and subjective and objective. Bonnett argues that Peters' response to this dichotomy is to suggest that each side has a grain of truth but they both make their point too extremely; but his response of the 'holy ground' of education is very important argues Bonnett. The holy ground "consists in various public modes of experience which are the source of that body of content emphasised by the traditionalists, and are constitutive of the development of mind and therefore of the possibility of individual potential emphasised by the progressivists."² This public mode can help to synthesise the two extremes. It is also this public mode which helps mental development and "which constitute mind in a very fundamental sense."³ Bonnett argues that for Peters it is public standards that transcend the dualism of subjective and objective and consequently the traditional and progressive views of education.

...for at this level the inner order and outer order seem to be fundamentally at one: the progressives' desire for individual development only being possible in terms of their acquisition, and the traditionalist's desire for the teacher to assume his proper responsibilities for directing the course of his development in terms of an objective external order being subsumed by a notion of initiation into public procedures which allows the pupil the possibility of making his own appropriate response to the human situation.⁴

This is what structures the mental life of the pupil, but what is important for our argument is the appropriate response to the human situation, this I will come back to later. These standards bring an element of permanence to the flux of experience and a continuity for human experience. Bonnett argues that the 'holy ground' for Peters are the public forms of rationality of the sciences and the humanities.

Bonnett looks at the problem that if these public standards are fundamental to constituting the mind, how are they pointed out to what he calls the neonate if the child needs these public standards before he can enter into significant relationships. The solution to the latter for Bonnett is "that we must...presuppose a definite structure to consciousness which is pre-social in origin."⁵ If it was not for this pre-social origin of consciousness the public standards which constitute the mind would be the social constructions of a particular society. One can see straightaway how he is bringing phenomenology in to help his argument with the concept of the pre-social because he is worried about society justifying the public standards which Rorty would not be worried about. Bonnett concludes that Peters' originary pre-social is blind until it is structured by the social public standards; the world is presented to consciousness pre-socially, but it is only accessible to consciousness through the public standards.⁶ Therefore these public standards are not fundamentally constitutive for consciousness. Bonnett argues that there has to be something more primordial than public standards and this is the point where he brings Heidegger into his argument regarding education: "It will be this prior dwelling with things and not public standards alone which allows of the possibility of genuine communication and human awareness."⁷ He thus uses the Heideggerian argument that to live authentically one does not take refuge in public standards all the time and "that authenticity proper aspires to a direct relationship to Being, a relationship beyond the reach of generalising standards as such..."⁸

Bonnett criticises Peters because of his overemphasis on rationality which represents the sole non-arbitrary pathway to truth. He explains that rational

standards overcome arbitrariness and organise things into a manageable order which is accessible to thought.

Such rational categorising,...involves a threefold mastery of things: *fixing* them as of a certain class with certain objective properties, *assessing* them as having met the relevant standards, *evaluating* them according to where we have placed them in our overall order of things.⁹

Bonnett explains that Heidegger points out the calculative nature of rational thought, and that its success in the sciences has led to it becoming the dominant form of thought which is in danger of setting standards for thought as a whole and rules out any other way of relating to Being. This has the danger of ruling out radical alternatives of thought. For our purpose what is important is how Bonnett develops his ideas regarding education with the help of Heidegger. What he argues is that our relationship with things needs to be a receptive-responsive one in which our preconceptions have to be held in check so that the thing can be revealed in its true nature. He uses the Heideggerian term of 'poetic building' which is a pre-Socratic experience of receptiveness.

The aspect under which they are perceived is thus one of openness, which is incompatible with standardisation, though it may well be that they are first brought to our attention in the context of self-centred practical purposes, or 'impartial' theoretical purposes in which standardisation is prominent. Indeed it is likely today that our first, though very partial, glimpse of them is afforded through everyday rational categories, but such thinking requires a willingness to shed these categories - to allow a certain dissolution of them such that their significance in experience becomes diminished and the thing itself comes to presence.¹⁰

Bonnett thus goes beyond Peters' with his application of Heidegger to education in which he sees the 'holy ground' of education emerge as an openness to Being; and this openness to Being is jeopardised by a standards oriented calculative rationality.

Bonnett's critique is also important in an indirect way regarding education which he does not spell out. In his criticism of 'calculating rationality' he states that it distorts criticality "which emphasises analytical dissection and reconstruction - both in terms of categories which must define the matters at stake in advance."¹¹ He

also argues that criticality does violence to the public ordering of things so that the original may show itself.

In this way thought itself may become a poetic building - and this includes that thought involved in the process of education, even though this is a highly practical concern.¹²

This stressing of the process of education is very important, but if one overstresses the importance of process there is the problem of the 'progressives' radical subjectivism. Bonnett does see a problem but he argues that it can be overcome. He stresses that the acquisition of public standards does point to a compulsory curriculum to achieve the latter standards, thus the curriculum aims, content, and teaching methods have to be "determined independently of any individual child by reference to the structure of the different public modes of rational experience".¹³ He has to complement this with an education which does not originate from either individualism or modern rationality but from an authentic relationship with things themselves, and furthermore this thinking must "aspire to a poetic building in which an individual learner is brought into contact with that within his culture which will allow *his* thinking to aspire to thought of Being."¹⁴ He sees obstacles such as 'mass culture' and Heidegger's 'they-self' but argues that this may be the starting point. The way forward for Bonnett is the notion of Heideggerian authenticity and responsibility towards Being with an openness that allows a modification of standards. The task of the educator according to Bonnett is to challenge the learner to acknowledge and locate his own concerns and take on personal responsibility.

In thus deepening by disclosing those concerns which are his, he becomes individualised and achieves a care for his own being which is the reverse of egocentricism. On the contrary it is the condition of openness.¹⁵

The latter is a bit ambitious to say the least, even if one created such a curriculum the realities of everyday education would flatten it. For such a curriculum to succeed one has to tackle the everydayness of teaching.

To put Bonnett's argument into a nursing educational context the first thing that can be stressed is that a compulsory curriculum does not need to follow. Also,

if we take Rorty's interpretation and critique of Heidegger to the effect that his fundamental ontology is flawed and that there is no Being hidden in the depths of a prereflective consciousness, this then becomes interesting in how we can apply it to a curriculum. The first thing that we need to tackle is Bonnett's fear of public standards constituting the mind, or in other words the problems of relativism. Bernstein sums Rorty's argument up succinctly:

If by relativism we mean that there is not truth, objectivity, and standards for judging better and worse arguments or moral positions, then Rorty is certainly *not* a relativist,...Rorty's aim is not to deny or denigrate "truth" and "objectivity" but to demystify these...labels. If by relativism we mean epistemological behaviourism, that there is no other way to justify knowledge claims or claims to truth than by appealing to those social practices which have been hammered out in the course of human history and are the forms of inquiry *within* which we distinguish what is true and false, what is objective and idiosyncratic, then Rorty advocates such a relativism. But this does not mean that "anything goes."¹⁶

If we view Rorty's relativism in the latter way we can get round some of the problems that Bonnett is worried about regarding the content of the curriculum. The content of the nursing curriculum will have been hammered out over the history of nursing.

I now want to come back to Heidegger's concept of the "Situation". As we have already seen, because Dasein is grounded in the "they" it has to engage with the 'concrete situation' and not with the abstract "not at home" and "nothing". Also, because Being-in is equiprimordial to Being-with, the concrete situation is situated in the ready-to-hand world. The "Situation" is disclosed through resolution: and if we reinforce an earlier quote what is important for Heidegger is that: "Resoluteness brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of its Situation."¹⁷ Dasein is called from its lostness in the they-self of the public world to its uncanny worldless state, also, understanding Dasein in its uncanniness is in the state of mind of anxiety, and it is this resoluteness which pushes Dasein into the solicitous leaping-in of Being-with-Others. But all this is manifested in a concrete "Situation" because "it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but *calls us forth into the Situation*".¹⁸ The situation for Heidegger is an important notion which mean properly

understanding and confronting one's situation, and looking for the appropriate response is crucial. But what Heidegger means is an 'historical' situation such as the German post-First World War "Situation", not particular human situations. I am therefore going to borrow and amend this concept from Heidegger and exploit it. Also, Bonnett takes this point seriously as we have already seen when he argues that there should be an education "which allows the pupil the possibility of making his own appropriate response to the human situation."¹⁹ There is no time to have a theory beforehand and then control the "Situation" by taking action. Rorty also agrees with the latter when he argues that our knowledge is "dictated by our understanding of the practice, rather than the practice's being 'legitimated' by a 'rational reconstruction' out of elements."²⁰ One thus gets a feeling of the "Situation" by becoming immersed in it according to Rorty. We can now see why he argues that we cannot have a theory of practice but a practice of theorising.

We must therefore start to look at the education of nurses by looking at this Heideggerian amended "Situation" at its level within a nursing context. A nurse would be grounded in the inauthentic "they" of other nurses and from this "theyness" would have to engage with the concrete "Situation" of the ready-to-hand world, and this ready-to-hand world will have a background of practices which is pervasive and involves skills. Also, this background knowledge cannot be made the object of theoretical analysis. To understand this background knowledge in the practical situation the nurse would have to develop the skill of circumspective penetration so that they can absorb themselves and become embedded in the environment which created the concrete "Situation." The nurse will also have to develop "Resoluteness" which will call the individual nurse from the "they" of the public nurses into its uncanniness of anxiety which will make the nurses engage with the concrete "Situation" and not with the abstract present-to-hand world. This resoluteness, as we have already seen, also pushes Dasein into solicitous Being-with-Others.

As we have already seen, the problem with the nursing curriculum is that it is dominated by subjects such as sociology, psychology, and physiology. But in the

"Situation" of mental health nursing a problem may just exist, and the subjects will not help to deal with the problem when an act is needed. There is also the added difficulty that all the latter subjects are knowledge bases with their own theories to help interpret that knowledge, and those theories will not help in dealing with a nursing "Situation" because they have been developed to deal with an epistemological knowledge base. As both Rorty and Dreyfus have argued, one cannot theorise about practice because there is nothing to theorise about, just a pervasive background of skills and competencies. Getting involved with the difficulties of the latter subjects will take the nurse further and further away from the ready-to-hand nursing "Situation" and more into the present-at-hand world of subjects and theories. What we therefore need to do is to analyse the nursing "Situation" using an amended Heideggerian framework of what he meant by "Situation" in a much more specific and particular sense.

As student mental health nurses begin to interact with other students and more experienced staff, they will start to pick up a concept of themselves as mental health nurses (hereafter nurses). They presumably want to become better nurses, that is they want to improve and refine their nursing, but most probably without completely changing their concepts of themselves as nurses. These concepts of being a nurse and being a better nurse are socially constructed entities, and as we have seen Rorty argue, this knowledge is just the study of certain ways human beings interact (in this case in a mental health context) and it does not require any ontological or epistemological foundations. Also, the only way to measure the latter knowledge claims is by appealing to the social practices of the day, which in this case are nursing mental health practices. Nursing itself is institutionalised and clinical environments already encapsulate assumptions about what nursing involves, and these assumptions come from the mental health practices of the time. Neither nursing as institutionalised practice nor views about improvement ever constitute completely coherent positions. Within each there is a variation of emphasis, discontinuities and even conflict, and this again fits into Rorty's framework. Yet

those involved in decision making must make coherent sense out of this milieu and attempt to make their own conduct both coherent, and to some extent, understandable to others who are likewise engaged. This view of nurses and of institutionalised practices sees a flow of influence and power between individuals and the various reference groups to which they subscribe. The flow is not one way because at any point the views and conduct of others may create particular freedoms and constraints for individuals in one or more of these categories. There is a constant and complicated flux in which actions, views and language create concepts of stability, change, practicality, and validity. Rorty's epistemological behaviourism or hermeneutics will help to look at alternative points of view within the different interpretations of the social practices.

We have then two central features of our view of being a nurse. The first is that the experience of the individual and the collective experience of nurses is to some extent always dynamic. Like a child who only sees the roundabout when it is in motion the experience is of movement; the speculation is about stillness. The 'real' roundabout moves and is moving, to stop it or pick out one aspect and move with it (to snap a photograph) is to create a degree of 'unreality'. The second feature is that all nurses have a position from which to experience the flux of their world. There is no position 'outside' from which one can experience nursing. Thus in the short run some views, some concepts, and some assumptions are not negotiable because they would be too much of a threat toward the basic position from which the nurse will have experiences of being-a-nurse. A theoretical position such as ours, which understands these to be the central features of the experience of nursing will require a set of concepts and practices which can have an effective purchase upon that world. Such concepts and practices will need to get inside the flux of the experience and trace a relationship between the non-negotiability of short term perceptions, views and concepts of the basic position to have nursing experiences; and longer term rationality.

This concept of the non-negotiability of relatively short run aspects of being a nurse is radically different from more 'empiricist' notions of human agency. We do not see the nurse as a dispassionate collector of practices and insights which are then organised into some coherent package. To be a nurse at all necessitates an 'ontological commitment' and the practices and insights which exist and are subsequently revised and modified are central to one's existence as a nurse. This ontological commitment implies that 'good practice' and new ideas have to be appraised and often creatively modified before they can become an integrated part of any person's repertoire. The appraisal at this level is not simply a response to professional ethics and standards, it is a fundamental necessity in terms of the integrity of one's being as mental health nurse.

The non-negotiability of certain aspects of being a nurse means that in any context in which it is appropriate to be a nurse certain actions will be necessarily 'value loaded' in that the imperative to conduct oneself in particular ways in response to a nursing "Situation" in such a context constitutes the confirmation of one actually being a nurse. The "Situation" calls out for action which is deemed to be definitive of being a nurse. Such phenomena are easily observable: "I just couldn't ignore her distressed condition due to her hallucinations and delusion" or "I had to do something about his behaviour, it was really distressing the rest of the clients". These sorts of utterance encapsulate complex theoretical positions, views of self as a nurse and expressions of competence. At that 'moment' to question the validity of those imperatives would constitute a frontal attack upon the authenticity of the nurse's basic experience of being a nurse.

The nurse's perceived practical imperative derives from the relationship between the context and the individual's idea of what it is to be a nurse. This selective perception creates a "Situation" which has come into being because certain things are going on (clients and nurses saying or doing things) which are perceived to carry imperatives. The "Situation" will last for so long and then it will cease to exist. If the "Situation" passes [an example of inauthentic behaviour can be used

here] without an appropriate response to the imperatives then the opportunity to confirm 'being'-a-nurse has gone. If the "Situations" are dramatic then such omissions are disturbing and guilt ridden whilst, conversely, appropriate conduct is reassuring and gratifying. If we exclude the 'inspiration of the moment' then the resource for appropriate conduct is the nurse's skills and competencies. Skills and competencies which can handle "Situations" in appropriate ways are ones which enhance and enrich being a nurse (these are the Heideggerian skills which only make sense on the background context of nursing) whereas skills and competencies (or lack of them)- or ideas and theories - which cannot be translated in "Situations" into appropriate conduct are perceived as irrelevant and impractical.

The essential feature of a "Situation" as opposed to a context is the person's capacity to act upon that which is perceived. The desire or decision to 'be' someone (a nurse) involves a commitment to practically engage in contexts which are socially constructed settings (nursing context) for those modes of being. It also implies a belief in some capacity to engage some degree of competence (Heideggerian skills) which exists or will be acquired in time. Thus a mode of 'being' at this level is a dynamic concept (which it also is at Heidegger's level) in that it operates within process; it monitors and modifies experience, creating perceived stability (situations) and change (new situations). What constitutes a "Situation" for someone in a given context is a set of perceptions which together carry imperatives to act in such a way that the action involved endorses appropriate being-a-nurse. The demand to 'be practical' is therefore a requirement that one be competent to respond to the perceived imperatives in a "Situation". Given the flux of experience such situations will last for only a certain time, during which the appropriate action must be carried out. How much time there is is purely a function of the concepts one brings to the "Situation", so the practical complexity and the demands upon various personal competencies that "Situations" make, may change through a co-ordinated modification in concepts, and a re-appraisal of skill requirements.

We have then three basic concepts with which to give our account of nursing: being a nurse (a mode of being), socially constructed contexts, and "Situations", which are sets of simultaneous perceptions by individuals which together constitute a perceived need to act appropriately (i.e. be practical). 'Being a nurse' and 'socially constructed contexts' are related in that in devising and maintaining contexts, nurses (amongst others) will seek to establish significant meanings which reciprocate general beliefs about appropriate being. Thus if nurses believe that the clients should behave a certain way in a ward environment, they are likely to produce a physical context to enhance the behaviour and establish rules about the ritualisation of this aspect of being a nurse. There are at least two significant variables which are very important which condition the exactness with which any particular context can exemplify any general concept of being a nurse. One is the meaning of those things which need to be particularised. Clearly confidence (misplaced or otherwise) in things which can be translated into physical form will have a kind of substantiality which appeals to many: physical environment, displays, notice boards, off duty lists, hardware, and the organisation of materials in space. The meaning given to those latter tangible things is usually overemphasised to the detriment of the more important intangible things, this is why the tangible content of the subjects of the curriculum are also usually overemphasised and treated as the ground of the curriculum. Thinking which takes the latter route is the Heideggerian 'technical thinking'. The more important other meanings, such as those directly connected with intellectual functioning, aspects of social relations, interpersonal therapeutic relationships and personal development are less easy to articulate in forms which are perceived to make a 'practical' difference to people's conduct and to this extent they may make weaker contextual claims upon being. In the latter case there is a conceptual gap between general notions of being a nurse and the consistently meaningful attributes of the context. This is usually due to the latter's intangible nature.

The other variable is that implicitly general concepts on the one hand and particular contexts on the other must be coherent within themselves. Modes of being are abstractions which are variously particularised by individuals so that the degree of inter subjective agreement will tend to be reflected in the degree of contextual cohesion. The more complex the notion of 'being' happens to be then the more difficult is the task of achieving coherence at the general level. Also the less inter subjective agreement among those who are engaged in constructing contexts, the more they will be inclined to use their power to particularise their own version at the expense of competing versions and hence diminish contextual coherence. The latter concept of what it means to be a nurse is difficult to capture because it is embedded in the Heideggerian background of skills and practices which is elusive to 'technical thinking'.

There is thus a unique practicality of "Situations" and given that contexts exist (e.g. hospitals) then those who enter those contexts (nurses, clients) immediately and necessarily create "Situations" for themselves by virtue of their selective perception of the context. Each nurse has a personal concept of being a nurse (more or less coherent, more or less in agreement with others) and the perceptual interaction of this with the context creates "Situations". These Heideggerian "Situations" contain imperatives of a *uniquely* practical kind. The unique practicality of situations derives from the perceived need to respond to factors which *collectively* have no theoretical relationship with each other. There is no theoretical perspective from which to extrapolate an act which is simultaneously appropriate to John who approaches a nurse and states that "He has seen a green dragon" and to Beryl who cannot contain her frustration with George and Jenny because they are opting out of the ward programme. The act appropriate to these quite different entities is a creative individual act not a deduction from, nor application of, a theoretical position. Partial analyses can take place in theoretical terms but what is analysable and at what level is determined by the perceived need to act which is in turn a function of the interaction of modal beliefs and perceptions of

context. How partial the analysis has to be will largely depend upon the coherence of modal beliefs in relation to the coherence of the context.

The above argument leads to an approach to analysing good clinical environments. As far as any individual nurse is concerned then to the extent that the context (clinical environment) encapsulates meanings which particularise that person's views upon appropriate being then that clinical environment will present relatively few practical challenges in the unique terms described above. This is because to say that 'the context encapsulates meanings' implies that other persons involved in the clinical environments (notably nurses and clients) interpret the context, and hence maintain it, in the same way. Therefore in the situations described above the nurse qua nurse will be able to do a number of things which John, Beryl, George, and Jenny would both understand and accept. Consequently any situation which emerged from it would not present any more of a challenge to appropriate being. Actions and situations are always contributions to their particular contexts, but they are also, and necessarily, 'commentaries' upon the validity of the quality of personal existence.

It may now be possible to see how my interpretation of an Heideggerian philosophy of education differs from product based philosophies. The former version of practical activity sees individuals as having to act in contexts, acting which will be more or less satisfying in terms of their vision of themselves and in terms of their contribution to the context itself. In other words, an acting which will be informed by Heideggerian skills which are picked up from the background context of nursing. What is relevant to satisfactory outcomes in this respect is not simply a matter of preference or interest nor is it fully comprehensible in terms of theory. The continual necessity to act appropriately in contexts (to 'be') *discloses* relevance and gives such *disclosures* more or less significance as far as potentiality to act is concerned. In product based courses it is usually a given that to avow an interest or to claim relevance for a topic (e.g. management styles, psychology etc.) implies some connection to personal competence or visions of oneself but the

justification of such topics as taught are more usually appraised in terms of their general relevance to theory, or to the profession. In Heideggerian terms that which is taught is *disclosed* rather than *chosen*. Choice is always present, but it is a choice which is circumscribed by beliefs about actual competencies or determination to acquire competencies by oneself or by others. Such considerations cannot be completely individualised because all meaningful action has an effect upon contexts and hence upon others.

Being a mental health nurse is a state of committed participation in an intersubjective world of variously shared meanings. The way in which one participates in that world via actions and articulations which affect one's own understanding of oneself, contributes to that context in which one is acting and creates more or less practical challenges to oneself and others. Being a 'better' nurse is clearly evaluative but one's autonomy, ability and sensitivity will be enhanced if one's resources to 'be' in the above terms are enhanced. In the short run (and in the very short run, i.e., in an actual situation) only some of these resources are available for rational scrutiny but the process of articulation, sharing understandings and practical experience in connection with these articulations discloses more of one's conduct and one's views to awareness. Such an outcome is not an automatic corollary of experience as such because that which is disclosed is a function of understandings and competencies which present differing levels of types of challenge.

Given the above perspective the demands of this Heideggerian approach upon students would be considerable. In rejecting the theory to practice paradigm for understanding nurses' practices the necessity to create new forms for the articulation of understanding must be recognised. The rejection of this paradigm is not seen as embracing an empathetic model which arguably becomes solipsistic; it is seen as just as intellectually demanding as the theory to practice paradigm and arguably more so. The 'more so' is not in terms of 'pure' or 'isolated' intellectual articulation but in terms of the requirement that as the 'pure' intellectual articulation

advances so the *corresponding* demands upon personal and practical self scrutiny are necessarily involved.

Due to the analysis starting with a nursing "Situation" the students will have to start with their own personal experiences with the consequence that these experiences will be radically constrained by concepts of practicality not by concepts of theories or knowledge bases; its intellectual origins therefore lie with the phenomenology of lived experience. There are therefore no epistemological foundations to be found in the "Situation"; and following Rorty, there are no Heideggerian ontological foundations to be found in the pervasive background of practices and skills, though I do admit that this is arguable. This then leads to Rorty's pragmatic theory of truth and the hermeneutics of epistemological behaviourism. This hermeneutic enterprise has to begin with 'finding one's own experience' and to use concepts which bring control to the flux of this experience. But this text of students finding their own experience has to be linked to published research so that the study of this experience does not become too atomistic or radically subjective, nor spuriously scientific. This means that 'talk' and 'language' are given a centrality in the effort to create an authentic confrontation with the richness and complexity of personal experience, and as we have seen, Vogel's interpretation of Heidegger's authentic communication "is not to get the other to abstract from his particularity so that he can follow the pure rationality of an argument"²¹. This also fits in with Bonnett's criticism of Peters' overemphasis on the rational categorisation of "fixing" things as a certain class, "assessing" them as having met relevant standards, and "evaluating" them as to where to be placed in the overall order of things, which we looked at earlier. The latter is what Heidegger criticises as the technical interpretation of thinking and Rorty agrees with this, but where he differs from Heidegger is that when technical thinking is removed there is a more fundamental and rigorous way of thinking. For Rorty, epistemological behaviourism fills this space, and this is what needs to be developed in a philosophy

of education for nurses. This we will come back to after we have fleshed out the Heideggerian framework much more.

The converse of subtle micro interaction is the institutionalisation of practices and the emergence of images of society, hospitals, nursing and of patients. The action of communication within the nursing "Situations" creates social events which flow into forms of institutionalised life which in turn provide the context which gives the meaning of how individual acts are interpreted. This phenomenological intellectual inheritance has always stopped short at curriculum design, but with the help of the Heideggerian framework this is what we now need to look at. The precise practices of this phenomenological intellectual inheritance need to be developed within the context of a nursing curriculum. Indeed, the central problems of a phenomenological inheritance will exist in any curriculum, but they will exist only up to a point. If they are encapsulated and stifled within a curriculum, they will become part of the hidden curriculum because the students will be concretely faced with problems of subjectivity and objectivity, the particular and the general, authenticity and inauthenticity, coherence and meaning, and the relations between self and others. These are among the central problems of the phenomenological intellectual inheritance itself, and if these problems are ignored then a curriculum that is responding to a phenomenological intellectual inheritance is spurious.

However, the students will not have to grapple with the latter difficult problems because the concept of the practical provides a consolation; and it does this because although the fundamental problems (e.g. subjectivity/objectivity) need to be solved in general, their particular manifestation for any student is rarely posed in such a demanding form and hence in their particular case such problems can be resolved. But this consolation of the practical must never obscure the fundamental problem itself, the door must always be left ajar. Unless the door is kept ajar the link between personal experience and the phenomenological intellectual inheritance will be broken, because the *raison d'être* of any intellectual inheritance will be

obscured. This link cannot be maintained by saying things about the problem; it can only be maintained through practice itself. The 'talking' is parasitic upon the practice, the practice can never be parasitic upon the practice. The students' concepts of the practical will require a resolution at a particular level and a sensitive response to that expectation has to be constructive. However the response must also seek to envisage a practical moment when the problem will re-emerge, positively transformed by the intervening experiences. Teachers of young children do this sort of thing when they respond to a child's query with 'half an answer' and a suggestion of "why don't you try this?" Subsequently the child may return with a discovery and a new formulation of the problem with usually no recriminations for being initially incompletely informed. As with children, how far the students get into the phenomenological intellectual inheritance will be directly related to experience. Given that the inheritance is seen as valuable then it would be a course aim to link students to it and encourage exploration of it. But what must be forsaken is the relatively straightforward study of an intellectual inheritance where the balance between self discovery and general understanding is not so clearly monitored and maintained.

Student nurses will already have a concept of being a nurse, even though it will be naive. They presumably want to become better nurses; that is they want to improve and refine their nursing; and these concepts of being a nurse and being a better nurse are socially constructed entities. Nursing itself is institutionalised and hospitals already encapsulate assumptions about what nursing involves, but neither hospitals as institutionalised practices nor views about improvement ever constitute completely coherent positions. Within each there is variation of emphasis, discontinuities and even conflict, between different clinical areas, and between the hospital and community. Yet those involved in decision making must make some coherent sense out of this milieu and attempt to make their own conduct both coherent and, to some extent, understandable to others who are likewise engaged. This view of nurses and of institutionalised practices sees a flow of influence and

power between individuals and the various reference groups to which they subscribe - clinical colleagues, advisors, other disciplines, and nursing literature. The flow is not one way because at any point the views and conduct of others may create particular freedoms and constraints for individuals in one or more of those categories. There is a constant and complicated flux in which actions, views and language create concepts of stability, change, practicality and validity.

We now need to examine the practicalities of planning an Heideggerian curriculum.

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8 AN HEIDEGGERIAN CURRICULUM

A PROCESS APPROACH AND THE USE OF EXPERIENCE

A course influenced by an Heideggerian framework would focus upon the activity of mental health nursing: it is centred upon the real experiences and practice of its students. The curriculum content, the teaching and learning methods and the course work will centre around the students' experience of mental health nursing. Students will study their own practice and experience via description, observations, data collection, taping, videos, and peer group work. The course would aim at enhancing students' confidence, commitment and understanding of their own practice by carefully ensuring that their theorising is directly related to their capacity to put their learning into effective practice. It is also important that students develop the capacity to make positive contributions to the improvement of their own places of work in ways which reflect their growing understanding of their own practice.

Due to the course being based on the students' practice there would be no lectures and no pre-determined content as the foundation of the course, these would become a resource just like a video or a book and would be called upon to enhance students' experience. At the beginning students would be expected to offer authentic descriptions of aspects of their mental health nursing experiences. The sharing of experience and the study of this experience would constitute the course content. The main learning medium would be seminars, tutorials and workshops using materials mostly provided by students themselves; or lectures which the students would also ask for. The analysis of experiences and materials will provide the link with published research and literature.

The course therefore, as can be seen, would employ a 'process' approach. 'Process' is a word which in recent years has revealed both conceptual problems and some important practical and institutional concerns. It is important that we draw attention to one of the most significant of these at the very outset so that the verbal

and conceptual perambulations in the course are perceived as centrally relevant to how it would be both "taught" and "learned". Many process approaches are closely related to the notion of experience, and both the latter key terms here can have many meanings and putting the two together without careful analysis can rarely elucidate arguments or positions. It is widely accepted that the articulation of experience can sometimes distort experience or its understanding. The Heideggerian course must therefore grasp three nettles simultaneously: experience, process, and articulation. Because we want to work through students' experience we believe we are committed to a process approach. But an articulation of our intentions necessarily radicalises quite a number of conventional assumptions. This radical perspective creates a problem about the form of articulation, its appropriate content and, by implication, its length. We naturally hope that 'by now' we have addressed all of those which are of significance but one of these 'nettles' has not been spelled out and must be addressed here.

We assume throughout that students are primarily interested in their experiences and that the goal of practical enhancement justifiably commits us to prioritising students' experience in 'classrooms'. The content of our course is therefore 'experience' and the aim of the modules is for students to understand experience in ways which facilitate good practice. The process approach is the way in which we seek to identify, articulate, maintain, and understand students' experience as the priority content. This process is implicit. However, it seems reasonable to argue that if we made the process explicit then it would be easier to achieve these goals. But this step of making students' experience explicit in the classroom has to be taken very carefully. As we have seen from Heidegger's analysis, the subtlety, the uniqueness, the significance, and the indeterminacy of much experience makes its study continually problematic. One seductive way of avoiding this problematic confrontation is to find ways of processing experience so that it can be categorised, itemised or analysed. If the learning context legitimates such moves without care then the activity of processing becomes the (new) content.

To make our process explicit we will have to identify how the latter will be organisationally facilitated.

Thus, as we have seen, following Heidegger and his concern for lived experience, and the hermeneutic enterprise of Rorty; to translate both into a nursing mental health educational context, one has to begin with 'finding one's own experience'. This means that the course content, the teaching methods, and the course assessments will all derive quite directly from the experiences of students. 'The experiences of students' is, however, a catch all phrase, so an intention to use experiences as the basis of the course presents the problems of identification and structure: which experiences; and how are they linked and studied? The approach presented here is to offer quite specific answers to these questions and it must do so if it aspires to provide a rigorous course of study at diploma and degree level. There is a further claim embedded in this argument. People learn from experience - what else could they learn from! But often people fail to learn as well. Even if the "Which" and the "How" of the previous paragraph are answered it is a further question as to whether such study will lead to changes in action. Unless there can be confidence that action will be significantly affected by study then such study cannot be called practical. Mere intention is not sufficient. This Heideggerian 'position' is not offered to students as an ideology but it is the position which illuminates the educational practice in terms of teaching, assessment procedures, monitoring and evaluation, and student support.

NURSING RESEARCH ON THE USE OF EXPERIENCE

The importance of practice and experience has been looked at very closely in nursing by Benner. She argues that "Experience-based skill acquisition is safer and quicker when it rests upon a sound educational base."¹ The philosophy of Heidegger and its interpretation by Dreyfus is the sound educational base that she uses but she is more interested in the context of expertise and the difference between the novice and the

expert nurse. What she looked at closely was "if there were distinguishable, characteristic differences in the novice's and expert's descriptions of the same clinical incident."² The strong point of her research is that it moves the grounding of nursing away from theoretical formalisms and towards practical experiences; from the present-at-hand towards the ready-to-hand.

The expert nurse perceives the situation as a whole, uses past concrete situations as paradigms, and moves to the accurate region of the problem without wasteful consideration of a large number of irrelevant options. In contrast, the competent or proficient nurse in a novel situation must rely on conscious, deliberate analytic problem solving of an elemental nature.³

As we can see, Benner is using the Dreyfusian Heideggerian interpretation as the underlying theory to argue the difference between novice and expert nurses. She also uses the Dreyfus brothers model of skill acquisition which she applies to nursing practice,⁴ and the five stages are Novice, Advanced Beginner, Competent, Proficient, and Expert. Novice nurses are persons with no experiences in the nursing situations in which they are expected to function, they thus use rule-governed behaviour which is very limited. Advanced beginners are those who show barely sufficient acceptable clinical skills. Competent nurses can plan long range goals and have clear priorities. Proficient nurses view situations holistically and their nursing skills are guided by maxims. The expert nurse does not have to rely on formal thinking to cope with complex situations because they use past concrete experiences as what Benner calls paradigm cases;⁵ they have an enormous background of experience with an intuitive grasp of each situation. An intuitive grasp which she has adapted from the Dreyfus brothers is the direct apprehension of a situation based upon the experience of past situations, it is what Benner calls a gestalt or holistic understanding that bypasses formal thinking, and it is not possible without the experience of the background situations.⁶ The competencies are demonstrated by exemplars which make the practice explicit and this practical knowledge is shared and passed on by the use of maxims, and these maxims only make sense if the person already has a deep understanding of the nursing situation.⁷ This is what

Benner means by knowledge embedded in practice, and the interpretation of a maxim will vary according to the degree of expertise the nurse has.

But there is a problem with who decides who the experts are? Cash points out this problem in the fact that, "This point is related to that of the status of the person who codes the material to establish the dimensions of expert practice."⁸ He goes on to argue that the selection of the experienced nurses was done by staff development directors who had conferred with ward managers and peers and used certain criteria.⁹ Benner then used a sample of pairing twenty one experienced nurses and students and compared their interpretations of Critical Incidents that are situation based descriptions of clinical incidents, and a paradigm is a collection of critical incidents that alter understanding and perception of future clinical situations. Each nurse was interviewed at least three times and observed at least once in their clinical environment. The interviews were also carried out within the Dreyfus' framework of five key aspects of intuitive judgement: pattern recognition, commonsense understanding, skilled know-how, sense of salience, and deliberative rationality. From the interviews and studies of the transcripts emerged thirty three competencies which were classified into seven domains of nursing practice. Cash points out that the coding was done by a research team of a nurse, a psychologist and an anthropologist using consensual validation. The important point for Cash is that the latter method is used not to provide the characteristics of an expert nurse, but is used to "elicit the characteristics of expert practice within a specific context."¹⁰ Thus expertise cannot be fixed on the person because the context is more important, but on the other hand the individual expert has a specific way of thinking intuitively, Cash argues that these two positions cannot be reconciled. He goes on to argue that Benner does not provide a solution to the former problem of who interprets the critical incidents and that since what constitutes expert nursing practice is empowered by a specific group of professionals therefore the concept of expertise is arbitrary. Expertise is determined "by whatever community does the judging",¹¹ it is thus "socially determined."¹² But one solution of this problem is Rorty's

pragmatism: one substitutes the specific group of professionals with the 'nursing' social practices of the day which have been argued out. Also, because Benner concentrates on skill acquisition the effect of Heidegger's thought on the nurse curriculum has not been thought through properly.

Before we come back to the curriculum it is worth noting that Benner, in a later study claimed that the lived experience of nursing involves a level of involvement and absorption in the situation.¹³ Thus there is a lot of nursing research which is moving towards an Heideggerian approach and there has been a lot of good work written regarding Heidegger and his differences with Husserl in a nursing research context.¹⁴ But what has caused most controversy amongst nurses is Benner's concept of 'intuition'¹⁵ which we looked at earlier which she has taken from the Dreyfus brothers. Much of this debate has centred on the concept of intuition itself without looking at the wider context of Heidegger's thought on where the ontological shift from 'practical thinking' to 'theoretical thinking' happens. Also, the effect of Heidegger's thought on the nurse curriculum has not been thought through properly as Darbyshire¹⁶ points out, especially on how the nurse curriculum can use the 'experiences' of nurses. All the research has been concentrated on qualified nurses.

Three field research studies influenced by Benner's work have used what was called a seven-stage Heideggerian hermeneutical analysis to look at the experiences of nurse education. The first study by Diekelmann has used this approach to research the 'testing' of students¹⁷ and uses the analysis to look for what the author calls Heideggerian "shared practices and common meanings."¹⁸ Those shared practices and common meanings were then identified and coded as themes and constitutive patterns, and the constitutive patterns were identified by the author as the relationships among the themes which she states is reflected in all the texts. A software package called MARTIN¹⁹ was used as the tool for analysing the qualitative narrative data. The analysis and interpretation was then undertaken by three experienced interpretative researchers and four graduate students. The research

project interviewed forty four students and teachers from ten schools of nursing in the midwest region of the United States, and each individual was asked to give a narrative account of experiences that stood out to them in the context of being a student or teacher. The seven-stage analysis of the narrative text was then used. The purpose of the analysis is to use continuous reappraisals and comparisons to expose contradictions and inconsistencies. Diekelmann argues that multiple interpretations at every stage of the analysis serve as a bias control because if unsubstantiated meanings and inaccurate interpretations are not supported by textual reference, the researchers return to the texts. If commonalities and shared practices are exposed, and if the shared interpretations revealed are based on shared cultural meanings, they will then be recognisable by nurses who share the same culture. The study revealed "that what matters in teaching and learning are the practices that we create as teachers and how these practices are experienced by the students."²⁰ Diekelmann concludes that education influenced by the Behavioural approach is teacher-centred and "This approach perpetuates a relationship in which the teacher is powerful and in control,..."²¹ The study concludes that too much time is spent on content in the curriculum and not enough time on the student experiences. Again we have the same problem of the empowerment by a specific group of professionals for which Cash criticised Benner's work above. One could argue that even though the same seven-stage analysis is used, a different team of interpretative researchers would interpret the data differently, the Dreyfusian interpretation all the way down; and again, Rorty's pragmatism of substituting the specific interpretative researchers with the 'nursing' social practices of the day would be a solution to the problem.

Another research project by Diekelmann which looks closer at Behavioural Pedagogy²² and its influence on the nursing curriculum used the same approach as the latter study. This time twenty one teachers and twenty one students from a medium sized midwestern city participated in unstructured interviews. The same process as above using the seven-stage Heideggerian hermeneutical analysis of the data was done. The results of the study was that "Learning-as-cognitive-gain",

which displays an overemphasis on the content of the curriculum, was the constitutive pattern that emerged across all interviews. The consequence of this was that teachers spent a great deal of time revising lectures, and the students became obsessed by the lecture medium. Teachers constantly had the pressure of adding more and more content to their lectures and "Cognitive gain as an aim of education often emphasises content without relation to any kind of situatedness or context."²³ This has the effect that all the learning strategies are geared towards how to increase the amount of content learned and that the 'thinking' process in particular situations is lost.

Applying content as thinking was a theme that emerged in many of the interviews. Often teachers and students spoke of trying to apply content in patient situations. Teachers spend a great deal of time forging links for students between classroom content and patient care...Thus, one danger of behavioural pedagogy is that it emphasises learning content and the acontextualisation application of content; thinking is de-emphasised and/or defined as merely applying content to specific situations.²⁴

Diekelmann argues that the obsession with content in teaching methods conceals what is being learned, the meanings that the students are using to reflect upon their experiences are being covered over, and that the memorisation of facts is given precedence to the detriment of what she calls thinking skilfully. It is at this point that she uses the later Heidegger²⁵ who argues that: "Thinking does not take content and apply it in a corresponding way."²⁶ Diekelmann goes on to argue that teachers who constantly focus on content encourage a linear problem solving, results oriented student nurse who stays at the level of nursing diagnoses, patients needs, and care plans; but is not able to stay in-a-situation and think contextually. Above all, she argues that "it will only be through experience that students will learn nursing practice."²⁷

In the final study by Rather²⁸ we are going to look at which uses the Heideggerian seven-stage analysis is concentrating on experienced Registered Nurses who are studying for degrees, and the researcher interviews fifteen of the latter nurses. The constitutive pattern that emerged was that nursing meant more to

the researchee's than just a role or a job, it was 'a way of thinking', and like Diekelmann above she uses the later Heidegger to support the results. Rather also found that the experienced undergraduates, no longer thought as 'novices' in the nursing situations that they found themselves in, were not hampered by rule-governed formal thinking, and concludes that "there are many implications for nursing curricula embedded in this new understanding of how RNs (Registered Nurses) learn."²⁹ She argues that lecturing on acontextual facts and rules may be appropriate for novices, but not for more advanced practitioners. I want to argue that latter is not appropriate for novice nurses as well.

Before we move back to the nursing curriculum it is worth noting that there has been a recent debate regarding the predominance of experience in the philosophy of education generally. White has argued that "non-religious citizens need frameworks within which to make sense of their existence, both at the social and at the cosmic level."³⁰ His argument is that people brought up religiously are provided with such frameworks but for secular children it is a hit-and-miss affair, particularly regarding 'the cosmic framework'; the consequence of this is that they are left 'without bearings'. Cooper³¹ argues that the contemporary educational scene is not 'frameworkless', on the contrary there is a very strong framework which he calls 'naturalism', and by naturalism he means the positivist scientific objective standpoint of the present-at-hand world. He thus agrees with White that: "We need a vision of education in which our attachment to the experienced world is placed centre stage."³² But rather than just using the experience of the environment as a dwelling place, which includes aesthetic experience, as it reveals itself to us as the framework, which is what White argues; Cooper argues that phenomenology should be used as the framework for a philosophy of education. Thus Cooper also argues "that education should focus on the '*experienced* world'"³³ but within the framework of phenomenology if the young are not to be left 'without bearings'. There are thus strong arguments within the context of nursing and also within the philosophy of education generally, to support the idea that practice and experience should be at the

centre of the nurse curriculum. With these arguments to back us up we now need to return to the nursing context.

A NURSING CONTEXT

All human conduct occurs in contexts and most nursing activity occurs in contexts which are specifically intended to facilitate nursing. Some contexts are better than others. For any one nurse, some clinical environments will be easier to nurse in than others. The clinical environments which are seen as 'easy' will be ones where the other nurses share one's own ideas about nursing and where the clients subscribe or can be 'made' to subscribe to those ideas. The contexts which are valued are therefore ones which reciprocate one's own ideas and practices. In reality, of course, no context entirely reciprocates any one person's beliefs, so some negotiation has to take place. On both sides there will be certain aspects which are not negotiable, but usually there is room for practical compromises which allow the nurse to engage practically in the context and enable colleagues to accept and respond to that engagement in ways which sustain the integrity of the context as a whole. In the clinical environment the same category of non-negotiability will consist of features of the nurses' behaviour and understanding which "have to be accepted" at least in the short run, e.g. economic circumstances, staffing levels, use of medication. The negotiating in the clinical environment produces the creative compromise of nursing routine. In any one context, e.g. acute care, drug unit, community, there will be a family resemblance between the various clinical environment routines and yet each one will be significantly unique because of the specific mix of the ideas and competencies of that particular collection of people.

Like almost all contexts which are specifically focused upon human welfare, nursing contexts are directly linked with other contexts. Clients go into clinical environments or therapeutic relationships in order to deal with the world. Competencies are expected to be relevant to that world in terms of concepts, skills,

information, conduct, and attitudes. The opportunities to 'close down' the context of nursing are relatively limited. Therefore many of the concepts, skills and attitudes involved in nursing are intricately connected to the client's and the nurses' lives outside nursing. If relevance is to be sustained then so must consistency. That which is seen as important - and which claims commitment - may therefore be directly connected to almost any arena of human life. This connection of contexts of nursing and contexts elsewhere can be - and usually is - quite specific. Consider the sentence, "I'm sure you can do that, Paul". Such a sentence can easily be understood as the culmination of a dialogue between a nurse and a client. Given the varying contexts in which it may be uttered, the various sentences which may have preceded it and the various ways in which it could have been said, then its final form will similarly vary. But many of the variables involved will quite directly derive from beliefs and skills which transcend purely nursing contexts: Beliefs and skills to do with the manner and style of human relations or nurse/client relations, moral beliefs, attitudes towards human intention and so on. The practical power of such a sentence will be understood via these sorts of considerations and its practical effect will be in terms of how Paul understands it (again according to similar criteria).

These general beliefs and competencies permeate and mould most acts significant to individuals - if they didn't then there would be little predictable regularity in human conduct. These beliefs and competencies constitute the content of committed being. The problem is to find a way of identifying them from the pretheoretical background practices which are more primordial than the beliefs and competencies. To the extent that they can be subjected to rational scrutiny and modification then it also follows (given this argument) that a whole range of practical actions would also be modified accordingly. The sentence, "I'm sure you can do that, Paul" would be moulded long before it was expressed. Under normal circumstances, perceptions of context and the manner of engagement with it create immediate opportunities and expectations. To begin a chess game commits one to trying to win and abiding by the rules; to attempt an explanation creates expectations

of consistency and eventual insight. In addition what is known about the participants further refines the expectations and commitments, affecting the style of play or authority upon a subject. Exactly to what extent the sentence to Paul would have been formed in this way would be directly related to its significance for the person who expresses it. Some sentences (or propositions) "have" to be uttered given the perception of circumstances in conjunction with the beliefs and competencies of the speaker. The argument at this point is claiming that when practitioners involve themselves in any context, their perception is selective with particular relevance to the extent to which they can conduct themselves practically in acceptable ways. Their commitment to nursing implies that when in contexts of nursing they find ways to endorse that fact of their being nurses. As argued above some contexts facilitate this more than others, but in any contexts which are seen in this way, an individual's particular beliefs and competencies will create situations which require a response. When "Situations" arise then not to respond appropriately is to endure feelings of incompetence and guilt; to respond appropriately is to endorse feelings of competence and appropriate being. Other, e.g. colleagues and clients, will see an individual's conduct in terms of the extent to which it contributes to the maintenance of the context or its improvement.

NURSING SITUATIONS

The approach to the course is to encourage students to describe carefully nursing "Situations", i.e., events and circumstances in which they perceive an imperative to act in particular ways. Initially such descriptions may be meaningful to almost any audience - in the same way that a person's conduct upon being the first at the scene of an accident may be readily understandable to all. Quite soon students will find themselves describing events where the meaning is less clear and where their own interpretations are significantly different from others. It is through the in-depth examination of such occurrences in their "Situational" settings that students will be

able to discover and subsequently examine their basic beliefs, the beliefs which come from the Heideggerian 'Befindlichkeit' which lay at the root of most of their significant conduct and only make sense in the contextual background of shared practices of which the nurses are brought up in. The last point in the basic argument is concerned with what is involved in the general practical application of rational nursing beliefs. For Heidegger, the term belief is too cognitive, beliefs are derivative from what Heidegger calls 'Befindlichkeit'. Maquarrie and Robinson translate it as 'state-of-mind' and Dreyfus translates it as 'affectedness' because state-of-mind has connotations of a mental state.³⁴ He argues that one needs "an English word that conveys *being found in a situation where things and options already matter...*"³⁵ A much better translation for our means is the one used by Cooper³⁶ which is 'situatedness'. It has the connotations of 'finding yourself in a situation', thus for our means it can mean 'the situation the students find themselves in'. It's a kind of attunement to one's circumstances which is presupposed by any articulated beliefs about them. It is from this situatedness that the beliefs originate. Experience can reveal that action 'works' for someone, but that is not to say either that it will work for someone else or that someone else will be able to do that particular action in a similarly effective way.

In the real world of mental health nursing a *situation* or a problem just exists. The 'subjects' (i.e. sociology, psychology, physiology, etc.) are perspectives for trying to understand aspects of the situation or problem. When we have to do something about a *situation* we do not, and cannot, *act* partially. We cannot act 'physiologically' or 'sociologically'; *actions* are not like perspectives. So when a student needed to *act* in a *situation*, say, in a clinical area, some sort of integration needed to be required. A process of selecting relevant bits out of what had been learned in psychology or ethics and so on. Students found it almost impossible to integrate and apply the subjects, and although they often knew a lot in theory they couldn't apply it in practice. The problem seems to arise from the whole idea that the best way to learn to do something rationally and effectively is to study some

'theory' and then try to 'apply' it in practice. There is a split between the *subjects* and *acting* in a *situation*. It is before this split happens in the pretheoretical ready-to-hand world where teaching needs to start; the nurses find themselves in the 'situatedness' of a situation; and has already been said: in the real world of mental health nursing a *situation* exists such as a client approaching you who is experiencing hallucinations and delusions. You need to *act* in that *situation*, thus to act is *doing* something, and this doing is a *skill* which has to be done *competently*. This has the consequence that the *doing* something which is a *skill* is going to be very important as regarding the beliefs that are going to be generated from the situation. We also need to make explicit here, that for Heidegger the shared everyday skills and practices into which we are socialised provide the intelligibility for people to make sense of their world, the so-called knowing-how. This knowing is embedded in the everyday skills rather than in concepts, beliefs or values; and this knowing also directs our actions. If we therefore contextualise the skills and practices of mental health nursing, then this is where the curriculum should start from, not from the concepts which are directed from the content of the subjects.

The students will 'find themselves already in a situation', and from this 'situatedness' they will either take on the beliefs and values that have already been generated from the implicit background of mental health skills and practices or they will begin to question them. The question that needs to be asked is whether the 'subjects' that have been studied help one to act skilfully with a certain amount of competence. The answer has got to be no! The 'subjects' only help you *after* the situation in which you *acted skilfully* and *competently* has happened. The subjects help you to put your thoughts into context and think through the situation *after* it has happened by the use of critical reflection which distances one from the situation. It also needs to be noted that the beliefs and values which have been generated from the background of mental health skills and practices are historical and therefore open to interpretation, a new generation of mental health nurses may interpret differently and question the past and even the present generation's beliefs and values. This is

the crux of Heidegger's philosophical anthropological problem which we discussed in detail earlier, and as we have seen, Heidegger wanted to reveal the ahistorical cross-cultural structures of everyday experience in his existential analytic. This is where Rorty argues that Heidegger's quest for Being in the everyday background skills and practices is doomed, and pragmatism should take over; and Rorty's interpretation is fruitful for education as we will see.

What we now need to do is relook at our discussions on comportment, the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, Being-with and solicitude which we looked at earlier; but now discuss them within the context of the implementation of a nurse curriculum.

As we have seen, Dasein in its everydayness of Being-in comports itself naturally to the ready-to-hand world of equipment with which it is concerned, and this is a more primordial encounter than relating itself consciously to the Nature of the present-at-hand. We are now at the crux of the difficulties that surround the relationship between theory and practice. We have access to both the latter worlds of the theoretical and practical, and nurse education needs to develop more emphasis upon the practical world of the ready-to-hand. Also, if we use educational methods to open up the ready-to-hand world, the Being-with of Others is also encountered, and other Daseins are not related to with concern but with solicitude. Both these relationships are inconspicuous, they are not conscious relationships. Also, the solicitude which 'leaps-in' and takes away care is detrimental to the solicitude which 'leaps-ahead', Heidegger points out above that the solicitude which 'leaps-in' is to mistakenly relate to other Daseins as if they were a piece of equipment, but the solicitude which 'leaps-ahead' leads to authenticity. Thus in the nursing 'situation' which is in the ready-to-hand world, the students have to be made aware of how to relate to equipment and to other nurses and clients.

If we concentrate first on the ready-to-hand world it is worth noting that being-there is more originary than consciousness, thus the origin of knowledge is in being-there and not consciousness. This further reinforces the consequence that

being-there in the ready-to-hand world should be the start of the content of the curriculum and not the 'subjects'. To open up the ready-to-hand world circumspection has to be used, and the circumspection involved in looking around only makes sense in the practical background of the world of the clinical environment. Circumspective penetration will enable the student to be more aware of the background cultural mental health skills and practices that are generating the beliefs, and as Dreyfus has argued above, circumspection is a type of reflecting, but a reflecting from the practical background that the nurse dwells and is immersed in; and it is from reflection of this practical world that we can make sense of the present-at-hand theoretical world. It is not the critical reflection which distances the individual. This reflection of the practical world is much more precise when manipulation and using stops, but because it is still immersed and tied to the practical world it is not a theoretical mode of thinking. As argued above, Heidegger calls this 'tarrying around' so that there is no connotation with theoretical thinking. It is the circumspective penetration mode of comportment that is adaptable and copes with situations on the basis of a vast past experience the individual brings to the situation. This is what Benner means by intuition, it is not a conscious awareness such as formal thinking which would radically slow down what needed to be done, but nevertheless, this intuition of a vast array of past experience does get done what needed to be done in the practical ready-to-hand world. Thus it does not involve mental content.

Circumspection is a guide for practice, but it is also, as we have seen above, subordinate to the context in which it is working; the context is a given, hence the clinical situation the nurse is in is the given, the ground of what nursing is. Also, when Dasein surveys the situation it goes into the mode of 'deliberating' which is when circumspection interprets from its environment. This part is important for teaching, because it is circumspective deliberation that allows Dasein to stay within the confines of the ready-to-hand, and not make the ontological switch to the theoretical present-at-hand. Thus interpretation from the environment is important

here. Consider the following clinical situation: "A client who is experiencing psychotic symptoms suddenly picks up the nearest chair and puts it through a window." What does the nurse do, back away or approach the client? Both could be right and wrong. Circumspection has to interpret this situation in the clinical context. "The same methodic retreat makes it necessary to dismiss the dualism of subject and object; to construe phenomenology as interpretation rather than reflection; to follow the arrival and withdrawal of things in the horizon of the world instead of remaining riveted to entities constantly present;..."³⁷ The nurse in the above situation has got to act, and what she does has to be based on past experiences in similar clinical situations. But if the situation is acute there is not time to reflect on the situation. Staying riveted to the theory of schizophrenia is not going to help in the situation.

It must be remembered that Heidegger focuses on practical examples because they involve action, and actions seem easiest to explain without resorting to an appeal to mental representations. However, action takes place against a wider social background, and the action that the nurse takes occurs within a cultural background of other shared practices; and as we have already seen, Dreyfus suggests that these practices are typically not consciously learned but simply required unreflectively. What is important to note here is that the background is pervasive and the practices involve skills. From the Heideggerian perspective, the acquisition of cultural skills is not a reflective process involving mental representations. Such skills are simply absorbed through living in one's culture, or in this particular case, through living in a mental health nursing culture.

For Heidegger, circumspection is much more precise than mere manipulating and using. The nurse who is merely using and manipulating equipment or clients needs to concentrate much more on circumspective concern which directs attention to relevant features of the environment. Deliberating is when circumspection interprets an object from its environment with which it has been concerned with and brought close after it has surveyed the situation from the totality of equipment. That

is, the nurse is surveying her environment and remains bound to the practicalities of experience. The framework which does this is the 'if - then', if this or if that, this opens up the ready-to-hand much more. As the ready-to-hand is opened up much more, the nurse who is in the latter situation, will she do 'this' or 'that', what will she put to use, how will she cope? This is circumspective deliberation which opens up the clinical nursing situation and can bring certain aspects of it closer. Envisaging goes beyond the local situation and takes into account what is not tangibly there. Our earlier example is 'if one wants to use a nail to hang a picture on the wall 'then' a hammer is needed, but if there is no hammer in the local environment envisaging one's deliberation knows what is needed but it is un-ready-to-hand. There is still no mental representation. Dreyfus calls this absorbed coping which is the new kind of intentionality, the nurse is absorbed in the clinical situation of the ready-to-hand and when things begin to break down the nurse surveys the situation and has to interpret what they are going to do.

If they approach the client straightaway and talk to them it could be the right thing to do, or it could be the wrong thing to do. If they back off from the client and decide to approach them later, it could be the right thing to do, or it could be the wrong thing to do. In other words, if this or if that. What will help them to make a decision will be circumspective deliberation and envisaging what they are going to do whilst they are absorbed in the situation. And it will be a vast array of past experiences in similar situations which will help them to decide, but this will not be theoretical thinking, we do not switch into the theoretical mode and have to give a rationale for why a psychotic client is disturbed. Rather, all the nurse does is interact with the client and use her skills and competencies, these having been derived from the past experiences of similar situations. Theorising about these types of situations comes much later in the day. If the nurse chooses the wrong thing to do and the client becomes more disturbed, what Dreyfus calls malfunction will happen. If the hammer is too heavy we quickly get another one without having to theorise. In our

example the nurse could quickly try different skills and competencies without having to sit back and theorise.

Before we move on to malfunction it is worth reiterating that Dreyfus has argued that circumspection is a mode of awareness and experience that opens up the practical ready-to-hand world and the things in it, and even though it takes account of the situation without recourse to mental states it is not mindless, it is a form of open experience rather than private subjective experience. It follows that a nurse has to take into account the surrounding practical environment of the clinical situation she is in; she has to become immersed in it to achieve a state of circumspection which is deliberating and is adaptable and copes with situations in a variety of ways using skills and competencies which are based on a vast past of experiences that one brings to the situation. It is also plausible to suppose that this vast array of past experiences exceeds what is possible to capture in a theory: the phenomena of coping are simply too complex. This complexity is also evident when situations in which things go wrong are considered. The nurse, in order to analyse the situation by the use of circumspective penetration or deliberation, plainly needs to consider the situation, but does this considering involve intentional content? Does it involve reflection upon mental representations? This difference between reflection upon the experience of the ready-to-hand world and reflection upon mental representations and therefore theories is going to be crucial as we develop teaching methods.

As we have seen earlier, it is difficult for us to pinpoint where the ontological shift from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand arises; or in other words, at what point the move from practical to theoretical thinking takes place. Heidegger explains what accounts for the move when things break down but he does not provide an account of this transition, but what is important for Heidegger is that circumspection guides practice, but it is also subordinate to the context in which it is functioning. When the nurse surveys its whereabouts, she is locked in the totality of the equipment in which she is working. In other words, the 'equipment totality' will determine what options are open, and it is this environmental world, or context of

equipment that is the starting point for Dasein. This is what is given and where Dasein starts from. By analogy, this is also the starting point of the curriculum.

It is only when the malfunction lasts, what Dreyfus calls a temporary breakdown occurs, there is a move from absorbed coping to deliberate coping, and then to deliberation. The above psychotic client becomes very disturbed and no amount of skills and competencies that are attempted works. It is at this point that the nurse will act deliberately and have to pay attention, and if this gets us nowhere the nurse moves into the stance of deliberation which Dreyfus argues involves reflective planning. This is where one stops and considers, and plans what to do, but it is in the clinical context of involved activity. And as Dreyfus has already argued, the deliberation is limited to the local situation and it is the Heideggerian envisaging which can take account of what is not present. Here is the crux of the relationship between theory and practice, for Heidegger mental representations are not independent of the world; in this clinical situation they cannot be analysed without reference to the ready-to-hand world. Dreyfus points out that deliberation is not a pure detached theoretical reflection because in this situation, for it to make sense it has to refer to the ready-to-hand world of the disturbed client. Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger implies that deliberate action and even theoretical contemplation takes place on the background of the ready-to-hand world, there is no mental representation in the mind which we then act upon. Temporary breakdown introduces mental representations, but in this clinical context these representations originate from the clinical context of the ready-to-hand world and not from consciousness; therefore reflecting upon experience and from mental representations that originate from that experience due to a temporary breakdown is different to reflecting upon the mental representations that originate from theories. Therefore, the mode of circumspection which acts deliberately after a temporary breakdown can be defined as reflecting upon the experience of the clinical practical situation of the environment of the ready-to-hand world that the nurse dwells and is immersed in; and if there is a temporary breakdown then there is a reflection upon the mental

representations which are generated from that breakdown. Circumspection is not a detached reflecting away from the ready-to-hand world to the mental representations which originate in the theoretical present-at-hand world.

The theoretical present-at-hand is discovered in the 'if' and 'then' of how the ready-to-hand is interpreted. If the hammer is too heavy 'then' it can either be interpreted as a hammer with mass, which is theoretical present-at-hand; or 'if' the hammer is too heavy 'then' it can be interpreted as too heavy and get me a lighter one, which is ready-to-hand. If there is not a lighter hammer then the situation becomes unready-to-hand. The confinement of the ready-to-hand is broken when the equipment is not seen as a tool for use and manipulation. The breakout from the ready-to-hand world is due to releasing entities from their place in the ready-to-hand environment. When temporary breakdown becomes total breakdown, this is where Dreyfus argues that we can either stare at the equipment or take a new detached theoretical present-at-hand stance. You begin to think about the objects away from their context. In a nursing context if the psychotic client is disturbed 'then' he can either be interpreted as an individual with paranoid schizophrenia, which is theoretical present-at-hand; or 'if' the client is disturbed 'then' he can be interpreted as an individual who needs a nurse with mental health skills and competencies, which is ready-to-hand. If the skills and competencies do not work and client becomes more disturbed then the situation becomes unready-to-hand. In this total breakdown the client may have to be given medication to calm their disturbed behaviour and a detached theoretical present-at-hand stance is taken. The nurses begin to think about the client away from the context of the clinical environment that they are working in.

Before we start to develop the latter Heideggerian framework to teaching methods we need to look more closely at Being-in and Being-with. As we have already seen the Being-with of Others is also encountered in the ready-to-hand world, and usually the same mistake of interpreting Being-with in a theoretical present-at-hand way is made. As Heidegger says, we meet the Dasein-with of Others at work in the ready-to-hand world. What we have to be aware of is that

Being-in and Being-with are what Heidegger calls equiprimordial, and as we begin to use teaching methods which concentrate on circumspective penetration to open up the ready-to-hand world, it should also make us more aware of the Dasein-with of Others. Thus there is the concernful relationship to equipment in the ready-to-hand world which circumspective penetration will make the student more aware of. But there is also the relationship of solicitude to other Daseins, and these two different ontological categories have different kinds of Being, therefore the different kinds of relationship of concern and solicitude. And as we have seen, it is the deficient mode of the leaping-in solicitude which takes away care in which we encounter Others; and this type of solicitude dwells in the inauthenticity of the everydayness of the they-self. It is the authentic-self which has to be disclosed and cleared away from the concealments of averageness and idle talk. A teaching method will therefore have to be developed to achieve the latter. But we have a potential difficulty in the context of mental health nursing. Does the nurse relate to the client in the ontological category of Being-in, in the ready-to-hand mode as equipment, thus the relationship is concernful? Or does the nurse relate to the client in the ontological category of Being-with, through the relationship of solicitude? This difficulty I hope to address as we concentrate on teaching methods. But we now need to look at the skill of reflection in a nursing educational context in much more depth to prepare ourselves for teaching methods in an Heideggerian context.

A central feature of consciousness is our ability to reflect upon our experiences. Some situations facilitate considerable reflection: just before going to sleep, sun bathing, listening to boring lectures. Other situations allow almost no reflection or, if it occurs, it is fleeting: any dramatic or swift change in our environment: accidents, interruptions, emergencies. As we have seen, reflecting can be a distancing activity, where the individual can distance themselves from absorption in the situation. The difficulty with reflecting whilst the fire burns is that we have to *act*, moments spent reflecting will allow the fire to get worse. All our mental attention goes towards maximising our efficiency in putting out the fire. To

concentrate upon our *action* tends to rule out reflecting upon it. The more inexperienced we are, or the more unusual the circumstances or the more insecure we feel, then the more we shall have to concentrate. We shall be less able to distance ourselves from the situation, to 'watch' the scene for a moment, to reflect upon it. In some clinical situations a nurse will have to *act* without thinking about it. This is where the Bennerian raw experience and skill comes into the equation. If you are on an acute admission ward and a client comes up to you and says "I am God almighty", you will have to *act* immediately. But in other clinical situations such as assessing a client, one will have time to think theoretically before you carry out the assessment.

The nurse needs to be aware of these two types of clinical situations, one in which they will have to *act skilfully* and *competently* without any chance to reflect upon the situation, and the other where they have lots of time to think and reflect about what they are going to do. It is the former situation where the nurse will pick the skills up from their experiences and not in a text book; and it is these experiences which contain the know-how which is embedded in the everyday skills of mental health nursing practice which they are having which need to be used in the classroom. The reason being, that if we follow Heidegger, these existential structures in a mental health nursing context provide the conditions of intelligibility for mental health nursing; the knowing that is embedded in these skills and practices is the grounding of mental health nursing. Teaching methods need to make a clearing here for the students to home in upon.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRICULUM

The start of the teaching process will begin with 'clinical situations' where students have had experiences where they have had to act skilfully and competently without any chance to reflect upon the situation. Thus the main thrust of the work in an Heideggerian Mental Health Nursing course is to provide a practical method of

analysis of *nursing situations* that are significant to the students involved; especially as these nursing situations are embedded in the everyday mental health nursing skills and practices that the students are socialised into. There are many other approaches to analysis: one might analyse other nurses' *nursing situations*; one might study typical *nursing situations* or one might analyse a nursing system. Most of these different analyses, if taken far enough, would embrace very similar contents and they therefore overlap in this respect. However, the approach sees the fact that the students themselves are embedded *in* situations and feel in some way compelled to do something about them as a significantly different factor; which makes a special demand upon the method of analysis.

It has already been pointed out in that most action in most situations is unreflective. What reflection does go on is usually of the monitoring type, the 'is this going OK' or 'what should I do now' type of conscious observation of oneself doing something. Very little reflection embraces the situation 'as a whole' and takes the form of 'is my general position here correct?' or 'how did I get into this?'. As things of a problematic kind occur we respond unreflectingly with our everyday skills and competencies, using the sorts of practices which we have used pretty successfully in the past in similar situations. When things are going well we are free to relax and go along with events. If our everyday skills (our everyday practice) on any series of occasions do not deal with the little problems that arise then the problems may irritatingly persist or perhaps get worse. It is along this route that reflection begins to emerge as necessary with questions such as 'what on earth do I do now?', 'I can't stand this any longer' or 'if we go on like this things will get out of hand'. This is obviously a cruder version of Dreyfus's ideas which we discussed in the last section, but the students will understand it much easier to begin with.

The situation becomes one which we feel we must attend to, it can't be just left - so we are being coerced into looking at it as a whole. As we have already tried quite a few of our usual approaches to the problem, the prospect is not at all straightforward at this stage. It is at this point that the analysis of a Mental Health

Nursing course informed by Heideggerian insights begins. The characterisation of this type of situation is called a *focus*.³⁸ What is important is that the curriculum is starting with a nursing situation which is embedded in practice at the point of the unready-to-hand.

A focus is a minimum description of a situation which the student accepts as valid and significant. It must be a description to which a student can honestly respond with a thought such as "Yes, I can imagine myself being quite likely to experience this and I would feel that I must do something about it". If this sort of response cannot be genuinely felt then the focus in question is inappropriate for study by that student. Thus a focus such as: 'A client on your ward is persistently aggressive'; most students would feel concerned about; but a focus such as: 'The clinical area you are working in is being decorated next week'; might not be something which students feel would be high up on their list of probable concerns. Students will be given a focus and this will be the *nursing situation* which will be studied.

We do not think about all that we do: it is rare to think about the way we use a knife and fork. Those things which we have learned to do we tend not to think about; those things which we see as new tend to provoke some thought. Reflection and thinking provide alternatives and options; it allows us to knowingly engage in choosing ourselves whereas unreflective action accumulates its effects without us monitoring where it is all leading to. An Heideggerian teaching method attempts to construct a context in which students may reflect upon themselves, their experiences and their judgements of others. It also tries to provide students with a reasonable systematic way of engaging in this reflection. It cannot, however, do the work for the student. A necessary ingredient is the student's genuine commitment to the enterprise, because without that commitment some of the relevant data to reflect upon will not be made available. Each student needs to seriously reflect so that each one can have access to that necessary part of the study.

This has the consequence that the Heideggerian teaching methods are organised in accordance with three important principles. Each of these principles is central to the appropriate development of students understanding of themselves and of mental health nursing.

The first principle is that the students' personal beliefs form the major content for the development of their understanding. Taking into account, as we argued earlier, that the precognitive situatedness of the mental health everyday skills and practices that the students find themselves in is where the beliefs originate; and it is the experience of the latter, not the beliefs which originate from textbooks where the teaching starts. Then at first sight this may seem straightforward, of course what we believe determines how well we understand anything. However, conventionally teaching spends most of its time looking at the beliefs of others, not of the students themselves. Usually these other beliefs are those of the teachers or of authorities. Students study beliefs which are considered to be the best beliefs on offer (content) or other beliefs in order to demonstrate that the authorities' beliefs are the best. The aim is for the students to acquire these beliefs and, when and if appropriate, act upon them. Thus we learn about 'injections' and then apply our knowledge if we need to carry out the procedure of giving an injection. This sort of teaching often includes reference to the students beliefs at, say, the beginning of the lesson ("Sheila, where do you think the injection site is?") or interspersed during a lesson. In more 'open' contents, such as literature, philosophy, psychiatry, or mental health nursing, discussion plays a greater role and the students' beliefs get more consideration. But still the students' beliefs do not form the focus of the discussion except insofar as the belief being considered is relevant, relevant to a content which is identified independently of the students' belief. Broadly speaking in conventional courses the students' beliefs function as a means to an end, not as ends in themselves. The students' are therefore encouraged to study beliefs which did not originate from the situatedness of their practice.

One could argue that in the subjects studied by mental health nurses, areas of knowledge such as clinical procedures and physiology have less scope for discussion centring around the students' beliefs. This becomes less so with sociology, but this can vary very much depending on how much scientific procedure had effected those topics. A consequence of the latter is that if one of these subjects gains the ascendancy in a curriculum it will then tend to dominate. Heideggerian teaching methods would want to balance this out by making sure the students' beliefs form the major content and also influence the other content which is studied. The beliefs which are discussed are expected to be genuine beliefs and not 'pretend' views which have been dressed up on the occasion to impress, fill a silence or to deceive. However, students' are not forced to reveal their beliefs (anyway, how could one do such a thing?) but the discussions are aimed at creating a context in which students' can feel free to speak their minds and be heard with consideration and respect. Students' who find this expectation unusual or even a little daunting must try to involve themselves in discussion from the very beginning. The quality of the work and learning depends very much upon the seriousness with which students contribute their ideas to the discussions.

The second Principle is that the tutors' major role is to help the students express, analyse and contextualise their beliefs, not to approve or disapprove, advocate or prescribe beliefs of their own. Again, in conventional teaching teachers' rarely feel inhibited in respect to advising students or stating their own beliefs relative to the students' beliefs, indeed sometimes the tutors' beliefs create the content, in, for example, the design of a curriculum. In an Heideggerian teaching context the tutors beliefs do not create the content, they create the way the content is studied. The content comes from the student' beliefs, the method of studying it comes from the tutors'. The tutors' role is to help the students say or write what they believe, to help them explore beliefs and their implications and to link the beliefs to other beliefs which have been expressed. But again, it has to be spelt out that it is the students' beliefs which originate from their practical situatedness where the

teaching sessions begin, this does not stop the exploration of other beliefs which have been generated from other experiential contexts than their mental health practice; but these beliefs are always derivative to the former beliefs and are never the starting point.

The third Principle is that the method of analysis reveals the content which is relevant to students beliefs. In conventional courses the content has a coherence which is often determined by a logic which is directly related to the content. In history for example 'time' forms an important basis for curriculum construction, or certain historical features like kings and queens, wars, etc. In science, the theoretical basis for the subject often dictates the curriculum: divisions such as biology, chemistry, and physics have different theoretical foundations and within each the content for study will often follow the logic of those theoretical foundations. Sometimes 'themes' or 'topics' occur and then the reasons for identifying relevant content are more flexible. The theme the 'Individual in Society' may include the individual in the family or the workplace. Exactly what reasons make these aspects relevant to the theme or relevant to the student who is studying the theme is less clear. In more formal curricula (e. g. the physiological curriculum derived from physiological theories) the relevance to the student is simply that it is important as a whole and the room for tailoring the content to the individual is minimal. If it is adapted too much to individuals then its logical (theoretical) basis may be difficult to see and its coherence lost. In the 'theme' approach there is often more concession to the students' relationship to the theme, and the more flexible logic of identification of relevant content leaves more room for adapting it to the student. But exactly what relationship to the student? Do we include content which the student is interested in, or finds easiest to learn, or is new, or which spreads over various disciplines, or what?

In an Heideggerian course the theme is identified as something which students feel and believe to be a *nursing situation* which would be important to them, like a client who seems to be resistive to therapeutic interventions or a clinical

area which is giving students a hard time. This nursing situation becomes the focus for all the other relevant content which is studied. Thereafter the method of analysis proceeds with the students providing the content at its various stages. This content is thereafter different from conventional courses: it is not determined by any 'theory' (of how to talk to an hallucinated client etc.) nor is it determined by what the students (or anyone else) thinks one ought to include as relevant to the theme (because it is, say, 'interesting' or in some way 'relevant'). The content is determined by following the analysis. Each move in the analysis will 'reveal' or 'disclose' an appropriate content for study, as in scrabble when a new letter gives the possibilities of new words being created. When the analysis has been completed, and if it has been done seriously and conscientiously, then the topic has been studied in a practical way. It is practical if the students' original beliefs about the theme have been carefully explicated, analysed and examined for their validity and if the students feel that 'now' they can act more appropriately should a situation of that kind arise.

What is important is that there are no guarantees. When we speak of being practical we usually mean something which can be effectively used. To give practical help or advice is to say something which the person can actually act upon to good effect; to do something practical for someone is to help that good effect along in some way. However, there is no advice or help which can be guaranteed in its effect. Explanations, demonstrations, guided movements, stage by stage instructions - all can sometimes fail to be effective. The value of each lies not so much in the level of 'guarantee' they offer but in their appropriateness to the task in hand. It is clearly inappropriate to try to learn colours without some objects which have those colours in them, it is inappropriate to learn to ride a bicycle only by reading about it, and many would think that to learn to live morally demands more than just a demonstration of 'moral behaviour' by some saint like person. In Mental Health Nursing most of what has to be learned can be accommodated through language, mostly description and explanation. However this is not always the case. When

discussing feelings, facial expressions, gestures, tones of voice and other manifestations of the subtle ways we behave in the world it may be more appropriate to see or even experience things. Therefore, besides discussion students may be able to see others in action through simulation or on video or film as well as occasionally demonstrating certain actions to a group. Whatever combination of practical activity is used there can be no guarantees of effectiveness. However, the more insightful and informed the belief, the sensitive and perceptive the student, the more probable is it that any practical effort will be successful. The more sophisticated the student (and sophistication should grow as the course progresses) the more he or she will have a sophisticated concept of what counts as success (just as the sophisticated artist's concept of the successful drawing of a man is rather different from a child's conception of success).

The emphasis on personal beliefs and their status in an Heideggerian curriculum may seem to imply that all beliefs are equally valid or that the view of authorities, as may be found in the literature of mental health nursing are of minor significance. Only in one important sense are all views equally valid and that is in the sense that a belief effects action whether the belief is true or false. However, there are reasons for beliefs and many beliefs can be shown to be true or false or inconsistent with other beliefs. If students are to become well informed, if they are to raise their knowledge above that of the 'person in the street' then a considerable amount of reading, and study of that reading, must take place. What is different about an Heideggerian influenced mental health nursing curriculum from conventional courses in this area is that because the modules are 'constructed' by expressed student beliefs the reading which is relevant to the examination and elaboration of those beliefs cannot be identified in advance by someone else. The specific way in which reading is used in analyses is explained in more detail further on. At this juncture it is sufficient to point out that even elaborate and consistent ignorance is no substitute for knowing what you are talking about, or knowing what

you are doing. Also, Rorty's pragmatic approach is relevant at this juncture, the students will choose content which appeal to the social practices of the day.

The first year is very important because it is a time for re-orientation, a re-orientation that should point in a positive and optimistic way towards a fulfilling three years. The work in the first year tries to create a context in which important things can be established or discovered. This will involve some changes in attitude by the students towards their tutors, their own experience and nursing as a professional activity. Attitude change rarely occurs 'overnight' and whilst under pressure to change one's feelings can move from positive to negative quite often; some of the experiences in the first year are: A gradual discovery that mental health nursing cannot be learned like more simple skills (driving a car, cooking) can be frightening; and this realisation may create anxiety in that it can be seen that quite a lot depends upon the learner herself. Some of the basic concepts of analysis will be gradually introduced and used in many ways so that they become familiar. Students will be encouraged to learn to use a library in a sophisticated way - not just getting out a book that someone else has identified or merely looking along the shelves. Unless the students learn to use the library as librarian uses it, then Mental Health Nursing Studies will be difficult. These skills take time to learn and are learned best by getting interested in something and following it through.

The discussion approach used in an Heideggerian Mental Health Nursing Studies course takes a little getting used to. It is useful if one gets to know the others in the group and the tutors. Some of the work is intended to aid this experience. By the third semester students should not be inhibited about expressing their views. Throughout the first year students have contact with clinical areas. The discussion about mental health nursing should help students to carefully appraise their commitment to mental health nursing and to more fully grasp what will be involved in learning to become professional. The first year should encourage the students to gain confidence in themselves and their potential to learn, and realise that there is much to learn; and to gain an interest in various aspects of a demanding job. In

semester one students are introduced to portfolio work. In the first instance the portfolio is a medium through which students begin to seriously reflect in a practical way upon aspects of their mental health nursing. The portfolio is written during clinical experience. In the second year the analysis is used in a more systematic way, and the concepts are extended and used in a more refined way. Students will be acquiring a reasonable grasp of the rationale to the approach used in an Heideggerian curriculum, they will begin to apply the concepts and analytical moves to their own experience. Some students may be able to devise policies for some of the problems they face in nursing experiences. By the end of the first year students should be able to see the relevance of the method of analysis they have learned, be able to use it in an elementary way in relation to their own problems; be confident of their potential to intervene usefully in the world and have a growing interest in problems which go beyond their own mundane concerns to the wider world of mental health nursing in general.

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9 CONCLUSION

To conclude, it has been seen as important that from within an Heideggerian context, basic beliefs and attitudes will have been grounded in the background skills and practices of mental health nursing. The curriculum will then ground itself and emerge from within these background skills and practices and the tutor can develop circumspective deliberation from out of the ready-to-hand situations that the students find themselves in; the students explore the clinical situations they find themselves in by use of a focus. The focus originates from the background skills and practices of mental health nursing and starts with the unanalysable interventions which the students do without any mental representation. An example would be how a student diffuses a potentially violent situation by use of their interpersonal skills straightaway without even thinking about why and what they have done. The focus is used to attempt to make educational sense of the intangible situations and interventions that the students experience. As the tutor develops the discussion from the origins of the ready-to-hand to the un-ready-to-hand, mental content starts to emerge from the ready-to-hand as negotiable practices are discussed. At this point it is important to differentiate the interpersonal skills which are used without any mental content and which would arise from the ready-to-hand background skills and practices; and a counselling model which would be a practice which does use mental content and arises from the theoretical present-at-hand world. Other practices which could be used are pharmacological, psycho-analytical, behavioural, or cognitive behavioural approaches; these are all analysed on the present-at-hand theoretical conscious level, therefore an ontological shift has occurred. The important point is that the students should see the relevance of the theory to the practice because the theoretical present-at-hand has been analysed from out of the practical ready-to-hand. What we now need to explore is how this is achieved.

The start of the teaching process will begin with 'clinical situations' where students have had experiences where they had have to act skilfully and competently without any chance to reflect upon the situation. Thus the main thrust of the course is to provide a practical method of analysis of *nursing situations* that are significant to the students involved; especially as these nursing situations are embedded in the everyday mental health nursing skills and practices that the students are socialised into. There are many other approaches to analysis: one might analyse other nurses' *nursing situations*, one might study typical *nursing situations* or one might analyse a nursing system. Most of these different analyses, if taken far enough, would embrace very similar contents and they therefore overlap in this respect. However, the approach sees the fact that the students themselves are embedded *in* situations and feel in some way compelled to do something about them as a significantly different factor; which makes a special demand upon the method of analysis. The analysis is important because the students' personal beliefs form the major content for the development of their understanding. Taking into account, as we argued earlier, that the precognitive situatedness of the mental health everyday skills and practices that the students find themselves in is where the beliefs originate; and it is the experience of the latter, not the beliefs which originate from textbooks where the teaching starts.

From using a focus the tutor develops the students' circumspective concern of the proximal ready-to-hand environment, by exploring this environment manifestations of behaviour will be discussed. Manifestations¹ refer to the meanings the student attaches to significant items in the focus. Some manifestations of behaviour are unambiguous² such as clients co-operating regarding their care. A client putting a chair through a window could be seen as unambiguous in an unsophisticated way, and the therapeutic response of seclusion could also be universally endorsed by all the nurses who were there; but experienced nurses would view the latter behaviour as ambiguous,³ and the reason for this is that the ambiguity will be seen differently and interpreted differently by nurses. But even though the

nurse can consciously attempt to understand the surface complexities of responding to ambiguous situations, the practices and skills which underlie are picked up unreflectingly. Thus the experienced nurse could deal with the clinical situation by using their interpersonal skills successfully without even thinking about it. If the latter approach does not deal with the clinical situation then it becomes un-ready-to-hand. What can be pointed out to the students in the discussion of the focus is that they need to be aware of these two types of response, one in which they can act *skilfully* and *competently* without any chance to reflect upon the situation, and the other where the situation becomes un-ready-to-hand. It is the former situation where the nurse will pick the skills up from their experiences and not in a text book; and it is these experiences which contain the know-how which is embedded in the everyday skills of mental health nursing practice which they are having which need to be used in the classroom. The knowing that is embedded in these skills and practices is the grounding of mental health nursing. Teaching methods need to start here.

When the situation becomes un-ready-to-hand the students will be encouraged to reflect upon the ready-to-hand focus. This is where circumspective deliberation begins, but it stays within the confines of practice. Practical priorities will be tried out first and it is usually the endorsed⁴ practices which will be used first. If the client continued to be physically aggressive then the technique of 'control and restraint' would be universally endorsed and the nurses would be coping with the situation, and if the client calmed down himself the intervention would have been as successful as the earlier unreflecting use of interpersonal skills. If the client remained disturbed, then the use of medication could be explored, which the majority of students taking part in the discussion would probably endorse, but some students may not endorse the use of medication, likewise with the use of seclusion. The latter two practices then become negotiable⁵ and are open to interpretation by the students, and the analysis of these negotiable practices is where circumspective deliberation begins to bite. The tutor will develop the discussion around the focus

between the students, but this analysis is still within the confines of the ready-to-hand, and as the deliberation develops, envisaging beyond the ready-to-hand develops, but the reflection is still subordinate to the practice. Mental content begins to develop but it originates from the ready-to-hand.

As the students begin to study the negotiable practices they will still be able to see the relevance of the practices or interventions to the ready-to-hand world. If cognitive behavioural therapies and the psychological theories behind them are studied in more depth, then it is obvious that the student has made the ontological shift to the present-at-hand world because they are starting to look at things away from their context. What is important is that the move from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand has been made and the student will see the relevance of it, and once in the theoretical world of the present-at-hand the conventional curriculum begins. The difference being that the students will see the relevance of the subject of psychology to their practice, the same applies to the subject of physiology to pharmacological interventions and all the other knowledge bases which are deemed relevant to a mental health nursing curriculum.

What is different is how the knowledge base is approached. There have been arguments for the nurse curriculum to be grounded in the biological sciences,⁶ sociology,⁷ and psychology.⁸ Also, in the early 1980's a syllabus⁹ was produced which stated predominantly that mental health nursing in particular should be grounded in a skills based approach, and counselling was deemed to be the appropriate one. In contemporary mental health nursing cognitive behavioural therapies¹⁰ are deemed to be the appropriate skills to ground the curriculum on. Whether the curriculum should be grounded in a knowledge base or in a particular therapeutic intervention, the problems remain the same: who decided what knowledge base or which particular intervention?

In an Heideggerian curriculum the students would decide which content is to be studied. Within the context of a discussion around a focus and the negotiable practices which are manifested from it, and as the students move from the ready-to-

hand world to the present-at-hand world they will be led first of all to contemporary therapeutic interventions and then to the knowledge bases that those interventions get their rationale from. If we put Rorty's pragmatic argument into this context, the students will be led to the social and therapeutic interventions of the day and choose content which would appeal to the social practices of the day. In the 1970s it would have been predominantly biology and physiology which would lead to medical interventions or possibly psychology which would lead to behavioural interventions; in the 1980s it would have been counselling interventions which would lead to humanistic psychology, and arguably, in the 1990s it will be cognitive behavioural interventions which would lead to scientific psychology. This would stop one of the latter subjects or interventions gaining the ascendancy in a curriculum which it would then tend to dominate. Heideggerian teaching methods would want to balance this out by making sure the students' beliefs form the major content and also influence the other content which is studied. What is important is that the students will see the relevance of the theory to practice if the curriculum starts in practice based around a focus. All the traditional teaching methods such as lectures will come into play when the students' discussion starts to move into the present-at-hand world. So just as Heidegger's phenomenology is more primordial than Husserl's phenomenology; the Heideggerian nurse curriculum is more primordial than the traditional curriculum.

Finally, we need to look at the ontological category of Being-with and how this fits into the latter educational context, because as we have already seen, Being-with is also encountered from within the context of the ready-to-hand. So as well as relating to the clients through the concerned relationship of the manipulation and use of tools; the tools being in this context therapeutic interventions either not represented in the mind such as basic interpersonal skills or consciously represented in the mind such as cognitive behavioural therapy. The students will also have to relate to the clients through solicitude in the mode of leaping-ahead. This can be done through the ordinary interpersonal relationships that the students have with

their clients in the clinical context. In the ready-to-hand world the mode of relationship would be leaping-ahead; and as the students move into the present-at-hand world of represented theory, the mode of relationship would be leaping-in. The clients need to be empowered regarding their knowledge of the types of therapeutic interventions that can be used on them. The students just need to be made aware of the different ontological categories of Being-in and Being-with.

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² See Appendix three.

³ See Appendix three.

⁴ See Appendix three.

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10 APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE - THE FOCUS

Students will be given a focus (a minimum description of a situation which the student accepts as valid and significant) to discuss in the classroom and then to study. The written analysis and resolution to the problem is called a policy. In ordinary experience this would show itself as something of importance emerging or occurring in the world which the person felt they had to 'sit down' and think through in a serious way. Examples in everyday life would be a boyfriend or girlfriend who was getting 'too serious' or 'less serious', or the necessity to adjust one's lifestyle and standard of living because of a significant change in one's level of income; a clinical example would be a client who is continually psychotic or a client who is persistently aggressive. A focus is something which is expected to persist or whose effects are expected to persist for some time. It is something which we anticipate will demand significant attention from us. Often we live in hopes that some problems will just 'go away'. Friends may say of our boyfriend: "Oh he's just worried about his job" or "It's a passing phase - don't worry", and sometimes we like to hear such talk because it avoids the necessity to confront it as a real problem. This sort of attitude may, however, leave things rather late and when we can no longer avoid the issue it may have got more extreme ("Last night we hardly spoke to each other"). Thus, if we pick it up early we may be making a mountain out of a molehill, if we leave it too long it may become a bigger problem than our resources can handle. This sort of double-edged hazard is an important characteristic feature of practical analysis. A lot depends upon our willingness or ability to grasp or confront a difficulty as a potential difficulty. The world is in many ways always changing and difficulties which are 'far off' may not get 'too close' if we are lucky. Certainly, identifying them gives them a sort of reality which may appear to bring

them 'nearer' too quickly. On the other hand leaving them alone for too long may make things worse. A great deal hinges on the precise 'moment' of recognition of a problem in relation to the 'here and now'. Also, we obviously have to chart where circumspective deliberation and reflection upon the ready-to-hand world becomes reflection upon the present-at-hand world.

In general, to identify a problem that is 'far off' requires more knowledge and more responsibility than to leave it to 'get closer' first. The knowledge is required because for it to be in fact, a *real* problem, one must be sure that its course does bring it 'this way', that the early signs of say, one's boyfriend's coolness, are indeed signs of coolness and not just the beginnings of flu. The responsibility is required because having identified something as a potential problem, the emergence of it as a real problem is now partly up to what one does oneself (Is my own irritability with his coolness making things worse, should I have gone to the party with him last Saturday). In the analysis of a focus the student is not asked to locate it at any particular point in the future. For some students it may seem as if it is quite 'close' (say the next time they are in a clinical situation or they even have experienced the problem themselves), or for others it may seem to be located 'further away'. There is a further consequence of the location of a problem 'in time'. Problems which are 'further away' have different features from problems which are 'nearer'. Those which are further away have fewer specific features than problems which are 'close too'. Specific features are easier to grasp so problems which are 'closer' appear to be more 'real'. A client who presents a problem now, and tomorrow, can be a man, one of a large family, who has a delusion about God, doesn't like much on the unit except the food, is obsessed with washing his hands, and who has one particular friend who goes along with everything he says. A nurse who wants to improve the situation probably cannot expect the size of family to change nor the obsession (although both could conceivably change); but the client may go off the food, change the content of his delusion, and the friendship may be the least stable factor of all.

In the long run some factors become more significant than factors which are significant in the short run: it is not much good rushing out to the shops for a fire extinguisher if your house has just caught fire, but to responsibly anticipate the possibility of fire may lead one to buy a fire extinguisher in advance. Indeed, more imaginative anticipation may prevent a fire altogether. The example of the fire extinguisher helps to explain why the inverted commas have been upon the concepts of 'closer' and 'distant' in the above paragraphs. If the fire extinguisher is bought then the 'distant' possibility of a fire may never occur. If that is true then it is not in the 'distance' at all; it is only 'there' if we do not buy the fire extinguisher. So what is 'distant' or 'close' depends a lot upon our actions now, such things are not just 'there' like trains approaching from far off; to speak of a problem being located in 'time' or as 'distant' or 'close', where 'close' may also mean more 'real' are ways of speaking which are not strictly correct. At some level of analysis this error in speaking can lead to faulty conclusions but at an elementary level it is acceptable. It should not worry any students in the first two years at least!

The result of this consideration about the location of a problem 'in time' is that, once again, this presents a double edged possibility: The 'closer' the problem is the more it appears rich and detailed, the 'further away' the simpler it is and more factors may be expected to change. As the previous double edged hazard also applies, it can be seen that if one can grasp a problem with knowledge and with skill well 'in advance' then one can be optimistic about outcomes; if problems are grasped in advance only with relative ignorance and incompetence then the probability of chaos or incapacity may be increased. One final point about the focus which may already be seen from what has been said so far. The focus (and the resultant policy) are about things which are likely to persist over time, not about one-off troublesome accidental type situations. They are about fairly mainstream or typical problems, not about odd or idiosyncratic situations. In general it is not rational to expect the unusual and one cannot base a long term policy upon such an expectation.

Our discussion on the practical level of what is 'distant' and 'close' fits in quite nicely with Heidegger's discussion of things ready-to-hand not being measurable lengthways which we looked at earlier, the distance is determined by circumspection. This circumspective concern decides the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally, and what is important for Heidegger as we have already seen is that what is closest is not something fixed in a spatial position, also, Dasein's spatiality has the characteristics of de-severance and directionality. The nurse is being circumspective regarding the proximal ready-to-hand environment and concentrating on anticipating what is going to happen. This is how in a focus one can grasp a problem which is 'far off' with skill well in advance. Thus, by its active attention Dasein brings something close through the two existential structures of de-severance and directionality.

APPENDIX TWO - MANIFESTATIONS

'Manifestations' refers to the meanings that the student attaches to the significant items in the 'focus'. It is a form of definition, but not a definition that would be found in a dictionary but what is called technically an ostensive definition. It is quite straightforward. The manifestations of, say, 'aggressive behaviour' would be things like using unacceptable language (exactly what words?), pushing other clients or staff roughly (exactly how) and so on. In the Chambers English Dictionary it says under 'aggression': a first act of hostility or injury. But what the dictionary doesn't often give are examples of what sorts of behaviour would be seen as aggressive. So the manifestations of behaviour are the behaviours that an observer could make in witnessing the behaviour being defined. It is about what can be observed. Saying 'being aggressive' is 'being hostile' will not do because what counts as hostile i.e. exactly what would one observe, is not made clear. Nor are references to mental states any good here. Saying 'being difficult' or 'trying to make trouble' are inappropriate as one cannot observe (in any straightforward sense) 'trying' or 'being

difficult'. The importance of this concept of 'manifestations' is that although we may often use the same words we may not always be referring to the same things. Two people may use the word 'intelligence' but not be seeing intelligence in the same sort of behaviours. Or someone may call something aggressive when another may call it outspokenness or frankness. If effective communication is to occur then it is important that what is being talked about is made as clear as possible by the students.

There are some manifestations of behaviour which are pretty clear and which are interpreted in the same way by most people in 'normal' contexts. There are some however (in all contexts) which are less clear and have a certain ambiguity about them. Some forms of calling out by clients in a clinical situation may be interpreted by one nurse as rude behaviour, by another nurse as good humour or enthusiasm. Many facial expressions have an ambiguity about them, although poking one's tongue out or grossly distorting one's mouth with one's forefingers pulled in opposite directions whilst crossing one's eyes are rather less open to varying interpretations.

There is room for manoeuvre when one is confronted with an ambiguous act. Unambiguous acts give us much less freedom: if we are not seen to interpret such things in the obviously appropriate way then we are seen as either grossly out of touch or as being particularly defiant of social norms. So if a client does something which he and all the other clients consider to be clearly disrespectful, then for the nurse to see it as anything else shows the nurse to be either out of touch, ignorant or 'blind', one who is not like the other nurses at all. Unambiguous manifestations of behaviour do not give much room for freedom of response, they are more socially visible, more 'real' because of the general agreement in their interpretation. Ambiguous behaviours are less 'real' because interpretation of what actually is 'there' may vary.

Therefore, the first stage of analysis of a focus by the students is concerned with the manifestations of behaviour. The manifestations of an obvious or unambiguous kind are identified and briefly described. Then the ambiguous

manifestations are identified and discussed. To make it quite clear: an unambiguous manifestation is one which the students believe would be interpreted in most normal circumstances in the same way by most people; an ambiguous manifestation is a behaviour which in normal circumstances might reasonably be interpreted in more than one way. Clearly, the more aware a nurse is of the varying ways in which things may be interpreted and of how they may relate to each other the more perceptive and sensitive she can be to the things which are going on around her. The more she is able to interpret ambiguous behaviour the more she can pick up clues and respond to messages and 'feelers' which clients (like the rest of us) put out in social situations. Accepting ambiguity in situations is important for a mental health nurse because so much of what is happening is intangible.

Unlike the other Branches of nursing such as adult and children's nursing where the phenomena they deal with is much more tangible such as physical symptoms (this is not to say that they don't deal with intangible phenomena), and the tools they use to deal with the phenomena are also tangible (thermometers etc.); both the majority of the phenomena (interpersonal relationships, delusions and hallucinations etc.) and the tools they use (use of self, interpersonal skills etc.) in mental health nursing are intangible. This is where an Heideggerian curriculum and teaching methods are ideal.

APPENDIX THREE -AMBIGUOUS/UNAMBIGUOUS MANIFESTATIONS

From the focus we identify two categories of manifestation, ambiguous and unambiguous. Nurses have a range of responses to the unambiguous behaviours and we assume that these practices are more or less successful. Students will therefore concentrate on ambiguous behaviours, and examples of the ambiguous manifestations of 'not being co-operative' will be the sorts of things which occur in clinical situations a lot of the time. Such things as aggressive behaviour, loud bad language, delusional ideas and suicidal ideas are all ambiguous. They are

ambiguous because they will be seen differently and interpreted differently by nurses.

At an elementary level a student may see no particular preference for one interpretation over any other. But at a sophisticated level, however, there may be good reasons for, say, refusing a client's request, or not helping them to do something. For example, in the manifestation of 'loud bad language' there are two examples: 'nurse ignores it unless it goes on for too long' and 'nurse uses bad language back'. 'Nurse ignores it unless it goes on for too long' could be seen as the nurse helping the client depending on the context. Similarly, 'nurse uses bad language back' may be seen as helping the client if it is part of a well thought out behavioural programme or just the opposite, again; the interpretation is 'context dependent'. Let us interject a reminder here: the significance of any utterance or interpretation of it can have multiple interpretations put upon it. Also, how does the client interpret the utterance. Well, a lot will depend on the consistency of utterance and what else is done which look like the same thing - and that is what is being examined in this part of the analysis.

To return to the analysis: The procedure is: ambiguous manifestations - examples of nurse responses - each response seen as a member of a class of responses - each class given a suitable descriptive title. This might produce this sort of list:

- Getting clients to help each other
- Avoiding problems
- Rejecting problems
- Isolation of the difficulty
- Private chastisement or regret
- Public chastisement or regret
- Deprivation of privileges
- Deprivation from favourite activities
- Public ridicule
- Adjust level of difficulty
- Adjust standards

For each category the student should be able to cite several ways in which that thing might be done - in response to the focus in question and, most probably, in response

to other sorts of situations as well. What has been outlined above might be called the 'logic of the analysis'. It is very important to realise that when we think things through we do not always follow the logic in any rigid way. We are able to jump around, leave bits out and follow red herrings. But what is important is that a lot of the jumping around and leaving bits out will be done without thinking things through without any mental content at all, the experienced nurses will just be able to do it unless the situation becomes un-ready-to-hand. When the latter is reached the thinking that is going on by the students will almost always find themselves thinking of categories, and then an example of an 'example' and then a category with constant mental refinement going on at the same time. This is why the discussions which aid analysis may 'go all over the place' and sometimes be difficult to keep on course. This is the point where circumspective deliberation begins and the tutor allows the student nurses to stay within the confines of the practical situation of the focus in their analysis.

The next step then is concerned with what might be called practical priorities: with which things one is inclined to do first and which things come low down the list. Things which we do first are usually things which we believe have most chance of being successful, the ones we leave until last are the 'long shots'. In addition those we think are quite legitimate we prefer to those about which we have some reservations. We try to avoid doing things which we think are not justified or things which will not work. The practical priorities which the students mention first will be what Dreyfus has called coping very quickly, the interventions which will have the most chance of being successful. As we have seen, if the hammer is too heavy, all we have to do is exchange it for another. So if a client is becoming so called aggressive in their manner, the nurse quickly explores whether it is because a significant other has not visited, if this is not the case then it may be an altercation with another client, and so on. The nurse is coping very quickly without any theorising going on, and if an intervention works, the transparent coping mode is slipped back into very easily. Even one of the 'long shot' shot interventions might

work. The tutor can explore all the different interventions in the focus with the students.

But to move on, each item in the list of nursing practices above is now labelled in one of three ways. If it is an item which the student feels is most likely to work (compared with the others) then it is **endorsed**. If it is a practice which the student has little faith in, or thinks won't work or is one which the student feels is wrong - on moral grounds - then it is **not endorsed**. If it is a practice in the middle, one which the student feels she may do it, but it 'depends on circumstances', then this item is labelled **negotiable**. Two points to bear in mind: if the category seems a bit too general then think back to the item example (Manifestation, Response A, Response B) which generated it and use that as your 'test' of acceptability. If the list as a whole produces too many or too few negotiable practices then most probably the list suffers from some lack of care, honesty and diligence as mentioned above, thus the earlier stages should be carefully re-examined. This sort of thinking might produce labelling like this:

getting clients to help each other	endorsed
avoiding problems	not endorsed
rejecting problems	not endorsed
isolating the difficulty	negotiable
giving responsibility	negotiable
private chastisement or regret	negotiable
public chastisement or regret	not endorsed
deprivation of privileges	negotiable
public ridicule	not endorsed
adjust level of difficulty	endorsed
adjust standards	not endorsed

For the student here, the endorsed things are the things which would be tried first if it were practical to do so, the negotiable ones would be next and the not endorsed will be the 'last resort' if at all. It is the endorsed ones which would probably work with the students still being in the transparent coping mode, and the coping mode if they move beyond the un-ready-to-hand.

The analysis continues only with those practices which have been identified as negotiable; the endorsed and not endorsed items are 'dropped'. The reason for this

move is as follows. A policy is intended to be a practical exercise. If done properly it should immediately improve practice. It has to work for the person who does the policy (but not necessarily for anyone else). It must not be something which may only work in theory, it must work in that practical situation. However, what people may reasonably try out in a practical way is limited. In general people will not see as practical anything which they disapprove of because, say, it goes against their moral beliefs or they just can't accept that such a thing would work for them. These are the sorts of objections to the non-endorsed practices which may be identified. Also, it is unlikely that classes of things which people strongly believe to be practical and legitimate can be shown to be ineffective or wrong on the strength of a single argument. If either of these possibilities were likely then people would show much less consistency in their views and conduct than they in fact do. In relation to these unlikely occurrences the most practical route is to seek improvement in the practices which are, for that person, negotiable. These are the practices about which the person is more open, has less clear views and which may be used or may not depending on the circumstances. The latter situation will be much more common in mental health nursing.

Within this group of practices at the start of analysis there is little to choose between items, all are 'worth trying'. So, if one can find grounds for discriminating between them, if one can see with some precision what sorts of circumstances make some appropriate and some not, then this would count as a practical improvement. It would be practical because the items are already believed to be practical in that they would be legitimate and could be engaged in (i.e. they are already something which can be done) and this need not change. It would be an improvement because instead of a relatively arbitrary choice being made what is done may be more precise and more co-ordinated, the grounds may be more informed, the effects and consequences more understood and hence the transformation of the situation which may result more of what can be rationally anticipated. The next step in analysis concerns itself with the analysis of negotiable practices in order to try to achieve this sort of

outcome. We shall have to wait until that stage is completed before a more comprehensive justification of why this seemingly modest conclusion in terms of the practical, is believed to be a sufficient achievement. It is also at the analysis of the negotiable practices where circumspective deliberation begins to bite.

APPENDIX FOUR - NEGOTIABLE PRACTICES

It can be seen then that the 'list' of practices which are analysed under Mental Health Nurses Practice and which are then labelled endorsed, negotiable, or not endorsed will tend to have a pattern to it. The pattern will tend to be revealed via the reasons which the analyst has for labelling the practices that particular way. For example, one student may reject the practice of 'using seclusion' because it doesn't work; another may reject the 'use of seclusion' for moral reasons, i.e. even if it works the student thinks it should not be done because it is wrong. But some students may agree with 'using seclusion' because it is successful, and so on. These sorts of considerations lie behind many of the things we do and are most readily available via an examination of the things we feel strongly about. However, we do not have one set of principles for the practices we endorse and a different set for the practices we do not endorse - both endorsed and not endorsed practices will reveal principles and beliefs which apply to a whole range of practices. These principles and beliefs form the basis - in a way the filter - for the practices we choose to engage in. Why then do we not analyse the endorsed or the not endorsed practices, why do we only analyse in depth the negotiable practices?

There are three main reasons. First, people in general will not significantly modify the things they believe strongly compared with the things they feel less strongly about (we get less upset when it is not one of our really favourite CD's which was borrowed without asking). Now although the same principle may be involved (one should ask before one borrows another's possessions) it is easier for us to examine the principle because we care just that little bit less. For example, when

capital punishment is debated in parliament the press often prints the views of the parents of a child who may have been murdered recently. It is rare to see reference to principles being uttered by these parents or references to evidence of a general kind. Their views are deeply affected by their own grief, their sense of outrage, their frustration and their longing for their murdered child. We may well be surprised if they were not like that, but their feelings are not the same as the reasons which should inform a general decision about capital punishment as a practice. Almost all Members of Parliament of varying persuasions agree that 'in the end' it must be reasons and not emotions that determine decisions of that kind. However, when the examination has been completed, it may well be that we may be able to see our committed views in a different light.

The second reason for looking only at negotiable practices is that the outcome must be practical. We can almost guarantee a practical outcome if we start with things which are already capable of being done but refine say the way they are done or when they are done or how often they are done. It is likely to be less practical if we take something and say of it 'no this won't work try something else' because we then have to find something else. The main thrust of the analysis is not aimed at changing what is actually done but at slightly re-arranging the things that are being done (or could be done) anyway. The reason why this can be very significant and sometimes lead to quite dramatic results links up with the 'total package' discussion we have already discussed above. The brilliant nurse rarely uses words which weak nurses don't know, rarely uses gestures which weak nurses could not use and rarely does something that would completely surprise a naive observer. The 'package', the 'language' is broadly the same. What is different is a range of subtle changes in timing, tone, frequency and so on, which *together* amount to quite a different profile of behaviour. The reasons for these subtle shifts are complex and therefore to understand them so that one might develop one's own expertise requires a lot of understanding and time spent studying.

The third reason is that, to the extent that the students share the tutors perceptions then working in the area of negotiable practice has less risk. All practical innovation is risky and most nurses prefer to minimise risk; nurses who see themselves as having some problem would not want to make it worse. In many clinical situations negotiable practices have least social significance in the life of the group; it is not that they necessarily are the least significant, they be the most significant in some cases, but they are seen as the least significant. This is because they are the practices which the nurses can feel most free about. The endorsed practices are the ones which the nurses would use as often as was practically possible; the deprecated practices are the ones to be used only if all else fails. If there is some harmony in the classroom in the sense of the tutors and the students seeing certain behaviours in similar ways then any particular negotiable practice will be one which the tutor feels under least compulsion to use and could substitute for another practice if desirable. Thus changing the frequency or occasion for use of such practices will be less noticeable than if endorsed practices or deprecated practices were altered in these ways.

APPENDIX FIVE - ANALYSING NEGOTIABLE PRACTICES

The analysis of negotiable practices forms the 'meat' of a policy, and it is in this context that circumspective deliberation allows the nurse to stay within the confines of the ready-to-hand. All the other aspects of the deliberation must be carefully done in order to make sure what is analysed in this part of the policy is really significant. There are two main moves in the circumspective deliberation of negotiable practices, these will be briefly described. Then each move will be explained so that why these moves are made may be understood. Finally, an example will be used to illustrate the points of importance.

The first move is that a few negotiable practices are selected for analysis by the students. It was explained that under normal circumstances no negotiable

practice would have clear priority over any other negotiable practice, i.e. we may observe one being done, then another and so on. The first move is that one negotiable practice is assumed to be used exclusively on every practical occasion. This means that if a situation arises where we could do x,y or z then normally as situations of this kind occur over time we may observe an almost 'arbitrary' pattern such as y,z,z,x,y,z,y,x,y,x,x,,etc. The deliberative move is to assume that such situations are arising but the pattern will be x,x,x,x,x,x,,to the exclusion of y and z.

Suppose that: x = Isolating the difficulty

y = Giving responsibility

z = Deprivation of privileges

and John is clearly having difficulties during group meetings. The nurse perhaps could do x or y or z with John at that moment. Each is practicable. In the deliberation we assume that every time this arises x is chosen as the strategy. To deliberate these three negotiable practices the students take each and compare it to the others when each one has been assumed to have been used on every practicable occasion to the exclusion of the others. For each practice the students must now describe the state of affairs that is being created if such exclusive use of a practice were to occur: if one is often suggesting to clients that they take more responsibility, what sort of attitudes, beliefs and behaviours is this regularity likely to produce in the clients? Or, if one is often depriving clients of their privileges when a difficulty is met, what sorts of attitudes, beliefs and behaviours will tend to be created as time goes by? This description is a speculation and it is still grounded in the ready-to-hand. It has the same logical form as the speculation involved in looking out of the window and deciding what to wear to go out. As a speculation it will be more or less supported by some general theoretical beliefs (like 'dark clouds indicate rain'), and more or less supported by good evidence (that what one sees are such clouds in sufficient quantity). This speculation is not 'personal', it is one which must be objective. It is therefore a speculation which depends upon knowledge or at least

reasonable belief. To make an informed and reasonable speculation of this kind will require evidence and the support of authorities (who in turn rely on evidence).

As the deliberation develops, envisaging starts to go beyond the local situation and there is reflection upon the ready-to-hand, but the reflection that the tutor develops is subordinate to the context of practice. The reflective planning done by the students is still from within the clinical context, the envisaging takes account of what is not present. This is the point where mental representation originates, but the representation comes from the clinical context of the ready-to-hand and not consciousness. This circumspective deliberation reflects upon content which is generated from the ready-to-hand. But as the tutor develops the students' thinking, they begin to think about objects away from the clinical context of the ready-to-hand. The psychotic client who is disturbed can be thought about as a paranoid schizophrenic and the aetiology of schizophrenia can be explored (the theoretical present-at-hand). Or he can be thought about as an individual who needs a nurse with nursing mental health skills and competencies, but if the skills and competencies do not work then the situation becomes un-ready-to-hand. But as the students start to think about theories away from the clinical situation (the focus) that caused them, because the thinking started in the ready-to-hand, the relevance of theory should be much more worthwhile. It is *at this point* that *reading* plays an important part. It is therefore also at this point that the ontological switch to the theoretical present-at-hand happens.

The reading is not therefore about 'the focus' it is about the negotiable practices which each student identifies (and students will, of course, vary in their identifications). The reading is about what is practically relevant to that particular analyst (student). It could therefore be (in our examples) research about clients being given responsibility or the effects of the deprivation of privileges on clients. If one can use a library one can find very relevant material on each of these topics. The first move then is in effect looking at how the situation in the focus might tend to go

if the nurse made a subtle change in her practice (her negotiable practices to be precise).

The second move is a more general evaluation of each of the above outcomes (xxx...yyy...zzz...). It should draw upon understanding and show relationships with some of the endorsed practices and unambiguous manifestations which would have been itemised earlier in the analysis. It should also make a more general evaluation in terms of nursing desirability, i.e. whether such a state of affairs should be created, is desirable, justified and so on. As with the first move there is much in the literature of nursing relevant to evaluation of this sort to support the arguments which may be offered. These two moves in analysing negotiable practices form the core of a mature policy. All that remains is for an appropriate conclusion to be drawn. The form of the conclusion can be seen more easily if the reasoning behind moves one and two are fully understood.

So, the first move operates like this: when we do something we want it to work and it is difficult to tell exactly when it will work. If we are doing something which is not too easy to interpret then it may 'work' rather differently from what we intended and be difficult to detect in terms of results. Easy to detect or not, it is certainly the case that if it works really well it will definitely change things. The analysis looks at which directions the nurse practice in question is going. 'If it worked really well' leads us on to the second move in the analysis. Things only 'work' in relation to other things being there as well. If a state of affairs comes about then other, incompatible, states of affairs must disappear within that situation. If the first move examines the direction of change *as intended*, the second move examines the direction of change *as understood*. To engage in the second move in the analysis of negotiable practices one looks at how the meanings which may be attached to a practice after the first move relate to the meanings which already have high status at the beginning of the analysis. So what has been achieved and how can it be drawn together in conclusion?

First, when a negotiable practice of the kind x,y,z, is engaged in, then the analyst (student) can be much clearer upon the direction in which social life and understanding is travelling. Second, there should be some chance of seeing that to the extent that this direction is achieved, then one practice may be superior to another and hence the grounds for choosing between them will be firmer. Third, the student should see how what is being said and done might be interpreted by the clients and this may be different from the student's intention. Fourth, it may point a way to changing priorities if the negotiable practice is used more often and extended and if unambiguous responses are used less. Finally, it should disclose to the student some basic beliefs and values which lie beneath one's attitudes and expectations and provide a medium through which some of them may be examined. But within the Heideggerian context, those basic beliefs and attitudes will have been grounded in the background skills and practices of mental health nursing.