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A STUDY OF THE DOCTRINES OF FREEDOM
AND IMMORTALITY IN THE WORKS OF
IAN THOMAS RAMSEY AND
AUSTIN MARSDEN FARRER

By
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A Thesis
Submitted
in Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

Durham University,
1979

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The thesis examines the doctrines of freedom and immortality as they are found in the works of Ian Thomas Ramsey and Austin Marsden Farrer. Chapters I and IV provide the background to the work of Dr. Ramsey and Dr. Farrer respectively. The background is examined in both its historical and philosophical perspectives in order not only to trace the influences behind the works of these two scholars but also to set their work in the wider intellectual scene. Chapters II and III trace the development of the writings of I.T. Ramsey on these subjects up to the delivery of his Forwood lectures on Freedom and Immortality in 1957, while chapter III examines his work from 1957 until his death in 1972. Chapters V and VI repeat the process for the works of A.M. Farrer, chapter V examining his work up to the delivery of his Gifford Lectures on the Freedom of the Will in 1957, while chapter VI examines his work from 1957 until his death in 1968. Thus, not only are we enabled to see the contribution of each of these scholars in relation to each other and to the wider contemporary intellectual scene but we are enabled also to trace the development of their thoughts on these subjects with regard to their own intellectual development.

The thesis traces their reactions to the restatement in the mid-years of this century of the two hundred year old challenge of David Hume to theology and metaphysics. Such an examination of different approaches of Christian apologetic to a common problem may therefore suggest a way forward for a renewed apologetic in the face of a radically secularised society, which takes account of both the methods and results of scientific enquiry but which nevertheless does not compromise the fundamental tenets of the Christian faith and which provides a significant place for theology and metaphysics in the intellectual schema.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all those who have helped in the writing of this thesis, my family and friends for their support and encouragement, the Methodist Church and in particular the staff of Wesley House, Cambridge for enabling me to carry out this project, and especially my supervisor, Dr. A. L. Loades of the Department of Theology, University of Durham for all that she has done.
The full references to which the abbreviations used in the text of the thesis refer are to be found either, in the cases of abbreviations used widely throughout the work, in the list of abbreviations at the front of the thesis or, in the case of those references which are more localised, in the notes to chapters at the end of the thesis where they are listed according to chapter and page. Subsequent references to these works are listed by reference to the page on which they first occur. For example, *Part of My Life*, A.J. Ayer, Collins 1977, is first cited on page 7 of the thesis and the full reference to the work is to be found on the corresponding page in the notes to chapters, i.e. Chapter I page 7. Subsequent references then follow under chapter and page as, *Part of My Life* see above p. 7. Individual secondary works are cited in the text itself and a full bibliography of the works of both I.T. Ramsey and A.M. Farrer is included at the end of the thesis along with a select bibliography of secondary works. Thus the flow of the text remains as uninterrupted as possible. The bibliography of the published works of I.T. Ramsey is published separately and is enclosed at the end of the thesis.
The following abbreviations are used throughout this work. Other abbreviations, less frequently used, are to be found in the notes to chapters at the back of the book:


Relig. and Sci.  Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis (first given in 1960 as the fourth in the series of Annual Theological Lectures arranged by the Church of Ireland in the Queen's University, Belfast) I.T. Ramsey, SPCK: London 1964.


FS  Faith and Speculation (containing the Deems Lectures 1964),

RF  Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, A.M.Farrer, edited
    by C.C.Conti, SPCK;London 1972

Hebblethwaite "Austin Farrer's Concept of Divine Providence", B.Hebblethwaite,

PDHA "Providence and Divine Action", B.Hebblethwaite, Religious Studies,

Curtis "The Rational Theology of Dr.Farrer", P.Curtis, Theology,vol.LXXIII,
    no.600,June 1970,pp.249-56.

Henderson Introductory notes on Austin Farrer's The Prior Actuality of God,
    E.H.Henderson, Philosophy Dept.,Louisiana State Univ.,Baton Rouge,
    Louisiana. (duplicated sheets).

JTS.  Journal of Theological Studies

CQR.  Church Quarterly Review

Theol.  Theology

Phil.Qtly.  Philosophical Quarterly

Mod.Chman.  Modern Churchman

Relig.Stud.  Religious Studies

Complete bibliographies of the works of I.T.Ramsey and A.M.Farrer
   can be found in:

   A Bibliography of the Published Works: Ian Thomas Ramsey, J.H.Pye,

   Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, A.M.Farrer,
CHAPTER I
Ian Thomas Ramsey, as the Nolloth Professor of the Christian Religion at Oxford and Fellow of Oriel College, was invited in 1957 to give the Forwood Lectures in the University of Liverpool. The subject on which he chose to lecture was 'Freedom and Immortality. In order to appreciate the lectures, one needs to pay attention, however briefly, to the problems facing the Church of England in the 1950's, not least amongst which was the loss of the influence which it had held in the Victorian era and even up to the end of the Second World War. As David Edwards remarks, "On the whole the nation insofar as it thought about the Church at all, probably assumed that most of the Church's problems could not be solved." (Edwards p.1).

The problems which it faced included not only the loss of the 'working classes', disillusioned by years of war and the contemporary social and economic conditions and motivated by the rise of the Marxist dialectic (cf. The Reith Lectures 1979, Christianity and the World Order, E.R. Norman, Collins 1979), but also the 'alienation' of the scientifically minded intellectuals. It had to be recognised that England was fast becoming what has been called "a secularised democracy which relied on a science based technology".

Professor Dorothy Emmet has remarked of Ian Ramsey that "under his imperturbable demeanour he had a feeling of desperation about the need to rethink the problem of religious truth in a world where our scientific understanding of man and indeed the understanding of science and philosophy themselves were changing in ways of which most people in the Churches were unaware." (Edwards p.6).

Ramsey throughout his career was, however, to urge that a new renaissance and a new reformation were not only desirable but even at the door and he would speak of a world in which science and humanity would be combined and stand hand in hand. Indeed his last words in the House of Lords (on 22nd March 1972) were about "this search for a new culture and this pilgrimage towards a better humanity."

It was stated above that the point of drawing attention to certain features of Ramsey's career was to enable us to appreciate the Forwood Lectures, Freedom and Immortality, but the question is, why these two admittedly "not obviously similar themes" were chosen as the subject matter and why they were approached in quite the way that they were. Probably the best starting point would be the introduction to the book itself where Ramsey suggests that the title might "stir memories of Immanuel Kant for whom immortality, freedom and the existence of God, were (as he called them) postulates of practical reason." (F&I p.11).
Though he purports to say little more about Kant, perhaps taking this as a cue from Kant himself, he asks Kant's questions of 'What can I know, what ought I to do and what may I hope?', questions which had a pervading influence not only in this book but throughout the life of this remarkable man as well. What he hoped to show was that the two topics of "freedom" and "immortality" were, in fact, properly united because each made a similar claim or sort of claim; because each appealed to a similar kind of situation, a situation which for Ramsey was not restricted to the "observable" factors of sense experience.

Ramsey's initial indication of what he understands by "freedom" reads as follows:

"We make a free decision when we are not just this or that behaviour pattern but when we are 'men', when each of us is distinctively 'I'. At such moments of decision, when all of us characteristically use of ourselves the word 'I' this word covers more than all language about objects or all scientific language talks about. The wink on the promenade at New Brighton differs significantly from the fall of the lid to clean the eye though this in part it is." (F&I p.26).

He continues to say that a free decision

"is not just a reaction to stimuli but involves all that and something more besides, something which makes it all the more appropriate to speak of it as a response to a challenge, a challenge which is the challenge of objects and more." (F&I p.51).

Likewise concerning immortality he remarks that "We are immortal insofar as we know a situation which transcends space and time." (F&I p.89).

Ramsey's own belief in posthumous immortality arose out of his religious experience which was strongly theistic, as he himself noted; it was through Christian worship that the disclosure came most powerfully and it was this which led him to declare, "To the all powerfulness of God, as to the obligation of Duty we respond freely - our response has our personal backing. In both cases we are never more ourselves than we are then." (F&I p.59).

He relates the two subjects of "freedom" and "immortality" together in his comment that

"just as with every conviction of freedom there goes an awareness of some obligation, just as freedom is a response to obligation, so with our convictions about our own immortality, there goes an awareness of something Other which - like ourselves - is not restricted to the spatio-temporal." (F&I p.99).

The merits and demerits, the advantages and disadvantages of such a point
of view will be discussed later. Let us rather, for the moment, content ourselves with drawing together some kind of picture of the philosophical climate in which Ian Ramsey was working and to which he was addressing his ideas and to picture some of the figures who influenced and shaped his particular modus operandi. Whether or not we may agree with Ramsey that on his criteria "everyone, Christian or not, can reasonably believe in immortality." (F&I p.143) he, at least, can mutter with Spinoza "We discern and discover that we are eternal." (F&I p.83).

John MacQuarrie (God Talk, 1967) connects Ramsey's position with that of John Locke who allowed the experience of inner sense to stand alongside the data of the senses of sight, hearing, touch, while David Edwards remarks, "... not for nothing did Ramsey introduce Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity in a new edition in 1958." (Edwards p.48). Here we see Ramsey's relation to the Empiricist tradition, in his connection with Locke, and his relation to the Idealist tradition in his connection with Kant.

The invocation to Kant in the introduction, however, who looked to moral experience to remedy the deficiencies of strictly scientific knowledge based on sense experience gives a firm indication at the start of the book of the procedure which is to be followed. He is further led to reflect that "perhaps indeed Kant has an importance and a relevance for us for which he is not always given credit. While Kant may have been inadequate when he argued in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, that all Christian Doctrine had to be understood in relation to our experience of Duty, yet I think that Kant was abundantly right insofar as he suggested that even Christian doctrines only receive an adequate logical placing when they are given in relation to situations which, in some very important respects, is similar to that in which we discern duty. It is with situations of this kind that I have been specially concerned throughout the book." (F&I p.147).

One wonders, however, whether Ramsey's comments on Kant are not a little naive. There is a tendency in Ramsey to use the work of writers and thinkers like Kant as source material providing grist for his own particular mill rather than letting them stand in their own right.

It is in relation to Duty, and especially conscience as the discernment of obligation, that we may discern the influence of a former bishop of Durham, Joseph Butler (1692 - 1752) as also with the notions of probability, commitment and discernment. Butler maintained that an estimate of "probability" remains far from certain, but, "in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal oblig-
estion" he illustrated this point with the example of the obligation which a man feels to jump into a river to save a drowning child though there may be no certainty of either rescue or survival. In such cases, said Butler, probability is the guide of life. (Intro. to Analogy, ed. Bernard, loc. cit. p. 2). The other theme which appears in Butler's writings which Ian Ramsey also developed concerns what he calls the "human condition". "When we think, we know ourselves to be more than gross bodies, and we can be led by reasonable reflection to consider this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged as having a reference of some sort or another to a much larger plan of things." (Butler). That is to say that a moral commitment to an action is based upon the discernment that a person - e.g. a drowning child - is ultimately more than the details of our bodily behaviour - more truly personal, and eternally more significant in the universe and it is only when this fact breaks in upon us that we can be considered as being truly free and making a free and responsible decision. (cf. Dr. Williams Libr. lect. 23). In this way, then, God was to be approached through a moral commitment to a situation. Ramsey, says Edwards "had a sense of the divine glory which went beyond the stern imperative of duty." (Edwards p. 9). Ian Ramsey, it is true to say, believed that the usual approach to freedom was very much mistaken in that it was seen as a conflict between Determinism on the one hand and Indeterminism on the other. The Determinists would say that we only have an impression of freedom because we can never be certain that all the factors relevant to some particular case have been noted. The Libertarians (i.e. the Indeterminists), however, would say that as there are many matters unknown to us, we can never show conclusively that any event is inevitable. H. D. Lewis is not convinced though, that "the traditional debate between determinists and indeterminists has in fact spun as much on this particular merry-go-round as Professor Ramsey supposes." (Lewis, R.). The point is, however, that in, for example, the parable of the good Samaritan (F&M p. 30-1), whatever its faults, where "man meets man" and "the situation takes on depth" (i.e. because it becomes observables and more), the Samaritan is "moved inwardly" - there is a response to a moral obligation "which cannot be netted in the language of observables", we can discern the background influence of Butler and of Kant alongside the modern Existentialists.

Another profound influence on Ian Ramsey was the Irish bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley (1685-1753). Berkeley, as summarised by Ramsey said, "We see God as we see persons. Hair, face, skin, all these are visible, but to 'see' a person is to see these and more besides." Already the parallels between the ideas of Ian Ramsey and those of George Berkeley become app-
arent, but he continues:

"Likewise God. We look on the universe, from galaxies to mesons, from blood sugar to insulin, from points to entropy, from acetic acid to Vitamin B, from Hydrogen to whatever element at the moment closes the periodic table, and by them all we see God as we see a person, through his hair and face and skin - a person who is all these and more. The world as Berkeley taught us to look upon it is divine, visual language, and all we need to add some two hundred years later is that what the scientist does and what the theologian does, each in his own way is to discover the logical patterns of the divine, visual language as best he can."

(Relig. and Sci. p. 86-7).

It is with almost surprising confidence that Ian Ramsey placed himself so squarely in the traditions of bishops Butler and Berkeley because, certainly in Ramsey's lifetime, it was more usual to regard man as a mere animal thrown up by the processes of evolution and his freedom was more usually seen as a futile defiance of a restricting social code and of a hostile, or at least indifferent environment. Perhaps a common assumption was to think of the universe not as the language of God but rather as tending to greater and greater disorder.

Ian Ramsey certainly preferred to give an unemotional expression to his faith, perhaps as befitted the mathematician turned philosopher, but this may be the reason why during his lifetime he did not usually succeed in convincing the sceptics.

It is unfair and in many ways false to try to divide those who influenced the writing of Freedom and Immortality into two camps labelled "historical" and "contemporary", so for this reason, after this more general historical introduction the references which follow will be more closely integrated, though perhaps as we move on into the next stage of the discussion we may use some words of David Hume as a link.

In 1748 David Hume had written:

"When we run over libraries... What havoc must we make? If we take in one hand any volume - of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance - let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." (Enquiry, sec. 12, pt. 3, ed. P. D. Nidditch.)

Two hundred years later, this challenge was at its height. The emphasis on mathematics and the experimental reasoning of science was to result in a contemptuous dismissal of both theology and metaphysics in the light of the ascent of the more 'scientific' approach offered by contemporary empiricism.

Professor C. H. Dodd recalls how Ramsey considered that the challenge that religious propositions were nonsense should be taken up. His hope was that, by working himself in the new philosophy, he would be able to construct a new
apologetic for Christianity, taking account of all that they were saying, employing their methods but showing their propositions up as arbitrary - a notable example of a man setting himself to prepare the role he was to fulfil."

(The context of this is a conversation in 1938 when Ian Ramsey told C.H. Dodd how he wanted a spell in Oxford "because the new kind of antimeta-physical philosophy flourished there.")

It is significant how he concludes his Freedom and Immortality with "a protest against two popular misconceptions: that those with an intense affection for ordinary language must necessarily deny metaphysics, or that those who wish to defend metaphysics must necessarily trade in occult and shadowy worlds. Which means that this book has been fighting on two battlefronts; and it is a sobering reflection that not many wars have been won under such a necessity." (F&I p.152).

It seems to be the opinion of the vast majority of philosophers who are acquainted with his work that in fact Ramsey did not win, he failed ultimately, in his task of restating metaphysics and theology in an age of empiricism. It was not however that he dismissed empiricism outright. He accepted that there was much validity in David Hume's challenge, as there was in the challenge of his twentieth century successors, for example A.J. Ayer or Anthony Flew. (cf. A.Flew, God and Philosophy, Hutchinson, 1966) He accepted the force of C.D. Broad's inaugural lecture at Cambridge in 1934 (C.D. Broad, Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism, CUP 1934, pp. 27-34) against the attempt to base the freedom of the will on the idea of a timeless self acting and, with the other empiricists, he questioned whether such an idea was "even intelligible, let alone true or false." (F&I p.20). It was necessary to show, however, just where and how empiricism was inadequate and just where and how metaphysics was more than just "sophistry and illusion", more than just mere nonsense. He firmly believed that both Kant, for example, and Spinoza before him, had been talking something more than sophistry and illusion; and had tried, therefore, to argue that metaphysics had in fact got a future.

It will perhaps be of use to recall at this point some words of Lady Helen Oppenheimer on the philosophical climate in the early 1950's. She writes:

"The philosophical world of Oxford in the early 1950's was a strenuous and exciting world, a curious mixture of the liberating and the circumscribing. One seemed to be let out of a large but stuffy room onto a fresh and enticing but narrow path which one could explore with delight, so long as one did not stray into metaphysics. The door had been opened by Wittgenstein, but at that stage this was still something of a secret door. The blue and brown books, the lecture notes which had been the key, were still circulating, half under cover, in typescript. A more accessible way out had been opened in 1949 in the shape
of Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. Now one was set free into an outdoor world. People were whole things, not mysterious combinations of body and mind. Worries about the reality of the material world or whether anybody else existed could be put behind one, but at the cost of discovery that there were some ideas which could never be formulated, some things which there was no point in trying to say. Most of one's fellows seemed to pay this price gladly, and philosophers seemed to be characteristically watchdogs rather than explorers." (Edwards, p. 52).

It was to this rather negative stance which condemned all metaphysics and theology as nonsense that Ramsey was to address himself in works which included in their number the Forwood Lectures. The state of things suggested by Lady Helen Oppenheimer is borne out by A.J. Ayer, who studied in fact under Gilbert Ryle, who agreed that "the dominant tone of Oxford philosophy at the time was surly and unadventurous" (Part of my Life, p. 23) though it was to change somewhat with H.H. Price and R.G. Collingwood. Of the three professors of philosophy in Oxford at that time, J.A. Smith, Harold Joachim and H.A. Pritchard, Ayer suggests that of the three, H.A. Pritchard was the most gifted but "narrow and dogmatic" and "disapproved strongly of the new tendencies in philosophy which had been inaugurated at Cambridge by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore."

In the Oxford of the 1900's the Hegelian synthesis of science, philosophy and religion had prevailed. Wallace of Merton, for example, could commend Hegel's insistence that religion and philosophy coincide: in fact he sees philosophy itself as a divine service, indeed a religion. The reaction of philosophers in the early years of the twentieth century came as a reaction principally against a lack of clarity in the phraseology which was bandied about. This reaction is associated most distinctively in this country with the names of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. Their common aim was one of clarification. It was Moore who first ruthlessly pressed the question, "What do you mean by so-and-so...?" while Russell tried more systematically to outline a meaningful language.

Although neither Russell nor Moore explicitly attacked theological statements it is plain that theology, just like metaphysics, was being boldly challenged to prove that it was meaningful and it is in the light of this post-Russell-Moore philosophical system, principally, that Freedom and Immortality came to birth. Since he had begun teaching in Cambridge, Ramsey had accepted the challenge of the great modern Cambridge figures and especially of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein (to whom we shall shortly turn) to think more clearly. He saw in Russell the attempt to demonstrate that the task of philosophy is that of analysing language so as to lay bare the truth about the way things are, and in Moore a concern to keep
philosophers from "soaring to lofty metaphysical heights by means of the abuse of language" (Gill p.18). He insisted on making sure that philosophical terminology had a firm grounding in common sense, so, as Ramsey himself says, it was G.E. Moore who "challenged the metaphysical ventures in Hegelianism with the question, 'What does it mean?' " (Contemp Emp. - Xian Sch., p.4-5) and Bertrand Russell who "gave a much more systematic account of meaningful and reliable language." (ibid., p.4-5). Indeed he says that "of all the features of recent empiricism undoubtedly the most constant and important has been a primary interest in meaning, in meaning rather than the truth as such." (ibid., p.3). This is interestingly shown in the way in which Ramsey is concerned to show the logical and experimental relationship which exists between disclosures and talk about moral duty on the one hand and disclosures and talk of God on the other. His purpose is to display the fact that decisive and moral experiences may have a religious significance, an argument which he develops in the context of the contemporary debate between Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer over the relation of talk about God to talk about notions of Absolute Duty. (This debate is contained in letters written by Lord Russell and Professor Ayer in The Observer, on 13th and 20th Oct., 1957). The controversy centered around the claim that the existence of 'Absolute values' does not at all necessitate belief in God and has in fact no bearing on such a belief. Such a notion led Lord Russell to remark that "I cannot believe that a dislike of wanton cruelty is merely a matter of taste like a dislike of oysters." Nevertheless he agreed with Professor Ayer in thinking that the question whether ethical values are absolute had no bearing whatever on the question of the existence of God, that is to say, he denied any relation between the humanistic and the theistic points of view.

Ayer, however, wished to go further and to urge that the humanist's interpretation excludes that of the theist and to maintain, therefore, that it is inconsistent to hold both that ethical values are absolute and yet that they are validated by authority. Ian Ramsey suggests that "For Russell, stories of wanton cruelty evoke a situation transcending but including observables to whose challenge he responds by resisting cruelty or working for the destruction of whatever, or whoever, is cruel." (F&I, p.44). This response is unlike his response to oysters which is merely a response to the spatio-temporal (i.e. taste, smell, feel etc.) but is rather a response to a moral challenge to which he then makes an appropriate moral response.
"It is in relation to situations such as these, which include, but are not limited to, observable features, that the phrase 'absolute values' finds its justification and empirical anchorage. It is in such a situation that the phrase 'absolute values' is pegged down." (F&I p. 45).

In his reply to H.D. Lewis' criticism of Freedom and Immortality (Lewis R.) Ian Ramsey wrote in the Hibbert Journal (FRFI) that the purpose of the lectures was to make clear what he believed to be the empirical anchorage of discourse about free will and to say just what sort of situations justify talk about free will, to talk about the freedom which belongs to responsible moral decision and so on.

"Wittgenstein's point of view (at any rate at one stage of his development) was that a significant and unambiguous language would confine itself to the empirical propositions of sense experience. Its exact formulation would yield no cut-and-dried system but was rather a matter for experiment and testing and towards this end the so-called 'Verification Principle' might be a useful guide." (CCp p. 256).

A.J. Ayer (Part of my Life p. 115) points out that though the English translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, for which Russell, having suggested its title, wrote the introduction, had been published in 1922 and he himself had been working in Cambridge since 1929 his ideas had hardly penetrated to Oxford well into the 1930's. The Tractatus maintained that significant propositions fell into two classes: either they were tautologies, like the propositions of logic and pure mathematics, or they were empirically verifiable. Everything else, including metaphysics and theology, was literally nonsensical, which ties in very well with Hume's invitation to commit to the flames any volume of divinity or school metaphysics if it didn't contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number or any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact or existence, on the basis that it could contain nothing but "sophistry and illusion". It is interesting to note that Ayer remarks that in the 1930's one approached the theory of knowledge from a starting point of sense data which he suggests was, "unorthodox by Oxford standards, but not by those of Cambridge". He suggests, too, that by the mid-thirties Wittgenstein had already

"moved away from the position which he held in the Tractatus, but his current views were imparted only to the narrow circle of his Cambridge pupils. He was at pains to keep any report of them out of general circulation from a morbid fear of their being misrepresented or plagiarized. It was not until the late 1930's that one or two copies of notes taken from his lectures, the celebrated Blue and Brown books, somehow managed to find their way to Oxford." (Part of my Life p. 120).
Wittgenstein was, at this time, in Trinity College, with Richard Braithwaite, to whom we shall refer later, next door at King’s with G.E. Moore and Maynard Keynes, the economist.

Wittgenstein saw the function and purpose of philosophy as the analysis of language. We would understand and communicate our own experiences and the experiences of others better if we paid more attention to the ways in which we talk about such experiences. "The uses and functions of language are the beginning points for understanding - conceived of as 'the given' or 'forms of life'." (Wittgenstein - Phil. Investig. p. 226). He conceived of the philosopher's problems in terms of what he called psychological "disease" or "mental cramps" and recognised two primary mistakes in the contemporary philosophy of language. One is that "one narrows one's thinking with only one kind of example" (ibid. para. 593). The second is the insistence that all sentences of the same form (e.g., the car is red, the man is good) must have the same logic. This is as naive as to insist that all currency of the same denomination has the same international value, hence the famous Wittgensteinian maxim - "Don't look for meaning, look for use". So also Wittgenstein's insistence that words are like chess pieces in that each is defined in terms of its function and thus the question, "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?" (ibid. para. 108). That is to say, one explains how a particular word functions, just as one explains how a particular chess piece functions, by explaining the ways in which it may or may not be moved. "Essence", then, "is expressed by grammar" (ibid. para. 371), and meaning is determined by the rules of the various language "games". "In many ways", writes Jerry Gill, "the views of Ian Ramsey, the late bishop of Durham, are based on the insights of Wittgenstein. In other words, bishop Ramsey makes use of Wittgenstein's method by way of meeting the challenge of logical empiricism." (Gill p. 31).

Ian Ramsey, it is true to say, was extremely forthright in his appreciation of the contribution of logical empiricism. Indeed he insists that if religious language is not anchored in empirical experience then it can be neither philosophically nor religiously adequate. He was, however, concerned to make some important modifications in connection with the logical-empirical concept of "empirical". It was important to him that the term "empirical" should be given a far broader base in order to include religious disclosure. He maintained that "Wittgenstein would not allow other areas of disclosure to be dismissed as 'meaningless' - language was so rich in its logical variety, and a major task of philosophy
was to display and present this variety against all who held that evidence and criteria, if they be not scientific evidence and criteria, are worthless; and against all reductionists who would argue that 'x is nothing but y', that 'x is really only y'." (CE p.6)

Jerry Gill, in his book, Ian Ramsey - To Speak Responsibly of God writes:

"He sees in mature empiricism, or linguistic analysis, both the tolerant spirit and analytic methodology necessary for the construction of a balanced, reasonable and theologically adequate account of the meaning of religious language. It is in this sense that Ramsey can be said to accept the basic thrust of the challenge set forth by logical empiricism. He is impressed with the concern for meaning and verification expressed by the movement and with its desire to develop reliable, if flexible, criteria with regard to the various usages of language. Moreover, he is convinced that the language philosophers, following the later Wittgenstein, are much more tolerant and sensitive towards language than were their positivistic forerunners. Ramsey believes 'that contemporary empiricism may revitalise our faith and our doctrine and make what seems so often to be the dry bones of theological discourse live' (Alden Tuthill Lects. 1963 - CE. p. 59)." (op. cit. p. 50-1).

Gill's views are endorsed by Ramsey himself who writes: "We associate Wittgenstein - at least the later Wittgenstein - with a much newer concept of meaning than we find either in the logical positivists or in the early Russell." (CE. p. 6-7). Wittgenstein can therefore be seen as leading away from any narrow, hard and circumscribed account of meaning such as the Verification Principle expressed. For Wittgenstein, the Verification Principle (being itself obviously nonsense for it could neither be verified by sense experience nor taken as a tautology) was merely a mnemonic, enabling us to formulate the clearest and most precise, and least ambiguous of languages, and it was valuable insofar as its talk about "verification" and "criteria" implied that we would only understand a word when we had elaborated a context for its use.

"The highest aim of philosophy," (Ramsey maintained) "must be to generalise about the logical pattern of the most complex discourse, not excluding metaphysical and theological discourse, and to give clues to its logical structure, to search for illuminating paradigm cases, such as the Verification principle provides in a simple and elementary, even if important, case, viz. scientific discourse." (CE. p. 6-7).

One of the principle aims of the Vienna Circle ... was to rebuild the bridge between philosophy and science which had been largely broken by the Romantic Movement and the accompanying rise of Idealist metaphysics at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its members saw what they
called the "logic of science" as constituting the future of philosophy, once the fight against metaphysics had been won and the physical world had been reduced to the elements of sense experience. It is with good reason that the twentieth century has been characterised as the age of analysis. The mood of discontent with the traditional approaches to philosophy in general and with the absolute Idealism of the nineteenth century in particular, which had found its expression with the early analytic concern of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in England, found its European expression with the Vienna circle, whose primary concern, as we have seen, was to enable the same sort of progress as had been made by the natural sciences to be made by philosophy. In the English speaking world, the closest and most influential expression of this approach to philosophy is to be found in A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* whose logical positivism may be seen as, in some ways at least, a reaction against pseudo-scientific metaphysics. He operated on the assumption that there are only two types of language which can be said to admit knowledge and truth and these are, as we have seen in the works of his predecessors, logical discourse and empirical assertions. With Ayer the attack on theology becomes quite explicit and it, like much else, is claimed to be absolutely devoid of meaning except in so far as it can be given an analysis in terms of propositions about sense experience. To such an attack as this Ian Ramsey replied:

"The argument is that theology is 'meaningless' unless it refers merely to some personal 'thrill' or 'satisfaction' or 'pleasure' or 'uplift'. For, in the first place, it is clear that theological words like 'God' or 'soul' have no direct empirical reference like, (on a common-sense view) the words 'table', 'sun', 'tree', 'book', ....... Nor, in the second place, have theological words such indirect empirical relevance as belongs to scientific words like, 'field', 'electron', 'potential', 'entropy', 'force', .... The conclusion is that the propositions of theology cannot be 'verified' in terms of sense experience except in so far as they are about our 'feelings' and bodily sensations. Theology on this view could never be more than subjective." (CCPC p. 258).

* The Vienna Circle really began in the 1920's with Moritz Schlick who was professor at Keil and then, from 1922, in the chair of The Philosophy of Inductive Science at the University of Vienna. The circle published its manifesto, *Wissenschaftliche Weltannahme: Der Wiener Kreis* (Scientific View of the World: The Vienna Circle) in 1929 and in 1930 took over the journal, *Annalen der Philosophie*, renaming it *Erkenntnis*, in which Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* had first appeared under its German title, *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*. 
So, while Ramsey is extremely forthright in his appreciation of the contribution of the logical empiricists, insisting that all theological and religious discourse must have an empirical grounding to prove adequate, and pleading for a broadened concept of "empirical", he also endeavours to establish that, although religious language has certain peculiarities, it is no more odd than much of the language of theoretical science and personal relationships. It is in this way that Ramsey can be seen as taking a view of the nature of theological language which distinguished him from many thinkers who are classified as linguistic analysts. His understanding of the complexity and flexibility of language places Ramsey squarely in the tradition of the later Wittgenstein. Moreover, there is a marked similarity between his view of language and that of such thinkers as J.L. Austin and Max Black. (cf. especially the latter part of J.L. Austin's How to do Things with Words; and Max Black's analysis of metaphor in his Models and Metaphors and his Lectures on Religious Belief.) The work of J.L. Austin and his colleagues on the various aspects of English verbal usage in linguistic philosophy "has gone almost entirely out of fashion, but in its heyday it aroused very strong feelings both among its practitioners and amongst those...who were sceptical of its importance." (Part of my Life p.295).

Gill remarks on Freedom and Immortality that "the primary argument offered by Ramsey in favour of the free will position is an appeal to the facets of ordinary language which are portrayed in talk about decision and action." (p.44).

Such language not only has freedom of decision built into it but it defies all attempts to eliminate it without eliminating the vast majority of ordinary language at the same time. From Ramsey's examples of free choice one can see that for him such an option is unacceptable. This is clearly an example of what J.L. Austin termed "linguistic phenomenology". (J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p.120). The underlying conviction of such an appeal is that ordinary language contains the majority of important distinctions that need to be made concerning empirical reality. Thus in attempting to make a case for the viability of a metaphysics that is cognitively meaningful Ramsey lays the groundwork for an understanding of the function of the term "God". He relies to a great extent on the work of men like Austin and P.F. Strawson (cf. P.F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory p.57-8), though the cornerstone upon which Ramsey's understanding of models is based, however, is the distinction between "picture" models and "analogue" models and for this distinction as well as for several other ideas, Ramsey acknowledges the influence of the work of Max Black.
Ramsey was particularly interested in the work of four men who became his colleagues in Oxford, namely, Stuart Hampshire, R.M. Hare, J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson (Ian Ramsey took P.F. Strawson's *An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (1959) very seriously). It seemed to him that through the work of such broadened empiricists, some ground was won back for a descriptive, as opposed to a speculative, metaphysic, though he was in no doubt that there still remained a vast amount of work to be done especially because of his belief that personal existence, the "Volitional Unity" of his Burney Prize essay in 1938 - the 'I' as he now preferred to say - was even more mysterious than such men allowed. (Ramsey's main supervisor in philosophy was A.C. Ewing, whose interests are expressed in his book, *Idealism: A Critical Survey* (1934) - These views are reflected immaturely in Ramsey's Burney Prize essay of 1938. He believed, too, that meaningful person language, describing the person in action, could be both straightforwardly descriptive and evocatively more, which was, incidentally, one reason why he was so interested in J.L. Austin's category of the performative utterance (for example, "I baptise thee") as being more than descriptive, and it was to his own vision of personality to which he was appealing when he spoke of 'I' as an "integrator" word and when he defended the possibility of metaphysical language about the 'I'.

In such passages Ramsey appears to stand closer to the tradition of the French and German existentialists and especially to that of Kierkegaard than many might suspect, because like many British philosophers of his day he made little actual reference to the continentals.

The height of J.L. Austin's influence was not reached until the 1950's. The strongest philosophical influence in Oxford in the years immediately following the war was that of Gilbert Ryle. His dismissal of the traditional view of the relation between mind and body (which he calls the Cartesian myth), depicted in his famous phrase as the idea of "the ghost in the machine" (Concept of Mind) won him many adherents among young philosophers of his day. Ramsey himself had learned from James Ward and his pupil G.F. Stout, those pioneers of modern philosophical psychology, to reject any dualism of mind and body and to think instead of an embodied self. He came to recognise the intimate nature of the union between the mental and the physical, though still believing that there was in some sense at least a citadel of the 'I' which made each personality personal. Ian Ramsey felt himself compelled to go further than Ryle. Though Ryle was probably the most dominant philosopher in Oxford at the time, Ramsey felt him
to be inadequate. In Tübingen in 1967 he quoted Ryle's argument to the effect that "the self elusiveness of 'I' is only the elusiveness of today's diary entry which cannot be made until today is past, but which can then be made without any kind of problem or dilemma." In his article in Philosophical Quarterly in 1955 I would suggest that Ramsey already felt this way, but as a junior colleague of Ryle's in Oxford felt inhibited in criticising him, even though the diary entry at any depth about 'I' would be, for Ramsey, far more mysterious than Ryle allowed.

A far more thorough discussion of the relation of Ian Ramsey's thought to that of Ryle (and for that matter of Strawson) can be found in Ramsey's Biology and Personality. For Ramsey then, although no-one ever has what would be called straightforward empirical experience of himself as a self, every person does, insofar as he is a person at all, come to use the term 'I' and to tacitly develop a concept of the self. This is evident even in David Hume's ironic conclusion to the effect that "I can have no experience of self". (D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Part II.)

The influence of Ryle, as that of Strawson and earlier, Wittgenstein helped Ramsey to base his case for the logical address of God talk upon the inherent peculiarity of the logic of 'I'. Jerry Gill writes:

"It is the commonness and importance of such talk, especially in the case of the first person pronoun that Ramsey thinks provides the foundation for language about God. Ramsey begins his discussion of the 'Systematic Elusiveness of I' by tracing the difficulties which David Hume encountered while trying to pin down the logic of self awareness and personal identity. Since the only epistemological objects Hume would accept were sense experience and since one could never obtain a sense impression of one's self, Hume concluded that the concept of selfhood and personal identity are bogus. However, since people (including Hume himself) found the concept indispensable both practically and theoretically, he remained dissatisfied with his analytic conclusion." (Gill, p. 83-84).

The main objection which Ramsey raised against the view of Hume and Ryle is aimed at what he takes to be their common basic assumption which is, as he sees it, that they both consider that any situation which becomes the "object" of a higher order action is unchanged in the process. The assumption that Ramsey is in effect challenging is that there is no difference between the 'I' which is unsaid in the statement, 'I am running', and the first 'I' in the statement, 'I said, 'I am running'.' And he would maintain that an essential change has taken place when the 'speaking' 'I' has been objectified by a higher order statement.

It is absolutely essential to see the connection which Ian Ramsey
finds between his understanding of religious and his talk about God, or at least his interpretation of such talk. The nature of religious discourse, involving as it does both a perceptual and religious dimension (i.e., it discusses that which is spatio-temporal and more), is marked by a similar structure in the form which religious language takes by means of models and qualifiers. (cf. RL chap. II). This juxtaposition, which provides a bridge between empirical experience and language on the one hand and religious experience on the other, points to a similarity between the approach of Ramsey to theological language and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and it is clear that, in a broad sense at least, Ramsey's position may be classed as one which follows the "middle way" of analogy, a method found, too, in the works of Bishop Butler. The argument of Bishop Butler's Analogy is indeed introduced in the first chapter of Part I on "Immortality", which Ramsey remarks, is not just "merely meant to establish in a general sort of way the 'credibility of a future life'". (RL p. 14-15).

Ramsey did not in fact see himself as offering an original theory of religious language but rather, as he puts it, "a generalisation of Thomism" (RL p. 185) for certainly, as we have noted, there is a marked similarity between his theory of models and qualifiers and the Thomist doctrine of Analogy with its accompanying distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi, though he does offer such a wholly novel restatement of the doctrine as to render the connection at this point quite tenuous. Ian Ramsey does, however, combine the best in both empiricism and existentialism. His theology is empirical insofar as he shows how our symbols of God have roots in finite experience.... and yet equally his theology is, as we have seen, existentialist insofar as he insists that the disclosure of God occurs through personal situations and that it demands an appropriate commitment. At the same time he manages to avoid the irrationalism and obscurity by which much existentialist theology is marred as much as he avoids the tendency to equate theistic statements with their empirical grounds or to assume that the latter constitutes verification of the former. (cf. Owen ).

An important controversy was worked out between Ian Ramsey and Anthony Flew in the Hibbert Journal in 1956 (Flew, Funerals), centering round the question whether or not a man could witness his own funeral. Ramsey summed up Flew as saying that, "after death we no longer walk, talk, joke, climb mountains or become buried under snow. All that remains is the
body...We may be more than bodies, but what we are more, perishes at death." (P+F). The crux of Ramsey's reply was to assert that personal behaviour was more than Flew had allowed. The 'I' was "more than the biological man, the social man, the economic man, the psychological man." (P+F, p. 337).

"Ramsey's funeral", (he wrote) "does not cover all that of which Ramsey is aware when he is aware of 'myself'. It is this 'more' for which on the day of my funeral, philosophical friends, if they feel so inclined, can spend their time choosing logically appropriate phrases. I for my part will be content to 'enjoy it', untouched then (I hope) by the need to give it a logical mapping." (Ibid, p. 337-8).

Ramsey, then, appealed to his own awareness of self as a gateway to metaphysics and religion - He told Flew:

"To talk of 'free will' has been to claim that here was something not reducible to predictability stories, causal stories or any other of the technical tales which would profess to reduce a 'person' to 'objects' - spatio-temporal events." (Ibid, p. 334).

The conviction from which Ramsey never deviated once he had made it his own was expressed in a contribution to the Cambridge Review in 1956, in an article which was a response to R.B. Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture of November 1955 on "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief." Braithwaite argued that the "primary use" of Christian assertions was "to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles" (Braithwaite p. 82) and in particular to declare the Christian's commitment to an "agapeistic" or loving way of life connected with stories which encourage such behaviour. For Ian Ramsey, such an account was drastically inadequate because it did not give a full enough account of the believer's response to the discernment of moral obligation. For him, the response came before any commitment and the response to God's claim was a response to fact, though to be fair, he does say that he sympathises with Professor Braithwaite's aim to do justice to both the empiricist demand that meaning must be tied to empirical use and to the religious man's claim for his religious belief to be taken seriously. To develop the argument a little more fully; Ian Ramsey finds difficulties which are broadly two-fold: on the one hand while he is willing "to admit as empirical, something far beyond what the first naive formulations of the Verification Principle would have allowed - has he gone far enough?" (R+E. (Camb.), p. 404-5) and on the other, Ramsey questions whether the lecture "takes seriously enough all that the religious man - and in particular the Christian - claims
in his religious belief."

(ibid.) Ramsey goes on to argue that commitment to a way of life, agapeistic or any other, must be more than a straightforwardly empirical claim, that is to say that the "x" pattern of living could in principle be given an exhaustive spatio-temporal description. If such a way of life involved only that which was descriptive in terms of spatio-temporal elements it would lead to no more than what Ramsey calls an "agapeistic idolatry". Ramsey would see rather the notion of an agapeistic way of life as a qualified model of "believing", "hoping", qualified by "all things" whose purpose is to evoke a characteristically different situation - a situation where the penny drops and "we pursue the story till in Bradley's sense we are satisfied." (ibid.) Only at that point is agape disclosed and we respond with an agapeistic way of life. Braithwaite had, then, redefined the nature of religious language by likening it to the language of morality and commendation, and this, for Ramsey, was his major inadequacy.

It is possible to classify Ian Ramsey's position as in one respect similar to the work, too, of men like Basil Mitchell who in his contribution to New Essays in Philosophical Theology (NEPT, p.103-6) and probably more importantly in his contribution to Faith and Logic and in his *Justification of Religious Belief* makes the attempt to relate religious language to experience and to establish it, in theory at least, as cognitively meaningful. John Hick, who maintained that statements that make predictions about experiences taking place after death are open to verification, or at least confirmation, says that religious truth and thus religious language is unique in that it is not limited to propositional assertions, though he does say that Christian language can be shown to be meaningful when it is viewed as an autonomous language game which is based on the experience of the Christian community. (cf. W. Zuurdeeg, *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion*; Ian Ramsey was especially sensitive to the interrelatedness of the various functions of language which we find in the works of men like Michael Foster, who maintained that revelation can be cognitively meaningful, that is, subject to the judgement true, without being reducible to either logical or empirical language. John Hutchison, who in *Language and Faith* maintains that since religion is to be understood primarily as a means of comprehensive life orientation, the language of religion is to be understood as the expression and description of various orientations of life, and Frederick Ferre, who suggests that much of religious lang-
uage is an empirical-theoretical model. ("Theological speech projects a model of immense responsive significance, drawn from 'the facts', as the key to its conceptual synthesis." F. Ferré.)* Such thinkers, like Ian Ramsey, are concerned to preserve the empirical cogntivity of religious discourse. The whole movement of contemporary philosophy indeed, might be said to be characterised by a pre-occupation with language that has questioned in many different ways the status of metaphysical words and also a concern to give all propositions some empirical relevance.

"To face the challenge which contemporary philosophy makes on us", wrote Ian Ramsey, "we must justify a position for theological words on the language map and in particular elucidate their empirical relevance." (CCPC, p. 259).

and he continues:

"There is, as Whitehead would put it, a 'limitation', 'an abruptness' about the world. We cannot talk about anything we jolly well like. We do not start our thinking from absolute zero, in an utter vacuum. The curious point I would like to make is this, that the limitation is really linguistic - that 'given fact' and empirical 'limitation' express rather a demand on language that describe features of the world. They are, I suggest, a demand that our overall total language shall be finite, that our language hierarchy shall have something like what Whitehead would call an apex." (Ibid, p. 261).

Yet it is important to keep always in the fore that, as in the notes preserved by Professor Peter Baelz when Ramsey was lecturing in 1946, Ramsey's work shows an attempt to work towards a philosophical theology broadly on the line of a personalised Idealism, but owing a great deal to the tougher kinds of philosophy since the older Idealists. Ian Ramsey saw the world in terms of relationships between persons, and persons as centres of experience, experience as volition, thought and perception which owes the continuity of its existence to being dependent on God.

The main lines of this are Berkeleian; our sensory experience is the medium through which we can become aware of the activity of the divine will though he felt that religious experience was unhelpful unless a philosophical theology based on sense experience and value appreciation was brought to it. Ramsey's Idealism was, however, in no way the Absolute Idealism of men like F. H. Bradley, for he saw that the Absolute "could only too easily be regarded as night in which every cow - and everything else for that matter - was uniformly black." (P&I, p. 98), and he thinks that it is one of the greatest mistakes of the Absolute Idealists to suppose that when such situations as were offered in Freedom and Immortality were evoked, they were, so to say, structurally

homogenous, that in such situations the distinction between subject and object disappeared.

F.H. Bradley, incidently, gives an excellent account of such evocation in his Essays on Truth and Reality (F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, OUP, 1914, chap. VI on “Immediate Experience”) where he suggests that an awareness of a person as public behaviour and more would be established by surveying this and that feature of a person’s behaviour until a disclosure situation occurred around such features as we had to date enumerated. Bishop Berkeley makes a similar point with his character Alciphron. (G. Berkeley, Dialogue, IV, 5). For Ian Ramsey metaphysics could never deny the observations and experiments of science and common-sense, metaphysics, that is, as concerned to organise common-sense assertions in accordance with some perspective or another, a development of C. D. Broad’s description of metaphysics as “critical common-sense.” Nor should metaphysical realities be described as if they were physical objects. Indeed he recalled the famous phrase of Bishop Butler’s, “Everything is what it is, and not another thing.” Ramsey, as Butler and Kant, grounded his metaphysics in ethics because to him what was most self-disclosing was not walking, talking, joking or climbing, pain or pleasure but responding to a moral claim. A moral action disclosed the “and more” that was not dreamed of in Hume’s philosophy— for in that response, “the ‘I’ knew what it was to be personal, free and more than spatio-temporal”.

“Metaphysics,” (he wrote), “arises from man’s desire to know, in a world of change and transitoriness, just where he is journeying; it arises whenever man seeks to map the universe and to plot his position in it, to answer Kant’s three questions, What can I know?, What ought I to do?, What may I hope?” (P for M p. 153).

Such may be the justification for such a work as Freedom and Immortality rising, whether adequately or not, to meet the challenge posed by Hume and restated by the empirical philosophy of the twentieth century. As H. D. Lewis in his review of Freedom and Immortality writes:

“Above all, this book takes us to the heart of the controversies about religion which arise from the course which philosophy has taken of late. Professor Ramsey is thoroughly familiar with the techniques of recent linguistic philosophy and he has also wide theological knowledge and acute understanding of theological difficulties.” (Lewis R.).

One of Ramsey’s favourite quotations was from A. N. Whitehead’s, Science and the Modern World:

“Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within the passing flux of immediate things,”
something which is real and yet waiting to be realised, something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts, something whose possession is the final good and yet is beyond reach, something which is the ultimate ideal and the hopeless quest."

Perhaps the final comment at this stage should be by Ian Ramsey himself. When Hugh Joseph asked him what he hoped to do, he replied, "I think my ambition, Hugh, would be this, to build a bridge between theology and philosophy". Thus far we have tried to show, albeit in brief, both the foundations on which that bridge was set and to offer a glimpse of the swirling waters of contemporary philosophy which necessitated its building.
CHAPTER II
If we endeavour to trace the development in Ian Ramsey's thought which led him to bring together those "two not obviously similar themes" of freedom and immortality for the Forwood lectures of the same name in 1957 and to subsequently publish them in 1960, we are afforded surprisingly little help in our pursuit by those published works of his which appeared in the years prior to the lectures being given. What hints are afforded in the published material amount, for the most part, to oblique references in works treating on what are, to a greater or lesser degree, different subjects, and where they do appear, the themes are rarely tied together.

In the Hulsean Sermon, preached in Cambridge late in 1950 (reprinted in the Cambridge Review, vol. LXII, no. 1751, Nov. 1950, pp. 194f.) he states his belief that "metaphysics should begin.... with conative activity, not with cognition as a relation to static constituents" (op. cit., p. 194). So, conation rather than cognition is the ultimate characterisation of human self-understanding. He declares that.... "personal activity always eludes our understanding of it", because, "we can never adequately understand it because our activity of understanding is itself a new datum for understanding." (This basic datum for metaphysics is, he says, an activity of which we have a "notion", and which we try, necessarily in vain, to describe adequately in "ideas"). This suggestion was developed further in 1955 in an article in the Philosophical Quarterly entitled, "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'". In this article Ramsey distinguishes between two theories about "elusiveness" which he broadly categorises as, on the one hand, those akin to Hume, and on the other, those akin to Ryle. The former is typified by the phrase, "I can never catch myself at any time without a perception" and "I can never observe anything but perceptions" (i.e., any simple and continuing self eludes Hume's gaze (see the Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. I, pt. IV, sec. 6). The latter is developed in regard to Ryle's notion of higher order actions, that is to say, where certain sorts of actions are, in one way or another, concerned with or are operative upon, other actions, e.g. B hitting C; A applauding (B hitting C).

W.H. Poteat suggests that 'I' functions in a definite logical relation to empirical propositions about behaviour in his essay in New Essays in Religious Language ("God and the 'Private 'I'", W.H. Poteat, NEinRL, ed. Dallas M. High, OUP, NY, 1969). "I is a logically extended concept since what it names over and above what may be stated in and hence known by means of reports upon behaviour or dispositions.
to behaviour systematically eludes, at any given level of reporting, incorporation into the reports of that level." (op. cit. p. 130).

It was Ryle who suggested that in fact self elusiveness is systematic because with any of our own operations of any order there immediately arises the possibility of an operation of a higher order so that when we are faced with our own operations there then arises the (systematic) possibility of an infinite series of operations which means that at no given time we ever complete self description (i.e. we can never completely describe ourselves). This means, Ryle would say, that every time we attempt self-description we add a fact to be described. This does not mean, however, that there is anything "mysterious". "It is an elusiveness only tantalizing till we see what is happening - like trying to count pennies in a line, when, as I am enumerating the last penny another is always added....The penny which eludes me for a moment I count the next moment." (The Concept of Mind.) (Ramsey later develops this notion of mystery in his Alden-Tuthill lectures in 1963. (The Alden-Tuthill lectures on Theological Literacy. No. 1, "On Understanding Mystery", Chicago Theological Seminary Register, vol. LIII, no. 5, May 1963) to which we shall refer later). Ramsey concludes however that, despite the differences, behind both the account of Hume and that of Ryle is the same assumption, viz. that any situation which becomes the "object" of a higher order action is unchanged in the process. This notion is expressed by Hume in terms of perception, while Ryle, though never explicitly stating it, implies it throughout his work. What Ramsey saw as their assumption, differently expressed, raises two difficulties for him. Firstly, granted the assumption, he questions what is to be made of the subject-object distinction (developed by reference to Ryle) and, secondly, what account is to be given of what Hume calls "personal identity"? About the first, Ramsey maintains that the objectification of the subject is to deny ourselves the possibility of ever talking sense. About the second he observes that "Hume confesses that, try as he will, he 'never can observe anything but the perception'. This is to confess that, try as he will, all terms within the bracket in the example of "I describing (I solving chess problem C), are always, in all attempts, 'objective'." (CE. p. 22).

Self awareness is then, logically problematical; since the self awareness which characterises any highest order action as it occurs is in part
observationally elusive. But how can a fact which is in part observationally elusive be displayed and how can it be talked about appropriately? In answer to the first part, Ramsey remarks that ".....we plainly cannot give a straightforward account of what is observationally elusive, in observation language. All we can do is to evoke or induce by some tale or other, the sort of situation for which part-elusiveness is claimed." (ibid. p.23.). In answer to the second he suggests that the problem of personal identity, self elusiveness, and the systematic elusiveness of 'I' are all alike to be related to the inadequacy of objective terms and relations, worked by the ordinary subject-predicate model, to account for a highest order action. Here we see in Ramsey the denial of the Empiricist claim to be able to give full account of the matter in observational terms only. We may see then how the systematic elusiveness of 'I' relates to the fact that self-awareness, as characterising highest order "actions" or feelings of personal identity, cannot be adequately dealt with in terms of those elements to which a highest order action objectively refers. In Humean terms, we do indeed "feel" personal identity now when reflecting on a train of past perceptions, but Hume's error, as Ian Ramsey points out, was "to suppose that its empirical anchorage could be no other than those 'past perceptions' alone..." (ibid. p.30). So, from the point of view of language, the systematic elusiveness of 'I' makes the claim that 'I' systematically eludes all observational language; it is a claim that 'I' has a logical status all of its own and is not a perception word.

I have felt it important to thus elaborate Ramsey's position in regard to the self in such detail because, as I hope will become clear, his understanding of the logical status of 'I' is of the greatest importance to his understanding of the notions of freedom and immortality and ultimately to the way in which we may talk about God Himself. We must therefore establish an understanding of this as the background to his later work if we are to follow the way in which he was to develop his arguments in relation to the topics which here interest us most closely. (The importance of the concept of the self and self-awareness to the work of Austin Farrer will be discussed later, both in its own right and as a key in the relationship between the respective approaches of Dr. Ramsey and Dr. Farrer).

The issue is pursued further by Ramsey in his discussion: "Christianity and Language" (Phil.Qtrly., vol. 4, no. 17, Oct. 1934) where he asks:
"What of that which is compassed by our total awareness at the time of what Ryle would call a 'higher order activity'? What of the total experience which Berkeley called, perhaps misleadingly, 'a reflex act' or 'inward feeling', or reflexion, or 'conscientia quaedam interna'? What of the facts compassed by the experience which might be called not 'self-awareness' but 'self-other-awareness' insisting for example, that Bradley's 'positive whole of feeling' - a fact commended empirically - must, as Whitehead urges, be given a subject-object structure. Here is an 'experience' not only subjective but objective, an experience to which no amount of public language will do justice. For full treatment it needs inter alia the word 'I' besides the word 'me'; which means that it both demands and eludes public language." (op.cit.p.337).

But, for Ramsey, the whole point of the matter is that in the end the conclusion must (in accordance with his reasoning) be that ....the word 'God' would stand in relation to all discursive knowledge (the sciences, history, 'theology', and so on) as 'I' does to me" for it is at this point that we become most truly aware of ourselves and thus most truly free. He elaborates further upon the status of person words ('I', 'me', 'my' etc.) in an interesting article, written in 1955/6, "Persons and Funerals: What do Person Words Mean?"

Here we begin to see how the consideration of person words become closely linked with the metaphysical doctrines of freedom and immortality and all that those concepts involve. "To understand how the concept 'death' functions", wrote W.H. Poteat (Phil.Qutlv., IX, 1959, 46-58), "is to understand more about how the concept self does." However, Ramsey's purpose in this paper is to consider the issue the other way round. The paper arose fundamentally in response to another paper written in April 1956 by Anthony Flew entitled, "Can a man witness his own funeral" (Hibbert Journal, Apr. 1956, 242-250). Flew's paper raised at least five basic questions for Ramsey. Firstly, whether 'life' and 'personal behaviour' are no more than walking, talking, joking....and the like? Secondly, whether there is in fact anything which is perceptually elusive about characteristically personal situations? Thirdly, whether personal behaviour is no more than behaviour which is observable, or in principle observable, including in the latter phrase all that psycho-somatic medicine, deep analysis and the like might reveal? Fourthly, whether a person is what we can point at without needing to do more to know what 'person' means? and fifthly, whether there are any situations which already give an empirical anchorage to the phrase, "invisible, intangible, disembodied spirit" and
thus give us a sense for its "being there"?

In reply to Flew's questions Ramsey cites, first of all, Bishop Butler's Analogy: "It is easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies as in them, that we might have animated bodies or any other organs and senses wholly different from those now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same new bodies variously modified and organised - as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present." (Analogy ch.1). Butler, as Ramsey points out, does not suggest that it is easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies or in them nor that it is easy to know what we mean by "animate". For Butler nothing - certainly not a doctrine of future life - was easy. Butler's point is, he says, "that there is something puzzling and mysterious about human existence; that we know mightily little about it; and that those who have attacked the possibility of a future life have been taking too cut-and-dried a view of existence." (P+F, p.332).

His reasons for thus citing Butler at this point is that he believes that Butler's positive contribution (from chapter 1 of the Analogy and the Dissertation Of Personal Identity) was that he maintained that we "ourselves" are not "gross bodies"; "systems of matter" are not "ourselves". The "elusive entity" is not for Butler properly pictured as a soul which does some animating - what is elusive is "we" - the mystery and puzzle is about "ourselves". We are, he says, "living beings", and part of ourselves is a body. We are "the same living agents" though the body changes, and this identity we know by a "natural sense". No person in his wits can act on the assumption that he may not be the same person tomorrow.

What is being claimed is that in self awareness, i.e., the awareness of oneself as a living being, is something "peculiarly incorrigible and authentic", and that there breaks in upon us at some point an awareness of that which is more than spatio-temporal. It is readily admitted that such a claim by itself "proves" nothing. What Butler is doing is drawing our attention to a situation which cannot be reduced to observable behaviour, let alone to bodies. With this Berkeley would agree. We are each, he would say, aware of distinctive situations which cannot satisfactorily be exhausted in observable terms. Ramsey had certainly been saying this kind of thing in print since at least 1948 when in a paper given by him at the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy ("Man and Religion: Individual and Community", Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress
of Philosophy, August 1948, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 308-10) he had declared that, "it is the sine qua non of a religious attitude that man should not be entirely reducible to spatio-temporal terms". The peculiarly elusive situations which Butler describes are given, Berkeley would say, in our experience of activity:

"An agent, an active mind or spirit, cannot be an idea, or like an idea, whence it should seem to follow that those words which denote an active principle, soul or spirit do not in a strict and proper sense stand for ideas. And yet they are not insignificant either, since I understand what is signified by the term 'I' or 'myself', and know what it means, although it be no idea... but that which... operates about them. Certainly it must be allowed that we have some notion that we understand or know what is meant by the terms myself, will... love, hate, and so forth; although to speak exactly, these words do not suggest so many distinct ideas." (Alciphron, Seventh Dialogue; cited P. p. 333).

Our walking, talking, joking etc., does not exhaust our behaviour which is characteristically more than anything which can be, as Ramsey says, "cased in terms of such 'objects' though plainly it includes reference to them".

"Here" says Ramsey) "is that experience of 'self-activity' which, when they have wished to emphasise its perceptual elusiveness, men have spoken of in terms of 'free will', a contorted phrase expressing the best of intentions with the worst of logic for the phrase tries to claim that in 'will' is a situation which escapes, is 'free' from, the rest of 'object' language."

He continues:

"To talk of 'free will' has been to claim that here is something not reducible to predictability stories, causal stories or other technical tales and more importantly a 'person' to 'objects' - spatio-temporal events." (ibid. p. 334).

In mentioning Hume in this context he refers us to his article, "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'" already mentioned. Hume, he notes, is puzzled because he has a 'feeling' of 'personal identity' when reflecting on, "the train of past perceptions that compose a mind". Hume recognises that the ideas are (felt to be) connected together though we may never perceive this connection - once again the situation is seen to be perceptually odd. In all of this Ramsey is claiming, "that there are certain characteristically personal situations to be evoked in certain ways which are not wholly tractable in terms of (public) behaviour stories, even if these are complex enough to cover part, i.e. the public part, of what is meant by attitudes, emotions and the like" (ibid. p. 336). Among such stories by which suitable situations may be evoked are stories about death and funerals. "Death", for example, can mean many things or at
least can be perceived in many different ways. It can be looked at, for example, from a biochemical point of view which deals with decomposition and the like; (I draw these examples from Ramsey's article) social death, "that occasion after which a man can no longer throw his darts or attend dinnerparties"; psychological death, the point beyond which we have no longer the appropriate behaviour response; statistical death and so on. The contemplation of death can often suggest (Ramsey would say "reveal") to us that we are, however, more than the biological man, the social man, the economic man, the psychological man, for as W.H. Poteat in 1959 ("I will die: an Analysis", Phil.Qtly. vol. IX, (1959), 46-53) so penetratingly puts the matter, "If 'death' is a concept which simply correlates with or is logically assimilable to reports or predictions of events, (biochemical, social, physiological, auditory etc.) and 'acts' of behaviour - survival of death is a logical contradiction."

Is it then the case that death obliterates everything (except the body) that is covered by the assertion, "I am alive"? Ian Ramsey's emphatic reply would be in the negative for though "death" may very well leave a body and mark an end to all walking, talking etc., it does not, however, bring to an end, what we know now, in certain situations, as something "more than" the body and any and all spatio-temporal elements that those situations contain. (A further example of this occurs in Religion and Science, Conflict and Synthesis, chap. 2, p. 40, in regard to the statement, "I am dancing") When I use the expression, "I die" of myself what I am asserting is not assimilable to "reports or predictions of events" in the common sense world but it is nevertheless perfectly though, no doubt, strangely - meaningful. Likewise in "The Logical Character of Resurrection Belief" (Theology, vol. IX, no. 443, May 1957, 186-92, reprinted in CE. from which page references will be taken), which arose in reply to H.J. Paton's Gifford Lectures - The Modern Predicament; "belief in the Resurrection", is seen as, "something more than belief in a matter of fact." (CE. p. 88). The article, appearing, like Religious Language, in 1957, poses the question whether Christians can argue that we are immortal because Jesus is immortal when what is so obvious is that Jesus is utterly different from us, though it does not go as far as to develop a full answer to this question, pointing merely to the logical peculiarity of the resurrection of Jesus.

The disciples on the Emmaus road lacked the vital depth of discernment, "their eyes were holden", they only knew Christ at the point of full disclosure and then he "became invisible". It is in St. Thomas however that
we find the clearest example of someone for whom Jesus became an object of sense and more. This plain down to earth empiricist sees and believes as he puts his hand in Jesus' side and touches the imprints of the nails in his hands and feet but now at the moment of full disclosure his resurrection belief is more than just a belief in a matter of fact, objects of sight and touch - He goes beyond saying, "I admit it's Jesus after all" to make the confession, "My Lord and my God". - "Here is a commitment which goes beyond what is seen ... Thomas sees ... but only perceptual objects. He believes in the Resurrection as an object of sense and more." (CE.p.181). - The resurrection therefore cannot be netted in the language of definite descriptions. Likewise for Mary Magdalene, the resurrection is a matter of fact and more. Resurrection belief is therefore "a total response to something that touches personally" (ibid.p.182).

So, Ramsey finds three stages of development. Firstly, the "matters of fact" which are "objects of sense" and about which empirical questions can be asked, that of which legal witnesses talk, on which historical discussion can be centered, for which verification can be sought. Then, the situation which is "matters of fact and more" - a situation which is empirically odd, the clue to which comes in personal situations. To know what resurrection means demands a fuller discernment and finally such a fuller discernment which embraces "objects of sense and more", evokes and is fulfilled in a response, which finds its expression in commitment.

Ramsey is only too ready to recognise and admit that all of these are points which cannot be fully argued. All we can do, he says, is to, "tell tales until the penny drops and the vision comes". Then it is that we begin to realize all that is contained in person words and likewise when we observe, as in the case of "Persons and Funerals", the peculiar behaviour of "death" in the first person singular we are struck by the logical peculiarity of 'I' itself.

"We have already" says Ramsey, "an intimation of immortality and though I cannot talk straightforwardly about witnessing my funeral (let alone be right or wrong in so doing) none can assert that my body is all that is left of me at death, if already they have known me (or at any rate themselves) as more than a walker, a talker or a weigher of sausages." (P+F.p.338).

The following year (1957) saw the qualification of what is probably one of the most read of Ian Ramsey's published works - Religious Language (RL) which, while not treating of the subject of death or immortality maintains that, the "exercise of free will... links closely
both discernment and commitment features such as those which characterize a religious situation." (RL p.28). Ramsey suggests that, "the claim of 'free will' is that there are occasions of human activity which will not be exhaustively unpacked in scientific language, however far those languages go." (ibid. p.29). It claims a "personal" situation which needs more than scientific language to talk about it. Free will does not deny Determinism any more than it necessarily implies Indeterminism; rather it claims a characteristically "personal" situation which the language of causal connectedness never exhausts. (Austin Farrer discusses the determinist-indeterminist argument at length and especially in his The Freedom of the Will which we shall discuss later). With the discernment that takes place in what, for Ramsey, constitutes a characteristically religious situation goes a corresponding personal commitment, "something which can be seen in the contrasts between choosing to do x, and being told off to do x; deciding to do y and being ordered to do y." (ibid. p.29). To use Ian Ramsey's own words in summing this up we may conclude that

"In all these situations of choosing and deciding in contrast to being told off or being ordered, there is some possibility, some prospective situation on which our discernment focuses, which we discern as having a claim on us. We 'exercise free will', when we respond to this claim with a response which involves our whole personality. Here then, in 'free will', is the kind of discernment-commitment which we have argued is a feature of religious life." (ibid. p.29).

Again we may see the importance for Ian Ramsey of that which is spatio-temporal "and more", that which constitutes our "whole personality", that which constitutes 'I', a notion which has, as we have seen, the greatest importance in his consideration of both the themes under discussion. As W.H. Poteat said, "To say 'I will die' is to say something which entails that certain empirical propositions about the experiencable world will at a certain time be true. But it is to say something more than and different from just this. Death, in certain circumstances, is a concept which applies to the experiencable world, but also extends beyond it." (I will die: an Analysis p.208).

Ian Ramsey postulates that we may expect religious language to contain what he calls 'significant tautologies' the function of which are to commend key words which arise in connection with religious language and therefore with its character as commitment. Under this heading is the notion of exercising free will.

"Suppose someone asks us, with regard to a certain action x, where we would say we acted 'freely': 'Why did you do x?' It is true
that we might as a first move give various reasons of a straightforward kind, specifying one causal antecedent or another. But coming nearer and nearer to the event, the ultimate reason would always be: 'Because I chose to do x.' If we were further questioned: 'Why did you choose to do x?', the only possible move, apart from yet another retrospective sequence of causal antecedents... would be to say... "Because I'm I"." (ibid., p.40).

In the analysis of a free response therefore, we eventually reach a position in the question-answer scheme beyond which no further move is possible along the same lines. This again points to the idea that the freedom of the will comes at the moment of true and full self awareness - the point at which I realize what 'I'm I' really means and I respond to it with an appropriate commitment.

Though the evidence for the development of Ian Ramsey's thought on the subjects of freedom and immortality, whether taken together or in isolation, is limited, there is some suggestion from unpublished notes and from lectures given during his time at Christ's College in Cambridge in the early forties that even as early as this Ian Ramsey was at least tentatively bringing together these two "not obviously similar themes", which in Freedom and Immortality would be combined in one brief book. (see Appendix (A).)
CHAPTER III
The year 1957 marked not only the publication of Religious Language, probably about the most far reaching of Ian Ramsey's books and his first major publication, and the giving of the Forwood Lectures on Freedom and Immortality in the University of Liverpool, but it marked a turning point in the intellectual life of Ramsey himself. Though his move to the see of Durham, the pressures of which would no doubt limit considerably the time available for academic pursuit, was still nine years off, it seems that by this time he had already reached the point beyond which he has little more to say on the subjects of freedom and immortality. Indeed, many of his theories of the self had in some form or other been aired before. He was well aware of the intellectual crisis which prevailed in England and recognised the need for careful thought and perhaps the more careful expression of that thought. "We are," he said at the beginning of his F.D.Maurice lectures, On Being Sure in Religion, "in a most serious intellectual crisis that requires a major operation, which will test both the sympathetic sensitiveness of the surgeons and their intellectual skills and techniques, if we are to come out of it alive" (OBSinR, p.2).

Both Religious Language and Freedom and Immortality are apologetic in nature. In Religious Language he hoped "to show how the contemporary philosophical interest in language, far from being soul destroying, can be so developed as to provide a novel inroad into the problems and controversies of theology, illuminating its claims and reforming its apologetic." (RL p.11), while the purpose of Freedom and Immortality was "to register a protest against two popular misconceptions: that those with an intense affection for ordinary language must necessarily deny metaphysics or that those who defend metaphysics must necessarily trade in occult realms and shadowy worlds." (F&I p.152). As David Edwards notes in his biography of Ian Ramsey:

"Ramsey had a sophisticated awareness of the problems involved in the emphasis on ethical intuition when it was more usual to regard all moralities, differing greatly between themselves, as the products of indoctrination by families and societies. He knew also that the emphasis on personality, freedom and immortality needed to be defended when so many of the observations of science seemed to point the other way. To demonstrate that he was not a babe in these relativist and reductionist woods, it is enough to point to the one and a half thousand pages of the five symposia which he edited between 1961 and 1971: Prospect for Metaphysics, Biology and Personality, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy.
Science and Personality and Words about God." (Edwards p.36).

The range of Ian Ramsey's writings extends, of course, much further and from them we can see that he meets the challenge of empiricism with a great deal of natural optimism. "I believe", he said, "that contemporary empiricism may revitalise our faith and doctrine and make what seem so often to be the dry bones of theological discourse live." (Theol. Literacy I: On Understanding Mystery - cited CE, p.59).

In his review of J. Hartland Swann's, An Analysis of Morals (CQR, vol. 162, Apr-Jn 1961, 228-9) he writes:

"It is a well known fact that contemporary empiricism has by this time gone far beyond that narrow and circumscribed view of meaning associated with the name of logical positivism - nowhere has this progress been more evident than in Moral Philosophy, where the broader empiricism has yielded many valuable insights into the logical complexity of language." (op.cit, p.228).

As he said in his review of John Wilson's, Philosophy and Religion: The Logic of Religious Belief, (Frontier, vol. 5, no. 3, Aug. 1962, 528-9)

"By this time (1962) and in the best traditions of empiricists such as Wittgenstein and Wisdom, there is a decided reluctance to dub any discourse 'nonsense'. There is, on the contrary, a ready recognition of the logical variegation of language; and a constant willingness to accept, for what it proves to be worth, any discourse with its appropriate context - verbal and social - and to examine it with a view to seeing how that particular brand of language works, and what is its empirical anchorage." (op.cit, p.528).

It was indeed Ramsey's continuing plea that we should recognise this "logical variegation of language" and to use it as a base for interdisciplinary discussion which he felt to be the only way forward for theology. Indeed in his article on "A New Prospect for Theological Studies" (Theol. vol. LXVII, no 594, Dec. 1964, 527-33) he explicitly states this.

"The new prospect for theology arises as and when theology expresses its continuing concern with problems which are of significance to everyone, believer and unbeliever alike; when it arranges for such dialogue between the different disciplines as can provide helpful and informative inroads into a particular problem; and when as it listens rather than speaks, and learns rather than teaches, it starts to construct theological discourse with a new relevance. Further as this discourse is the currency for a common moment of vision, to that extent will it be legitimate to speak of all disciplines providing their 'own characteristic understanding of a mystery which confronts them all' (Models and Mystery p.70) and finding their union in a wonder and insight and worship." (op.cit, p.531).
Ramsey thus argues that we should "no longer see theology as a subject quite apart" (ibid. p. 530). On the contrary, we should see it "engaging in dialogue with other disciplines and making possible their cross-fertilization, and all that by bringing them to bear, with itself, on teasing and stubborn problems of contemporary thought and behaviour." (ibid. p. 530). The "most stubborn of the problems", as he calls them, are those which he sees as occurring on the frontiers between different disciplines. We see here an indication of how, for Ian Ramsey, the world, indeed the cosmos, was to be seen as an integral unit. He introduces here for example the problems that arise in an affluent society at a time of rapid social change - problems for example of labour and management which plainly need for their solution all the help that can be gained from economists, engineers, sociologists and psychologists but on which presumably theology if it has any view of man and his place in the universe, might be expected to have something to say.

"A general manager who is taunted by the tantalizing prospect of a production target of 1965 being no sooner reached before it is replaced by an even higher target for 1966, may be expressing a dissatisfaction like that which theological doctrines of the End were designed to meet. Whether these doctrines in fact any longer meet such a need, and the conditions under which they might be successful, if they are not now can be discovered only by frank, penetrating dialogue with no holds barred and no privileges expected or asked for on either side." (ibid. p. 531).

The range of such frontier problems is vast, extending across the whole spectrum of our lives, corporate and individual. I hope I may be forgiven for extending my quotation from "A New Prospect for Theology" a considerable degree further, for it reflects not only that which is relevant to Ramsey's treatment of the relation between metaphysics and contemporary empiricism but also reflects Ramsey's concern for the freedom and rights of the individual, the person as he most fully is or might most fully be.

"There are topics" (says Ramsey) "like that of the population explosion around which cluster problems like that of sterilization on which help will be needed from gynaecologists, lawyers, sociologists, and I dare add, moral philosophers, for whatever is thought about the point and purpose of moral philosophy, or of the function of moral philosophers in society, everyone would agree that the discussion of moral problems can benefit from the critical analysis which one would expect moral philosophers to bring to it. Other frontier problems arise around such topics as the alleged erosion by developments in the social and biological sciences of the
concept of personal responsibility - problems whose discussion would bring together, for example, scientists, sociologists, lawyers, psychiatrists to work with the theologian. There are also problems relating to crime and to the social institution of punishment, that need examination in the light of developments in the social sciences and in psychology, as well as developments in theological understanding of sin, law and the state. Present insight into evolution, investigation into the molecular basis of life, developments in cybernetics and neuro-surgery – all these must as inevitably influence our attitude to persons and socially as they appear to challenge traditional Christian views of man's origin and purpose. Yet another frontier area is that of health and healing which needs and deserves joint thinking by doctors, psychiatrists, theologians and others; and again it may be that educational problems are precisely those which need a cross-fertilized study. It is in wrestling with such problems in a co-operative venture of scholarship with other academic disciplines that theology may find a new prospect and a new relevance." (ibid. p. 531-2).

But though he saw empiricism as no longer wielding the "nonsense veto", as he calls it in On Being Sure in Religion, which it did in the 'thirties he still saw it as presenting us with a challenge – a challenge to religious people to elucidate "the empirical anchorage of their religious assertions" (OBSinR. p. 3). It was precisely this challenge that was to be met by such interdisciplinary discussion as he was to advocate in "A New Prospect for Theology". Two years before, in 1962, in his lecture in Oxford on Logical-Empiricism and Patristics, (Studia Patristica vol. 5. p. iii, Berlin 1962, pp. 541-7 (Texte und untersuchungen 80).) he had maintained that to condemn and dismiss the empiricism which prevailed in Great Britain, the United States and Scandinavia as "mere positivism or antimetaphysical" was a fundamental error. "Here it might seem", he wrote, "is no possible kind of friend; nothing disguised about the enmity. Here is something which could be of no possible help to Christian Philosophy." His purpose in this paper was to suggest that this kind of condemning judgment was mistaken; and that on the contrary, "we may have from contemporary empiricism, albeit a mellowed and chastened empiricism, insights and techniques which can be of very positive help to us." (op. cit. p. 541). But why might we not dismiss contemporary empiricism as "no possible kind of friend"? For Ramsey, then, the answer was that Christian philosophy had a two-fold lesson to learn from the insights and techniques of this empiricism. Firstly it would teach us that before rushing to facts we ought to linger over our language, giving it the oddness, the non-descriptive character, it must have in order to be
suitable currency for what it talks about. It was no longer good enough to suppose that all language is basically descriptive - "the tomato is red" and "the soul is immortal" only differing in so far as souls differ from tomatoes and immortality from redness. It was no longer plausible to say that what is not in this world, is in some other "world", for to make theology descriptive of another-separate-counterpart world is to raise difficulties not only about the meaning and verifiability of theological language, but also about the relation of any such "other" world to this one.

What Ramsey saw contemporary empiricism as saying to us was that rather than looking for an ontological diversity of different worlds, we ought rather to look for a logical diversity of language about one world and expect to find logical problems which are problems about the use of words so that what once seemed to be a puzzle about facts becomes a puzzle about language. And secondly it urges us that to look for meaning over vast acreages of shadowy facts in a counterpart world is to look for it, primarily, in situations including but transcending the spatio-temporal situations which the language contrives to evoke and express. Ramsey assures us that he is not suggesting that we should give up all question of ontology though he would say that we ought to be more circumspect and cautious about it. Thus he was able to write in 1960 in support of his views:

"We must give our theology a logical structure peculiar enough to ground it in the kind of situation I have... called a 'disclosure' - on such a view, to understand, for example, the assertion, 'the soul is immortal', we would start, I suggest, with discourse about mortality and develop in such a way as to lead to a disclosure which subjectively discloses to us everything that sentences containing the word 'soul' aptly expresses. 'Immortality' is no 'property' of a thing called a 'soul', and there is no logical kinship between, 'my soul is immortal' and its verbal kinsman, 'my flowers are everlasting'." (CE p.14).

Contemporary empiricism, therefore, broadened to include such disclosures as Ian Ramsey would talk about, introduces for him a more generous account of rationality, endeavours to map mystery, and displays a deliberate concern for the empirical basis of the Christian faith as expressed in its language of Bible, doctrine and liturgy knit with appropriate activity.
The challenge of contemporary empiricism was there, but it was a challenge which Ramsey welcomed because it brought about the situation where Christian theology had to think about the terms which it used and explore the nature and form of its belief. It was at one and the same time both a time of challenge and of great optimism. He opened his speech to the Parish and People Conference in Durham in 1967 (printed in *Spirituality for Today*) with the words, "My guess is that theology today, whatever its weaknesses, is much closer to and much more suited to Christian devotion than it has been for centuries." (op.cit.p.74).

In this speech he recalls how hard it was for him when reading a paper to the Oxford Society for Historical Theology very soon after the war, when theology was still very much what it had been for a long time, to urge that theology should take note of the growing empirical concerns with philosophy and its interest in language which at its most popular level had been expressed with great clarity in A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* some ten years earlier. It was then still some four or five years before the explicit challenge of the Falsification controversy occurred. It was more than ten years after that before Paul van Buren, Altizer, Bill Hamilton and the "God is dead" movement and so on. All these mark different expressions at different times of the battery of criticism which had been active for the past twenty or thirty years, yet it was Ramsey's belief that, "our present theological travail is bringing new spirituality to birth" (Sp. for Today p.75) for it asked of theology the question both whether and where it touched down and brought to light questions which hung over much traditional theology of spirituality of whether it did not imply "such a dichotomy between the natural and supernatural as made that theology utterly vacuous or, if not vacuous, pointless." (ibid.p.76), but he rejoices in the fact that at least "whatever the case was thirty years ago no-one is now prepared to deny the possible meaningfulness at least of religious language." (Point, no.3, Summer 1968, p.58).

Optimistic as he was, however, Ian Ramsey was not blind to the fact that not everyone greeted the challenge of empiricism with open arms as he did. In an article on "The Crisis of Faith" (Theoria to Theory, vol.7, Jan.1973, pp.3-38) he noted: "faced with the challenge of empirical knowledge men become negative, not to say neurotic, insensitive not to say incensed, in the defence of the status quo." (op. cit. p.24).
As a result of the growing importance which was being attached to the empirical and the secular, Ramsey realised that it was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory and difficult to read off at all easily God's purposes in nature and history, "a point which is obvious enough to the critical reader of the Old Testament and which lies behind John Wisdom's famous remark: "The existence of God is not an experimental issue in the way it was" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1944-5). (The Crisis of Faith p.26). This point may be put in the words of The Fourth R:

"On the one hand there was the theological view that God controlled the events of nature - rain or sunshine. Natural calamities were viewed as punishment, natural prosperity as reward. God was directly involved alike in man's prosperity and in his failures. Further, it was God who gave man the victory in battles between nations. Yet for some four hundred years men have been developing very different interpretations of nature, human history and history. The new ways of talking about the world, human nature and about history, not only seem never to need the concept of God, but often seem to be in head-on collision with all the ways of talking traditional to the theologian." (The Fourth R, sec. 82, p. 42).

Thus we are faced with the question of how we ensure that we talk sense, and how we make good sense rather than bad sense of what lies at the heart of our religious faith and conclusions. When Ian Ramsey came to consider such questions as a young man surrounded by logical positivists and challenged at every point to elucidate the meaningfulness of religious discourse he came to see that such discourse could not do without alluding to the facts and the features of the world around us, and yet it could not be satisfied with such an "empirical cashing" alone. It must, he maintained, therefore appeal to both empirical criteria and more, but not to more such criteria, since if this were so there would be no transcendence; nor to similar criteria but in another world since even if we could imagine it, it could have no grounding at all. Faced by this predicament, he came to talk of disclosures as that by which the transcendent made itself known both in and through the spatio-temporal, whether subjectively as that in ourselves which is more than our observable behaviour, or objectively as that which we speak of in terms of the Word of God. In other words, as we look around us, some so-called facts are there to be discriminated and looked at. These are, for Ramsey, the stock-in-trade of informative descriptive language - in the case of persons, eyes, ears, hair and skin as in Bishop Berkeley's Alciphron; but some other facts "declare themselves" and that is how we recognise persons and personal activity. In short, what Ramsey is maintaining is
that here, once again, we come to a position where we must, as he would have it, conclude that theology and, indeed, all religious claims, Christian or any other, in the end appeal to "disclosures", moments of vision, flashes of insight, though it is true to say that such phrases as evoke such disclosures may in fact conceal the point that a disclosure may not be at all spectacular, but rather possess the impressiveness and growing significance of a silence. Hence Ramsey’s frequent use of the two metaphors expounded in Religious Language, "the ice breaks" (a spectacular discontinuity) and "the light dawns" (a gradual awakening). It is perhaps worth recalling, as Ian Ramsey reminded his readers in a letter entitled The Intellectual Crisis of British Christianity (Theol., vol. LXVIII, no. 536, Feb. 1965, pp. 109-11) that Religious Language was written at a time when, to meet attacks on the Christian faith, it was necessary to show both that religious language could not be read as if it were flat and altogether descriptive like, "Blue Copper Sulphate turns white on heating"; and secondly that "what there is" is not restricted to "empirical facts" supposed implicitly if not always explicitly - to be solid, independent, utterly objective sense-data. He was to express this in more positive terms throughout the ensuing years in all its many dimensions and applications. Writing, for example, to his clergy as Bishop of Durham in 1968 in an article in his Diocesan magazine he says: "We who are Christians believe that there is a faith dimension to human existence, that there is an eternity in which time is fulfilled, that there is a divine which is interwoven with the secular." (The Church in the Secular City, The Bishoprick, vol. 43, no. 3, May 1968, p. 44).

The problems arose precisely because this faith dimension was never talked about - perhaps it never could be talked about - in a clear and unexceptionable way; if only the faith dimension was clear to everybody and its description agreed by everybody there would be no contemporary problems or controversy.

In regard to the "more" which Ian Ramsey would say that the Christian claims, lies beyond, behind and within the secular world, he sets the problems and difficulties into two groups with, on the one hand, what he calls the "sophisticated" and, on the other, what he calls the "popular" conception. The sophisticated attempts he sees as having described the "more" in terms of another world, another realm separated from this earthly realm by a gulf. This other world has then been regarded in
terms of some metaphysical system which, it is claimed, gives the truth about reality, a reality regarded as something quite distinct from the appearances which characterize space and time - This was the same kind of metaphysics as we saw coming under fire earlier. To talk about "another world", it was claimed, is unintelligible for it is to use, of a world which is in principle altogether different from our own, a language which is appropriate only to this world from which that other world in principle differs. Metaphysics, on this view, becomes at best a fantasy, an imaginative piece of "story", whose telling is designed to encourage us to take up a particular attitude towards life and to regard it, for example, as a pilgrimage or vale of soul-making (cf. Brathwaite and his attitude in EVNR). The difficulty of this more "sophisticated" attempt therefore is its growing incredibility, unintelligibility and irrelevance. In the "popular" view on the other hand, this "more" is not separated by any gulf from the present world. On the contrary, it is so clearly involved that all transcendence and mystery is lost and all men's failures and successes are alike attributed to God and explained by immediate reference to him. Despite all this, Ramsey would assert that the claims of metaphysics are justifiable since behind these erroneous expressions lie man's fundamental metaphysical desire to plot his position in the cosmos, a desire which finds its expression in Kant's questions, What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? In his contribution to Prospect for Metaphysics (P for M, ch. X: On the poss. and purpose of a metaphys 1 theol.) Ramsey argues that the situation which justifies metaphysics is very like what justifies for each of us our own use of 'I'...... "In this word 'I' we have a paradigm for all metaphysical indicators" (op. cit. p. 163). "We speak of God", he wrote, "by qualifying any and all descriptive language, whether of people, human behaviour, or the Universe, in such a way that it tells a more than descriptive story, in such a way that it evokes a disclosure, and this I suggest is most generally done either by qualifying descriptive language infinitely, or by qualifying descriptive language negatively." (Ibid. p. 173). This idea was put forward in its most detailed form in chapter two of Ramsey's Religious Language and again in Freedom and Immortality, for example, in the discussion in chapter five of the language of immortality and, more especially, a "future" life. The possibility of metaphysics arises therefore both because there is at least one integrator word, 'I'
(and hence he sees solipsism as the logical primitive metaphysics) and because this word 'I' is given in relation to a vision of what is unseen, in a disclosure situation.

"The possibility of a metaphysical theology arises when, to talk of the objective constituent of all disclosure situations which go beyond what is seen, to unite the various metaphysical words that are cast up in this way we use the word 'God'. This word 'God' is modelled on, though it has necessarily important differences from, 'I'. These differences are in fact grounded in the observable features of these various disclosure situations which most aptly lead us to God rather than to ourselves or other people."

(P for H p.174).

In the years which followed the publication of Religious Language and Freedom and Immortality we find this continued emphasis on the notion of personality and the role of the 'I' such as we saw displayed most markedly in Ramsey's earlier works. These references rising more and more out of the realms of morals and ethics as time goes on, appear as a constant theme throughout Ramsey's work.

"Can an account ever be given by the scientist himself, of the scientist himself, in wholly scientific, i.e. 'object' terms?" he asked in "Religion and Science: A Philosopher's Approach" (COFR, vol.162, Jan-Mar 1961, pp77-91, reprinted CE pp.143-58). "Here is a question which is surely to be given a negative answer; otherwise we would objectify the subject, so room is left for metaphysical key words."

How reminiscent this is not only of his early article on "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'" but also the first two chapters of his Freedom and Immortality where Ramsey, in his discussion of freedom, explores, firstly, the tensions between theories of predictability and decision; on the one hand that human will is or is not, respectively, a matter of what is, in principle, observable and on the other hand that acts of will are or are not objects and then, in chapter two where he develops his thesis that "free" decision is rightly seen as a response to the peculiar challenge which we call moral obligation and which is the challenge of objects and more. The complex doctrine of free will is, he maintains, a claim that there are certain situations in which subjectively a person transcends his public behaviour and acts more than "officially", such as in the parable of the Good Samaritan which Ramsey uses as an example of a man coming to himself, being most fully human, when the Samaritan acts in response to the challenges which in the same way but objectively transcends any observables though it may well be expressed.
through them whereas the priest and the levite, acting in their "official" way, pass by and fail to respond to the "obligation" which presents itself to them. (F&I p.30-31).

These same ideas are expressed in more contemporary terms in, for example, Ramsey's discussion of Biology and Personality (op.cit. chapter XIII), where he says, "The claim for free will is essentially the claim that certain kinds of personal behaviour (acts of will) elude the net of scientific discourse. To speak about free will in this sense is to claim some distinctiveness about personality, a claim, for some behaviour, that it has a 'personal backing'" (ibid. p.177).

Ramsey with his usual form offers us three examples of this kind of situation in which personal backing is an important element in a discussion. We may look at one example in detail. Jim, he says, is a rather hen-pecked husband who loves to fly his pigeons and one Bank holiday there is a most exciting pigeon race being held in the neighbourhood. But, we find him instead on the front at New Brighton with his wife and children. "I am surprised to see you here Jim", we say. "Oh", says his wife, "he decided to come to New Brighton after all." We look at Jim. Did he? We picture the various cause-factors in a discussion which, we may easily imagine, was mostly one-sided, and at the end of which Jim says, 'Yes, let's go to New Brighton.' There is no need to suppose that with sufficient ability someone might not be able to tell a compelling causal story culminating in Jim's crucial remark. But to answer the question whether Jim decided in a sense which both interests the moralist and is also connected with the problem of free will it is not a matter of whether his words were or were not completely determined by antecedent cause factors.

The question is, did Jim give his words a personal backing or not? Suppose Jim winks. It may be ambiguous. It may be what we would call the vanquished wink. This would imply, "I have been subject again to external pressures, and yielded. I did not behave 'like a man'. There may, on the other hand, be the victorious wink which would imply, "She thinks she won, but actually I did it freely. But either way - vanquished or victor - the wink witnesses to two senses of decision. In one case, the 'decision' had Jim's personal backing, and in the other case it had not. Further, only Jim can know. (F&I p.21-2).

A second example, more clear perhaps, but less plausible is the story of a Duke of Newcastle who dreamed he was making a speech in the House of Lords, and awoke to
find that he was. The point is that if we suppose at the moment of waking the Duke decided to give his words henceforward his personal backing, once again only he would know. The causal pattern could be exactly the same in both cases.

"The difference is that while all of it could be described homogenously as 'he is speaking' or 'the noble Lord is speaking' only part of it could be accurately described by the Duke as 'I am speaking'. The suggestion is, therefore, that what is significant about a personal backing, about the kind of decision on which the doctrine of free will concentrates, is something denoted by the word 'I' for each of us, and which is lost to such object words and phrases as 'He' or 'the noble Duke'." (F&I p. 23).

The third example concerns the phrases "I'm running" and "He's running" said by another person about me, and again the point is, that while the spatio-temporal features in both cases might be identical, in fact only the 'I' phrase can lay claim to personal backing.

Ian Ramsey's treatment of the notion of the 'soul' is very much akin to his treatment of the 'I'. Keeping "close to the empirical position", he wrote in Biology and Personality, "I would suggest that the word 'soul' can only be justified in relation to certain situations where what is more about human personality than its overt behaviour is disclosed." (B+P p. 178). He finds what he has to say about the soul much nearer to the Hebraic approach to נֶפֶשׁ (nēphēsh) as it appears particularly in the Old Testament where the word "soul" was so used as to be a synonym for "I" or "person" describes the whole living being- "objects and more", as opposed to the more circumscribed philosophical view of the soul as almost some kind of occult counterpart to body, though this too is not without its limitations. We shall discuss this in more detail when a little later we come to discuss the concept of immortality as explored in Freedom and Immortality and in the years subsequent to its publication. Suffice it to say here that we shall give the lie to the utterance "...if we allow it to be supposed that.....immortality is ever the 'property' of some 'thing' or 'object' called the 'soul'. To use the word 'soul' in such a way would be logically irresponsible and cavalier." (F&I p. 101).

Indeed, modern medicine and especially the recognition of a class of psychosomatic illness such as asthma have cut across the neat Cartesian separation of mind and body and now forces us to see man as a unity. He accuses both Creationist and Traductionist of being equally logically
circumspect in their treatment of the logical geography of the soul. "If we wish to maintain the theological distinctiveness of the soul", he says, "we must at least give some sort of hint as to the kind of logical peculiarity which soul language exhibits." (F&I p.102). It is precisely the same kind of logical peculiarity which is being advocated here as we have earlier seen advocated by Ramsey in relation to the word 'I'(acting especially in its role as the comprehensive integrator). We find much of the discussion by Ian Ramsey of the 'I', and thus of freedom and immortality as inseparably bound up with this, brought sharply into focus in the many varied considerations of personality, involving as it does the totality of the self. This is particularly evident in such works as Biology and Personality where, for instance, we find penetrating discussion of current neurological developments and, as is of particular interest to us, their effects on our notions of free will and responsibility. In a reply to a question from Dr. Rushworth in reference to the importance of environment in determining behaviour, for example, which asks amongst other things, whether Ian Ramsey would "agree that the variability of response to the same stimulus (ie. as applied to human beings) in a normal animal can be taken as an expression of free will?" (B+P p.196). Ian Ramsey answers:

"We need not deny that brain surgery could make a marionette of any of us, and that in this sense, free will and personality might disappear. But this does not mean that free will is no more than a variable response to a similar stimuli in the environment....such variable responses to the same environment might be a necessary criterion of free will, but it would not be sufficient. Free will rather relates to the claim that in certain types of activity - which admittedly occur as a response to some kind of environmental challenge - we realize ourselves as persons in a way that is not netted by the disciplines of science. If brain surgery ever made a marionette of someone, he would only be recreated as a person as and when he learned once again, for instance, that kind of free response that comes from responding to the challenge of Duty...." (ibid. p.197).

Here we see the practical implications of brain surgery and neurological research linked with and related to the discussion of free will and the response to the challenge of Duty in a way which focuses and highlights what Ramsey would have us support by grounding it as he saw so necessary in the empirical world, the world of science and technological development though without being bound to it and limited by it. Again, Professor Maynard Smith, while agreeing with Professor Ramsey that there are certain situations - for exam-
people after certain brain lesions - in which a man cannot be held to be responsible for his actions, questions nevertheless whether a man who has suffered a particular brain lesion is to be held not responsible for his actions, "because those actions are materially caused or determined?" or whether he is to be held not responsible "because of the particular kind of material causation involved?" (ibid. p.199).

Ramsey replies with characteristic emphasis on the totality of being (including of course its transcendental aspect) that we need to distinguish between a man's "action" and his "behaviour". He takes action to be that which embodies a man's whole personality, that is to say, that in being active a man is being most distinctively himself. Behaviour, on the other hand, he sees as the external expression of this activity, i.e. behaviour is what activity yields for study. A man who has suffered a particular brain lesion may well not be responsible for his behaviour but only when and because that behaviour is not the expression of his own activity. For Ramsey, therefore, it was necessary not to restrict talk of responsible behaviour to those specimens of behaviour for which, for the moment at any rate, we have no causal explanation. While he agrees that freedom and responsibility are not to be inserted into gaps which for the moment are left by causal explanation however, he feels that the case of those who claim freedom and responsibility for some actions, is that in those cases a man's activity is not something of which an exhaustive treatment can be given by the biological sciences but is characterised by a subjectivity which can never - and it is for Ramsey a logical never - be translated without remainder into a causal nexus of objects.

Ramsey had argued along these lines before, not only in Freedom and Immortality but also in Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis, which was published the year before Biology and Personality. In it, considering the notion of responsibility, Ian Ramsey had written: "If a person commits (for example) a murder, the question will be asked, 'Did he at the time of committing the act labour under such a defect of reasons as not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know this, did he know that what he was doing was wrong?" Could the murderer have chosen to let his victim live - is it just a matter of biochemistry, concerning, say, the level of blood sugar in the body etc., or is there something more? The matter is drawn out by Ian Ramsey by reference to
his correspondence with a Dr. Christopher Ounstead which he quotes on pages thirty seven to eight of his Biology and Personality, in the chapter entitled "What is man?". Dr. Ounstead writes, "A scientist cannot properly answer either of these questions... for the language in which they are couched implies metaphysical assumptions in principle untestable by scientific method." (p. 37). Does the scientist therefore refuse to answer? He has in fact two roles which must ordinarily be played simultaneously, "As a scientist he must disregard free will; as a clinician he must constantly assert its claims." (ibid. p. 38). Ramsey sees the importance of this - if free will and therefore morality is excluded, the question is raised whether it must then follow that a scientific society must become amoral. "With no religious view of personality", he answers, "that seems to be the inevitable conclusion." (ibid. p. 38).

In a supplementary note to this chapter he makes the point that, "To talk about 'acts of will' being either 'caused' or 'uncaused' seems to me a logical blunder - rather like asking what is the square root of my singing. To talk of an 'act of will' does not (I suggest) name an event in space and time. That it has one set of references to spatio-temporal events or to observable behaviour, we need not doubt or deny. But what we assert is that an 'act of will' is an ontological peculiar which, while displaying itself in spatio-temporal behaviour is not limited to the behaviour it displays in this way." (ibid. p. 57).

But what "more", we may be tempted to ask, is there then in an "act of will" than the spatio-temporal behaviour associated with it? For Ian Ramsey, to believe in free will is to believe that in certain cases of decision - whose ancestry may be more and more revealed, at least once the decision is "taken"; at the moment of decision we know ourselves active in a way which transcends all that scientific reports, however complex, might relate. He sees freedom as, "endeavours after self-realization, self-fulfilment and self-understanding... endeavours to exercise an outgoing, self expressive activity." (Personality and Science - An Interdisciplinary Discussion, Ciba Foundation Blueprint, ed. ITR/R. Porter, Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh: London 1971 p. 127). Indeed, as Ryle had said, "Men are neither machines nor ghosts in machines."

The plea is that we talk of persons as persons and not of some form of compound of mind and body. Man is to be seen not as just another animal or organism, distinctive only in having a particular biological complexity and social behaviour. Personality speaks of more than a special brand of organism albeit with some distinctive overt behaviour. In his contribution to Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy he develops further
this theme of the involvement of freedom in the notion of full personality. Having discussed this as we have seen in Biology and Personality especially, in regard to its practical applications, in the case of certain brain lesions or, perhaps less dramatically, in the case of the habitual shoplifter, we find the discussion continued in his contribution, "Moral Judgements and God's Commands":

"A moral judgement" (he writes) "occurs as and when a group of natural properties 'comes alive', 'takes on depth', in this sense discloses a claim emerging from them, a claim to which we respond in a 'free' decision. We make a value judgement rather than a plain descriptive judgement, when there arises around a group of plain 'facts' what I have called elsewhere a 'discovery', what might be called 'ethical insight'. We are all aware of what happens when (as we'd say) a puzzle picture suddenly comes to life, when a flat set of straight lines takes on depth, when yet another hand in a formal reception is that of a friend. The plain, flat situation.....mediates something else, reveals an 'undercurrent' - around and out of the 'plain facts' a discovery occurs. I have given examples elsewhere of how in this way moral obligations or, more generally, value claims, are disclosed through and around plain facts and I would respectfully refer the reader to them." (CE+CP p.166).

Some of these examples appeared in the first part of chapter two of Freedom and Immortality. One such example, the first in the chapter, supposes the event of a road accident with the consequent screeching of brakes, crashing of metal against metal and groans. From a strictly scientific standpoint Ramsey argues, we find here a situation in regard to the noises, human and otherwise, comparable with those to be heard in the case of "the grinding of meat in an inefficient mincer turned by a vile tempered butcher." (F&I p.29). In this case too, the noise precedes the cutting up of flesh and the dispersal of blood. What has been done here is to regard the situation purely in "object" terms. The example is developed further; we are asked to suppose that one person who hears this fearsome noise is a doctor. He rushes out of his house, yet this need be no more than a reaction to stimuli, years of practice in hospital and laboratory leave him acting with all the efficiency of a trained automaton. Suppose then, that at the time of the accident, the doctor was reading, like all good doctors should, the latest edition of the British Medical Journal. Now, he might decide either to continue to read his
journal quite unmoved by the sounds outside or, alternatively, he might leave what he was doing and go to the crash. Yet, argues Ramsey, we need not say that he "decided" to go to the crash. He might go quite "automatically." It might still be just a matter of training or habit, again the reaction may be no more than a reaction to stimuli, albeit that a far more complex reaction has taken place than before, due to the greater range and variety of the stimuli. This might be called an "impersonal decision", if we want to talk in terms of decision at all, since still a scientific account of the "decision" in object terms alone would be wholly adequate. Suppose, however, that our doctor friend, hearing the noise of the accident feels, as he might say, "obliged" to leave his journal. He might start to talk of "duty to humanity", of a "challenge" to which he must respond. This state of affairs alone would, for Ramsey, mark free will and responsible decision. Personal backing has been added to his "decision". A free decision is therefore neither merely a reaction to stimuli, though nor is it independent of such, since the challenge issues from the objects even though it is not restricted to them; it is a personal response transcending all the observables, the objects, of the given situation. Similarly our attention is drawn to the parable of the Good Samaritan recounted by St. Luke (Lk. 10:30-35). (F&I p. 30f.). Instead of a motor accident those involved in the story (and it is important to add the phrase "in the story" because the priest and the levite did not get involved in the incident and that is the whole point) are confronted by a traveller, wounded on his way to Jericho. Both priest and levite, passing by, act in their "official" capacity, moving only within the channels of the patterns of behaviour laid down by their office — once again we may speak of the situation as "impersonal". Then, along comes the Samaritan. Here is not a situation of Samaritan meets Jew, (as it was priest/levite meets object outside the category of ritually clean etc.) but official categories are transcended and man meets man. The Samaritan is moved (ἐσπανκχνικθωθε) and acts in response to the challenge before him. He bandages the wounded traveller and gives him all the help that he is able. Such actions make free decision a decision personally backed. "Such a claim disclosed through and around plain facts has traditionally been spoken of by terms like 'Duty' or 'Moral Law' and a theological interpretation arises as and when such terms are theologically contextualized." (CE&CP p. 166).
Moreover he argues,

"Natural Law..., claims that everyone who deserves to be called a person acknowledges some basic moral obligation, which gives rise to moral principles on which there can be general agreement. Further, since moral obligation has been traditionally interpreted in terms of God's will, natural law readily lent itself in days past to a supplementation by Christian principles which were related to that particular mystery of his will which was made known in Jesus Christ." (CE+CP, chap.XX: Towards the Rehabilitation of Natural Law p.383).

Indeed, it is then, in recognising a dominant moral claim about 'survival' that we recognise ourselves as distinctively persons. It is not surprising then, that, as Ramsey argues, traditionally the recognition of Natural Law has been supposed to be somehow definitive of human personality. For this is, in effect, none other than the old point that we become persons in discovering or discerning moral obligation, the point argued throughout Freedom and Immortality and especially, as we have seen, in chapter two. Ramsey thus maintains that in responding to Duty, "we become aware of ourselves and indeed our responsibility and freedom as and when we respond transcendentally to the claim of what is a transcendent moral challenge." (B+P p.185). It is in becoming aware of moral demand that we become aware of ourselves, our freedom and our responsibility. The example of Ramsey's most quoted in this regard is the well known story of David and Nathan (II Sam.12:1-7a) (cf. RL p.113 + Medicine, Morals and Man p.166-77). The logical exercise which Nathan performed was that of calling up by a parable such a description of events as might, along-side David's behaviour, produce a disclosure of the transcendent obligation in relation to which David would "come to himself", which, in fact, as we know, he did.

In his activity, man not only recognises himself as fully man but, as Peter Baelz in his Christian Theology and Metaphysics (p.101) says: "In his activity and in his perceiving - which is, after all, a form of activity - man is engaged with what is other than himself, and what is other than himself is at least as real and as substantial as himself." (cited by ITR in his review of the book, Ch. Q. vol.1, no.2, Oct.1968 p.170). In a specifically Christian context then, "coming to oneself" is the appropriate response to a cosmic disclosure which in one way or another arises around the person of Jesus who, Christians would claim, is the individuation of God himself. The claim is that when the historical pattern, the Jesus of history, "comes alive", the individuation, like that of the
universe or that of an all compelling duty, is the individuation of God. When, further, in such a situation a self-disclosure occurs and we "come to ourselves", we "come alive" the phrase aptly used about us is that we have found "eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord". But how may we express this "other" which is other than ourselves? In an article in the first edition of *New Directions*, Ian Ramsey recalls how twelve years previously he had written in *Freedom and Immortality* that philosophers whose concern was with ordinary language as the basis of their investigations and reflections would do well to concern themselves with the most ordinary of situations such as the casual remark on the pavement or the popular song since in such language might be found clues to a dimension of existence that was untouched by more precise ways of talking, in which the person was much less self-involved. It is this "ordinary language" which we find on the promenade at New Brighton, in road accidents, disasters at sea, marriage, nicknames and the children's toys. These exhibit such diversity, Ramsey would maintain, as might argue for the possibility of metaphysics (i.e., for the possibility of some language used aptly about what is unseen). In expressing the point rather more theologically, he states his belief that God has not left himself without a witness in the ordinary language we use, though this ordinary language can be so disenfranchised as to fail to point to the rock from whence it was hewn. If we believe, as Ramsey would have us believe, that the ordinary and the secular may point to the sacred, then surely we must also believe that ordinary language may have this revealing quality. Ramsey goes on to approach this from another direction. He states his belief that, "the basis for all religious faith, and for Christian faith in particular, is to be found in disclosure situations where (as we would say) we "come alive", in response to something we "see" which breaks in on us, which subjectively and objectively takes on depth." (*New Directions* p. 21). It is with precisely such situations that we have been involved in our present discussion, the doctor at the car accident, the Good Samaritan and the man who dives into the river to save a drowning child regardless of his own safety, along with countless others from the pages of Ramsey (and those of his predecessors such as Butler), notably works like *Freedom and Immortality*, experience such disclosures as they respond with characteristic activity when and as
they add their personal backing to their actions.

Much the same sentiments were expressed in Ian Ramsey's sermon at the Conference of Modern Churchmen in 1969 (printed in Mod.Chman, NS, vol. XIII, no. 1, Oct. 1969, pp. 7-15). I hope that I may be forgiven for quoting at some length a section of this sermon but, as will I hope be seen, it is an example of Ramsey at his best and well illustrates the points which we have so far been making.

"...a man finds his freedom, comes alive, when he freely acknowledges something that inspires him, when there is a spontaneous response to an authoritative disclosure. We may have been struggling with a problem or wrestling with a moral decision. We feel caught, imprisoned in a web of the most intricate intellectual construction or baffled, oppressed by the complexities of a moral problem. Then, in one case, a particular technique brings a solution, there is a breakthrough, a release, the light dawns, we come alive and in coming alive find our freedom. Or, in the other case, as we detail the empirical features of the moral problem and at the same time survey the principles which enshrine our ideal, again, a breakthrough, a matching; and around a certain possibility emerges a moral obligation; we respond to make our moral decision and in responding find our freedom. The liberal is he who is concerned for this kind of freedom, the freedom which emerges when we respond to an authoritative disclosure. If people or institutions, or doctrines, attitudes, structures or policies are not to be oppressive, they must be such as to win in this way our spontaneous acknowledgement, our free response. The liberal in theology, the liberal tradition in Christianity seeks then a freedom which matches an authority which is neither oppressive nor private, neither authoritarian nor laissez-faire." (op. cit. p. 8).

Along these lines, he continues a little later in the same sermon:

"An intellectual system whether of science or politics or theology can be (as) oppressive, it can enslave, men, quite as much as iron fetters or economic circumstances. Men can be in captivity to a particular pattern of reasoning as much! as to a foreign power. Reason might supply, and it did supply, particular principles, particular systems to give the Christian faith a wide perspective and the universal appeal, but at the next move these very principles and systems could strangle it of life." (ibid. p. 9).

and he concludes:

"...we must not be imprisoned in, or bound by a particular styling or particular images. This would be idolatry." (ibid. p. 9).

In From Fear to Faith (edit. N. Autton, London: SPCK 1971) we again find the theme of wholeness taken up in Ian Ramsey's contribution, "The Theology of Wholeness", where once again we find the idea of man as more than biological man, psychological man, sociological man and so
on. Responding freely and spontaneously to some disclosed obligation, accepting some challenge to which I freely respond when I say that I am inspired, that is a sense of activity altogether different from the activity which takes place when I tumble down stairs or fall off the bus: that is what Ramsey calls "behavioural activity", because it does not have my personal backing - unless of course I am doing it in some comedy show. Here once again is the plea for personal backing as we saw it in the examples from Freedom and Immortality (the doctor, the Duke of Newcastle, the Good Samaritan) and elsewhere. "I have argued", he says, "that there can be no adequate account of human personality except by taking wholeness as a definitive category." (FsEToF, p.83). For the Christian, this wholeness is to be found in the response to the disclosure of God in Christ, a response which, exercised in freedom and spontaneity, brings to man, life and fulfilment. In it self-realization expresses itself through our biochemistry and our behaviour. "This personal activity, however, will never in time be perfectly expressed, for we are, like the Author of our salvation, made perfect only through suffering and death, and perfect wholeness is but one way of styling our eternity." (ibid, p.84).

The transition from talk about freedom and personality to talk about immortality comes at this stage as an easy progression. In Freedom and Immortality Ian Ramsey had written at the beginning of chapter four, "What situation justifies belief in immortality? .... Any situation which, subjectively, is my public behaviour and more. In particular, situations of 'freedom' offer us at one and the same time discernments of immortality as well." (F&I p.91). He goes on to explain how this might be so. "When we are 'free', " he says, "we exhibit what we call 'personal decision', we are 'alive' in a sense which mortality cannot exhaust; half-decided, we are half-alive - wholly official, and from the standpoint of personality we are dead already." (F&I p.91). Death, he had already shown (see for example P+F, Hibbert Journal, vol. 45, no. 4, 1955-6, pp. 330-338 and p.64ff.) can have many meanings. Biological "death", for example, talks of the break down of organic processes, decomposition and the like. Death for the psychologist may be spoken of in terms of a point beyond which we can never again show certain behaviour responses. Socially, "death" is that occasion after which a man may no longer throw his darts or attend his dinner parties. Death for the statistician is something which involves the pay out of insurance premiums and so the list might go on. Death is then, the
cessation of everything which is now taken to characterize a person's behaviour. While it is true to say that we may talk about people acting impersonally, the butcher, the tax collector, the doctor, the booking clerk, the priest and the levite, we are, it has been argued, more than this, more than our "official" self, we are more than our biochemical reactions and organic processes, our behaviour responses, our economic significance and so on. When we act with our "personal backing", when we make our "free decision" we become "alive" and this sense of life is not one which death as a descriptive word can end, for "life" now refers to a situation which is not exhausted by any one or all of a set of spatio-temporal events. "....To justify 'freedom' by appealing to decision-situations which exceed public behaviour....is at the same time to justify belief in immortality." (F&I p.66). "Just as with every conviction of freedom there goes an awareness of some obligation", he adds, "just as freedom is a response to obligation; so with our conviction about our own immortality, there goes an awareness of some other which - like ourselves - is not restricted to the spatio-temporal." (F&I p.99). If, as Ramsey argues, we are not restricted or confined to those features of our existence which are in space and time and are thus in that way free, we are, in that sense, immortal.

In his article "Immortality" in Collier's Encyclopaedia he again reasserted his conviction that belief in immortality is more than a claim for mere survival. Indeed, he sees man's belief in immortality as a conviction of his transcendence of time, "The point....of all traditional arguments for immortality must lie in their ability....to evoke situations which give man a vision of his transcendence."

The transcendence he says "may be disclosed as a man realizes his mystical participation in an evolutionary process of cosmic proportions, as and when he realizes his freedom in responding to Duty which transcends the pressures of social convention; or when in moral progress he realizes what is 'beyond morality'."

We see again the emphasis on what is the "more" in a situation and also the characteristic linking together of the notions of freedom (in its relation to duty) and immortality. This was the same kind of thing as Ramsey had found in the works of Bishop Butler. In his article on Bishop Butler written for the Dr. Williams Trust he wrote of Butler:
"In his discussion of a future life, Butler argues that we know only the effects of death, and that what we know at the present of our own power and activity exceeds these effects. What death is, we do not (nor shall not) know till we ourselves have died. While death certainly removes the possibility of having the sort of proof that we have now of someone being a living person, nevertheless, we cannot conclude with certainty that death destroys living persons. As he says (Works, vol. II, p. 15), 'We cannot argue from the reason of the thing that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin and bones.' So, he concludes, there is a presumption, however slight, that we live after death. As Butler remarks later, (J. Butler, Works vol. II), 'That we are living beings, affords a strong possibility that we shall continue so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us....' Such a view indeed could 'have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience.' So, as he says, a supposition 'which in all reason we are to go upon' is that 'our living nature will continue after death.' Here is a question of great consequence, and belief in immortality will thus be part of a reasonable life and total commitment." (op. cit. p. 16-17).

But, if a notion of immortality is that of the transcendence of time, then what sense can we make of such phrases as "eternal life." In his On Being Sure in Religion, an expanded version of his F.D. Maurice lectures of 1961-2, Ian Ramsey argued that the word "eternal" is a key word in the New Testament and that since it is the aim of the divine economy to draw our minds from the temporal and to fix them on the eternal we ought then to avoid any confusion between thoughts which our Lord has taken such pains to keep distinct and which indeed our conscience tells us ought to be so. It is when the two are confused that misunderstanding and perplexity arise. If we multiply, Maurice had argued in his Theological Essays of 1853 (p. 436, cited OBSR p. 11), a thousand years by a thousand, by twenty thousand, by a hundred thousand, by a million we end up as far from eternity as ever. Our fundamental mistake therefore is to bring Time into the question. "Eternal" is not synonymous with "everlasting" if everlasting is taken to mean "going on in a temporal time series for ever and ever." "Undoubtedly the point of the word eternal is to draw our minds from the temporal, to fix them elsewhere" (ibid. p. 16) or, at least, the word "eternal" is one which, "beginning with a temporal reference, will help us to draw our minds from fixing on it." (ibid. p. 16-17).
We may compare this to his article on "Hell" where he explores the doctrine of Hell in very Maurician terms, treating the idea of 'endless' punishment very much along the same lines as he had treated on the idea of "eternal" life in On Being Sure in Religion in 1953. The article on Hell was originally given as a Durham University Lightfoot Society Lecture and contains some very typical Ramsey comments on the subject of life after death. For example, "while talk about life after death will always bristle with logical problems, nevertheless faute de mieux we must speak of it somehow or other in terms of such features of our present existence as seem to us most fundamental to human, and in particular (Butler would say) moral, existence." (Talk of God p. 210.)

However, while Ramsey agreed that the multiplication of years by increasing degrees would leave us, at every stage, as far off from eternity as ever, he saw a marked degree of similarity between Maurice's example of the multiplication of years and an infinite sequence in mathematics (e.g. \( \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{5}, \ldots \)). In the infinite sequence we may at any point be said to be "as far off" from unity "as ever." Yet, argued Ramsey, it is equally true that while there is no end to the story, nevertheless at some stage or other we may "see" that to which the sequence is "pointing," viz 1. Thus too with his example of the series of circles which he uses in Freedom and Immortality. "If someone," he wrote, "draws a series of circles, centres \( O_1, O_2, O_3, O_4, \ldots, O_n \) respectively, and draws to each circle diameters \( A_1 O_1 B_1, A_2 O_2 B_2, \ldots, A_n O_n B_n \) respectively: we might 'see' at once that the ratio of any circle centre \( O_r \) to its diameter \( A_r O_r B_r \) was constant." (F&I p. 114) - Herein is a disclosure situation by which we get to know what is meant by the symbol \( \pi \). So with talk of a "future life" "Immortality" tells us something of which we can be aware here and now (the word belongs as we have seen to a disclosure in the present).

However, while we may now have a reliable account of an infinite series of moments, Ramsey is aware that from this we have no reason whatever to assume that "life" after death is to be regarded as temporally continuous with this life. "Our picture of a continuous temporal series which, as 'infinite' inevitably extends beyond death, is only a rough way of working out the significance of what is given to us now in our intimation of immortality." (F&I p. 117).

Ramsey was only too quick to recognise the problems and difficult-
ies which faced those involved in commending the Christian Faith; the problem of how to create such disclosure situations, such moments of vision, and moreover how to recapture the haunting situations of life which, too, led to those great moments of cosmic disclosure which stir men and become recognised as the point at which God is revealing Himself. In facing this question in *New Directions* in 1969 (ND, NS, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1969 pp. 21-24) he recalled that in a memoir of Charles Raven he had written:

"Sunset and moonlight, a moth emerging from its pupa; or the patterns of a bird's feathering - all these provided him with glimpses of the eternal; and God also met him in splendour when he saw in Liverpool a young couple lovelmaking on a seat by the roadside on St. James's Mount. When in the same city he saw the proprietor of a dingy shop in shirt sleeves dispensing packets of fish and chips wrapped in a newspaper to a crowd of shawl-clad women, again there was, he tells us, 'of a sudden the glory; and God fulfilling his eternal task, giving his children their daily bread'. In this way, nature and human nature constantly revealed God." (op. cit. p. 22).

The disclosure situations occur, then, in the ordinary events of life which suddenly, by the disclosure, "come alive," "take on depth", assume new meaning and significance. They occur not only in dramatic events but in the simplicity and beauty of the life of the world as it is lived from day to day. Wherever people meet people there is God in the midst of them waiting to be recognised and whose recognition gives us a glimpse of our own immortality, our "eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" - that point at which we recognise the "more", the transcendent dimension of our lives. In his chapter on the Theology of Salvation in Medicine Nomina and Man (ed. E. Claxton and H.A.C. McKay, Blanford, 1969, pp. 67-77) with reference to St. Paul's distinction between flesh and Spirit (Rom. 8, cf. II Cor) Ian Ramsey remarks concerning this that the contrast which St. Paul is making is not one between mind and body, or between flesh and spirit of as dichotomous but is between, on the one hand, the person who makes his fleshly activities his dominant concern and pursuit and on the other hand, the person who recognises that while he is fleshly he is also much more, and that he has an existence which while it certainly includes, also extends beyond his eating, drinking and reproductive functions. This wider existence in which man is fulfilled, in which he finds his 'wholeness' or 'salvation' Ian Ramsey sees as an existence which is revealed, an existence in
which a man experiences self-disclosure, when he comes to know God and his power and love in Jesus Christ. He wrote:

"The one may be a whole man, but his integration comes from a purpose which is entirely earthly centered. The other is a whole man with an integration which comes from a purpose which arises in a situation of a transcendent kind, transcendent, that is, in not being restricted to the spatio-temporal elements of which scientific disclosure speaks." (p. 171).

The divine act of creation (Gen. 2:7, cf. I Cor. 15) was a first in-breathing of life - the creation of the natural man, but with God's act in Christ there was, so to say, a second in-breathing. Whereas the first gave to man human life, his natural personality, the second gave him eternal life, his Christian status though from first to last man is conceived as a unity. Ramsey's concern to see man as a unity remains a constant theme, as we have seen, throughout his work. The Cartesian duality, shattered by Ryle in The Concept of Mind, finds no place either, in the thought of Ian Ramsey. We may recall his comment in Biology and Personality:

"The distinction between 'mind' and 'soul' has often been greatly blurred. The Greeks by no means spoke with one voice on the matter, as a popular view often believes. As for the Hebrews, the word translated 'soul' can be variously translated 'breath', 'life', 'mind', 'living being', 'person' or 'self'. Yet while there can be no easy answer given as to what is meant by the word 'soul'. . . . It is undoubtedly true that when a personality has been accounted for as the taking on of a soul, this soul is supposed to be some 'thing' superadded to what was there before. But contemporary philosophy would certainly warn us against taking this kind of explanation at its face value, for what could be meant by talking of the soul as a thing, supposing it to be, on the one hand, something like an object (or perhaps a mind) and yet utterly different from both of them since they and not it are wholly spatio-temporal." (op. cit. p. 178).

In 1970, in a sermon preached to the British Association, in Durham Cathedral, Ian Ramsey said:

"The main mistake is to suppose that theology is prescriptive, dictating the answers to which scientific enquiry must come. But the distinctive function of theology is . . . to witness to 'depth'. . . . to take seriously the moral dimension. . . . Theology needs to do a task which it avoided doing for some three hundred years; and deliberately refused to do a hundred years ago. But the road to such an integration, the road to a contemporary mapping or projection of theology, is the same as the road to a scientific culture - through the crucible of contemporary social and moral problems shared by all disciplines." (Edward p. 27).

It was in this crucible of contemporary social and moral problems that Freedom and Immortality had been forged in 1957. Professor Braithwaite
had once complained that Professor Ramsey sometimes used the words "empirical" and "fact" in contexts which surprised him. Use of these expressions made it look to him as if Ramsey were committing the gravest of all category mistakes - that of supposing an ought to follow from an is (Camb. Rev. 1956). It raises the question of how one can commit oneself to an empirical fact and how a fact can have a claim on one. He suspected that the inverted commas which Ramsey sometimes puts around his "facts" indicated that these can only be referred to by statements whose "logic" is "odd", in that it includes the use of a special "logical qualifier". Braithwaite was troubled about this "odd logic" not least by the problem of how it might be communicated to a non-Christian. As David Edwards notes in his biography of Ramsey:

"Braithwaite had put his finger on Ramsey's weakness as a philosopher, by complaining that Ramsey could not explain the 'facts' of Christian belief fully to the non-Christian. In part this was due to Ramsey's own conviction. Although all men had a moral sense which went beyond the biological drive to survival, yet this did not amount to the universal recognition of Natural Law, let alone God, by the conscience. For Ramsey, there was a disclosure which Christians, and only they, saw." (Edwards p. 38).

This is perhaps a little harsh on Ramsey since for him the whole point of a disclosure was that it was an act of revelation. Admittedly, he did not explicate what the "more" of life was nor how and where it was to be recognised, except to say that it could just as easily be in the common events of life as in the dramatic ones.

It was of course only his desire to show the empirical anchorage of all religious discourse and not to explain it away purely in terms of empirical "facts".

In Theology (Jan. 1965) Professor Ninian Smart claimed that all religious language must somehow describe ultimate reality and not just engineer the discernment of it. He added:

"If we take the description away, we take truth away. That is why Ramsey's position, though it so far need not entail atheism, is compatible with it... 'God' becomes the name for penny dropping experiences... it is as though someone was to say that 'God' was the name for all patches of blue... Ramsey thus has really dispensed with transcendence... This is equivalent to a superstitious atheism."

Edwards, commenting on the period when Ramsey became Nolloth Professor of the Christian Religion at Oxford, suggests that Christian belief at
this time often seemed to be treated as an inherited tradition, appealing to the imagination, producing holiness and courtesy but ill at ease with both science and democracy. The need to develop a dialogue between a traditional theology and the new philosophy was increasingly recognised, but the stress was on being thoroughly professional, and, to be blunt, Oxonian, in philosophy. The key figure in the Christian don's discussion group known as "the Metaphysicals" which Ramsey joined was the brilliantly graceful and ingenious Austin Farrer, who, it appears made no secret of either his affection for or his suspicion towards the newcomer. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that when, in 1957, Faith and Logic, a collection of essays by members of this group appeared under the editorship of Basil Mitchell, it contained no contribution by Ian Ramsey. This might suggest that the new professor had yet to prove himself amongst the Oxford philosophers.

The same year as Faith and Logic was published saw the delivery of the Forwood lectures on Freedom and Immortality by Ian Ramsey in Liverpool. Their publication by S.C.M. in 1960 was not greeted by their reviewers with an overwhelming enthusiasm though the journal, Theology, regarded it as "a book which should be compulsory reading in theological colleges", and in the Hibbert Journal, H.D. Lewis, whose very constructive criticism we shall discuss in a little while, maintained that "no-one who wishes to examine the problems of freedom and immortality, as they appear today can afford to neglect this book." J.I. Packer, writing for the Church of England Newspaper remembering how when the empiricist revival broke out just before the last war, it was the delight of the young philosophers to dismiss all theological statements as nonsense on the grounds (admitted by both sides) that they cannot be experimentally verified in the manner of scientific hypotheses, remarks that, "Now that the new empiricism is middle-aged, ... it has become more sober and demanding" and thus commends such a book as Freedom and Immortality rising as it does to meet this challenge. The Times Literary Supplement (TLS Apr. 8, 1960) recognising that while, "like Kant, Professor Ramsey justifies our belief in free will and immortality by reference to moral duty" and "holds that the situation of response to duty reveals a self which is not wholly bound down by spatio-temporal conditions in respect either of causal determinism or of the limits of its existence" noted that, "nevertheless a moral dec-
cision is an event which takes place in time," and wanted to know "how it can be exempt from ordinary causality". Equally, it pointed out that "although 'going-on' is not an adequate account of immortality, immortality entails at least going on after death" and they further, therefore, wanted to know, "What goes on and how it goes on." "Professor Ramsey", they concluded, "has so little in the way of a clear answer to these questions that his book remains scarcely more than a pointer to problems which deserve consideration." (The comments from these reviews are taken from copies cut out from their respective journals and kept by Ian Ramsey amongst his private papers.) This is, it is true to say, in many ways a fair criticism of Freedom and Immortality. As we have seen many of the answers to the questions raised by the critic of the Times Literary Supplement are answered when we look at Ramsey's work as a whole. Though we may be doing this nearly twenty years on, however, the reviewer did have fifteen years of Ramsey behind him but one feels that he is little acquainted with what Ian Ramsey had already had to say. Perhaps the trouble is that Ian Ramsey assumed too much and wrote too much from his own sure standpoint, unhelpful in that he did not go so far as to suggest ways in which those presenting the Christian faith to non-Christians might help to bring about the all important disclosure situations. The reviewer for the Church Times ("Two Vital Concepts", Church Times, 8 Apr. 1960) provides us with a systematic and penetrating criticism of Freedom and Immortality, again only a short while after its publication. He criticises Ramsey's use, and sometimes perhaps too frequent use, of illustrations from mathematics and science. While he would admit that some of these at least are not unhelpful, he thinks that their use often looks artificial "and might unkindly be described as bogus" and he goes so far as almost to accuse Ramsey of using them merely to add a hint of academic respectability to the work. He doubts, secondly, whether indeed the very substance of Ramsey's arguments "would prove as attractive to the empiricists as the form in which they are dressed up". With regard to Ramsey's discussion of personal decision with its appeal to seeing such situations as being more than just this or that behaviour pattern but as the place where each of us is distinctively 'I'; while admitting with Ramsey that in a responsible decision there is something more than can be explained by references to physical, economic or psychological determinism and
that at least a particular kind of free decision occurs as a response to the challenge of duty or absolute value, he objects to Ramsey's introduction of God at this point, at least along the lines of his empiricist argument. He sees Ramsey's reference to non moral disclosure situations (connected with such phrases as "first cause" and "necessary being") as being the introduction of the cosmological argument, "without support or defence, to justify bringing in God and in aid of the transcendental character of moral obligation". He concludes, "From the empiricist's standpoint there is surely a big gap in the author's reasoning here. Even to the more sympathetic reader it may look suspiciously as though God is being introduced to validate absolute moral values." Likewise with immortality. His synopsis of Ramsey is, in so far as it goes, correct. At the root of all language about immortality for Ramsey is the freedom of the human person and it is as a person that one receives intimations of immortality, for when one exercises personal decision one is "alive" in the truest sense, and while death is the termination of man as an object, bringing to an end his public behaviour, in so far as he is an "object and more", he is immortal. The Church Times sees this explanation of immortality as on a "distinctively slender foundation" for an examination of the ways in which immortality can be significantly described. The fundamental error of the reviewer is to see Ramsey's method and arguments as those of contemporary empiricism, seen without qualification or explanation. Ramsey however never conceded to the empiricist position but saw that it was nevertheless important to give discourse about God a grounding, an anchorage in the empirical world, and it was this with which the book was involved and not in providing a "proof" for the existence of God.

The most significant review of Freedom and Immortality, however, was written by H. D. Lewis for the Hibbert Journal in 1961. (Lewis R.) By way of introduction Professor Lewis describes how "the philosopher who undertakes to write about religious questions today is apt to find himself balancing on a very slim tightrope." (op. cit. p. 168). If he begins to speak of God as if he were one entity among others then he will fall foul of many critics, not least amongst whom are the empiricists. On the other side there is "the bottomless abyss of not saying anything at all." (ibid., p. 168). While he admits that at no point does Ian Ramsey ever quite lose his foothold, Professor Lewis does add that
"he...gives his readers some exceedingly anxious moments by leaning so far over on the side of the abyss of silence." (ibid., p.168).

Lewis' criticisms are both helpful and, for the most part, well founded. He finds a certain amount of difficulty in Ramsey's use of the idea of personal backing in so far as he would like to know how it comes about, what its value is and how precisely to understand the "more" which, while expressing itself in various observable directions, ultimately transcends them. A subsidiary difficulty concerns the dismissal of behaviour which does not involve the free and personal decision as only reaction to stimuli. Thus with the priest and levite in the parable of the Good Samaritan -

"Were they not in their way acting responsibly or should we exempt them on the grounds that their choice is not free? Many redoubtable defenders of freedom in the past have ended up in the position of holding that only good actions, but never bad ones, are free and responsible. That accords well with one kind of theology, but not I imagine one that commends itself to Professor Ramsey." (ibid., p.170).

He feels, too, some misgiving over Ramsey's description of a free decision as "spatio-temporal and more", arguing that all our conduct must in some way be said to be temporal (though we may also in some cases be said to transcend time); again in the quarrel is over the "more" and the plea is that Ramsey be more precise over what he means by it because all that we know is that it is not an idea of a timeless self.

The discussion on immortality follows very closely that on freedom. The main emphasis is again on the fact that we are "spatio-temporal and more", "because we are in that sense free, in that sense we are immortal." (F&I, p.66), and the same arguments for a more precise definition of the "more" thus apply once again.

Lewis' suspicion is that Ramsey is, in fact, conceding more than necessary to prevailing fashion and Ramsey's arguments along these lines come dangerously close to suggesting that because we are persons and responsible beings we are ipso facto immortal when he says for example, "It is in so recognising duty as something which transcends the spatio-temporal, that we recognise our own transcendence of the spatio-temporal, our own immortality." (F&I, p.73) or "In some cases, our awareness of obligation and our awareness of immortality are given together." (F&I, p.72). In short, for Ramsey, as we have seen, "immortality" and "unending life" do not tell of some "property" of a "thing" called a soul, or of some existence like our public behaviour now but
going on and on and on. They tell rather of a situation we know now which is characteristically distinctive in being more than spatio-temporal. Further, while Ramsey manages to stress "the sense of wonder and mystery and depth which surrounds the 'special situations' he describes..... even if this does lend these situations a religious character, that will not suffice to establish particular items of religious belief." (Lewis R. p.175).

Here Lewis betrays that he has, like so many others, missed the point of Freedom and Immortality. If one tries to force the book to provide answers or proofs or to establish the validity of propositional claims then, ultimately the book will fail to live up to the task but then that is not the purpose for which the book was written. Its purpose, as Ramsey points out in his reply to Lewis' criticisms, an article entitled, "Some Further Reflections on Freedom and Immortality" (Hibbert Journal vol.LIX, no.235, July 1961, 349-55) was to make clear what he believed to be the empirical anchorage of discourse about the freedom of the will and immortality. Ramsey, it is true opens himself to criticism because he so often assumes too much of his readers. Freedom and Immortality is only fully intelligible when read in the light of the totality of Ramsey's works. It stands nevertheless, as a book of first rate importance not only because it provides us with a survey of almost the whole of Ramsey's philosophy in this area, though the background to its language lies elsewhere, in only about one hundred and fifty pages but more importantly because it provides the theological world with serious attempt to come to grips with the problems which both challenge it and face our modern world.

Ten years after the publication of Freedom and Immortality Ian Ramsey, by this time Bishop of Durham, wrote in his diocesan magazine: "We have today reached a stage when, for very different reasons, ways of describing the faith-dimension in terms of traditional metaphysics as well as traditional ways of interpreting the world have all collapsed and broken down and need a thorough overhaul. In this context of breakdown and collapse it is very easy indeed to dismiss the whole of religion and theology as a sham, the Church as the community of the immature, and to acknowledge the secular in and by itself all sufficient." (The Church and the Secular City, The Bishopric, vol.43, no.3, May 1968, 46).

It was in reaction to this kind of attitude and the increasing popularity of atheistic, or at best agnostic, secularism that Freedom and Immortality came to birth both as a product of contemporary Christian thinking and as the focus for thinking to come. We may recall Professor
Dorothy Emmet's comment on Ian Ramsey: that

"Under his imperturbable demeanour he had a feeling of desperation about the need to rethink the problem of religious truth in a world where our scientific understanding of man, and indeed the understanding of science and philosophy themselves were changing in ways of which most people in the Churches were unaware."

(Edwards p.6)

In an article on "The Crisis of Faith" (Theoria to Theory, vol. 7, Jan. 1973), in 1973 he repeated this warning that

"... As we face the crisis of our own time, the reaction of our predecessors to the crisis of a past age is a terrible warning. Not only did they fail to face up squarely to searching issues; their side-stepping merely postponed until today the crisis which should have been faced yesterday." (op. cit. p. 24).

His plea was as ever for theology to step into the fray and to give account of itself. Long gone were the days when theology could rest sure in its position in the life of men. "But let us not forget", he wrote in Spirituality for Today

"that self-satisfaction in theology as elsewhere, very often accompanies a spiritual blindness; whereas the concept of theology, as tentative and exploratory can better bear witness to every new insight into mystery and transcendence, and may thus be seen as providing ever new expressions of a sense of finitude, which matches, as it arises from, a new sense of the infinite." (p.75).

It was not, as we have seen, a fray into which Ian Ramsey stepped with his eyes closed. At the end of Freedom and Immortality he wrote of its convictions that they registered a protest against two popular misconceptions, that, on the one hand those with what he calls "an intense affection for ordinary language" (F&I p. 152) must necessarily deny metaphysics or, on the other hand, that those who defend metaphysics must necessarily trade in "occult and shadowy worlds" (F&I p. 152) which meant that he had been, as he had in much of his work, fighting on two fronts at once, against secularism on the one hand and blindness in the face of the modern situation by theology on the other. And we recall his "... it is a sobering reflection that not many wars have been won under such a necessity." (F&I p.152)

It is the generations to come who will know the answer, and it is only a shame that Ian Ramsey could not live to see its progress so far and help it along with still more of his wisdom and insight and piety.
"In reading him, if you are bold enough to begin, bear in mind the characteristic marks of his style. His mind was nourished by three streams; metaphysical philosophy, the scriptures, and the poetry of Greece, Rome, and England. But in writing he seldom refers to others by name - perhaps only Wittgenstein quotes less - you may often hear behind his thought the resonance of some ancient or modern controversy, but mostly he writes in dialogue with himself, a dialogue closely written and compressed. He demands unflagging concentration. This is not to say that he wrote badly. He had the almost unique distinction among modern theologians of writing brilliant and clear English, far removed from those misty affirmations thundered from a neo-Germanic fog which now pass for theology. But when he wrote philosophy he let you off nothing." (Curtis p. 249).

So wrote Philip Curtis in his article, written two years after Farrer's death in 1968, on "Dr. Farrer's Rational Theology".

Austin Marsden Farrer, Warden of Keble College, Oxford from 1960 until his death in 1968 (and near the end of his life elected a Fellow of the British Academy) was a philosopher and theologian of rare qualities, combining, to an unusual degree, both philosophical sensitivity and penetrating faith. It is now generally admitted that Farrer deserved a wider audience than he received during his lifetime. He represented the best tradition in metaphysics in the line of Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Whitehead while remaining an unabashed spokesman for orthodox Christianity, at odds with the then current fashions of Form Criticism, Positivism and neo-orthodoxy. Neglect of his work may be in part due, too, to his remarkable intellectual independence. His style is brilliantly graceful and ingenious and yet even at his best he was never an easy writer to understand. In both the world of philosophy and of biblical studies he was regarded for the most part with puzzled interest. During his lifetime his work received little discussion except in reviews, perhaps understandable in the light of the dominant positivist and analytic orientation of Oxford in his day as we have seen; yet it remains regrettable since he was so much concerned to come to grips with the various attacks on metaphysics and natural theology and even adopted the techniques and availed himself of the lessons of language analysis in some of his work. He remains one of the few writers of the post-war period to have produced work of any note in doctrinal theology in the Anglican Communion. In his book New Directions in Anglican Theology, R.J. Page writes,
"By contrast to the fifty years preceding 1939, the last quarter century has not been marked by outstanding theological work of a constructive and systematic character in Anglican circles. Good work there has been from time to time, notably by E.L. Mascall, Austin Farrer, Leonard Hodgson and F.W. Dillistone in England. Overall, however, one cannot escape the impression that Anglican Theology has been too much content to live off its own fat... When one surveys the achievements of the last several decades as a whole, and compares them with the period 1689-1939 the contrast leaves one with little cause for optimism."

It was in the years just preceding and during the second world war that what has become known as neo-orthodoxy exerted its greatest influence in Anglican circles (see Alec R. Vidler, *Twentieth Century Defenders of the Faith*, NY: Seabury, 1965, pp. 79-101). While the writings of Karl Barth have never been widely accepted, if read, in Anglican circles, his debate with Emil Brunner over the possibility and validity of any natural theology warranted observation. Barth's suspicion of natural theology and, indeed, of apologetics in general found its clearest expression in his Gifford lectures of 1938 - *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*. His influence was to turn attention to the Bible and its interpretation, and to render questions of natural theology, if not suspect, then at least of lesser importance and interest than the topics of dogmatics and theology itself. It was during these years too, that the ideas of Søren Kierkegaard first became available to the English reader. In the writings of Kierkegaard as with Barth, the English mind was presented with the rejection of any attempt to accommodate the Christian faith into any philosophical system which sought to "understand" or to explain it (cf. Søren Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*).

For Kierkegaard the Christian faith demanded a leap which inevitably took one beyond the bounds of rational inquiry.

Combined with the earlier sociological, theological and philosophical situation which we have considered earlier in relation to the work of Bishop Ramsey the effect of such a climate was to direct theological pursuit, for the most part, away from natural theology to other spheres. Not everyone however followed the prevailing trend. Works like Austin Farrer's *Finite and Infinite*, which appeared in 1943, anticipate some of the post war discussion, as did the publication of E.L. Mascall's *He Who Is* which, with his earlier *Existence and Analogy*, represents an attempt to reformulate the discussion of natural theology and to pre-
sent afresh the traditional "proofs" and the analogy of being in such a way as to prove relevant to the discussion current in contemporary philosophical circles. At this point, however, neither Farrer nor Mascall had really come to terms with the philosophical objections which were being raised by the rise of the logical Positivists and the Empiricists to any type of metaphysical theology (cf. Malvern, Xian Soc (Eliot), BofTh., OS+W, HAD, Our Culture, TH (Maritain), AthG (Maritain)). Farrer however had and was to present the theological and philosophical public with an apologia for theism of great originality and importance by trying to impress upon people the fact that the problem of speaking about God could not be evaded merely by denying the validity of natural theology.

"There is a superstition among revelationists" (he wrote in Finite and Infinite) "that by declaring themselves independent of any proof of God by analogy from the finite world, they have escaped the necessity of considering the analogy or relation of the finite to the infinite altogether. They are completely mistaken; for all their statements about God must be expressed and plainly are expressed in language drawn from the finite world.... For the revelation has to be thought about to be received, and can be thought about only by the aid of words or finite images, and these cannot signify of God unless the appropriate 'mode of signification' functions in our minds." (FI p. 2f.).

The criterion to which Farrer appeals in his work is rationality, not the rationality which operates in the narrow parameters of logical deduction, nor logic working in a vacuum, as it were, but rather rationality illuminatingly at work within the life of faith. For Farrer, the religious thinker does not start in a world devoid of already functioning religious belief and experience. He starts within a religious tradition that is as old as mankind. As Farrer notes, many teachers have taught things they had not themselves been taught: Christ for example or Moses; "But the novelty was never religion itself. The pioneer began with a hereditary system for interpreting things religiously, and in so doing found himself driven to innovation in religion—not to an innovation called 'religion'." (FS p. 4).

Standing within the religious tradition in its specifically Christian form, Farrer is concerned to test the rationality of beliefs which he first inherited and by which he then decided to live. He was one of the most remarkable men of his age. He was brilliantly (sometimes a little too brilliantly) original and his work is marked th-
roughout by the stamp of his personality though the material is never forced or imposed upon. His scholarship is immense, his style of writing discloses the mind of a poet, yet his writings are never obscure or cluttered and they display a remarkable frankness. This is often to be seen in the explicitly dialogue form of his writings. He has a capacity for putting himself in his critics' shoes and pointing out their difficulties. This, it is true to say, led to the accusation that he was, rather unfairly at times, conducting both sides of an argument himself, yet the capacity to do such merits our admiration. John Hick in the forward to Reflective Faith said of Farrer, "His work is so far removed from the realm of unanalysed slogans, vague metaphors, and all forms of sloppiness and imprecision, that to read someone of Farrer's stature is to lose any taste for the lower levels of theological writing." (RF p. xiv). He remained however for the whole of his career, an unfashionable thinker, or at least a non-fashionable one, working in a field in which few theologians of his day bothered or dared to venture. He was "a speculative theologian at a time when the world at large had little use for theologians and theologians little use for speculation". Over the years his work grew steadily more unified and though he must often have been tempted to withdraw from the stream of contemporary philosophy, this he never did. J.H. Houlden in the preface to The Brink of Mystery says this about him:

"For theologians... he had a message; not to conceive their task too narrowly and to let a wide range of human resources of mind and heart contribute to the task of clothing in words our experience of God. Farrer built bridges, easily ruined, often ignored and well worth keeping in repair." (op. cit. p.x).

And Farrer himself once wrote that "The grand error about intellectual integrity... is the belief that it can be achieved by the limitation of view; by scrupulous care in cleaning out the most of a fool's paradise. There can be no integrity about refusing to pronounce upon things from which we avert our eyes. Integrity of mind is the acknowledgement of truth." (Celeb. of Faith p.15).

He was a man of deep integrity who consistently refused to dodge logical difficulties.

It is not my intention at this point to give any systematic account of any one of the writings of Austin Farrer in any detail, yet it is necessary that we consider at least the major of them to illuminate the background of his thought insofar as they meet certain
needs, propose certain views and oppose certain contemporary schools of thought. His work is uncluttered by the use of critical apparatus and his works are almost entirely free from footnotes.

Without doubt the most significant of Farrer's philosophical writings was his first major work, the massive *Finite and Infinite* which appeared in 1943. By 1959, a reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement* judged that "in Dr. Farrer the academic world has one of the most interesting minds of the century" though his work evoked little sustained examination. It may be noted in general, however, that there is a marked difference between his earlier and his later works, not only in subject matter but in his whole approach to the problems of theology. In his article in *Theology* on "Austin Farrer's Concept of Divine Providence", Brian Hebblethwaite shows how by the 1960's we find Farrer sitting much more loosely to tradition than before. His rejection of belief in the Devil is an example of this (cf. *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* and *Saving Belief*). It is a common feature of modern theology that it has to reckon with the loss of conviction carried by traditional arguments and has been forced to rethink the whole apparatus of theism. Farrer hammers out the problems posed by the contemporary climate, scrutinizing with typical integrity the objections and counter-objections, and especially those raised by modern science, to the various ways of understanding the relation between God and the world.

When *Finite and Infinite* appeared, the first phase of logical positivism still occupied a confident position on the English philosophical scene and the propositions of metaphysics and theology had, as we have seen, been arrogantly dismissed as meaningless nonsense. Theology had for the most part retreated to a position of the discussion of the Fathers or of scripture and seldom ventured into the realms of philosophical discussion. Those who wrote on questions of theology as such tended either to repeat what St. Thomas had once said, insisting on the possibility of inescapable demonstration and writing with a curious aridity, or, if they avoided St. Thomas, they philosophised naively, ignoring the problem of the analogical language employed by theology. It was into this situation that *Finite and Infinite* was born, "the first deliverance of rational theology to be on the one hand rigorous and fully
aware of the difficulties of talking about God and on the other hand to talk about a God who was the God of Christian tradition, and not a modified Idealist hangover." (Curtis p. 250).

Farrer faced squarely and with distinctive wit and clarity both the superstition that traditional theology thinks of God as a being among other beings, and the equally unfounded assertion that the function of theological arguments is to fill in the gaps in scientific explanations. He wrote in the first edition of Finite and Infinite:

"We promise also to renounce dramatic order. By this is meant an order which produces the rabbit of theistic proof from the hat of impartial cosmology. It is indeed traditional to use several hats indifferently, in order, one must suppose, to underline the fact that between hat and rabbit there is no connexion whatever. So sometimes it is impartial cosmology, sometimes impartial ethics, sometimes epistemology, or even aesthetics that plays the part; no doubt one could think of others: We work up an insoluble antithesis; we fence round a lacuna of explanation; bang goes the pistol, and therefore we say God!" (FI p. 6).

We see in Finite and Infinite the Scholastic-Aristotelian view of the absoluteness and independence of God from the world, combined with a voluntaristic metaphysics of finite substance which, like the process philosophy of Whitehead, allows for an undetermined future at all levels of the created world and for human creativity and freedom.

Unlike the process philosophers however, Farrer was unwilling to give up the orthodox Christian belief that finite existence is radically contingent upon a transcendent creative agent. Finite and Infinite then, was conceived by Farrer as a defence of Thomist theology, the defence of God as actus purus, as ipsum esse, though Farrer indeed saw St. Thomas as remaining too much under the influence of Aristotle.

"He (i.e. Farrer) saw in a process metaphysics of will, the philosophy required to express consistently the fundamental point of Thomas' natural theology which Thomas himself could not express because of his metaphysics (although he was, to be sure, attempting to say things Aristotle did not and could not say). The philosophy of essence and existence requires elaboration in terms of will before the perfect creative agency of God can be philosophically articulated." (Henderson p. 7).

Farrer's philosophy provides such elaboration as Henderson in the above quote sees necessary. His early Thomism sets him in conflict
with the divine revelationists. Even in his last years he expresses distrustfulness towards process theology. In *Finite and Infinite* Farrer takes as his starting point for the development of his theory about finite entities that point of reality which, he argues, we can know best and which is therefore able to serve as a clue to understanding the being of all things, viz. acts of deliberate will. For Farrer as for Ramsey, the starting point of the argument is "the person". From the very beginning of his philosophical work Farrer understood will as ontologically revelatory in a way that other things cannot be. Despite his focus on will however, Farrer generalized from his analysis of activity in the will in Aristotelian-Thomistic language of substance, form, essence, act and potency: so that his theology expresses what appears to be a scholastic way of thinking. He both developed arguments for the existence of God in terms of the essence-existence and actuality distinction and insisted that God himself must not be conceived of as being dependent on anything outside himself.

"God wills and knows all he is, as all He wills and knows. He is in real relation to nothing in that nothing outside him conditions his activity...... Those who wish to make theology easier for the imagination by receding from this position, have removed every metaphysical reason for believing in God at all." (FI p. 58).

Gervase Matthew OP in his review of Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* (Rev. FI (GM).) saw Farrer's study of the nature of Being as having an especial significance for the future of Thomism in England, though he has much reservation about describing Farrer as a Thomist. Farrer's style, it is true, is characteristically his own, reflecting the concise and compressed nature of his thinking and in such cases it is difficult to know whether to label his writings as "Thomist" or whether rather to go only so far as to recognize that the thought behind them is influenced by the thought of this particular thinker.

Both directly and indirectly by reaction Farrer owes much to the work of the logical positivists. Hebblethwaite suggests that Farrer's insistence on the hand of God being perfectly hidden seems to invite Flew's challenge to specify what difference it makes to speak of God's hand at all (Hebblethwaite p. 226-7). Farrer, indeed, was very sensitive to the empirical demand, and attempted to specify the experiential grounds both for thinking theistically and for reading nature, history and our
own lives in terms of the outworkings of a sovereign providence. But the experience of grace, of our own will being caught up by God's will working in us, on which he laid so much stress in Faith and Speculation and which he regarded as the clue for interpreting God's action in nature and history as well is undeniably for him private experience, whereas the empirical demand is strictly for public evidence.

The debt owed to Thomas, is, however, obvious and it is true to say that Finite and Infinite marks the first time that a modern English philosopher of Farrer's standing had discussed and utilized Thomism in a modern metaphysical system. As in the work of Thomas the place of analogy in mental concepts and the recognition of a fundamental distinction between essence and existence help to form the main groundwork of his thought.

"It is clear," (writes Gervase Matthew) "that a statement of analogy in terms of mental concepts can form the only bridge between Thomism and that Logical Positivist critique which has shown itself one of the most vital movements of our time."

He adds by way of warning that

"Any Thomist must part company with the author (i.e. Austin Farrer) at the phrase, 'an impoverished by-product form of the essence-existence argument is that which substitutes the distinction possible-actual.'" (Rev.FI(28) p.37).

Mascall, too, in the paper which he wrote for the British Academy on the death of Austin Farrer in 1968, saw the error of labelling Farrer a Thomist or neo-Thomist in the strict sense of the term. Writing on Finite and Infinite in the first part of the paper he says

"In this he came forth as a firm advocate of natural theology against the fashionable school of the 'revelationists'. Steering a middle-course between the Thomists, whom he accused of a rigid Aristotelianism and of making untenable claims of inescapable demonstrations, and the 'Moderns' whom he accused of evading real problems and refusing to philosophize seriously if at all, he set out to rehabilitate the doctrine of Analogy in modern form." (Proc.Brit.Acad. p.435).

Against the will of the "revelationists" such as Karl Barth, to whom we have made reference earlier, to expunge metaphysics from theology he argues that even our reception and interpretation of supernatural revelation involves a natural or rational knowledge of God and that this presupposed rational theology; rational theology in turn, involves
metaphysical elements, notably some notion of substance. Furthermore, this involvement serves the interests of piety as much as those of logic "for religion is based on respect for being - for God, yes, but only because God is seen to be uniquely worthy of it by a mind open to respect for being in general." (GV p.66).

Fr. Vincent Turner SJ, writing in Theology on "Mr. Austin Farrer's Metaphysics of Theism", is impressed with the way in which Farrer, particularly in his Finite and Infinite, breaks loose from the usual tradition of natural theology outside Scholastic circles, most of which has been of a Kantian and Idealist flavour and has presupposed the habitual reduction of the notion of substance to the notion of subject. Fr. Turner sees the phenomenalism of today and yesterday "in its antimetaphysical aggressiveness" as the heir to a tradition which is much older than Hume or Kant but "has been shaped by Kant and dignified by post-Kantian Idealism itself - a body of doctrines which on closer scrutiny betrays some astonishing resemblances to contemporary positivism" (op. cit. p.99). Traditional metaphysics then, metaphysics of an Aristotelian mould, he sees as "a corpse, not only cold, it would appear but rotten". He sees Austin Farrer as basically empirical in temper, well acquainted with philosophy "Kantian and modern, Cartesian and Berkeley" and while he sees in Farrer a radical Thomism it is not one which is merely exegetical or "a serving of a twice cooked dish".

While he feels that it is perhaps no exaggeration to commend Finite and Infinite as the finest contribution to natural theology that has appeared for many a long year he expresses certain reservations concerning its construction and presentation which will be dealt with when later we come to examine the work in greater detail.

In his Twentieth Century Religious Thought, John MacQuarrie in his chapter on Neo-Thomism and Roman Catholic Theology shows none of the reservation of either Gervase Matthew or Father Turner in identifying the name of Austin Farrer with the Neo-Thomists. His criterion for the name of Neo-Thomist is the use of ideas inherited from the thought of St. Thomas and Scholastic philosophy, many of which, as he observes, derive ultimately from Aristotle. He believed it to have at its disposal an extraordinarily subtle and adaptable conceptual framework. It distinguishes between "act" and "actuality" and "potency" or "potentiality" and, with the exception of God who is "pure act" (actus purus) everything is made up
of both act and potency. Among other elements in the heritage which neo-Thomism has received are the doctrine of causes, the proofs for the existence of God and the doctrine of analogy along with the understanding that philosophy does not contradict the revealed truths of theology but is autonomous in its own sphere. Reason, correctly applied, it is believed, will lead to results which support the assertions of revelation.

These ideas are not, of course, simply reasserted by neo-Thomism. Its task is rather to apply them anew to the problems of our own time. These ideas find their renewed application in the works of both Ian Ramsey and of Austin Farrer, to differing degrees and in differing ways (cf. M-D Chenu, Is Theology a Science?). Neo-Thomism, then, recognizes the possibility of metaphysics and holds that the business of philosophy is synthesis as well as analysis.

In chapter 7 of his Existence and Analogy, which discusses Farrer's Finite and Infinite and D.M. Emmet's The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Mascall quotes Professor A.E. Taylor's comment (JTS, vol. XLV, 1943, p. 239, cited EA Mascall p. 159) that Dr. Farrer "shows himself to be thoroughly steeped in Thomism" and "indeed his argument is couched all through in Thomist technical language...." The main reason for this he sees as the simple one, that it is appropriate to discuss the issues of rational theology, so far as is possible, in the traditional language in which it has been historically delivered to us, yet he is insistent that Farrer is "no blind devotee of Thomist formulae". We may note too, how radically existential is Farrer's whole attitude. Fr. Vincent Turner sees this as one of its chief merits. Dr. Farrer's book, he writes:

"is both extremely traditional and extremely 'philosophical' precisely because its metaphysics is through and through an existential metaphysics. Herein, perhaps, lies its greatest originality. For with a wealth of fresh insights the old problems of analogy and the cosmological schema are thought out again in the context of the immanent activity of finite selves." (op. cit. p. 104).

Dr. Mascall agrees. "In line with this fundamental existentialism, is Dr. Farrer's conviction that any finite whatever, if we know how to look at it, declares the existence of God." (EA p. 168) (cf. Ramsey's phrase that the universe and in particular the world "speaks the cosmic language of God" and the development of this in RL.).

Commenting on the centrality to Farrer's argument for rational
theology of the distinction of essence and existence in all finite beings, Mascall further notes that the function of the arguments derived from the particular kind of finite being which is man (the anthropological arguments) is not ultimately to call our attention to characteristics which are possessed by man alone among finite beings, but, by putting before us the type of finite being with which we are most familiar (namely ourselves), to call our attention to a universal character of finite beings as such. He further observes that Dr. Farrer seems to be asserting that we subjectively experience our own dependence and then validly affirm it of finite being as a whole. (Mascall himself would suggest that we rather objectively apprehend dependence in all the finite beings which we perceive and then turn to ourselves in order to experience it subjectively.) "The character of dependence can validly be affirmed of finite being as a whole, although it is only as it occurs in ourselves that we can learn what dependence 'feels like'." (EA p. 169) says Mascall. Compare this with Farrer's, "There is no question of demonstrating God from the creatures by a pure inference. God, being a unique existent, must be apprehended if he is to be known at all. But... he must be apprehended in the cosmological relation (that is, his relation to the finite world) and not in abstraction from it." (FI p. 45).

Donald MacKinnon in his paper for the Malvern Conference of 1941 on 'Revelation and Social Justice' wrote, "The mystery of man's being is seen in his freedom and its obverse, the utterness of his dependence on grace. Without grace man is not man." (Malvern p. 97). We shall see as time goes on that herein is a major difference between the work of Ian Ramsey and that of Austin Farrer. In the writings of the former there is little or no mention of the concept of grace while, for the latter, though indeed he never made it the sole basis for seeing nature and history as the sphere of providential action, the concept is of central importance and the believer's experience of grace is stressed. This distinction will become more apparent when we come to examine the works of Farrer in more specific detail. In his article "Providence and Divine Action", Brian Hebblethwaite shows how, for Farrer, the God-world relation and the God-man relation are constant but that this constancy is best conceived as the constancy of consistent action in the execution both of an overall purpose for the world and of particular purposes for individual lives within it. The evolution of the cosmos, the developing
history of man and of Israel in particular, the life of Jesus and our own lives, are all to be seen as developing, dynamic affairs, teleologically ordered and it is they that are the field of the hidden hand of God making them make themselves, if Farrer's theory of double agency is right. What is more, each active element in the whole complex story, from the most fundamental particle to human beings and human history is not only to be seen as being held in being by the creative act of God, but also furthered on his way and woven into the whole providential pattern by the hidden divine hand. This is not, however, to be seen as a one-sided personal relation for there comes a point when the believer, taken up into God's will, finds himself responding to grace. Nor is it entirely an act on the side of the believer, for the human response itself is to be seen as God's action in us.

Farrer's whole theology is a theology of action and will, action (human action, that is) being the prime analogy for our conception of the divine agency which we experience in grace and discern in nature and history as realizing specific ends, not just waiting for some overall purposiveness to be discerned. We might compare this with I.T. Ramsey's Models for Divine Activity. Hebblethwaite criticises Ramsey's treatment of this idea for "collapsing all talk of God into his favourite formula of 'models and qualifiers'." He continues, "Realizing that the crucial models were models for divine activity he had to say that activity was a univocal notion since the conception of analogy had got swallowed up by that of model. We might say that Ramsey's heart was in the right place, but that his theory of religious language was inadequate to the task of bringing out the necessary distinctions." (P+DA, 228-9).

Everyone, even the most devoted Barthian who wishes to convey any sense at all must of necessity use the terms of our knowledge of the world, ourselves and our nature and history, but the metaphysician, "if he must use analogy to describe finite experiences, he can, like the poet, know both his mystery and his analogy and out of his knowledge find new analogies to correct his first choice. The theologian writing of God's particular activity uses what words he can find in scripture or makes for himself." (Curtis p. 254). For Farrer, as Curtis points out, the crux of how the theologian trusts his analogies depends on his belief in the resurrection and on those stories of the empty tomb which anchor our talk of the resurrection to the empirical world, and which, as for
the incarnation, distinguishes images from platonizing myth. "For if the images do not and did not mean in the world of flesh, what is left but piety and morals." (Curtis p.255).

As we read more of Farrer's work, we can see that Farrer clearly intends to include himself in the retreat from absolutism. We find in the preface to *Faith and Speculation* that by 1967 he was engaged in a purgation of "the old Aristotelian leaven from the voluntarist metaphysics I sketched so many years ago in *Finite and Infinite*" (FS p.v) and elsewhere he described *Faith and Speculation* as containing, "that reform of the theology proper of *Finite and Infinite*, from an actus purus to a causa sui formulation..." (Letter from Farrer, Sept. 8, 1966, cited PAof G ). Scholastic Aristotelianism made the mistake of limiting the life of God to a life within himself. Process theology makes the opposite mistake of limiting the life of God to his life in relation to the world. Farrer, in opposition to both, argues that God is an absolutely free and creative agent

and that we cannot, therefore, deny that he has a life apart from and independent of the world he has created. On the other hand, such a perfect agent must be able wilfully to condescend to create a world and to relate himself to the world he creates (cf. 'Philosophical Reflections on Creation'; O.R. Jones, pp. 101-133, 229-260 in *Science and Religion*, I.G. Barbour, London: SCM, 1968). Thus Farrer's solution to the problem of the relation of God to the world is to say that God lives both apart from and in relation to his creatures. And insofar as God lives in relation to his creatures, he limits his foreknowledge and control, allowing them to act freely and creatively and responding to their actions in an effort to help them attain their highest good, even offering himself up as a sacrifice in order to recreate them to a new life. Farrer does not so much reject process theology as critically adapt it to the characteristically Christian way of thinking.

As Farrer began to focus directly on issues involving the relation of God to the world we can see how he began to let his voluntarist metaphysics shape his theological conclusions rather than simply support the traditional views (cf. final chapter of *Freedom of the Will* and more clearly in his theodicy *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, his apologetic work *Saving Belief* and in the very short *A Science of God?*). In Farrer then, we find from the outset the idea of a God who is altogether free and who in this freedom can choose to create a world in
which images of his own freedom (human persons) are allowed to develop and in relation to whose activity he adjusts his own life and upon whom he makes his actions wait. In Love Almighty and IIs Unlimited for example, he wrestles with the problems of providence and evil. Here Farrer argues that if there is to be a world in which certain unique goods are possible, it must be such as to include "limitless accident" or "uncalculated effect" and that God in creating such a world must let it be itself and act to draw "some good out of every accident" (op. cit. 164). In A Science of God?, he says:

"God thinks things as they are and designs them to go the way they go. He does not impose an order against the grain of things; he makes them follow their own bent and work out the world by being themselves. It is no matter of regret to God that the universe is not a piece of streamlined engineering. It is meant to be what it is - a free-for-all of self-moving forces, each being itself with all its might, and yet (Wonder of wonders!) by their free interaction settling into the balanced systems we know and into the complexities whereby we exist." (op. cit. p. 76).

What we find here is the gentle persuasion of nature rather than the forcing of things. Concern with the problem of providence led Farrer to speak of God as a being with whose will the events of the world and the actions of men sometimes do and sometimes do not conform. So begins the voluntaristic reform of his theology to which the metaphysics of Finite and Infinite and The Freedom of the Will were well suited. Here is the movement from actus purus to causa sui described earlier. "I make no concession", wrote Farrer in a letter on 24 March 1966, "to those who wish to relativize God or to qualify his prior actuality." In phrases such as this one may perhaps see the confirmation of the usual interpretation of his earlier thought, as indeed he himself saw it, as defending the Thomist position. In his later work where he suggests that God is to be thought of as the primary and perfect case of free and creative will, is to be seen the change which he described in the preface to Faith and Speculation as the "purification of the old Aristotelian leaven." (op. cit. p. v).

Thus we can see how Farrer indeed steers the middle course between the divine relativists, positing a restriction of power in God by recognizing no life of his beyond his relation to the world, and the Scholastic Absolutists, positing a restriction of power in God by making God incapable of condescending to a life in relation
His fundamental metaphysical principle indeed is esse est operari. (FI p.21).

In the preface to his book God the Problem, Gordon Kaufman writes, "Although the notion of God as agent seems presupposed by most contemporary theologians.... Austin Farrer has been almost alone in trying to specify carefully and consistently just what this might be understood to mean."

Farrer's response to the contemporary challenge reflects both the continuity and change within recent British philosophy. His writings are an attempt to meet his critics at the point of their logical interests without surrendering the tenets of his own faith and belief, though indeed there is always to be seen the central conflict between the restriction of philosophy to analysis and Farrer's insistence that it also consists in synthesis.

His refusal to exclude metaphysics from philosophy is based neither upon the impossibility of such a venture nor upon the difficulties posed by the verification principle but rather marks an attempt to do justice to realities, such as the integrity and freedom of the self. He has what he calls "an appetite for real being" (cf. FI p.701, GV chap.4, et al.). Not that Farrer ever swallowed the metaphysical pill whole. As we have seen, along with the Analysts he rejects certain meanings of metaphysics and denies that its method is solely deductive. His attempt to include certain descriptive and explanatory functions within philosophy is far from an indiscriminate defence of metaphysics. The analysis of language which he undertakes is far from the quest for an ideal language of the formalist wing of the analytic movement but should rather be seen as lending support to his view that philosophical theology is explicative in function and it comports with his traditionalism in religion.

His work throughout displays this tension of collaboration and dissent. In the early 1940's we find Farrer in his Finite and Infinite engaged with the logical positivism of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. By the early 1950's, in A Midwinter Dream (University: A Journal of Enquiry, vol.I, pp.86-90 reprinted as "A Theologian's Point of View", The Socratic, no.5,1952, pp.35-8; abridged version reprinted as "Theology and Philosophy", RF, pp.1-4) for example, he is engaged in a dialogue which both shows his interest in the extension of religious language (i.e. the general acceptance of the propriety of more types of statements
than the traditional two - "factual" and "analytic", and which includes allusions to Wisdom's garden and to Braithwaite's adoption of certain attitudes (principally the agapeistic). By 1958 The Freedom of the Will can be seen as explicitly participating in the renascence of the philosophy of mind of the late 1950's. Indeed Ryle's critique of Descartes helped Farrer, as also it helped Ian Ramsey, to further his own exploration of the mind-body problem in method as well as content (cf. FW pp.13-19). Above all, these books and their successors of the 1960's show him appropriating more than ever the "therapeutic" function of language analysis established by Wittgenstein. His treatment of some of the problems of freedom and evil, for example, show this, whereby he dissolves the problem by correcting misunderstanding in the logic of our language about it. Indeed as Hebblethwaite in his article on Farrer's concept of divine providence says:

"... the relatively small books which Farrer published in the 1960's (Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Saving Belief, A Science of God? and Faith and Speculation) contain, among other things, the most direct, sustained, and searching treatment of the problems of divine providence that modern theology has to offer, that problem itself being the most perplexing as well as the central problem of Christian Theism." (Hebblethwaite p.541).

He points out how Farrer was much too good a theologian simply to go along with fashionable trends, though he notes that it is interesting to see that in Farrer's later works questions are raised and answered much more directly than in the earlier ones in that much less is allowed to pass through his intellectual scrutiny unscathed. We find both rigour and realism in his approach as he examines both objection and counter-objection. Above all, as we have noted, Farrer achieves an ever more perceptive awareness of the challenges put to Christian theism by the methods and discoveries of modern science.

We have concentrated almost totally so far on Farrer's work in the realm of philosophy but in fact Farrer wrote extensively in a field that was to exert a fascination over him for the whole of his life, namely that of biblical exegesis. In this he displayed an imaginative ingenuity which provoked at one and the same time both admiration and apprehension. The principle that governed his work in exegesis was that of typology, according to which the thought and the writing of
the authors of the New Testament was dominated, whether consciously or unconsciously by the assumption that the words and deeds of Jesus were the outworking of the great Old Testament themes. This is not to suggest that Farrer, like the contemporary scholars of the "demythologizing" school, thought that the gospels were pieces of imaginative writing with little reliable historical basis; on the contrary, for Farrer, as we have seen, God was the ultimate ground of history. Fundamental to Farrer's biblical exegesis, as we shall see in discussing it more closely elsewhere, was the conviction found throughout his writings, that divine truth is far more adequately expressed through images than through concepts. Farrer never ultimately worked out in detail an epistemology of the image, parallel to the many epistemologies of the concept which philosophers have devised; the nearest that he came to this was in points of his Bampton lectures of 1948 entitled The Glass of Vision which he described as an attempt to bring together his thoughts on three things - the sense of metaphysical philosophy, the sense of scriptural revelation, and the sense of poetry. He was far more interested to show how images worked than in constructing any formal theory about them.

We can, and shall, see how immense was the contribution of Farrer to the intellectual life of Oxford. The excessively linguistic bias of English philosophy and the excessively sceptical nature of the German New Testament critics failed to throw him off balance. It is ironic to think that descriptive metaphysics, constructed on our actual or active use of language, was being attempted by Farrer years before the strictures of Positivism were lifted in England by the work of men such as Hampshire and Strawson and it is a cause of regret that the work of Austin Farrer was so much neglected during his lifetime and indeed for too many years after his death. A comment in a letter by Austin Farrer to E.H. Henderson, dated 24th March 1966, two years before his death may serve as a fitting conclusion to this general appraisal of his work. He wrote:

"You ask about my position in the philosophical world. I am disregarded because I am an orthodox professional theologian, and because I do not keep up with the philosophical game. I do not attend philosophical conferences. I do not write for the philosophical periodicals; if anyone bothers to criticise me I don't answer them. And why? My attention is hopelessly distracted. I am interested in scripture, especially the gospels. I have this college, of which I am what you'd call president. I am also in charge of the chapel; I am an expositor of doctrine in our terribly weak Church and I do what I can by preaching and pious working to crumble the bread of Truth for the people."
CHAPTER V
The writings of the late Dr. Farrer constitute a reflection of both the continuity of, and the changes which have been taking place within, recent British philosophical theology. Throughout these changes he sought to meet those who would consider seriously his work, at their point of interest. He himself always remained firmly in control of his subject matter and positive in the defence of what he believed to be the case. For example, as we have seen, Karl Barth's work largely contributed to the climate in which theological pursuit in England was turned away from natural theology to other spheres. It was against Barth that Austin Farrer directed criticism in a review of Barth's *Doctrine of the Word of God and God in Action in Theology* in 1936 (Theol., vols. 32-3, 1936). In the first place he criticized Barth's method and logic, accusing him of putting forward a nonsensical theory that paradox is the intrinsic nature of the divine Word (op. cit., p. 370). In the second place he accuses him of being a dogmatist only in his own sense— in fencing an area for the free operation of the Word — and he writes:

"An instructive example is his treatment of freedom in man's response to grace. He refuses all theories which attempt to co-ordinate man's will and God's and while asserting the absolute reality of man's free act, simply appends a series of negations. It is a unique case of freedom which does not presuppose a previous inborn capacity; a real self-determination, yet not so as to exclude an absolute higher determination by God......" (op. cit., p. 371)

Further, Farrer laid great stress on the notion of God's providence. This is a concept almost entirely absent from the works of Ian Ramsey and constitutes one of the most major differences in their thought. (cf. Remarks in *Faith and Logic* and other essays on providence.) For Farrer, "...in providence God is supposed to act in and through natural agencies to bring about his purposes and specifically not in gaps between them." (P+DA, p. 244). It is about providence in this sense that Austin Farrer wrote, though chiefly in his later works, "about what God can and does do in and through his creatures, without forcing them or faking the natural story." (ibid., 244). Indeed Farrer suggested that the whole web of creaturely events is to be construed as pliable or flexible to the providential hand of God. Moreover, this action in nature and history becomes manifest, not at particular points in the natural story, but when we so look at nature and history, not just when we reflect on the believer's own self-understanding. So Farrer distinguished his position from that of Barth in..."
that for him the conception of the Word suffers analysis into two elements - language which does not represent but indicates; and the experienced action of God upon us, which does not represent but is, and only indicates insofar as its incomplete, derivative and anticipatory character points beyond itself to its source. Despite the protestations of Barth, the key for Farrer is experience: language ultimately does not represent but only points to the place where God wills to act upon us, either backwards to what he has done or forwards to what he will do, finally, in the resurrection. He expresses similar views in his review of Melville Channing Pearce's An Essay in the Christian Co-ordination of Contraries (CQR, vols. 123-4, pp. 328-30.) where he writes: "....we do not experience God, existentially or otherwise, we experience that in which the other world is hidden and implied, 'the crib in which Christ lies'." (cf. Ramsey's talk, discussed above, of the universe talking "the cosmic language of God".) Thus we can see that for Farrer as for Ramsey the nature of the material world is essentially parabolic.

Both Farrer and Ramsey agree that the questions of metaphysics, and indeed of theology, are real questions. In his review of Paul Ortegat's, Philosophie de la Religion (JTS, vol. 40, pp. 100-1.) Farrer contends that the questions of metaphysics are real questions insofar as metaphysics is the science of that which is absolute and he states his belief that "the true metaphysics can be demonstrated in two ways, positively and dialectically: positively through the evidence of its own principles and the coherence of its own system, dialectically by victorious confrontation with rival doctrines." (op. cit. p. 100.)

Alongside the doctrine of providence runs another doctrine which, like that of providence, though it occupies a central position in the works of Dr. Farrer, is again almost entirely absent from the writings of Ian Ramsey. This is the doctrine of grace and it constitutes as we have already observed, a second major difference between the works of Ramsey and Farrer. In his essay in The Parish Communion on "Eucharist and Church in the New Testament" he wrote:

"Since, then, the whole reality of the redeemed society resides in Christ, who is both its focus, its cause and its highest archetype, and who by the predestinating grace of God, must spread abroad his being to embrace all beings within it, we shall see what the mystical
identification means." (op.cit.p.83). Farrer's work remains grounded in the natural order. He continued in the same essay:

"To embrace life and to suffer death are not two things, but one and the same. We are in a world where the Resurrection life can be possessed only by anticipation, only in the spirit and in such a manner that the old life of the flesh continues alongside of it and in strife against it. Even, perhaps, were we sinless as our Lord, our fleshly being would continue to make inordinate claims, even though like him we never conceded them; and so we should still find the death pains of the flesh to be the continual growing pains of the Spirit." (op.cit.p.91)

The important thing remains, however, that the believer's life and the natural order are to be interpreted in the light of the grace and providential agency of God. Not only can man co-operate with the creative will of God, and it may be noted, thereby discern God's activity in the process, but, Farrer would suggest, in this purposive providential agency he sees that it works in the natural order and not in the gaps in it.

Thus we have seen two concepts essential to the thought of Dr. Farrer, those of providence and grace, of which, in the order of knowing, grace takes the primary position. Their centrality in Farrer and their almost total absence in Ramsey reflects well the difference between the mind of the poet and that of the scientist.

In 1939 in "The Theology of Morals" Farrer wrote: "The gifts of grace recover to us the pattern of the true nature and enable us to develop its capacity beyond what nature can." (op.cit.p.178). But where and how, asks Farrer, do we in fact find the moral truth that springs from these "gifts of grace"? To follow scripture alone is, he believes, insufficient, while to follow the dictates of conscience alone is to desert historical revelation and to be each his own Moses. Ultimately then, he believes that if we believe that grace restores and perfects nature, we must also hold that Christ restores and perfects natural moral "sense" or "reason". (cf. I.T. Ramsey, "The Rehabilitation of Natural Law" in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. SCM Press; London 1966).

We find once again the customary rooting of the discussion in the finite world in Farrer's essay on "The Christian Doctrine of Man" in the second volume of The Christian Understanding of Man where Farrer writes:
"Words about our final consummation or the end would bear no sense unless they bore analogy to present experience. And so the actual reception of grace, as being a foretaste of our end, is our very key to the conception of it." (Xian Doct. of Man p. 75).

Thus the Christian life carries with it a sense of being in via (cf. J. Maritain Approaches to God, Allen & Unwin 1955). In short, "... the Christian doctrine of man's end and consummation itself implies that the creator has assigned to man a determinate nature which can be perfectly fulfilled but not passed beyond." (Xian Doct. of Man p. 76).

This is not to suggest that the present pattern of our nature is unalterable since grace, Farrer would suggest, may "perform upon us marvels that we cannot conceive, but still in perfecting, not superseding our nature - a nature which is a datum for grace and imposes a measure on what grace may effect: just what measure we cannot know." (ibid. p. 75).

"Man, apart from revelation and grace, is still man, and the creature of God, and, though he may be corrupt in his spiritual nature, he has still the power of reflecting on his true nature and obtaining some impression of the pattern of it intended by God. He may not even be aware, Farrer would say, that God is, but that does not prevent his having some sense of a goal set before him, "... because man as a spiritual being is essentially an aspirant, and an aspirant must have an object for his aspiration; ... in being aware of himself in any wise, man is aware, however confusedly, of a pattern of true nature." (ibid. p. 78).

Once again we can draw no line that man's unaided moral reflection is incapable of passing since, "there is no single moral conviction that nature may not arrive at for herself, so long as we are speaking of man's ideal for his own life on earth, or for his relations with his neighbour." (ibid. p. 78). (cf. K. E. Kirk, Vision of God; Kirk suggests that only in disinterested contemplation does man find the solution to his ethical problems. Cf. also P. W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement, chap. VIII, The Image of Perfect Integration, pp. 310-353 and Farrer's belief in heaven in "Heaven and Hell" (Saving Belief, chap. VI) - the laying of ourselves open to be laid hold of by the objects of our belief.)

It is, Farrer would suggest, the paradox of our human existence that man thus becomes an object to himself (cf. I. T. Ramsey's "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'.")

... it is the mystery of the will that he is thus concerned with realizing what
he is; "that man's will is free - that it is a will in fact, and not something else - is certainly Christian doctrine, however many views have been taken by Christians about the scope of his freedom ...." (Xian Doct. of man p. 88).

Ferrr does not necessarily suggest an arbitrary freedom of choice, that man is able to will anything that could ever come into his head, but what we must assert, he would say, is that man has freedom of effort and here he is in entire agreement with Ian Ramsey. It is Farrer's contention that a man can recognise an aspiration as the highest he has, either absolutely, or the highest possible in any given set of circumstances and can recognise this only by effort on his part. Herein lies man's freedom, whether or not he chooses to make the effort and again in whether he chooses to bring his action into line with his aspiration. Man's freedom may indeed be marred in part by impediments of one kind or another (cf. his chapter on Adam and Lucifer in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited) but Farrer suggests that it is enough to assert that he has some freedom, however narrow its scope.

In one of his most "formalistic" discussions (Met. of Morals) it was Kant's contention that if a man were to recognise a highest good as the highest he must already be able to discriminate the pattern by reason. The merit of Kant's position is that it gives credit to nature (cf. Philosophy, vol. 50, 1975, p. 135f, D. H. MacKinnon's article on "Kant's Philosophy of Religion"). Farrer suggests that the faculty of judgement is a faculty of recognising which is the better of two or more objects: "In order to acknowledge Hamlet as the best of plays I do not need an innate knowledge of Hamlet but only a power of comparing it with other works." (Xian Doct. of Man p. 90).

The same is true of the recognition of true good. Whenever we encounter it we know it to be superior to all else that we know. This does not however apply to the notion of the highest good, since good can only be apprehended as such with the co-operation of desire and since ours is so warped as to render us incapable of recognising it, the presentation of the good objectively is only possible if it is accompanied by the subjective correction of aspiration and this is the work of the Holy Spirit. All I need is to be a mind in order that there may be something there for revelation to illumine and a desire and a will to be clothed with the love of God shed abroad in the heart. Here we see the classical Augustinian tension - memoria, intellectia, vol-
untas. (cf. Anselm, Proslogion). The freedom of the faculties prior to the action of grace need only be therefore that they exist, not such that they are capable of responding to God apart from God's enabling action.

The co-operation with God, though, which takes place is not, let it be understood, that of abstract intellect alone but the co-operation of the whole self and thus man becomes rather than merely possesses rationality. "God in willing his own existence," writes Farrer, "wills absolute good. Man is the image of God insofar as he both has a will and wills the supreme good according to his ability." (Xian Doct. of Man p.91) or, as he puts it in his review of G. Santayana's The Realm of the Spirit, "....in the Christian view, will is the act of the Spirit, or conscious reason, penetrating as it were the animal soul and directing the human machine by voluntary choice."

Thus God acts as agent in man's life.

Repeating the sentiments of The Christian Doctrine of Man Farrer, in his review of The Realm of the Spirit, talks of "....the Christian, seeing himself as a fallible and perverse spiritual soul, a will often abused and never pure, yet whose very principle it is to aspire after truth and perfection," looking up "to that Supreme Being in whom truth and perfection are, without any variableness or shadow of turning."

The year 1943 saw the emergence of Farrer's immense work Finite and Infinite. Its purpose was threefold, "To state the whole mechanism of the mind in working with the scheme of the Analogy of Being, or, as I have called it, the cosmological idea....to reveal all the hidden metaphors and tricks of logical complication...."; "To show the involvement of theology with an at least implicit doctrine of finite substances, and to restate the doctrine explicitly...."; "To show how far down in our common thinking the question of faith enters. This is not to use faith in a sense appropriate to revealed theology but as it is an act correlative with these highly important but not yet undeniable intuitions which mould our practical thought." (FI p.vi) It is his contention that the Thomists possess the true principles for the solution of the problems of rational theology, and, above all else, the problem of analogical argument and analogical predication, though he admits that "by their rigid Aristotelianism and their insistence on the possibility of inescapable demonstration they make themselves vile in
modern eyes." (FI p.vi). In other words, analogy for Farrer results in something much more tenable than modern Thomists (though not St. Thomas) would have supposed. (cf. V. Freller, *Divine Science and the Science of God - A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas*, chap. 4, “Scientia Dei and the Unknown God”, pp. 179-266, Princeton UP, 1967). The moderns, on the other hand, he says, by reaction, "deny that the problems exist, and either philosophise about the Infinite Being with surprising naiveté or refuse to philosophise at all and content themselves with introducing a certain degree of order into the deliverances of diffused or particular inspiration."

(PI p.vi). There is nothing for it, says Farrer, but to restate the doctrine of Analogy of Being in credible form. In short, "The way to prove the possibility of rational theology is to write it in such a way as to convince the reader that one is writing about something and not about nothing." (FI p.1).

In his article on "Mr. Austin Farrer's Metaphysics of Theism", Fr. Vincent Turner, while commending *Finite and Infinite* as perhaps "the finest contribution to natural theology that has appeared for many a long year..." (V. Turner p.100) displays a marked reservation about the importance of the work. He criticises both its style and construction. Certainly "to read him through and to follow his argument in all its parts and complications and its coherence demands an effort of close and patient attention such as very few philosophical books demand." (Ibid. p.100).

He accuses Dr. Farrer of being diffuse, elliptical and "sometimes so allusive as to be cryptic, sometimes so congested that the pursuit of thought leaves the reader broken winded." (Ibid. p.100). He thinks that the transitions are badly managed and yet despite the faults of construction and presentation he considers the substance to be good, though he feels that perhaps too much court is paid to the logical positivists. Such a challenge makes it clear how the perspective had shifted from Barth. It is obvious now that Austin Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* anticipated in an interesting manner some of the discussions which were to take place after the war and is thus, though admittedly difficult and involved, of great importance (though this perhaps explains why the book did not for many years, and perhaps has not yet, received as wide attention as it ought).

The same year saw the publication of E.L. Mascall's *He Who Is* which, with his earlier *Existence and Analogy*, represents an attempt
to reformulate much of the content of natural theology, specifically
the traditional "proofs" and the Analogy of Being, in a way which
took account of some of the problems being posed in philosophical
circles. It is fair to say, however, that both Farrer and Mascall at
this time, together with Dorothy Emmet in her Nature of Metaphysical
Thinking (1949), had not taken full account of the philosophical ob-
jections to projects in metaphysics or philosophical theology (cf.
I.T. Ramsey in Prospect for Metaphysics). Each author still felt,
however, able to move with confidence within the framework of tradi-
tional theism. H.A. Hodges, as a philosopher, is someone who exhibits
in both his philosophical and theological works the incapacity (perhaps
commendable) to take the positivists too seriously (cf. "Things and
Persons" Logical Positivism and Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, suppl. vol. XXII, 1948 and "What is to become of Philosophical
Theology?" in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. H.D. Lewis, Allen and
Unwin 1956).

The first part of Finite and Infinite is devoted to the analysis
of the nature of theological statements and the way in which they
are used, anticipating what was soon to become a stock phrase among
philosophers, Wittgenstein's maxim, "Don't look for meaning, look for
use".
(Cf. I.M. Crombie, "The Possibility of Theological Statements" in Faith
and Logic (chap. II), Allen and Unwin 1957, pp. 31-84 and "Theology and
Falsification" in New Essays in Philosophical Theology (chap. VI), part
I.M. Crombie).

Farrer's concern was with the exhibition and clarification of the
propositions of theistic metaphysics. The discussion of analogy in
this section is excellent; it is both detailed and careful yet of
wide range.

In the second part of the book, which makes an examination of
finite substances, Dr. Farrer proceeds to validate the theistic hyp-
othesis by a reasoned defence of this doctrine.
This discussion takes up two-thirds of the book, some two hundred pages. The doctrine of finite substance is discussed on the grounds of, and must be understood in the light of, Farrer's theory of the active self (cf. *Christ, Faith and History*, ed. S.W. Sykes and J.P. Clayton, CUP, 1972, chap. 16, "substance" in Christology - a cross bench view; D.M. MacKinnon, pp. 270-301). As Bishop Berkeley maintained, we know what it is like to be a cause and here too the requisite analogues are sought in the nature of finite substances or agents, for example, selves and the active self is considered especially in the unity of the act of will.

Part II of *Finite and Infinite* can be further sub-divided into three sub-sections. Firstly the idea of substance is examined from a logical and linguistic standpoint in order that the validity of the use of the notion of substance may be established. The section includes a refutation of the positivists and vindicates substance-language, for as E.L. Mascall in his *Existence and Analogy* writes, "the notion of substance is the indispensable basis of any theistic metaphysic, in spite of the fact that it has been almost universally rejected since the time of Berkeley and Hume." (E+A p.161). He then goes on with a discussion of the self as representing, as we have said, the most accessible instance of substance. To establish the validity of the concept of self he demonstrates how the reality of the will may be shown to follow from the failure of any attempt to reduce it to a mere logical class of mental states or acts. (Professor Hodgson in his review of *Finite and Infinite* in The Guardian, Nov. 12, 1943 describes this section on 'substance' as "a book within a book.")

Austin Farrer sums up his results by arguing for two structures of unity since, he contests, the unity of the self is neither the focusing of many acts in the single act nor is it the continuity of activity from one act to the next. Both indeed belong to the unity of the self which is neither.

It is itself *indefinable*, it is not a structure or pattern (accidents) but that which has these (substance). A good reason for its elusiveness is to be found, Farrer argues, in the very form of thought. The unity of the self and its structural complication cannot be grasped in one; yet
they imply and support one another. The unity is best seen when the self is exposed to external things and not to its own constituents. Thus for Farrer the self is to be seen as a continuous intellective and creative activity which proceeds by concentration into successive particular acts. Hence it is the substantial connection provided by activity as such and studied under the name of will which holds together the self as well as the act. The act is not even as an act to be seen self-sufficient; its boundaries extend to embrace the totality of a self, which is thus metaphysically, and not just phenomenally or logically, one.

Farrer's fundamental metaphysical principle is "Esse est o-nerari ..." (FI p. 21) though by taking (deliberate) acts of will as the type of operation whose nature is most knowable, he is able to conceive finite entities as on a rising-falling scaled existence (cf. A.O. Lovejoy, The Free Chain of Being, NY: Harper, 1960, M.D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the 12th Century, trans. J. Taylor and L.K. Little, Chicago UP, 1958 p. 21 and M.D. Knowles OSB, "The Influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Western Mysticism" in Christian Spirituality, Essays in honour of Gordon Rupp, ed. P. Brooks, SCM: London, 1975, pp. 79-95. See also, C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image, p. 70f. on Pseudo-Dionysius.). On such a scale the position of any entity on the scale is determined by the degree of consciousness, deliberation, freedom and creativity its acts are capable of attaining. In arguing, therefore, to the necessity for a primary and perfect case of being he is arguing not to actus purus or even to a being whose essence and existence are identical, but to a perfect, free and creative will, to a being who wills to be all that he is, and is all that he wills to be. This accords well with Aquinas' principle that no impotencia can be posited of God. Once again we find that Farrer's argument is firmly rooted in the finite world. He wrote:

"Every argument for God's existence must start from the world of finites or from the nature of finite substance as such. . . . We must take some distinction within the finite and then claim to show that the co-existence of the elements distinguished in the way in which they do co-exist, is intelligible only if God exists as the grounds of such co-existence." (FI p. 262).

Philip Curtis in his article on "The Rational Theology of Dr. Farrer", comments on this, that

"In asserting the cosmological relation - the relation of finite to an infinite being - we are clarifying what we know in a confused way. Descartes in his Meditations III saw God as a clear and distinct idea involved
in his thinking. Farrer sees God in the experience of finitude, in knowing the finite we grasp the infinite as the fulness of being. God and the world in the cosmological relation are grasped together. "(Curtis p.251).

This provides an interesting comparison with the work of E.L. Mascall for whom the world constitutes a splintered image of God's existence. Farrer's raw material is simply that which may be known in the life of any human agent, though viewed in a light which may open our eyes and make us say, "that is what really happens! "(cf. Ramsey's notion of the "disclosure situation" in RL). We are not then to be seen merely as a string of contiguous parts, we have a past and a present and we move towards a future in which are our projects, some of them freely chosen, and we move, for Farrer, in the light of the rising-falling scale of existence which we have noted earlier as a mark of Farrer's work, from mere habit to conscious choice. To realize this scale is thus to accept a doctrine of finite substance with genuine causal relations, that is to say, my acts do really flow from me, from what I am and what I will, and the activity so seen is the basis of our talk about God in terms of will, intellect and goodness if we accept Farrer's argument. If these terms are further applied to a unique existent it is, Farrer believes, because in the co-existence of elements in our finite life we are confronted with the source of our splintered being.

So thought Dr. Farrer in 1943. In his later writings, such as The Freedom of the Will and Faith and Speculation, as we shall see, he was inclined to detect in his earlier work an "Aristotelian leaven" which ought, he felt, to be purged out. Notably this was to be found in the arguments of Part III of Finite and Infinite, relying on the essence-existence distinction and posing the question, "why this existence in this mode?". But he never abandoned his insistence on the reality of the scale of being which we have mentioned earlier (cf. the evolutionary arguments in Metaphysical Beliefs, S.E. Toulmin, R.W. Hepburn and A. MacIntyre, SCM. London, 1957), known in human act, and on the identification of existence with activity, and he never ceased to throw light on the simultaneous nature of human act as free and limited which is the clue to understanding the completely free act which is God. It must be remembered throughout, however, that "for Farrer the crucial point is that freedom involves, indeed is, transcendence, and on this Farrer always remained unmoved." (Curtis p.253).
We have noted in Dr. Farrer the influence of the great medieval Dominican St. Thomas Aquinas and in Dr. Farrer's system the place of Thomas' Five Ways is held by the 8 usiological and the 5 anthropological arguments which appear in Part III of Finite and Infinite. These arguments are used by Farrer to divide the types of finite distinction available as the basis for analogical dialectic into two classes. The usiological arguments are those which can be used of finite beings in general while the anthropological are those used of the particular type of finite being that we are, i.e. man. Both classes are in fact to be seen as needed because God must be exhibited as the creator of all finite being while, he contends, we have no direct knowledge of any particular mode of existence except our own - "Without anthropology we should not start, and without usiology we should not arrive." (FI p. 264). (Farrer sub-divides his usiological arguments into two classes:—

A. based on the finitude of finite beings - includes the two contrasts of: (I) Essence-Existence
   (II) Actual-Possible

B. based on substantial relations, sub-dividing them into:
   (I) operation and interior effect
   (II) continuous ingredience
   (III) discontinuous ingredience: formality and informality
   (IV) discontinuous ingredience: condition and action
   (V) generation
   (VI) generation and decay

(II)-(VI) are all concerned with different aspects of the contrast between the self-unity of an operation and the affectedness of other operations by it.

The anthropological arguments are subdivided as follows:—

(I) Intellect as such and its human impurities
(II) will as such and its human limitations
(III) intellectual and voluntary activity
(IV) moral obligation
(V) The pursuit of perfection.

In all thirteen cases the procedure is, broadly speaking, the same. The result of all this can be summed up in Farrer's own words,

"The knowledge of God to which rational theology leads us - the knowledge of him which is bound up with an apprehension of the universal aspects of finite existence or of human existence - is the knowledge of existent
perfection conceived through the analogy of spirit, and the knowledge that this Being is the creator of all finite existence. But that is all. We learn from it that all finites, in being themselves and expressing their natures in their acts, are expressing also the creativity of God who creates through them. (FI p.299).

For Farrer, freedom is to be described in terms of the development of rational and fully voluntary action by the specialization of acts which were previously different aspects of a single form. The operation of free will he sees in the light of the construction of character, indeed he describes character as "....the policy of choice." (FI p.191). We recall Ramsey's point that a free decision demands an appropriate response or commitment—the adding of our personal backing—in order to be a free decision (cf. FI chap. II and elsewhere).

Similarly in Farrer we find that in Farrer's estimation, "...the practical judgement is not complete without an act; I have not will-ed until I have (in my own sincere expectation) committed myself, and only then insofar as I have committed myself." (FI p.155). Again this provides a significant point of comparison between the work of Dr. Farrer and that of Professor Ramsey.

It will have been noted that throughout the discussion so far, no mention has been made of the subject of immortality in this context. The reason is that Finite and Infinite deals with the topics of rational theology and Farrer feels that, in his own words, "rational theology deals with God and freedom, but not with Immortality, Providence or Grace, except in considering their mere possibility when the idea of them has come from another quarter." (FI p.300). Thus we must wait a little longer before Dr. Farrer provides us with any detailed thought on this particular aspect of the doctrines which we have here set out to explore.

Throughout Finite and Infinite Farrer appeals to the method of analogy propounded and employed by St. Thomas Aquinas. In his article on "The Extension of St. Thomas's doctrine of Analogy to Modern Philosophical problems" in the Downside Review Farrer continues and expands this theme:

"The modern passion for intellectual clarity really has shown that other realities beside the divine are incurably mysterious; and we have got to wrestle with the mystery and not deny it. If we want to borrow from the medievals, let us borrow what can help us. They did develop an instrument for wrestling with mystery, where they saw mystery,
namely the analogical method. It is for us to apply it in fresh fields." (ExStT p.71).

Now, as Dr. Farrer points out, the traditional Thomist would have drawn a hard and fast distinction between our knowledge of sensible finite substances and our knowledge of God. The finite substance offers itself to us through its sensible accidents while the lineaments of the divine essence do not present themselves in and with the immediate objects of sense-knowledge as the forms of creaturely essence do. Therefore our knowledge of God is analogical whereas our knowledge of finite substance is not. "I apprehend finite substances for what they are," wrote Dr. Farrer, "but to God's being I can only analogize from the creaturely signs." (ibid. p.71). Farrer goes on to suggest that the balance of the contest between creaturely being and the being of the Creator has altered, and that, for the modern, what we take to be our apprehension of finite substances approximates far more towards the traditional accounts of our apprehension of God than strict traditionalism would have allowed. In short St. Thomas meant that

"The reflective mind, in connection with its apprehension of the finite being, has a confused conception of infinitude of being as that essence whereof the finite is a reduced and limited copy, and as that existence whereof every contingent existence is the effect." (ibid. p.77).

He ties this to his belief in its relation to talk of the freedom of the will in his comment that "I believe myself to have an indubitable awareness of my own acts of voluntary decision...." (ibid. p.77).

This awareness is essentially an internal phenomenon. In an article, "On Credulity", he maintained that when we ask what that true essence of man is, which the insincere betrays, the fool misses, and the callous ignores and the perverse distorts, we, in fact, open up a completely new dimension of questions. We are then up against an object which is quite differently related to us from the objects of science or personal understanding. The distinction he draws is between that which is "out there" and that which is "within", "within" not as our states of mind are "within" but "within" with a depth which is so much deeper than they can ever attain. He elaborates on this in a way reminiscent of Ian Ramsey's article on "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'." Farrer writes:

"Just as you cannot become aware of the personal reality of your friend by trying on him preconceived questions of psychological or economic science, but only by understanding the impact of his existence, so it is with awareness of your own being and destiny, and of its demands on you. You cannot say: I propose to open just a
The theme is continued in "Does God Exist", where he adds:

"We can become aware of a whole universe of creatures objectively, but there is only one creature we can express subjectively, and that is ourselves. I can become aware through outward experience of the patterns of activity which make up many levels and sorts of beings, for example, a biologist can examine the activity-pattern of the body of a frog. But one cannot taste what it is like to be a frog, one can only taste what it is like to be a man." (DGE p. 42).

Thus Farrer would argue that what is important for us is the fact that we experience our own existence as an activity of self-determination.

To be a man, Farrer suggests, is to be the architect of one's own life - we do what we choose to do, yet "the astonishing and almost terrifying fact of our own freedom only throws into higher relief the fact of its limitations." (ibid. p. 42). Thus we can see how Farrer contends that God designs through us rather than for us (cf. "Editor's Introduction", Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil by G. W. Leibniz, ed. A. M. Farrer, tr. E. M. Huggard, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951, pp. 7-47). We experience such limitations in two sorts. There are those imposed by the brute force of the physical limitations of our bodies, the fact that "I am a man and not an angel." (DGE p. 42) and there are those limitations which, unlike those which limit us by the things which we cannot do, limit us in the doing of those things which we can do. Farrer wrote, "All serious men know that they are limited not only by what they are but by what they are called to be; not by what the human race has attained (which isn't on the average anything very grand) but by what the human race in general, and they themselves in particular, are called to attain." (ibid. p. 42).

He argues that all finite existence is ordained because it is finite especially in the case of ourselves where we can experience what it feels like to be under divine ordinance. Even at the point of our most human, most independent, most godlike aspect - that of our free will we are no less under the mysterious divine ordinance, though "our free will certainly has great play, it can even reject its true dest-
iny, but that, we know, is a sort of suicide." (ibid. p. 44). What in fact the will is, is then explained and described as, "A power freely to frame projects seen to be good and to execute them because they are seen to be good." (ibid. p. 46). Irrational impulse however, invades our rational choice at every point, and the two aspects can never be fully separated. This in turn means that we can never fully understand the business that we bring about and consequently we cannot choose what is simply good but only the best of the possibilities that circumstances open for us. It is this fact that gives plausibility to the determinists' case, "so natural it is for us to measure the modicum of will we possess by the standard of this absolute, creative freedom which is what we mean by God." (ibid. p. 46).

The question of what particular contingent events might suggest about God's activity is taken up in Dr. Farrer's Bampton Lectures published in 1948 - The Glass of Vision. Revelation, Curtis suggests, was given in the form of propositions, but a century of critical study made this view seem untenable. Instead we must therefore find God's revelation in his saving activity. In The Glass of Vision Farrer wrote, "We have not to distinguish between God's action and ours but between two phases of God's action - his supernatural action, and his action by way of nature." (op. cit.). It is difficult, he continued, "to see how anything resembling Christianity can survive the denial of this distinction, for Christianity is faith in Christ, and Christ is God acting not only by way of nature, but supernaturally.

If you reduce Christ to a part of God's natural action, he is Christ no longer." (ibid. p. 3). Farrer finds the naturalness of nature in the fact that it is the real operation of second causes, whether those causes are bound or free. Men are, for him, as free as they discover themselves to be, and in exercising their freedom they express their nature. This does not mean, however, that man is free to do whatever he likes. As Farrer says, he cannot exercise the activities of either angels or eagles, he can only exercise his own, those, that is to say, which belong to his nature and to his place in the total nature. It is thus Farrer's contention that the natural mind may know of God whatever is involved in the perception of its own necessary dependence upon him, as of secondary upon primary being and act. That the finite mind perceives in detail and fulness, Farrer believes, is always finite existence; what it perceives of God is the bare form of an
absolute act, seen as enacting the various multiplicity of finite existence.

The Glass of Vision was the nearest Farrer ever came to working out an epistemology of the image in any form comparable to the many epistemologies of the concept which abound in the philosophical world, though even here it is never worked out in detail. He described these lectures as an attempt to bring together his thoughts on three things: the sense of metaphysical philosophy, the sense of scriptural revelation and the sense of poetry. His method was to show how the images worked by the use of example rather than by the construction of any formal theory. However, he remained insistent that if the images are approached in a spirit of rationalism then they will ultimately fail in their task of communicating knowledge—the images themselves must illuminate us and indeed it is not possible (or necessary were it possible) to get behind them to any underlying non-metaphysical facts:

"...The metaphysician cannot point away from his analogically expressed thoughts about the natural mysteries to some non-analogical thoughts about them which mean all that the analogical thoughts mean. He has not got any such non-analogical thoughts; analogy is the proper form of metaphysical thought, in the realm of thought there is no getting behind it." (GV p. 74).

(cf. The Idea of the Transcendent, C.F. Woods in Soundings ed. A. Vidler, pp. 43-67, CUP, 1962). The efficiency of such thoughts depends not merely on the rational capacity of the human mind to recognize likenesses but they are, Farrer would say, given by God to the Jews, refashioned and reworked by Christ and thus continued through the Apostles and the Church. Here Farrer's epistemology of the image aligns itself with his doctrine about revelation and its communication and development. To rationalist eyes this method seemed too subjective while to traditional Evangelicals it seemed to do less than justice to the place of faith in Christian commitment. Even though The Glass of Vision is primarily about revelation and "the form of divine truth in the human mind" (op. cit. 1) there is, however, no study of divine providence as such.

In the "Editor's Introduction" to Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origins of Evil by G.W. Leibniz, Farrer, having stated his belief that "Every theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to conceive God by the analogy of
the human mind" (Theod. p.109) goes on to ask what material the finite mind supposes for an analogical picture of the infinite mind in the making of choices or decrees? The point of this material is to make the sense of "analogy" and "freedom" clearer in a particular theological application which reciprocally illuminates "freedom". The use of such language of God, Farrer suggests, has its first and natural application to ourselves. We all of us choose and in our choosing exercise real freedom of the mind (cf. I.T. Ramsey's talk of the adding of our personal backing discussed above). The finite mind, as Farrer conceives it, is nothing but "a self-operating succession of perceptions, ideas or representations." (Theod. p.110). With regard to some of our ideas we nevertheless have no freedom, those for example which represent us to our bodies. In Farrerian terms we think of them as constituting our given substance. Thus we regard them in terms of sheer data as we do those reflections of our environment which they mediate to us. They make up a closely packed and confused mass and Farrer suggests that they represent the spiritual counterpart to the force which we have to recognise in things as physically interpreted, though indeed, being real spiritual force, it is quasi-voluntary in that in this sense we will to be ourselves though this willing is merely a willing to conform to the conditions of our existence and we are, in fact, making no choice. Acting freely, or performing deliberate acts, on the other hand, contains not only the element of force but also choice. This choice is exercised between alternative possibilities arising out of our situation in virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as seemingly better. Farrer repudiates any suggestion that this might lead to a determinist position - that would be to say that if God has chosen the whole form and fabric of the world and has chosen everything in it, this must necessarily include the choices we shall make. Any choices that have already been made for us are patently not real choices at all. However if we do not ourselves exercise real choice then we can have no clue as to what any choice would be, let alone what divine choice would be and so the whole argument falls. Farrer finds two possible lines of escape from such a predicament. On the one hand he suggests that we might define human choice in such a way that it allows for predetermination without ceasing to be choice (which is precisely what Leibniz attempted to do) or, on the other hand, alternatively we may make the most of the
negative element in all theology. For, as Farrer says, "we do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinite creative will (and) perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divine freedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments." (Theod. p.111-112).

In "An English Appreciation" in Kerygma and Myth Austin Farrer expands his discussion on the relation between poetical symbol and literal fact. "Angels above the blue and devils underground fitly frame the setting of man in the spiritual heirarchy," he wrote, "but excavation will not reach the one nor aeronautics the other." (K+M p.215). Indeed, "St. Augustine was aware of the importance of distinguishing the literal from the symbolic, and the schoolmen theorised the problem almost ad nauseam." (ibid. p.216). It is in Kerygma and Myth that we find Farrer speaking of the use of faith to confirm evidence and asserting: "it is possible through faith and evidence together, and through neither alone, to believe that Christ really and corporeally rose from the dead." (ibid. p.220). Again he writes: "What Christians find in Christ through faith inclines them at certain points to accept with regard to him testimony about matters of fact which would be inconclusive if offered with regard to any other man." (ibid. p.220). Boobyer criticises this attitude because he feels that it "is not faith confirming evidence but faith bringing about a jump beyond evidence; and small though the jump may seem, conclusive proof is still lacking that we have come down on something true." (Boobyer p.39, cited S of C p.275). In the same article Farrer expresses his belief that the value of the existentialists is in opening the eyes of the materialists to inward things. Existentialism, he believes, shows them how to talk in a tolerably hard and exact way about personal interaction, about freedom, responsibility and decision. In short he believes that it reveals man in something like the sense the word bears for Christian thought, though he adds the warning that "when it is used to set up arbitrary limits to the scope of our thought we have every reason to suspect and hate it...." (K+M p.221).

1955 saw the publication of an article in The Twentieth Century Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge on the topic of "Analogy" in which Farrer sets out once again his views, with their attendant Thomist background, on the use of analogy and analogical language. He believes that "Analogy is both the name of a philosophical problem about the meaning of theological statements and of a particular solution
offered to that problem." (analogy p.64). He points out that much religious language is metaphorical, figurative or parabolical and that it thus bases itself upon some sort of analogy between divine things and creaturely things, using the latter to set forward the former much in the same way as St. Paul uses the relation of members to head in an animal body to express the relation of Christians to Christ.

A sermon entitled, "How do we know that we have found Him?" in Christ and the Christian provides us with a good example of Farrer's notion of grace, which, as we have observed above, is so notably absent from the writings of Ian Thomas Ramsey. To quote this sermon at length will not only give us an insight into his standpoint on grace but also provide us with a most moving example of Farrer's graceful style carried here into his preaching. Farrer writes:

"He assures me, God assures me, partly through my mind, as when I reconsider the manger and the cross, the words and the works, the sepulchre and the throne of Jesus, and see that they are divine. But he assures me also in my life, through his dealings with me; for he gives me grace. Yes, he gives me grace; and though I spill the water of life upon the ground before his very eyes, not even putting the cup to my lips, he forgives me, and gives me more. As those who cannot love through the meanness and distrustfulness of their minds cease to be able to believe in the love which others bear them, so the despite that we do God's grace destroys our knowledge of it. How do I know that I have found Him? Not, heaven knows, because I cannot sin, the nearness of his grace, and the dearness of his love, offer me opportunities for sinning such as I had not when he was further removed; for now I can throw his mercy in his very face. But there is a grace beyond grace, a grace mastering the contempt of grace, the grace of repentance, to which he recalls me; and thus indeed I know, not that I have found him, but that I have been found by him." (op.cit.p.86-7)

His sermon in The Bible and the Christian entitled "The everyday use of the Bible" contains an early expression of Farrer's views on hell.

(Cf. I.T. Ramsey on "Hell" in Talk of God mentioned above; Farrer's chapter on "Adam and Lucifer" in his Love Almight and Its Unlimited, and G. Bonner, The Warfare of Christ, Faith Press, 1962 (last chapter.).) He was later, by the time of Saving Belief, to reject belief in the devil altogether. The sermon revolves around Marlowe's Faustus. Faustus expresses wonder that Mephistopheles should be let out of hell to visit him and is addressed by the fiend;
"Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it. Thinkst thou that I who saw the face of God am not tormented with a thousand hells in being deprived of everlasting bliss?"

"The devil has seen God face to face", says Dr. Farrer, "though we have only seen him by the rushlight of faith, in a glass darkly; yet surely, the equanimity is surprising, with which we deprive ourselves of heavenly vision, and do not heed the hell we are in." (SS p. 150).

Much the same idea is expressed in his article in Faith and Logic on "Revelation", from another point of view. Here Farrer contends that faith is not a mere blind belief that certain attitudes and policies, utterly unremunerative in this world, will be, as he says, inexplicably rewarded in another. Faith is for him that which assures us of everlasting salvation, but only because it is a way of life here and now. The way of faith convinces us not by easing life but by, in some mysterious way, deepening it. Faith and Logic first appeared in 1957, the product, as we have seen earlier, of the Christian dons' discussion group "The Metaphysicals" of which Austin Farrer was a member. In it Farrer holds fast to his belief in inspiration, a touch of the divine presence in prophet, apostle and believer, though there is a new emphasis on the impossibility of saying how God does this. The same collection of essays contains another chapter by Austin Farrer on "A Starting Point for the Philosophical Examination of Theological Belief" (F+L ch. I pp. 9-30). The essay treats on the themes of theological statements and parable and the logic behind them. This he does largely by reference to the work of Kant. In it we find this comment on divine providence and man's freedom of will: "Patient of man's imperfections, God forgives but does not tolerate. For, by a costly and incessant action bearing on man's free will, he persuades him towards his everlasting good." (F+L p. 124). Thus a claim is made on our natures which defies descriptive explanation and links with Ian Ramsey's contention of the "and more" element in the description of our being. In the same essay, too, we find material which is reminiscent of Ramsey's interpretation of Butler's maxim that "Probability is the very guide of life". "It is a logical truth", he says, "that the claim made on us by a drowning man cannot be deduced from any genuinely descriptive statements that we may make either about him or about ourselves; but that is not to deny that the claim arises out of his nature and ours." (Ibid. p. 132). Thus once again we can see that despite what are undoubtedly major differences
between the works of I.T. Ramsey and A.H. Farrer, there is also a great deal which is similar, and the consideration of such may prove to be of vital importance for the future of English apologetic.
CHAPTER VI
The year 1957 saw not only I.T. Ramsey's Forwood lectures on Freedom and Immortality but also Austin Farrer's Gifford lectures on The Freedom of the Will. Two years later, in 1959, Ian Ramsey was to review the published form of those same Gifford Lectures in The Journal of Theological Studies. He was not entirely satisfied with what he read. Certainly "none but Dr. Farrer could have written this book. Its literary brilliance delights the reader; its metaphors are elegantly complex and its aphorisms sparkle." So wrote Ian Ramsey (Rev. FW. ITR. p. 458). Nevertheless there were certain aspects of the problems raised by the lectures which remained for Bishop Ramsey elusive: once formulated they tended to disappear "in a wonder that is akin to worship and a sense of creaturely dependence" (ibid. p. 458). Just how this disappearing takes place remains for the most part, however, unexplained.

What Farrer in The Freedom of the Will is attempting to give the reader, is a credible and possible account of the relation which exists between our conscious action and the kind of physical action pattern which is the study of the natural scientist. Any action performed by us of which we are aware (i.e. conscious action) is a pattern of physical functioning which like all of the higher forms of organisation has what Farrer calls the real power to bewitch the lower forms and lead them a new dance. He never abandoned his insistence on the reality of the scale of being which we found earlier in Finite and Infinite, which sees created things ranged in order from lifeless matter at the bottom to man at the top and in which the human act takes its place. Nor did he ever abandon the identification of existence with activity (esse est operari) even as he attempted to purge out from his later works the "Aristotelian leaven" which he felt to be present in the earlier ones and especially in Finite and Infinite. He argues unceasingly that the nature of the human act as free and unlimited gives us, by analogy, a clue to the understanding of the completely free act which is God, though he admits that "no analogies are more than partial, and all parallels, if we allow ourselves to be misled by them are misleading." (OLS p. 54). He seeks throughout his work therefore, to give full value to the laws of nature and the physical processes which are the object of the scientist's study. Nevertheless he is equally clear that a mechanical view of the universe fails to do justice to both the multiplicity of existing systems and
to phenomena such as reason or will which exist alongside them. The hand of God is to be seen, therefore, not only in the evolutionary process, but in history and in individual lives, insofar as we perceive what it is to co-operate with God's providential grace. Despite its limitations, therefore, the natural universe in general and the natural world in particular is not a closed system but open to the control of the divine will which brings to fruition particular effects from the mass of interlocking systems of which it is composed. Again we find the theme, recurrent in Dr. Farrer's philosophical writings, of God making the creature make itself; that is to say, he draws out what he sees as the peculiar relation between free creaturely activity and the continuing activity of God in the affairs of the created order. This applies, as we have suggested, not only to evolution in general but to individual lives as well and nowhere more so than in the life of Jesus. Whenever the eye of faith looks at the created world it must perceive, then, both the creature making itself and God making it make itself. Farrer further distinguishes different modes of the divine action in relation to the different levels of creaturely existence. Brian Hebblethwaite represented this position clearly when he wrote:

"In the case of mere physical forces, there is the highest degree of mutual externality between the two; it is natural enough to speak of God's action here as the action of a cause. In the case of rational creatures there is more mutual penetration; the entry of the divine into the human may be called inspiration on the one side and co-operation on the other. In the person of Christ the mutual interpretation is complete; it is necessary to talk of a personal identity." (Hebblethwaite p. 547).

Farrer thus believed that, at the human level, God's usual mode of activity is by the employment of human hands.

_The Freedom of the Will_ is written in the soliloquizing style which is so rarely absent from Farrer's writings, though it is here self-confessedly more evident than elsewhere. He wrote:

"...I have used the device of a running debate between the doctrines of freedom and necessity. I hope that my readers will recognise this as what it is, a convenient method for discussing everything, first or last; and that they will not complain either because my determinist changes colour like a chameleon, or because, at any given point, he lacks the complexion of what they take to be the true doctrine." (FW. pp. vii–viii).

This is, of course, exactly what happened - his critics complained,
perhaps not altogether unfairly, that Farrer was conducting both sides of the argument according to his own rules, and that as a consequence while the book runs on quite happily, the reader is sometimes surprised just how far he has been taken. Nevertheless, it was Farrer's specific purpose to write in this way and he does it; it must be admitted, for the most part successfully.

The importance of the will in rational theology is a theme which runs throughout the work of Dr. Farrer. The scale of being which we found expounded in _Finite and Infinite_ and which is developed in _The Freedom of the Will_ is essentially a scale of freedom which moves from mere habit at one end to fully conscious choice at the other. Behind the theory of the scale of being ( _scala natura_ ) one may find traces of the Platonic and neo-Platonic concept of "participation" - the theory that lower things in the world of "many" share in the perfection of the one ideal form that they more or less resemble - that the Thomist doctrine of Analogy seems to presuppose.

In the later _The Freedom of the Will_, Farrer examines this doctrine of the will, since without will, which must be, by definition, to some degree free, the doctrine of finite selves which pervades his writings cannot be maintained. The unity of the self is concentrated primarily in the act of will. He wrote in _The Freedom of the Will_: "To discuss free will is essentially to discuss will. The addition of the adjective 'free' does not distinguish one sort of will (free) from another that is not. 'Free' is like 'proper', 'normal', 'healthy', and a string of other words which negate privations or exclude morbidities." (FW.p.106).

The Gifford lectures are an outstanding refutation of philosophical determinism. What Farrer sets out to show is that the determinist case - whether ancient or modern - is never satisfactory as the whole story and that it is in telling the whole story that theology becomes relevant as a necessary supplement. The fact that we act in one way rather than in another cannot ultimately be explained by purely physical laws. Ultimately these provide for us only the directing framework for such patterns of action. Indeed, if our actions were decided for us by physical laws alone, necessary as these are, consciousness would be denied any natural utility.

"You cannot play croquet if the mallets turn out to be flamingoes uncurling as they swing and balls turn into hedgehogs. We can play croquet or indeed perform
any physical act because we can rely on the results which are intended in our actions; and we do not deny that much of our life is not intended; I do not plan how to walk or breathe. I am given a fixed pattern. But I may impose my own super-pattern on my materials; and my knowledge of my freedom here is that which is most luminous to me; in the light of it I can interpret my neighbour, and face his claims since the freedom I have is the freedom to choose, but the claims which confront me I do not choose. I can choose to ignore them, but not without triviality can I claim to make up my life as a poem as I go along." (FW p. 10).

Thus, my freedom is a freedom of choice and it is exercised in the field of the natural world within the context of the multiplicity of natural laws which compose the created order.

Farrer is insistent, despite the arguments of Professor Ryle, that while these two ways of talking about the person - the conscious subject and the physical object - may fit together, and fit very well, they will never fuse.

"In speaking of any person," (he writes) "we must either ride our mental horse or our physical horse. The fact that the two horses keep in step with one another all along make it comparatively easy to vault from the back of one to the back of the other but our speech still cannot ride both at once; even less, by any logical magic, turn them into one horse and ride that." (FW p. 11).

Farrer's argument in The Freedom of the Will is developed by reference to A.J. Ayer, G. Ryle and Lord Samuel (the context is set by a series of broadcasts, afterwards published under the title of The Physical Basis of Mind in which seven scientists summarized, in several aspects, the then present position of physiological knowledge. Reply was made by Ayer, Ryle and Lord Samuel who was a friend of Einstein and President of the British Institute of Philosophy. Amongst his works is his Essay in Physics, 1951 (NY: Harcourt Brace 1952). By means of the soliloquising idiom he thus maintains in The Freedom of the Will a non-determinist position against Lord Samuel's position that the "increased exactitude both on the side of psychology and neurology" (FW p. 21) might bring these two types of statements closer together. He attacks Ayer's contention that "anyone who has reflected on what the expression of a mental state and what a report about alterations in the brain means, will see that there can be no further link between them, than... de facto concurrence, for what on earth could any further link be
supposed to be?" (FW p.8). Ayer's suggestion is that to attempt such a link is to murder the language in which we try to frame it and that all that would be thus created would be a hybrid from talk of neurology and consciousness. While Ryle attacks Ayer's dualism by taking the sentient, intelligent, active bodily man as one, Farrer, while often close to Ryle, attacked, as we have seen, any attempt to fuse the physical and the mental. We may recall at this point the similar arguments raised by Ian Ramsey in his Biology and Personality debate which we have discussed above.

In the face of the arguments presented by such men there develops Farrer's own complex theory, in terms of what he describes as "areas of bodily functioning" which, while seeking to do full justice to the realm of physical law, refuses, as we have seen, to accept them as capable of providing any full or ultimate explanation. Whenever, says Farrer, there is a conscious act - be it playing tennis or doing mental arithmetic - some bodily function is involved, though he would admit that it is plain that this "area of bodily functioning" varies enormously. Further all that goes on in this bodily functioning is never available to consciousness and it is neurology which can look at what consciousness misses. Farrer is ultimately arguing (as does Dr. Ryle from whom Dr. Farrer is not, in many instances, as we have noted, all that distant) against the kind of dualism which finds its classic expression in Descartes and he is arguing for the "single history" of a person being partially determined by physical factors, partly by mental, where we can do without neither one nor the other. While he maintains that "the intelligible coincidence of mind and nerve is found not in the brain but in the hand; not in abstract thought but in bodily conduct" (FW p.23), Dr. Farrer argues against the Berkeleian line, and says that "we must insist....that no sensations, whether of movement or anything else, are directly produced. They are produced," he argues, "indirectly by executive actions making changes in the body and it is these changes that are reported by sensation. Nevertheless, our power to give ourselves sensations within certain ranges often appears for all practical purposes absolute; and so provide a full-blooded analogy to the ghostly experience of imagination, where also within limits, we can imagine what we will" (FW. p.35), while we must regard the laws of nature as, "generalisations about the working uniformity of existing things." (FW p.76). Internal action is then,
concerned not with the brain but with acts carried by action patterns rooted in the brain. The crucial thing is, however, that freedom always involves transcendence and on this Farrer, like Ramsey with his insistence on the "and more" factor, remained, as we have seen, unmoved.

Thus we can see that the importance of the will in rational theology displays itself as a dominant, if not the dominant, theme in the philosophical writings of Austin Farrer. It constituted, for him, both the prime analogy between finite and infinite and is the focus in The Freedom of the Will, of the paradoxical relation which exists between primary and secondary causality. On the broader perspective, The Freedom of the Will represents a further outworking of the problem of divine providence which runs throughout Dr. Farrer's work (as it did through the works of St. Thomas), the problem of the co-operation of the human will with the divine. Clearly not all of God's purposes are realised here and now; it is axiomatic to Dr. Farrer's position, however, that no gap in scientific explanation will ever be found, but it remains equally axiomatic that the fabric of nature is plastic to the divine moulding, both in general and in particular, within, that is, the framework of the necessary conditions of the physical universe.

Ultimately, Farrer would recognise, eternal life must be postulated as the only final theodicy. (cf. J. Pieper, Death and Immortality, Burns and Oates, 1969 and J. R. Lucas, "The Soul", chap. V, Faith and Logic ed. B. Mitchell, Allen and Unwin, 1957). It was Farrer's belief that the soul is itself naturally immortal and this, too, finds its expression in The Freedom of the Will. The phrase "naturally immortal" is one which may lend itself all too easily to misinterpretation. What it does not mean is "immortal independently of God", to suggest such is to deify the soul. It is possible to consider "the soul is naturally immortal" as analogous to "Granite is naturally durable" (an example suggested by Farrer himself (FW p. 102).) - "In the system in which we have our present being, the destruction of granite can be seen to be difficult and the perishing of the soul (we should be taken to hold) impossible."(FW p. 102). Here "naturally" means "in accordance with the laws of nature". A third possibility is to take naturally as implying that the naturalness of the soul lies in its relation to its creator and not in its relation to with the rest of the created world. (cf. FW p. 102). It is the latter of these two, (already having dismissed
"naturally" as implying independence of God), to which Farrer declares his allegiance, since he feels that the former leaves no hope for the soul's survival except as part of the "natural" world. If we say, for whatever reason, that the human person is continued in another form after death, Dr. Farrer recognises that it is incumbent upon us to indicate what is continued (since the body evidently is not). Farrer writes:

"To speak of immortality is to make a distinction between something which undergoes a transformation and circumstance in the alteration of which that transformation consists. A complete account should specify (a) what abides, (b) what circumstances are removed, (c) what circumstances take their place. It has to be conceded that we cannot give a proper account of (c) this side of the grave. But unless we can distinguish (a) from (b) we cannot talk about immortality." (FW p. 104).

We must distinguish, therefore, what survives from what it survives. Farrer distinguishes firstly, form from matter: "The form, pattern or rhythm of our lives operates a matter of minute physical energies, but it is not (as we have argued) reducible to them." (FW p. 105).

To make such a distinction Farrer attends to what he calls "the purposes". "The soul", he says, "in this life is not the single mistress of her matter but enslaved by her dependence on it." (FW p. 105).

What he is saying is that the acts of the soul have a material purpose; they are directed to maintain the position of the soul in the material field, a position of which it is relieved by death. Whatever the medium of the new post mortem position, Farrer believes that fundamentally it will allow for a simplification of purpose.

Farrer then returns, in The Freedom of the Will, to the consideration of the will and we find the reiteration of the Thomist maxim of esse est operari which we found to be so fundamental to the earlier Finite and Infinite. In The Freedom of the Will, he writes, "We call nothing an exercise of will which does not constitute an act, though the act may be invisible and internal, say the registration of a decision for my guidance tomorrow." (FW p. 109). Farrer's language here is reminiscent of J. L. Austin's notion of the performative utterance, a notion which we considered earlier as taken up by I. T. Ramsey in his discussion of such planning in Freedom and Immortality (promising today to buy my son a toy tomorrow).

He contends that acts of will do not cause events but rather take their shape in them. "There is one thing called 'action' in virtue of performance," he writes, "and 'volition' in virtue of being
willed. An action is what a personal agent does, or in which he acts. That is the special way it is brought about. To be able to recognise an act is to see this." (FW p. 112). Further, "to understand action would be to understand its voluntariness, and to understand how it is voluntary would be to understand how it is free. 'Free' and 'voluntary' seem to be nothing more than two formal aspects of a complex reality, personal action." (FW p. 114).

As one progresses through The Freedom of the Will, one finds more and more that is reminiscent of Ian Ramsey and it becomes increasingly obvious that they are faced with what are, fundamentally, the same problems, primarily the problem of apologetic in the face of an alienated scientifically minded intellectual class whose thought patterns were fashioned in the forge of linguistic philosophy and shaped by the intellectual strictures of Logical Positivism.

Though, superficially at least, representing almost diametrically opposed schools of thought within Christian apologetic, on a philosophical level, both in fact coped with the subsequent progressive secularisation of thought by a fundamental appeal to the same grounds which find their focus in the philosophical writings of the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas. Both in dealing with the mind-body distinction, both in the form in which it was presented by Descartes and particularly in the form in which it was presented in Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, produce an alternative way of thinking which lays great stress on the notion of the self. Ramsey as we have seen, for example in "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I' ", presents the self as the sum of the empirical parts plus more and this is drawn out as we have seen in his debate on the relation of biology and personality. Much the same kind of thing is to be found in The Freedom of the Will; the natural scientist, though able to give account of the many physical aspects which enter into our being, is ultimately incapable of any full and final description which can give an adequate account of the person/self. Farrer writes:

"You may seem to reduce the gap between 'body' and 'mind' by interpreting the workings of the 'mind' in a body-like manner. But only at a price - You open a hiatus in your thought about the mind itself. There is an area which the paraphysical story cannot be stretched to cover; that intimate province of the person which each of us is, going about its own business according to its proper manner of proceeding. The paraphysical account proves to be at best a diagram we make of mind-at-a-distance; it can never close
in upon its object, or coalesce with the mind's own way of thinking itself." (FW p.175).

Furthermore, having rejected the Aristotelian theory of nature on the ground that it projected mental or linguistic form upon the inanimate world, he adds:

"There is no getting away from the significant tautologies that I am myself, and that no other thing is I. The person 'I' is never a bunch of electrons, but the person 'I' is often a hungry creature; he may therefore reasonably claim a direct perception of hunger at work, independently of any subsequent reflective attempt to formulate or diagrammatise the working of hunger (Flif p.206).

In an article on "Predestination" in Christianity according to Saint Paul, we find Farrer further engaged in the struggle to relate the notion of free-will to that of the divine providence. In it he affirms his belief that the thought of God and divine care fit our every action like a glove, yet without constraint since "what he designs for us is that we should freely act; what he creates is liberty." (Predest. p.99). To enter into God's plan is, he believes, to be most sovereignly ourselves since it is through giving us both the power and courage to be ourselves that he fulfils his purposes in us. Any positive act in which we engage, therefore, gives effect to everlasting love. He lays stress on the inescapability of this love which is God. He writes:

"We cannot escape from God, any more than we can escape from the atmosphere; but then we do not want to; for why? we should cease to breathe. We can never draw a line and say 'God on that side, I on this'. God is on all sides; he has beset us behind and before, and laid his hands upon us; such knowledge is too wonderful we cannot overtake it." (Predest. p.99).

In such a light, to talk of divine predestination is to do no more than to talk about the God who is the object of faith, the God, that is, who saves. Nevertheless, it remains an incontrovertible fact that free beings have abused their freedom and it is this which, for Farrer, provides the ground of God's acting through his predestinating grace, both entering in and working through our freedom. In effect, for Farrer, God loves us into loving him; our freedom consists in "a sharing in the freedom of that son, who is divinely free to be all that his Father begets in him, and wholly himself in being the home and vessel of the Holy Ghost." (Predest. p.101).

The theme of the divine predestination reoccurs in an arrangement
of homily and verse entitled Said or Sung which appeared in 1960. In the chapter on "Craggy Doctrine" (SS chap. III) Farrer refutes any claim that divine predestination might be linked to the notion of physical determinism. While determinism may discuss whether men really act by choice as they think they do or whether they are worked by their nerves as puppets are worked by strings or whether men may be fooled into acting by what Farrer calls "a sort of Guy Fawkes conspiracy" (SS p. 17), the question of divine predestination takes it for granted that we do make real free choices. How then do we relate the making of free choices to such predestinating grace? It is clear that if we believe in God at all, then we must believe in both his wisdom and his foresight - "God does not push his creatures into existence like ducklings into a pond, to sink or swim and to fend for themselves. He has a plan for them." (ibid. p. 18). Comparison with plans of human contrivance is ultimately a futile operation since all such plans are imperfect because they, by virtue of their human origin, leave out all manner of factors - God on the other hand "... leaves no factors out of his reckoning, nor does he plan for an imaginary virtue we haven't got, he plans for the very men we are." (ibid. p. 19). He continues:

"His plans for us are what perfect wisdom suggests to infinite love; his plans for us are his love, they are all the good that his love can see for us, as a parent's plans for his child would ideally be - he looks at the child and loves it, and in loving it sees what opens out before it." (ibid. p. 19).

The same volume contains a chapter entitled, "Dying to live" in which Dr. Farrer suggests that to have immortal life is to "live by the only imperishable principle there is, and that is the will of God." (SS p. 156). To attain to immortal life, therefore, that life of which Christ speaks, one must enter into the state whereby the eternal or divine will takes the place of the perishable or human will. The most perfect example of the achievement of such a state is, of course, to be found in the utter surrender of Jesus to the will of the Father on the cross. Our attempts to give, so often end in the failure of the retraction of what we have given to God but "... the death of the cross was a self-giving final and Absolute; and it was also entirely free, it gave to the Father a soul unsullied, it was the gate of immortal life." (ibid. p. 156)

On the cross, Christ suffers willingly so long as our sin is mortified by his death. In Lord I Believe we find how
this belief is related to Farrer's conception of heaven and hell. "When we meet him and see in his hands the impress of the force with which we have hammered the nails we shall be in hell," he wrote, but he continues, "but he will draw our eyes to his, and then we shall be in heaven." (Ed. I Believe p. 68). This bears an interesting comparison to the very Maurician concept of the heaven-hell-God relation which we found in the work of Ian Ramsey for many of the ideas are fundamentally the same, (Cf. "Hell" in Talk of God).

In Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited Farrer postulates that the primary distinction between man and the beasts lies in man's capacity to think rationally and to give subsequent expression to that thought in speech. Through this "reason" he shares, however faintly, in that truth which is the mind of God, and becomes a copy or reflection of the divine likeness - in short, it is through this that he is a person (cf. P. Tillich, Theology of Culture, chap. II, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion", pp. 10-30, OUP 1964). As he was later to write in Saving Belief:

"......God is not the animal that we are, nor an animal at all. We do not share an identity of nature with him, but are the remote offprints of his likeness. To acknowledge the infinite Creator in the facts of finite existence requires therefore a positive attitude, an incipient faith, from the very start." (SB p. 24).

We find in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited a fundamental shift in position concerning Farrer's account of the immortal nature of man. In The Freedom of the Will we read that "Immortality is not a gift of grace; the soul is naturally immortal" (FW p. 102) and decided, if we agree with Dr. Farrer, that "natural" here meant the relation of the soul in its nature with the divine nature. In Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Farrer categorically states that man is not first an immortal soul, but "an animal on whom the capacity for everlasting life has been conferred." (op. cit. p. 107). This does not seem to accord well with the fact that man as fundamentally a reasoning animal is thus by nature a reflection, however poor, of the divine and is thus by Farrer's own reckoning to some degree, however small, naturally immortal. In Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited it is suggested that the capacity for everlasting life is conferred by the fact that man has been enabled to talk and in acquiring speech he has required the rudiments of reason (see LAIL p. 107). Speech, indeed, Dr. Farrer suggests,
"opens a path to knowledge, justice and love and even to the notion of God Himself." (LAIL p.110). While yet transformed by the capacity for speech man remains an animal and as such a physical thing. As a speaker and thus as a reasoning person he is capable of an immortal destiny; as a thing and as an animal he is open to destruction and certain to die. The relation of our present being to our future immortality is as of seed to plant or caterpillar to butterfly (although, these examples, though unable to be bettered, remain wide of the mark). "What, ultimately, God does for us and shall do for us is God's secret; that he will do it is our faith." (ibid. p.110-111). This faith finds its expression throughout the work of Dr. Farrer. Elsewhere it finds expression in such phrases as, "...there is another life; God raises the dead" (ibid. p.176) or, "If there was ever a speaking and loving person, there is a creature for God to immortalize." (ibid. p.190).

Farrer is, however, ready to recognize that such a distinction, that while men suffer and perish as animals, they are redeemed and saved as rational persons, cannot so easily be drawn since as he perceives, "Spiritual redemption may be offered a person who lacks the bodily means to profit by it." (ibid. p.113) — If man is damned as a body, how shall he be saved as a soul? Farrer writes, "It is a common though not always acknowledged observation that the gospel is preached to multitudes with whom its acceptance is not a live option or psychological possibility." (ibid. p.114). Such an observation enables Dr. Farrer to bring in once again the question of divine providence. The believer's standing in faith must be seen as the work of God — God has made us capable of receiving his Gospel by his whole way of working the infinite complexities of the bodily world and thus we are recipients not only of spiritual grace but of a physical providence as well.

In the chapter entitled "Adam and Lucifer" Farrer expresses his belief that "the power, or shall we rather say, the liability, to sin is inherent in a finite free will; inherent therefore just as much in angels as in men." (ibid. p.143). The scope of our freedom he believes is to be found within this world, so constituted as it is, and, as a result, he says, "Our voluntary acts, whether virtuous, blameworthy, or indifferent can only realize natural possibilities and carry natural consequences." (ibid. p.158).

"The Descent into Hell and the Ascent into Life" in The Gospel
of the Resurrection published in 1962 raises the question, "What is it to have died and to be dead?" (GofR p.97). "What", asks Dr. Farrer, "is the tenuous thread which spans the abyss of not being, to join our being what we were with our being what we shall become?" (ibid. p.97). While Farrer expresses his belief that resurrection will be our refashioning in the stuff of glory he admits that (being this side of the grave) he does not know its mode "but Christ knows; for he descended into hell." (ibid. p.97).

The following quotation is a fine example both of Austin Farrer's views and of the brilliance and lucidity of his style. In The Gospel of the Resurrection he wrote,

"Christ became progressively a man by everything he did or suffered up to the peak of his maturity. Then, in the flower of his age, he died. When he died his making was not finished; for what sort of a man was he to remain? Not the sort of man we are, nor the sort of man any of us here have seen, but the sort of man we must each of us be one day by God's grace; not the man in flesh and blood, but the man in glory. And how was he to reach that state? How is anyone to reach it, anyhow while this world lasts? He must pass the dead point of Hades. The parallel rays of the sun, passing the lens of a burning glass, are so deflected that they slope together and cross all in a single point, a point ideally speaking, with no magnitude; which point being passed, they fan out again into a fresh cone. The cone spreads to light, and, were it unbroken by any obstacle, should expand to all infinity. Death, the annihilation of all we were, is the point of no magnitude into which our being must contract if it is to expand into the flower of glory. This is the pinpoint, this is the needle's eye, which we must pass to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Here the rich unloads his wealth, and the proud his state, yes, and the poor his skin and bones, to slip through into a better world." (ibid. p.98).

To be in such a state is to be, in heaven and heaven, for Farrer, is nothing but Jesus Christ, and those in union with him.

1964 saw the publication of one of Austin Farrer's most popular works, a little book of about one hundred and fifty pages entitled, Saving Belief - A discussion of essentials (SB). Its subject matter ranges, as the title suggests, over all the major topics of the Christian faith, from proofs of God's existence to belief in heaven and hell. Within the book, Farrer further explores his beliefs on freedom and what it is to be a free-thinker. To be such is to submit to the facts, "Freedom can only be freedom to embrace and explore the world," he wrote, "not even the humanist can create his universe; he must respond to realities according to the demands they make on him; and it cannot
surprise him that, in the eyes of a believer, the supreme freedom should be freedom to know God and to respond to him." (SB p. 33).

Indeed "... God does not limit us by being limited; he only limits us by being true." (ibid, p. 34), and here, as elsewhere, Farrer maintains his principle that nothing should be asserted about the divine which contradicts or undermines what we know about the natural and the human. Here again we find raised the question of providential care. Though the world is made to run itself and God by setting the world outside his own being assures his freedom of action in respect of the world, nevertheless every creature contained in it is confronted by the omnipotence which made it:

"The sun in the height of a clear noon, radiates on every earthly thing that lies open to his light; and so a transcendent Godhead must radiate on every creature subject to his will. All things are external to his being; nothing is outside the sphere of his action. And it is the present relation of every creature to almighty Goodness that makes the core of the belief in Providence." (ibid, p. 43).

(Both editions of Saving Belief, published by Hodder and Stoughton, though published at a three year interval, read, in the paragraph quoted above, "moon" in the first line (line 21 SB). English usage makes such a reading difficult - what is meant by "the sun in the height of a clear moon"? It would accord well with the context and facilitate a better idiomatic rendering of the text to alter the reading, as we have done, from "moon" to read, "the sun in the height of a clear noon". Then, the meaning of the passage is obvious, the sun stands in direct relation to the earth and, while their beings remain quite distinct from one another, the earth remains bathed in the sun's light. If, however, the reading in the text is allowed to stand as published and the reading "moon" is correct then there is a fundamental shift in meaning and the relation between sun and earth, and consequently of God and world, to read back the analogy, becomes indirect rather than direct, and the earth is bathed only, in this context, in the reflected light of the sun. A possible, though nonetheless hypothetical, explanation of such a use of the image of the moon would be to say that the creator God does not stand in direct relation to the created world, in that he acts in a direct providential way within the natural complex of systems, but acts rather only through the person and work of Christ (here represented by the image of the moon) thus making his relation to the world in effect, indirect. Such an explanation is well within the bounds of credibility and entails
no alteration of the text. The context of the passage, however, accords better with the variant reading which we have suggested, since Farrer is not engaged at this point in any form of specifically Christological debate but is considering rather the pure relation of God to the world. If we state the problem thus; either God stands in direct relation to the world or God stands in indirect relation to the world, therefore, either God stands in direct relation to the world or God does not stand in direct relation to the world (i.e., because that relation is indirect) then the extent of the antithesis of meaning is clear and it makes a tremendous amount of difference to the notion of the relation between divine, providential (and indeed predestinating) grace and the freedom of the world, within the parameters of the physical laws of the universe and of those creatures endowed through speech with the germ of rationality to operate within such a sphere, whether such a relation is posited as direct (God-world) or indirect (God-Christ-world) even though the Godhead is essentially one.

The fact remains, however, that "God is God; he can and does give an entire, an adequate and an undivided attention to every single creature and every single circumstance." (SB, p. 45). The world in which God thus acts is an unimaginable complex of multiple planes; atomic, molecular, cellular; vegetable, animal and social. God's acting, however, does not entail the curtailment of the natural running of the created order at any level, the constituent elements run themselves and by their mutual interaction run the world. "God not only makes the world, he makes it make itself or rather, he causes the innumerable constituents to make it." (SB, p. 51).

In Saving Belief, as elsewhere, Farrer considers it absurd to attempt to defend God's providence or to justify the tolerance of the evils he permits without some reference to the idea of resurrection, the supreme act of providential caring and love. In Christ we find the Godhead clothed in flesh. To argue for divine providence without the notion of resurrection is, for Farrer to "agree to box with my hands tied." (SB, p. 55). "How am I to strike the balance of God's dealings," wrote Dr. Farrer, "if I leave out that single weight outweighing all which he has flung into the scales, his own Godhead clothed with flesh, drawing us into the fellowship of immortal being?" (SB, p. 55).

In 1959 in the Introduction to The Easter Enigma: An Essay on the
Resurrection with special reference to the data of Psychical Research

he wrote of Christ's resurrection that, as faith conceives it, it "is unique in kind" and that "Christians will always resist the reduction of it to a level with any class of facts whatsoever. What Christ did in rising from the dead is what no other man has done." (Easter Enigma p.11).

The resurrection constitutes a miracle unlike any other. (cf. T.A. Roberts, The Gospels and the Resurrection, p.114). It represents a unique manifestation within this world of transition which God makes for us out of this way of being into another, though at no point in the story are the natures of such beings forced or violated in being thus fulfilled and transformed.

In what way is the immortalisation of such a creature meaningful, the creature which, unlike all others, bears the stamp of the divine image? It is Farrer's contention that God would never let perish a mind capable of abstracting itself from the mere concerns of its body, except of course if the creature brought it upon itself by its invincible perversity and so he concludes that, "we shall not dream of justifying God's way with men, if we are obliged to leave out of view the very highroad of his goodness, immortal hope." (SB p.56).

In shaping us thus for immortality, God sets a path along which we may walk and endows us with the grace to walk along it. Such divine action is seen primarily, Farrer would argue, in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus, since that is precisely what God does about the salvation of the world. Thus in the common case of a good man, a good human life, humanity supplies the pattern and God the grace. In the case of Jesus on the other hand, divine redemptive action supplies the pattern and manhood the medium or instrument:

"A good man helped by grace may do things divinely, Christ did divine things humanly. Wherever the eye of faith looks in the created world it perceives two levels of action. There is the creature making itself and there is God making it make itself." (SB p.75).

This God does by making them make themselves by their own principle of action.

In The Triple Victory (1965) Farrer expresses the matter thus:

"The two-sidedness of Christ's action is perfectly expressed in the text of St. John, 'I am the Resurrection'. What does this mean, 'I give resurrection' or 'I rise from the dead'? It means both, and it means more. It means 'I achieve resurrection in myself, and so I win it for others'. It means more still;
it means 'I do this, because of what I am. This is what divine sonship, taking hold of mortal flesh does to it.' " (TV p. 25).

Here too, in Saving Belief, we find the principle of esse est operari. "The will of God", writes Farrer, "is God himself in action, and God is always in action." (SB p. 97) and we see, too, the relation of such a principle to the idea of man's freedom of will (and therefore of choice):

"It is indeed the supreme paradox of our condition, that an Almighty power respects our free-will; but his respecting of it does not mean that he sits back and watches it. He works upon free creatures through all the infinite operations of his providence." (SB p. 97). Thus the process is in no way forced, and the divine cannot be said to act by incursion on the physical laws of the created order but only by his movement within and through them.

Farrer is concerned to avoid a two-decker system of heaven and earth. He contends that the division of angels and men is no more than a "parish boundary" and that between men who are living and those who are departed, "a hedge between two fields" (SB p. 130). The great divide is that which separates the Godhead from all and every created being.

In the chapter on "Heaven and Hell", Farrer admits the lack of possibility in knowing, this side of the grave at least, by what sort of joint the new immortal life thus far postulated will fit onto the old life. We cannot know what the new life is going to be like, but in what ever else it may consist, heaven is certainly not, for Dr. Farrer, an optional extra but a fundamental tenet of our faith. To use one of Austin Farrer's most well known phrases, "Heaven is not a cash payment for walking with God, it's where the road goes" (SB p. 140). Our immortality is the new gift of God; heaven is the presence of God only insofar as the presence of God is what makes heaven heavenly since it is nonsense if it is taken to define a geographical region (or even a condition) in which those who have died find themselves. One does not enter the presence of God, therefore, merely by exchanging life for death. Hell, on the other hand, is, for Farrer, not to be seen as anything which gives shape to the Christian's experience but is simply rather something to be shuddered from. It is here that we find expressed, Austin Farrer's renunciation of the traditional belief in the Devil, for while "Christians profess a credal belief in God and resurrection to eternal life, they do not profess such belief in the devil or everlasting torment." (SB p. 150).
"The doctrine of hell," he continues, "has certainly found a place in authoritative statements of Christian teaching; it has never formed part of a creed properly so called." (SB p. 150). What Dr. Farrer means by the acceptance of a creedal formula is the laying open of ourselves to be laid hold of by it. Hence the Christian may believe that there is a hell, but he does not believe in it or in the Devil in the same way in which he might believe in heaven and in God, for he does not put his faith in it (cf. H.H. Price, "Belief 'In' and Belief 'That'", chap. VIII of B. Mitchell ed. The Philosophy of Religion, Oxford readings in Philosophy, OUP, 1971, pp. 168-79).

For the temper of Austin Farrer's traditionalism, however, it is interesting to compare Saving Belief with contributions to the same discussion by other, Cambridge, men. (cf. for eg. Soundings, ed. Vidler; Honest to God, J.A.T. Robinson; Objections to Christian Belief, D.M. MacKinnon.)

In A Science of God? Farrer reiterates his belief that man's freedom lies in the fact that while God thinks things as they are, and designs them to go the way they go, he does not impose an order against the grain of things but makes them follow their own bent and work out the world by being themselves. The world is just what God designed it to be, a free-for-all of self moving forces each being itself and yet by free interaction creating, with all the rest, the balanced system which we know with all the complexities whereby we exist.

Farrer's language about the person is here remarkably akin, at times, to the language which we found in the philosophical writings of Professor Ramsey. While he would not have us forget the physical side of our nature, he reminds us that, "We are physical plus...... and of course it is the plus that specially interests us......." (SoF p. 102). Again, this kind of talk is exactly parallel to the ".... and more" theology of I.T. Ramsey which we explored in our discussion of Ramsey's Freedom and Immortality. (Farrer's view implies that God wills the brain etc. to function harmoniously as the seat of man's thought and action but that he creates them indirectly, in and through his positing of the atomic, molecular and organic processes which constitute them. (cf. Hebblethwaite p. 232 and I.T. Ramsey's Biology and Personality debate ).

These same factors, because God has created them as free and
capable of following their own bent, because he never forces the story, sometimes cause great damage. What we are facing, therefore, is the problem of the primary-secondary causality relation. Farrer's contention is that God's action in the world occurs in and through the whole matrix of secondary causality both particularly - the cooperation of individual spirits with God - and generally - in the processes of evolution. God does not override the natural causal sequence and yet nevertheless every situation in life is a field for divine operation.

In the following year, only a year before his death in 1968, Austin Marsden Farrer published his last major work, *Faith and Speculation*, which contained the Deen's lectures of 1964. In this book Farrer takes occasion to purge out "the old Aristotelian leaven from the voluntarist metaphysics I sketched so many years ago in *Finite and Infinite*." (*FS* p. v). Here too, Farrer's two-level approach to the God-world relation - God making the creature make itself - which we found in the final chapters of *The Freedom of the Will*, finds its re-expression as the subject matter of the final chapters of *Faith and Speculation*. Here Farrer acknowledges explicitly that there is no way of identifying the hidden action of God's grace except from the standpoint of experience. Here we can see a feature of Austin Farrer's later writings, the attempt to map out what may not legitimately be said about how God acts in the world. In his article on "Austin Farrer's Concept of Divine Providence", Brian Hebblethwaite divides the main features of Farrer's characterisation of the problem of primary and secondary causality into its positive and negative aspects. On the negative side, Farrer both rejects those theories which assimilate God's mode of action to that of the creatures, making Him, as it were, an agent among agents - since divine action, as we have seen, takes place in Farrer's estimation without the forcing of the natural order and the consequent competing with creaturely agencies on the side of the divine and he rejects those theories of nature which do not allow room for divine action; that is to say, where the grid of causal uniformity is made to fit too tightly. Positively in these lectures, Farrer stresses the experiential value of co-operation with the divine will which, incidentally, represents Farrer's fundamental understanding of prayer (cf. Hebblethwaite p. 549).

*Faith and Speculation* provides, too, an interesting example of
the respective approaches of Ian Ramsey and Austin Farrer to the problem of the relation between theistic belief and the philosophical empiricism which marked the middle years of this century. Farrer begins by postulating his belief that "however long the believer is given to explain himself, and at whatever point the test is applied, a strict empirical criteria for truth of fact must condemn theistic belief" (FS p.16) and that so much is evident a priori and in advance of any experiments being made. Two conditions must therefore be fulfilled before serious consideration of theistic belief can take place. Both the structure of believing thought must be allowed free operation and the question must be raised, "What refinement of the empirical principle could conceivably square with the validity of the thought structure thus deployed?" (FS p.16). We may recall Bishop Ramsey's concern to consider the tenets of contemporary empiricism and to explore in what ways the basis of empirical thought might best be broadened and extended to encompass the propositions of theistic belief. Here we find both Ramsey and Farrer engaged in the same way in facing the problem of the alienation of the scientifically minded intellectual classes which we have earlier discussed. Both are asking the question, (here postulated by Farrer) "Is the empirical principle so stretched as to cover the theological genre, still of any substance? And will it, even so, allow this or that theological assertion?" (FS p.16).

In Faith and Speculation Farrer actually goes so far as to use the term model (and especially the notion of the Personal Model) to describe the analogous relation which exists between man and the divine (cf. FS esp. chap. III) in much the same way as Ramsey employs the model and qualifier technique which he developed in his Religious Language (cf. RL chap. II) and which is so much the distinctive mark of his work. Here we can see how both authors are appealing, ultimately, to the Thomist doctrine of analogy to provide the base for their thought though their interpretation of Thomas is so radically different. Farrer is, of the two, the most obviously Thomist in his thought in adopting in particular St. Thomas' maxim of esse est operari, though both reflect St. Thomas' skill in speaking persuasively to protagonists of another view - always with the hope of arriving at mutual understanding. Farrer, in particular, displays an appreciation of Thomas' dialogical method while Ramsey displays greater appreciation of his sense that mental rapport, common ground, was the prerequisite of any dialogue
that hopes to arrive at consensus.

Farrer makes it clear in *Faith and Speculation* that he believes that it is "the object of religion to establish a positive relation between men and their Creator" (FS p.53). He makes use of many forms of the model, the foremost amongst which is the use of the personal model which he takes up, as we have noted, in the text of *Faith and Speculation* in the special form of the happy relation between friends. As by actions directed at our friends we draw responses from them and in the process of free mutuality, thereby come to know them; so too the relation between a man and his creator establishes a positive rapport between activity on both sides. In so far as the relation of theistic belief to empiricism raises the fundamental question of whether there is any empirical verification of our engagement with the actual will of an actual God, we are forced to admit that any such verification is only of a general kind, that is to say, it consists only in so far as we find "life" and blessing in the process, through God uniting us with his will and therefore with himself here and now. Ultimately, we cannot directly experience in the present, the maintenance or restoration of the relationship beyond this life and thus the final verification (in empirical terms) of divine fidelity escapes us and in the end "we can in the only possible way, experience the active relation of a created energy to the Creator's action by embracing the divine will." (FS p.66). Grace, in this context, is seen as the action of the Creator in the creature; "He acts in the creature everywhere; when he acts in the rational creature he is pleased to act in that creature's mental and voluntary life, bringing them into his own. For of such a conformity or union with the divine mind and will can be made capable. Physical or animal energies cannot." (FS p.67). Such action takes place, as we have seen, through creaturely agencies without forcing them or competing with them. In the final analysis, for Farrer, there is only one practical relation of the human person to the divine and that is "the voluntary relation of which faith, obedience, love and their contraries are the modalities." (FS p.99). Indeed, "at any given moment a man will be called upon to make some voluntary reaction. Because it is what he is called to do he must view it as his own. Anything preceding it may be taken as signifying the divine will which calls for it." (FS p.93-9).

At the end of *Faith and Speculation*, in the Deems lectures, we
find Farrer's refutation of the Aristotelianism which is to be found in his earlier works. There he writes:

"Freedom of choice finds its place in Aristotle's system, but not at the level of divine existence. It is the discretionary adaptation of means to ends on the part of a changeable being in pursuit of its own fulfilment. The supreme Being doubtless has supreme Freedom, since he immediately and timelessly does all that a rational mind can wish to achieve. But his freedom is not expressed in decision, nor is it creative. Aristotelianism accommodates activity within a framework of essence. Essence gives activity to aim, and the Supreme Activity is supremely expressive of the essence which it perpetually actualizes."

(FS p. 139).

He concludes:

"...the ghost of an Aristotelian theology continued to haunt a Newtonian universe. Kant was still struggling with it in his Critique of Pure Reason and (to descend from the sublime to the ridiculous) so was the author of Finite and Infinite." (FS p. 140).

Thus was completed the reform of Farrer's theology already begun in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited and A Science of God? and explicitly undertaken in Faith and Speculation. Shortly before his death in the Autumn of 1968, Austin Farrer wrote an article in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas (Dict. of Hist. of Ideas) on the subject of "Freewill in Theology". In it he reviews in brief the conclusions reached over a lifetime of reflection, a reflection subjected constantly to review and intellectual testing. We find here his belief in free-will as uninhibited, intentional action and the assertion of free-will as the negation of constraint and he provides the reader with an incisive account of the history of the notions of freewill from the early Greek sophists to the linguistic philosophers of the twentieth century.

A short while later Austin Marsden Farrer died leaving behind him a lifetime's work, a major contribution to philosophical theology in this century but in which, above all else, he had sought to do what he most desired, "to crumble the bread of truth for the people", to use his own phrase, and the humility of the man and of the priest never fails to shine from the pages of his work which always sparkles with the ingenuity and brilliance of a first class mind.
Our examination of the philosophical writings of Ian Thomas Ramsey and Austin Marsden Farrer and especially those which touch on the topics of freedom and immortality has served to illuminate for us some of the major problems faced by contemporary apologetic. We have examined the way in which two men have, from different standpoints, approached a common problem, a problem which, incidentally, the Church still faces, the problem of apologetic in the face of the radical secularisation of modern society. Both were forced to face squarely the Empiricist challenge as it presented itself in the middle years of this century in the writings of Ayer, Flew, Braithwaite and others in whom the challenge of David Hume, two hundred years earlier, to theology and metaphysics found its modern expression. The propositions of theology and metaphysics were contemptuously dismissed by such as meaningless nonsense and so, in a sense, the battle was doubly difficult. Not only had the Christian apologist to argue for the verity of theological propositions but he had first to defend them against the charge that they were in fact not propositions at all but meaningless combinations of words. To this battle came Ian Ramsey and Austin Farrer, employing in the task all the resourcefulness of first-class minds, fully aware of the problems which faced them. Ian Ramsey, at the end of his *Freedom and Immortality*, wrote:

"None of these convictions is, in itself, very startling or novel, but at least they register a protest against two popular misconceptions: that those with an intense affection for ordinary language must necessarily deny metaphysics, or that those who defend metaphysics must necessarily trade in occult realms and shadowy worlds. Which means that the book has been fighting on two battle-fronts at once; and it is a sobering reflection that not many wars have been won under such a necessity."

(F&I p.152.).

The same might be said, too, of the philosophical writings of Dr. Farrer. They faced, also, the challenge of neo-orthodoxy which in the years just preceding and during the second World War exerted its greatest influence in Anglican circles and which found its clearest expression in this country in Dr. Karl Barth's Gifford Lectures of 1936 on The Knowledge of God and the Service of God. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* anticipated, as we have seen, much of the post-war discussion which arose around this turning away of theological pursuit from natural theology, appearing at a time when, too, logical positivism occupied a confident position on the English philosophical scene, "the first
deliverance of rational theology to be on the one hand rigorous and fully aware of the difficulties of talking about God and on the other hand to talk about God who was the God of Christian tradition, and not a modified Idealist hangover. *(Curtis p. 250.)*

Both thinkers drew on sources, both ancient and modern whose ideas can be seen in varying degree throughout their work, from the Greek and Roman poets to the Existentialists of modern-day Europe. Of particular note amongst such influences was the thirteenth century Dominican master, Thomas Aquinas. The climate in which Thomas lived and worked was to a large degree similar to the climate and the conditions to which both Ramsey and Farrer directed their work. In Aquinas' time the Moors, despite their defeat by the crusaders, still laid siege to the Christian world and further afield the Tartars were making the Western world aware of the power and the human resources of the Asiatic continent. The founding of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem served to make more acutely felt what has been called: "the haunting shadows of Islam." M-D. Chenu, in his book *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, wrote of this situation: "Now Christians were becoming conscious of the facts that faith had touched only a part of the human race and that there existed a whole world containing tremendous secular resources." *(op. cit. p. 11.)*

Thus Thomas Aquinas wrote in a situation of changing social, economic and political conditions which swept across the face of the Western world. Feudal society was crumbling under the wheels of an advancing technology which, linked with the specialisation of craftsmen and a rapid growth of population led to the gradual development of urban centres. Here the new class of matured persons had won for itself a whole series of new freedoms.

In the twentieth century Europe of Ramsey and Farrer we see a similar rapid change in the social and economic climate. Like that through which Aquinas lived, it was marked by an increased technology and the subsequent secularisation of society. Developments in communication and travel facilitated the rapid social changes which were to take place under the influence of the rise of the Marxist dialectic on a population of Europe, tired, and discontented after years of war.

Thus social change, an increased technology and the secularisation of the Western world played their part in influencing the philosophical climate to which both Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, and Ian Ramsey...
and Austin Farrer in the twentieth, directed their attention.

Of the two twentieth century authors, Austin Farrer is, of the two, as we have observed, the most obviously Thomist in his outlook, though not necessarily in himself a Thomist in the full sense; though each adopted from Aquinas, whether consciously or not, different traits and ideas whether erroneous or valid. Their primary appeal is to the Thomist doctrine of analogy, though they also share with Thomas in giving a large degree of importance to the notion of the active self and its place within the ontological schema of the universe.

Both Ramsey and Farrer demonstrate an abiding concern with the "more" of existence; man is to be seen as the sum of his empirical parts "plus" or "and more", and it is to map out, though not to try to explain away, this "more" which has been one of the major purposes of this work. Their concern with the techniques employed by, and the results achieved by, the specialised sciences displays an open-mindedness becoming of those who would seek to do full justice to the whole spectrum of facts, rather than limiting themselves, as has been the fault of some contemporary schools of thought, to a narrower and more limited world view which does not take account of all there is. Whether or not they proved successful in their apologetic task, their intellectual honesty remains both a noteworthy and a praiseworthy feature of their work. Both display, too, with St. Thomas, a concern to map out the common ground as a prerequisite to dialogue, always with the hope of arriving at a mutual understanding. They were, of course, able to say things which Aquinas could not say in his work just as he had sought to say things which Aristotle did not, and could not, say. There are, of course, too, areas touched by either Ramsey or Farrer, touched by one and not by the other. The doctrines of grace and divine providence, which feature in the writings of Dr. Farrer are, as we have seen, largely absent from those of Professor Ramsey.

For both Ramsey and Farrer, however, the doctrines of freedom and of immortality occupied an important place in the cosmological schema. Their intimate relation to the all-important doctrine of the person reveals for us the immense depth of metaphysical insight employed by these two men.

There are many who would say that, despite their efforts, both Ramsey and Farrer failed, in the last analysis, in their task. To some degree at least, this must be true and it is easy for us to criticise
in retrospect and with the wisdom of hindsight the work of either of these scholars. Yet, they must equally retain the important position which they undoubtedly hold in a continuing and, let us hope, expanding debate. The strictures of early positivism having been lifted - in no small part due to the work and the efforts of Ian Ramsey and Austin Farrer - the field has become clear for a more open and honest dialogue.

It is an unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, fact that at certain points, differences in their respective approaches and views have served to highlight the drawbacks in the works of the other, and have therefore in some way tended to mute the apologetic force or effectiveness of their writings, rather than presenting a united front for contemporary Christian apologetic in the face of a secular, and often a hostile and unsympathetic, scientific and technological world.

The importance of their contribution must not, however, be underestimated. Their unstinting efforts gave a new credibility to theology and to metaphysics which has enabled the dialogue of the later years of this century to take place. The process is by no means complete and to look for an end at this point would be to deny the possibility of further progress and intellectual advancement. We can, and must, however, learn both from the insights and from the mistakes of such men and of their predecessors, both ancient and more recent as they applied the resources available to them at the time, to the task. Only if we can thus learn to apply what they have to offer to the ongoing situation can there be a hope for a renewed apologetic and a future for reasonable dialogue which may take account of the transcendent and the invisible as part of the structure of the cosmos and thus learn more about ourselves and about God in a way which will better enable us to do full justice to both our freedom and our dependence and our creatureliness and our immortal selves.

The insights of Drs. Ramsey and Farrer into the use of the category of models, both as a radical reinterpretation of the work of St. Thomas and as, in some cases, a wholly novel contribution to the debate, and their work on the use of analogical methodology which played such a part in the formulation of their thought must surely play a great part in any future work to be undertaken in this field.
Reflection from a distance will inevitably highlight those places where Ramsey and Farrer failed, as well as where they were successful and they would be the first to press that we should bring to bear the full force and vigour of our critical faculties in the examination of their role in the history of Christian apologetics and philosophical endeavour. Their shunning of the arrogance which has marked much of modern thought has surely, too, much to teach us about the way in which future endeavours are to be approached. Their work, while honest and forthright, always sought to do justice to that in which they believed and they were, while open, uncompromising.

What we may find in the work of Dr. Farrer and Professor Ramsey are not final answers but pointers along a continuing and exciting path. What we have been provided with is not the finished building but a firm foundation on which we may build and if by their work we are enabled to continue, in honest dialogue, to press the claims of Christian apologetic, which takes account of both the discoveries and the work of the natural scientist and of the transcendent dimension of all existence and the tenets of the Christian faith, then they will not have laboured in vain.
Appendix (A)

In a set of handwritten notes entitled "Freedom and Miracle" he begins by asking a question remarkably similar in form to the words which opened the published form of the Forwood Lectures over a decade later (and it was even then, in 1960, described as being "well ahead of its time"). The notes begin by asking, "What is my purpose in uniting these not obviously similar themes?" while the introduction to Freedom and Immortality begins with the words, "It may seem very surprising to some readers that these not obviously similar themes of freedom and immortality should be brought together in one brief book." (F&I p.11).

The notes continue, "Well, what I hope to show is that each makes a similar sort of claim about the universe and each appeals to a situation similar to the other in some very important respects. Further I believe it is in such a situation that we may find an empirical basis for metaphysics and QG theology alike."

Behind all his discussions is the hope that his hearers might be able to see the sort of defence that might be given to certain traditional concepts by one who "nevertheless wishes to give full credit to the approach and techniques of contemporary empiricism". His first move is to discuss "what is commonly called 'free will'" and his intention is to see "just what is being claimed about what". (It is interesting to note that next to this Ian Ramsey has written an aside - 'What is all the fuss being made about?'). He sees the problem, as commonly set out, as being one of science versus morality. He notes that "free will is a threat to the universality of causation" because, "it challenges the claim of science to be completely adequate" though he does indeed question whether science does in fact demand completely determined patterns (and indeed goes so far as to maintain that the "claim of science is not so much for universal causation as that __________ going on, contains more than spatio-temporal factors").

He sees the claim of "freedom" as......"a situation of 'willing' not .....wholly netted by observational language" (M57/1).

Paper clipped to a letter dated January 22nd, 1945, headed Magdalene College Cambridge and signed by a John Knaresborough, inviting Ian Ramsey to lecture to a course of chaplains on the 7th, 8th, and 9th. of February that year are a small set of brief notes, again handwritten, obviously
intended as the substance of (at least one of) those talks or lectures. These are, for the most part, unintelligible, unreadable or both but which on the third page have Freedom (and the importance of the individual) and Immortality (and life) linked closely together. These notes, it may be remembered, predate Freedom and Immortality by at least a dozen years.

There are also several typed sheets, undated but probably of the same period, one of which is headed, "Immortality". The paper is typed but contains a number of pencilled alterations, though these are, for the most part, stylistic. In this paper, under the sub-title of "moral considerations", Ramsey notes that it is said that certain duties, our own moral development for example, imply immortality but he questions whether we know of any, or are capable of specifying any such unconditional and universally recognised "duty". Some moral improvement, for example, may be very self-centered, though he does not in fact develop how this might be so. He further questions whether we may know any such duties without having to know first that we are immortal. He goes on in this section to draw his (reader's or) hearer's attention that it has been held that frustrations, unrewarded goodness etc., demand future existence. We cannot believe that injustice will prevail. Of course this proposal depends upon the assumption that the universe is, on the whole, good. This in turn raises the whole question of a prior belief in God as the Christian tradition has held him to be. Finally, our acting on the assumption that our efforts give results of permanent value, raises the difficulty that "permanent value" may be secured for someone without personal immortality for the agent. Under "empirical considerations" he postulates that in fact popularity of belief is important because we cannot think of our entire cessation but rather we think of death in terms of sleep and look toward the future in terms of Spring after Winter as well as abnormal psychical facts - a rather weak point on which he does not elaborate. While he readily admits that none of these features of moral and empirical experience prove immortality, nevertheless he does suggest that they are features which are coherent with such a belief. Nor, he says, are there positive arguments against it, births and deaths are "haphazard" only in relation to one of many cause-factors. From a metaphysical point of view he maintains that an adequate account of self and ownership ("to account for the fact that we speak of events being more") demands, "non-spatio-temporal self constituents as a further abstractive from the subjective side of the active unity". One phrase which he sees as needing to be unpacked in this context is the phrase "Personal Activity" (not only into observational sentences and what he calls 'prim-
itive' sentences but also into sentences which use a word like 'soul').

"The subjective aspect of the active unity", he says, "is never adequately described in spatio temporal events." In support of this he argues that this is the point behind Berkeley's "notions" and is involved in the special place which Descartes gives to the "cogito" - In being aware of our own activity we are aware of our "eternal self". Because of the non-spatio-temporal soul (or because of the inadequacies of language, relating to spatio-temporal facts only) no subject can ever be adequately described in temporal terms or be said to cease to exist without misusing language, i.e. without supposing incomplete language to be complete. From this, Ramsey concludes that in this sense we then "persist", "both temporally and more concretely". To all of this he adds several comments, noting firstly that if this means survival (= temporal persistence)(= volitional harmony with God) for all, it need not necessitate immortality and he also sees and admits the dilemma of universalism which leads either to a situation which is morally compromising or involves some limitation of God, though again he does not explicate how, and he adds that if we accept the moral difficulties, then probably the best comment is to remember the construct character of time. The comments here are underdeveloped and may be intended to be used in conjunction with other material, either lectures or some other form of teaching. This opinion may also hold for a comment that the appeal of the Christian to Christ is not for propositions nor as an analogy but for a demonstration of the power of God (cf. the article in Theology, May 1957, p. 191 which we have discussed earlier. There we read that, "Christ is no term in an argument for immortality from analogy, but rather a focus for resurrection-vision and devotion..... Can Christians argue that we are immortal because Jesus is immortal, when what is so obvious is that Jesus is utterly different from us? How easy to get off on the wrong logical foot..... " (LogcharacR of ResurrecN belief p. 191 ).

As Ramsey said in the early 'forties, any approach like this which closely linked activity and immortality could readily provide a thought background in which to express the gospel. Here is the germ of the idea which was later to bring together the "not obviously similar themes of freedom and immortality...... in one brief book" (F&I p. 11). Ramsey further thinks that resurrection of a "body" (which he interprets as meaning the "permanence of some 'filling'" ) is demanded if we are to avoid the "fallacy of misplaced concretion"; it is, he says, "an expression of the point that "personal activity" would not be exhausted by the logic of
spatio-temporal events, but is nevertheless in part worked according to it."

In another paper of the same period entitled, "The Quest for a Christian Philosophy" he discussed his concept of metaphysics and its role as well as outlining several theories of the self. In a section entitled "the relevance to free will discussions" he wrote that, "'acts of will' are not spatio-temporal events, (whose uniqueness is to be analysed in terms of non causation)" yet he adds, "neither does the uniqueness and personally responsible character of an act of will arise from some mysterious relation between soul and empirical self as though of two independent entities and against a background of a Pure Ego theory of the Self." In such a theory, he says, adequate accounts of the self demand that the subjective side of the active unity should be specified totally in terms of the empirical "data" of "minds" and 'bodies' but also in terms of a "timeless self-constituent", a soul or spirit which is itself an abstractive, yet different altogether from any and all of the abstractions of the serial theories, in being non-spatio-temporal. Rejecting all the presuppositions of theories of self he here claims to offer "a new interpretation of free will", declaring that the 'ultimacy', the ontological uniqueness, of the will is to be understood in terms of the metaphysical givenness of the concrete active unity. The individuality, the responsibility of the will is to be referred to this active unity which not only requires a "soul" for its most comprehensive description, but for which we would claim that it is only in virtue of this "soul" that any adequate analysis of ownership can be made.

The final part of the paper is given over to a very brief discussion of God and the world, of Time, creation and Immortality. On the subject of the latter he has this to say: "Because of its non-spatio-temporal soul, no 'subject' can properly be said to cease to exist, nor for that matter can it ever be described as a whole in temporal terms. But if we distinguish between survival (mere "going on") and immortality (involving the will) this has no need to raise difficulties. Immortality would be 'permanent' volitional harmony with God, hell, 'permanent' rebellion...." (Ramsey's development of the concept of "Hell" has been referred to elsewhere).

We can see here clearly the close connection that is already being forged between freedom and immortality via the notion of will, both of which Ramsey establishes as involving the will in a very important way.
An interesting section occurs in a set of lecture (?) notes in which Ramsey discusses notions of Duty and moral responsibility in relation to the notions of the Eternal and Immortality, where once again he argues strongly for the concept of Person as the starting point for discussion, for example he writes, "....Not altogether unlike Spinoza, I think that once sempiternity is given up, we must seek for our Eternity in the concept of Person...." Here too, he argues for the existence of some sort of timeless constituent to be included in the definition of the concept...."I would suggest then that each self, besides having a body and mind, has also a timeless constituent - in virtue of which bodily events and mental events belong to the same person." This timeless constituent is seen then as a unifying factor.

"This Timeless Self is that in virtue of which all my actions are 'mine'. A touch of timelessness, so to say, makes my whole world akin" (and he continues) "'Eternal', then, I would define as that characteristic which belongs to "myself": my volitional unity when we have abstracted the spatio-temporal elements. We are Persons and qua Persons, Eternal. There I suggest our concept of Immortality must start."

Here then, in bold and direct terms from the early 1940's is the setting forth of the possibility of connections existing between the concepts of immortality, the person, the will and ultimately, freedom which is its fullest exercise when acting in love. Ramsey asks, ".....with what characteristic can an Eternity constructed of Timeless Persons be best characterised?" and he answers, "Let me say immediately that I believe that the volitional unity will have as its ultimate constituent, feelings least adequately described as 'Love'." He here supports his thesis by reference to Bradley's Ethical Studies where Bradley says: "Here our morality is consummated in oneness with God, and everywhere we find 'immortal love'" and MacTaggert's exposition of love in his chapter on "Emotion" in The Nature of Existence. This love which is immortal is, he says, that emotion which springs essentially from a sense of union with another self. Freedom too, for Ramsey consists in a volitional unity with God, here the strands of thought meet in one; in this freedom and immortality stand inseparably together.
Notes to Chapters: (abbreviations)

Chapter I.

p.4. Dr. Williams Lib Lect. 23 "Joseph Butler 1692-1752, Some Features of his Life and Thought", Dr. Williams Library Lectures 23, I.T. Ramsey Dr. Williams Trust: London 1969.


p.9. Lewis R. see above p. 4.


Part of my Life see above p. 7.


CCPC see above p.9.

p.13. Part of my Life see above p. 7.


p.19.  CCCG  see above p. 9.

p.20.  Lewis R.  see above p. 4.


p.27.  P+F  see above p. 17.

p.29.  P+F  see above p. 17.

Chapter III.


The Crisis of Faith  "The Crisis of Faith" (an address to the Church Leaders' Conference, Birmingham, Sept. 1972), I.T. Ramsey, Theoria to Theory, vol. VI,
p.40. EVNRB as Braithwaite p.17 above.

p.47. CE+CP Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed.I.T.Ramsey,

p.48. CE+CP as above p.47.

p.49. CE+CP as above p.47.

p.50. New Directions "Pop and Revelation", I.T.Ramsey, New Directions,


c+pF see above p.17.

p.57. MM+M Medicine Morals and Man, ed.E.Claxton and H.A.C.McKay,
       Blanford 1969.


p.61. Lewis R. see above p.4.

p.64. Sp.for Today see above p.37.

Chapter IV.

p.65. New Directions in Anglican Theology New Directions in Anglican
       Theology:A Survey from Temple to Robinson, R.J.Page,Mowbrays

p.66. P+F see above p.17.

p.67. Philosophical Fragments Philosophical Fragments, Søren Kierkegaard,

p.68. Malvern "Revelation and Social Justice" D.M.Mackinnon, Malvern Con­
       ference Papers 1941.


BofTh Borderlands of Theology, D.M.Mackinnon,Things and Persons i


Our Culture "Our Culture:its Thought",Our Culture,ed.V.Demant,SPCK;

TH(Maritain) True Humanism, J.Maritain, G.Bles,1938.


p.69. Brink of Mystery The Brink of Mystery, A.M.Farrer,edit.C.C.Conti,

* entitled, The Life of the Church and the Order of Society, Longmans;
       London 1942.


EA Existence and Analogy, E. L. Mascall, Libra Books; DLT; London 1949

V. Turner see above p.73.

p.75. EA see above p.74.

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DURHAM, 1979
Ian Ramsey was one of the founders of the Christian Philosophers' Group and attended its meetings for as long as he could. Individual members of the Group have kindly contributed towards the cost of the printing, as have other people interested in Ian Ramsey's work. John Habgood, the present Bishop of Durham donated money from the Lightfoot Fund, and the Dean and Chapter of Durham Cathedral also supported us, as did Dr. Williams's Trust. We are most grateful to everyone for their help.

A copy of the bibliography is deposited with Ian Ramsey's papers in the care of the Library of Durham Cathedral, together with a copy of the material of the bibliography rearranged as follows: titles in alphabetical order; reviews and articles under alphabetical order of journal; books (and parts of books) under alphabetical order of publisher.

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Further copies of the printed bibliography at £1.25 (post free in the U.K.) may be obtained from Ann Loades, Department of Theology, Abbey House, Palace Green, Durham DH1 3RS. Photo-copies of the bibliography re-arranged as indicated above, are obtainable from the same address at the current price for each photo-copied page.

Ann Loades
Editor
It is the intention of this work to provide not only a comprehensive bibliography of the works of Ian Thomas Ramsey but also to give some indication of the tremendous scope and variety of issues on which he had something to say. His contribution as a philosopher and as a bishop to contemporary society was immense; the price which he paid for such concern, the highest.

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