

a transformation of the soul which, depending on man's intentions and deeds, travels through three levels or degrees. The lowest state of the soul (*nafs ammāra*) which continually incites to evil, i.e. the inclination of the soul to fulfill the temporal needs and desires of the human body, must gradually give way to the self-reproaching soul (*nafs lawwāma*), which begins to blame itself for his actions, regrets his past behavior, and inclines towards repentance. According to Geoffroy, as a result of this continued inner struggle, man's soul will reach its highest degree: the tranquil soul (*nafs muṭma'inna*), which is content and pleased with God, and likewise, God is pleased with the soul.¹³⁷ Consequently, from the Qur'anic perspective, man's ultimate challenge, i.e. life's ongoing trial '*balā*', is to remain cognizant of the qualities of his inner nature, and strive to move forward—through personal effort and free will—with the spiritual development of his soul, the process which ultimately leads man in a journey to 'become' who he 'is'.

4.6.3. Rumi on Self-purification (*tazkiyat al-nafs*)

Keeping in mind the Qur'anic notion of Divine trial '*balā*', i.e. the underlying purpose for the cosmic creation, and its inference with the concept of *tazkiyat al-nafs*, as well as various qualities and dual potentialities of the human soul, and the significance of faculty of free will discussed previously, we will now scrutinize Rumi's teachings and highlight some of the practical guidelines that he offers in the path of self-purification. As already discussed, in Rumi's thought, humankind has been created in God's image and is the most distinguished creature of the whole Creation. However, as observed by Humā'ī, for Rumi, man's awareness of his divine nature and self-worth is the precondition for setting foot in the path of spiritual development.¹³⁸ The guiding principle in this path, Rumi reminds us, is to see beyond the surface of this world, to choose actions which accord with the essence and the true meaning of the world, and in fact, serve the purpose of man's creation. In Zarrinkub's opinion, Rumi's guidelines

¹³⁷ Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam*, p. 149. Also, see Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, pp. 109-18.

¹³⁸ Humā'ī, *Mulawi Nameh: What Is Rumi Saying?*, Vol.1, pp. 185-86.

which are primarily in the form of inspirations— not resembling religious manuals wherein contains a list of permissible and prohibited acts for the sake of rewards and punishment of the other world—are meant to encourage the traveller to experience the sweet outcome of the spiritual path in this life.¹³⁹ In Rumi's view, man's spiritual advancement is a constant upward movement which he often articulates by the image of a journey. However, as Schimmel points out, in addition to the symbol of journey, which is also used by many other mystics, Rumi often refers to the path as the spiritual ladder or staircase; climbing every step of the ladder results in getting closer to the top, and eventually to the roof where the union between the lover and the Beloved takes place.¹⁴⁰

For Rumi, similar to other Sufi masters, adherence to religious obligations and rituals of Islam as set forth in the Islamic Law (*sharī'ah*) is essential for entering the spiritual path (*Tarīqah*). For, as Nasr observes, "according to a well-known Sufi symbol, Islam is like a walnut of which the shell is like the *sharī'ah*, the kernel like the *Tarīqah*, and the oil which is invisible yet everywhere present, the *Ḥaqīqah*, the Truth"¹⁴¹. Therefore, the external support and the solid structure for the spiritual path of Islam is indeed the *sharī'ah*, without which, the journey in the spiritual path will not be possible. According to Ashraf, from the Muslim mystical perspective, the inner meaning of the obligatory rituals of Islam is to lead man towards a closer relationship with God, to motivate him in the battle against the temptations of *nafs ammāra*, and the gradual transformation of the soul to its elevated state of tranquility.¹⁴² As such, the required rituals, which are at the core of the *Sunna* of the Prophet, are viewed as the minimum that all Muslims are obligated to observe; yet, the spiritual development awaits those who adhere to the Substance of the Prophet. According to Schuon:

¹³⁹ Zarrinkub, *Sirr Nay: A Critical Analysis and Commentary of Masnavi*, Vol. 1, pp. 15-24.

¹⁴⁰ Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalalodin Rumi*, p. 289.

¹⁴¹ Nasr, *The Ideals and Realities of Islam*, p. 118.

¹⁴² Syed Ali Ashraf, 'The Inner Meaning of the Islamic Rites: Prayer, Pilgrimage, Fasting, Jihad', in Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), *Islamic Spirituality - Foundations* (1; New York: Crossroad, 1987), p. 111.

Outwardly the Prophet is the legislator, and he can easily be grasped as such; inwardly, in his Substance, he represents esoterism at every level...a concrete and quasi-sacramental presence that prefigures the state of salvation or of deliverance and that invites one not to legality or to the social virtues but to self-transcendence and transformation – hence to extinction and to a second birth....Being a spiritual beatitude and thus a state of consciousness, the prophetic Substance remains independent of all formal conditions, even though the formal practices can be rightly considered as paths toward participation in this Substance.¹⁴³

Consequently, the life of the Prophet—in both its external manifestations which forms the Islamic law, as well as, its inner reality which serves as the fountainhead for Islamic spirituality—is at the center of Rumi's teachings. In other words, the inclusive meaning of *balā*, i.e. the actualization of man's inner potentials is made possible through the example of the Prophet. Furthermore, as Zamāni observes, while for the Muslim mystics, including Rumi, Prophet Muhammad is the perfect role model and that his state of perfection is unattainable by anyone else; there are, nonetheless, those who have followed the Prophet very closely and reached the state of sainthood.¹⁴⁴ These saints are able to serve as the spiritual guide i.e. *shaykh*; a role that is crucial in the success of the mystical path. In support of this notion, Humā'ī points out that Rumi, not only discusses the importance of finding a spiritual guide, but also emphasizes total dedication and obedience to the guidelines of the *shaykh*.¹⁴⁵ However, as Chittick observes, Rumi also warns against those who claim to be a true *shaykh* but in reality are not, and should not be followed. He further concludes that for Rumi, selecting such a person to guide the way and trusting one's spiritual advancement to him, will not only produce any success, but on the

¹⁴³ Frithjof Schuon, 'The Spiritual Significance of the Substance of the Prophet', in Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), pp. 49-50.

¹⁴⁴ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma 'Nawi*, p. 632; 63-70.

¹⁴⁵ Huma' I, *Mulawi Nameh: What Is Rumi Saying?* , Vol. 2, pp. 616-19.

contrary, will prevent the seeker from climbing the first steps of the spiritual ladder, and may even result in much damage.¹⁴⁶

Returning to our discussion about the significance of the rituals of Islam, such as daily prayer and fast of Ramadan, Rumi invites his audience to contemplate on the following suggestions: first, to pay close attention to the distinction between the form of the rituals and their inner meanings; second, he encourages the devotees not to limit themselves with what has been requested by the *sharī'ah*, and to perform other complementary practices which are essential in the spiritual development.¹⁴⁷ An example of Rumi's interpretation regarding the inner dimension of the religious rites appears in *Fīhi mā fīhi*. Responding to a question from one of his disciples who asked "is there any way nearer to God than prayer?" Rumi said "Also prayer!" Then he elaborates:

But prayer which is not merely this outward form. This is the 'body' of prayer... everything which is expressed in words and sounds and has a beginning and an end is 'form' and 'body'; its 'soul' is unconditioned and infinite, and has neither beginning nor end. Hence we realize that the 'soul' of prayer is not this form alone. Rather it is a complete absorption, a state of unconsciousness excluding and not finding room for all these outward forms.¹⁴⁸ Purpose of the prayer is that the spiritual state which possesses you visibly when you are at prayer should be with you always. Whether sleeping or walking, whether writing or reading, in all circumstances you should not be free from God's hand, so that '*they continue at their prayers*' will apply to you.¹⁴⁹

It may be noted here that Rumi's interpretation of the ritual prayer stated above is rooted in the Qur'an where God's awareness is the foundation for the obligatory formal prayer; in fact, remembering God and constantly being aware of His presence is more

¹⁴⁶ Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, p. 120.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., pp.150-51.

¹⁴⁸ Rumi, *Fīhi Ma Fīhi (Discourses of Rumi)*, p. 24.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp.182-83.

significant than the actual ritual itself (Q. 29:45). Hence, as Shah-Kāzemi observes, one of the most essential practices of the mystical path of Islam and a key component in purification of the *nafs* is “remembrance of God” (*dhikr Allah*).¹⁵⁰ Michon supports this notion and points out, “doctrinally speaking, the *dhikr* is the becoming aware by the creature of the connection that unites him for all eternity to the Creator”¹⁵¹. Understood in this sense, both exoteric and esoteric dimensions of a religion are constructed in and around remembrance of God ‘*dhikr*’. However, at the practical level, *dhikr* may be viewed from within the frame of the *sharī’ah* as is manifested through the obligatory ritual practices; next it is part of the supererogatory deeds that the most dedicated Muslims perform such as reading the Qur’an; and finally, it becomes a unique spiritual exercise in form of repetition and thoughtful penetration of God’s most beautiful Names¹⁵².

In Rumi’s view, *dhikr* is an indispensable spiritual exercise as he clearly affirms in the following statement of *Fīhi mā fīhi*: “the remembrance of Him provides strength, feathers and wings to the bird of the spirit”.¹⁵³ Moreover, throughout much of his teachings, Rumi speaks of a number of concrete and tangible benefits of the *dhikr* wherein contains the solution to some of the most difficult obstacles in the path of spiritual development. It may be argued that Rumi’s interpretation of *dhikr*, when seen from the overall meaning of *balā*, seems to suggest that *dhikr* empowers man in overcoming some of the difficulties which may prevent him from realizing his inner abilities. An example of this becomes visible in his *Dīwān* where he informs us that *dhikr*, when invoked in sincerity, serves as the remedy for heedlessness, deliverance from negative and vicious thoughts, immunity from Satanic temptations, and cultivating human thought to be productive and positive:

¹⁵⁰ Reza Shah-Kazemi, *Spiritual Quest: Reflections on Qur’anic Prayer According to the Teachings of Imam Ali* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p. 12.

¹⁵¹ Michon, ‘The Spiritual Practices of Sufism’, p. 275.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Rumi, *Fīhi Ma Fīhi (Discourses of Rumi)*, p. 183.

The cry of the ghouls is the cry of an acquaintance—an acquaintance who would lure you to perdition.

It keeps on crying, "Oh caravan! Come towards me, here is the track and the landmarks".

The ghoul mentions the name of each, saying "O so-and-so," in order that it may make that personage one of those who sinks.

When he reaches the spot, he sees wolves and lions, his life lost, the road far off, and the day late.

Tell us, then, what is that ghoul's cry like? It is "I desire wealth, I desire position and renown".

Prevent these voices from entering your heart, so that spiritual mysteries may be revealed.

Invoke the name of God, burn the cry of the ghouls, close your narcissus-eye to this vulture.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, by nurturing and humbling the heart, *dhikr* prepares the human soul to quest for God's love and enjoy its company in various stations of the path. According to Rumi, as the seeker climbs the spiritual ladder, the love for the Beloved grows deeper and intensifies to the point that he experiences His presence and unites with Him.¹⁵⁵ We may mention here that while remembering God is the ultimate act of worship for every Muslim, the more systematic forms of it appears to be practiced in organized Sufi gatherings. As Chittick observes, "remembrance or invocation is the central spiritual technique of Sufism, but always under the guidance of a shaykh, who alone can grant the disciple the right and the spiritual receptivity to invoke the Name of God in a systematic fashion"¹⁵⁶.

In addition to prayer and *dhikr*, Rumi makes a number of references to other practices which are considered among the first steps of the spiritual ladder, and as such, implicitly refer to the all-inclusive meaning of *balā*. These practices are essential in the

¹⁵⁴ Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, II:748-54.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., VI:4040-41.

¹⁵⁶ Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, p. 150.

process of self-purification or disciplining the *nafs* due to the fact that they target the base instincts of the *nafs*. Hence, from the Rumian perspective, in order to succeed in the battle against the sensuality of the ego, or to use the Prophetic tradition, “the greater war (*jihad*)”¹⁵⁷, one must reduce the amount of food intake as well as the time he spends in sleep. Thus, concerning the obligatory practices of Islam, Rumi regards the fast of Ramadan the greatest pillar, and one of the best means by which the sensations of the *nafs* may be controlled.¹⁵⁸ As Schimmel notes, Rumi “kept the practice of fasting very strictly, even beyond the prescribed measure.., as he knew well the alchemy of hunger which the early ascetics had practiced and preached.”¹⁵⁹ By the same token, Rumi makes numerous references to the importance of nightly vigil, a practice which he is well known for. In Rumi’s view nighttime provides the best opportunity for spending time alone with the Beloved:

The Prophet said, “The night is long, so shorten it not with your sleep; the day is bright, so darken it not with your sins.” The night is long for you to voice your secrets and ask your needs without the disturbance of people. When friend and enemies are not around to annoy you, you can achieve privacy and contentment. God pulls down this veil so that your acts may be protected and guarded from hypocrisy – so that they may be accomplished sincerely for Him alone. In the dark of night, the hypocrite is distinguished from the sincere believer and is disgraced. Things are hidden by night and become disgraced only by daylight. But the hypocrite is disgraced by the night.¹⁶⁰

It is worth mentioning that, while Rumi engages the seeker to firmly strive in the path of spirituality and contemplate on the goal of this journey, i.e. to control the sensualities of the ego and live according to the guidelines of the intellect, he nevertheless is well aware of the difficulties of the path. To this end, Rumi sheds light on a number of practices that assists the seeker in overcoming some of the obstacles.

¹⁵⁷ Furuzanfar, *Ahadith-E Mathnavi*, p. 63.

¹⁵⁸ Rumi, *Diwan Shams Tabrizi*, I:1602.

¹⁵⁹ Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalalodin Rumi*, pp. 291 & 303.

¹⁶⁰ Rumi, *Fihi Ma Fihi (Discourses of Rumi)*, pp. 71-72.

As Humā'ī observes, one of the most important elements in succeeding in the path, in Rumi's view, is the companionship with other sincere friends, travellers, and the saints.¹⁶¹ To Rumi, Religion is, in fact, finding and recognizing the proper companions¹⁶² and that sitting with God, i.e. experiencing His presence, is conceivable through spending time with the saints:

Whoever wishes to sit with God let him sit in the presence of the saints.

If you are broken off, divided from the presence of the saints, you are in perdition, because you are a part without the whole.

Whosoever the devil cuts off from the noble saints, he finds him without any one to help him, and devours his head.

To go for one moment a single span apart from the community is a result of the devil's guide. Hearken, and know this well!¹⁶³

From the mystical perspective, man begins the spiritual journey by repentance (*towba*) through God's remembrance (*dhikr*); constant attentiveness to his actions (*murāqabah*); and by keeping track of his inner states (*muḥāsabab*), he will move up the spiritual ladder.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, according to Zamāni, concurring with this general Sufi model, Rumi emphasizes that patience (*ṣabr*), constitutes one of the most important stages of the path.¹⁶⁵ In Rumi's spirituality, detachment from the desires of the lower self, i.e. attractions of the material world, takes time and requires patience; a quality that eventually is build up within the soul. According to Schimmel, the significance of patience becomes visible in Rumi's spring-poems where he describes how the birds and trees are rewarded with lovely colors and aromas, after they patiently waited during the harsh times of the winter.¹⁶⁶ A related concept to patience is gratitude (*shukr*), which Rumi expounds upon and sheds light on its various connotations in the *Mathnawī*. From the Rumian perspective, Zamāni affirms, gratitude results in God's

¹⁶¹ Huma'ī, *Mulawi Nameh: What Is Rumi Saying?*, Vol. 2, pp. 803-06.

¹⁶² Rumi, *Fihī Ma Fihī (Discourses of Rumi)* p. 20.

¹⁶³ Rumi, *The Mathnawī of Jalaluddin Rumi*, II:2163-66.

¹⁶⁴ Yasrebi, *Practical Mysticism*, pp. 191-245.

¹⁶⁵ Zamani, *Sharh Jame' Mathnawī Ma' Navi (a Comprehensive Commentary of Mathnawī)*, Vol.6, p. 1250.

¹⁶⁶ Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalalodin Rumi*, pp. 304-05.

blessings and more favors, and leads man out of heedlessness, while ingratitude brings hopelessness and sorrow.¹⁶⁷ To this end Rumi writes: "ingratitude is the rule followed by the ape, while thankfulness and gratitude is the way of the Prophet."¹⁶⁸ In the third book of *Mathnawī*, he criticizes those who enjoy God's bounty; do not appreciate all that He has granted them; yet, they complain as soon as the slightest misery befalls them. Due to the fact the concluding section of this chapter will deal with the notion of suffering in Rumi's thought, it suffices us to reference one example here.

Those bad-natured ones rendered no thanks for that bounty: in fidelity they were less than dogs.

When to a dog there comes from the door a piece of bread, he will grid up his loins at the door.

He will become the watcher and guardian of the door, even though violence and hard treatment befall him.¹⁶⁹

Finally, from the Sufi perspective, an important dimension of self-purification, which is directly related to *balā* – specially its manifestation in adversity and hardship –, has to do with the concept of trust in God (*tawakkul*). Yasribī is of the opinion that *tawakkul* is considered one of the highest stages of the spiritual path; however, to reach the apex level of *tawakkul*, the seeker must remain firm and strong during tribulations and trials '*balā*' which he faces.¹⁷⁰ While the Muslim mystics are in agreement with regards to the meaning of *tawakkul*, total trust in God Who is Wise, Kind, and Loving; at the practical level there seems to be some level of divergence. As Schimmel notes, "*Tawakkul* in its interiorized sense means to realize *tawhīd*; for it would be *shirk khafī*, 'hidden associationism', to rely upon or be afraid of any created being...resulting in perfect inner peace."¹⁷¹ One of the implications of *tawakkul*, stated in the expression of *ḥusn az-ẓann*, 'to think well of God', was widely used in reference to daily needs, such

¹⁶⁷ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma`Nawi*, pp. 538-44.

¹⁶⁸ Rumi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, VI:1829.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., III:286-89.

¹⁷⁰ Yasrebi, *Practical Mysticism*, pp. 310-19.

¹⁷¹ Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, pp. 118-19.

as food and clothing – to be certain that your *rizq* will reach you. Although this positive attitude with regards to the total trust in God has been a source of strength, still in its exaggerated form, resulted in acceptance of a blind fate, the idea of predestination, and passivity¹⁷². For Rumi, God's will actualizes through and in connection with man's exertions and actions; hence, *tawakkul* is viewed as the dynamic force and the positive motivation, reassuring man that his efforts will produce results, either in this world or the hereafter. One may note that Rumi's interpretation of *tawakkul* implicitly refers to man's *ibtālā* both in its all-inclusive meaning, i.e. actualization of inner potentials, and in its manifestation in adversities. As Zamāni notes, though Rumi mentions *tawakkul* in various contexts in his teachings; he fully expounds upon this topic in two stories of the *Mathnawī*.¹⁷³ In the first book, Rumi uses two animals to represent the two contrasting views: a beast as the symbol of passivity and indifference, those who are of the opinion that efforts on man's part conflicts with trust in God; and a lion to represent those who find no contradiction between their works while fully trusting in God. By reading this dialogue between the animals, the reader is left with a clear understanding of the importance of *tawakkul*, and Rumi's view on the topic: that man's efforts are indeed within the frameworks of God's Will.¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, it must be mentioned here that while Rumi inspires his reader to fully utilize his abilities in this spiritual journey – to get to know himself and realize the great potentials of his inner nature; to devote to the purification and augmentation of the nafs and its transformation to the tranquil level; and ultimately reach a close proximity with God and experience his presence – by the same token, he points out that these inspirations should not lead to overestimation of the importance of man's own efforts. For, as already discussed previously, in Rumi's view, man's biggest challenge (*ibtālā*) is to make a serious effort in detaching from all that occupies the self. Therefore, he continuously reminds the reader that although it is true that man with his free volition embarks on this path and his aspirations (*himmat*) must remain at the highest level;

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma`Nawi*, pp. 532-36.

¹⁷⁴ Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, I:908-37. Also, see a similar story in V:2419-2427

yet, it is God's grace (‘*ināyat*’) that has granted him the aspiration in the first place. As Chittick points out, in Rumi's view, all success in the spiritual development, as well as everything that mankind owns and enjoys, is attributed to the Source and none to his own self.¹⁷⁵ Consequently, as it may be concluded from the above discussion, through various stages of the spiritual combat, man's struggle in self-knowledge (*ma'rifat al-nafs*), and self-purification (*tazkiyat al-nafs*) will lead to God-awareness (*ma'rifat Allah*). Through his sincere efforts and God's grace, this spiritual journey will lead to the transformation of the *nafs* to its highest level of serenity, i.e. the tranquil soul. In combination of love of God, which occupies a major portion of Rumi's teachings, following this spiritual re-birth, man has become who he is. According to Chittick, for Rumi, one of the ways by which the newly born self is manifested is by fully giving up his will and asking God to do as He pleases, for man's ego, I-ness, and self-hood, no longer exists.¹⁷⁶ This brings us to our final analysis of Rumi's teachings and a recap to our previous discussion pertaining to the notion of free will and its relation to *ibtilā*.

Once again we will investigate Rumi's thought further as he unveils the concept of the Divine Trust (*amāna*), or free will. Rumi takes the matter to a higher level by engaging in a paradoxical discussion about free will which adds an important perspective to our understanding of the notion of *balā*. According to Rumi, prior to man being entrusted with free will, he was living in peace and harmony; however, acceptance of the divine trust, i.e. free will and the responsibility of choosing between one act over the other, caused a major disturbance to man's worry-less and serene situation. This constant predicament of having to decide between two opposite paths—with doubts and uncertainties on both sides – causes much anxiety and conflict in man's soul; to the extent that he may desire not having this capability of free will. Rumi holds this situation to be the ultimate *balā*, the real test of man; the difficulty of which is the reason for the heavens and the earth not to have accepted this responsibility. Rumi,

¹⁷⁵ Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, pp. 160-61.

¹⁷⁶ For a discussion on naughting the self, see Chittick, *The sūfī Path of Love*, pp. 173-5

then, pleads to God not to place him in situations that he must decide between two or more choices:

Who am I? Heaven, with its hundred mighty businesses, cried out for help against this ambush of free will; Saying, 'Deliver me from this pillory of free will, O gracious and long-suffering; Lord!

The one-way pull on *the straight Path* is better than the two ways of perplexity, O gracious One.

Although Thou art the entire goal of these two ways, yet indeed this duality is agonising to the spirit.

Although the destination of these two ways is unto Thee alone, yet the battle is never like the banquet."

This perplexity in the heart is like war: when a man is perplexed he says, "I wonder whether this is better for my case or that".

In perplexity the fear of failure and the hope of success are always in conflict with each other, now advancing and now retreating.

From Thee first came this ebb and flow within me; else, O gracious One, this sea of mine was still.

From the same source whence Thou gavest me this perplexity, graciously make me un-perplexed likewise.

Thou art afflicting me...How long will this affliction continue? Do not afflict me, o Lord! Bestow on me one path; do not make me follow ten paths!¹⁷⁷

The above verses of the *Mathnawī*, however, as Zamāni observes, appears to be in conflict with Rumi's interpretation of the ability of free will, which is what makes man the fruit of the creation and means by which he becomes the mirror for God's attributes.¹⁷⁸ If according to Rumi's elucidation stated previously, free will is an indispensable component in the fulfillment of the viceroy role, then, pleading to God not to be placed in situations where free volition is put into practice; seems to raise a significant inconsistency, and a paradox which needs to be dealt with.

¹⁷⁷ Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi* VI:202-14.

¹⁷⁸ Zamani, *Sharh Jame' Mathnavi Ma' Navi (a Comprehensive Commentary of Mathnavi)*, pp.78-81.

Zamāni is of the opinion that the origin of this imaginary contradiction in Rumi's teachings may be found in his vision of the perfect man and the concept of "distinctive predestination" (*jabr khāssih*) whereby man's choice is in total harmony with God's will.¹⁷⁹ From the Rumian perspective, while mankind is faced with the constant challenge (*balā*) of freely choosing how he spends his time on earth, nonetheless he is able to reach certain level of spiritual maturity to realize that in order to fulfill his responsibility as God's vicegerent, he must make sure his choices are in accordance with God's will. It is in this sense that Rumi engages in an intimate dialogue with God asking Him to remove the burden of choice, i.e. having to decide between the commands of his self (*nafs*) and what is pleasing to God. For, indeed, the battle between the various choices is valid when there is a separation between man and his Lord; however, in the state of union with God, man's wishes are dissolved in God's will. According to Zamāni, this level of spiritual purification is achievable by certain individuals; freely giving up freedom of choice and putting one's fate in the hands of predestination, is what Rumi calls "a unique version of predestination".¹⁸⁰ To this end, Rumi writes:

I am like an emaciated camel, and my back is wounded by my free-will which resembles a pack-saddle.

At one moment this pannier weighs heavily on this side, at another moment that pannier sags to that side.

Let the ill-balanced load drop from me, that I may behold the meadow of the pious.¹⁸¹

4.7. Divine Trial and the Concept of Suffering

As stated in the general introduction, the central hypothesis of this study is that *ibtālā*, contrary to popular perception, is not synonymous with suffering. This notion was further discussed in the thematic typology of the Qur'anic narratives, and demonstrated

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma 'Nawi*, pp.282-84.

¹⁸¹ Rumi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, VI:214-16.

that, in fact, *ibtīlā* conveys a positive image, and that it is manifested in both adversity and prosperity. Therefore, in its all-inclusive connotation, *ibtīlā* is the means by which mankind is granted the opportunity to actualize the potentials of his inner nature. It is in accord with this understanding of *ibtīlā* that the Qur'an explicitly affirms that man, as part of his human experience, will be put to the 'test' (*balā*) by various means of "good and bad"¹⁸². Consequently, the test encompasses both the 'negatives', i.e. illness, natural disasters, and loss of livelihood; and the 'positives', i.e. wealth, and good health. What the Qur'an seems to emphasize, however, is man's behavior and how he perceives the particular circumstances of his life.¹⁸³ Needless to say that, by nature, while man strives for joy and happiness, he resists any undesirable situation which may cause him sadness and sorrow. In the words of Becker, the universal ambition of man is to strive for the highest level of prosperity and avoid anything that goes against this desire.¹⁸⁴ Contrary to this aspiration, however, from the Qur'anic perspective, adversity, misery, and human suffering, is central to man's spiritual development. Therefore, the concluding section of this Chapter is charged with examination of Rumi's teachings concerning the issue of adversity and suffering, as it relates to the notion of *ibtīlā*.

The overall examination of the Qur'anic narratives regarding various types of adversities, as well as suffering which may be associated with them, is discussed explicitly and with clear examples. Nonetheless, as Bowker points out, these examples are indicative of the fact that the subject is not treated in the Qur'an as a 'problem', or a theoretical issue, but rather as real occurrences to show that suffering is part of human experience.¹⁸⁵ Bowker further attests that a major portion of the Qur'anic narratives, whereby adversities and suffering is discussed, demonstrate that man's suffering is considered as a trial or test (*balā*). This notion, which frequently appears in explicit terms in the Qur'an, illustrates that suffering is an instrument in the fulfillment of purposes of God in creation of humankind. According to Bowker, it is in light of this

¹⁸² For example see Q. 21:35

¹⁸³ An example of this is evident in the following Qur'anic verses: 18:7; 39:49, and 89:15-16

¹⁸⁴ Ernest Becker, *Escape from Evil* (New York, USA: The Free Press, 1975), p. 2.

¹⁸⁵ Bowker, *Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World*, p. 101.

perspective and the significance of omnipotence and compassion as characteristics of God that the Qur'an is able to uphold that, despite to what appears to be the contrary, God is in control of His creation, within which, suffering is one of its components.¹⁸⁶ The theological aspects of Bowker's observation will be discussed in the following Chapter; for now, however, let us turn to Rumi and the mystical interpretation of suffering.

As highlighted in the preceding discussion, according to Rumi, man's ultimate mission is to realize his divine origins, and to strive in the path of spiritual development by means of self-purification. This mystical approach aims at severing attachments, which are viewed as anchoring human beings too deeply in the material world. Suffering is, therefore, a way of altering man to the need of detachment which is a notion explicitly stated in the Qur'an¹⁸⁷ and discussed in the discourse of the Muslim mystics. As Zamāni observes, in Rumi's view, man is in charge of his life; his priorities and his main concerns in life are the result of his choices. Therefore, trials and tests '*balā*' are unique to humankind due to the fact that man is the only created being who enjoys the ability of free will. Thus, for Rumi, '*balā*' is a necessary component of man's creation.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, Rumi frequently reminds his audience that because man is deeply attached to his selfhood, he is not able to understand the true situations of his life. He suffers through afflictions, yet these instances are wake up calls and beneficial to him; he occupies himself with transitory cheerfulness, even though many of them are harmful as they contribute to his state of negligence.¹⁸⁹ According to Chittick, in Rumi's view, "Trials and tribulations are all necessary stages of purification, through which man is delivered from attachment to himself and the world".¹⁹⁰ It may be noted that Rumi often refers to the trial of Prophet Joseph to demonstrate the positive consequence of a '*balā*' and the lasting result of being set free of all attachments. According to Renard, in

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 109-13.

¹⁸⁷ See for example: Q. 6:42-44; Q. 7:94-95

¹⁸⁸ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma 'Nawi*, p. 518.

¹⁸⁹ Karim Zamani, *Comprehensive Commentary of Rumi's Fihi Ma Fihi* (Tehran, IR: Moin, 1390), p. 531.

¹⁹⁰ Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, p. 238.

Rumi's view, "Joseph experienced his enslavement as a major trial, but it freed him from slavery to creatures so that he could be the slave of God alone."¹⁹¹

In his elucidation of *balā* in adversity, Rumi frequently references the primordial covenant, and points out that man is faced with afflictions and sorrow in order that he is reminded of his covenant with God. For him, this is precisely the mission of the prophets:

In order to pull us up and help us travel, messenger after messenger comes from that Source of existence:

Every heartache and suffering that enters your body and heart pulls you by the ear to the promised Abode.

He has afflicted you from every direction in order to pull you back to the Directionless.¹⁹²

Rumi's reference to affliction of the body made in the above verse of the *Dīwān* is presented fully in a number of his discourses in *Fīhi mā fīhi*. It can be seen from the following example that, in Rumi's view, man has the tendency to forget God in two circumstances: in good health, and prosperous life. Thus, health and wealth are two major objects in which *balā* is manifested:

Between God and His servant are just two veils; and all other veils manifest out of thee: they are health, and wealth. The man who is well in body says, 'Where is God? I do not know, and I do not see.' As soon as pain afflicts him he begins to say, 'O God! O God!' communing and conversing with God. So you see that health was his veil, and God was hidden under that pain. As much as man has wealth and resources, he procures the means to gratifying his desires, and is preoccupied night and day with that. The moment indigence appears, his ego is weakened and he goes round about God.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Renard, *All the King's Falcons, Rumi on Prophets and Revelation*, p. 61.

¹⁹² Rumi, *Diwan Shams Tabrizi* 35486-87; 3952. Translation by Chittick in *Sufi Path of Love*, p. 238

¹⁹³ Rumi, *Fīhi Ma Fīhi (Discourses of Rumi)*, p. 240.

Rumi's interpretation of the spiritual benefits of physical illness with regards to man's spiritual growth is also illuminated in the teachings of Nursi and his paradoxical statement of "For you, illness is good health". According to Michel, having experienced physical illness first-hand, Nursi sheds light on a number of positive benefits and lessons of when man is afflicted with illness: it is a reminder of mortality without which people will continue in their heedlessness; and that it is during the experience of sickness that people appreciate the blessing of good health.¹⁹⁴ Michel further informs us that "For Nursi, sickness is a human reality that, like all human realities, should lead the believer to God."¹⁹⁵ To this end, Rumi emphasizes that if the believer's prayer in removing the hardship and suffering is not answered by God, it is for his own benefit, to keep man in this state of nearness to God:

God said, "It is not because he is despicable in My sight; the very deferment of the bounty is for the sake of helping him.

Need caused him to turn towards Me from his forgetfulness: it dragged him by the hair into My presence.

If I satisfy his need, he will go back and become absorbed in that idle play.

Although he is now crying with all his soul, 'O Thou whose protection is invoked', let him continue to moan with broken heart and wounded breast.

It pleases Me to hear his voice saying, 'O Lord' and his secret prayers.¹⁹⁶

Furthermore, from the Qur'anic—and, by extension, Rumian—perspective, manifestation of *balā* in adversity has a profound impact on man's character. For if *balā* is the means by which man's inner potentials become actualized, what is important here is man's response to a particular instance of *balā* such as in adversity and any suffering which may have been associated with it. According to Zarrinkub, in Rumi's view, when man undergoes a certain type of *balā*, his attitude, his reaction, and his action, is the

¹⁹⁴ Thomas Michel, 'For You, Illness Is Good Health: Said Nursi's Spirituality in His Approach to Physical Illness', in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (ed.), *Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi's Risale-I Nur* (State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 181.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 187.

¹⁹⁶ Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, VI:4222-26.

testimony to his true characteristics.¹⁹⁷ A self-centered, egoistic person, whose purpose in life is to satisfy the desires of his animal soul, complains and questions God's justice. Conversely, a person with strong belief in the overall goodness of God's creation finds a meaning to this test, and strives to learn the spiritual lessons of the experience.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, according to Chittick, in Rumi's vision, "If a person tries to flee from suffering through various stratagems, he is in fact fleeing God. The only way to flee from suffering is to seek refuge from one's own ego with God."¹⁹⁹ Once again, it is in *Fīhi mā fīhi* that Rumi expounds upon that aspect of *balā* in which man's true character is exposed: while people may claim to hold certain qualities and traits, it is only through *balā* that the truth comes out:

God tells us, "Just as I wanted to manifest My Treasure, so I wanted to manifest your ability to recognize that Treasure. Just as I wanted to display the Purity and Gentleness of this Ocean, so I wanted to display the high aspirations and growth through Gentleness of the fish and the creatures of the Sea. Hence they may behold their own fidelity and display their aspirations. "Do people think they will be let to say 'We believe' and that they will not be tried" (Q. 29:1-2)? Hundreds of thousands of snakes claim to be fish. Their forms are the form of fish, but their meanings are the meanings of snakes."²⁰⁰

Additionally, not only man's character is exposed through *balā*; the difficulty and the pain which accompanies *balā* is instrumental in building one's character. Rumi's view pertaining to the positive impact of *balā* in purifying the soul is evident from the following verse of the *Dīwān*:

When someone beats a rug with a stick, he is not beating the rug—his aim is to get rid of the dust.

¹⁹⁷ Zarrinkub, *Sirr Nay: A Critical Analysis and Commentary of Masnavi*, p. 55.

¹⁹⁸ Rumi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rumi* III:682-86.

¹⁹⁹ Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, p. 238.

²⁰⁰ Rumi, *Majalis-I Sab'ah (the Seven Sessions)*, p. 161. Translation is from Chittick in *Sufi path of love*, p. 49.

Your inward is full of dust from the veil of I-ness, and that dust will not leave all at once.²⁰¹

Furthermore, as established before, the concept of man's 'separation' from his divine Source (*aṣ*) is fundamental to Rumi's thought and its importance becomes visible, once again, in his interpretation of suffering. As Chittick observes, in Rumi's view, man's major problem is his failure in realizing that the adversities, pain, and suffering that he experiences in life, are meant to remind him of his separation from God and to provide him the opportunity to detach from himself and attain to the Self.²⁰² Zarrinkub also supports this notion, yet emphasizes the importance of man's submission to God's Will as a theme that is closely related to *balā* within the Rumian thought.²⁰³ The following example illustrates Rumi's overall perspective with respect to man's worldly attachments, and the cause of his suffering:

Consider that in spite of all of the world's bitternesses you are mortally enamoured of it and recklessly devoted to it.
Deem bitter tribulation to be a Mercy, deem the kingdom of Merv and Balkh to be a Vengeance...
The cruelty of Time and every affliction that exists are lighter than farness from God and forgetfulness of Him,
Because these afflictions will pass, but that forgetfulness, distance from Him, will not. Only he who brings his spirit to God awake and mindful of Him is possessed of felicity.²⁰⁴

It is worth mentioning here that the idea of ownership, which Nursi seems to emphasize, plays an instrumental role in how man responds to a particular hardship. According to Turner, in Nursi's view, while man may perceive himself as the 'owner' of his own attributes such as power, wisdom, and knowledge; nonetheless, this apparently

²⁰¹ Rumi, *Diwan Shams Tabrizi*. Translation is from Chittick in *Sufi Path of Love*, p. 239

²⁰² Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, p. 237.

²⁰³ Zarrinkub, *Sirr Nay: A Critical Analysis and Commentary of Masnavi*, Vol. 1, p. 61.

²⁰⁴ Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, VI:1735-36; 56-57.

real ownership is, in fact, illusory.²⁰⁵ In light of this understanding, the true owner of the manifestations of those attributes, i.e. their actual exhibitions, such as wealth and social status, belongs to the Creator as well. Therefore, the one who is being tested through the *balā* of loss of wealth is in the position to realize that, in reality, he /she were never the actual owner of the lost privilege. As a result of this adversity, then, man gains a level of spiritual refinement which he may not be able to attain otherwise. Furthermore, in the context of the given example, the whole notion of suffering becomes preventable. In other words, if man is able to understand *ibtīlā* correctly, or in Rumi's words, if he can see beyond form, i.e. the temporary effects of his adversity, and find the meaning of this *balā*, i.e. the realization that God is the true Owner of what appears to be 'ours', there will not remain any ground for suffering. That suffering is a subjective matter is a notion that is supported by Aslan, where he draws attention to a number of elements in examination of the issue of suffering.²⁰⁶

This brings us to our final point of Rumi's exposition relating to adversity and its manifestation in the context of *balā*. The aim of this final inquiry is to highlight some of the practical guidelines of this mystical approach in man's encounters with suffering. In other words, what is expected of the one who is experiencing a *balā* in adversity? How can one overcome the difficulties of the adversity without going into despair, and at the same time, benefit from spiritual refinement? Confirming the significance of faith in God's Wisdom and Mercy, the very first advice of the Qur'an is for the believer to endure the hardship with patience '*ṣabr*'.²⁰⁷ It must be noted, however, that while *ṣabr* is a frequently mentioned virtue in the Qur'an, its significance in the context of *balā*, conveys a deeper meaning: patience as a result of faith, and not out of disparity.²⁰⁸ The

²⁰⁵ Colin Turner (ed.), *The Six-Sided Vision of Said Nursi: Toward a Spiritual Architecture of the Risale-I Nur*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (Spiritual Dimensions of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's Risale-I Nur, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 34.

²⁰⁶ Adnan Aslan, 'The Fall, Evil, and Suffering in Islam', in Peter Koslowski (ed.), *The Origin and the Overcoming of Evil and Suffering in the World Religions* (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), p. 45.

²⁰⁷ For example see Qur'an 2:177

²⁰⁸ For a discussion on *ṣabr* see for example: Tabatabai, *Al-Mizan* Vol. 11, p. 141; and Vol. 13, p. 417.

second major advice of the Qur'an is the virtue of truly trusting in God (*tawakkul*).²⁰⁹ As Aslan observers, *tawakkul* protects man from suffering as it assures him that, there is goodness associated with the affliction, which reduces the anxiety.²¹⁰

Correspondingly, the two notions of *ṣabr* and *tawakkul* are frequently visible in Rumi's teachings, and lend themselves to assist man in his encounters with the various difficulties and afflictions of his life. According to Zamāni, a well-known parable which addresses the overall issue of suffering while emphasizing the importance of *ṣabr* and *tawakkul* is the story of the chickpeas in Rumi's *Mathnawī*.²¹¹ This parable appears in book three of *Mathnawī* and is based on an imaginary conversation between a housewife, who is preparing a food, and the chickpeas that are being cooked. As it is often the case with humankind, the chickpeas complain and question the housewife for positioning them in the pot with boiling water. Through the course of this dialogue, the chickpeas try to escape from this condition by continually jumping out of water; however, realizing their inability to end this misery, they frantically plea to their cook to take them out of the pot. Rumi then engages the housewife in this conversation to console the herbs in their suffering, so that they may learn that patiently enduring the suffering is necessary for their spiritual growth.

At the time of its being boiled, the chickpea comes up continually to the top of the pot and raises a hundred cries,

Saying, "Why are you setting the fire on me? Since you bought me, how are you turning me upside down?"

The housewife goes on hitting it with the ladle. 'No!' says she: "boil nicely and don't jump away from the one who makes the fire.

I do not boil you because you are hateful to me: nay, 'tis that you may get taste and savour, this affliction of yours is not on account of your being despised

Continue, O chickpea, to boil in tribulation, that neither existence nor self may remain to thee.

²⁰⁹ See for example: Qur'an 9:129; 33:48; 58:10

²¹⁰ Aslan, 'The Fall, Evil, and Suffering in Islam ', pp.44-45.

²¹¹ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma 'Nawi*, p. 518.

The chickpea said, "Since it is so, O lady, I will gladly boil: give me help in verity!
In this boiling thou art, as it were, my architect: smite me with the skimming-
spoon, for thou smites very delightfully."²¹²

As the final verse of aforementioned story reveals, for Rumi, the evidence of true submission to God's Will, becomes visible when man reaches the station of inner contentment, *rizā*. Therefore, as man journeys on the spiritual path and is faced with various types of *balā*, the two notions of *ṣabr* and *tawakkul* will be his wings to fly with, eventually leading him to the higher state of *rezā*. According to Zarrinkub, the love of the Beloved, which is central to Rumi's mysticism, plays a significant role in the process of man's spiritual refinement with all of its hardships and steep hills.²¹³ In Rumi's view, reaching the station of *rezā*, therefore, is attainable through the gateway of God's love. Through various tribulations and suffering which are meant as *balā*, man's inner potentials are actualized, and he is able to transform his soul to its highest level of tranquility which the Qur'an refers to as '*nafs muṭma'inna*'. As Zamāni observes, in Rumi's mysticism, it is in this state of the soul that man is pleased with his Lord regardless of the circumstances of his life, experiencing *balā* in adversity or in prosperity.²¹⁴

4.8. Conclusion

Founded on the teachings of Perennial Philosophy, the primary concern of mysticism is to expound upon the most significant human potential, i.e. the divine element within man's inner nature, which enables him to see beyond the surface of things to understand the hidden reality beneath. Thus, a common theme for all religions, mysticism represents the esoteric dimension of a religion as compare to its exoteric teachings. Muslim mysticism, therefore, characterizes the esoteric and spiritual dimensions of Islam, which historically has been exemplified by Sufism.

²¹² Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, III:41604164; 4178; 4197-4198.

²¹³ Zarrinkub, *Sirr Nay: A Critical Analysis and Commentary of Masnavi*, Vol. 1, p. 492.

²¹⁴ Zamani, *Minagar-E Eshgh : A Thematical Commentary of the Mathnawi Ma 'Nawi*, p. 543.

The Muslim mystical literature in general and Rumi's teachings in particular, encompasses a comprehensive exploration of the notion of divine trial '*balā*'. While the mainstream Qur'anic exegesis, for the most part, seem to lack a comprehensive analysis of the concept of *balā*, Rumi's mystical approach, however, engages in an in-depth elucidation of this notion which appears to correspond more with the all-inclusive Qur'anic approach. Contribution of Rumi's perspective in underscoring the importance of the meaning of *balā* is illustrated in his overall worldview: his understanding of man's creation and position in the creational tree, i.e. man as the fruit of God's creation; and his interpretation of *balā* with its positive connotations in the overall spiritual development of mankind.

Several key Qur'anic themes such as Adam and the fall, the *alast* Covenant, man as God's vicegerent on earth, and the Trust, as well as their implications in the context of *balā*, were explored in light of Rumi's major works, particularly, *Mathnawī*, *Dīwān*, and *Fīhi mā fīhi*. As a result of the above examination, Rumi's mysticism and his practical guidelines relating to man's biggest challenges '*ibtīlā*', namely, self-knowledge and self-purification, received an exhaustive review. The result of this inquiry illustrates that Rumi's vision accords with the teachings of the Qur'an, where man as the fruit of the creation, is faced with many challenges during his life, i.e. trials and tests in good and bad. That man's affection to the attachments and desires of the lower self (*nafs*), are the main obstacles in his spiritual development, is clearly stated in the Qur'an, and discussed in various contexts in Rumi's teachings. Moreover, the underpinning cause of most human sufferings is also related to his ego and the desires of the temporal world. Thus, both the Qur'an, and Rumi's mystical approach, aim at severing these attachments; manifestation of *balā* in adversity and suffering is therefore a way of alerting man to the need of detachment. Furthermore, man's ultimate *balā* is to realize that he has been separated from his divine essence and strive in the path of spiritual refinement to find the way back to his Source. Therefore, from the Rumian perspective, *balā* is a necessary component of man's creation, and the means by which human potentials get to be actualized. This life long process of spiritual development assists

man to become who he is, and become the polished mirror in which God's most beautiful names and attributes are manifested.

The concluding Chapter of this study will examine the problem of evil and suffering, as it relates to the notion of *balā*, from a theological perspective.

Chapter Five

Divine Trial and the Notion of the 'Best of All Possible Worlds'

5.1. Introduction

The notion of *ibtilā*, as discussed in the first chapter of this study, is seen traditionally as being synonymous with adversity and suffering, and portrays a negative connotation. However, as already established, from the Qur'anic perspective *ibtilā* is wholly positive in so far as it is an overarching notion which informs the creation of the universe, and is instrumental in actualization of the Divine purpose with respect to creation of the humankind. Furthermore, as the chapter on typology of the Qur'anic narratives highlighted, the fact that *ibtilā* is manifested both in prosperity and adversity, further emphasizes its all-inclusive meaning, the actualization of human potentials, and demonstrates the overall constructiveness of this concept. Nevertheless, because of the misconceptions surrounding it, *ibtilā* in its negative form, hardship and suffering, needs to be studied in the context of Muslim theodicy and the attendant concepts of "good" and "evil".

The wide-ranging "problem of evil" has been generally recognized as one of the most debated topics in the history of philosophy of religion. Although the theoretical dimension of the problem poses an intellectual challenge for many philosophers and theologians of various religious traditions, its existential dimension, i.e. evil encountered in real life, concerns every individual. It is claimed that the reality, as well as the magnitude of many kinds of evil in the world shakes the very foundation of the traditional belief in God. As human beings we are faced with hardships, illnesses, pain, natural disasters that cause immense suffering, fear and anxiety, and injustice, all of which challenge faith. As Hick points out, by remembering the afflictions that invade many people of the world, "... we do indeed have to ask ourselves whether it is possible to think of this world as the work of an omnipotent creator who is motivated by limitless

love...this is indeed the most serious challenge that there is to theistic faith."¹ Plantinga supports this notion and further attests that, natural atheology, which attempts to show that "God does not exist or that at any rate it is unreasonable or irrational to believe that He does, has to do with the so called problem of evil."² Therefore, the concept of evil has, for the most part, been discussed in terms of the core beliefs common to major theistic traditions. Moreover, scholarly works have paid attention to the issue of evil in the context of doctrinal concepts pertaining to specific religious traditions.

The overall examination of the problem of evil seems to suggest that the topic includes several forms and versions, and is composed of various interrelated issues and complex arguments. According to Peterson, the 'technical' discussion regarding the very nature of the problem of evil, and differences of opinion amongst the philosophers regarding the exact structure of the problem and their approach, has resulted in many formulations of the issue.³ Similarly, "in its 'existential' dimension, the problem of evil pertains not simply to the abstract analysis of propositions but to one's subjective experience, including a total sense of life or conscious attitude toward God."⁴

Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the underlying reason for most human suffering is 'attachment' to the material world. People suffer because they see the world as imperfect, unjust, unfair, and full of adversity and suffering, and aspire to a perfect world, a utopia, a *madina al-fazila*. In the context of religion, the main criticism leveled at God concerns His apparent disregard for human 'suffering', and the fact that suffering, adversity, and evil exist at all.

In this chapter, by adopting the method of deconstructionism, the notion of *ibtīlā* in its negative manifestation, evil and human suffering, will be explored in the context of Muslim theodicy. An overview of the problem of evil and its various versions will be

¹ John Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 118.

² Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil* (Cambridge, UK: WM. B. Eerdmans, 1974), p. 7.

³ Michael L. Peterson, *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings* (Indiana, USA: Univ. of Notre Dame, 2011), pp. 2-3.

⁴ Ibid.

briefly discussed first, followed by a synopsis of some of the explanations offered from theistic perspectives and their theodicies. The final section of this chapter will examine the problem of evil and human suffering from the perspectives of Muslim theodicy in general, and the Ghazālīan concept of the '*best of all possible worlds*' in particular. For, according to Ghazālī, this world is already the best possible world, including all of its apparent imperfections.

5.2. The Problem of Evil: an Overview

The overall 'problem of evil', commonly referred to as the underlying cause of human suffering, makes itself known in the philosophical debates in Judeo-Christian thought as well as Muslim literature, and comprises an across-the-board scope.⁵ Therefore, due to the extensive nature of the issue and its similar connotations within the monotheistic faiths, a general outline of the classical formulation of the problem of evil appears necessary. Scrutinizing the concept of evil according to the following framework, not only will benefit in a more coherent understanding of the issue, it will also serve as a solid foundation for later discussions relating to Muslim theodicean thought.

The examination of the philosophical and theological literature seems to indicate that the problem of evil poses a major challenge to the belief that God exists, and an enormous amount of human suffering also exists. More precisely, the problem, in its comprehensive form, is generally identified in two broad categories: *theoretical* and *existential*. According to Peterson, the *theoretical* dimension which may further be divided into *logical* and *evidential* types, engages in theological discussions about the relationship of certain attributes of God and existence of evil.⁶ A similar categorization is formulated by Inwagen who, in his Gifford lectures, classifies the problem of evil into the categories of *theoretical* and *practical*, where the former constitutes debates over

⁵ According to G. E. Von Grunebaum, while in Christianity evil is both structural and accidental, in Islam evil is only accidental. See G. E. Von Grunebaum, 'Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil', *Studia Islamica* (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595068>: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1970), p. 119.

⁶ Peterson, *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings* pp. 3-4.

'doctrinal' and 'apologetic' problems.⁷ Moreover, not finding the distinction between logical and evidential debates very useful, Inwagen proposes to differentiate between the 'global' arguments from evil and various 'local' arguments. Inwagen further argues that the intellectual challenges with respect to the belief in God, in the face of global evil and particular local evil, must be considered separately.⁸

With respect to the arguments about the problem of evil in its *logical* version, the purpose is to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency in the traditional theistic belief that an absolutely omnipotent, and omniscient God exists, and the proposition that evil exists. An example of this attempt is seen from Mackie, who claims that it is impossible that an all-powerful God was unable to create a universe which contains moral good but no moral evil.⁹ In an effort to refute Mackie's statement, Plantinga responds with a free will defense.¹⁰ Plantinga's argument is grounded in the fact that God has created mankind with free will and that by virtue of having this freedom man may choose to do good or evil acts; moral evil is not in control of God. Plantinga concludes by affirming that there is no inconsistency in theistic belief; that it is indeed possible that an omnipotent God exists, and that the universe contains moral evil.¹¹

The debate in the *evidential* version of the problem, on the other hand, takes an inductive approach to illustrate that, given the fact of evil in the world, theism is not reasonable or conceivable. An example of the philosophical argument and counter-argument in this debate may be seen from the works of Martin and Basinger.¹²

While the problem of evil has been largely discussed in its theoretical dimensions, nevertheless, the '*existential*' or '*practical*' dimension of this issue has also received the

⁷ Peter Van Inwagen, *The Problem of Evil* (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 7-9.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ J. L. Mackie, 'Evil and Omnipotence', in Marilyn Mccord and Adams Adams, Robert Merrihew (ed.), *The Problem of Evil* (New York, USA: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 25-37.

¹⁰ Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil*, p. 29.

¹¹ Ibid., pp.12-40.

¹² Michael Martin, 'Is Evil Evidence against the Existence of God?', in Michael L. Peterson (ed.), *The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings* (Indiana, US: University of Notre Dame, 2011), 135-39. And, David Basinger, 'Evil as Evidence against God's Existence', *ibid.* (Univ. of Notre Dame), 141-52.

attention of various scholars. According to Peterson, "the existential problem involves how the experience of evil conditions one's attitude toward God and perhaps toward the world."¹³ However, the scholarly works in the practical aspects of the problem do not, necessarily, illustrate how believers of religious traditions deal with the evil situation in their life, i.e. *balā* in the form of affliction and suffering. But rather, the attempt is to investigate how the adherents of religious traditions come in terms with their religious belief after they have encountered such an experience. In other words, does an encounter with evil, such as an earthquake which may be called a natural *balā*, change the perspectives of a theist insofar as complaining about God and the world that He has created? It is argued that the answer lays in the personal perspectives and world view of each individual. A generally happy individual who does not regret his own existence will not expressively question God and the creation of the world in which evil does exist. According to Hasker, "The judgment about the goodness or badness of existence as a whole are best made not from the standpoint of 'a cosmic ideal observer', but from the standpoint of a human being – one who loves and struggles, who sorrows and rejoices, and who is glad for the opportunity to live out his life upon the earth."¹⁴

The aforementioned outline of the problem of evil, more or less, is applicable to the Muslim philosophical thought as well. However, as Saeedimehr observes, for the majority of the Muslim philosophers, the problem of evil is presented under the umbrella of Divine Providence, which embodies three Divine attributes: God's knowledge of the best order of the universe, His being is the actual cause of the universe, and that He is pleased with the actual realization of the world.¹⁵ Furthermore, there are two other versions of the problem of evil that has been discussed by Muslim scholars: the problem of creative dualism, which is the existence of two creators, one of whom creates evils, and the belief in God's wisdom which appears to be in contradiction

¹³ Peterson, *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings*, p. 7.

¹⁴ William Hasker, 'On Regretting the Evils of This World', in Michael L. Peterson (ed.), *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings* (Indiana, USA: University of Notre Dame, 2011), p. 165.

¹⁵ Mohammad Saeedimehr, 'Islamic Philosophy and the Problem of Evil: A Philosophical Theodicy', *Intl. J. Humanities*, 17 (2010), 127-48.

with the existence of evil. In an attempt to reconcile between these attributes of God and the proposition that evil is real, the philosophers engage in discussion of Divine decree (*gadhā al-ilāhī*) and predestination (*taqdir al-ilāhī*).¹⁶ To these topics we shall return later in the chapter. Moreover, Muslim scholars have generally been engaged in the theoretical version of the problem, although without emphasizing the distinction between the logical and evidential types; and seem to have not been concerned with the existential aspects. Aslan supports this notion, and affirms that the rational arguments developed by the philosophers relating to the problem of evil and suffering, are disconnected from the experience of real people who encounter the impact of suffering in their life. He further argues that, the vital task is not, to develop a theodicy in order to defend a specific theistic belief, but rather to show how a person who is going through adversity can overcome suffering; this is the task of the Quran.¹⁷ Nonetheless, it should be noted here that this undertaking seems to have been accomplished by the Muslim mystics. As Schimmel points out, by introducing the principle of love, the Mystics tried to solve the problem of evil and human suffering.¹⁸ The perspectives of the Muslim philosophers as it relates to the problem of evil will be discussed in more detail in conjunction with the Muslim theodicean approach.

5.3. Perspectives in Theodicy: a Synopsis

The overall philosophical debates pertaining to the problem of evil, particularly in responding to the perennial question of human suffering, have resulted in various responses which are generally referred to as “*theodicy*”. Gottfried Leibniz (1647-1716), a prominent German philosopher, is known for coining the term *theodicy* from the Greek words for God (*Theos*) and justice (*dike*).¹⁹ The “problem of theodicy” arises when the problem of evil is placed alongside with the beliefs that are generally associated with ethical monotheism – divine attributes such as God is compassionate,

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Aslan, 'The Fall, Evil, and Suffering in Islam', , pp. 24-25.

¹⁸ Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, pp. 196-200.

¹⁹ Ronald M. Green, 'Theodicy', in Lindsay Jones (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion* (2 edn., 13; Detroit, USA: Macmillan Reference, 2005), p. 9112.

all-powerful, and all-knowing – and seems to result in a formation of a logical contradiction. The attempt to provide specific explanations for many forms of human suffering in the world and defend God's aforementioned attributes, therefore, is the aim of the enterprise of theodicy. This effort, Green observes, "... aims to show that traditional claims about God's power and goodness are compatible with the fact of suffering."²⁰ Furthermore, in its narrower position, theodicy is concerned with the special question of "optimism", i.e., is this world the best possible world that can be? In other words, does this world, with all of its apparent imperfections, represent the highest creative power of God, or is He able to create a more perfect world? It may be noted that certain themes in this perennial debate, in its overall treatment and with respect to the question of optimism, seem to appear in the works of Muslim theologians as well as Western thinkers.²¹

In solving the overall problem – the seeming inconsistency between certain attributes of God and the fact of evil – a number of theodicies have emerged in various historical periods. The Christian theodicean thought seems to have been greatly influenced by the teachings of St. Augustine (A.D. 354 – 430) who held that evil has no positive reality but it is rather *privatio boni*, the "privation of good"; and that evil is produced by human beings who misuse their freedom.²² Moreover, as Green points out, St. Augustine fully elaborated on the doctrine of original sin and focused on merit punishment to explain the cause for human suffering.²³ Alternatively, a contemporary philosopher, John Hick (1922-2012), has developed the theodicy of "soul-making" which is based on the teachings of Bishop Irenaeus (c. 130-202) of the early Eastern Orthodox Church.²⁴ According to the Irenaean view, while the fact of evil and human suffering, similar to Augustinian view, is traced back to mankind's misuse of his freedom, its position in the

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See, Eric L. Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

²² See St. Augustine, 'A Good Creation's Capacity for Evil (from City of God)', in Michael L. Peterson (ed.), *The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings* (Indiana, US: Univ. of Notre Dame, 2011), 191-96.

²³ Green, 'Theodicy', p. 9117.

²⁴ John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 211-15.

divine plan is not the same. As observed by Peterson, this perspective does not view "evil in the world as the fall from a once perfect state, but rather as a necessary stage in the development of a relatively immature creation into a more mature state."²⁵ Thus, instead of looking to the past to solve the mystery of evil, this theodicy looks into the future. In Hicks' words: "Man is in the process of becoming the perfected being whom God is seeking to create...this is not taking place by a natural evolution, but through a hazardous adventure in individual freedom...we must find the meaning of evil in the part that it is made to play in the eventual outworking of that purpose."²⁶

Likewise, the Muslim theological literature (*kalām*) reflects a variety of theodicean approaches which is largely an outcome of debates between two divergent theological factions: the Mu'tazilite and the Ash'arite. As stated in *Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldūn*, the theological differences of opinion emerged from diverse interpretations of the Qur'anic narratives concerning Divine attributes.²⁷ Thus, the roots of the early formulation of the Muslim theodicy appear to have been arisen from a categorical emphasis on God's power. The Mu'tazilite School of theology employed a rationalistic approach and sought to counterbalance the attribute of God's power with Divine justice. However, as Wolfson observes, the Mu'tazilite's emphasis on God's justice went too far which resulted in a reactionary response from some of its members, and ultimately the establishment of the Ash'arite School of theology.²⁸

From the Ash'arite perspective, humans are obligated to act according to God's law of justice; God himself, however, is not subject to any rules; God is just in whatever He does.²⁹ Conversely, the Mu'tazilite held that God is subject to the same law of justice

²⁵ Peterson, *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings*.

²⁶ Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, pp. 253- 61.

²⁷ Abdol Rahman Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldūn*, trans. Mohammad P. Ghonabadi, 2 vols. (Tehran, IR: Sherkat Elmi Farhangi, 1375), Vol. 2, pp. 942-50.

²⁸ Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 35-37.

²⁹ See, W. Montgomery Watt, 'Ash`Ariyya', in H.A.R. Gibb, Kramers, J.H. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Islam* (I; Leiden: Brill, 1986), p. 696.

as the humans, that, indeed, He has a permanent obligation to act in just ways.³⁰ In opposition, Ibn Rushd (Averroës, d. 1198), the Andalusian Muslim philosopher, challenges both of these beliefs, and is of the opinion that the attribute of justice should not be used for man and God in one and the same fashion. In Averroës's philosophy, "man is just because he gains something good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection requires him to be just."³¹ The insistence of the Ash'arite view, which became the dominant "orthodox" strain of theology in Sunni Islam, on God's omnipotence, resulted in rejection of human free will and causality. Consequently, their approach had a profound impact on the understanding, or misunderstanding, of the problem of evil and, in turn, the concept of theodicy. As observed by the prominent Shiite philosopher, Morteza Muṭahharī (d. 1979), while the extreme tendency of the Ash'arite approach – rejection of human free will and attribution of all acts to God – sought to vindicate God of any injustice, in reality, they exonerated human oppressors of any wrong doing. Muṭahharī further comments on this exaggerated theological view of the Ash'arite and explains that the injustice of the oppressors was, in their opinion, the act of God and not the act of human beings.³²

In order to determine whether the mainstream theological view of *ibtilā* is a negative one or not, we must first determine what constitutes the Muslim theological view on the issue of 'good' and 'evil'. The main issue regarding the Mu'tazilite/Ash'arite debate concerns whether the human intellect is able to discern that which is good and that which is evil without help from Divine revelation, or whether it is God alone Who determines what is good and what is evil, thus making human intellect dependent on revelation for guidance. According to the Ash'arite school of thought, there is no intrinsic quality of good and bad in things; the revealed Law is the sole foundation of good and evil; that which God commands is good and obligatory and what He forbids is

³⁰ D. Gimaret, 'Mu`Tazila', in E. Van Donzel C.E. Bosworth and W.P. Heinrichs and Ch. Pellat (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (New edn., VII; Leiden: Brill, 1993), p. 789.

³¹ Ibn Rushd (Averroes), *The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, trans. Mohammad Jamil Rehman (Lexington, KY: ForgottenBooks, 1921), p. 287.

³² Mutahhari, *'Adl-E Elahi*, pp. 50-51.

bad.³³ On the contrary, the Mu‘tazilite held that human intellect is capable of making distinction between good and evil independent of the revelation, and affirmed that it is through the faculty of reason that man comprehends the goodness of what God has revealed.³⁴ Likewise, the Shi‘ite scholastic literature categorically emphasizes that the moral values of good and evil is indeed inherent in the acts themselves. An example of this statement is seen in the writings of Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī (d. 1274), one of the most celebrated Shi‘ite scholar of Persian heritage. In his major book on theological concepts, *Kashf al-Morād – Tajrid al-i‘tiqād*, Tūsī strongly rejects the Ash‘arite claim and makes elaborated comments relating to rational deduction of good and bad (*ḥusn/qubḥ-e ‘aqlī*).³⁵ By drawing attention to examples of virtuous acts such as helping the poor and corrupt acts such as lying, Tūsī affirms that a non-believer is able to realize these qualities as well as a religious person; therefore, Divine law is not what makes these acts good or bad. Tūsī further claims that the authenticity and truthfulness of the prophetic message solely depends on whether man is able to validate that message through his own reasoning. In Tūsī’s conclusion, without this rational deduction, a firm religious belief is not attainable as the foundation of this conviction is based on a weak and shaky ground.³⁶

Additionally, the ontological nature of good and evil is rooted in the philosophical interpretation of existence (*wujūd*) and non-existence (*‘adam*).³⁷ From the perspectives of Muslim philosophers, ‘good’ is generally referred to a positive entity which stems from existence, whereas ‘evil’ is viewed as a negative entity and is defined as non-existence.³⁸ Hence, the notion of evil as the ‘privation of good’ appears to be at the core of the Muslim debate, and provides a strong explanation for the existence of evil

³³ Watt, ‘Ash‘ariyya’.

³⁴ Richard C. And Woodward Martin, Mark R., *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol* (Oxford, ENG: Oneworld, 1997), pp. 16-17.

³⁵ Tūsī, *Kashf Al-Morād, Sharh Tajrid Al-I‘tiqād*, pp. 421-26.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ For a discussion on Muslim philosophers’ interpretation of *wujūd* and ‘*adam*’ See, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 65-68.

³⁸ Saeedimehr, ‘Islamic Philosophy and the Problem of Evil: A Philosophical Theodicy’, (p.132-3)

and human suffering. Furthermore, this theory lends itself to a solid foundation for the Muslim optimistic worldview, i.e. the belief that this world is the best of all possible worlds. An example of the doctrine of evil as 'privation of good' is presented in the writings of the prominent Muslim Philosopher, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037). According to Inati, in Ibn Sīnā's view, who is influenced by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, 'being' is coextensive with 'good' (*khayr*); and 'non-being' or privation is 'evil' (*sharr*).³⁹ Moreover, in his elucidation of the metaphysical nature of evil, Ibn Sīnā makes a distinction between two types of evil: "essential" evil (*sharr bidh-dhāt*) and "accidental" evil (*sharr bil-'araḍ*); where essential evil is privation but accidental evil is either being or privation.⁴⁰ It may be argued, therefore, that from Ibn Sīnā's perspective, *balā*, in the form of human suffering such as pain and grief, is 'good' insofar as it is seen as existing positive realities.⁴¹ In addition to metaphysical evil, moral evil which is the result of human freedom – caused by 'ignorance' – is another type of evil discussed in Ibn Sīnā's philosophy.⁴² It should further be noted that by making the distinction between the metaphysical (essential and accidental) and moral types of evil, Ibn Sīnā is in fact establishing the foundation for his theodicy. Various elements of Ibn Sīnā's theodicy will be highlighted during our discussion of al-Ghazālī's teachings. According to Inati seven theories may be identified from Ibn Sīnā's theodicy:

(1) God is good and providential, but precisely because of His goodness, God cannot intend any good or evil in the world; (2) there is more good than evil in the universe. Essential evil is rare; only non-essential evil is predominant; (3) evil is a necessary consequence of the good, and to wish the removal of evil is to wish the removal of the good; (4) evil is a necessary means for the good; (5) God is not omnipotent; that is, God cannot free the world from evil; (6) essential evil is privation of being, and therefore cannot be caused by God, who is the

³⁹ Shams C. Inati, *The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sina's Theodicy* (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), p. 66.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ For Ibn Sīnā's view on 'Existence' see: Michael E. Marmura, *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of the Healing* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005b), pp. 22-38.

⁴² Inati, *The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sina's Theodicy* pp. 103-25.

cause of being only; (7) human evil is due to human free will, resulting from knowledge.⁴³

Furthermore, Sadr al-Din Shirāzī (1571–1636) known as Mullā Sadrā, has had a significant influence in shaping Muslim philosophical thought. As Rizvi points out, “Mullā Sadrā was given the title of Sadr al-Muta’allihin (Master of the theosists) for his approach to philosophy that combined an interest in theology and drew upon insights from mystical intuition...he became famous as the thinker who revolutionized the doctrine of existence in Islamic metaphysics.”⁴⁴ In his *Mafātih Al-ghayb*, Mullā Sadrā asserts that absolute existence is absolute good; that God is the sole Necessary Being, and therefore He is the absolute good; all other beings lack a certain degree of perfect good.⁴⁵ Thus, Rahman, in examining Mullā Sadrā’s philosophy stated in his *magnum opus*, *Asfār*, informs us that from Mullā Sadrā’s perspective, “absolute existence has no opposite, nor peer...evil, therefore, is never absolute, but only relative, partial, and negative....and is infected with absolute contingency and, as such, suffer from the darkness of negation”.⁴⁶ We should further mention that in Mullā Sadrā’s view, this world has been created in a perfect manner, and that the amount of evil that is present is in fact insignificant to the good that is inherent in our world.⁴⁷ Therefore, one may argue that *ibtālā* for Mullā Sadrā is positive insofar as it is part of the perfect world created by God who is the absolute Good.

To recapitulate, the non-existence theory of evil proposed by Muslim philosophers indicates that evil is nothing but privation of good. Additionally, the Muslim theologians’ interpretation of Divine attributes of Providence, as well as ascription of moral evil to the faculty of human free will, constitutes the Muslim theodicean approach relating to ‘good’ and ‘evil’. This overall positive approach, then, forms the foundation for the

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 169-72.

⁴⁴ Sajjad Rizvi, ‘Mulla Sadra’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mulla-sadra/>: Stanford University, 2009). Accessed January 13, 2013

⁴⁵ Sadr Al-Din Mulla Sadra Shirazi, *Mafatih Al-Ghayb*, trans. Mohammad Khajawii (Tehran, IR: Mola, 1387), p. 388.

⁴⁶ Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (Albany, NY: State Univ. of NY Press, 1975), p. 36.

⁴⁷ Mulla Sadra Shirazi, *Mafatih Al-Ghayb*, pp. 389-91.

doctrine of the optimum (*al-aṣḥāh*), i.e., that this world is the most excellent creation. In what follows, we will examine the notion of *balā* in its manifestation as affliction and suffering, in the context of al-Ghazālī's statement, "there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is" (*laysa fī'l-imkān abda ' mimma kān*).

5.4. Ghazālian Theodicy: Concept of the "Best of All Possible Worlds"

From the perspective of Muslim theologians this world represents the excellent creative power of God – the most Perfect One who is the ultimate source of existence. However, the problem of evil, *balā* in the form of affliction and human suffering, calls the perfectness of the world – the doctrine of the optimum – into question. In the face of many imperfections, and various degrees of negative *balā*, is this world the best world that it can possibly be? In other words, is it possible for God to create a world without *balā* where human beings would not be subjected to the high amount of misfortunes and suffering? Perhaps the most decisive answer is exemplified in the teachings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (AH 450-505/1058-1111), the prominent Muslim intellectual of the fifth century Islam. For al-Ghazālī, not only this world is indeed the best that it can be, "there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is" (*laysa fī'l-imkān abda ' mimma kān*).⁴⁸

Al-Ghazālī was a renowned Muslim jurist, theologian, and mystic: a prominent thinker who is well known for his comprehensive influence in the formation of various disciplines of Muslim scholarly thought. His contributions has earned him the honorific title *Ḥujjat al-Islām* "the proof of Islam".⁴⁹ Al-Ghazālī was born in Ṭūs, a town located in eastern Iran, and while he lost his father at a young age, under the guidance of his caretaker, he received a great education. Following several years of studying under the greatest theologian of the time, al-Juwānī, at the age of thirty-three, al-Ghazālī was appointed to the main professorship at the Nizāmīyah College in Baghdad, one of the

⁴⁸ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm Al-Dīn*, trans. Mohammad Khajawii (4; Tehran, IR: Shirkat Intisharat Elmi va Farhangi, 1377) Vol. 4, p. 445.

⁴⁹ W. Montgomery Watt, 'Ghazali, Abu Hamid', in Lindsay Jones (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion* (Second edn., 5; USA: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 3469-72.

most distinguished positions in the academic world of his time. However, after four years and following a mystical religious experience, al-Ghazālī abandoned his position and adopted the life of a mystic.⁵⁰ He settled in Damascus for two years, where he devoted his life to prayer and contemplation, and subsequently performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Al-Ghazālī returned to his homeland where he spent the next ten years in seclusion, and composed his encyclopedic work titled *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*, ‘The Revivification of the Religious Sciences’. He eventually returned to teaching, and spent the last few years of his life writing summaries of *Iḥyā’*, the composition of his celebrated autobiography, and books on *kalām* and jurisprudence – the subjects that had occupied him before his mystical experience. According to Watt, “When he became a mystic he did not cease to be a good Muslim any more than he ceased to be an Ash’arite theologian.”⁵¹ Al-Ghazālī died in Ṭūs at the age of 55 in 505/1111.

As mentioned previously, the task of this part of the study is to examine the notion of *balā* in the context of al-Ghazālī’s overall theological view with special interest in his statement of ‘the best of all possible worlds’ – Ghazālian theodicy. However, in order to understand al-Ghazālī’s thought and the framework in which the statement was articulated, a concise discussion of his mystical experience seems necessary. Much of what is known about al-Ghazālī’s condition leading up to the mystical experience and his motivations for leaving Baghdad is through his spiritual autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, ‘Deliverance from Error’. In spite of his extraordinary achievements, al-Ghazālī had become skeptical of the truth of the religious knowledge and sought to search for a kind of knowledge that can provide ‘certitude’ in the authenticity of faith. In Burrell’s words, al-Ghazālī was “resolved to go in search of an answer to the question deep in most human hearts: how do I *know* religion in TRUE?”⁵² According to Bowker’s observation, al-Ghazālī felt that the high volume of knowledge and the skillful demonstration of it through victorious argumentations “amounted to nothing – nothing,

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), p. 12.

⁵² David Burrell, preface to Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Munqidh Min Al-Dalal, Deliverance from Error*, trans. R.J. McCarthy (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2006), p. 10.

if it did not bring him into a direct experience of that which he could describe externally with such fluency, the nature of God and of man's relatedness to Him⁵³. After making a thorough study of the various categories of truth seekers, namely philosophers, theologians, and Gnostics, he declared that the true knowledge of religion is attainable if what he knows is connected to and is grounded in direct mystical experience. Thus, he writes: "I knew with certainty that I had learned all I could by way of theory. There remained, then, only what was attainable, not by hearing and study, but by fruitional experience and actually engaging in the way."⁵⁴

Al-Ghazālī acknowledged that attainment of this higher knowledge which would ultimately lead him from the dark alleys of 'doubtfulness' to the light of 'certainty' is achievable by shunning fame and fortune. However, after months of inner struggle, he realized that the path was not easy; as severing from worldly attachments did not come without serious affliction and suffering, '*balā*'. It is in facing a serious illness – physical and spiritual – that al-Ghazālī experienced an inner transformation which results in leaving the professorship position, family, and wealth to search for the authentic knowledge of religion and a personal experience of God. Thus, we are told:

I therefore reflected unceasingly on this for some time, while I still had freedom of choice. One day I would firmly resolve to leave Baghdad and disengage myself from those circumstances, and another day I would revoke my resolution. I would put one foot forward, and the other backward.....mundane desires began tugging me with their chains to remain as I was, while the herald of faith was crying out: "Away! Up and away"...As such thoughts the call would reassert itself and I would make an irrevocable decision to run off and escape. Then Satan would return to the attack and say: "This is a passing state"....thus I incessantly vacillated between the contending pull of worldly desires and the appeals of the afterlife for about six months, starting with Rajab of the year 488 (July 1095 A.D.). In this month the matter passed from choice to compulsion. For, God put

⁵³ John Bowker, *The Religious Imagination and the Sense of God* (Oxford, ENG: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 195.

⁵⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Munqidh Min Al-Dalāl, Deliverance from Error*, p. 52.

a lock upon my tongue so that I was impeded from public teaching. I struggled with myself to teach for a single day, to gratify the hearts of the students who were frequenting my lectures, but my tongue would not utter a single word: I was completely unable to say anything. As a result that impediment of my speech caused sadness in my heart accompanied by an inability to digest; food and drink became unpalatable to me so that I could neither swallow broth easily nor digest a mouthful of solid food. That led to such a weakening of my powers that the physicians lost hope of treating me and said: "This is something which has settled in his heart and crept from it into his humors; there is no way to treat it unless his heart is eased of the anxiety which has visited it."...Then, when I perceived my powerlessness, and when my capacity to make a choice had completely collapsed, I had recourse to God Most High as does a hard pressed man who has no way out of his difficulty. And I was answered by Him Who "answers the needy man when he calls on Him" (Q. 27: 62-63), and He made it easy for my heart to turn away from fame and fortune, family, children, and associates.⁵⁵

It should be noted here that al-Ghazālī's exposition of this experience seems to accord with the wholly positive nature and all-inclusive meaning of *balā* emphasized in the Qur'an, which was discussed in Chapter One of the study. For it is through undergoing this multidimensional trail, *balā* in the form of physical and mental illness, that al-Ghazālī's intellectual and spiritual potentials are fully actualized. Consequently, this devastating *balā* which appeared as entirely negative encompassing much tribulations and hardships, proved to be the most constructive experience of his life. As Humā'ī observes, the new and transformed al-Ghazālī' became to be one of the most influential thinkers who revolutionized the intellectual prospects of humanity.⁵⁶ Watt supports this notion and points out that the reflections of what al-Ghazālī' learnt in the years of solitude is vividly communicated in his greatest work *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*. This *magnum opus* provides both a theoretical justification of al-Ghazālī's position and a highly detailed elucidation of it which emphasized the deeper meaning of the external acts; it

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 53-55.

⁵⁶ Jalal Al-Din Huma'ī, *Ghazālī-Nāmah, Sharh-I Hāl Va Āsār Va 'aqā'id* (Tehran, IR: Huma, 1368), p. 9.

shows how a profound inner life may be integrated with sound theological doctrine.⁵⁷ Additionally, in Horten's opinion, "Al-Ghazālī drew attention to conscience in religion, the spiritual-intellectual element, in the light of which the store of positive and external Islamic elements could be understood and reverentially conserved."⁵⁸

It may be inferred from the above brief discussion that al-Ghazālī's personal experience with *balā*, as manifested in a crisis affecting both his physical and mental health, becomes visible at the heart of his theodicy – and by extension – the affirmation that "there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is" (*laysa fi'l-imkān abda 'mimmā kān*). Prior to the scrutiny of this statement, al-Ghazālī's theological thought, as it relates to the overall concept of Creation, needs to be discussed briefly. In other words, the inquiry for the next section is to examine the conditions of a Creation that, in Ghazālī's view, establishes the premise for the doctrine of "the best of all possible worlds", and in turn, affirmation of the wholly positive nature of *balā*.

5.4.1. Ghazālī on God and Creation-in-Time

The concept of God and creation, and the relationship between the two, in so far as existence is concerned, presents itself as one of the most fundamental discourses in Muslim theological thought. The origin of the debate appears to address the following question: has the universe always coexisted with God, or has it been created by God at a specific time? The discussion, which is reflected in the works of *falasifa* and *mutakallimun*, attempts to shed light on the distinction between "eternity" or *qīdam* and that which is eternal or *qadīm*, and "creation-in-time" or *ḥudūth*, and that which is created-in-time or *ḥādīth*.⁵⁹ As defined by philosopher and theologian Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, *qadīm* is applied to that which is not preceded by anything else and therefore is eternal. On the other hand, *ḥādīth* is referred to that which has not existed before its

⁵⁷ Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali*, pp. 12-13. Also, Watt, 'Ghazali, Abu Hamid', p. 3472.

⁵⁸ Max Horten, 'Moral Philosophers in Islam', *Islamic Studies* (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20846901>, 13; Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, Int. Islamic University, 1974), p. 15.

⁵⁹ See Muhammad Hussain Tabatabai, *Nihayah Al-Hikmah (the Utmost of Philosophy)*, ed. Hadi Khosroshahi, trans. Mahdi Tadayyon (Ghom, IR: Bustan-e Ketab, 1387/2008), pp.92-136.

existence, i.e., its existence is contingent, and therefore is created-in-time.⁶⁰ Accordingly, since God is the only “necessary” being, Tūsī affirms, He is the only “eternal”; everything else – the world, the non-God (*mā siwā Allah*) – is contingent, temporal, and alterable; indeed, the world may not exist at all.⁶¹

Furthermore, while the existence of the world is contingent and subject to possibilities of existence and nonexistence, from the Muslim philosophical perspective, its creation is “necessary” due to the preceding will and knowledge of its Creator. However, as Burrell observes, the philosophers “enamoured with eternal emanation were bound to be seen as compromising the majesty of Allah as well as obscuring a cardinal feature of divine revelation: that the universe itself is God’s gracious gift.”⁶²

The doctrine of creation-in-time, which was the position of the orthodoxy, was first challenged by Ibn Sīnā and led to his formulation of the doctrine of “contingency” or *imkān zāti*. As Rahman points out, while the notion of temporal creation did not agree with Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical worldview, he nevertheless took the demands of traditional Islam seriously and sought to synthesize between the two.⁶³ Ibn Sīnā demonstrated that there is a radical distinction between God and the world, in that “although there can be no temporal gap between God and the world, there is surely a gap in the nature of being between the two, a sort of ontological hiatus or rupture which is expressed in the doctrine of necessity and contingency.”⁶⁴ In Ibn Sīnā’s view, the universe is the creative work of God Who creates according to His knowledge and due to His generosity; since God is “eternal” and it is in His nature to create, therefore, the object of His creation must also be “eternal”. According to Rahman, the theory of contingency as well as the doctrine of distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘existence’ is the hallmark of

⁶⁰ Tūsī, *Kashf Al-Morād, Sharh Tajrid Al-I`Tiqad*, pp. 47-48.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 83; 220.

⁶² David Burrell, 'Creation or Emanation', in David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (ed.), *God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1990), p. 29.

⁶³ Fazlur Rahman, 'Ibn Sina's Theory of the God-World Relationship', in David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (ed.), *God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 38-44.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

Ibn Sīnā's philosophy – its profound impact is evident in later Muslim philosophy and Medieval Latin thought.⁶⁵

However, the contingency doctrine and eternity of the world which emphasized that creation is innately contingent but extrinsically necessary, met with strong objections from the orthodox Muslim theologians. This conclusion, Goodman observes, seemed too strong for the *mutakallimun* for it "appeared to tie God's hands and to ignore the radical contingency of finite being, which was the linchpin of Kalām creationism."⁶⁶ The highlights of this opposition are particularly reflected in the teachings of al-Ghazālī. In al-Ghazālī's view, the creation of the universe is the work of an omnipotent, omniscient Creator; His creation is not out of caprice and due to necessity, but indeed, out of His will and wisdom, and for the benefit of the world.⁶⁷ According to Marmura, in Ash'arite theology and by extension for al-Ghazālī, "whatever the divine eternal will chooses and decrees must come about. In this sense the existence of what it decrees is necessary".⁶⁸ Nevertheless, opposing Ibn Sīnā's doctrine, al-Ghazālī affirms that "God's will does not have to decree the creation of the world; it does so 'freely' by an eternal voluntary act...by this act it decrees the world's creation out of nothing (*ex nihilo*) at a finite time."⁶⁹

Furthermore, the implication of the creation in time theory, Ormsby points out, is the presupposition that God chose one moment rather than another to bring the world into existence.⁷⁰ In his *al-Iqtisād fī'l-i'tiqād*, written prior to his experience of *balā* and at the pick of his career in Baghdad, al-Ghazālī engages in a theological discussion about the creation-in-time theory and attempts to establish his argument. In al-Ghazālī's

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

⁶⁶ L. E. Goodman, 'Time in Islam', in Ian Richard Netton (ed.), *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (3; London, ENG: Routledge, 2007), p. 13.

⁶⁷ Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm Al-Dīn*, Vol. 1, pp. 208-09.

⁶⁸ Michael E. Marmura, 'Al-Ghazālī', in Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005a), pp. 141-42.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Eric L. Ormsby, 'Creation in Time in Islamic Thought with Special Reference to Al-Ghazali', in David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (ed.), *God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 252.

theology, "the world comes to be at that time when the eternal will stands in nexus with is coming-to-be...the world is specified in a specific measure and a specific position. To ask why it distinguishes or specifies one time or one thing rather than another is to ask, why is it a will, or, why is will will?"⁷¹ As Ormsby observes, from the Ghazālian perspective:

The world is a realization of one possibility among many possibilities, all of them utterly equal in response to God. With respect to itself, the world could as easily not exist as exist; and this inescapable fact applied to every object and every event in the world... The corollary of this is that whatever does exist is a product of divine will: "every contingent is willed". So, too, whatever does not exist, does not exist because its nonexistence God has knowingly foreordained and willed. Nothing is random; nothing is happenstance; whatever exists, whatever occurs, is intended.⁷²

It may be noted here that al-Ghazālī's theological viewpoints, such as the creation of the world discussed briefly above, are, for the most part, outlined in his works composed during the period of his professorship in Baghdad. However, the profound practical implications of much of his teachings, and the extent of his influence in shaping the Muslim theological and mystical thought, is explicitly communicated in his writing following his experience of *balā*. It is, therefore, in Book 35 of the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, where al-Ghazālī's famous statement makes itself known: "there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is" (*laysa fi'l-imkān abda' mim mā kān*). In the following section we will examine al-Ghazālī's dictum and shed light on its association to the notion of *balā*. We will further study al-Ghazālī's *balā* and its impact on his intellectual and spiritual development.

⁷¹ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Iqtisād Fi'l-I'tiqād* (Ankara, 1962), pp. 104-07. Cited in Ormsby, 'Creation in Time in Islamic Thought', pp. 254-55

⁷² Ormsby, 'Creation in Time in Islamic Thought with Special Reference to Al-Ghazali', p. 255.

5.4.2. The Best of All Possible Worlds: Context for Trust in God

As mentioned previously, during the year 1095, al-Ghazālī experienced a major physical and mental crisis, *balā* in its negative form, which had a profound consequence on his intellectual and spiritual life. According to his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, in addition to his physical suffering – inability to speak, eat, or drink – he also suffered mentally from a strong sense of sadness. After six months of this struggle, he renounced his professorship position, donated all his wealth, and left Baghdad to pursue a life of seclusion and poverty.⁷³ According to Zarrinkūb, the authenticity of religious knowledge and the level of “certitude” which al-Ghazālī pursued for much of his life through rational deductions bore fruit after his illness and significant mystical experience.⁷⁴

Al-Ghazālī’s *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*, which contains the statement of “the best of all possible worlds”, is considered his *magnum opus* and was composed during the next decade of his life following the experience of *balā*. It may be argued, therefore, that al-Ghazālī’s experience of *balā* demonstrates the constructiveness of *balā* emphasized in the Qur’an and discussed in Chapter One of this study. This notion is supported by Bowker who, in his study of the problem of suffering in world’s religions, points out that “suffering is treated in the Qur’an as it occurs, in direct and simple terms, not as a theoretical problem....there is a sense in which it is almost dissolved as a problem”⁷⁵. Did not the Qur’an pronounce: “...You may dislike something although it is good for you, or like something although it is bad for you: God knows and you do not?”⁷⁶

According to Ormsby, during his ten years of seclusion, al-Ghazālī seems to have reached an inner state of conviction and insight which enabled him to view the world

⁷³ See Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Munqidh Min Al-Dalal, Deliverance from Error*.

⁷⁴ Abdolhusin Zarrinkub, *Farar Az Madrasah - Life and Teachings of Al-Ghazali* (Tehran, IR: Amir Kabir, 1387), p. 124.

⁷⁵ Bowker, *Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World*, p. 101.

⁷⁶ Quran, 2:216

perfect as is: “the perfect rightness of the actual”.⁷⁷ For al-Ghazālī, this world, with all of its ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and apparent imperfections, is indeed the best world and there is nothing in possibility better than what is.⁷⁸ As already established, in al-Ghazālī’s theology, discussed in *al-Iqtisād fī’l-i’tiqād*, the world is contingent, i.e., can equally be and not be; its creation was actualized through God’s will and at a specific time. The fact that the world came to being, and that its creation occurred in time, illustrates that what came to be is the creative work of an omniscient Creator. Thus, while it is logical to assert that our world could be ‘other’ than what is, theologically, it is not permissible to affirm that our world could be ‘better’ than what is.⁷⁹ In al-Ghazālī’s view, our present world with all of its circumstances is most excellent and just. From this perspective, it may be argued that, the assumption that a world without *balā* – not currently in existence – will be superior to the presently created world, where *balā* is part of its structure, is not conceivable.

Al-Ghazālī’s memorable dictum of “the best of all possible worlds”, appears in Book 35 of the *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn: Kitāb al-tawhīd wa’ l-tawakkul*, Divine Unity and Trust in God. Following his in-depth presentation on the doctrine of *tawhīd* and its practical implications, the practice of seeing God as the only true agent in the world and the One whom man must continuously find hope in and depend on, al-Ghazālī states:

Everything that God distributes among men such as sustenance, life-span ‘*ajal*’, happiness and sadness, weakness and power, faith and unbelief, obedience and apostasy – all of it is unqualifiedly just with no injustice in it, true with no wrong infecting it. Indeed, all this happens according to a necessary and true order, according to what is appropriate as it is appropriate and in the measure that is proper to it; nor is anything more fitting, more perfect, and more attractive within the realm of possibility. For if something was to exist and remind one of the sheer omnipotence of God and not of the good things accomplished by His action, it would be miserliness which utterly contradict God’s generosity, and injustice

⁷⁷ Ormsby, ‘Creation in Time in Islamic Thought with Special Reference to Al-Ghazali’, p. 256.

⁷⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-Dīn*, Vol. 4, p. 445.

⁷⁹ Ormsby, ‘Creation in Time in Islamic Thought with Special Reference to Al-Ghazali’, p. 257.

contrary to divine justice. And if God were not omnipotent, He would be impotent, thereby contradicting the nature of divinity.⁸⁰

The statement gave rise to much controversy in al-Ghazālī's life time which continued for several centuries. According to his critics, the fact that this proclamation strictly compromised divine power – it is not possible for God to create a more excellent world – is contrary to the belief of the orthodoxy and must be rejected at once. According to Ormsby, in addition to al-Ghazālī's apparent disregard for certain Ash'arite theological thought pertaining to divine attributes, two other major objections were also raised: resemblances of the passage with Mu'tazilite doctrine of *al-aṣḥāḥ*, and the possibility that al-Ghazālī had been influenced by the teachings of the philosophers.⁸¹ Humā'ī is of the same opinion, and sheds light on various arguments and counter arguments that preoccupied the minds of many of al-Ghazālī's critics and defenders.⁸² Despite the fact that al-Ghazālī responded to his critics in several occasions and attempted to clarify his position, the controversy and the heated discussions surrounding it went too far. According to Humā'ī's observation, the core of these discussions concerns matters that is above and beyond human understanding, that man with his limited 'reasoning' is incapable to make judgment on God and whether or not His creation could be better than what is.⁸³

In scrutinizing al-Ghazālī's dictum, it is important to note that this statement makes itself known in the context of the notion of *tawakkul*, "trust in God". In his book, *The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God*, 'al-Maṣṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ ma 'ānī asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā', al-Ghazālī engages in an in-depth discussion of the divine attribute of *Al-Wakīl*, the Trustee, and illustrates how God, in His essence, deserves to have matters entrusted

⁸⁰ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Tawhīd Wa' L-Tawakkul, Faith in Divine Unity & Trust in Divine Providence*, trans. David Burrell (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2001), pp. 45-46.

⁸¹ Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, pp. 32-33.

⁸² Huma'ī, *Ghazālī-Nāmāh, Sharḥ-I Hāl Va Āsār Va 'aqā'id*, pp. 428-29.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 430.

to him.⁸⁴ Moreover, according to Soroush, *tawakkul*, based on the teachings of the Qur'an, maybe considered the fruit of *tawhīd*; it entails the affirmation that there is only One true agent in the world, as well as the sincere belief that the effectiveness of all other "causes" (*asbāb*) actualize through Him.⁸⁵ As Griffel observes, al-Ghazālī's famous passage marks the end of his comments on the importance of the belief in *tawhīd*, at which point the notion of *tawakkul* is linked to it.⁸⁶ While the statement contains various elements of classical formulation of theodicy, such as justification of God's attributes in face of evil; it, nevertheless, aims to prescribe practical ways by which trust in God is achievable. For al-Ghazālī, one's belief in divine unity is manifested in the level of one's trust in God. In Burrell's observation, al-Ghazālī's purpose is to illustrate that "the test of our understanding of divine unity will not come by way of clever philosophical schemes but through a life of trust, *tawakkul*, in which concerted practice will bring each of us personally to the threshold of the only understanding possible here, that of unveiling".⁸⁷ To this end, in the passage preceding "the best of all possible worlds" statement, al-Ghazālī explicitly expounds on his purpose:

The faith in divine unity which brings about the state of trust in God is only perfected by faith in God's mercy '*rahma*', and in His wisdom, '*hikma*'. And if faith in divine unity brings about insight into the cause of the causes '*musab-bib al-asbāb*', the state of trust in God will only be perfected by confidence in the trustee '*wakīl*' and tranquility of heart towards the benevolent sponsor....it would take too long to explain the path of those experiencing the unveiling to show how they develop their strong trust in God....we can only briefly show their way so that whoever aims to develop a firm trust in God believes in it...a belief without any doubt.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, Al-Maṣṣad Al-Asnā Fī Sharḥ Ma'ānī Asmā' Allāh Al-Ḥusnā* trans. David B. Burrell (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Text Society, 1992), p. 126.

⁸⁵ Abdolkarim Soroush, *Hekmat Wa Ma' Ishat* (Tehran, IR: Serat, 1373), pp. 375-76.

⁸⁶ Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 227.

⁸⁷ David Burrell, in introduction to Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Tawhīd Wa' L-Tawakkul, Faith in Divine Unity & Trust in Divine Providence*, p. xv.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44; with modification in the English translation.

The practical implications of such an elevated level of trust in God, one may infer, is the cornerstone of al-Ghazālī's dictum of "the best of all possible worlds". In other words, *tawakkul* which is considered one of the most significant stations in man's spiritual development – its manifestation truly visible when faced with a negative *balā* – is not attainable without a true conviction that this world is indeed the best and most excellent of all possible worlds. Moreover, in leading up to his famous dictum, al-Ghazālī makes it perfectly clear that, the divine attributes of 'wisdom' and 'will', are instrumental in observing the world as the most excellent world, and are regarded as the foundation for the total trust in its Creator. As Ormsby points out, al-Ghazālī's emphasis on divine wisdom which is a central theme in his theodicy was objected by his fellow Ash'arite; as for them, any attempt to rationalize God's actions was against orthodoxy. Therefore, his stress on divine wisdom may be viewed as an effort to modify the strict Ash'arite assertion of God's autonomous unaccountability, and affirm that God's creation is, in fact, based on divine wisdom.⁸⁹ Consequently, in al-Ghazālī's vision, this world – including all of its apparent deficiencies – insofar as it is designed and planned according to God's will and wisdom, is the most excellent world. One may infer that, in the Ghazālian scheme, it is only through this indispensable worldview that man is able to trust in God – and by extension – realize the wholly positive nature of the notion of *balā*. In other words, a true confirmation that this world is the most excellent created work of God is to affirm that divine wisdom is implanted in all experiences of life – *balā* in prosperity and in adversity.

From the Ghazālian perspective, the signs and verifications of divine wisdom are abundantly visible throughout this universe; indeed, its impact permeates each and every creature. In the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī makes references to what may seem to the most insignificant creatures such as, an ant, a bee, or a spider, and elucidates on the amazing ways by which these tiny animals are sustained in this world.⁹⁰ Additionally, to substantiate his argument for the divine wisdom, al-Ghazālī frequently refers to human

⁸⁹ Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, p. 47.

⁹⁰ Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm Al-Dīn*, Vol. 4, p. 550.

body and the perfect appropriateness of its anatomy. For him, the design, the position, and the functionality of each and every part of human body, provides the most convincing example of divine wisdom.⁹¹ To this end, he describes the perfectness of various body parts, such as the structure of human eye and the functionality of numerous veins and muscles of the body, to remind man of the marvels of his own body and to illustrate the instrumentality of divine wisdom in His flawless creation. As Ormsby points out, al-Ghazālī's portrayals of the creation of human body is very precise, "for he wishes to emphasize the meticulous rightness of things as they are."⁹² Once again, al-Ghazālī makes a serious effort to persuade his readers that this world, which is the created work of God according to His will and wisdom, is perfect in each and every aspect. This sincere belief is a necessary prerequisite for those who, in the path of spiritual development, are seeking to reach the apex of the station of *tawakkul*; the extent and the genuineness of this conviction is tested in face of *balā*.

5.4.3. *Balā* in the Context of the "Best of All Possible Worlds"

The implicit reference to the notion of *balā* becomes visible when al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the perfect appropriateness of things as they are is extended to the social order. In his view, divine will remains at the core of all human affairs; undoubtedly, the events of this world unfold not randomly but according to God's will. In his book, *The Forty Foundations of Religion*, '*Kitāb al-arba 'in fī uṣūl al-dīn*', al-Ghazālī writes:

He wills all existent things, directing all that occurs. Nothing transpires in the physical or spiritual world, whether it be little or much, small or large, good or bad, beneficial or harmful, belief or disbelief, knowledge or ignorance, victory or loss, increase or decrease, obedience or disobedience, except by His decree, destining, wisdom, and willing. For whatever He wills is, and whatever He does not will is not.⁹³

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 555.

⁹² Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, p. 50.

⁹³ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Arba 'in Fī Uṣūl Al-Dīn*, trans. Aaron Spevack (Ghazālī on the Principles of Islamic Spirituality - Selections from the Forty Foundations of Religion Woodstock, VT: Sky Light Paths, 2012), p. 21.

Moreover, the aforementioned two principles, that God is the only true agent in the world and that His will directly influences all situations of human life, further signifies that there is complete justice in this world. While al-Ghazālī does not deny the actuality and presence of negative *balā* – hardship and adversity – in human life, he asserts that their existence is necessary and instrumental in demonstrating the perfect rightness of the world. Thus, the *Iḥyāʾ* text continues:

Indeed, all kinds of poverty, loss, and adversity in this world represent a deficiency in this world, but an increase and enhancement in the next world. And everything which amounts to a deficiency in the next world for one person spells a benefit for another. For if there was no night one would never realize the value of daylight; were it not for illness, the healthy person would never enjoy good health; and if there were no hell, the inhabitant of paradise would not know the extent of their blessing. If the imperfect is not created, the perfect will not be known. If beasts had not been created, the dignity of human beings would not be evident, for the perfect and the imperfect are manifested in relation to one another. Therefore, Divine generosity and wisdom require that Creation includes both perfect and imperfect.⁹⁴

It may be argued that the all-encompassing meaning of *balā* which the Qurʾan emphasizes – divine trial in adversity and prosperity – discussed in Chapter One of the study, is highlighted in various sections of al-Ghazālī's writings, and that his doctrine of the best of all possible worlds, presupposes the notion of *balā*. It is in viewing the creation from a cosmic perspective and trust in God, not from individual's limited knowledge, that man can truly affirm the perfectness of the world. As Watt observes, the overall attitude of the Qurʾan is that *balā* in its form of suffering is caused or permitted by God, and that humankind's attempt to understand in detail the purposes of God is not always fruitful.⁹⁵ Therefore, al-Ghazālī does not make any attempt to

⁹⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Tawḥīd Waʾ L-Tawakkul, Faith in Divine Unity & Trust in Divine Providence*, p. 46. With modifications in the English translation.

⁹⁵ W. Montgomery Watt, 'Suffering in Sunnite Islam', *Studia Islamica* (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595556>, 50: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1979), pp.12-13.

absolve God from responsibility for the evils of this world. According to Ormsby, "the question of the ultimate authorship of evil does not arise, or at least does not occupy the central position, in his version of theodicy, that it occupies in Western versions".⁹⁶

The doctrine of "the best of all possible worlds" also appears in the writings of Gottfried Leibniz (1647-1716), the prominent German philosopher, who is recognized for coining the term "theodicy". While there appears to be affinities between al-Ghazālī's statement and what Leibniz attempted to establish almost six centuries later in Europe, there are also distinctive differences among the two scholars. As mentioned previously, from the Ghazālian perspective, the principle of creation-in-time is essential in affirmation that this world is the best created work of its Creator.⁹⁷ For al-Ghazālī the fact that this world was created at a specific time and according to God's will and wisdom, makes it the best and most excellent creation. Conversely, in his discussion of God as the "*first reason of things*", and the contingency of the existence of the world, Leibniz engages in a discussion of other possible worlds that God could have created. For him, the divine choice to create this world out of infinite possibilities makes it the most perfect world:

One must seek the reason for the existence of the world, which is the whole assemblage of *contingent* things, and see it in the substance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in consequence is *necessary* and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible,...the cause of the world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them...that if there were not the best (optimum) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any...and that God must have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, p. 54.

⁹⁷ See section 5.4.1 Ghazālī on God and Creation-in-time

⁹⁸ Freiherr Von Gottfried Leibniz, *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil*, trans. E.M. Huggard (Charleston, SC: Bibliobazaar, 2007), pp. 130-31.

Furthermore, it may be argued that, while both al-Ghazālī and Leibniz utilize rational deductions in their writings, nonetheless, their worldview and perspective differ greatly from one another. Al-Ghazālī's goal was to demonstrate the perfection of the world and the actual rightness of everything existent by underscoring the importance of divine wisdom without limiting God's power and His freedom. The overarching purpose for al-Ghazālī, however, was to construct a solid foundation for *tawakkul* and convince his readers how to attain this conviction. Leibniz, on the other hand, while underlines the divine wisdom in the design of His creation, he nonetheless emphasizes the instrumentality of human reason and its ability to comprehend God's harmonic creation "without being aided by the light of faith".⁹⁹ According to Kermani, "Leibniz's apologetic interest is directed at God on the surface, but actually at human reason, which must be capable of explaining God – so as to behave in God-like fashion".¹⁰⁰

In addition to the aforementioned differences between al-Ghazālī and Leibniz, as it relates to the notion of 'the best of all possible worlds', Aslan argues that the two thinkers belong to different traditions of scholarship; therefore, their discourses and their intendant audiences, as well as, what they attempted to achieve is quite different.¹⁰¹ In his opinion, al-Ghazālī's passage appears in the *Iḥyā'* to educate the general Muslim public in their spiritual development, the goal is not to justify the existence of suffering; Leibniz's idea, on the other hand, appears in one of his philosophical essays articulated in a rationalistic approach in order to convince other philosophers, as well as, to develop a consistent theodicy.¹⁰²

In our analysis of the Qur'anic concept of *balā* in the context of al-Ghazālī's doctrine of "the best of all possible worlds", attention should also be made to his elucidation of the concept of 'patience' (*ṣabr*), which is a closely related theme to *balā* not only in face of hardship and adversity but equally in prosperity. Book 32 of the *Iḥyā'* 'ulūm al-dīn,

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰⁰ Navid Kermani, *The Terror of God (Original Work in German)*, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), p. 85.

¹⁰¹ Aslan, 'The Fall, Evil, and Suffering in Islam ', , pp. 38-39.

¹⁰² Ibid.

titled: *Kitāb al-ṣabr wa' l-shukr', Patience and Thankfulness*, includes al-Ghazālī's deep engagement with the all-inclusive meaning of *balā*, where he outlines various circumstances of man's life – good and bad – and provides guidance on proper behavior in each condition.

In this section of the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī's explains that the human experience in this world involves two diverse conditions of life, desirable and undesirable, in both circumstances man is in need of patience.¹⁰³ The first kind is when he is enjoying good health, experiencing prosperity, happiness, prestige, and views the circumstances of his life as being in harmony with his desires; yet, he needs to exercise patience. Here al-Ghazālī engages in a thought provoking discussion pertaining to the notion of *balā* and its manifestation in 'good'; his explication appears to accord with the all-encompassing meaning of *balā* that is emphasized in the Qur'an and has already been illustrated in previous chapters of this study. Shedding light on the importance of *ṣabr*, and its practical application during the time that man is enjoying life's delightful conditions, 'trial of good fortune', al-Ghazālī explains:

If man does not restrain himself from irresponsible living and a propensity for this, he will lose himself in legitimate pleasures that lead to transgression. [As stated in Qur'an 96:6-7] *Surely man transgresses; for he believes himself to be self-sufficient*. As some of the Gnostics say patience in well-being is more difficult than patience in tribulation. The true believer is he who patiently endures well-being; this means that he does not rely on it. He knows that well-being is entrusted to him, and it may be that it shall soon be taken back, and so he should not yield himself wholly to its enjoyments. He does not persist obstinately in a life of luxury, physical pleasure, frivolity and amusement. He must care about God's claims regarding the expenditure of his wealth, regarding the way he dispenses succor for creation,... regarding all else that God has favoured him with. This patience is linked to thankfulness. Patience in good fortune is more difficult, because it is related to the capacity for endurance... A hungry man is

¹⁰³ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Ṣabr Wa' L-Shukr', Patience and Thankfulness, Book Xxxii of Iḥyā' 'ulūm Al-Dīn*, trans. H.T. Littlejohn (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Text Society, 2011), p. 33.

better able to endure his hunger when food is not available than when delicious, good foods are set before him, and he could eat. In this situation the trial of good fortune is great.¹⁰⁴

The second kind of condition in man's life, according to al-Ghazālī, includes those uninvited circumstances that are contrary to man's desires and causes him stress and unhappiness, and yet he has no choice but to go through this experience – *balā* in adversity. From his perspective, the actualization of the virtue of *ṣabr*, in its elevated degree, is demonstrated when man encounters misfortunes and calamities, such as: loss of wealth, major illnesses, death of a loved one, and various other kinds of tribulations.¹⁰⁵

Al-Ghazālī further distinguishes between absolute and relative *balā* in the context of this world and the Hereafter. Absolute *balā* in this world applies to disbelief and disobedience; it is man's obligation not to be patient in this *balā*; he must change this status and become a believer; otherwise this will turn to absolute tribulation in the Hereafter: he will be placed in a distance from God. On the other hand, relative *balā* in this world applies to tribulations and adversities which, while considered hardships, do not affect one's religion; these kinds of *balā* require man to exercise patience.¹⁰⁶

The link between the concept of *balā* and al-Ghazālī's dictum of "the best possible worlds" becomes particularly evident as he begins to elucidate on the wholly positive nature of *balā*, and sheds light on means by which man can benefit from these adversities. This kind of *balā* is, in reality, a blessing:

Thus, patience in this world refers to what is not an absolute tribulation, but to what can also be considered a blessing. This is why it is possible for the functions of patience and thankfulness to be combined in it. For example, wealth may be the cause of man's destruction, he can be a target because of his

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 190.

money; he and his children even be killed. Health too can be considered in the same way. Every worldly blessing ...can also become a tribulation; while every worldly tribulation can also become a blessing. It may be that poverty and illness are what is best for a servant; if his body was healthy, and his wealth manifold, he may behave with pride and insolence. God has said, *were God to expand His provision to all his servants, they would act insolently on earth* (Q.42:27).¹⁰⁷

‘Abd al-Jabbār, the Mu‘tazilite theologian, who has written extensively on the issue of illness and pain inflicted by God, supports the above notion. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, although man may go through a period of suffering and pain as a result of an illness; however, there is larger good hidden in this experience – this illness is, in fact, a *lutf* from God.¹⁰⁸

As already established, the notion of divine wisdom is central to al-Ghazālī’s famous statement and his assertion that this world is the most perfect world. This emphasis makes itself known, once again, as he demonstrates that God creates nothing unless it encompasses a blessing for His creatures.¹⁰⁹ In al-Ghazālī’s view, divine wisdom is evident in His creation of tribulations, for there is hidden blessing in every kind of *balā* that is created by God. It should also be pointed out that a similar view is held by the contemporary Muslim theologian and thinker, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (d. 1960).¹¹⁰ From the Nursian perspective, “Beneath the veil of events like storms, an earthquake, and plague, is the unfolding of numerous hidden immaterial flowers. The seeds of many potentialities which have not developed sprout and grow beautiful because of events which are apparently ugly.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 190-91.

¹⁰⁸ See Margaretha T. Heemskerk, *Suffering in the Mu‘tazilite Theology: ‘Abd Al-Jabbar’s Teachings on Pain and Divine Justice* (London: Brill, 2000), pp. 112-27.

¹⁰⁹ See Zarrinkub, *Farar Az Madrasah - Life and Teachings of Al-Ghazali*, pp. 172-73.

¹¹⁰ For various aspects of Nursi’s teachings, see Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ (ed.), *Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-I Nur* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008).

¹¹¹ Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, ‘Risale-I Nur, the Words: The Eighteenth Word’, <<http://www.erisale.com/index.jsp?locale=en#content.en.201.240>>, accessed May 29, 2013

Moreover, al-Ghazālī reminds his readers that, in addition to being patient, in encountering *balā* in adversities, man should also be thankful to God, for his *balā* could have been much greater with higher level of hardship and suffering. Moreover, for al-Ghazālī, thankfulness during *balā* is the sign of a true monotheist who loves only the One and is content with whatever his situation is. To this end, al-Ghazālī emphasis a particular aspect of patience: the ‘pleasing patience’ *‘ṣabr jamīl’*, where the person who is going through a difficult *balā* is not identifiable from others around him, for as much as he feels the pain in his heart, he upholds his calmness and sustains his usual outwardly behavior.¹¹²

In recapitulating the all-encompassing meaning of *balā* – means by which human potentials are actualized, as emphasized in the Qur’an and discussed previously – we should point out the character building element of the notion of *balā* as highlighted in al-Ghazālī’s teachings. As Zarrinkub points out, from the Ghazālian perspective, the underlying reason for much of man’s wrong doings and transgressions is due to his adoration and attachment to the material world.¹¹³ The preoccupation with worldly affections and desires forms a veil between man and God leading him away from the straight path.¹¹⁴ The remedy for severing the love of the material world, al-Ghazālī asserts, lays in the experience of *balā* in trial and tribulation:

Another way in which misfortunes of this world are roads to the Hereafter is that all sins leading to perdition are to be found in the love of this world, while all of the means of deliverance are to be found in turning the heart away from the abode of vanities. Were blessings to be granted according to desires, without mixing them with tribulation and misfortune, the heart would find itself at home in this world and in its means, until it becomes as a Paradise for it...there are,

¹¹² Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Ṣabr Wa’ L-Shukr’, Patience and Thankfulness, Book Xxxii of Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm Al-Dīn* pp. 44; 194-96.

¹¹³ Zarrinkub, *Farar Az Madrasah - Life and Teachings of Al-Ghazali*, pp. 206-07.

¹¹⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb Al-Ṣabr Wa’ L-Shukr’, Patience and Thankfulness, Book Xxxii of Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm Al-Dīn* p. 55.

therefore, blessings in tribulation in this respect, and one must rejoice in them, even when the pain is, necessarily, there.¹¹⁵

It may be argued that the above passage sheds light on another aspect of al-Ghazālī's teachings: that *balā*, in its perceived negative version, plays an instrumental role in man's spiritual development and his relationship to God. In his later work *Kimyā' al-Sa'āda, The Alchemy of Happiness*, he offers an extensive commentary on human's soul (*nafs*) and the importance of its purification. For al-Ghazālī, *balā* in adversity and illness is, indeed, a blessing and a sign of divine's grace (*lutf*); through the experience of *balā* man is able to sever the excessive desire for worldly attachments, and preoccupy his heart with that which is of vital significance – the divine love.¹¹⁶ As Elkaissy-Friemuth points out, in al-Ghazālī's view, the essence of human soul is divine insofar as it has been created in the image of God; the purpose of its creation in the material world is to provide the platform for the *nafs* to attain the necessary knowledge and experience.¹¹⁷ Consequently, *nafs* is hindered from following its *fitra* due to the many desires of the physical body, detaching from the unnecessary desires is the key to the spiritual development of *nafs*.¹¹⁸

It should also be mentioned that John Hick's "soul-making theodicy", briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, seems to resemble al-Ghazālī's view as it pertains to the process and ways by which human soul reaches its full potentials. From Hick's perspective, there are two stages to man's creation: the first stage was brought forward by an omnipotent creator; the second stage, however, cannot be accomplished by the all-powerful God, but rather, its completion is contingent upon man's cooperation.¹¹⁹ The first stage is when the divine creative power initiated the existence of the physical universe, and in the course of various stages, organic life was brought forward;

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 197.

¹¹⁶ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, *Kimyā' al-Sa'āda, the Alchemy of Happiness* (2; Tehran, IR: Shirkat Intisharat Elmi va Farhangi, 1354), pp. 61-73.

¹¹⁷ Maha Elkaissy-Friemuth, *God and Humans in Islamic Thought, 'Abd Al-Jabbar, Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), p. 136.

¹¹⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *Kimyā' al-Sa'āda, the Alchemy of Happiness* pp. 78-80.

¹¹⁹ Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, p. 255.

ultimately this led to the emergence of man as the creature with various potentials and the ability to experience a personal life. The second stage, Hick informs us, is of a different kind due to the fact that personal life is free and self-directing. Hence, divine command cannot make man perfect, but rather man's perfection is only doable through his own free choices, as he experiences the various conditions of life – good and bad – and willingly actualizes his potentials, *balā* in adversity and prosperity. In criticizing the antitheistic writers such as Hume who question the existence of a loving and powerful God in face of evil in this world, Hick argues:

The question that we have to ask is not, is the architecture of the world the most pleasant and convenient possible? The question that we have to ask is rather, is this the kind of world that God might make as an environment in which moral beings may be fashioned, through their own insights and responses..., to live a personal life of eternal worth? We have to recognize that the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for which the world exists. Rather, this world must be a place of soul-making. And its value is to be judged, not primarily by the quantity of pleasure and pain occurring in it at any particular moment, but by its fitness for its primary purpose, the purpose of soul-making...The good that outshines all ill is not a paradise long since lost but a kingdom which is yet to come in its full glory and permanence.¹²⁰

It is worth pointing out that, while there are certain similarities between al-Ghazālī's "the best of all possible world" statement and Hick's "soul-making" theodicy, nevertheless, there appears to be a distinctive feature in their overall approach which gives each a unique perspective. Al-Ghazālī seems to view the structure of the world, from a divine perspective and through the lens of divine attributes. For him, if man does not have a firm belief that this world is the most excellent world, then he is questioning the divine attributes of goodness and power which, in al-Ghazālī's view, is inconceivable even in face of much evil in the world. Hence, his emphasis is different

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 61 & 257.

than the classical formulation of the problem of evil which casts doubts on God's attributes. As previously discussed, al-Ghazālī's makes a serious effort to demonstrate the perfectness of the world as is to lead the way in attaining a total trust in God.¹²¹ On the other hand, Hick seems to view the structure of the world from a human perspective. In his view, this world is the best and most perfect environment for man to actualize his full potentials and earn the "personal life of eternal worth". For Hick, a world without problems and hardships is a morally static environment which does not provide the necessary condition for man, to freely and willingly find God, and attain goodness as he overcomes the various temptations of his life.¹²²

Likewise, Nursi is of the opinion that, the realization of man's inner-most potentials is doable through various circumstances of life. As Stowasser informs us, in Nursi's view, "Adam's expulsion from paradise, served but as a means to unfold his potentialities; human striving occurs only through the challenges that are posed to the human by the existence of evil spirits and harmful things".¹²³ Furthermore, this notion is also supported by Muslim philosopher, Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938). In discussing the Qur'anic view of the dynamic conception of the universe and the purposefulness of its creation, Iqbal argues that, it is in facing the many challenges and the exercise of faulty of his volition, that man plays a critical role in realizing the divine purpose for the creation of the universe.¹²⁴ As Ward observes, in Iqbal's view, "...the production of finite egos is a production of true creative centers, with their own potentiality and capacity for evil as well as good."¹²⁵

¹²¹ See Volume 4 in the *Iḥyā'*, and Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: Dispute over Al-Ghazali's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, pp. 61-63.

¹²² See Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, pp. 253-364. Douglas Geivett has challenged some aspects of Hick's theodicy; see R. Douglas Geivett, *Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy; Afterword by John Hick* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993).

¹²³ Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 'Theodicy and the Many Meanings of Adam and Eve', in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (ed.), *Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought: The Case of Said Nursi* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 15-16.

¹²⁴ Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Dubai, UAE: Kitab -al-Islamiyyah, 1934), pp. 12; 138-46.

¹²⁵ Keith Ward, *Religion & Creation* (New York: Oxford University press, 1996), p. 65.

From the Muslim perspective, therefore, the notion of *balā* and its manifestation in adversity and hardship is part and parcel of the world which is, indeed, the best possible and most excellent world. It is through facing countless challenges of life – *balā* in good and bad – that humans are able to actualize their potentials and earn the eternal life of happiness and tranquility that is emphasized in the Qur'an.

5.5. Conclusion

The all-inclusive meaning of *balā* in the Qur'an and its positive connotation has been discussed in various parts of this study. Nevertheless, due to the fact that *balā* is traditionally seen as synonymous with suffering, it should also be examined in the context of Muslim theodicy and the attendant concepts of "good" and "evil".

The widespread 'problem of evil', generally referred to as the principal cause of human suffering, is recognized as a primary concern in the history of philosophy of religion – in Judeo-Christian thought as well as Muslim literature. These theological and philosophical discussions seem to be concerned mainly with the 'theoretical' aspects of the problem – logical and evidential – and less with the 'existential / practical' versions. Moreover, this extensive debate, comprised of many elements and versions, seems to include several interrelated problems which contribute to the complexity of the topic. In general, these discussions revolve around the idea that the problem of evil poses a major challenge to the belief that, in face of much human suffering, an omnipotent and loving God exists.

The attempt to provide specific explanations for the existence of evil, i.e. *balā* in its negative version, and to demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between the conviction that God is compassionate, all-knowing and all-powerful, and that the world does contain various forms of human suffering, resulted in the emergence of a number of theodicies. The Christian theodicean thought has been greatly influenced by St. Augustine, who asserted that evil has no positive reality and advocated for the doctrine of *privatio boni* "privation of good". However, in more recent years, John Hick

constructed the theodicy of “soul-making”, and affirmed that the world including its various forms of evil and human suffering, is the most excellent environment for man to become the perfect creature that God intended to create.

The Muslim philosophical (*falsifa*) and theological literature (*kalām*) also reflects a variety of discussions relating to the problem of evil. Although the root of an early formulation of Muslim theodicy goes back to the uncompromising emphasis on God’s power, themes such as divine justice and human free will contributed to the rise of conflicting views. The debate further intensified as the two theological schools, the Mu‘tazilite and the Ash‘arite, sought to establish, based on the teachings of the Qur‘an, the superiority of their thought. The Ash‘arite school of thought, who persisted on God’s omnipotence and rejected human free will, prevailed and became the orthodox school of Sunnite Islam. The Mu‘tazilite, on the other hand, who employed rational deductions in their teachings, influenced the Shiite Islam.

Furthermore, optimism – referred to as the special problem of theodicy – also gained attention in the theological discussions: is this world the best that it can be in face of human suffering, *balā*? In al-Ghazālī’s opinion, not only this world is the most perfect and excellent world, there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is. Having experienced a major negative version of *balā* in his life – physical and mental illness which had a profound impact on his character – al-Ghazālī’s “best of all possible worlds” dictum affirmed that, even with its apparent imperfections, this world is the most excellent creation of a wise and omnipotent God. Al-Ghazālī’s exposition of this experience, fully explained in *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, seems to accord with the overall positive connotation of *balā* emphasized in the Qur‘an. Furthermore, the instrumentality of *balā* and its positive impact on man’s spiritual development, which the Qur‘an seems to import, is clearly manifested in al-Ghazālī’s trial. For it is by going through this experience, of what seemed to be a devastating *balā* – adversity and suffering – that al-Ghazālī transformed to become one of the most influential thinkers of the Muslim world.

Al-Ghazālī's "the best of all possible worlds" statement contains several elements of classical formulation of theodicy; nevertheless, this famous dictum appears in the book of *tawakkul*, Trust in God, of the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*. Therefore, due to the fact that the statement makes itself known in the context of *tawakkul*, al-Ghazālī seems to have been more concerned with man's spiritual development and sought to demonstrate how to attain the highest level of trust in God. Moreover, the notion of *ṣabr*, patience, and *shukr*, thankfulness, the two topics which are closely related to *balā*, are highlighted in the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*. In his elucidation of these concepts, al-Ghazālī expounds upon the benefits of a negative form of *balā*, i.e., adversity, illness, and misfortune, and points out the character building element of *balā*, as well as, *balā* as means by which man is able to detach from the material attachments.

It may be concluded that in al-Ghazālī's vision, *balā*, even in its negative form, is entirely positive; and contrary to misperceptions surrounding it, is beneficial to man's spiritual development. The highlight of al-Ghazālī's teachings imports with the aim of the Qur'an and sheds light on how man's psychological and spiritual state may be developed, if he is to face the inevitable difficulties of life without despair and anxiety, but rather with a positive attitude. As Iqbal points out "the main purpose of the Qur'an is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his manifold relations with God and the universe."¹²⁶ A critical time when this relationship is strengthen is when man is faced with difficult times, misfortune and misery, and yet remains a sincere believer. To use the langue of the Qur'an, those who, when faced with *balā*, patiently persevere and assert: "*We are from Allah and to Him we shall return*". We may conclude, therefore, that the Qur'an does not develop a systematic theodicy, but rather aims to educate, to build character, and to prepare and empower man to overcome occasions of suffering.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 9.

¹²⁷ For a possibility of developing a rational theodicy based on the Qur'an, see Muhammad Al-Ghazali, 'The Problem of Evil from Islamic Perspective', *Dialogue & Alliance* 8/2 (1994), 65-74.

Conclusion

The main objective of this research was to shed light on the all-encompassing meaning of the notion of *balā* (Divine trial), within the context of the Qur'anic teachings, which had thus far been overlooked. By using the method of textual analysis, fifty verses of the Qur'an whereby the concept of *balā* is emphasized were scrutinized exhaustively; the result of which formed a distinctive typology. The foundation of this dissertation, therefore, is grounded in the revelation itself and the framework which the typology of the Qur'anic narratives seems to suggest. According to the findings of this typology, the overall Qur'anic portrayal of the notion of Divine trial – presented mostly by utilizing the two major terms of *balā* and *fitna* – demonstrates that the notion of *balā* is the *raison d'être* of the creation and, as such, is wholly positive and purposeful; and that it is instrumental in man's spiritual development and actualization of his inner-nature potentials. Moreover, the statistical survey of *balā* / *fitna* narratives indicates that Divine trial remained at the core of the Qur'anic teachings during both phases of the revelation, Meccan and Medinan periods, which underscores the importance of this concept and its all-inclusive meaning.

In order to expound upon the multi-dimensional aspects of *balā* emphasized in the Qur'an, the two most important sources of Islamic sciences, namely the *hadith* collections and Muslim exegetical literature were examined thoroughly. The study of the Sunnite *hadith* collections illustrates that there is a limited number of prophetic traditions about *balā*, and even then, the traditions mainly point out the negative aspects of *balā*, its manifestation in adversities and calamities. A more comprehensive discussion of *balā*, however, is found in the teachings of Imam Ali as represented in the book of *Nahjol-Balāgha*. Furthermore, to answer one of the leading research questions, namely to discover whether or not the Qur'anic exegesis engage in an in-depth exposition of *balā*, twelve narratives discussed in the typology were studied in light of six Sunnite and Shiite Qur'anic commentaries of the classical period to contemporary time. The result of this critical analysis demonstrates that the mainstream Qur'anic

exegetical literature, for the most part, fails to engage in an in-depth discussion of *balā*, and therefore, does not contribute to a comprehensive comprehension of this topic. Therefore, the lack of engagement on the part of exegetes and their limited understandings of this highly emphasized Qur'anic theme may have contributed to the misconceptions that currently surrounds this topic, namely that it is equated with suffering, and that it has a negative connotation.

As it was illustrated in the typology of the Qur'anic narratives, a large number of the *balā* / *fitna* narratives, whereby Divine trial is treated in its most comprehensive meaning, pertain to the notion of prophethood. Due to the fact that prophethood is treated in the Islamic scripture as a universal phenomenon, and the fact that the stories of the prophets and their addressee communities occupy a major portion of the Islamic revelation, a specific chapter was dedicated to investigate how *balā* is manifested in the lives of the prophets. The critical analysis of these narratives demonstrates that the prophets experienced many difficult challenges or *balā* in the course of their life which proved to be instrumental in their spiritual development. Additionally, as the ideal prototype and the best role model to be followed, prophets' conduct and behavior during these times provided the inspiration and guidance for their communities. The result of this examination, discussed in full detail in Chapter three, clarifies some of the most misconceptions about *balā* and illustrates that the sole purpose of *balā* is not for God to punish the sinful individuals, and that *balā* is manifested not just in adversity but also in prosperity, as in the case of Solomon and David. Moreover, the scrutiny of Divine trial in the lives of the ten Qur'anic prophets presented in the exegetical literature further confirmed that the majority of the exegetes seem to have missed the constructive and positive aspects of *balā* which the prophets encountered throughout their lives, both prior to becoming a prophet and after they were charged with the prophetic mission. This research also shows that the mainstream Qur'anic exegetes seem to be more concerned with the non-factual details of the prophetic tales, rather than the purposefulness of a particular *balā*. An example of this is seen in their exposition of *balā* of Ibrahim – when God commands him to sacrifice his son – and the

serious attempt made by most of the Qur'anic commentaries to prove the identity of Ibrahim's son – a point which the Qur'an itself is silent on. Therefore, the exegetes' stress on some of the insignificant aspects of the prophetic stories and their challenges resulted in their lack of engagement with the positive and the all-encompassing meaning of *balā*.

Although the mainstream Qur'anic exegetical literature, which elucidates mostly on the exoteric teachings of the Qur'an, seem to lack a thorough and widespread analysis of the notion of *balā*, the mystical literature which is concerned with the esoteric interpretation of the revelation, on the other hand, appears to throw light on its full and multi-dimensional meanings. Muslim mysticism, historically represented by Sufism, is primarily concerned with man's inner nature and the divine element ingrained in its roots. From the perspective of Muslim mystics in general, and Rumi's teachings in particular, the concept of *balā* is viewed in conjunction with key Qur'anic themes such as Adam and the fall, the *alast* covenant, man's viceregal role, and the Divine Trust bestowed on to him. In Rumi's mysticism themes such as self-knowledge and self-purification, which lead to God's awareness, are closely related to *balā*; and all man's challenges and difficulties, as well as times of prosperity and wellbeing, is viewed as the context and means by which man travels in the spiritual journey and gains higher status. Rumi's contribution in expounding upon the significance of the creational tree, and man's position as the fruit of God's creation, further enhances the in-depth meaning of *balā* and its instrumental role in man's spiritual development.

The findings of this research also illustrate that *balā* manifested in adversity and hardship, which may lead to human suffering, from Rumian perspective, is purposeful as it assists man in severing worldly attachments. This understanding is grounded in the fact that most human suffering is due to man's desire for the temporal world and the continues demands of his ego; by going through a hardship in form of a *balā*, man has the opportunity to realize the divine essence of his nature and detach from the material world. Rumi emphasizes that mankind's most important *balā* is that he has been

separated from his divine essence, and that every situation in life, good and bad, is means by which man is able to actualize his potentials and ultimately find his way back to the Divine. From this mystical understanding, therefore, *balā* is a necessary element in man's creation and it provides him with the opportunity to purify his soul in order to become the perfect reflection of God's most beautiful names and His attributes.

As the findings of this research indicate, the positive nature and the all-encompassing meaning of *balā* is highlighted throughout the Qur'an; however, since *balā* is sometimes manifested in adversity and hardship, which in turn may result in human suffering, it was also examined in view of Muslim theodicean thought and the attendant concepts of "good" and "evil". The 'problem of evil', which is at the core of the philosophical and theological discussions within the Judeo-Christian thought as well as Muslim literature, generally is referred to as the main cause for human suffering. While the overall 'problem of evil' includes different versions – comprehensively discussed in the history of philosophy of religion – the main debate revolves around the seeming inconsistency between the existences of evil, and the belief in the existence of God who is all-powerful, all-wise, and omnipotent. The effort to explain, and to reconcile certain theistic belief with the existence of evil and human suffering in the world, therefore, has resulted in the creation of various theodicies.

From the perspective of the Christian theodicean thought, greatly influenced by the teachings of St. Augustine, the question of evil is explained best through the doctrine of *privatio boni* "privation of good", and the notion that evil has no positive reality. More recently, however, John Hick's "soul-making" theodicy, and the assertion that this world, with all of its evil and human suffering, is the best environment for man to become the creature that God planned to create, has attracted the attention of many. Likewise, the 'problem of evil' has been discussed in Muslim philosophy and theology, while its earliest debate emphasized the categorical belief in God's power, the dispute eventually extended to include conflicting views about divine justice, human free will, and reward and punishment. The two theological schools, the Ash'arite and the

Mu‘tazilite, attempted to establish their views in the teachings of the Qur‘an; the Sunnite Islam accepted the views of the Ash‘arite and their assertion on God’s power and the rejection of human free will, while the Shiite Islam was largely influenced by the Mu‘tazilite.

At the core of the Muslim theodicean thought lays the question of optimism: in face of calamities and human suffering – *balā* manifested in its negative version – is this world the most excellent world that it can be? This special problem of theodicy has been addressed by al-Ghazālī, who had experienced the impact of a serious physical and mental illness, and affirmed that not only this world is the best that it can be; there is not in possibility anything more wonderful than what is. Al-Ghazālī’s famous dictum of “the best of all possible worlds”, which was raised by Leibniz in Europe several centuries later, includes several components of theodicy; nonetheless, the statement reveals itself in the book of *tawakkul*, Trust in God, of the *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*. By introducing “the best of all possible worlds” statement in the context of Trust in God, al-Ghazālī appears to engage in an expressive discussion about the practical aspects of *balā*, and to remind his readers that this world, including its imperfections, is in fact the most excellent world, and that by going through the challenges of life, man is able to grow spiritually and attain the highest levels of trust in God. Moreover, al-Ghazālī provides an extensive discussion on two important Qur‘anic terms that are used in conjunction with *balā*, namely *ṣabr*, patience, and *shukr*, thankfulness, to emphasize that *balā* in good and bad, is instrumental in man’s spiritual development.

Al-Ghazālī’s theodicean thought which is highly influenced by his personal experience of a negative *balā* – adversity, physical / mental illness, and suffering – throws light on the all-inclusive meaning and the positive connotation of *balā* which the Qur‘an emphasizes. For it is through this difficult experience, what seemed to be a destructive form of evil, that al-Ghazālī’s potentials are actualized, and he is transformed to become one the most influential thinkers of the Muslim world.

The findings of this research demonstrate that the Qur'anic notion of divine trial, *balā*, is multi-dimensional and wholly positive; it is not equated with suffering as its manifestation becomes known both in adversity and prosperity; that it is not meant to punish the sinful, as all human beings, including the prophets, are tested in good and bad; and that it is instrumental in man's spiritual development as it provides him with the opportunities to 'become' who he 'is'. It is further concluded that the Qur'anic exegetical material do not, for the most part, engage in an in-depth elucidation of *balā*, and that the all-comprehensive nature, and the entirely positive meaning of *balā* emphasized in the Qur'an, is largely discussed in the Muslim mystical literature.

***Balā* Narratives in the Qur'an**

	Sura Verse K/M	Translation	Context / Comments
1	2:49, M	Children of Israel: Remember when We delivered you from the folk of Pharaoh who were visiting you with evil chastisement, slaughtering your sons, and sparing your women; and in that was a grievous <u>trial</u> from your Lord	Example of other nations Linking trial to Allah V1, p 286
2	2:124, M	And when his Lord tested Abraham with certain words, and he fulfilled them. He said 'Behold, I make you a leader for the people.' Said he, 'And of my seed?' He said 'My covenant shall not reach the evildoers'.	Example of Abraham's test The result becoming the Imam V
3	2:155, M	Surely We will try you with something of fear and hunger, and diminution of goods and lives and fruits; yet give thou good tidings unto the patient	Refers to time of warfare for Muslims Tangible items of test V1, p 530
4	2:249, M	And when Salūt went forth with the hosts he said, 'God will try you with a river; whosoever drinks of it is not of me, and whose tasted it not, he is of me,...	Example of other nations Drinking from the River : Test V2, p442
5	3:152, M	...God has been true in His promise towards you...Then He turned you from them, that He might try you; and He has pardoned you..	Battle of Uhud – when some Muslims left the stage to look for war gifts V 4, p 67
6	3:154, M	Then He sent down upon you, after grief, security...Say: 'Even if you had been in your houses, those for whom slaying was appointed would have sallied forth unto their last couches'; and that God might try what was in your breasts, and that He might prove what was in your hearts; God knows the thoughts in the breasts.	Battle of Uhud- V 4, P 75
7	3:186, M	You shall surely be tried in your possessions and your selves, and you shall hear from those who were given the Book before you, and from those who are idolaters, much hurt; but if you are patient and god-fearing – surely that is true constancy	Hardships of Muslims at the time and in general: Afflictions / suffering; also grief from those outside of their faith, Patience is prescribed V3, p 131

8	5:48, M	..For every community We decreed a law and a way of life. Had God willed, He could have made you a single community – but in order to test you in what He revealed to you. So vie with one another in virtue. To God is your homecoming, all of you, and He will then acquaint you with that over which you differed.	The Book / Law are the subject in which communities are tested by. Diversity in Scripture is in Divine Plan and is due to natural differences between people of different times; the aim of all Revelations is for man to grow and actualize his potentials; ultimate goal is for man to be virtuous and strive to grow spiritually V5,p 577
9	5:94, M	O Believers, God will surely put you to the test in some of the game that your hands and lances shall garner, in order that God may know who truly fears Him in the realm of the Unseen. Thereafter, whoso transgresses, a painful torment awaits him.	Killing game is forbidden in the state of Ihram Purpose: for God to know (kala>m aspects) V 4
10	6:165, K	It is He Who made you inheritors of the earth, and elevated some of you above others in degree in order to test you in what He bestowed upon you.	Diverse status of people on earth is part of the Divine plan to test some with others; differences are purposeful and are the mechanism for tests V7, p 546
11	7:141, K	Exactly as in 2:49 (#1)	Example of other nations Linking trial to Allah V1, p 286 & V8, p 302
12	7:163, K Tarif Khalidi	Ask them about a town by the sea, when they broke the Sabbath. Their fish would swim to them from every side on the day of the Sabbath. When they did not keep the Sabbath, the fish would not come to them. This is how We put them to the test because of their iniquity.	Example of other nations Linking trial to Allah V8, p 384
13	8:17, M	You did not slay them; it was God who slew them. It was not you who threw when you threw, but God it was Who threw, in order to bestow upon the believers, from His grace, a fine achievement. God is All-Hearing...; Yusuf Ali: "in order that He might test the believers by a gracious trial"	Refers to the battle Badr; how Muslims won with God's help even though they had much less arm forces V9, p 48

14	11:7, K	He is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was upon the waters, so as to test you: who among you is the best in works...; Yusuf Ali: That He might try you, which of you is best in conduct,....	Key verse: pointing to the fact that (1) Test / Trials are part of Creation; (2)_Creation as we see around us is not a sport; our life is our opportunity to develop our potentials ;(3) Is the test the goal of creation or what comes as the result of the test? (4) Mutazila's thought on how God's acts are based on purposes, (5) No one is exempt from this Divine Plan V 10, p225
15	14:6, K	Same context as in 2:49 & 7:141 (# 1 & 5)	Example of other nations Linking trial to Allah V 12, p 28
16	16:92, K	And do not be like the woman who unravels her weaving, once made fast, into shreds. You consider the oaths you swear among yourselves as trickery, whenever one party is more numerous than another. But God will assuredly put you to the test because of this, and on the Day of Resurrection He will make fully clear to you what you once disputed about.	Oaths are the means of tests
17	18:7, K	We fashioned what lies upon the earth as an ornament for it, to <u>test them</u> as to who shall be the best in works. And We shall turn all that lies upon it into a desolate plain.	Key verse: (1)Everything on this earth is a test; wealth, position, glory, (all that we strive for), they test a man's true quality: some who become their slave, some who use them but don't fall into despair if don't get them,(2) our potentials actualize based on how we choose to live (3) No one is exempt;V 13, p 232

18	21:35, K Yusuf Ali	Every soul shall have a taste of death: and We <u>test</u> you by evil and by good by way of trial. To Us you must ye return.	Key verse: Use of both terms bala / fitna Evil & Good: Adversity & Prosperity V 14, P 406
19	33:11, M	It was there that the believers were tested, and convulsed a mighty convulsion	Battle? V 16, p 428
20	37:106, K	That was indeed a conspicuous ordeal; Yusuf A.: For this was obviously a trial	Example of Prophet's test Ibrahim's test to sacrifice his son; the end result was the goal not the actual sacrifice; trial was just a test; reward for those who do right (v110) V17, p232
21	44:33, K	And We brought them wonders, in which was a clear ordeal; Yusuf A.: And granted them Signs in which there was a manifest trial	Example of other nations - Linking trial to Allah; People of Israel (how God free them from Pharaoh, God chose them above nations; but all was a test) V18, p215
22	47:4, M	..Yet, had God willed, He could Himself have vanquished them, but it was so in order that He might test some of you through others...	Refers to time of battle; unbelievers and believers are being tested V18, p341
23	47:31, M	We shall put you to the test , to know who are truly exerting themselves for God and are standing firm, and We shall put to the test your secret thoughts	Refers to time of battle, i.e., How Muslims should engage in killing the enemy, V18, p 365
24	76:2-3, M	We created man from a sperm drop of fluids commingled, that We may test him; and formed him to hear and see; We guided him upon the way, be he grateful or ungrateful.	Key verse: Man is being reminded of how he was created and then given certain faculties and was guided; the test. V 20, p 194

25	89:15, K	And as for man, if his Lord <u>tries</u> him, honours him, and prospers him, he will say: 'My Lord has honoured me'	God tries us both by prosperity and adversity; instead of showing humility and kindness man puffs up as he sees permanency in this status; in adversity instead of patience man gets depressed; V17-20 says how we fail the test by not caring for orphans or the poor. Points: (1) Repeating the word bala in two verses indicates that both His giving and restricting is His test (similar to 21:35 tests in good & evil) (2) gifts from God is an honor but when man does not use it on the right path it becomes the reason for his punishment (3) wealth or lack of it is not a sign of being closer to God, rather good conduct is V20, p472
26	89:16, K	But if He tries him, and constricts his livelihood, he will say: 'My Lord has demeaned me'; Yusuf Ali: 'But when He tried him, restricting his subsistence for him, then said he (in despair), 'My Lord hath humiliated me!'	
27	67:2, K	He Who created death and life to test you as to which of you is most righteous in deed; He is Almighty, All-Forgiving	Key verse: (1) death is before life and it is created – death is not a negative state (2) when Life as we know is ceased existence continues in a another state (3) Test is the mean where man can grow and built his life to go into eternity; this verse relates to the other key verses about creation V19, p 585

28	68:17, M	We are testing them, as We once tested the owners of the garden	Meccans who called the Prophet a mad man were tested comparing them to the owners of the garden at a different time in history! V 19, p 625
29	86:9, K	The Day when the secrets of hearts are put on trial.	Day of judgment is when the Truth of the hearts comes to surface. Are not all the tests for this reason? What is hidden will be evident on that day! See 2:284 V 20, P 432

K= Revealed in Mecca (15 verses)

M= Revealed in Medina (14 verses)

***Fitna* Narratives in the Qur'an**

	Sura Verse K/M	Translation	Context / Comments
1	5:41, M	O Messenger! Let not those grieve thee, who race each other into Unbelief: (Whether it be) among those who say "We believe with their lips but whose hearts have no faith; or it be among the Jews- Men who will listen to any lie....If anyone's trial is intended by Allah, thou hast no authority in that least for him against Allah.	What is the meaning of Fitna here? V 5, P 555
2	6:53, K	Thus did We try some of them by comparison with others that they should say; "Is it these then that Allah hath favoured from amongst us?" Doth not Allah know best those who are grateful?	The influential / wealthy people felt they are better than those who Allah had selected to Send his teachings to! V7, P 147
3	7:155, K	And Moses chose seventy of his people for Our place of meeting: when they were seized with violent quaking, he prayed: "O My Lord! If it had been Thy Will thou couldst have destroyed, long before, both them and me: Wouldst Thou destroy us for the deeds of the foolish ones among us? This is no more than Thy trial: by it Thou causes whom Thou wilt to stray, and Thou leadest whom though will into the right path..	Other nations / Moses V 8, P 354
4	8:28, M	And know ye that your possessions and your progeny are but a trial, and that it is Allah with whom lies your highest reward.	Some people in Medina shared Prophet's decisions with the Meccans to save their wealth/ kids left in Mecca V 9, P 70
5	9:126, M	See they not that they are tried every year once or twice? Yet turn not in repentance, and they take no heed.	The purpose of trial is for people to repent and come back. The means of trial not mentioned V9, P 555
6	17:60, K	Behold! We told thee that thy Lord doth encompass mankind round about: We granted the Vision which We showed thee but as a trial for me- as also the Cursed Tree (mentioned) in the Qur'an: We put terror (and warning)	Some commentators take this as referring to the Miraj, others to other spiritual visions.

		into them, but it only increases their inordinate transgression!	Prophet's vision / Tree; Hypocrites? V13, P 188
7	20:40, K	Behold! Thy sister went forth and said, "Shall I show you one who will nurse and rear the (child)? So we brought thee back to thy mother...then thou didst slay a man, but We saved thee from trouble, and We tried thee in various ways...	Other prophet :Life of Moses / many trials V14, P 210
8	21:35, K	Every soul shall have a taste of death: and We <u>test</u> you by evil and by good by way of <u>trial</u> . To Us you must ye return.	Key verse: Use of both terms bala / fitna Evil & Good: Adversity & Prosperity V 14, P 406
9	21:111, K	"I know not but that it may be a trial for you and a grant of (worldly) livelihood (to you) for a time.	It may be that the enjoyment of this world's goods is but a trial. V 14, P 469
10	22:11, M	There are among men some who worship Allah, as it were, on the verge: if good befalls them, they are, therewith, well content; but if a trial comes to them, they turn on their faces: they lose both this world and the Hereafter: that is loss for all to see!	Firm mind in faith is the key in passing the tests in life V 14, P 494
11	22:53, M	That He may make the suggestions thrown in by Satan, but a trial for those in whose hearts is a disease and who are hardened of heart: verily the wrongdoers are in a schism far (from the Truth)	22:52 Satan's suggestions in revelation V 14, P 555
12	25:20, K	And the messengers whom We sent before thee were all (Men) who ate food and walked through the streets. We have made some of you as a trial for others: will ye have patience? For Allah is One Who sees (all things).	Prophet is rejected due to being an ordinary man; in Allah's plan people serve as a test for each other (rich for the poor and vice versa) V 15, P268
13	29:2, K	Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, "we believe", and that they will not be tested?	Profession of Faith is not enough- it must be tested during life's circumstances. This is in Allah's Plan as everyone goes through the tests. Pay attention to Allah will know V 16, P 147
14	29:3, K	We did test those before them, and Allah will certainly know those who are true from those who are false.	

15	39:49, K	Now, when trouble touches man he cries to Us: but when We bestow a favour upon him as from Ourselves, he says, "This has been given to me because of a certain knowledge (I have)! Nay, but this is but a trial, but most of them understand not!	Prosperity is a test as much as adversity See 30:33, 39:8, 28:78 V 17, P 501
16	44:17, K	We did, before them, try the people of Pharaoh: There came to them a messenger most honourable.	The test of Egyptians / Moses V 18, P 210
17	54:27, K	For We will send the she-camel by way of trial for them. So watch them, (O Salih), and possess thyself in patience!	Other nations / prophet: Salih V 19, P 131
18	60:5, M	"Our Lord! Make us not a (test and) trial for the Unbelievers, but forgive us, our Lord! For Thou are the Exalted in Might, the Wise."	V 19, P 398
19	64:15, M	Your riches and your children may be but a trial: but in the Presence of Allah is the highest Reward.	Children / wealth: how we perceive them in life, our affections for them, etc V 19, P 517
20	72:17, K	Verse 16: (And Allah's message is): "if they (the Pagans) had only remained on the (right) Way, We should certainly have bestowed on them Rain in abundance – 17: "that We might try them by that (means). But if any turns away from the remembrance of his Lord, He will cause him to undergo a severe Penalty.	Rain as a mean for test: in prosperity V 20, P 71
21	74:31, K	And We have set none but angels as guardians of the Fire; and We have fixed their number only as a trial for Unbelievers- in order that the People of the Book may arrive at certainty, and Believers may increase in Faith..	Number 19 (angels guarding hell) V20, P

K= Revealed in Mecca (14 verses)

M= Revealed in Medina (7 verses)

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