Philip II of Macedon: a consideration of books VII – IX of Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is two-fold: firstly to examine the career and character of Philip II of Macedon as portrayed in Books VII - IX of Justin's epitome of the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus, and to consider to what extent Justin-Trogus (a composite name for the author of the views in the text of Justin) furnishes accurate historical fact, and to what extent he paints a one-sided interpretation of the events, and secondly to identify as far as possible Justin's principles of selection and compression as evidenced in Books VII - IX.

Apart from this account of Justin-Trogus, there is only one other continuous account of the reign of Philip II, namely that found in Diodorus Siculus XVI. A comparison between Justin-Trogus' material and that of Diodorus, together with evidence from other ancient sources and also modern scholars, has provided a large quantity of historical matter which has been used to compile a historical commentary. From an examination of some aspects covered by this commentary the following conclusions have been reached:

The factual information in Books VII - IX seems to be as reliable as that given by Diodorus, but there is in Justin-Trogus' account some considerable rhetorical padding which must be treated with extreme caution by modern researchers of the reign of Philip II. Justin's principles of selection seem to have been dominated by an interest in the more anecdotal aspects of the Macedonian monarchy, the loss of Greek freedom and a lack of interest in military matters. His methods of compression are closely linked to the latter, and can be identified to some extent by examining the links between different topics.
INTRODUCTION

The narrative in the Historiae Philippicae of Justin-Trogus from the start of Chapter 6 of Book VII to the close of Book IX forms one of the two continuous accounts extant for the reign of Philip II of Macedon. The other account is that furnished by Diodorus Siculus in Book XVI of his history.

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to establish to what extent the factual historical information provided by Justin-Trogus in Books VII - IX is accurate, and to what extent he has painted a one-sided view of his own interpretation of the historical facts. This last aspect is especially relevant in the presentation of Philip's character, which contrasts markedly with the portrayal found in the account of Diodorus. Work of this nature is immediately rendered more difficult by the fact that we are examining not the original history of Pompeius Trogus, composed during the reign of Augustus, but an epitome of this work made two or three centuries later, which, as will be shown, does not form a straightforward summary of Trogus' material by M. Iunianus Justinus, but rather forms an anthology of extracts. This leads to a secondary aim, namely an investigation of Justin's principles of selection and compression as seen in Books VII - IX.

Although the account of Philip's reign does not actually begin until VII. 6. 1., it seems sensible to take VII. 1. 1. as the starting point for a historical commentary, since it is with Book VII that Justin-Trogus commences his history of Macedon. The character of the first five chapters of Book VII differs somewhat

1 The term "Justin-Trogus" will be used exclusively for the author of the text under consideration unless either Justin or Trogus is being mentioned specifically.
from the rest of the material under consideration, in that they cover a large time span in a very limited space dealing in very brief summary form with Philip's royal predecessors and anecdotes concerning them, while the remaining chapter of Book VII and the whole of Books VIII and IX contain a relatively detailed account of the events of Philip's reign. On the other hand, the first five chapters of Book VII are typical of other sections of Justin-Trogus' history which deal with the origines of many other peoples and places in just a few sentences (see below). Comparisons are to be made with the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides for this early period rather than with Diodorus, although every possible cross reference to other ancient writers has been noted.

The Historiae Philippicae originally occupied forty-four books, and no doubt its title was inspired by the Φύλλαμμα of Theopompus, the fourth century historian who was one of Trogus' main sources (see below). From this it would seem that Trogus set out to relate the origin, rise, progress, decline and extinction of the Macedonian monarchy, with Philip II as the central figure, but in fact the scope of the Historiae Philippicae is much wider than this, owing to multitudinous digressions into the origins and progress of many other peoples who came into contact with the Macedonians. The structure of the work can be summarised as follows:

1) Books I - VI deal with the Assyrian, Median and Persian Empires, Cambyses' Egyptian expedition, leading to a section on that country and its peoples; Darius in Scythia and a geographical examination of the peoples on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea; Darius' conflict with the Ionians and subsequently with the Athenians, culminating in the Battle of Marathon, and leading to a digression into Athenian history from its origins as
far as involvement with Persia; the invasion of Xerxes and its subsequent failure; the origins of conflict between Athens and Sparta, leading to an account of the early history of Sparta and her involvement with Messenia and ultimately leading to the Peloponnesian War; a digression into Sicilian origins occupying most of Book IV arising from mention of the Sicilian Expedition; the continuation of the Peloponnesian War leading to the downfall of Athens; and finally the rise and subsequent decline of Spartan influence succeeded by Theban hegemony and its decline after the Battle of Mantinea, bringing Greek affairs to the threshold of Macedonian influence in the shape of Philip.

2) Books VII - XXXIII cover the history of Macedonia from its beginnings down to the capture of Perseus by the Romans in 169 B.C. However, throughout these books there are continual digressions involving, for example, the Sacred War in Greece, the origins of Byzantium and Perinthus, further information about the Scythians and Persians, and accounts of the Cypriotes, Paphlagonians, Apulians, Sabines, Samnites, Sicilians and Carthaginians.

3) Books XXXIV - XL treat events in Asia Minor, Pontus, Syria, Egypt and Bithynia, following on from the Roman occupation of Macedonia.

4) Books XLI - XLII deal with the history of Parthia and Armenia.

5) Book XLIII covers the foundations of Rome and Massilia, leading on to information about the Gallic background of Trogus himself.

6) Finally Book XLIV deals with Spain up to its organisation as a Roman province under Augustus.

It will be clear from what follows that the epitome of Justin does not simply constitute an abridgement of Trogus' work: many
important events covered by Trogus are omitted, some matters
given a very cursory glance while others of lesser importance
are given detailed treatment, with the result that the whole
epitome has an appearance of incoherence and inequality. However,
Justin makes it clear in his preface that his intention was to
select those passages of Trogus which seemed to him to be most
worthy of being known (cognitione quaeque dignissima), and to
leave out what he considered not to be especially interesting or
instructive.

One other important piece of evidence remains to be considered.
Several of the manuscripts contain a table of prologi, which form
a summary of each book of Trogus, and which bear a resemblance to
the epitomes of the lost books of Livy. The author of these
prologi is unknown, and the date of composition cannot precisely
be determined. It is clear from many indications, but chiefly
from the frequent discrepancies between these and the epitome of
Justin, that the compiler of the prologi did not use Justin's
text or vice-versa. It would therefore seem that both writers
have drawn directly on Trogus' original text.

In turning to a consideration of the contents of Books VII,
VIII and IX, it may be best to examine the prologue of each book
in relation to Justin's epitome of it.

The prologue to Book VII states: Septimo volumine continentur
origines Macedonicae regesque a conditore gentis Carano usque ad
magnum Philippum: ipsius Philippi res gestae usque ad captam
urbem Mothonem. Additae in excessu Illyriorum et Paeonum
origines.

Book VII contains six chapters: Chapter 1 deals very cursorily
with the historical geography of Macedonia and events leading to
the legendary foundation of Aegae by Caranus and his unification
of the Macedonian people, while Chapter 2 mentions briefly the
This chapter contains two anecdotes - the choice of the royal Macedonian burial ground as communicated by Perdiccas to Argaeus, and the placing of the infant Aeropus in his cradle on the battlefield to inspire the Macedonians to rout the Illyrians on at least one of the occasions of their perpetual clashes. The chapter concludes with the accession of Amyntas I, though the sentence which introduces him looks straight forward to the achievements of his son Alexander I. Chapter 3 is wholly devoted to the entertainment and subsequent murder engineered by Alexander of the Persian envoys sent by Megabazus to the court of Amyntas to demand hostages following Darius' abortive Scythian expedition. Although Megabazus sends Bubares to exact vengeance for the Persians for this outrage, the necessity for this is averted by a marriage alliance between Bubares and Amyntas' daughter. Chapter 4 opens with the death of Amyntas I in 498, passes quickly through the reign of Alexander (498 - 454), mentioning his good relations with the Persians and the expansion of Macedonia through his efforts, and reaches the accession of Amyntas III in 393 (thus omitting any mention of Perdiccas II, 454 - 413, Archelaus, 413 - 399, and Amyntas II, 390's). The remainder of Chapter 4 covers the two marriages of Amyntas III and the offspring produced from these, a very brief reference to trouble with the Illyrians and Olynthians (which seems to interrupt the account of Amyntas' domestic problems in an almost incongruous way), the plot against his life by his wife Eurydice, and his eventual death at an advanced age, to be succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander II. Chapter 5 traces the buying off of the Illyrians by Alexander II, and the giving of his brother Philip as a hostage, firstly to the Illyrians, and then to the Thebans (recording the beneficial effect of Philip's sojourn in Thebes with reference to his later achievements), the successive murders of both Alexander II and his
younger brother Perdiccas III by their mother, and ultimately the accession of the youngest brother, Philip II himself. Chapter 6 begins with comments on Philip's potential as a ruler, the dangers threatening him on all sides and the methods that in general he employed to deal with these, and then specifically his operations against the Athenians, Illyrians and Thessalians. The book concludes with his marriage to Olympias and the anecdote about the loss of his eye during the siege of Methone.

Thus it can be seen clearly that there is only one obvious discrepancy between the prologue of Book VII and the epitome, and that is the complete omission in the epitome of the origins of the Illyrians and Paeonians. What is difficult to ascertain is the position that the Illyrian and Paeonian section would have occupied in the original text of Trogus, bearing in mind that the epitome of Book VII closes with the loss of Philip's eye at Methone, while the prologue of Book VIII suggests that at least some mention was made of the capture of Methone as a starting point for Book VIII of Trogus (see below, p. viii). A digression into the origins of the Illyrians would have fitted in well either at 2. 6ff. or at 6. 7. on the occasion of the defeat of Bardylis by the Macedonians.

In view of the fact that Philip did achieve a victory over Paeonia in the autumn of 359 and followed this up with the victory over Bardylis and the Illyrians in the spring of 358, the linking of the origins of these two peoples in this sentence in the prologue would suggest that the digression should be placed in Chapter 6, but before the account of the siege of Methone (winter 355 - spring 354), and probably before the reference to the marriage with Olympias in 357.

The prologue to Book VIII runs as follows: Octavo volumine continentur res gestae Philippi magni post captam urbem Mothonen, a principio belli Phocensis, quod sacrum vocant, usque ad finem

The epitome to Book VIII is again divided into six chapters, which may briefly be summarised as follows: Chapter 1 which mentions Philip only as looking for a suitable opportunity to intervene in Greek affairs is concerned almost exclusively with the causes of the outbreak of the Sacred War in 354, down as far as the death of Philomelus and the choice of Onomarchus as his successor. Chapter 2 moves very rapidly from Philip being chosen by the Thebans and Thessalians to oppose Onomarchus to his defeat of the Phocians at an unspecified battle and mentions his use of emblems of the god to affect the consciences of the sacrilegious Phocians, and the fact that he was much eulogised for his trouble. The chapter concludes with the seizure by the Athenians of the pass of Thermopylae, accompanied by a long reflection on the contrast between their current occupation of the pass and that which had taken place during the Persian invasion. Chapter 3 deals with Philip's aggression in Thrace and Thessaly, with especial mention of his destruction of Olynthus and his elimination of his step-brothers, the seizure of gold and silver mines in the area and his intervention between two Thracian princes. Chapter 4 is devoted entirely to the first and second embassies to Philip from the Athenians including an assessment of the shameful depths to which Greek dignity had sunk, and ends up with Philip's seizure of Thermopylae. The first half of Chapter 5 deals with the fate of the Phocians and concludes with the effect of Philip's policy of transplanting populations upon these people. The final chapter picks up the factual side of the transplanting of populations, mentions his reduction of the Dardanians and other neighbours, and
ends with the story of the expulsion by Philip of his relative Arrybas (N.B. the spelling of this name differs from the spelling in the prologue, viz. Arybbas), king of Epirus, and his corruption of Alexander, the twenty-two year old step-son of the latter.

The first point to be considered is whether or not Book VIII of Trogus contained any mention of the capture of Methone, or whether it was quite usual for the beginning of a prologue to mention again a fact given at the end of the previous prologue. The example here of res gestae...post captam urbem Mothonen is the only example in the prologues of events being dealt with after a particular event. The most frequent opening to the prologues is (........)o volumine continentur haec. Ut... and a statement in the indicative (31 examples out of the 44 prologues). Of the remaining thirteen, five have the formula (........)o volumine continentur res (........)icae (or whatever the particular spelling is for the ethnic adjective), two have the formula (........)o volumine continentur origines... and five have (........)o volumine continentur res gestae, while the remaining prologue (XII) has bella Bactriana et Indica as the subject of continentur. Of the five examples using res... gestae as the subject of continentur, Book VIII is under consideration here, Book XI has the genitive of the person responsible followed by usque ad, Book XVIII has an ablative of the agent followed by contra, Book XIX has the genitive of description followed by per and the accusative to denote the agent, and Book XX has a genitive of the person responsible. In none of the last four is there a specific reflection of a previous reference to the particular topic. It would therefore seem likely, in view of the repetition of captam urbem Mothonen in the prologue to Book VIII, that some mention at least was made of Methone by Trogus in Book VIII before he turned to the new topic of the Sacred War which starts so abruptly in Justin's account (cf. commentary, p. 40).
The bellum which the prologue has Philip conducting against the Chalcidian cities must be the Chalcidian campaign of 349/8 which ended in the fall of Olynthus in the latter year. If the interiectumque can be taken with the last sentence Ut Illyrici reges... etc. as well as with bellum, then all the events contained in Chapter 3 except the capture of Olynthus, the second half of Chapter 5 and the whole of Chapter 6 could be covered with et Thracia atque Thessalia subactae... eicto Arybba, this leaves two phrases in the prologue unaccounted for: Illyrici reges ab eo victi sunt and frustra Perinthos oppugnatas. The last phrase is of course explained quite simply as a complete omission by Justin of an episode covered by Trogus, an episode which presumably held no interest for the epitomator (see below). The other phrase must refer to the campaign against Pleuratus, chief of the Illyrian Ardiaei, which was conducted in 345 (see commentary, p. 82.), and the plural reges may help to explain why Dardanos is used by Justin instead of Ardiaeos, in that Philip was probably campaigning against both Illyrian tribes and their respective kings, though Justin chose only to mention one of the tribes included in Trogus' original account.

The prologue to Book IX is by far the longest of the three:

Nono volumine continentur haec. Ut Philippus a Perintho summotus Byzantii origines, a cuius obsidione summotus Philippus Scythiae bellum intulit. Repetitae inde Scythicae res ab his temporibus, in quibus illa prius finierant, uaque ad Philippi bellum, quod cum Aethea Scytkiae rege gessit. Unde reversus Graeciae bellum intulit victisique Chaeronaeae, cum bella Persica moliertur praemissa classe cum ducibus, a Pausania occupatis angustiis nuptiarum filiae occissus est, priusquam bella Persica inchoaret. Repetitae res inde Persicace ab Dario Noto, cui successit filius Artaxerxes cognomine Mnemon, qui post fratrem Cyrum victum pulsasque Cnido per Conona classe Lacedaemoniorum bellum cum
Significantly this prologue contains many more events not given by Justin in the epitome, although Book IX is not proportionately so much longer than the two previous books. The figures comparing the number of lines in the prologues with the number of lines in the corresponding book in the epitome are as follows: Book VII - 5 lines of prologue, 172 lines of Justin's text; Book VIII - 8 lines of prologue, 186 lines of Justin's text; Book IX - 15 lines of prologue, 234 lines of Justin's text.

Book IX of Justin contains eight chapters: Chapter 1 covers a brief mention of the siege of Byzantium with a reference to its foundation by Pausanias, Philip's capture of 170 Athenian cargo ships, and his storming of towns in the Chersonese, leading up to the Scythian expedition. Chapter 2 is devoted entirely to the Scythian expedition, explaining why Philip was asked for help in the first place by Atheas, and tracing events down to the defeat of the Scythians. The opening lines of Chapter 3 complete the Scythian story, with the loss of Philip's booty to the Triballi, and the serious wounding of the Macedonian king in the battle in which it was lost. The remainder of Chapter 3 deals with the Theban - Athenian alliance of 339 and leads on to two sentences which mention the Battle of Chaeronea (though not by name) and its result. Chapter 4 contains an account of Philip's behaviour after the battle and his treatment of the Athenians and the Thebans. The Congress of Corinth occupies most of Chapter 5, and at the end of the chapter reference is made to the sending of three generals with an advance party into Asia. Chapter 6 recounts preparations at Aegae for the wedding of Philip's daughter Cleopatra and Alexander of Epirus, Philip's assassination and the story of Pausanias' grievances. The rest of the account of Pausanias and the involvement of Olympias and Alexander occupy Chapter 7, and the book concludes with a character sketch of
Philip, followed by a curious parallel assessment of the virtues and vices of Philip and Alexander (see commentary, p. 143f.).

As in Book VIII there is no mention of the siege of Perinthus, and it is doubtful whether what Justin preserves about the foundation of Byzantium by Pausanias would have been sufficient to have merited the description Byzantii origines in the prologue.

The point at which the Scythiae res...finierant was the end of II. 5, at the time of the retreat of Darius from Scythia, which event is also mentioned at the start of VII. 3. Clearly Justin has no interest in the Scythian affairs between the expeditions of Darius and Philip. Unde reversus Graeciae bellum intulit victisque Chaeronea is probably represented in the epitome by two-thirds of Chapter 3, the whole of Chapter 4 and most of Chapter 5, while cum bella Persica moliretur praemia classe cum ducibus is covered by the rest of Chapter 5, and a Pausania occupatis angustiis...inchoaret clearly must account for the rest of Book IX. So all the matter in the prologue from Repetitae res inde Persicae to the end would seem to have been omitted completely from Justin's epitome.

It can therefore be seen from the foregoing pages that Justin does not just simply follow the pattern of Trogus' history in a summary form. He is quite selective, and this will be discussed below in an examination of his principles of selection and compression (see page xxxii.). The main topic of interest in Books VII - IX of Justin's epitome is the portrayal of Philip II, and it is this which must now be analysed and compared with the only other continuous account of him extant, that in Diodorus Siculus XVI.

Despite introducing Philip amidst an atmosphere of optimism at the beginning of Chapter 6 of Book VII, and showing him to be a shrewd diplomat, politician and general in the early and dangerous months of his reign, Justin-Trogus quickly moves on to
implied criticisms of Philip's sudden and unexpected attack on Thessaly (non praedae cupiditate, sed quod exercitui suo robur Thessalorum equitum adiungere gestiebat (6. 8.)), a preliminary mention of his expulsion of Arrybas and a general comment that he was iam non contentus submovere bella ultra etiam quietos lacesit (6. 13.). Nevertheless there are two definite references to humane and merciful behaviour on Philip's part in this chapter: first he allowed the Athenian prisoners to leave without injury and unransomed, after their unsuccessful attempt to place Argaeus on the Macedonian throne (6. 6.); secondly he granted peace and merciful treatment to the people of Methone, even after he had lost his right eye during the siege of that town.

However, it is in Book VIII that a hostile portrayal of Philip really begins to take root. Almost immediately we are told that while the Greek states were squabbling with each other over the leadership of Greece, Philip, liberati omnium insidiatus, took his opportunity to manipulate matters, assisting the weaker sides amongst other things, and then victos pariter vicirosque subire regiam servitutem coegit (1. 3.). It is this theme of depriving the Greek states of their 'libertas' and enslaving them that dominates Justin-Trogus' portrayal of Philip from now on. Indeed the 'libertas Graeciae' is a theme which is still dear to the heart of Justin-Trogus much later in his history, when he refers to the whole of Greece rising up against Philip V spe pristinae libertatis (XXX. 3. 7.).

The first half of Chapter 2 deals with Philip's involvement on the Theban side of the Sacred War in Greece, his defeat of the Phocians and the reputation he thereby achieved apud omnes nationes (although these are unspecified by Justin-Trogus, they can hardly have included the Spartans and Athenians, who supported the Phocians). It is not beyond the realms of possibility that there may be a degree of sarcasm involved here; certainly Justin-
Trogus allows the most incredible assessment to be made of Philip's actions by these peoples: *quod orbis viribus expiari debuit, solum qui piacula exigeret extitisse. Dignum itaque qui a diis proximus habeatur, per quem deorum maiestas vindicata sit* (2. 6-7.).

Philip's character begins to suffer again at the start of Chapter 3, where his conduct towards his allies is described as *nec...melioris fidei* (3. 1.), and where he is said to have seized cities, formerly under his leadership, which he then *hostiliter... diripuit* (3. 2.). The description of his treatment of these cities leads to an assessment that he *non tam sacrilegii ultor extitisse quam sacrilegiorum licentiam quaesisse videretur* (3. 5.). The rest of Chapter 3 records Philip's dealings in Thrace, the destruction of Olynthus, his seizure of gold and silver mines in Thrace and Thessaly and further political and military involvement in Thrace. Justin-Trogus' treatment of Philip becomes more and more hostile throughout the rest of this book. His initial expedition into Thrace is portrayed as one where he joined the whole country (*provincia*) to the kingdom of Macedonia *bello pari perfidia gesto captiasque per dolum et occisis finitimis regibus* (3. 6.). Philip is then said to have sent public criers through the kingdoms and rich cities to contract for a programme of rebuilding walls, temples and shrines *ad abolendam invidiae famam, qua insignis praeter ceteros tunc temporis habebat* (3. 7.). Philip's destruction of Olynthus, which follows on from this is explained, according to Justin-Trogus, by his desire to eliminate as potential rivals to the throne his two surviving step-brothers, who had fled to Olynthus for protection, and that he *praedaeque ingenti pariter et paricidii voto fruitur* (3. 11.). He then seized the mines in Thessaly and Thrace *quasi omnia quae agitasset animo ei licerent* (3. 12.) and finally, having been called in to arbitrate in a dispute in Thrace, probably between the sons of
Berisades (cf. commentary, p. 66.), Philip regno...utrumque non ludicis more, sed fraude latronis ac scelere spoliavit (3. 15.).

Chapter 4, which deals with the various peace embassies sent to Philip by most of the leading Greek states, gives a general impression that Philip was in the strong position of being able to manipulate the Greek states and play them off against each other. There is a passing reference to the expertam...Philippi crudelitatem (4. 5.), and while Philip was deciding which of the two sides to support, Justin-Trogus says that he venditatione gloriae suae tantarum urbium fastidium agitat (4. 10.).

During Chapter 5 Philip is shown to have no respect for his promise made to the Phocians about saving their lives if they submitted: pactio eius fidel fuit, cuius antea fuerat deprecati belli promissio (5. 4.); and he is seen to have been responsible for wholesale butchery and spoliation. He is then represented as moving sections of the population of his kingdom around ad libidinem suam (5. 7.). This last theme is carried over into Chapter 6, and Book VIII concludes with his conquest of the Dardanians and other neighbours: fraude (6. 3.), and an attack on one of his own relatives, the Molossian king, Arrybas, whereby he invited Arrybas' step-son, Alexander, into Macedonia and simulato amore ad stupri consuetudinem perpullit (6. 6.). He subsequently expelled Arrybas from his kingdom and installed Alexander, but not before he sum... inpudicium fecit (6. 8.).

The invectives directed at Philip's character and personality, so prevalent in Book VIII, are less evident in Book IX. Apart from a brief allusion in the very first sentence to Philip's motives for making war on the whole of Greece, namely sollicitatus paucarum civitatum direptione et ex praeda modicarum urbium quantae opes universarum essent animo prospiciens (1. 1.), in the first two chapters and the start of Chapter 3 Justin-Trogus
concentrates on giving a full narrative account of the siege of
Byzantium, the Scythian expedition, the encounter with the
Triballi and Philip's wound resulting from that encounter, without
any judgements on his character or motives. The remainder of
Chapter 3 is concerned with diplomatic manoeuvres leading up to
the Battle of Chaeronea, during which Philip, it was claimed by
the Athenians and Thebans, would not rest nisi omnem Graeciam
domuerit (3. 7.).

At the beginning of Chapter 4 Philip is shown to behave very
moderately after Chaeronea in his attitude towards the victory and
his newly-acquired position as the leader of Greece (he asks to be
called general rather than king), with the result that neque apud
suos exultasse neque apud victos insultasse videretur (4. 3.).
This is followed by his humane treatment of the Athenians: et
captivos gratis remisit et bello consumptorum corpora sepulturae
reddidit (4. 4.), and his correspondingly harsh treatment of the
Thebans: non solum captivos, verum etiam interfectorum sepulturam
vendidit (4. 6.).

With Chapter 5 Justin-Trogus returns to a more detached
narrative account of events leading up to the Congress of Corinth,
apart from noting the attitude of the Spartans towards Philip: et
regem et leges contemptuerunt, servitutem, non pacem rati, quae non
ipsae civitatibus conveniret, sed a victore ferretur (5. 3.). This
of course continues Justin-Trogus' theme of the enslavement of the
Greeks already referred to. Chapter 6, which opens with the
marriage of Philip's daughter, Cleopatra, leads on to Philip's
murder, the only observation about his behaviour being that, when
Pausanias had made complaints to the king about his treatment by
Attalus, he was put off variis frustrationibus non sine risu (6.
8.), which does not necessarily portray Philip in a bad light —
after all, Pausanias may have been a thoroughly objectionable
young man who needed to be taken down a peg or two!
Chapter 7 contains the well known (see commentary, p. 130f.) anecdote about Philip's quarrel with his son, Alexander, and Book IX concludes with a final chapter assessing Philip's character, leading to a parallel assessment of the characters of both Philip and Alexander. The treatment is generally hostile (e.g. Misericordia in eo perfidia pari iure diletatae. Nulla apud eum turpis ratio vincendi. Blandus pariter et insidiosus, adloquio qui plura promitterent quam praestarent; (8. 7-8.)) although it is conceded that there was Inter haec eloquentia et insignis oratio (8. 10.). The parallel assessment is discussed on p. 143f. of the commentary.

If we turn to the only other continuous account of Philip's reign, that contained in Diodorus Book XVI, we can see from the outset that a very different view of the reign is held by that author (or his sources, but see below for a discussion on the sources both of Trogus and of Diodorus). He says of Philip:

"Οὕτως ὡρ ἔκπωσε μὲν καὶ τέτταρα ἑτη τῶν Μακεδόνων ἔβαλεν εὐεργεσίας ἐλαχίστοις δὲ ἁφαίρεσις κρατῆσθαι μεγίστην τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην δυναστείων κατεσκεύασε τὴν ἱδίαν. βασιλείαν καὶ παραλαβὼν τὴν Μακεδόνιαν δυναστείαν Ἰλλυρίως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλην ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων κυρίαν ἔποιησε. διὰ δὲ τὴν ἱδίαν ἀρετὴν τῆς μὲν Ἑλλάδος ἀπέσχη παρέλαβε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐκουσίως. τῶν πόλεων ὑποταπτωμένων, τοὺς δὲ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν συλλογίσατας καταπολεμήσας καὶ τῷ μαντεῖῳ βοηθήσας μετέσχε τῷ συνεδρίῳ τῶν Ἀρμενιοῦν καὶ διὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς θεὸν εὑσέβειαν ἐπαθὼν ἔλαβε τὰς ψῆφους τῶν κρατιδέων Φιλέων. Ἰλλυρίως δὲ καὶ Παίονιος καὶ Θράκης καὶ Σκύθων καὶ πάντα τὰ πλησίον πάντων ἔθνη καταπολεμήσας τὴν Περσῶν βασιλείαν ἔστεβάλετο καταλύσας καὶ δοῦναις μὲν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδας διαβίβασας τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ὑπεψάρανται μεσολαβήθησας δ' ἐκ τῆς πεπρωμένης τιλικραίας καὶ τοκύττας δυνάμεις ἀπέλιπτεν ὡστε τὸν μὲν Ἀλέξανδρον μη
There is no sign here of any hostility towards Philip at all. In fact his achievements were made διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν, as we are told twice in this passage; he took on the leadership of Greece with the voluntary subordination of the states to his authority, and he was about to liberate the Greek cities of Asia Minor. One should note here the assessment that Diodorus makes of Philip's character and behaviour throughout Book XVI, before attempting to compare his account with that of Justin-Trogus. The following points in Diodorus' narrative seem particularly significant.

In reference to Philip's struggles to combat external pressures at the start of his reign, Diodorus says that he ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐμπιθανέστεραι προσπάθειας ἦν καὶ διὰ τῶν διωρεῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπαγγελεῖσιν εἰς τὴν μεγίστην σύνεσαν τὰ πλῆθη προῆγετο, πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιφερομένων κυβόλων κυριότως ἀντιμηχανώς (3. 3.). He is consequently seen as a clever diplomat and politician, as is made clear in the following section covering his dealings with the Athenians, Thracians and Paeonians (3. 3-6.). Chapter 4 deals with Philip's defeat of the Illyrians and Paeonians during which he is said to have fought ἰρωσίας along with his best troops.

The narrative about Philip is resumed again in Chapter 8, where his siege of Amphipolis is described, after which, although he exiled those who were opposed to him, he behaved moderately to others (8. 2.). Philip is also said to have treated the Athenian garrison which he removed from Potidaea φιλανθρώπως, and he sent it back to Athens: σφάδρα γὰρ εὐλαβεῖτο τὸν ἐβημὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τὸ βάρος καὶ τὸ ἄξιομα τῆς πόλεως (8. 5.). In Chapter 22
reference is made to a concerted attack on Philip by three neighbouring kings. Diodorus says of them: τὴν συνεργίαν ἑφορώμενα τῶν Φιλαδέφων (22. 3.), but he makes no attempt to define or comment on this συνεργία.

Philip seems to have refrained from gross atrocity in his treatment of the inhabitants of cities which surrendered to him; for example, the people of Methone were compelled to hand over their city to him ἵνα ἀνελθῶν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκ τῆς Μεθώνης ἔχωσι ἐν ἵππων ἐκαστὸν (34. 5.)

Diodorus makes very little comment on Philip's involvement in the Sacred War (as opposed to the course of the war itself), though he mentions the battles in which he took part. After his defeat of Onomarchus, Philip put an end to the tyranny in Pherae and restored its freedom (38, 1.). After this he was prevented by the Athenians from passing through Thermopylae to make war on the Phocians, and so returned to Macedon ἡμῶν ἐαυτοῦ τὴν βασιλείαν τοῖς τε πράξεσι καὶ τῷ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἐνσέβεσι (38. 2.).

The account of Philip's actions is resumed in Chapter 52, where he is operating in Chalcidice, gaining possession of various towns including Zereia (53. 9.), and in Chapter 53 he captures more cities on the Hellespont through treachery (53. 2.); then, after bribing the two chief officials of Olynthus, he captures the town through their treachery and then ἐχάρτησαν δ' αὐτὴν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούσας ἐξαναπτυσσόμενος ἐλαθοροπώλησε (53. 3.). For the first time Diodorus shows Philip behaving with marked cruelty towards a city he has captured, and he carries on to say how he used the money from the plunder in giving gifts to his own men and bribes to inhabitants of other cities to induce them to betray their cities to him. He concludes the chapter with the statement: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπεφαίνετο διὰ Χρυσίου πολὺ ρᾶλλον ἢ διὰ τῶν θηλών ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ (53. 3.). The power of gold in
securing the capture of cities is also noted in the last two sections of Chapter 54, and certainly the last sentence is an indictment of Philip's methods: ἐγκατασκευάζων διὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προβάτας διόν τῆς ἐξεργασίας καὶ τῶν δεκαμένων ἱππαπον ἔνεος καὶ φίλους ἐνομούσα ταῖς πολεμαῖς δρεμόν τις ἐνεστείρε ἡ ὑδώ τῶν ἐνθρωπῶν (54. 4).

The whole of Chapter 55 is devoted to describing the way in which Philip won over the friendship of many people through granting them favours and making them promises, including an anecdote about the actor Satyrus, although Diodorus makes no judgement this time on his behaviour other than observing that πολλαῖ... τής τῆς ἐνεργεσίας ἐλπίς, προκλήσεσε καταβασάν ἀλλήλους προσνέμοντες ἐναυτοὺς τῷ Φίλιππῳ καὶ τὰς πατρίδας ἐγχειρίζοντες (55. 4).

When the Boeotians requested assistance from Philip, since they were under some financial and numerical duress, Philip's attitude was described as being ἡδείως δρι τὴν ἡπαίρησιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπολόγων τὰ ἀνεικτικα προνόματα συστάσεις τῶν Βοιωτῶν but he did send a few men as he wanted to guard against τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν περιορικὸν τὸ μαντεύον σεσυλημένον (58. 3.). Diodorus again shows that Philip is careful to exhibit his respect towards the gods, although this is far more likely to have been a political motive than a genuine religious one. The Sacred War is then terminated quite suddenly without a battle, and the Phocians surrender to Philip. Diodorus gives Philip no personal involvement in the action decided on against the Phocians, but rather leaves this entirely to the Amphictyonic Council. He ends this section of his narrative about Philip by saying that the king returned to Macedon οὐ μόνον δόξαν εἰσεβεβèλας καὶ ἀρετῆς στρατηγικῆς περιτεμπολημένον, οὐδὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐξήσειν αὐτῆς γεγνεότας μεγάλα προκατασκευασμένος (60. 4.), a reference to
Philip's wish to lead the Greeks in a war against Persia, although one cannot help wondering whether this reflects Diodorus' anticipation of events he is about to relate, rather than any plans for such an expedition being already formulated in Philip's mind.

Chapter 69 takes up the narrative on Philip again, and here relates how Philip invaded Illyria, allied himself with the Thessalians after expelling tyrants from their cities, and as a result of this οἱ πλησίοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνενεχόμενες τῇ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κρίσει συμμαχίαν πρὸς οὗτον ἐποίησαντο (69. 8.). The important word here is προθύμως, used presumably because the Greeks heartily approved of Philip's expulsion of the Thessalian tyrants. The siege of Perinthus forms a considerable portion of Diodorus' account of Philip, filling chapters 74 - 76. Philip's motive for this siege was that Perinthus had opposed him and sided with the Athenians, and that his men ἐκεῖ οὗτος εὐθαῦσας πόλιν διωρίσασι καὶ διωρίσασι ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου τυμαθήσασι διὰ τὴν τοῦ λυστελθὼς ἔλπιδα τοῖς δεωσὶ ἐνεκαρτέρουν (75. 4.).

At the beginning of Chapter 84 Diodorus tells us of Philip τῶν πλείστων τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς φίλων προπημένος ἐφιλοτήτει καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καταπληγμένος ἔδραμον ἐκεῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος (84. 1.). This begins the section leading on to Chaeronea, and Philip is seen as preparing to remove the last obstacle to his achieving the ἡγεμονία of Greece, already alluded to in 60. 4., rather than as acting with the deliberate and calculated desire to crush the Athenians. The action leads on to the Battle of Chaeronea in Chapter 86, during which, despite the first great success going to his son, Alexander, on one wing, καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς προκυπτειόνων καὶ τῆς νίκης τὴς ἐπιγραφὴν οὐδ' οὕτω παραχωρῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ ἔδραμον τῇ βία τῶν ἀντιπαραμένουσι, ἐπετα ὦ καὶ φεύγειν συναναγκάζως οὕτως ἐγέρετο τῆς νίκης (86. 4.). Perhaps there is a little veiled
criticism here in that Philip is shown as very anxious to claim responsibility for the victory in the face of what was clearly a successful and significant contribution by his son.

An anecdote is related in Chapter 87 which shows Philip in a very bad light after a drinking session with his friends following the battle. Having formed a 'comus' with them he paraded amongst the captives ὑπερήφανος διὰ λόγου τὰς τῶν ἀκληροῦντων δυσοξείας (87. 1.). However, the remarks made by the Athenian orator, Demades, had an immediate sobering effect on him, and he then dissolved the revelries, applauded Demades' spirit and finally, as a result of the latter's eloquence, released the Athenian prisoners without ransom and completely abandoned τὴν ἐκ τῆς νίκης ὑπερηφανίαν (87. 3.).

Chapter 89 is concerned entirely with Philip's plan to invade Persia on behalf of the Greeks, after he had become their leader as a result of the Battle of Chaeronea. Diodorus gives as his motive for this action against the Persians that he wanted λαβεῖν παρ' ἀυτῶν δίκας ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς ἢ ἱερὰ γενομένης παρανομίας, and he was φιλοφρονοῦμενος δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας καὶ ἤδος καὶ κολυκῇ (89. 2.). Once more Philip is portrayed as being influenced by religious considerations, and this is again apparent in Chapter 91, where he sends an advance party to Asia Minor under the command of Attalus and Parmenion, and ὀπεσεῖτεν μὲν μεθ' ἑαυτῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ἐπενελέσθαι (91. 2.), consults the oracle of Apollo, and thinks that from his interpretation of the oracle he has the support of the gods.

This leads straight into the final section on Philip which ends Book XVI. The treatment is comprehensive, seemingly reflecting Philip's own detailed preparation for his Persian expedition. Diodorus says of him that he σφόδρα... ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ διὰ τὰς δεδομένας αὐτῷ τῆς ὄλης ἡγεμονίας τοῖς ταῖς προσηκούσαις ὁμιλίαις ἀρείβεσθαι.
Philip received golden crowns from various cities including Athens, and listened to a recitation by the actor, Neoptolemus, which impressed him with its apparent relevance to potential success in Persia. During the procession on the next day, amidst the statues of the twelve Olympian gods, Philip, along with other gods and goddesses, listened to a recitation by Neoptolemus, which impressed him with its apparent relevance to potential success in Persia (92. 5.).

When one recalls Justin-Trogus' remark dignum qui a diis proximus habeatur after Philip's defeat of the Phocians (Justin-Trogus VIII. 2. 7.), the question of self-deification could be posed, but there is clearly insufficient evidence to make any definite conclusions on this.

The background to the assassination story is covered in depth in Chapter 93 and the start of Chapter 94 (see commentary, p. 125f.). Suffice it to say that, with respect to Pausanias' grievances, Philip did not wish, amongst other things, to jeopardise the Persian expedition by punishing Attalus, and so tried to pacify Pausanias with gifts and promotion. After the murder, described in the second half of Chapter 94, Diodorus concludes in his final chapter that Philip met his fate μέγιστοισ γενόμενοι τῶν καθ' έαυτόν ἐπὶ τὸς Ἐλλάδας βασιλέως καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἀρχῆς έαυτον τῆς δύναμα Θεος σύνθεων καταφθάνεται (95. 1.). His final assessment of Philip is: δεικτέ ο ντος το βασιλείου καλαχίας μὲν εἰς τὴν μοναρχίαν ἄφορας παρειπηφέναι, μεγίστην δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μοναρχίων κατακτήσαντα, ὑπεξικέναι δὲ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τὴς ἐν τῶν ὁπλῶν ἀνδραγαθίας ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ δόξῃ ἡμίλεσι καὶ φιλοφροσύνης. μετὰ δὲ καὶ οὕτω τῶν Φίλιππων σειρῆνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ στρατικῇ συνεργῇ καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς ἡμίλες ἐπιτεύγματος ἦπερ ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰς μίχας ἀνδρείας. τῶν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τῶν ἄγνωστων κατερθιμάτων μετέχουν ἀπὸντας τοὺς στρατευμένους, τῶν
As at the start of Book XVI Diodorus clearly displays a favourable opinion of Philip and his achievements. He appreciates the king's qualities as a diplomat above all else.

From the beginning of Chapter 6 of Book VII of Justin-Trogus a comparison with the account of Diodorus reveals no major discrepancies of statement, with the exception of caedes fratrum indigne peremptorum (6. 3.), which, referring as it does to the murders of Alexander and Perdiccas by Eurydice, contradicts Diodorus XVI. 2. 4., where it is said that Alexander was murdered by Ptolemy of Alorus and that Perdiccas later fell in a battle against the Illyrians. However in Book VIII there are at least five places where the two authors have conflicting statements, four of which occur in the account of the Sacred War, namely a difference in the charge levelled at the Phocians as a result of which they were fined (1. 5.), different accounts of the death of Philomelus (1. 13.), alternative circumstances for and explanations of the defeat of the Phocians under Onomarchus (2. 4.), and the major involvement of Philip in the war as a champion of religion (2. 6ff; cf. the relevant sections in the commentary for details of these differences). The fifth discrepancy lies in the details supplied about the expulsion of Arrybas; Justin-Trogus says that Philip expelled Arrybas and installed that king's twenty-year old step-son Alexander on the Epirotic throne in his place (6. 4ff.), whereas Diodorus says that Arrybas died after a rule of ten years, and made his son Aeacides his heir, though Alexander succeeded to the throne with the backing of Philip (Diod. XVI. 72. 1.).

In Book IX different reasons for the breaking off of the siege of Byzantium are given in the two authors, although this discrepancy may have arisen as a result of compression of the narrative of Trogus by Justin (see below); there are conflicting
accounts of the numbers on each side at the Battle of Chaeronea and two versions of Philip's behaviour after the battle, although it might be suggested that Justin-Trogus finishes his description of Philip's behaviour after the battle at some point before he got drunk at the banquet, and therefore leaves out the king's faux pas rather than contradicting Diodorus.

In addition to the discrepancies between the two authors, there are numerous places where additional information is supplied in one account or the other. This naturally occurs more often in Diodorus, because a large amount of detail will have been lost through the epitomising of Trogus by Justin, and indeed the longest additional piece of information in Diodorus is the account of the siege of Perinthus, which is in fact mentioned in the prologues of Trogus for Books VIII and IX. Instances of Justin-Trogus supplying material which does not figure in Diodorus can be found at VIII. 2. 3., 3. 7-9., 3. 10., 5. 1., 5. 3., 5. 7-8., IX. 1. 8., most of Chapters 2, 3. 1-3., 4. 7-10., 5. 6., 7. 1. and most of 7. 7-14.

In attempting to make a comparison between the material contained in Justin-Trogus on Philip and that contained in Diodorus, it should be noted that there is a complex background to the sources of Book XVI of Diodorus. Professor N. G. L. Hammond has identified three main sources drawn on by Diodorus for this book: a first, which he shows after a convincing argument to be Ephorus, supplying the information for Philip's early career and then the siege of Perinthus in Chapters 1 - 4, 8, 14, 1-2, and 74 - 76. 4; a second, certainly Demophilus, son of Ephorus, for the narrative of the Sacred War in 23 - 31. 5., 32 - 33, 35 - 36, 2, 37 - 39 and 56 - 63; and a third, possibly Diyllus of Athens, for the Social War, the Olynthian War, the narrative dealing with events between the outbreak of war between Athens and Philip and the

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1 'The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI', CQ 1937, 79 - 91
Battle of Chaeronea, and the final period of Philip's life to his assassination in 7. 3ff., 21 - 22. 2. 5 - 53, 64, 77. 2-3, 84 - 88. 2., and 91 - 94. Hammond suggests that the remaining passages should be ascribed to an anonymous text book, such as that preserved in the Oxyrhynchus Papyri (I no. XII).

It can thus be seen that a direct comparison between the two continuous accounts extant for the reign of Philip II, i.e. Justin-Trogus VII - IX and Diodorus XVI, may be misleading, since, in the case of Diodorus at any rate, we are dealing with matter which derives from at least three different Greek historians, two of whom differed greatly in their style and interpretation of the events. It would seem sensible to identify as far as possible some of the characteristics of these three historians, add what we know of the characteristics of the other important fourth century historians mentioned by Diodorus, Duris of Samos in Book XVI and Theopompus in Book XV, and examine Justin-Trogus' account in the light of the results.

Ephorus, who undertook "τὰ καθόλου γράφειν", eulogised Philip, and the whole of his history had a rhetorical colouring. He dispensed with the usual annalistic form of writing and instead adopted an arrangement by subjects and topics. He displayed a pan-Hellenic sentiment, which almost certainly he acquired through being a pupil of Isocrates, and having little skill as a military historian, he seems to have used a set rhetorical form of composition for the accounts of battles. Demophilus wrote only an account of the Sacred War, with the careers of the Phocian commanders from Philomelus to Phalaecus as its main theme. From the evidence of Fragment 96 (Jacoby) Hammond concludes that Demophilus' account was written "...in a prosaic, not a gossiping,

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1 Polyb. V. 33. 2. 2 Cf. G. L. Barber: 'The Historian Ephorus', passim.
vein and is introduced for its antiquarian interest..."\(^1\). The same fragment makes it clear that Demophilus dissociated Philomelus from the plundering of the whole of the temple treasures by Onomarchus, Phayllus and Phalaecus, which is consistent with the version in Diodorus. The third possible source for Diodorus, Diyllus, was an Athenian citizen, who was pro-Athenian and quite prepared to distort the facts to maintain a favourable portrayal of Athens. His main characteristics are that he "...quotes orators, mentions actors, admires Demosthenes, likes a racy story (e.g. 64.), tells anecdotes of Philip and others, evaluates Athenian generals, and gives a highly coloured account of the Macedonian court (91 - 94)"\(^2\).

Theopompus' attitude towards history can to some extent be determined from the extant fragments. P. Treves says of him that in the Φίλαλησσάς he "accomplished something ... unique in Greek historical writing. Psychological insight into his protagonist, Philip, whom he saluted as the creator of a new age, moral and political discussions, geographical digressions in which he boasted that he had surpassed Herodotus, made of the Φίλαλησσάς perhaps the crowning achievement of classical and certainly the forerunner of Hellenistic historiography"\(^3\). Finally Duris of Samos was known as a writer who aimed at sensationalism and emotional impact, and he "believed μπαραντίζοντας to be an integral part of the historian's task"\(^4\).

Having made this brief survey of the known fourth century historians for this period, we now come to a consideration of the possible sources of Trogus. Gutschmid propounded the hypothesis that Timagenes of Alexandria was the source of Trogus\(^5\). a

\(^1\) Hammond, op. cit. p. 85.  
\(^2\) Hammond, op. cit. p. 90.  
\(^3\) Treves in OCD ii. pp. 521-2.  
\(^4\) F. W. Walbank in Hist. 9 (1960) p. 218.  
hypothesis which seems to have found general acceptance, except by Momigliano, who is concerned that the only two quotations of Timagenes (Senec. De Ira, III. 23. 4. and Quintil. X. 1. 75.) speak simply of his Historiae, rather than Historiae Philippicae, a characteristic title which Momigliano feels was unlikely to have been abbreviated¹. Timagenes had earlier been suggested as the author whom Livy attacks in IX, 17ff. in a paper by Schwab².

Momigliano discusses the alternative theories in another paper³, where he shows that a comparison between this attack by Livy and a similar polemic by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I. 4.) demonstrates that the characteristics of the latter do not indicate the type of source which Livy is attacking. Both Dionysius and Plutarch contrast Roman luck with valour, a thing which does not appear in Livy. Momigliano shows from passages in Justin-Trogus such as XLIII. 2. 5., which can be closely related to Plutarch. De Fortuna Romanorum 320 d., that Plutarch and Trogus had the same model, but that this model must be different from the work of the historian attacked by Livy, because of the attitude towards virtus and fortuna, and that consequently that historian cannot be Timagenes.

The view that there was an intermediate source between the fourth century Greek historians and Trogus has been supported by Momigliano, who considers that two passages in Justin-Trogus, VIII. 4. 7-8. and IX. 3. 11., give the impression of having been written by a Greek historian who was not a contemporary of Philip, but a more detached commentator on events which had occurred some quite considerable time before him. He feels that, whether or not this

¹ La valutazione di Filippo il Macedone in Giustino' in Rend. Ist. Lombardo (1933), p. 996.
² De Livio et Timagene historiarum scriptoribus aemulis', Stuttgart 1834.
³ Livio, Plutarco e Giustino su virtu e fortuna dei Romani' in Athenaeum (1934), pp. 45-56.
model is Timagenes, he will in his turn have drawn on the fourth
century historians for his material, and it is for traces of the
influence of these historians that we must examine the narrative of
Justin-Trogus.

Momigliano's argument for an intermediate source seems to rest
largely on his view that there must have existed a Greek source,
later than the contemporary historians Ephorus and Theopompus, who
could pass judgement on events in Greek history in a way that a
Roman could not have done. He therefore appears to discount the
possibility of a Roman having such philhellenic views that these
could not necessarily be distinguished from those of a Greek.
However, there seems to be no real reason why Trogus could not have
held intensely pro-Greek views, such as are evident in several
passages which occur in Books VIII and IX. In particular, it is
worth drawing attention to Trogus' family background and possible
education.

Very little is in fact known about these matters, save what has
been preserved in the text of the epitome by Justin, where we are
informed in Book XLIII. 1. 1. that ad initia Romanae urbis Trogus
veluti post longam peregrinationem domum revertitur, which would
seem to imply that Trogus regarded Rome as his home city, or at any
rate Italy as his home country, and then in XLIII. 5. 11-12 the
following information is given: maiores suos a Vocontiiis originem
ducere; avum suum Trogum Pompeium Sertoriano bello civitatem a Cn.
Pompeio percepisse, patruum Mithridatico bello turmum equitum sub
eodem Pompeio duxisse; patrem quoque sub C. Caesare militasse
epistularumque et legationum, simul et anuli curam habuisse. It is
clear from this that Trogus' father was an educated man, holding a
position of some responsibility, who was likely to have sent the
young Trogus abroad to complete his education (cf. Cic. Ad Fam. 16,
27., where the orator has sent his son to study in Athens). In
view of the family origins in Gallia Narbonensis, what would be
more natural than to send the young Trogus to the fashionable place for the completion of one's education in rhetoric and philosophy, a centre of Greek culture which had at that time superseded Athens in attracting τοὺς γνωριμωτάτους Ἰουρίων for their period of foreign study, namely the town of Massilia (cf. Strab. IV. 181. See also Tac. Agricola 4., where we are told of the young Agricola's training in Greek culture). If this were an acceptable theory, two important points could be explained: why Trogus chose Massilia as the focal point of his Gallic excursus, and also, more importantly, why work of such clear Greek inspiration should have interested him.

That Trogus should have had a Gallic excursus in the Historiae Philippicae is quite understandable, in view of his ancestry, and indeed there are several other places throughout the work which refer to Gallic history, as for example in Book XXIV. 4ff. But this does not explain why he should single out Massilia for detailed treatment. Momigliano suggests that the reign of Tarquinius Priscus (which was the point at which Trogus ended his account of Roman affairs) could have offered a convenient transition to the history of Massilia, since it had been established under this reign, and this seems quite plausible, especially if as a student in Massilia Trogus had become interested in the Greek origins of the city, and then in Greek history in general. An education in Greek rhetoric and philosophy could have developed for the young Trogus a keen interest in such a topic as the loss of Greek freedom and an attitude of anti-imperialism, such as is manifest in the portrayal of Philip in the Historiae Philippicae, especially in view of the fact that he came from a family only recently enfranchised and possibly therefore still smarting to some extent under the loss of Gallic freedom.

This brings us back to the question of an intermediate source
between Trogus and the fourth century historians. Having explained why Trogus may have been sufficiently interested in Greek history, and having suggested by implication that he was very well versed in the writings of Greek historians, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that he went right back to the original fourth century sources, Ephorus and Theopompus (the influence of each of which is discernible in his work; see below, p. xxxiff.), and interpreted their material in his own way. Momigliano has commented¹ that the historian's view of, for instance, the consequences of the Battle of Chaeronea suggests a reflection on this period by someone living much later than the events described, but he feels that this historian must have been a Greek. The observations made above about Trogus' background and possible education are intended to suggest that an intermediate Greek source is not a sine qua non for Trogus' view of Greek and Macedonian history.

As was remarked above, Justin-Trogus' text must be examined for traces of the fourth century primary source historians, Ephorus and Theopompus, and also, though they are even more difficult to identify, traces of Duris, Demophilus and Diyllus. In fact, since Demophilus seems only to have written on the Sacred War, and his account was used by Diodorus (see above, p. xxiv) whose treatment differs in detail from that of Justin-Trogus in several places (cf. commentary, p. 42ff.), he can almost certainly be discounted. It will be profitable to consider two passages from Book VI of Justin-Trogus: Post paucos deinde dies Epaminondas decedit, cum quo vires quoque rei publicae ceciderunt...Nam neque hunc ante ducem ullum memorabile bellum gessere, nec postea virtutibus, sed cladibus insignes fuere, ut manifestum sit patriae gloriam et natam et extinctam cum eo fuisse (VI. 8. 1-3.) and Huius morte etiam Atheniensium virtus intercridit siquidem amissos, cui aemulari

¹ op. cit. (1933), p. 989.
consueverant, in segnitiam tornoremque resoluti non ut olim in
classem et exercitus, sed in dies festos apparatusque ludorum
reditus publicos effundunt et cum actoribus nobilissimis poetisque
theatra celebrant, frequentius scenam quam castra visentes
versificatoresque meliores quam duces laudantes. Tunc vectigal
publicum, quo antea milites et remiges alebantur, urbano populo
dividii coeptum (VI. 9. 1.).

The influence of Ephorus is apparent in the first passage, as
Momigliano observes¹, in that Theban supremacy is recognised to
have come about through the personal merit of Epaminondas (cf.
Strab. IX. 2. = frg. 119 Jacoby); but in the second passage it is
Theopompus who has inspired the judgement on the decline of
Athenian spirit, confirmation of which can be seen by comparing it
with Theopompus frg. 100: "Εὐστρωτος ὁ ἐν τῇ δεκατῇ τῶν
Φιλιππικῶν, ἅρ' ἦς τινες τὸ τελευταῖον μέρος χαρίσαντες, ἐν δὲ
ἔστων τὰ περί τῶν Ἀθηνῶν δημαγωγῶν, Εὐβουλοῦν φησὶ τὸ
δημαγωγοῦν ἄσωτον γενέσθαι. Ἡ λέξει δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχρήσατο
καὶ τοσοῦτον ἄσωτα καὶ πλεονέξεις δεινήσακε τοῦ δήμου τοῦ
Ταρατίων ὅσον δὲ μὲν περὶ τῶν ἐπτώσεως ἐχεῖ μόνῳ ἀκρατῶς,
dὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσόδων καταμιστοφορῶν
διστελέσκε.

This seems to indicate that Trogus changed his source at this
point, and indeed the admiration for Athens felt by Ephorus (no
doubt the source for the digression into Athenian history from II.
6ff.) is no longer evident in Books VII - IX. The reason for this
change could be that Athenian politics after the death of
Epaminondas were treated in such a favourable manner by Ephorus,
that Trogus, who seems to have been trying to contrast a vivid
picture of a decadent Greece through his description of Athens with

¹ op. cit. (1933), p. 985.
the resulting triumph of Macedonia through Philip, had to turn to a source which portrayed Athens in this decadent condition. It is therefore most likely that Theopompus is the main fourth century source for Books VII - IX, although it is quite evident that Trogus did not slavishly follow one source. Indeed it can be seen that the concept of Philip introducing himself into Greek affairs with the appearance of defending the freedom of the weakest, but actually enslaving everybody, is as far removed from Ephorus as it is from Theopompus.

But the main fourth century influence on Books VII - IX was undoubtedly that of Theopompus. In VII. 5. 3. the story of Philip staying in the house of Epaminondas can be closely linked to the story of Duris (re-used in Diod. XVI. 2. 2.) who, we know, borrowed material from Theopompus; the reference to Philip losing his eye outside Methone in VII. 6. 13. is almost identical to Theopompus frg. 52, and there is a definite anti-Athenian tone in VII. 6. 6., VIII. 2. 11. and VIII. 3. 1-8. From this basic Theopompan material Trogus has developed his own very different view of Philip, in that he counterbalances the decadence of the Greeks with the treachery of Philip to produce a picture of universal corruption and the tragic ruin of Greece. The moralising sentiment of IX. 3. 11., rather than expressing the hopes or fears of contemporary historians, seems to embody the judgement of a later historian, who must be Trogus himself if an intermediate source is to be rejected.

Finally, consideration should be made of Justin and his principles of selection and compression. It has already been noted (see above, p. iii) that Justin's intention was to select cognitione quaeque dignissima, and indeed he refers to the epitome

1 op. cit. (1933), p. 987.
as being *breve veluti form~ corpusculum* (cf. Justin's *praefatio*).

It is important, therefore, to examine the things which seem to interest Justin as well as the material that he chooses to omit.

The main points of interest for Justin in Books VII - IX seem to be the more anecdotal aspects of the account of the reigns of the Macedonian monarchs, together with the moralising judgements on them, and the loss of Greek freedom. Examples of the anecdotes are the founding of Aegae in response to an oracle by Caranus (VII. 1. 7ff.), the institution of the royal burial ground (VII. 2. 2ff.), the placing of the baby king Aeropus in the battle-line against the Illyrians (VII. 2. 7ff.), the episode of the Persian envoys and Alexander I (VII. 3.), the cruel behaviour of Eurydice (VII. 4 - 5.), the crowns of laurel used by Philip's soldiers as holy emblems (VIII. 2. 3ff.), the corruption of Alexander of Epirus (VIII. 6. 4ff.), the story behind the Scythian expedition (IX. 2.), Philip's behaviour after Chaeronea (IX. 4.) and the story about the assassin Pausanias and the involvement of Alexander and Olympias (IX. 6. 5 - 7. 14.). The theme of Greek freedom is constantly in the background from the beginning of Book VIII, with moralising judgements especially at the beginning of VIII. 4. 7-10. and IX. 3. 11.

With regard to what has been omitted, mention has already been made of material in the prologues which does not appear in the epitome. The following passages are omitted by Justin: the origins of the Illyrians and Paeonians (Book VII), the siege of Perinthus (Book VIII), the account of the origins of Byzantium (presumably more detailed), a continuation of Scythian affairs from the point where they were last dealt with, Persian affairs from the time of Darius Nothus to the war between Artaxerxes Mnemon and Evagoras of Cyprus and finally the origins of Cyprus (Book IX). It seems quite reasonable to suppose that Justin has
cut all this material, especially in Book IX, in order to pursue
one main topic, namely the career of Philip and its effect on
Greek history. Even a very brief summary of all these digressions
in the epitome might have caused the reader to lose the thread of
the Philip saga, whereas in the detailed version of Trogus the
appearance of the history of Macedonian affairs would be more akin
to the episodic treatment of Diodorus, whereby the author
interweaves the stories of Philip and Timoleon.

It is also quite clear that either Trogus or Justin has very
little interest in military details: it is the consequences of
whatever military activity mentioned that draw the attention of
the writer. Even when battles are covered, as for example the
Battle of Marathon in II. 9. 8ff., much more interest is shown in
the courage or cowardice of the protagonists, the numbers
involved on both sides - especially if these reveal great disparity-
and the apportioning of credit where due, than in any analysis of
the strategy and tactics. It is difficult to say whether this
lack of interest was typical of Trogus or of Justin, but it is
more likely to have been on the part of the former in view of the
nature of the things that did interest him.

Another element which appears to interest Justin as well as
Trogus is the anti-feminine portrayal of the Macedonian queens,
Eurydice and Olympias. This can be compared with other passages
hostile towards women such as XIV. 6. 1ff. (Olympias again), XVI.
3. (Arsinoe of Cyrene), XXVII. 1. (Laodice), XXXIX. 2. 7ff. (the
mother of Grypus) and XXXIX. 4. 1ff. (Cleopatra of Egypt), although
there are certainly passages where women achieve the writer's
admiration, as for example Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus in the
Battle of Salamis (II. 12. 23f.). On the whole, though, Grace
Macurdy's view that "Justin loves to write on the crimes of
queens and would always chose the slanderous tale amongst his
sources seems to find much support in Books VII - IX.

As far as Justin's methods of compression are concerned, there must obviously be a very close link between these and his principles of selection. There are places where he has selected perhaps one episode from a more lengthy account by Trogus, but has not made a very good job of concealing the fact that this episode has been cut out of a more detailed context. An example of this can be seen at VII. 2. 14, where the text of Justin, in making a first reference to Alexander I, says: Cui Alexandro tanta omnium virtutum natura ornamenta extitera, ut etiam Olympio certamine vario ludicorum genere contenderit. Clearly Alexander's talent afforded him more achievements than his participation in various exercises in the Olympic Games, as the story of the Persian envoys which follows shows in any case, and so one must conclude that out of Trogus' account of the reign of Alexander I, Justin has selected a single anecdote, which may well have occurred somewhere between an introductory remark about Alexander's talents and a later comment about his competing in the Olympic Games (cf. commentary, p. 14.).

Another method of compression can be seen in the technique of making a vague general statement about a course of action, and then following this with one example of that course of action. Thus at VII. 6. 13. Justin says: His ita gestis Philippus iam non contentus submovere bella ultro etiam quietos lacessit, and follows that with an event associated with the attack on Methone which seemed worthy of mention, namely Philip's loss of his right eye. This sort of abridgement may also be discernible in the brevity of the accounts of those kings about whom Justin does not preserve any information other than their names (e.g. Argaeus and Philip I in VII. 2. 5.), although it is of course possible

1 G. Macurdy: 'Hellenistic Queens', p. 22.
that Trogus himself had no information about them.

It is the first type of evidence of compression, namely a clumsy transition from one sentence or paragraph to the next, which affords the most examples. These can be seen at VIII. 1. 9., 2. 1-2., 3. 1., 5. 5., IX. 1. 7. and 3. 4. (see the note on each in the commentary for details).

In formulating some conclusions from the foregoing ideas and evidence it will be as well to mention again the aims of this dissertation. They are firstly to examine the accuracy of the factual historical information provided by Justin-Trogus, noting any tendency to paint a one-sided interpretation of the evidence, and secondly to investigate Justin's principles of selection and compression in Books VII – IX.

The first question must necessarily receive a rather complex answer. The factual information given by Justin-Trogus has demonstrably come from different sources, some more reliable than others. His main source for Books VII – IX seems to have been Theopompus, the title of whose work he has probably imitated, and it has been suggested that an intermediate Hellenistic source is not a prerequisite for the pro-Greek views expressed in Trogus' history, views which were clearly not those of a contemporary of the events. This source identification has been corroborated by a comparison of sections of the text of Justin-Trogus with fragments of Theopompus and with what we know from other writers about Theopompus' attitude towards the Athenians and his love of a good story. However, it is quite clear that the Theopompan material has been assimilated into an account of the career and character of Philip which does not portray him as Theopompus did.

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1 This incidentally removes the difficulties expressed by Momigliano in the non-occurrence of the title associated with Timagenes. Cf. Momigliano in Rend. Ist. Lombardo, 1933, p. 996.
The fourth century historian saw in him the creator of a new age, whereas Justin-Trogus sees in him the enslaver of Greece. Justin-Trogus seems then to have been sufficiently able to make his own judgements and evaluations on important historical issues, rather than simply to reproduce the ideas of his sources.

The factual information in Books VII - IX would seem therefore to be as reliable as that given by Diodorus, in that both writers have drawn on Ephorus and Theopompus, who were contemporaries of the events narrated. There is however in Justin-Trogus' account some considerable rhetorical padding which must be treated with extreme caution by modern researchers of the reign of Philip II. Finally, with respect to the moralising passages, while Theopompus was undoubtedly a moraliser, he was an admirer of Philip, and so the presence of anti-Philip moralising passages in Justin-Trogus' account would tend to suggest that Trogus was also a moraliser.

As far as Justin's principles of selection and compression are concerned, it has been demonstrated that he seems to have been interested in the more anecdotal material concerning the Macedonian monarchy, especially those accompanied by a moralising comment, and also those passages dealing with the loss of Greek freedom. The material that he has chosen to omit could well have caused the reader of what is a summary of the reign of Philip to lose the thread of the king's career were he to have left it in, and so those passages not relating to Philip, especially in Book IX, do not appear in Justin's epitome. While Justin appears to have had little interest in military matters (though this may just reflect a lack of interest on the part of Trogus), he does seem to have been keen to portray wicked queens and their crimes. There is some evidence of compression in Books VII - IX in the form either of the selection of one episode of a more lengthy account by Trogus, or in the making of a general statement about a course of action and then following this with one example of that course of action.
A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON BOOKS VII - IX OF JUSTINUS' EPITOME

OF THE HISTORIAE PHILIPPICAE OF POMPEIUS TROGUS
1. Macedonia ante a nomine Emathionis regis, cuius prima virtutis experimenta in illis locis extant, Emathia cognominita est.

According to Strabo, Emathia was the earlier name of what was in his time Macedonia. He states that: κατέβηκεν δὲ τὴν χώραν τῶν Ἡματίτων τινὲς καὶ Ἰλλυρίων, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον Βοττιαίων καὶ Θρακέως (Strab. VII. frg. 11.). Emathia was then, no doubt, to begin with, a general name for a fairly wide area embracing several regions, taking its name from the mythical Emathion (see below). Hammond, in discussing the ancient region in which Pella was situated, makes it clear that during the fifth century at least there were changes in the names of the regions, as for example in the case of Bottia (replacing Paeonia?) which, in any case, seems to have become Emathia, revived from prehistoric times, by the time of the Roman empire, judging by the stamped tiles and waterpipes bearing the letters ΗΜΑ (μαθηματικά) found in excavations at Pella (Hammond 1972, 153.).

So far as the name Emathion is concerned, there seems to be some difficulty of identification of even his mythological pedigree. Hesiod refers to him as the son of Tithonos and Eos, and brother of Memnon, king of the Ethiopians (Hesiod. Theog. 985.), while Apollodorus says that he was the son of Tithonos and king of Arabia (Apollod. II. 5. 11.). Diodorus calls him king of the Ethiopians, and maintains that he picked a quarrel with Heracles (Diod. IV. 27.).

1. 2. Huius sicuti incrementa modica, ita termini perangusti fuere.

The Elder Pliny regarded these 'termini' as being Epirus in the west, Magnesia and Thessaly in the east and Paeonia and Pelagonia in the north (Plin. H. N. IV. 17.). 'incrementa' will have here the sense of "growth".
1. Populus Polasgi, regio Bottia dicebatur. This indicates that Justin-Trogus was noting that earlier writers about the prehistory of Macedonia linked it with a widespread tradition, from Herodotus onwards at least, that there had been an important people, in the view of most authors probably non-Greek, which had lived in the northern parts of the Aegean (cf. Herod. I. 56.). Who the Pelasgians were is still an open question. It is worth noting that Justin-Trogus is critical enough to have used 'dicebatur'.

It is quite probable that Bottia was an extension of a smaller area and that it was a false tradition that led it to be used for the whole region. Certainly both Herodotus and Thucydides knew this area as Macedonia.

1. Sed postea virtute regum et gentis industria subactis primo finitimis, mox populis nationibusque, imperium usque extremos Orientis terminos prolatum. 'Virtus' is appropriate to kings and aristocrats, while 'industria' is a virtue of others (cf. Earl 1967, 204f. also Wiseman 1971, 109f. ). Justin-Trogus seems to be regarding the history of Macedon from the earliest times to Alexander's (for the reference is clearly to him) extension of its boundaries 'usque extremos Orientis terminos' as being a deliberate and calculated policy of imperialism, perhaps regarding it with the eyes of a Roman who had seen Rome assume the reins of imperial government under Augustus, but until the reign of Philip this is hardly justified, and even then Philip's earlier conquests were surely designed more to safeguard himself than to extend his territory.
1. 5. *In regione Paeonia, quae nunc portio est Macedoniae, regnasset Pelegonus, pater Asteropaei, cuius troiano bello inter clarissimos vindices urbis nomen accepiimus.*

For discussion on Paeonia, see Hammond 1972, p. 296, where it is identified with east Central Macedonia. The death of Asteropaeus is narrated in some detail in *Iliad* XXI, 139-208, and Homer supplies us with a certain amount of genealogical information: Asteropaeus was the son of Pelegon (Πηλέγων), who was given birth by Periboa, eldest daughter of Acessamenus, and Axius, the river god. (The river Axius is one of three rivers which drain the plateaux of Upper Macedonia and flow eventually into the Thermaic Gulf. The other two rivers are the Haliaemon and the Lydias.) Asteropaeus was the commander of the Paeonians in the Trojan War, and was an ally of the Trojans. He was reputed to have been the tallest of all men and the bravest of the Paeonians; he wounded Achilles, but was finally killed by him.

Nothing certain is known of Pelegonus, but his name might possibly contain the same stem as Pelasgus (cf. Diod. IV. 72, where Pelasgus is mentioned as one of the sons of Asopus and Metope), or have been connected with it by Classical Greek writers. That it was related to Pelasgius, suggesting that he was of the original Pelasgian stock referred to by Justin-Trogus in 1. 3., is more doubtful.

1. 6. *Ex alio latere in Europa regnum Europus nomine tenuit.*

Vossius preferred to read 'Europia', which he regarded as a portion of Macedonia in which there was a "civitas" of Europus, rather than 'Europa', which was a part of Thrace near Mt. Haemus, since Justin-Trogus is talking specifically about Macedonia and its regions (cf. Graevius 1701, p. 167. n. 6.).

Europus was an eponymous hero of Macedonia, being the son of Macedon and Oreithyia, daughter of Cecrops. Macedon had been left as king of Macedonia, which was named after him, by his father, the
Egyptian Osiris, on the occasion of a visit to Europe (Steph. Byz. s. v. Europus; Diod. I. 20. 3.).

Hammond refers in detail to the eponym Europus and also to Cropus, the other son of Macedon and Oreithyia, but makes no mention of either Europa or Europia (Hammond 1972, p. 168f.).

1. 7-9. Sed et Caranus cum magna multitudine Graecorum sedes in Macedonia response oraculi iussus quaerere, cum Emathiam venisset, urbes Edessam non sentientibus oppidania propter imbrum et nebulae magnitudinem gregem caprarum imbre caprarum fugientium occupavit; revocatusque in memoriam oraculi, quo iussus erat ducibus capris imperium quaerere, regni sedem statuit; religiose postea observavit, quocumque agmen moveret, ante signa eadem capras habere, coeptorum duces habiturus, quas regni habuerat auctores.

There are basically two different traditions of the founding of the Macedonian dynasty: one ascribes the foundation to Caranus (as here; see also Euphorion, frg. 24.) who, following oracular instructions after he had made an enquiry about a colonising expedition from Argos into Macedonia, was told:

φράζεο, διε Καρανός, νόμος δέμον ἐνθεο μῦθον:
ἐκπολίτὼν Ἀργος τε καὶ Ἑλλάδα καλλιγναίσα
χάριτι πρὸς τηγαν Ἀλικρονος ἐνθα δ' ὄιν σῖνας
βοσκομένας ἐσείδης πρώτον, τόθε τοι χρεών ἐστιν
Βηλωτούν ναίειν αὐτῶν γενεών τε πρόπασων.

According to both Justin-Trogus and Euphorion Caranus captured the city of Edessa and changed its name to Aegae (derived, according to Euphorion, from αἰγαῖ (goats)), in commemoration of his good fortune. Diodorus also regards Caranus as the founder of the dynasty, but here we are provided with a different account of his acquisition of territory in Macedonia: Caranus, with a combined force from Argos and the rest of the Peloponnese, advances into the territory of the Macedonians and gives assistance to the king of the Orestae, at the
latter's request, in subduing the neighbouring Eordaei. Caranus then receives the previously agreed reward of half this king's territory, and rules as king over this land for thirty years, being succeeded by Coenus, Tirimus and Perdiccas (Diod. VII. 15.).

The other tradition is a folk tale of the foundation recorded by Herodotus, who relates that three brothers, Guanes, Aeropus and Perdiccas, who were of the family of Temenus and had been banished from Argos, came to Macedonia via Illyria and served the king of Lebæa in his household. Whenever the king's wife cooked bread for these three individuals, the loaf for Perdiccas grew to double the size of the other loaves. The king was alarmed and expelled the three brothers, but not before Perdiccas had marked out with a knife an area of sunlight shining down a smoke vent having been scornfully offered by the king to the three men as wages), this action apparently symbolising the claims of possession of house and land and also the calling of the sun to witness the claim. Despite being pursued by the king's horsemen, who had been ordered to kill them since the king had now realised the implication of Perdiccas' action, the brothers nevertheless escaped to the far side of a river (not named by Herodotus), which conveniently rose in flood to prevent their pursuers crossing it. The three Argives therefore settled in another part of Macedonia near to the Gardens of Midas, son of Gordias (see note on 1. 11.), and in time subdued the rest of Macedonia (Herod. VII. 137.).

Thucydides, in discussing Lower Macedonia as the kingdom of Perdiccas II, says that Macedonia was first acquired by Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and by his ancestors who were Temenids from Argos, who expelled the Pierians and the Bottiaeans, gained a narrow strip of land in Paeonia along the river Axios, extending from the mountains to Pella and the sea, seized Mygdonia from the Edonians and also drove out the Eordaeans from Eordaea and the Almopians from Almopia. Thucydides, then, while he does not quote the folk story,
but supplies details of tribal expulsions, does appear substantially
to follow the Herodotean tradition (Thuc. II. 99.).

Pausanias supplies additional information about Caranus in his
explanation of why the Macedonians were not accustomed to raise
trophies. He informs us that Caranus, king of Macedonia, having
overcome Cisseus, a neighbouring chief, set up an Argive-style trophy
which was then wrecked by a lion from Olympus, apparently as a result
of incurring the hatred of the local non-Greek peoples. After this
incident no trophies were set up by Macedonian kings (Paus. IX. 40. 8.).

Caranus is mentioned by Velleius Paterculus who says that at about
the time of the foundation of Carthage Caranus, a man of royal descent—
the sixteenth after Hercules—set out from Argos and seized the
kingdom of Macedonia (Vell. I. 6. 5.). Livy, in relating the war
between the Romans and Perseus in 168 B.C., says that Perseus was
reckoned as the twentieth after Caranus, the first king (Liv. XLV. 9.
3.).

So far then each of the two basic traditions is consistent within
itself and they are without serious contradictions. It is possible
that the king of the Borealae mentioned by Diodorus could be identified
with Cisseus whom Pausanias calls "a neighbouring chief", both of whom
are said to have been defeated by Caranus on or soon after his arrival
in Macedonia.

However, three further references confuse the alternative Caranus
stories: Diodorus, who has Caranus defeating the king of the Borealae
to gain his territory in Macedonia, in the following chapter credits
Perdiccas with the founding of Aegae. Diodorus says that Perdiccas,
who was the fourth king of Macedon, wished to enlarge his kingdom, and
when he consulted the oracle at Delphi he received the following reply:

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Dio Chrysostom, in his dialogue between Alexander the Great and Diogenes, makes the latter refer to an ancestor of Alexander, one Archelaus, who had come into Macedonia, dressed in a sheepskin and driving goats. Alexander then comments: "Τα περὶ τον χρησμόν, ὡς Διόγενες λέγει;" (D. Chr. IV. 70-71.). This story can be found in Hyginus, who says that Archelaus, the son of Temenus, came as an exile to King Cisseus in Macedonia. The king was at that time defending himself against hostile neighbours, and he promised Archelaus his daughter in marriage and half his kingdom if he were to help him subdue his enemies. After Archelaus had routed these enemies in one battle he claimed his reward, but the treacherous Cisseus, having taken the advice of friends, prepared a pit for Archelaus to fall into. However, Archelaus discovered this plot and succeeded in throwing Cisseus into the pit. Hyginus concludes the passage with the words: "inde profugit ex responso Apollinis in Macedonian capra duce, oppidumque ex nomine caprae Aegeas constituit" (Hyg. Fab. 219.). It is generally supposed that the foregoing account was the Argument of Euripides' Archelaus.

It has been suggested that, since the older oracle, which was delivered to Caranus, tells the recipient that ξύλῳ ἢ .. τῷ τοῦ χρεῶν ἐστὶν ἡλικίας αὐτῶν γενεάς τε πρόσωπον, whereas this element does not occur in the oracle given to Perdiccas, the later version was composed to avoid the awkwardness of having a foundation oracle implying a permanent royal seat at Aegae, when in fact King Archelaus, who reigned in the fifth century, moved the capital from Aegae to Pella (Parke and Wormell 1956, p. 64.). This would certainly seem a plausible explanation for the existence of two almost identical oracles. The problem of the oracle implied in the anecdote concerning Archelaus is less easily explained. Perhaps Euripides, making use of
elements from the different foundation stories which were already in existence, invented his own composite account for the purposes of his play, the Archelaus.

Clearly no firm conclusions can be drawn about Caranus. P.W. R.E. X. 1928. sees in him an artificial creation for the purpose of linking the Argive and Macedonian genealogies together. The fifth century writers, Herodotus and Thucydides, make Perdiccas the founder of the dynasty, and Caranus does not appear on the scene until the following century in Theopompus, when he appears as the first of the Argive immigrants (Theop. frg. 30. = Diod. VII. 17.).

1. 10. **Urbem Edessam ob memoriam munericis Aegaeas, populum Aegeadas vocavit.**

Hammond has shown convincingly that the Edessa here mentioned by Justin-Trogus as having its name changed to Aegae is not to be confused with the famous fourth-century city of Edessa situated at Vodena. Although no ancient authors have maintained this, most modern scholars in commenting on this passage have made the two Edessa's the same, despite epigraphic evidence from two inscriptions, one c. 300 B.C. (Ditt. Syll. 3. 269L.), and the other late fourth century (I.G. IV. 617, line 15), which record persons and money coming officially from each city. There is also literary evidence from Plutarch, Ptolemy and Pliny that both cities were in separate existence when each of them was writing (Plut. Pyrrh. 40. 22. 412. 6. 263. 6. Ptol. III. 13. 39. Plin. N.H. IV. 33. VI. 216.). Hammond argues, mainly making use of Theophrastus and Ptolemy, that Aegae should be placed at Palatitsa (Theophr. De Ventis. 27. Ptol. loc. cit. Hammond 1972, pp. 156-7.).

1. 11. **Pulso deinde Mida (nam is quoque portionem Macedoniamae tenuit)...**

Here there is a thorough confusion of traditions. One may assume that Justin-Trogus refers to the well-known Midas (or one of a number of early Phrygian kings, if this is a dynastic name). One might be
inclined to link this story with Herodotus' tradition that the Phrygians were descendants of the Briges (Herod. VII. 73.). However, the natural dating of this reported event, based on Herodotus, would be much earlier. It would seem, therefore, as appears elsewhere, that divergent stories had grown up which had no possible chronological correlation with each other. This suggests that the anecdote about Caranus was not based on fact, and that some, if not all, of the stories and legends about him are fictitious.

......aliiisque regibus pulsis......

This may possibly include Cisseus, as attested by Pausanias IX. 40. 8.

1. 12. .......primisque adunatis gentibus variorum populorum......

'Aduno' in the sense of making one or uniting men and armies is quite common in Justin-Trogus: cf. II. 12. 18. V. 9. 6. XV. 4. 22. XXIV. 6. 1. etc. Apart from in some Christian writers, Palladius and Lactantius Firmianus, the use of this word is rare.

Gronovius draws attention to a phrase in Mela I. 19: .......una gens aliquot populi et aliquot nomina. By 'gentem' he understands 'regionem' or 'provinciam', and by 'populos' he understands 'urbes' (Gronovius 1719, p. 215.).

Whatever meanings are given to 'gens' and 'populus', this is a gross oversimplification of the formation of the early Macedonian kingdom. It is quite clear that the process leading to the unification of different peoples to form the Macedonians was a very lengthy one, starting with Illyrian dominance in the region which was later to become Macedonia during the eighth and seventh centuries. During the seventh century the Macedones expanded northwards under Argead leadership, and down to about 550 B.C. they extended their influence over Bottia, Eordaea and Almopia. Further extensions were made during the reigns of Amyntas I and Alexander I, from c 540 B.C. to 454 B.C. (cf. Ellis 1976, pp. 34-36.)
veluti unum corpus Macedoniam fecit……

cf. Florus I. 1. 9: ita ex variis quasi elementis (Romulus)
congregavit corpus unum, populumque Romanum ipse fecit rex.

2. 1. Post hunc Perdicca regnavit, cuius et vita inlustris et mortis postrema, veluti ex oraculo, praecepta memorabilia fuere.

Justin-Trogus makes no mention of Coenus and Tirimmus, who, according to Diodorus, reigned between Caranus and Perdiccas for twenty-eight and forty-three years respectively (Diod. VII. 15.). Herodotus and Thucydides do not record their names either, but this is hardly surprising since their lists commence with Perdiccas. P.W. R.E. XIX. 590. sees Perdiccas as the founder of the Macedonian royal dynasty, the Caranus legend being invented perhaps during the reign of Alexander I or Archelaus to link the Argeads with the Temenids of Argos. For the oracle and foundation legend associated with Perdiccas, see note on 1. 7.

2. 2-3. Siquidem senex moriens Argeo filio monstravit locum, quo condi vellet: ibique non sua tantum, sed et succedentium sibi in regnum casa poni iussit, praefatus, quoad ibi conditae posterorum reliquiae forent, regnum in familia mansurum;

For Argeus, see note on 2. 5. That Aegae was the royal burial ground for the Macedonian kings from a very early period cannot be disputed. Diodorus, in dealing with the burial of Philip and Eurydice by Cassander, says that Cassander……. Εὐρυδίκην μὲν καὶ Φιλίππον …… έθαφεν ἐν Αἰγαλίς, καθ’ ἑαυτόν ἔθος ἢν τοῖς βασιλευτέροις. The same author, in his account of the sack of Aegae by Pyrrhus, relates that the Gauls left behind in the city……. πυθόμενοι πλῆθος ήτοι κατά τοὺς βασιλικούς τάφους τοῖς τετελευτηκέσθαι συγκαταρρύθη τραχύματα πολλὰ κατὰ τὰν παλαιὰν συνεδρείαν……., proceeded to dig into all the graves, loot them and scatter the bones (Diod. XIX. 52. 5.). Pliny describes Macedonia and its towns, referring to Aegae as: (oppidum) in
Presumably by 'locum' Justin-Trogus must mean the actual plot of land at Aegae, rather than a place other than Aegae. Nevertheless this is still a rather awkward reference, in view of the obvious fame of Aegae in antiquity as the royal burial ground, and bearing in mind that Justin-Trogus has only just mentioned it by name.

2. 4. *creduntque hac superstitione extinctam in Alexandro stirpem, quia locum sepulturae mutaverit.*

This seems to be a rather involved reason for the collapse of the Macedonian monarchy on the death of Alexander the Great. While the latter does not appear to have left any specific instructions concerning the place where he should be buried, it is clear from Pausanias that certain Macedonian soldiers had been assigned the duty of transporting Alexander's body back to Aegae (actually named by Pausanias) for burial. According to Pausanias it was in fact Ptolemy who persuaded the soldiers to hand over Alexander's body to him, and he then buried it in Memphis with Macedonian rites (Paus. I. 6. 3.).

2. 5. *Argeus moderate et cum amore popularium administrato regno successorem filium Philippum reliquit,......*

According to Herodotus Argeus (more usually Argeus) was the second king of Macedonia, being the son of Perdiccas who first won sovereign power (Herod. VIII. 139.). The Byzantine chronicler, Georgius Syncellus, who used lost sections of Diodorus and Theopompus amongst other ancient sources which are no longer extant, makes Argeus the fourth Macedonian king after Caranus, Coenus and Tirimmus (Syncellus 1829, p. 499.), but in the view of Daskalakis the name of Perdiccas was probably also included in the genealogy, but could not be read owing to the severe damage to the manuscript at that point (Daskalakis 1965, p. 116.). Syncellus says that Argeus reigned for thirty-four years. Eusebius in the main text of his *Chronicle* assigns Argeus a
reign of thirty-one years, placing him after Perdiccas as the fifth king, but the remaining lists in Eusebius give him a reign of thirty-eight years (Euseb. Chron. I. 227.). In the opinion of Daskalakis the mistake is in the first list (op. cit. p. 121.).

Polyaenus describes an episode when Argeus was at war with the Taulantii, who were led by their king, Galaurus. Since the enemy outnumbered his men, Argeus caused a large number of Macedonian maidens to appear on Mt. Ereboia, decked with thyrsi and wreaths. This frightened the enemy who thought from the distance that they were men, and they accordingly fled, leaving their weapons, and giving victory to Argeus, who then set up a temple to Dionysus Pseudanor and decided to call the maidens, whom the Macedonians had formerly called Klodones (a Macedonian name for female Bacchanals, Plut. Alex. 2.), Mimallones, owing to their imitation (μύης) of men (Polyaen. IV. 1.).

\[\text{\ldots\ldots qui inmatura morte raptus Aeropum, parvulum admodum, instituit heredem.}\]

Herodotus in his list of the predecessors of Perdiccas I gives Aeropus as the son of Philip and father of Alcetas whom Justin-Trogus omits (Herod. VIII. 139.). Eusebius has the same order as Herodotus, except that his list commences with Caranus, Coenus and Tirimmus as the first three kings before Perdiccas I, whereas Herodotus' list commences with Perdiccas I. Eusebius assigns a reign of twenty years to Aeropus (Euseb. op. cit.). His name is also found in the list of Macedonian kings found in Syncellus (op. cit.).

Philip I will have reigned during the first half of the sixth century, this being determined from his relative position between Perdiccas I (early seventh century) and Amyntas I (c. 500 B.C.) as demonstrated in P-W RE 2265. Nothing further appears to be known of him.
2. 6. Sed Macedonibus adsidua certamina cum Thracios et Illyrios fuere, quorum armis veluti cotidiano exercitio indurati gloria bellicae laudis finitimos terrebant.

It is difficult to attempt to identify these conflicts in any but the most general of terms. See the note on 1. 12. for Macedonian expansion down to about 550 B.C. which involved absorbing earlier Illyrian sites, as for example Palatitsa and Vergina (cf. Ellis 1976, p. 35.).

2. 7-12. Igitur Illyrii infantiam regis pupilli contemnentes bello Macedonas adgrediuntur. Qui proelio pulsi rege suo in cunis prolato et pone aciem posito acrius certamen repetivere, tamquam ideo victi antea fuissent, quod bellantibus sibi regis sui auspicia defuissent, futuri vel proptererea victoriae, quod ex superstitione animum vincendi ceperant: simul et miseratio eos infantiae tenebat, quem si victi forent, captivum de rege facturi videbantur.

This seems to be the only account of this story extant. An indication can perhaps be found in it of the degree of faith the Macedonians had in royal leadership on the battlefield.

For 'auspicia' cf. Livy XXII. 5ff.: Flaminius was bound to lose because he had not got the 'auspicia'.

2. 13. Huic Amyntae succedit et propria virtute et Alexandri filii egregia indole insigniter clarus;

According to Herodotus, Aeropus was succeeded by Alcetas to whom Syncellus ascribes a reign of twenty years (Herod. VII. 139. Syncell p. 499.). It is possible that Justin-Trogus omitted Alcetas here, as well as Coenus and Tirimmus (see note on 2. 1.) because he knew of no facts or traditions relating to them. Amyntas' reign can be put from 540 - 498 B.C. (cf. Ellis 1976, p. 36.).

It was probably during the reign of Amyntas I that Macedonia became tributary to the Persians (cf. the story of the envoys in 3. 2ff.).
After this we find nothing recorded of Amyntas, except his offer to the Pisistratids of Anthemus in Chalcidice in 510 B.C., when Hippias had just been disappointed in his hope of a restoration to Athens by the power of the Spartan confederacy (Herod. V. 94.).

2. 14. quia Alexander tanta omnium virtutum natura ornamenti extitere, ut etiam Olympio certamine vario ludorum genere contenderit.

There is surely some evidence of severe abridgement here. Justin-Trogus can hardly mean that the sole result of Alexander's remarkable talent was his participation in the Olympic Games. This is most likely to be an example of Justin's selecting one main episode from Trogus' (no doubt) far more detailed account of Alexander I's life in the form of the story of the Persian envoys. A summary list of the main events of Alexander's career could easily have commenced with a reference to his taking part in the Olympic Games, but there must have been many more events noted by Trogus originally.

3. 1. Cum interim Darius, rex Persarum, turpi ab Scythia fugae submotus, ne ubique deformis militiae demnis haberetur, mittit cum parte copiarum Megabazum ad subigungem Thraciam ceteraque eius tractus Macedonia.

Herodotus gives a full account of this expedition into Scythia which, having defeated the Getae and gained the surrender of the eastern Thracians, crossed the Danube in 513 B.C. and pursued the Scythians further inland. However, owing to the Scythians' 'scorched earth' policy and effective cavalry harassment, Darius lost his supply lines and was forced to retreat, leaving behind his sick and wounded. He was faced with some opposition at the Hellespont, but crushed it decisively, burning Chalcedon and Abydus and then returning to Susa. It was now apparent to Darius that he must strengthen his control over the Hellespont, and so he left an army under Megabazus (the more usual spelling of his name) in Europe, which proceeded to strengthen Persian
influence in the area as far as the Strymon, and thus brought Persia into contact with Macedonian interests (Herod. IV. 92ff.).


The story here given by Justin-Trogus is substantially the same as that recorded by Herodotus, save for a few differences in detail: Herodotus says the envoys demanded earth and water, whereas Justin-Trogus states that they required hostages and a pledge for peace for the future. According to Justin-Trogus Megabazus sent part of his army under Bubares with the intention of bringing about a military engagement, whereas Herodotus refers vaguely to a search being conducted (Herod. V. 17-21.). As Daskalakis remarks, the affair is settled by the marriage between Bubares and Gygaea, daughter of Amyntas (though her name is not mentioned by Justin-Trogus), and Justin-Trogus brings in a romantic touch by causing Bubares to call off the war because he has fallen in love with the lady (Daskalakis 1965, p. 217.). It should be noted that Herodotus credits Alexander with having arranged the marriage between his sister and Bubares, but this is contradicted by Justin-Trogus' reference to the fact that Amyntas was still alive (and no doubt still in charge of such matters as arranging his daughter's wedding) until after the departure of Bubares.
from Macedonia.

3. 7-8. *Atque ita interfectis omnibus ignarus rei Magabasus, cum legati non redirent, mittit eo cum exercitus parte Bubarem ut in bellum facile et mediocre, dedit magnus ipse ire, ne dehonestaretur proelio tam foedae gentis.*

According to Herodotus, Bubares had a son by Gygaea who was called Amyntas, after his grandfather (Herod. V. 21. VIII. 136.). In conjunction with Artachaees a Bubares, son of Megabazus, superintended the construction of the canal which Xerxes made across the isthmus of Athos (Herod. VII. 22.).


Justin-Trogus is somewhat brief on the subject of Alexander I and his involvement with the Greeks. He does not even mention his additional name of "Philhellene". Certainly at the time of Xerxes' invasion it is clear that, no doubt through his matrimonial connection with the Persians, as Justin-Trogus remarks, Alexander was required to contribute military assistance to Xerxes, and indeed Macedonia is included in the list given by Herodotus of European states who were required to render military assistance at this time to the Great King (Herod. VII. 185.). However Herodotus tells us that he sent secret messages of warning and advice to the Greeks on at least two occasions, before the battle of Thermopylae (Herod. VII. 173.), and before the battle of Plataea (Herod. IX. 45.). Daskalakis' treatment of these episodes perhaps over-dramatises Alexander's "Hellenic patriotism", although equally Peter Green's view of the situation seems a little cynical—after all
the pressure Persia could exert over Macedonia at that time would no doubt prevent Alexander from showing pro-Greek feelings too overtly (Daskalakis 1965, p. 182. Green 1971, pp. 259-60.).

Olympus is on the border of Macedon and Thessaly. Of the twelve or so mountains of this name it appears to have been the one which was regarded as the home of the gods. Haemus is a very high mountain on the border of Thrace and Thessaly from which it is possible to see the Black Sea. Pauly-Wissowa, commenting on Alexander I, says that Justin-Trogus' statement here is exaggerated, and that it was not until after the Persian wars that Alexander occupied Bisaltic territory for any length of time.

4. 3. Per ordinem deinde successionis regnum Macedonae ad Amyntam, fratri eius Menelai filium, pervenit.
There is some difficulty here. If one starts with Caranus as the first king of Macedon, Alexander will be the tenth king (498 - 454 B.C.) succeeded by his son Perdiccas II (454 - 413 B.C.), followed by his illegitimate son Archelaus (413 - 399 B.C.), Orestes the infant son of the latter (390s B.C.), his guardian the usurper Aeropus II (390s B.C.), Amyntas II (390s B.C.) and finally Pausanias son of Aeropus (390s B.C.).

In 393/2 B.C. Amyntas III came to the throne (Syncellus 1829, pp. 498-9, 500. Euseb. Chron. I. 227. For chronology cf. Ellis 1976, p. 36ff., who follows Geyer 1930, p. 107.). The difficulty is to ascribe to the Amyntas recorded here the correct place in the genealogy. According to Justin-Trogus (here) and Aelian (XII. 43.) Amyntas was the son of Menelaus, presumably either the brother or nephew of Perdiccas II. However Diodorus says that he was the son of Arrhidaeus, and Beloch follows this (Diod. XV. 60. Beloch: G.G. II. 2. 56-58.). E. Elder has assumed from Thucydides II. 95. that the Amyntas mentioned as son of Philip (who was brother to Perdiccas II) was the Amyntas who became king of Macedon after Pausanias (i.e. Amyntas III), but there is no evidence to support this (Elder in Smith
On the whole it would probably be best to separate Amyntas son of Philip the pretender (attested by Thucydides in connection with the expedition of Sitalces) from Amyntas III, king of Macedon, son of either Menelaus or Arrhidaeus who were brother and nephew respectively to Philip the pretender. Certainly we are dealing here with Amyntas III, who reigned from 393/2 to 369/68. Ellis gives no indication as to the parentage of Amyntas III (cf. his family tree, op. cit. p. 39.).

4. 4-5. Hic quoque insignis industria et omnibus imperatoriiis virtutibus instructus fuit, qui ex Eurydice tres filios sustulit, Alexandrum, Perdiccam et Philippum. Alexandri Magni Macedonis patrem, et filiam Euryonen, ex Oygaea autem Archelaum, Arridaeum, Menelaum. Whatever qualities Amyntas did possess were certainly put to the test at the start of his reign when in 392 (cf. Ellis 1976, p. 42.) he was faced with an Illyrian invasion, in consequence of which he allied himself with Olynthus (Tod ii. 111.). Although he did eventually regain control of his kingdom, with the aid of the Olynthians (to whom he ceded a certain amount of territory) and also the Thracians, he was obliged to pay an annual tribute to the Illyrians (Diod. XIV. 92. 3. XVI. 2. 2.). It was then that Amyntas married Eurydice, an Illyrian princess— for discussion on her ethnic background, see Ellis 1976, p. 249, n. 98.— and had three sons, Alexander (II), Perdiccas (III) and Philip (II), together with a daughter Euryone.

Justin-Trogus makes no distinction in status between Eurydice and Oygaea here, unless the omission of the words 'filios' or 'tres filios' before 'Archelaum' indicate one (or are these words to be understood from the previous line?), although two lines later Eurydice is referred to as 'uxor'. Oygaea was probably an earlier wife of Amyntas, despite the use of 'noverca' later by Justin-Trogus (VIII. 3. 10.) for the relationship between Gygaea and Eurydice's sons in which Ellis does not see any indication as to the order of the marriages of
Amyntas. Also the position of Eurydice at the court both during 
Amyntas' reign and later would seem to suggest that she was the later 
wife. That Gygaea was a wife rather than a concubine Ellis 
demonstrates convincingly, drawing attention to the Argead descent 
indicated in her name and the royal names given to their three 
children (Ellis in Historia 1973, pp. 350-354.).

4. 6. Cum Illyriis deinde et cum Olynthiis gravia bella gessit. 
This must be a reference to the situation recorded by Diodorus 
whereby Amyntas, described as the father of Philip, was expelled from 
Macedonia by the Illyrians and made over his territory which bordered 
on the territory of the Olynthians to that people, presumably to keep 
it out of the hands of the Illyrians. (See previous note.) 
Subsequently he was restored with assistance from the Olynthians and 
the Thessalians, regained his kingdom and ruled for twenty-four years. 
Diodorus concludes the section by observing that some authorities say 
that Argaeus ruled over the Macedonians for two years after the 
expulsion of Amyntas until the return of the latter (see note on 6. 
8.). Diodorus later supplies a more detailed account of the return of 
Amyntas, a return which the Olynthians were obviously not expecting, 
and the ensuing struggle which he had to regain the territory he had 
made over to them, which ultimately led to his calling on the Spartans 
for aid (Diod. XIV. 92. 3. XV. 19. 2. Xen. Hell. V. 2. 11ff. II. 3. 
8ff.).

4. 7. Insidiis etiam Eurydices uxoris, quae nuptias generi pacta 
occidendum virum regnumque adultero tradendum susceperat, occupatus 
fuisset, ni filia paelicatum matris et sceleris consilia prodidisset. 
'Eurydices' is a Greek genitive. Amyntas curiously seems to have 
spared his wife after she had a) had an affair with their son-in-law, 
and b) made an attempt on his life with the intention of seizing his 
throne for the same individual! For the consequences of his clemency 
see 5. 4-6. (See the end of the note on 5. 4. for Justin-Trogus'
attitude towards Eurydice.)

4. 8. *Functus itaque tot periculis senex decessit. regno maximo ex filiis Alexandro tradito.*


5. 1-2. *Igitur Alexander inter prima initia regni ballum ab Illyriis pacta mercede et Philippo fratre dato obside redemit. Interieito quaque tempore per eundem obsidem cum Thebanis gratiam pacis reconciliat.*

Diodorus tells us that the Illyrians, who had taken Philip as a hostage, placed him in the care of the Thebans, after Amyntas had been defeated by them (Diod. XVI. 2. 2.). There is some uncertainty of chronology in Diodorus in that he has Amyntas being defeated by the Illyrians and denuded of power in two passages (XIV. 92. 3. and XV. 19. 2.) which the translator of the Loeb text of Diodorus XVI, C. L. Sherman, treats as being of different date, although he remarks that Beloch (G.G. III. 22 58.) regards the first mention as "erroneous" (Diod. vol. VII. (Loeb) p. 236, n. 1.).

Here Justin-Trogus has Alexander at the very start of his reign buying off the Illyrians and handing over Philip as a hostage to them, and then later making peace with the Thebans, again using Philip as a hostage. Another passage in Diodorus also has Alexander handing over Philip as a hostage, but this time to Pelopidas who has gained, in the in the interests of the Boeotians, the surrender of Larissa, which was garrisoned by Alexander, and has arrived in Macedon to make an alliance with the Macedonian king (Diod. XV. 67. 4.). Plutarch also describes Alexander as sending Philip as a hostage to Thebes (Plut. Pelop. 26. 4.). M. Cary and Pauly-Wissowa, following Aeschines II. 26ff, who refers to the presence of Philip at the court of Ptolemy Alorites
(the son-in-law, lover and subsequently husband of Eurydice) after the latter had murdered Alexander, both regard Ptolemy as the Macedonian ruler who sent Philip to Thebes (C.A.H. VI. 86. R.E. XIX. 2266.).

In comparing the accounts of these ancient authors, it seems more likely that Philip was handed over to the Illyrians either just before or just after the death of Amyntas, and then to the Thebans soon after the commencement of Alexander's reign, and Alexander may have been instrumental in this arrangement in the first instance and almost certainly so in the second case. If Ptolemy had wanted to remove the immediate threat to his position as Alexander's successor (which he became according to Diod. XVI. 2. 4.), then surely the obvious prince to hand over as hostage would have been the next in line, Perdiccas, the second of the three brothers, who did in fact dispose of Ptolemy and reign in his place, not Philip.

5. 2-3. Quae res Philippo maxima incrementa egregiae indolis dedit, siquidem Thebis triennio obesa habitus prima pueritia rudimenta in urbe severitatis antiquae et in domo Epaminondae, summī et philosophi et imperatoris, deposuit.

Justin-Trogus has previously made reference to the fact that Philip's stay in Thebes lasted for three years (VI. 9. 7.). According to Diodorus, Philip, who had escaped from being kept as a hostage, succeeded his brother Perdiccas on the latter's death. Pauly-Wissowa has mistakenly taken this to mean that Philip did not leave Thebes until after Perdiccas' death (R.E. XIX. 2266.). Pickard-Cambridge says that after three years Philip returned from Thebes and was entrusted with the administration of a district in Macedonia prior to his succeeding to the throne. Pickard-Cambridge is no doubt making use of Carystius frg. 1. (PHG IV. p. 356-7.), which relates that, according to Speusippus, Perdiccas gave Philip a subsidiary kingdom on the advice of Plato, and that he was still in possession of it on the death of Perdiccas (C.A.H. VI. p. 204.)
Diodorus says that Philip received his education under the superintendence of Epaminondas' father, and that Philip and Epaminondas grew up and were tutored together (Diod. XVI. 2. 2-3.), but, as Sherman remarks, Epaminondas had already won the Battle of Leuctra by this time, so he was unlikely still to have been under the guardianship of his tutor (Diod. vol. VII. (Loeb) p. 237. n. 3.). Plutarch says that Philip lived as a hostage in Thebes with Pammenes, and became a keen follower of Epaminondas (Plut. Pelop. 26. 5.). Probably the most important thing Philip learned from Epaminondas was in the field of military tactics, namely the principle of strengthening one wing for the main attack, using a combination of both cavalry and infantry for this purpose.

Momigliano had concluded that Diod. XVI. 2. 2-3. dealing with Philip's delivery by the Illyrians to the Thebans and his subsequent representation as a fellow pupil with Epaminondas betrayed an unreliable source, but Hammond regards these errors as more likely to have resulted from "the compendious style of Diodorus, writing several centuries after the events". Hammond then notes this sentence of Justin-Trogus and comments: "it is most probable that Justin and Diodorus, both using the same source, have provided us with an interesting example of the fallibility of Diodorus' method". (Momigliano in Rend. Ist. Lombard. LXV (1932) pp. 523-43; Hammond in Classical Quarterly 31 (1937) pp. 79-91)

5. 4. Nec multo post Alexander insidiis Eurydices matris adpetitus occumbit......

It would appear that having failed once (see 4. 7.) to secure the kingdom for her lover and son-in-law Ptolemy Alorites, Eurydice this time successfully organises the death of her own son, Alexander II, at the hands of Ptolemy. Justin-Trogus does not mention Ptolemy at this point, but we are told twice by Diodorus that Alexander was assassinated by Ptolemy Alorites (Diod. XV. 71. 1. and XVI. 2. 4.).
Aeschines tells us that Ptolemy was made regent (Aesch. II. 29.), while Diodorus tells us that he became king and ruled for three years.

Plutarch, in a section dealing with Alexander of Pherae, who was making a nuisance of himself in Thessaly, tells us that Pelopidas offered his services to the Thessalians, who had sent a request for help to Thebes, and proceeded to take Larissa, send Alexander packing and restore the Thessalians' equilibrium. He then continued on his travels, arriving in Macedonia in time to mediate in a war between Ptolemy and Alexander II, having been summoned as arbiter by both sides, and after settling their disagreements he returned to Thebes, taking Alexander's brother Philip and thirty other young men as hostages (Plut. Pelop. 26. 3.). Later Plutarch informs us that Pelopidas, who was again in Thessaly dealing with complaints against Alexander of Pherae, on hearing that Ptolemy had killed Alexander II in Macedon, marched against Ptolemy with some mercenaries he had recruited in Thessaly, lost the same mercenaries to Ptolemy's side owing to bribery by the latter, but was able to exert enough influence over Ptolemy (who was apparently overawed by the great Pelopidas) to make him agree to be regent for the dead king's brothers, Perdiccas and Philip, and to obtain as security for this Ptolemy's son Philoxenus and fifty companions as hostages, whom he despatched to Thebes (Plut. op. cit. 27. 2.).

Diodorus' account relating to the events surrounding the trouble between Alexander of Pherae and the Thessalians is to be found in XVI. 61. 3-5., where the writer says that Alexander II of Macedon was summoned by the aristocratic Aleuadae of Larissa to come to their aid. Alexander II then anticipated Alexander of Pherae's next move, which would have been to carry the fight into Macedon, by taking both Larissa and Crannon, but after the tyrant had returned home to Pherae, instead of restoring the cities to the Thessalians, the Macedonian king garrisoned them himself. Diodorus later says that the Boeotians, in answer to an appeal by the Thessalians for help against Alexander
of Pherae, sent Pelopidas with an army to Thessaly. He reached Larissa, found it occupied by a garrison sent there by Alexander of Macedon, and gained its surrender. He then made some sort of agreement with Alexander of Macedon, taking Philip his brother as hostage and despatching him to Thebes (Diod. XV. 67. 3-4.). The next time Diodorus mentions Alexander II of Macedon is to record his murder by Ptolemy Alorites, his brother-in-law, who then proceeded to rule for three years (Diod. XV. 71. 1.).

On the question of regency or kingship for Ptolemy, since Ellis points out that Diodorus apparently makes a distinction between someone acceding to the throne (παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν or διέλεξε τὴν ἀρχὴν) and someone who becomes a genuine successor and legitimate king (ἐβασιλεύσε), it would seem to follow from Diod. XV. 71. 1., which states: ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Ἀλκιμῆς ὁ Ἀμύτυς ὁ ἐσόμαθεν Ἀλέξανδρον τὴν ἀξιλήφων, καὶ ἐβασιλεύσε τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ ἐτὶ τρὶς, that Ptolemy was king, rather than regent (cf. Ellis 1971, pp. 15-16.).

More recently Ellis has stated that Ptolemy "...married the queen mother, Eurydice, and reigned technically as regent for her second son, Perdiccas (Ellis 1976, p. 43.).

Aeschines calls Ptolemy εὐσεβῶς, and Plutarch, after explaining that matters were in confusion in Macedonia owing to the fact that Ptolemy had killed the king and now τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέσχευ, goes on to say that Ptolemy met Pelopidas (who had been summoned by the pro-Alexandrian group) and agreed τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοῦ τεθνήκατος ἀσέλφος διαφυλάξεων (Aesch. II. 28f, Plut. Pelop. 27.).

Diodorus says that Ptolemy was the son of Amyntas and that he was the brother-in-law of Alexander whom he murdered (Diod. XV. 71. 1.). As Sherman remarks, he could easily have been the son of some Amyntas, since it was a common Macedonian name (Diod. vol. VII (Loeb), p. 148,n.). Macurdy makes the point that the Macedonians would be
unlikely to invite a man to be regent for two princes (despite his marriage to their sister), after he had killed their elder brother following an adulterous relationship with their mother, unless he had a reasonably strong claim to the throne itself, i.e. possibly being an illegitimate son of King Amyntas himself (Macurdy 1932, pp. 20-21.).

The scholium on Aeschines II. 32. tells us that Eurydice helped Ptolemy kill her son, Alexander, who had become king at his father's death in 370 B.C. The extent to which Eurydice was involved in Alexander's death can only be speculated on. Macurdy has a section on Eurydice: she contrasts Justin-Trogus' portrayal of an evil and scheming queen with the picture of the same woman as built up by Aeschines, who shows her to be a woman deeply concerned for the future of her children, as she makes an appeal to the Athenian general Iphicrates to support them against the pretender Pausanias (cf. 6. 5. below.). Macurdy is convinced that Justin-Trogus "loves to write on crimes of queens and would always choose the slanderous tale among his sources", but as she herself remarks only a few lines later, we cannot make any real judgement without knowing Trogus' sources (Macurdy, op. cit., p. 22. Aesch. II. 28ff.).

5. 5. cui Amyntas in scelere deprehensae......pepercerat.
See above (4. 7.), where Eurydice's plot against her husband, Amyntas III, was forestalled.

5. 6. Frater quoque eius Perdicca pari insidiarum fraude decipitur.
Again there is no reference by Justin-Trogus to any of the details surrounding the accession of Perdiccas to the throne of Macedon, such as we find in Diodorus, where we are told that Perdiccas killed Ptolemy Alorites, who had been ruling for the last three years since his assassination of Alexander II, and then became king (Diod. XVI. 2. 4.).
The account here in Justin-Trogus of the death of Perdiccas is at complete variance with the account in Diodorus, who states that Perdiccas was defeated in a great battle with the Illyrians and fell in action (Diod. XVI. 2. 4.). Macurdy again sees Justin-Trogus' story as a continuation of his portrait of the black-charactered Macedonian queen, and his using the reference to her pitiless disregard of the prayers of his small son a few lines below as a final embellishment of the same treatment (Macurdy 1932, p. 19.).

5. 7. Indignum prorsus libidinis causa liberos a matre vita privatos, quam scelerus suorum suppliciis liberorum contemplatio vindicaverat.

One of the many moralising sentences occurring in this section of Justin-Trogus (see introduction). Her 'scelerum' will no doubt refer largely to her attempted murder of her husband, Amyntas, and love affair with their son-in-law, Ptolemy Alorites, already referred to by Justin-Trogus in 4. 7. above. Presumably by 'liberorum contemplatio' Justin-Trogus means that Amyntas decided not to punish Eurydice on the grounds that he did not want to deprive his children of their mother's care and attention, although it must surely have been clear from her actions that she wanted Ptolemy to be king, and therefore the children of Amyntas would remain an obstacle to her plans and be in constant danger of their lives.

Justin-Trogus uses 'contemplatio' both here and below at VIII. 3. 14. in the sense of "having regard for" or "having consideration for" followed by a genitive. This is a usage found mainly in late Latin and especially in the jurists: cf. Dig. II. 15. 8. III. 5. 5. XVIII 1. 58.
The evidence for the regency of Philip for Amyntas IV, son of Perdiccas III, has been examined in some detail by Ellis. Dealing firstly with the literary evidence for the regency, he points out that, to accept Justin-Trogus' claim that there was a regency, we must "dismiss the terminology of Diodorus/Ephorus (XVI. 1. 3.) and the scholiast (on Aeschines III. 51.) as careless and misleading and we must assume that Demosthenes and others found the regency unworthy of mention." Apart from this, Ellis comments that, since it was unlikely that Philip was not king at the time of his movements against Thermopylae, Pagasae, Pherae, Methone or Potidaea, then the regency, if there was one, must have been short. This is of course at variance with Justin-Trogus' statement that Philip was regent 'diu', and Ellis therefore rejects Justin-Trogus' "admittedly vague estimate of the length of the regency."

Ellis then makes use of a pair of mid-fourth century inscriptions from Oropus recording grants of proxeny by the Oropian assembly to two different Amyntas' s, one to 'Αμύντασ Περδικκά Μακεδόνα and the other to 'Αμύντασ Ἀντίκχο Μακεδόνα (I.G. 4250, 4251.). He links the former with an inscription from Lebadeia, which records the names of twenty-six people who consulted the oracle of Trophonios. Kohler restored lines 7-8 of this Lebadeian inscription to read Π(ερδικκά) Μακεδόνα (Hermes 24 (1889) pp. 640-3.). This would seem to be a confirmation of Justin-Trogus' statement that Philip was for some time at least (however 'diu' is to be interpreted) regent for the young king, Amyntas IV. Ellis goes on to consider yet another inscription from Oropus, apparently on the base of a votive offering, which records the presence of Aristomedes of Pherae (B. Ch. Petrakos: Ἐπιγραφai Ναυατοι in ADelt 21 (1966) 45-7.). He builds up a picture of suspicious circumstances surrounding the presence of these three influential individuals in Boeotia, and links this with the known fate of two of them after the murder of Philip II in 336, in
that Amyntas Perdicca was executed for treason at the instigation of Alexander, and Amyntas Antiochou fled to Asia Minor, being associated in treasonable dealings against Alexander.

He goes on to amass circumstantial evidence for a plot against the Macedonian throne involving the two Amyntas's, the Lyncestian Alexander, son of Aeropus, and Aristomedes of Pherae. The real problem is to assign this conspiracy to its correct chronological position. Ellis rejects the early date (i.e. during the first year or two of Philip's "regency") on four counts, namely the youth of Amyntas Perdicca, the silence of Diodorus/Ephorus, who did record other claimants of the throne, Philip's action in marrying his daughter to a man who had been guilty of treason, and the non-appearance in the historical sources of Amyntas Antiochou, Aristomedes and the Lyncestian Alexander before the 330's. The circumstances surrounding the accession of Alexander the Great provide the necessary background, and so Ellis sees 336-334 as a more likely time for the plot against the throne, and he dates the inscriptions cited above to this period. Consequently the Lebadeian stone which refers to Amyntas Perdicca as king will have been set up at a time when he hoped to become king, probably in mid-335, rather than when he was king with Philip as his regent in 359. In this case it can no longer be used to back up Justin-Trogus' reference to Philip's regency.

Ellis concludes that the literary silence (apart from Justin-Trogus) on any regency at the beginning of Philip's reign, together with the fact that, whereas Amyntas is mentioned several times at the end of Philip's reign and the beginning of Alexander's reign, there is no reference to his having been king of the Macedonians, mean that Justin-Trogus' statement on the regency can be rejected. This seems to be sound and acceptable reasoning (cf. Ellis 1971, pp. 15-24).
5. 10. *At ubi graviora bella inminebant serumque auxilium in expectatione infantis erat, compulsus a populo regnum suscepit.*

As has been noted (see 5. 6.), Diodorus has a completely different version of the death of Perdiccas: rather than being murdered through the treachery of his mother Eurydice, he is killed with four thousand Macedonian soldiers in a battle against the Illyrians (Diod. XVI. 2. 4.). If Diodorus' version is to be accepted (and this seems far more likely to be nearer the truth than the (unsupported) evidence offered by Justin-Trogus in his anti-Eurydice polemic at 5. 6-7.), then there will have been great pressure upon Macedonia from the victorious Illyrians, eager, as Diodorus implies, to force home the advantage they had gained, and so prompt action would be required on the part of the new Macedonian king. In addition the Paeonians were beginning to threaten Macedonian territory (Diod. XVI. 2. 6.), and there were also struggles by various contenders for the throne, viz. Pausanias, backed by the Thracians (Beloch: G.G. III. 12. 225. 1.), Argaeus, backed by the Athenians (see below, 6.6.) and Archelaus, probably the eldest son of Amyntas III by his marriage with Gygaea (Theop. F.G.H. 115^29.). For the chronological sequence of these problems facing Philip see the note on 6.7.

If we accept the reasoning of Ellis outlined in the previous note, then Philip will have been proclaimed king of Macedonia on the death of Perdiccas, in preference to (rather than as regent for) Perdiccas' son Amyntas, who was obviously far too young to deal with the very serious external threats to Macedonia.

6. 1. *Ut est ingressum imperium. magna de illo spee omnibus fuit et propter ipsius ingenium, quod magnum spondebat virum, et propter vetera Macedoniarum fata,*

In reference to Philip's ability, Diodorus says: γέγονε γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁδοὺς ἀγχυνοτέρος στρατηγικὴν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ λοιμορρήτη ὑπὲρ σιαφέρων (Diod. XVI. 1. 6.).
'Fatum' is here used in its original meaning of "utterance", and specifically of a prophetic nature. This meaning is rare, but is nevertheless classical: cf. Cicero, Catiline III. 4. 9: *eo fatis quae Veientes scripta haberent*. When, where and to whom these utterances were made cannot be determined, since this appears to be the only reference.

6. 2. .... *quae cecinerant, uno ex Amyntae filiis regnante florentissimum fore Macedonae statum, cui spei scelus matris hunc residuum fecerat.*

Justin-Trogus makes no mention here of Philip's three half brothers, who could presumably have qualified as contenders for the fulfilment of this prophecy. With 'scelus matris' Justin-Trogus has yet another "dig" at Eurydice: he certainly does seem particularly hostile towards her. It is perhaps not too fanciful to carry this sentiment through to 'fratrum indigne peremptorum' on the next line.

6. 3-5. *Principio rerum cum hinc caedes fratrum indigne peremptorum, inde hostium multitudo, hinc insidiarum metus, inde inopia continui belli et exhausti regni inmaturam aetatem tironia urgerent: bella, quae velut conspiratione quadam ad opprimendum Macedoniam multarum gentium ex diversis locis uno tempore confluebant. quoniam omnibus per esse non poterat, dispensanda ratus alia interposita pactione conponit, alia redimit facillum quibusque adgressis, quorum victoria et militum tremidos animos firmaret et contemptum sibi hostium demeret.*

This is the most flowing piece of Latin prose so far in Book VII, and may well be an original passage taken from Trogus. The domestic troubles of 'caedes fratrum' and those implied in 'insidiarum metus' are well balanced by the problems facing the Macedonians in foreign policy as indicated by 'multitudo hostium' and 'inopia continui belli et exhausti regni'.

caedes fratrum
See above, 5. 4. and 5. 6.

hostium multitudo
This probably included the Paeonians, Illyrians, Thracians and Athenians (Diod. XVI. 2. 6.), but it may just be a general reference to outside hostility at the time of Philip's accession.

insidiarum metus
This must refer to the threat to Philip's security of tenure of the Macedonian throne by the pretenders Pausanias and Argaeus (see below, 6. 6.).

inopio: continui belli et exhausti regni
This was probably the perennial Illyrian aggression.

inmaturam aetatem tironis
At this time (359) Philip was twenty-three years old. He was born in 382, because according to Suda s. v. Καραβις he became king twenty-two years after his birth. Although 'tiro' is a military word meaning "recruit", it can be used for a "beginner" in anything; cf. Cic. Rosc. Am. 6. 17. etc.

alia interposita pactione conponit, alia redimit.
This accords with Diodorus XVI. 3. 3. which states that after restoring Macedonian morale and building up the army, Philip won over many people through gifts and promises. Diodorus instances Philip's voluntary withdrawal (albeit temporary) from Amphipolis, and his buying off the Paeonians and the Thracians, who were supporting the pretender Pausanias (Diod. XVI. 3. 4.). Cf. note on 5. 4.

facillimis quibusque adgressis
"He attacked those of his enemies who could most easily be subdued".
Presumably these are the victories against the Paeonians (Diod. XVI. 4. 2.), the Illyrians (Diod. XVI. 4. 3-7.), Amphipolis (Diod. XVI. 8. 2.), Pydna (Diod. XVI. 8. 2.), Potidaea (Diod. XVI. 8. 5.) and the Thessalian tyrants of Pherae (Diod. XVI. 14. 2.).

6. 6. Primum illi cum Atheniensibus certamen fuit: quibus per insidias victis metu belli gravioris, cum interficere omnes posset, incolumes sine pretio dimisit.

Diodorus says that the Athenians, who were hostile to Philip, were trying to put Argaeus on (restore him to? - ἀργαῖος) the Macedonian throne. They had sent an army of 3,000 hoplites, together with strong naval support under the command of Mantias (Diod. XVI. 2. 6.). It is more than likely that this is the same Argaeus who ruled for two years (c. 385-383, according to Ellis 1976, p. 42.) in Macedónia, after expelling Amyntas III, although he was subsequently ousted once again by Amyntas (see note on 4. 6.). Cf. Diod. XIV. 92. 3-4.

Diodorus says a little later that the Athenians' reason for supporting Argaeus' claim to the throne was to assist their attempts to recover Amphipolis, which had been taken from the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War by Brasidas, and that this prompted Philip to withdraw from the city and make it autonomous (Diod. XVI. 3. 3.).

This action of Philip was designed to detach Athenian support from Argaeus, and it succeeded to the extent that Philip was able, through secret negotiations, to promise to hand Amphipolis over to the Athenians in return for being allowed to take over Pydna, which was at that time in the Athenian League, but had formerly belonged to Macedonia (cf. Sherman in the Loeb edition of Diodorus, vol. VII. p. 241, n.3.). Diodorus goes on to relate the rest of the account concerning Argaeus' attempt to seize the throne: Mantias stayed at Methone, but sent Argaeus with his mercenaries to Aegae, the old Macedonian capital. Argaeus gained no support at all on his arrival at Aegae, and so turned back towards Methone, only to be met by
Philip and an army. Philip killed some of the mercenaries, and released the rest under a truce, after causing them to hand over the (Macedonian?) exiles (τοὺς φύγωντας) who were with them (Diod. XVI. 3. 5-6.). This treatment of the mercenaries who were allowed home under truce is what Justin-Trogus means by 'incolumes sine pretio dimisit'. Demosthenes adds that Philip made good the Athenian losses, and that he sent a letter in which he expressed a wish to make an alliance with them, and wanted to resume the cordial relations enjoyed by his ancestors (Demosth. XXIII. 121.).

This sentence, while it in no way contradicts any other accounts, seems inadequate: we are not told anything about the nature of Philip's conflict with the Athenians. Indeed the major figure of this affair, who must surely be Argaeus with his threat to Philip's throne, inasmuch as Justin-Trogus is dealing with events relating to Philip's own position as king at the beginning of his reign, gains no mention. Furthermore the statement that Philip gained the upper hand over the Athenians 'per insidias', without any explanation as to what this involved, is unclear. But perhaps most important of all, the statement 'quibus per insidias victis' implies, following immediately on from 'Primum illi cum Atheniensibus certamen fuit', that he conquered the Athenians (in a full scale war, or at least in a full engagement with an Athenian army), yet the sentence concludes with his allowing them to depart (presumably from the ambush) without being ransomed (probably from fear of repercussions). Clearly there has been some not inconsiderable abridgement here of the original Trogus by Justin, and we must presume that Trogus (who appears to have had some degree of competence as a historian) dealt with Argaeus and his claims to the throne, the negotiations concerning Amphipolis, the defeat of Argaeus and Philip's treatment of the prisoners. Perhaps there was originally a much longer paragraph, commencing with the words 'Primum illi cum Atheniensibus certamen fuit', and meaning that the Athenians were the first foreign people with whom Philip had
conflict after his accession, continuing with the details of the Argaeus affair and the detachment of Athenians sent to support him, and concluding with an account of Philip's ambushing of the Argaeus support force (consisting mainly of mercenaries, fellow exiles and a small number of Athenians, the majority of the latter remaining with Mantias at Methone), the defeat of which 'per insidias' led to many of the mercenaries being killed, the exiles being taken prisoner and the Athenians sent away 'incolumes sine pretio'.

6. 7. Post hos bello in Illyrios translato multa milia hostium caedit;

Diodorus, as has been mentioned (see note on 6. 5.), says that the Illyrians *μεγάλας δύναμις ἔθραυσαν καὶ στρατεύσαν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν παρεσκεύασον*, following their victory over the Macedonians, during which Perdiccas had been killed, and he says that the Macedonians had lost 4,000 men in the fight, and had become very demoralised as a result (Diod. XVI. 2. 5-6.). It is not surprising that Philip should launch an attack on the Illyrians at the earliest opportunity, but it is important to note that, according to both Justin-Trogus and Diodorus, Philip did not turn his attention to Illyrian matters until after he had dealt with Argaeus. Diodorus quite clearly indicates the sequence of Philip's actions, in dealing with Argeus (XVI. 3. 5-6.), and then ἐντολαθεὶς δὲ τοῦ προῖ Ἀθηναίων πολέμου he attacked and defeated the Paeonians (XVI. 4. 2.), and finally ἐπολεμαπομένων δὲ πολεμίων τῶν Ἰλλυρίων he invaded Illyria and defeated an army of 10,000 under King Bardylis.

A delay then possibly of a year occurred between Philip's accession to the Macedonian throne and war with the Illyrians, which on the face of it is inexplicable in view of the immediacy of the Illyrian threat to Macedonia following the defeat of Perdiccas, and their preparations for an invasion of Macedonia. Ellis sees the reason for this breathing space afforded to Philip in some sort of
truce with the Illyrians, immediately upon his accession, probably sealed by the marriage of Philip and Audata, the daughter or niece of Bardylis (Ath. 13. 557b. Ellis 1976, p. 46f.). This would then give Philip time for the programme of morale-boosting speeches and army reorganisation (including the introduction of the phalanx) recorded by Diodorus (XVI. 3. 1-2.).

As a result of Philip's victory, the Illyrians, who had lost some 7,000 men out of their army of about 10,000, were forced to withdraw from all Macedonian cities (Diod. XVI. 4. 7.). This was a most important victory for Philip, and surely deserves more space than Justin-Trogus gives it. It should also be noted that he makes no mention of Philip's reorganisation of the army.

6. 8-9. hinc Thessaliam non praedae cupiditate, sed quod exercitui suo robur Thessalorum equitum adiungere gestiebat, nihil minus quam bellum metuentem improvisus expugnat. unumque corpus equitum pedestriumque coniarum invicti exercitu fecit;

There is a great deal of information lacking here. The first reference in Diodorus to any activity of Philip's in Thessaly comes at XVI. 14. 1. where Philip is called in by the Aleuadae to oppose the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Tisiphonus, who had previously with their sister Thebe murdered her husband, Alexander of Pherae, and had, after some initial popularity as tyrannicides, gained the people's hatred for similar behaviour. Diodorus says that Philip defeated the tyrants and was on good terms from then on with the Thessalians. This should be dated to 358/7 (Beloch G.G. 2 3. 2. 83-84.), and in fact Ellis places it in 358 together with Philip's marriage to Philinna (see note on IX. 8. 2. below), which in itself suggests an involvement with Thessaly (Ellis 1976, pp. 14. 61.). However between the end of his account of the defeat of the Illyrians (XVI. 4. 7.) and this section about the Thessalians, Diodorus tells us about Philip's action against Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea (XVI. 8. 2-6.) and his
foundation of Philippi at or near the city of Crenides, his gold-mining activities there from which he amassed a great fortune, and his minting of the famous gold 'philippeioi' (XVI. 8. 6-7.). Ellis assigns the capture of Amphipolis to 357, the capture of Pydna, the foundation of Philippi and the capture of Potidaea to 356, and his chronology seems well supported (Ellis 1976, pp. 15. 64. 68f. 71.).

The problem can best be solved if a suggestion by Griffith be adopted, namely that of another intervention by Philip in the feud between the Aleuadae and the tyrants of Pherae in 355 (Griffith CQ 1970, p. 79.). This means accepting that Diodorus has fused the interventions of 358 (which must surely stand, preceding the date of Philip's marriage to Olympias in 357 attested in Justin-Trogus' next sentence) and 355, but will explain why his activities of 358-6 precede his (apparently) first intervention in Thessalian affairs.

The motive assigned by Justin-Trogus to Philip for intervention in (or rather, the storming of - 'expugnat'-) Thessaly is not found elsewhere. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that Philip, on being called into Thessaly by the Aleuadae, made it a condition of his assistance that the Thessalians should supply him with a certain number of cavalrymen each year to augment his expanding fighting force.

6. 9. ...... urbem nobilissimam Larissam capit.

Ruehl transposed this clause from its position between 'caedit' and 'hinc' at the end of sentence 7 to follow 'expugnat' at the end of sentence 8, but, as H. D. Westlake points out, Larissa "is the last city which Philip would wish to take at this time", and so he regards 'Larissam' as corrupt (Westlake 1935, 167. n. 2.). Ehrhardt, citing Diod. XVI. 14. 1-2., adds that the Aleuadae invited Philip into Larissa, and so a capture of the city would be a contradiction of this (Ehrhardt in CQ 1967, 297.). Griffith agrees with this, and thinks that possibly the name of an Illyrian city or a western Macedonian
city held by the Illyrians has been corrupted into 'Larissam': he suggests Arnissa, fifteen miles west of Edessa, although he doubts whether it was urbs nobilissima, but he does point out that if it had been in Illyrian hands and recaptured by Philip, this may have been important enough to be recorded (Griffith in CQ 1970, 69.).

Sordi repunctuates: ...milia hostium caedit. Urbem nobilissimam Larissam capit. Hinc Thessaliam..., but Griffith feels that 'capit' is still a difficulty (Sordi 1958, 349. n. 3. Griffith, loc. cit.).

Marriage 1  359?  Philip = Phila

Marriage 2  359  Philip = Audata
              Cynna

Marriage 3  358  Philip = Philinna
              Arridaeus

Marriage 4  357  Philip = Olympias
              Alexander III  Cleopatra

Marriage 5  352  Philip = Nicesepolis
              Thessalonice

Marriage 6  342  Philip = Meda

Marriage 7  337  Philip = Cleopatra
              Europe  Caranus?

fig. 1. THE WIVES AND OFFSPRING OF PHILIP II

Philip's marriage to Olympias and her parentage are well documented (cf. Diod. XIX. 51. 6. Plut. Alex. 2. 1. Paus. I. xi. 1.). Plutarch confirms that her brother (more correctly uncle or brother-in-law, since Olympias was both niece and sister-in-law to Arrybas, who was her father's younger brother), Arrymbas (as Plutarch spells it), gave his consent. On the two kings of the Molossians, according to Pausanias, after the reign of Alcetas (father of Neoptolemus and Arrybas), the kingdom of Epirus was split between the two brothers after a quarrel, whereby they were to rule with equal authority. (Paus. I. 11. 3.). The date of the wedding will have been 357 (Ellis 1976, p.62)

Having made a brief reference here to the fate of Arrybas, Justin-Trogus saves further details for VIII. 6. 4-8. (see below for comment.).

6. 13. His ita gestis Philippus iam non contentus submovere bella ultro etiam quietos lacesit.

This sentence appears to bridge the gap between Philip's wedding in 357 and the siege of Methone in 354. The cities which fell to him during this period were: Amphipolis in 357, Pydna, Potidaea and Apollonia in 356, and Methone, Pagae, Abdera and Maronea in 354. It may well have been the case that Trogus followed Philip's progress in some detail through this period, and that Justin selected Methone only for mention because of losing the sight of his right eye during the siege of that place.

Diodorus breaks off his account of the Sacred War with the death of Philomelus and succession of Onomarchus in 354 to say that, while this was going on in Greece, Philip stormed Methone, looted it and burnt it to the ground (Diod. XVI. 31. 6.). Only a few chapters later Diodorus repeats himself by saying that Philip began to besiege Methone, although he here supplies more detail about Philip's motives for aggression and the course his action took: the people of Methone, who were allowing their city to become a base for Philip's enemies, were forced to hand over their city to Philip, and after he allowed them to leave the city with one garment each, Philip burned it down and distributed its territory among the Macedonians (cf. Strab. IX. 436. Polyae. IV. 2. 15. Demosth. IX. 26.). It is agreed that Philip lost his right eye here (Diod. XVI. 34. 5. Strab. VII. 374.).

6. 15. Quo vulnere nec aegnor in beHum nec iracundior adversus hostes factus est, adeo ut interiectis diebus racem deprecantibus dederit, nec moderatus tantum, verum etiam mitis adversus victos fuerit.

Presumably Philip was merciful ('mitis') towards the defeated people of Methone in that he actually allowed them to leave the city with one garment each, as Diodorus tells us (loc. cit.), rather than slaughtering them all. Diodorus only tells us that the people of Methone held out for a long time— he gives no details about negotiations for peace. Justin-Trogus does not mention the expulsion of the citizens, and if he had, this could probably still have been regarded as 'mitis' as they were not massacred or enslaved, and Philip had lost an eye!

END OF BOOK VII
At the beginning of Book VIII there is a complete change of scene. Having concluded Book VII with the early years of Philip's reign in Macedonia and the difficulties he faced, leading on to his early conflicts with the many enemies who surrounded him, Justin-Trogus transfers us to central Greece in a somewhat abrupt manner; there is not even a linking sentence on the lines of "turning to matters in Greece...".

Apart from a brief show of unity against Persia, during the Persian Wars— and even then several of the smaller Greek states medized through fear of the Persians— the leading Greek powers of Athens, Sparta and Thebes each tried to secure a dominant position in Greece. After the Persian Wars (490-479 B.C.) Athens built up a maritime empire from what had started out as a defensive confederacy against the common enemy of Persia, only to lose this position of power after her final defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). Sparta then assumed leadership over the states of Greece, but following on from their victory at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. the Thebans replaced the Spartans as leaders from that date.

Although Athens, Sparta and Thebes each had brief periods of supremacy during the fourth century, they nevertheless lacked the stability enjoyed by their fifth-century predecessors for a variety of reasons, and while the Greek states demonstrated a willingness to avoid conflict with each other by the peace following the Battle of Mantinea in 362, the arrival on the scene of Philip II of Macedon was to curtail the power and sovereignty of the individual city states to a very great extent (cf. Adcock and Mosley, 1975, 88.).
1. 3. siguidem Philippus, rex Macedoniae, velut e specula quadam libertati omnium insidiatus, dum contentiones civitatum alit auxilium inferioribus ferendo, victos pariter victoresque subire regiam servitutem coegit.

It is interesting to compare this comment of Justin-Trogus on Philip's method of dealing with Greek affairs with an extract from Isocrates, who says, addressing Philip: "I observe that you are being painted in false colours by men who are jealous of you (i.e. Demosthenes and his party), for one thing, and are, besides, in the habit of stirring up trouble in their own cities—men who look upon a state of peace which is for the good of all as a state of war upon their selfish interests. Heedless of all other considerations, they keep talking about your power, representing that it is being built up, not in behalf of Hellas, but against her, that you have for a long time been plotting against us all, and that, while you are giving it out that you intend to go to the rescue of the Messenians, if you can settle the Phocian question, you really design to subdue the Peloponnesus to your rule. The Thessalians, they say, and the Thebans, and all those who belong to the Amphictyony, stand ready to follow your lead; while the Argives, the Messenians, the Megalopolitans, and many of the others are prepared to join forces with you and wipe out the Lacedaemonians; and if you succeed in doing this, you will easily be master of the rest of Hellas." (Isocr. V. 73-5. Loeb trans. 1928)
1.4. *Causa et origo huius militis Thebani fuere, qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam inbecillo animo ferentes victos armis Lacedaemonios et Phocenses, quasi parva supplicia caedibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune Graeciae concilium superbe accusaverunt.*

The Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. had seen the defeat of a Spartan army under a king, Cleombrotus, by the Thebans led by Epaminondas, which brought about a brief period of Theban dominance in Greek politics until she lost her outstanding general and leader at the Battle of Mantinea in 362. After this battle, which had been turned by the death of Epaminondas from a decisive victory into a rather tame draw, Thebes abandoned her claims to supremacy in Greece. She concluded a peace with the other states in 361 (except Sparta who refused to recognise the independence of Messenia), and concentrated on securing her position in Boeotia and strengthening her influence in Phocis and Thessaly (cf. Hammond 1959, 511ff.).

...victoria armis Lacedaemonios et Phocenses...

i.e. at the Battle of Leuctra.

...apud commune Graeciae concilium superbe accusaverunt.

Diodorus tells us that after the *Λευκτρικὸν πόλεμον* the Thebans brought a serious charge against the Spartans *ἐν Ἀμφικτύον* (the Amphictyonic Council) owing to their having seized the Cadmeia in 382 and caused them to be fined a large sum (Diod. XVI. 23. 2-3.).

1.5. *Lacedemoniis crimini datum, quod arcem Thebanam indutiarum tempore occupassent....*

In an earlier notice at the beginning of Book XV, in dealing with the year 382-1, Diodorus gives an account of the seizure of the Cadmeia by the Spartan Phoeibidas, who was en route for Olynthus and who was apparently acting under secret instructions from the Spartans.
According to Diodorus, Phoebidas then defeated the Thebans in battle, exiled 300 leading Thebans, left a strong Spartan garrison in the Cadmeia and departed to continue his expedition against the Olynthians, which had been his original assignment (Diod. XV. 20. 1-3.). Xenophon gives a much fuller account of this episode which does not contradict what Diodorus has to say, although he makes no reference to any secret instructions given to Phoebidas to seize the Cadmeia. On the other hand he gives no reason for Phoebidas' presence in the neighbourhood of Thebes (Xen. Hell. V. 25-36.). *indutiarum tempore* would appear to mean little more than 'at a time when the Spartans and Thebans were not at war', rather than implying the breaching of some specific peace or cease-fire agreement.

"...Phocensibus, quod Boeotiam depopulati essent:

Diodorus, in dealing with the start of the Sacred War, couples the fine imposed by the Thebans on the Spartans with similar treatment of the Phocians, as does Justin-Trogus, but in Diodorus the Phocians are charged with having cultivated part of the land consecrated to Apollo of Delphi near Cirrha, whereas Justin-Trogus here gives the reason as being that of plundering Boeotia (Diod. XVI. 23. 2-3.). Duris of Samos says that the war was caused by a Phocian carrying off a Theban married woman called Theano, but this statement is completely unsupported (FHG II, 469. FGrH 76. F2-). Pausanias, in giving an account of the start of the Sacred War, is unable to decide whether the fine was imposed upon the Phocians because of their misdeeds, or whether it was because of the old hatred of the Phocians by the Thessalians who had strong influence among the Amphictyons, although in a later passage he refers to an image of Apollo dedicated by the Amphictyons when they fined the Phocians ..."
To consider Justin-Trogus' statement and that of Diodorus, supported by Pausanias: Pickard-Cambridge follows Diodorus, although he says that other charges may have been added (CAH VI, 213.). Hammond accepts the cultivation charge without question (Hammond 1959, 512.). Grote lists the different statements without comment (Grote 1888, V. 239.). It would appear that only Thirlwall of the modern historians has any comment on Justin-Trogus' statement. He suggests that the loss of Epaminondas may have encouraged the subject Boeotian towns to attempt a revolt against Thebes, and the Phocians to assist them. He continues: "And it is possible that the step with which the Thebans began the fatal struggle, was prompted less by revenge than by precaution, in the view of disabling the Phocians from thus assailing Thebes on her tenderest side." (Thirlwall 1849, V. 328.) Thirlwall goes on to give Diodorus' evidence, and finds confirmation for his assertion that the Phocians cultivated part of this land sacred to Apollo, which had been decreed by the Amphictyons to lie waste for ever, in the border quarrels between the Phocians and Locrians, as attested by Pausanias (Paus. III. 9. 9.).

The statements of Justin-Trogus and Diodorus are not mutually exclusive. Yet while it is possible that Justin pruned Trogus' account of the origins of the Sacred War, and allowed the cultivation charge to drop out in reducing the evidence for the charges against the Spartans and Phocians to one sentence, it is unlikely that Diodorus would have overlooked what were undoubtedly equally serious grounds for accusation.

1. 6. prorsus quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent, Justin-Trogus continues in his hostile attitude towards the Thebans; having ascribed to them the 'origo...mali' and saying that they bore their prosperity 'inbellico animo', he alludes to their defeat of the Spartans and Phocians 'caedibus et rapinis' and then says that they accused the Spartans and Phocians 'superbe'. There does not appear
to be any hostility towards the Thebans in the account of Diodorus.

1. 7. Cum iudicium arbitrio victorum exerceretur, tanta pecunia damnatur, quanta exsolveri non posset.

Presumably the 'victorum' are the Thebans, victorious from Leuctra, but they could also include the Thessalians and Locrians, who were members of the Amphictyonic Council. 'victorum' could then have the general sense of "the most powerful", as rendered by J.S. Watson (Bohn trans. 1902). Diodorus says that the fine was πολλὰ τὰ δάνεια, and a little later he refers to it as μεγίστας ζημίας (Diod. XVI. 23. 2; 23. 5.). Pausanias says that the Phocians were upset πρὸς τὴν ζημίας τὸ μέγεθος (Paus. X. 2. 2.).

From here Diodorus has a much fuller account of how the Phocians did not pay up, and were charged a second time by the ἱεροχώροι (religious officials who were in charge of sacred business at meetings of the Amphictyonic Council). These men demanded that unless the Phocians discharged their debts they should have their land cursed.

1. 8. Igitur Phocenses cum agris, liberis coniugibusque privarentur, desperatis rebus Philomelo quodam duce veluti deo irascentes templum Apollinis Delphi occupaverer.

Again Diodorus fills in missing detail when he tells us that, apart from pointing out to his fellow Phocians that the fine was excessive, Philomelus declared that it was the ancestral right of the Phocians to control the oracle of Delphi, citing Homer, Iliad. II. 517, 519: οὐτὰρ Φωκείων Σχεδίως καὶ Ἐρετροφος Ἀρχινος οἱ Κυπαρίσσιοι ἐκ Πυθώνια (Delphi) τε πετρήσων.

He then asked for and gained full power as general, went to Archidamus, King of Sparta, from whom he obtained 15 talents, although the King did not wish at present to give open assistance. It was then that Philomelus, having added the same sum or more from his own pocket and hiring 1,000 Phocian peltasts, seized the oracle.
Justin-Trogus' statement 'cum agris, liberis, coniugibusque privarentur' can hardly refer to a situation which has just taken place. The last time the Phocians could have suffered on this scale would surely have been after their defeat along with the Spartans at Leuctra in 371, but this was some fourteen years earlier than the outbreak of the Sacred War. Surely this is a look to the future—a grim future of despoliation if the Phocians did not pay the fine. 'desperatis rebus' is far more understandable in this context.

...Philomelus quodam duce...
The part assigned to him by Diodorus has already been mentioned. The same author tells us that he had μήγασσον...ἐν τοῖς Φωκᾶσσον ἄξωμα. Pausanias echoes this and supplies the additional information that he came from Ledon, a city of Phocis, and that his father was Theotimus (Diod. XVI. 23. 4. Paus. X. 2. 2.).

1. 9. Inde auro et pecunia divites conduto mercenario milite bellum Thebanis intulerunt.
Consideration must be given to whether or not the use of 'inde' here by Justin-Trogus implies that Philomelus enriched himself with the temple treasures or whether he gained his funds mainly from the rich Delphians. Diodorus' evidence for this is confusing and contradictory: at XVI. 28. 2, we are told that during 354-3, the year after the seizure of the oracle, and after he had sent his envoys to the Spartans and Athenians with whom he managed to secure some sort of alliance, Philomelus did not touch the sacred temple dedications but secured enough money from the wealthy Delphians to pay for a large number of mercenaries which he had begun to recruit. However, two chapters later at 30. 1, he says that Philomelus was compelled to lay hands on the sacred dedications in order to be able to raise the money for the pay of the mercenaries which he had fixed at half as much again. This last reference is again at complete variance with 56. 5.
where specific reference is made to those Phocian commanders who did, or did not touch the temple treasures, and Philomelus is mentioned quite clearly as having kept his hands off the dedications, as opposed to his successors, Onomarchus and Phayllus.

Hammond, in his detailed examination of the chronology of the Sacred War, shows that Philomelus seized Delphi in June/July 356. In October/November 355 the Sacred War was declared, and in late autumn 354 Philomelus was killed in battle. He uses the different accounts of Philomelus and the temple treasures found in Diodorus to demonstrate that while Philomelus respected the sanctity of Delphi to begin with, he later plundered the Delphians, and finally the sanctuary itself (Hammond in GQ (1937), 63. Diod. XVI. 24. 5. 27. 3. 28. 2.; 30. 1.)

Parke and Wormell follow Hammond's chronology and regard the statement of Diodorus that Philomelus refrained from appropriating the temple treasures as originating from a pro-Athenian bias for Philomelus derived from Ephorus (Parke and Wormell 1956, I. 231. n. 2). It should also be noted that Justin-Trogus uses the word 'sacrilegium' in the next sentence in reference to the seizure of Delphi, and this does mean specifically the robbing of a temple or stealing of sacred things, as well as the violation or profanation of sacred things.

Taking the statement of Justin-Trogus in its most natural sense, it would seem quite justifiable to assume that the original account of Trogus has been condensed, leaving out the details of Philomelus' action at Delphi, and so the period from the summer of 356 to the autumn of 355 is covered within the one sentence. Certainly as far as the phrase 'bellum Thebanis intulerunt' is concerned, this is a gross over-simplification of the situation. Even though Diodorus' account is a little confused in places, it gives a reasonable sequence of events: initially the Phocians, soon after their seizure of the oracle, were attacked by the Locrians of Amphissa whom they defeated near the cliffs of Phaedriades, and then the Locrians appealed...
to the Thebans, who subsequently got the Amphictyons to declare war against the Phocians in the name of the god of Delphi (autumn 355). Having recruited more mercenaries, whether or not he used the temple treasures for this, Philomelus and his Phocians again invaded Locris and defeated a joint force of Locrians and Thebans in a cavalry battle. There then followed another battle between the Thessalians, with allies, amounting to 6,000 in all, and the Phocians in Locris, near a hill called Argolas in which the Phocians were again victorious. Both armies were then reinforced, the Thebans arriving with 13,000 men and the Achaeans coming to the assistance of the Phocians with 1,500 men. After some manoeuvres which involved the murders of prisoners on both sides, the final battle took place, at Neon, according to Pausanias, ending with the defeat of the Phocians and the death of Philomelus in late autumn 354 (Paus. X. 2. 4.).

1. 10. Factum Phocensium, tametsi omnes execrarentur propter sacrilegium, plus tamen invidiae Thebanis, a quibus ad hanc necessitatem compulsi fuerant, quam ipsis intulit.

Isocrates in his letter to Philip gives the Thebans a fairly bad press with regard to their foreign policy: he says that they won a splendid victory (at Leuctra in 371) but διὰ τὸ ἡ καλὰς χρήσθαι τοῖς εὐτυχεῖς ὑπὲρ βέλτιον πράσσουσι τῶν ἡπτῆντων καὶ δυστυχοῦσαντων. He goes on to list their acts of aggression against the Peloponnesians, Thessaly, Megara, Athens, Euboea, Byzantium and the Phocians (Isocr. V. 53-5.).

1. 11. Itaque auxilia his et ab Atheniensibus et a Lacedaemoniis missa.

According to Diodorus, as has been mentioned above, Philomelus paid a visit to Archidamus, King of Sparta, before his seizure of the oracle, in order to obtain his support for the intended seizure on the grounds of common interest, the fine imposed by the Amphictyons on the
Spartans, which Philomelus promised to annul. While he did not receive the king's open assistance he apparently gained a promise of secret co-operation together with 15 talents (Diod. XVI. 24. 1-2.). Later Diodorus says that after Philomelus had gained control of the oracle, forced the priestess to mount the tripod, and then experienced a favourable omen in the form of an eagle, he sent ambassadors to the Athenians, Spartans, Thebans and the other leading city-states, declaring that he only had lawful intentions, would be accountable for the temple treasures, and wanted assistance or at any rate non-interference. The Athenians, Spartans and some others, says Diodorus, made an alliance with him and promised assistance, but the Boeotians, Locrians and others made contrary declarations (ibid. 27.). The next reference to the Athenians or Spartans made by Diodorus comes at the beginning of XVI. 29., where he looks at the composition of the opposing sides, remarking that the Athenians, Spartans and some others of the Peloponnesians fought on the side of the Phocians. He goes on to say that the Spartans were eager to co-operate with the Phocians against the Thebans because of their treatment of them in respect of the fine imposed by the Amphictyons, which had been doubled at the instigation of the Thebans after initial non-payment. However, Diodorus concludes, they preferred to let the Phocians take the lead in starting a war against the Thebans.

Presumably 'itaque' implies that the reason for any assistance being given by the Athenians or Spartans to the Phocians was the treatment of the Phocians by the Thebans, although, as we have seen from Diodorus, the Spartans had good enough reason to oppose the Thebans.

1. 12. Prima igitur congressione Philomelus Thebanos castris exuit. Diódoros states that Philomelus' first engagement with the Thebans in the field was the cavalry engagement between the Phocians and a combined force of Boeotians and Locrians, prior to the defeat of...
6,000 Thessalians with their allies at the hill near Argolas (Diod. XVI. 30. 3-4). Whether or not Justin-Trogus means that Philomelus attacked the Boeotian and Locrian camp (or indeed either of the two, if they were separate) and then followed this up by putting to flight the occupants of the camp with his cavalry, or whether he means a completely different occasion not mentioned by Diodorus, must remain an open question.

1. 13. Sequenti proelio primus inter confertissimos dimicans cecidit et sacrilegii poenas impio sanguine luit.

Pausanias supplies the information as to where this final battle, which saw the defeat of the Phocians and the death of Philomelus, took place, namely at Neon. Both Pausanias and Diodorus say that Philomelus, during the rout which followed the Phocian defeat, threw himself off the top of a cliff. Diodorus adds that he had fought courageously and suffered many wounds, and since he had been driven into a position from which there was no escape he took this course to avoid being captured and tortured (Paus. X. 2. 4. Diod. XVI. 31. 4.). This is of course at variance with Justin-Trogus' statement here that he died fighting in the thick of the battle. Again Justin-Trogus is clearly following a different tradition from that followed by Diodorus, although it is not necessarily any the less trustworthy.

Pausanias comments on the way Philomelus took his life with the words: ἑτέραντο ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τοῖς Ἀμφικτύων ἢ τοῖς συνάντας ἡ τῇ δίκη. (loc. cit. in W.H.S. Jones 1935, 379.). Aelian, in referring to this punishment for sacrilege, says that it was κατὰ τῶν Δέλφων νόμον (Aelian. XI. 5.). Diodorus merely says that in this way ὅποι τῷ δαίμονίῳ δίκαις he ended his life.


So Diodorus XVI. 31. 5. and Pausanias X. 2. 5. According to Diodorus Onomarchus was the brother of Philomelus (Diod. XVI. 56. 5. 61. 2.).
It is perhaps a little surprising that this fact is given rather casually by Diodorus and not at the first mention of Onomarchus (ibid. 31. 5.) where one might have thought it an important fact to mention. Pausanias makes no reference to any relationship between Philomelus and Onomarchus, although he does say that Onomarchus and his successor Phayllus were brothers, as does Diodorus at the first mention of Phayllus (Paus. X. 2. 5. Diod. XVI. 36. 1.). Finally Aristotle, in a passage dealing with the origins of the Sacred War, refers to an Onomarchus, son of Euthycrates (Arist. Pol. V. 3. 4.), whereas if he had been brother to Philomelus (rather than a more distant relation or no relation at all) one might have expected his father to be Theotimus, who is recorded by Pausanias as being the father of Philomelus (Paus. X. 2. 2.). Thirlwall first drew attention to this point, although he accepted that Philomelus, Onomarchus and Phayllus were all brothers (Thirlwall 1849, 341.). More recent authors such as Bury, Pickard-Cambridge and Hammond make no reference to Onomarchus’ parentage or relationship with Philomelus. It seems most likely that Diodorus has made an error, possibly confusing the relationship with that of Onomarchus and Phayllus.

2. 1-2. Adversus quem Thebani Thessalique non ex civibus suis, ne victoris potentiam ferre non posseint, sed Philippum, Macedoniam regem, ducem eligunt et externae dominationi, quam in suis timuerunt, sponte succedunt.

This appears at first sight to be inaccurate. A conflict, which had broken out in Pherae between the noble Aleuadæ of Larissa and the tyrant Lycophron, caused the former to call on the aid of Philip and the latter to invoke the assistance of his friend and ally Onomarchus. Onomarchus sent his brother Phayllus with 7,000 men to Thessaly, where he was defeated by Philip. Onomarchus then marched into Thessaly with his whole army and defeated Philip in two battles. While Onomarchus proceeded to invade Boeotia and take Coroneia, Philip now strengthened
his position by persuading the Thessalians to unite with him against Lycophron and his Phocian allies, who were again summoned by the Pheraean (Diod. XVI. 35. 1-2. Polyaeon. IV. 2. 19.).

As far as Philip becoming leader of the Thessalians and Thebans is concerned, G.T. Griffith has demonstrated that Justin-Trogus has combined two narrative threads in a somewhat confusing manner. If, as seems quite likely, the Thebans had allied themselves with Philip at the time of the request for help against the Pheraean tyrant, Lycophron, by the Thessalians, then it is quite reasonable for Justin-Trogus to say of the Thebans (as well as of the Thessalians) that they chose Philip as their leader, and subsequently gained satisfaction from the eventual victory over Onomarchus. It is the next part of the sentence, '...et externae...succeedunt...', which cannot possibly apply to the Thebans, who, as Griffith says, "...did not come under Philip's 'rule' until 338, and then not voluntarily". However, the second part of the sentence can still apply to the Thessalians, especially if we follow M. Sordi and Griffith in accepting 352 as the date when Philip became archon of the Thessalian League (Griffith CQ 1970, 73-4. Sordi 1958, 249ff.).

Thus it can be seen that once again Justin's technique of condensing the narrative can lead to inaccuracy and misinterpretation. On the one hand the Thebans, allied with Philip, through the defeat of Onomarchus recorded in the next sentence gain their revenge for the sacrilege perpetrated by the Phocians, while the Thessalians, having invited Philip's assistance in freeing Pherae from the tyrant, accept his overlordship as the price for that act of liberation.

2. 3. Igitur Philippus, quasi sacrilegii, non Thebanorum ultor esset, omnes milites coronas laureas sumere iubet, atque ita veluti deo duce in proelium pergit.

Justin-Trogus here is the only authority for Philip's soldiers wearing crowns of laurel leaves. Neither Diodorus nor Pausanias gives any
indication that Philip's action against the Phocians was in any way connected with, or intended as, a punishment of sacrilege, even if this was purely an excuse for interfering in central Greek affairs (which it patently was).

The laurel was sacred to Apollo (Gk. δέκτης: cf. the myth about Apollo and Daphne, Ovid. Met. I. 452ff.), and it is thought that people may originally have supposed that the prophetic utterances at Delphi were delivered by the laurel trees which grew there. Laurel wood was used as fuel and for fumigation at Delphi, and laurels were also used for decorative purposes (Parke and Wormell 1956, 26.). The laurel was also sacred to Mars and used in connection with his cult worship (W. Warde Fowler 1908, 36.). It is interesting that here the laurel, as the emblem of the god, could have represented either Apollo or Mars (since it is a Roman who is writing), but it is most likely that Apollo is meant.

A parallel in terms of having a religious emblem forced in front of the eyes of the enemy can be found in Lactantius' account of Constantine's victory over Maxentius at the Battle of the Mulvian Bridge in A.D. 312, where Constantine gave orders for his men's shields to be emblazoned with the Chi-Rho monogram (Lact. De Mort. Persecut. 44. 5.). This idea was of course used much later by the Crusaders of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D., when shields bearing a cross were used.

2. 4. Phocenses insignibus dei conspectis conscientia delictorum territri abiectis armis fugam capessunt,...

This does not accord with the statement of Diodorus, who says that a fierce battle took place and that Philip won because the Thessalian cavalry was superior both in numbers and in courage. Certainly the defeat was followed by the flight of the Phocians, including Onomarchus, to the coast (see below), but neither Diodorus nor Pausanias gives reasons for this other than that the Phocians fled
after they had been defeated in a full engagement (Diod. XVI. 35. 5. Paus. X. 2. 5.).

Diodorus tells us that Onomarchus and his Phocians fled towards the sea and, having discovered that the Athenian naval commander Chares, who had probably been sent to protect Pagasae, happened to be sailing by with many triremes, they stripped off their armour and endeavoured to swim over to the boats. Diodorus gives a figure of 6,000 Phocians and mercenaries killed, and 3,000 taken prisoner, who were then apparently thrown into the sea as temple robbers (Diod. XVI. 35. 5-6.).

There is a little confusion over the death of Onomarchus, in that in the last sentence of chapter 35 Diodorus says that Philip hanged him (despite having said in the previous sentence that the στρατηγὸς - presumably Onomarchus- had perished along with the 6,000 Phocians and mercenaries), while at 61. 2. he says that Onomarchus διαδεξάμενος τὴν τῶν ἀπονομητῶν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τῶν συμπαρατάξαμένων ἐν Ὀθυμαλίᾳ Φιλίκως καὶ μισθοφόρων κατακοπεῖς ἐσταυρώθη.

With regard to the question of hanging, as Sherman points out, Philip must have hanged (or crucified) the dead body of Onomarchus (Sherman 1952, 337 n. 2.). Two possibilities as to his ultimate fate can be found in the account of Pausanias, who says that after Onomarchus had fled to the coast he was shot down (κατηκοντίσθη) or, depending on the reading, drowned (κατηποντίσθη) by his own soldiers, who reckoned that his lack of initiative and inexperience as a general had been responsible for this defeat (Paus. X. 2. 5.).

2. 5-6. Incredibile quantum ea res apud omnes nationes Philippo gloriae dedit: illum vindicem sacrilegii, illum ultorem religionum; quod orbis viribus expiare debuit, solum qui piacula exigeret extitissse. Justin-Trogus sees Philip as being regarded by all peoples as the champion of the Greek world against the sacrilegious Phocians, and that
he was responsible for bringing the punishment of the god to bear upon them; that he took upon himself a duty that should have been shouldered 'orbis viribus'. Diodorus in a long passage surveys the various punishments received directly from the gods by those who had committed the sacrilegious act of seizing the oracle, instancing the deaths of Philomelus (hurling himself over a cliff), Onomarchus (being cut to pieces in a battle in Thessaly together with the Phocians and mercenaries who had been fighting with him), Phayllus (dying of a lingering disease) and Phalaecus (who was obliged to spend a long life continually tortured by fear and danger) (Diod. XVI. 61-64.). Diodorus does not suggest that people saw in Philip the champion of Apollo, but he does say that he had enlarged his kingdom both by his achievements and τὴν πρὸς τῷ δειον ἐφευρέτου (Diod. XVI. 38. 2.).

2. 7. Dignum itaque qui a diis proximus habeatur, per quem deorum maiestas vindicata sit.
This might well reflect a belief which Justin-Trogus accepted that acts like Philip's justified deification. On the other hand there are other instances in Graeco-Roman history where the people were wild with delight at some act of liberation performed by a general not of their own nation, but they treated him as a hero, not in any way countenancing deification: e.g. Brasidas in Thrace (Thuc. V. 11. 1.) and Flamininus at Corinth (Liv. XXXIII. 33. 1-4.). Perhaps 'a diis proximus' was regarded as equivalent to 'heros'.

2. 8. Sed Athenienses audito belli eventu, ne in Graeciam Philippus transiret, angustias Thermopylarum pari ratione sicuti antea advenientibus Persia occupare, sed nequaquam simili aut virtute aut causa:
Philip turned towards central Greece probably in 352 after he had liberated Pherae from its tyrants and captured the port of Pagasae

Diodorus says that Philip made this move to Thermopylae with the intention of making war on the Phocians, but returned to Macedonia after he found the Athenians barring his way at the pass (Diod. XVI. 38. iff.). Demosthenes says that this operation cost the Athenians more than 200 talents (Demosth. XIX. 84.), and in his first Philippic he criticises the Athenians for lack of intelligent military thinking, in that they promptly rush off on an expedition to whichever part of Greece they hear Philip is making for, rather than plan out their strategy in advance of any potential move by Philip. He instances Thermopylae as one of the areas to which the Athenians have rushed out an expeditionary force, which must surely be the occasion here mentioned by Justin-Trogus (Demosth. I. 41.). Diodorus relates how Phayllus, after the death of his brother, having an inexhaustible supply of money (presumably the temple treasures from Delphi), gathered together a large force of mercenaries to renew the war, which included 1,000 Lacedaemonians, 2,000 Achaecans and 5,000 Athenian foot soldiers together with 400 horsemen and their general Naucicles. In addition the Pheraean tyrants, Lycophron and Pitholaus, had joined the Phocians with a further 2,000 mercenaries. Diodorus goes on to describe Phayllus' defeat in three battles at the hands of the Boeotians, near Orchomenus, on the banks of the Cephisus and near Coronea (Diod. XVI. 37.). He then goes straight into chapter 38 (having finished chapter 37 with the words: 'Ημεῖς δὲ τὰ περὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Φωκῶν διελθοῦσες ἐπάνειμον ἐπὶ τῶν Φίλιππων

with Philip's advance to Thermopylae following his defeat of Onomarchus, only to be prevented from entering the pass by the Athenians.

This raises the question of whether it was the Athenians only who held the pass against Philip on this occasion. Justin-Trogus and Diodorus both state this clearly, but Pickard-Cambridge seems quite
sure that Phayllus was waiting at Thermopylae at the head of a large army (presumably that outlined above) and that it was the arrival of the Athenian contingent under Nausicles which caused Philip to abandon his attempt to penetrate the pass of Thermopylae, rather than the Athenians occupying the pass on their own under the command of Nausicles (Pickard-Cambridge 1914, 177f.). It is of course possible that Diodorus attributed this successful blockade solely to the Athenians because their 5,000 hoplites comprised the largest contribution to the army being gathered by Phayllus. In view of Demosthenes' praise for this action by the Athenians (e.g. at XIX. 86, 319.) and the evidence of both Justin-Trogus and Diodorus, it would seem likely that the entrance to the pass at Thermopylae was protected by the Athenians only, and on their own initiative. Ellis appears to follow the Pickard-Cambridge view (Ellis 1976, 86.).

The common threat to the Greek states of Persian domination during the early fifth century had brought about co-operation between the states, unprecedented in the history of Greece, which, not the least because of the geographical isolation of many of its states, tended to be politically fragmented. The Spartans and Athenians had both had cause to feel proud about their achievements against the Persians, notably in the Battles of Thermopylae and Salamis. However this unity had not lasted: the Peloponnesian War at the end of the fourth century led to Spartan domination, which in its turn was supplanted by Theban hegemony. Justin-Trogus' comments on this move by the Athenians are to be seen in the light of the contrast he draws between the Athenians of the early fifth century, who had respected the gods and taken part in pan-Hellenic ventures such as common opposition to Persia and the building of an empire; and the Athenians of the later fourth century who had stooped to the behaviour outlined in sentences 9 and 10:
A nicely balanced piece of Latin prose: \textit{tunc pro...}, \textit{nunc pro...}, \textit{tunc...indicaturi, nunc...defensuri}; This statement by Justin-Trogus about Athenian motives for entering the conflict at this point and for siding with the Phocians is unfair, to say the least. There can be no doubt that they were far more concerned about stopping Philip from penetrating into central Greece than taking sides in the Sacred War. To say that they were fighting \textit{pro sacrilegio publico} is totally unjust.

This presumably means that, since Apollo, by his advice, guidance and control, had such an influence on Athenian policy and achievements, he ought to have been defended from the start by Athenian opposition to the Phocians. It was no doubt especially dishonourable to the Athenians that Apollo should have been defended by their traditional enemies, the Thebans, together with Philip of Macedon, who had no just cause to be interfering in central Greek affairs in any case.

In considering how important a deity Apollo was to the Athenians, there is not an easy answer. The main Greek gods were in one sense pan-Hellenic and in another protectors of particular states. Apollo probably did not have this role for Athens, but he was the god of the Ionians as a whole, and the Athenians made use in propaganda and
international 'image-building' of being the protectors of Delos, certainly from Pisistratus to Pericles (Herod. V. 94. 1. Plut. Per. 12. 1.).

Several oracles have been preserved dealing with colonisation by the Athenians of Ionia and particularly Miletus. These allude to Neleus, son of Codrus, king of Athens, being instructed by the Pythia to take a colony to Asia, though there are different versions of the details (Paus. VII. 2. 1. Sch. Lyc. 1378. Oenom. ap. Eus. P.E. 5. 29. Sch. Aristid. 112. 17.). Vitruvius refers to the foundation of thirteen colonies in Asia by the Athenians as a result of oracular advice from Apollo: Postea autem quam Athenienses ex responsis Apollinis Delphici, communi consilio totius Hellados, XIII colonias uno tempore, in Asiam deduxerunt... isque (Ion, who was appointed supreme chief) eas colonias in Asiam deduxit et Cariae fines occupavit ibique civitates amplissimas constituit Ephesum, Miletum, Myunta, Prienen, Samum, Teon, Colophona, Chium, Erythraea, Phocaeum, Clazomenes, Lebedon, Meliten... (Vitruv., IV. 1. 4.).

Perhaps one of the best known occasions when Apollo of Delphi was consulted by the Athenians was during the invasion of Xerxes, probably just before the Battle of Thermopylae in 480. Two oracular responses were given, the first of which was extremely gloomy and foreboding of destruction, the second containing the reference to a 'wooden wall' which Themistocles interpreted as being the Athenian fleet. This must certainly have been in Justin-Trogus' mind when he wrote 'dubiis rebus' (Herod. VII. 140–143.).

The reference to the Athenians' acquisition of 'tantum imperium terra marique' under the guidance of Apollo must mean the establishing of the treasury of the Confederacy of Delos (the maritime league against Persia led by Athens following the Persian Wars) in the temple of Apollo and Artemis on the island of Delos, the traditional centre of Ionian religion.
2. 12. Tantum facinus admisisse ingenia omni doctrina exculta, pulcherrimis legisbus institutisque formata, ut quid posthaec suscensis iure barbaris possit non haberent.

Justin-Trogus clearly feels that the Athenians have treated Apollo in a very shabby manner. He obviously finds it difficult to believe that a people as civilised as the Athenians could be so barbaric as to disregard the help and guidance they have received from Apollo.

3. 1. Sed nee Philippus melioris fidei adversus socios fuit.

This seems a rather clumsy transition. Justin-Trogus has not just been dealing with anyone's treatment of their allies (let alone more honourable treatment), unless he was thinking of Delphi as an ally of Athens. The last statement of fact came at the beginning of Chapter 2, when we were told that the Athenians seized the pass of Thermopylae. Justin-Trogus does not say what Philip's reaction was to the occupation of Thermopylae by the Athenians.

3. 2. Quippe veluti timena, ne ab hostibus sacrilegii scelere vinceretur. civitates, quarum paulo ante dux fuerat, quae sub auspiciis sius militaverant, quae gratulatae illi sibique victoriam fuerant, hostiliter occupatas dipuuit;

Possibly Pherae, Pharkadon, Pagasae, Magnesia, Trikka, Perrhaebia and Gomphi (cf. Hammond 1959, 544. for the last two.). PW RE XIX. 2273. points out that Pharkadon had to be taken by storm and was punished (Polyaen. IV. 2. 18.). The same fate is to be assumed for Trikka (Diod. XVIII. 56. 5.). The capture of Pagasae has already been mentioned above (2. 4. and 2. 8.) and evidently Magnesia was occupied at the same time as the settlement of Pherae and Pagasae (Demosth. I. 13. Grote 1888 IX. 297. n. 2.). If Justin-Trogus is referring to some or all of the towns mentioned above, then, following the chronology worked out by Hammond, the seizure of these towns took place between the defeat of Onomarchus in spring 352 and Philip's
advance to Thermopylae in summer 352 (Hammond 1959, 544.).
Certainly by November 352 he was besieging Heraeum Telchos near the shore of the Propontis, which must surely be included in his second Thracian campaign (cf. PW RE XIX. 2274.).

3. 3. coniuges liberosaque omnium sub corona vendidit;
This sentence in Justin-Trogus appears to be the only evidence for this particular action of Philip's. His treatment of the inhabitants of these cities seems rather severe; surely it would have been recorded by other authors, and by Demosthenes in particular who could have made great play of it in the 'Olynthiacs'.

3. 4-5. non deorum inmortualium templis, non sedibus sacris, non diis penatibus publicis privatisque, ad quos paulo ante ingressus hospitaliter fuerat, pepercit; prorsus ut non tam sacrilegii ultor extitisse quam sacrilegiorum licentiam quaesisse videretur.
These two sentences do not really add any more detail to the account of Philip's treatment of the aforementioned cities, but seem merely to serve as another moralising comment by either Justin or Trogus to highlight the impious and sacrilegious character being portrayed in this chapter.

3. 6. Inde veluti rebus egregie gestis in Thraciam traicit,...
There is a textual difficulty here. The manuscripts have cappadociam (ω), Dassaretiam (vGu) and 'alii alia' (O. Seel 1972, 78.). Various suggestions have been put forward such as Cassopiam (Valesius ad Harpoo.) and Chalcidicam (Bongarsius) and Thraciam (Giunta).
Accepting the emendation of 'Thraciam' which is adopted in the 1972 Teubner edition of Seel, this would no doubt refer to the second Thracian campaign mentioned by PW RE XIX. 2274., although this article has Philip operating in Illyria and Epirus before turning his mind to Thrace itself. His interference in the affairs of Epirus has already...
been touched on by Justin-Trogus in VII. 6. 10f. and is expanded at VIII. 6. 4ff. in a section dealing with Philip's foreign policy on a broader basis.

Justin-Trogus, throughout his account of Philip's wars, paints a very black picture of the King's character, as is exemplified by his use of the phrase 'pari perfidia' here.

The 'finitimis regibus' will probably include Cleitus, the son of Bardyllis, who, according to Arrian, became a tributary at this time (Arrian, Anab. I. 5. 1.), possibly also Arrybas, the Epirotic king referred to above.

Philip's main opponent on this campaign seems to have been Cersobleptes, who had turned away from the Macedonian king and allied himself with the Athenians, whom he promised to assist in recovering Amphipolis (Demosth. XXIII. 14.). Philip was invited by Cersobleptes' opponents, Amadocus and Oetriporis, to assist them against Cersobleptes, and in November 352 he laid siege to Heraeum Teichos (Demosth. III. 4.). By the spring of the following year Cersobleptes had been defeated and Philip's sphere of influence pushed as far as the river Hebrus and the Bosporus which was controlled by Byzantium. Hammond clearly accepts an alliance between Byzantium and Philip at this point, as does Ellis (Hammond 1959, 544. Ellis 1976, 87.). The Athenians were once again too late to prevent Philip from establishing himself, this time despatching late in the season a much smaller force than originally intended after receiving reports of a serious illness contracted by Philip and even a report of his death (Demosth. I. 13. Ellis 1976, 88.).

Quite what Justin-Trogus means by 'universam provinciam' obviously depends to a great extent on the accuracy of the reading 'Thraciam', but it can hardly include Illyria and/or Epirus.
3. 7-9. Deinde ad abolendam invidiae famam, qua insignis praeter ceteros tune temporis habebatur, per regna mittit et opulentissimas civitates, qui opinionem sererent regem Philippum magna pecunia locare et muros per civitates et fana ac tempula facienda, et ut per praecones susceptrres sollicitarent. Qui cum in Macedoniam venissent, varis dilationibus frustrati, vim regiae maiestatis timentes taciti proficiacebantur.

This action of Philip is not attested elsewhere. If this did happen, it was clearly a cunning campaign in propaganda which may well have kept many of these 'civitates' quiet for a time, while Philip turned his thoughts elsewhere. The singling out of 'muros', 'fana' and 'templum' for rebuilding was presumably designed to appeal to the citizens' natural concern for their future well-being with respect to their physical security as well as religious guidance and protection.

The word 'susceptor' is found only in post-classical Latin, e.g. Cod. Th. II. 12. 6: 'nemo militantium fiat susceptor defensorve causarum'. Amm. XVII. 10. 4: susceptorum vilium more. The meaning here is probably best rendered by "contractors". Presumably this word was supplied by Justin rather than Trogus.

3. 10. Post haece Olynthios adncreditur; receperant enim per misericordiam post caedem unius duos fratres eius, quos Philippus ex noverca genitos veluti participes regni interficiere gestiebat.

It is clear from the account built up from the speeches of Demosthenes, notably the 'Olynthiacs', that Philip was gradually absorbing the other towns in the Chalcidian peninsula and that Olynthus would have to be removed ultimately. She had already turned away from Philip in 352 by making an approach to Athens, while Philip was in Thrace (Pickard-Cambridge 1914, 182. Demosth. XXIII. 107-9.), although Potidaea had been given over to the Olynthians by Philip and he had not shown any hostility towards Olynthus at this point. Clearly the Olynthians realised that the danger for them was to be seen not
in Athens, who had lost a great deal of her former power, but in Philip. Diodorus says that Philip, οὐκός τις ἔφ' Ἑλληστών ἐκ τοιοῦτους ἄρης ἡγήσασθαι, acquired firstly Mecyberna and Torone through treason without a battle and then after defeating the Olynthians in two battles he eventually secured its surrender through further treachery (Diod. XVI. 53. 2.). Neither Demosthenes nor Diodorus refers to Philip's half-brothers.

The 'duos fratres' will have been Arrhidaeus and Menelaus, sons of Gygaea and Amyntas III, Archelaus the third brother having been killed (Beloch III. 2. 67. 1. 224f. CAH VI, 203.). Ellis has made a detailed study of the question of the death of Archelaus and the involvement of Olynthus with the two surviving brothers. He suggests that it was not until 352 that Archelaus was executed and Arrhidaeus and Menelaus fled to Olynthus, at a time when the Macedonian/Chalcidian alliance was breaking down. He considers that 'The two events may in fact represent an attempt by members of this collateral branch of the royal family, disappointed in their regal hopes and despairing of an opportunity to realise them, to enlist the aid of an outside power which had already shown sign of a desire to have Philip removed. The execution of Archelaus in this case would technically have been for treason and the final ultimatum delivered by Philip to the Olynthians in 349/8 was to hand over two more traitors or suffer the consequences.' (Ellis in Historia 1973, 354.). This seems very plausible, but it is nevertheless strange that Diodorus knows nothing of these circumstances.

On the threat to Philip's throne from this quarter Ellis suggests that the three brothers had been waiting for an opportunity to be provided by internal strife, but that when this had not materialised by 352 they had taken steps to become 'participes regni' (Ellis op. cit., 353.). Also they may not have been old enough in 359 to have presented any serious threat to Philip.
3. 11. Ob hanc igitur causam urbem antiquam et nobilem exscindit et fratres olim destinato supplicio tradit praedaeque ingenti pariter et parricidii voto frruitur.

Diodorus confirms that Philip plundered Olynthus, enslaved the inhabitants and sold men and property, by which action he gained large sums of money (Diod. XVI. 53. 3.). 'parricidii voto fruitur' could imply that Philip had made up his mind much earlier to eliminate his step-brothers at some convenient point, but it seems more likely to be a continuation of Justin-Trogus' rhetorical invective towards Philip.

3. 12. Inde, quasi omnia quae agitasset animo ei licerent, auraria in Thessalia, argenti metalia in Thracia occupat,...

Diodorus records (as has already been mentioned above in the note on VII. 6. 8.) Philip's settlement in 356 of Crenides, whose name he changed to Philippi, in Thrace, and whose gold mines he greatly improved as regards output and revenue (Diod. XVI. 8. 6-7.). Strabo mentions the fact that there were many gold mines in Crenides, and that the nearby Mt. Pangaeus had gold and silver mines; earlier the same author says that Philip gained large revenues from the mines in the district between the Strymon and the Nestus (Strab. VII. frg. 34. VII. 323.; cf. O. Davies 1935, 234, 237 and notes for further details on the evidence for mines in the Pangaeus district.). R. J. Forbes lists the places where gold was mined: Siphnos, Thasos, Skapte Hyle, Datum, Crenides, Philippi, Pangaios and perhaps at Laurion. He lists as silver mines: Laurion, Siphnos, Pangaios, Damastion (Epirus) and the Bermios-Fieria-Strymon region. A little later he says that during Philip II's reign "the fairly rich silver and gold mines of Chalcidice ...were newly discovered." Forbes comments that Philip's success "depended on his attempts to increase by prospecting and conquest the output of base and precious metals in his territories..." (Forbes 1961, VII. 139, 142.).
According to Hegesippus Philip claimed to have captured the island of Halonnesus from pirates and was offering it to the Athenians as his own property, but Hegesippus regarded this action of retaining possession of land which had been rescued from pirates as being tantamount to piracy itself; in any case since the Athenians owned the island Philip should not be giving them the island so much as giving back the island to them (Demosth. VII. 2. — but there does not seem to be any evidence to prove or disprove Athens' title to Halonnesus). Further to this, in the first 'Philippic', Demosthenes refers to Philip's policy of raiding Athens' maritime allies in order to pay for his war effort. Demosthenes says that Philip took captives from Lemnos and Imbros, ransomed the shipping from Geraiostos at a huge figure, and even carried off the sacred trireme (the 'Paralus') from Marathon.

This almost certainly refers to the complicated situation which arose in Thrace after the death of King Cotys in 358, when the Thracian kingdom seems to have been split between Cersobleptes, Berisades and Amadocus, who were probably brothers, though this is not explicitly stated by any of our ancient sources (Demosth. XXIII. 8ff.). At any rate we do know that Cersobleptes was the son of Cotys, and the fact that Cotys had other sons of nearly the same age could well be taken to mean Berisades and Amadocus (Diod. XVI. 34. 4. Demosth. XXIII. 163.). Thirlwall thinks that the 'duo fratres' referred to here by Justin—Trogus were Cersobleptes and Amadocus (Thirlwall 1849 V, 295. n. 1.), while Ellis implies that they could be the sons of Berisades, although his note on the Thracian campaign of 352/1 is both vague and
confusing (Ellis 1976, 110 and notes.). The events to which Justin-
Trogus is probably here referring concern an apparent attempt by
Cersobleptes to persuade Philip to join him in a combined attack on
the Chersonese, which failed to materialise since Amadocus was
unwilling to allow Philip a passage through his territory (Demosth.
XXIII. 183.). After this failure Cersobleptes switched to the
Athenians for support, which he got, and he also promised to help the
Athenians win back Amphipolis (ibid. 14.). This caused Amadocus to
turn to Philip.

3. 15. Sed Philippus more ingenii sui ad iudicium veluti ad bellum
incopinantibus fratribus instructo exercitu supervenit regnoque
utrumque non iudicia more, sed fraude latronis ac scelere spoliavit.

What happens next is difficult to ascertain in concrete terms. It
is clear from Aeschines that during the course of the peace
negotiations with the Athenians, which led to the peace of 346, Philip
set out for Thrace in order to make war against Cersobleptes, and it
is also clear that Cersobleptes lost his kingdom to Philip and was
forced to surrender his son to the king as a hostage (Aeschin. II. 81-
83. 90.). This Thracian campaign appears to have taken place between
the first and second embassies from the Athenians to Philip (cf. also
Demosth. XIX. 156. Isocr. V. 21.). There are only two references to
the activities of Philip in Diodorus between the fall of Olynthus in
318 and the siege of Perinthus in 340: these are campaigns into
Illyria and Thessaly in 344-3 and a campaign into Thrace against
Cersobleptes the following year (Diod. XVI. 69. 7-8. 71. 1-2.).
Probably the latter campaign is the one to which Justin-Trogus here
refers.

4. 1. Dum haec aguntur, legati Atheniensium petentes pacem ad eum
venerunt.

Aeschines gives an account of this first embassy in his speech 'On
the Embassy*, in which is to be found our only source for the actual interview with Philip. According to Aeschines Philocrates proposed that ten ambassadors be elected and sent to Philip to discuss both peace and common interests. This proposal was adopted and the ten ambassadors (who included Demosthenes as well as Philocrates and Aeschines) met Philip at Pella in early to mid-March 346 (cf. Ellis 1976, 108.). Philip received them graciously, and the ambassadors spoke in order of seniority of age (Aeschin. II. 18.).

4. 2. Quibus auditis et ipse legatos Athenas cum pacis condicionibus misit; ibique ex commodo utrorumque pax facta.

The 'legati' here referred to by Justin-Trogus included Antipater and Parmenio (Demosth. XIX. 69.). Philip had communicated to the ambassadors before they left Pella terms of peace, whereby he promised not to enter the Chersonese with an armed force during the negotiations (Aeschin. II. 82.)- but he did apparently reject the Athenian claim to Amphipolis (cf. CAH VI, 235.)- and he intended to confer benefits on the Athenians in return for an alliance- although he was not explicit about these (Demosth. XIX. 40.)- and generally he created a good impression in the eyes of the ambassadors. Ellis suggests that there must have been some discussion about the Athenian prisoners taken at Olynthus, a topic which was certainly raised during the second embassy (Demosth. XIX. 166-8.), and he also thinks that Philip will have offered four further concessions which he is reported to have promised: a restoration of Athenian influence in Euboea, the return to her of Oropus, the repopulation of Thespiae and Plataea and the cutting of a channel across the neck of the Chersonese to separate it from the mainland (Demosth. V. 10. VI. 30. XIX. 21.). Since the alliance did not work out and last as Philip had hoped, these promises were of course not carried out (Ellis 1976, 109.).

The envoys returned to Athens and two days of debating took place. Philocrates proposed at the first meeting that an alliance should be
made with Philip as well as peace, but that the Phocians and Halus be not allowed to join in this. Aeschines opposed this as did Demosthenes (Aesch. II. 63. Demosth. XIX. 14.). Between the two meetings (or possibly earlier) it became clear that Philip would not agree to the Phocians being saved from whatever fate he had in store for them, and indeed Antipater confirmed this (Aesch. II. 72.). Eventually a proposal was made by which peace should be made by Athens and her allies (no mention of the Phocians or Halus being made) with Philip and his allies on the basis of a guarantee of mutual possessions existing at that time (Demosth. VII. 18. 26.). After a stormy meeting which almost led to a declaration of war, the Athenians reluctantly accepted the peace formula proposed by Philocrates. These terms were then ratified before Philip's ambassadors a few days later (Demosth. XIX. 159. 174. 291. Aesch. II. 74ff. III. 68ff. cf. Ellis 1976, 111ff.).

4. 3. Ex ceteris quoque Graeciae civitatisbus non pacis amore, sed belli metu legationes venere;

Between the departure of the first Athenian embassy in mid-March and the arrival of the second in mid-June, the Peace of Philocrates having been concluded towards the end of April, Philip campaigned in Thrace. During this campaign Philip defeated Cersobleptes at Hieron Orus on the Propontis, left him as a vassal-prince and took his son away as a hostage (Aesch. II. 81ff. Demosth. XIX. 156. 334. Isocr. V. 21.). He also probably captured the coastal towns (Demosth. IX. 15. XVIII. 27.).

On Philip's return from Thrace he found waiting for him at Pella ambassadors from Athens, Thebes, Sparta, Thessaly and probably Phocis (Aesch. II. 112. 136-7. Demosth. IX. 11. XIX. 139. 156. cf. Ellis 1976, 113ff.). Ellis thinks that Argos, Messenia and Megalopolis were probably represented also at Pella, since they were very concerned about the result of the conflict (Isocr. V. 74.), and he summarises
the position in Greece in a very clear and concise way: "With the Peloponnesos divided, like central Greece, into two opposing camps, dependent respectively upon Sparta and Thebes, the dilemma for all amounted to this: would Philip— in concert with Thessaly, Thebes and the latter’s Peloponnesian dependants, Messenia, Megalopolis and Argos, and now with the agreement of Athens— crush Phokis and, in effect, confirm Theban dominance in central Greece and the Peloponnesos? Or would he abandon his existing commitment and join with Phokis, Athens and Sparta (and, again, the Thessalians) in bringing Theban power to an end? All indications pointed to the latter." (Ellis 1976, 115.).

4. 4. *siquidem crudescente ira Thessalique orant, ut professum adversus Phocenses ducem Graeciae exhibeat;* Diodorus supplies us with the information that the Boeotians, by means of an embassy, requested an alliance with Philip, but he goes straight on to say that Philip took over the Thessalians and entered Locris. He then goes directly to the capitulation by the Phocians under Phalaecus to Philip (Diod. XVI. 59. 2.). Aeschines says that ambassadors from Thebes were present at Pella at the same time as the second embassy from Athens, and after making reference to a settlement of the Sacred War he goes on to mention the conflict between the Thebans and the Boeotian towns, whereby the smaller Boeotian towns which had been dominated by Thebes were siding with the Phocians against Thebes in the hope of recovering their autonomy (Aeschin. II. 103-4. 119. 137. III. 142.). It would seem from this that Justin-Trogus has been rather loose in his terminology here— surely he meant the Thessalians and the Thebans.

4. 5. *tanto odio Phocensium ardentes, ut obliti cladium suarum perire ipsi quam non perdere eos praecoptarent, expertamque Philippi crudelitatem pati quam parcere hostibus suis mallent.* If Diodorus has omitted certain events between the Theban approach to
Philip and the capitulation of Phalaecus, then perhaps this sentence of Justin-Trogus refers to some of these. It could be that either the Phocians as a whole or just Phalaecus' men were at first determined to resist to the last, but then thought better of it. 'perire' seems reasonable in a planned desperate resistance, but any facts there may be in this sentence are obscured by rhetoric.

4. 6. Contra Phocensium legati adhibitia Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus bellum deprecabantur, cuius ab eo dilationem ter iam emerant.

Demosthenes in his third 'Philippic' has a probable reference to the Phocian envoys who had come to Philip to request his assistance against the Thebans (Demosth. IX. 11.). Elsewhere Demosthenes explains how Philip deceived both the Spartans and the Athenians as to the fact that he was acting in the interests of the Thebans (Demosth. XIX. 75ff). Demosthenes had somewhat different aims from those of his colleagues: his main requirement was the immediate return of the Athenian prisoners (Demosth. XIX. 65ff., Aeschin. II. 99.), while Aeschines and the other ambassadors concentrated on trying to convince Philip that the Thebans were just as guilty in transgressing against the Sacred Law as the Phocians (Aeschin. II. 104ff). Aeschines carefully distinguishes between the individual Phocians who had been responsible for the sacrilege and the majority of innocent Phocian inhabitants who should hand over their military leaders for punishment.
4. 7. **Poedum prorsus miserandumque spectaculum, Graeciam etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regum certe gentiumque semper victricem et multarum adhuc urbium dominam alienis excubare sedibus aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem;**

It seems rather inconsistent that while Justin-Trogus is sufficiently aware of the fragmented political situation in Greece when he refers (in 3. above) to Graeciae civitatibus, he seems here to be quite happy to refer to Greece as a whole as a political unit: 'Graeciam... orbis terrarum principem'. By using 'etiam nunc', does Justin-Trogus here refer to the time of the events he is describing in Greek history, or does he refer to the time at which he is writing this account? (cf. Lemaire 1823, 199 n.). If by using the expression 'regum certe gentiumque semper victricem' Justin-Trogus is still referring to Greece as a political whole he can only mean Greece's supremacy over Persia, which can hardly deserve this exaggerated description. By 'multarum... urbium' one is tempted to suggest that he means Athens in particular and her position of pre-eminence in the Confederacy of Delos. 'alienis excubare sedibus' seems to be a rather derogatory expression meaning something like "to be on the lookout at a foreign court". The Oxford Dictionary has two meanings, a) to keep watch or guard, be on the lookout, and b) to be on the alert, be vigilant. An example of the latter usage is provided by the Elder Pliny: omnium eorum (sc. pictorum) ars urbibus excubabat:—"With all these artists their art was on the alert for the benefit of cities" (Plin. N.H. XXXV. 118.).

4. 8. **in alterius ope spem omnem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices, eoque discordia sua civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adulentur ullo sordidam paulo ante clientelas suae partem,...**

Again a general reference to "the Greeks" as champions of the world—a far more laudatory term than they merited. Perhaps Justin-Trogus has a concept of Hellenic civilisation, which he may well have
considered to be greater than Roman civilisation, versus barbarism. The 'discordia' and 'civilibus bellis' presumably cover the period of history from the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to the time of the embassies to Philip. For the description of Macedonia as 'sordidam paulo ante clientelae suae partem' cf. Justin-Trogus VI. 9.

6: ut inter otia Graecorum sordidum et obscurum antea Macedonum nomen emergerent.

4. 9. ...et haec potissimum facere Thebanos Lacedaemoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiae imperantis aemulos.

The Thebans and Spartans are particularly mentioned here, no doubt, because they each in turn secured a dominant position (however short-lived) over the whole of Greece. Athens at the height of her power could not really have been regarded as dominating the whole of Greece.


Philip had his sights set on the pass of Thermopylae, which at this time was still in the hands of the Phocians, assisted by Spartan auxiliaries (Demosth. XIX. 77). Since this force was strong enough to hold the pass (particularly if it were to be strengthened by Athenian help, were they to realise his actual intentions) Philip had to create the impression amongst the Phocians, Spartans and Athenians that he intended to treat the Phocians in a favourable manner, although he also wanted to convince the Thebans and Thessalians that he would take their side against the Phocians (cf. Grote 1888 IX, 395-6. cf. also Justin-Trogus' next sentence, 11.). Quite what Justin-Trogus means by 'fastidium' is not clear, unless this is a reference to the delay between the embassies while Philip settled affairs in Thrace (cf. Demosth. XIX. 155-6.) whereby Philip kept various embassies waiting at Pella for his return. Certainly the
delay of fifty days annoyed Demosthenes very much. Justin-Trogus again shows his hostility towards Philip in the expression 'venditazione gloriae suae'.

4. 11. Secreto igitur auditis utrisque legationionibus his veniam belli pollicetur. iure iurando adactis responsum nemini prodituros; illis contra venturum se auxiliumque laturum; utrosque yetat parare bellum aut metuere.

An account of Philip's machinations at this point is given by Demosthenes, who says that Philip sent for the Spartans, \( \text{πάντα τα } \) πράγμαθεν \( \text{αὑτῷ κόμενος πράξεων } \) ἐκείνωσι, with the intention of preventing them from supplying help to the Phocians through the agency of the Athenians. What he means by \( \text{πάντα τα } \) πράγμαθε is not clear. The Spartans had in fact sent 1,000 hoplites under the command of King Archidamus (Diod. XVI. 59. 2.). Demosthenes then goes on to say that Philip, having thus caused the Spartans to withdraw from Thermopylae of their own accord, endeavoured to prevent the Athenians from realising that he was really supporting the Theban interest, in the hope that he would secure his position of dominance without conflict (Demosth. XIX. 76ff.). This accords well with Justin-Trogus here, if we understand by 'his' the states mentioned in sentence 6 above, namely the Phocians, Spartans and Athenians, and by 'illis' the states mentioned in sentence 4 above, namely the Thessalians and Boeotians (or Thebans—see above note on this sentence). cf. Lemaire 1823, 198. Diod. XVI. 59. 2.


Diodorus says that after Philip had received an embassy from the Boeotians (see above), he took over the Thessalians and came into Locris with a large army (Diod. XVI. 59. 2.). At Pherae the Athenian ambassadors finally administered the oaths to Philip and his
allies (Demosth. XIX. 158.), although not all of his allies did sign (ibid. 278. cf. Ellis 1976, 116.).

Diodorus makes no mention of Thermopylae, although he does say that Phalaecus was in Nicaea, a town which commanded the pass. According to Demosthenes at first the Athenians were alarmed at the proximity of Philip, but when Demosthenes tried to convince the Assembly of the danger, having already convinced the Council, Aeschines and Philocrates succeeded in getting him laughed off the platform. Their main argument was that Philip had come with the intention of protecting the Phocians and punishing the Thebans. Demosthenes later says that Philip sent two letters to the Athenians, asking them to send an army to join him at Thermopylae. Aeschines confirms this, although he only mentions one letter (Demosth. XIX. 18ff. 35. 51ff. Aeschin. II. 137.).

5. 1. *Tunc primum Phocenses captos se fraude Philippi animadvertentes trepidi ad arma confugiunt.*

After Philip had reached Thermopylae, he approached the Phocians with terms, but could get no reply from them until the Phocian envoys had returned from Athens (Demosth. XIX. 59.). The envoys then returned from Athens, having been unsuccessful in urging the Athenians to help them (cf. Aeschin. II. 132.), and having also witnessed the passing of a decree which stated that unless the Phocians handed over the temple at Delphi to the Amphictyons, the Athenians would compel them to do so by armed force (Demosth. XIX. 49.). When this news reached Phalaecus, who was in command of the Phocian mercenaries at Thermopylae, he realised the position was hopeless, in that he could not hold Thermopylae without Athenian or Spartan help, and so he sent an embassy to Philip to come to terms (Diod. XVI. 59. 2. Demosth. XIX. 60ff.). There is no mention of a general rush to arms by the Phocians—though they decided against resistance in the end—except in this notice of Justin-Trogus.
5. 2. *Sed neque spatium erat instruendi belli nec tempus ad contrahenda auxilia; et Philippus excidium minabatur, ni fieret deditio.*

Justin-Trogus does not appear to appreciate the fact that the Phocian mercenaries under the command of Phalaecus were in possession of the pass of Thermopylae before the arrival of Philip, and that they had been assisted by 1,000 hoplites from Sparta under the command of Archidamus (Diod. XVI. 59. 2.). Admittedly the Spartans had been induced to abandon Phalaecus (see note on 4. 11. above), but it could hardly be said that they were entirely unprepared for war, as Justin-Trogus is implying here. Perhaps he is again trying to show Philip in a very bad light, and highlighting the pathetic situation of the Phocians in the face of Philip's bullying threat of destruction if they did not surrender.

5. 3. *Vici: igitur necessitate pacta salute se dediderunt.*

As has been commented above (5. 1.), Phalaecus realised his position was hopeless, and so he capitulated and came to terms with Philip. He secured an agreement whereby, after yielding their towns to Philip, he and his mercenaries (Diod. XVI. 59. 3. says 8,000, but Demosth. XIX. 230. says 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse) were to evacuate the area with such Phocians as wished to accompany them, and withdraw to wherever they liked (Diod. *ibid.*). The rest of the Phocians surrendered themselves and their towns to Philip (Diod. *ibid.* Demosth. XIX. 56.). Neither Diodorus nor Demosthenes mentions any conditions attached to the Phocian surrender. Again, has Justin-Trogus conjured up this condition to lay even more vicious and heartless treatment of the Phocians at Philip's door? Or is Justin-Trogus confusing Phalaecus and his mercenaries with the rest of the Phocians?
5. 4. Sed pactio eius fidei fuit, cuius antea fuerat deprecati belli promissio.
Another example of Justin-Trogus' poor opinion of Philip's character, cf. examples above. This is in marked contrast to the account of Philip by Diodorus who shows Philip in quite a favourable light throughout (see introduction, p. xiv).

5. 5. Igitur caeduntur passim rapiunturque; non liberi parentibus, non coniuges maritis, non deorum simulacra templis suis relinquuntur. There is a glaring omission here, the result of which shows Philip in a far more unfavourable light than he deserves: the sequel of the submission of the Phocians to Philip was a joint celebration by the Macedonians, Thebans and Thessalians as a result of their long-awaited victory over the sacrilegious Phocians and the conclusion of the Sacred War (Demosth. XIX. 128.). Aeschines also took part in these events (ibid.). Philip then restored the temple at Delphi to the Delphians and called a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council (Diod. XVI. 59. 4. cf. Aeschin. II. 142.). The voting in this meeting secured the following treatment for the Phocians by the Amphictyons: they were expelled from the Amphictyonic Council, their two votes being transferred to Philip, and they were deprived of their share in the Delphic sanctuary. The Phocian towns (except for Abae) were all razed to the ground and their inhabitants were resettled in villages, each containing a maximum of fifty inhabitants and no nearer to each other than one furlong. A fine of sixty talents per annum was imposed as reparation for the pillaging of the temple treasures, and until this was paid the Phocians were not allowed to own either horses or weapons, their existing stock being either sold or destroyed. Finally those of the Phocians who had participated individually in the plundering of the shrine were declared cursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they might be (Diod. XVI. 60. 1-3. Demosth. XIX. 141. Paus. X. 3. 2-3.).
Pickard-Cambridge thinks that this was not particularly harsh treatment by Greek standards (CAH VI, 241.), and indeed we learn from Aeschines that the delegates from Oetaea had proposed that all adult Phocians be thrown over the cliffs and that the rest be sold as slaves, but that by bringing the Phocians into the meeting Aeschines was able to secure a hearing for them and prevent the passing of this measure (Aeschin. II. 142.). Hammond points out that the decision on this cruel measure really lay with Philip since he controlled the Thessalian votes, which had a majority on the Council (Hammond 1959, 554.).

That the Phocians did suffer in the ensuing breaking up of the cities is unquestionably true. Demosthenes remarks on the desolation and misery he observed when passing through Phocis on the way to Delphi (Demosth. XIX. 65.). But a great proportion of the blame for this must surely go to the Thebans and Thessalians, the bitter enemies of the Phocians, rather than to Philip. As Hammond points out in his comments on Philip's policy, the Macedonian king preferred to avoid bloodbaths at the conclusion of hostilities, and was obviously working towards a peaceful settlement of Greece under his leadership, with co-operation with Athens high on his list of priorities (Hammond 1959, loc. cit.).

PW RE XIX. 2281-2, feels that a good part of the blame for the devastation of the countryside and the grief and misery of the Phocians should be attributed to the ten years of war. Special difficulties were made for Philip by the claims of the Thebans who regarded rule over Boeotia as their right. He had to counter-balance satisfying the demands of the Thebans (which ended with Philip handing over the towns of Orchomenus, Coroneia and Cortiae to Thebes who subsequently destroyed them and sold their inhabitants into slavery) with welcoming Athenian proposals, such as those of Aeschines designed to limit Theban control over the Phocians (Aeschin. II. 116ff.). It was not Philip who brought the Phocian people into misery, and if the
Athenians, whose delegation arrived too late (Demosth. XIX. 127.), had interceded vigorously on behalf of the Phocians with the Thebans and other Amphictyons, they would no doubt have gained more than the refusal of the Boeotian proposal. Philip's policy was undoubtedly in line with Macedonia's interests, but in this case it could not be called cruel and heartless.

F. R. Wüst sees in this sentence of Justin-Trogus a rhetorical representation, and he cites Livy I. 29. as a parallel descriptive and rhetorical passage concerned with the destruction of Alba (Wüst 1938, 17. n.2.).

5. 6. Unum tantum miseris solacium fuit, quod, cum Philippus portione praedae socios fraudasset, nihil rerum suarum apud inimicos viderunt. If the substance of the preceding note is to be accepted, this sentence has very little meaning.

5. 7-13. Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nunc in hibernos, nunc in aestivos saltus traiciunt, sic ille populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quaeque loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique facies et excidio similis erat. Non quidem pavor ille hostilis nec discursus per urbem militum erat, non tumultus armorum, non bonorum atque hominum rapina, sed tacitus maeror et luctus, verentibus, ne ipsae lacrimae pro contumacia haberentur. Crescit dissimulatione ipse dolor, hoc altius demissus, quo minus profiteri licet. Nunc sepulcrum maiorum, nunc veteres penates, nunc testa, in quibus geniti erant quibusque genuerant, considerabant, miserantes nunc vicem suam, quod in eam diem vixissent, nunc filiorum, quod non post eam diem nati essent.

Justin-Trogus has quite a long section here in which, to say the least, he is factually rather vague— he mentions no peoples or cities by name— but his description of the suffering caused by this policy of Philip (a suffering not attested elsewhere) is quite vivid, and
could be compared with, for instance, the destruction of Alba by the Romans: ...*non quidem fuit tumultus ille nec pavor, qualis captarum esse urbsium solet....; sed silentium triste ac tacita maestitia ita defixit omnium animos...* (Livy. I. 29. 2ff.).

'sed tacitus...haberentur' in sentence 10 could be compared with Tacitus, *Agricola*. 44: *praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et aspicii. cum suspirlia nostra subscriberentur, cum denotandis tot hominum palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem muniebat.*

The elaborate rhetorical balance in sentences 12-13 is worthy of notice. There does not seem to be any other evidence either for suffering caused by this policy, or for unpopularity developing as a result of it.

On the question of transference of people from one part of Macedonia to another, it is likely that Chalcidian territory was involved, in that it had recently been annexed, and it is also possible that this sort of operation was carried out on the borders of Illyria, perhaps in association with Philip's campaign against the Dardanians (or Ardiaeans; see note on 6. 3. below.). In discussing this section of Justin-Trogus Ellis concludes: "In explaining the sort of activity described by Justin we are reduced largely to guesswork, but it seems likely that Philip was aware of the benefits to be gained by manipulating his own population, especially in order to stiffen the frontiers, to guard communication-lines and simply to divide concentrations of subjects, especially in Upper Macedonia and in the annexed areas of western Thrace and the Chalkidike, where disaffection was possible or likely" (Ellis 1976, 136.).

Diodorus' next notice about the activities of Philip is at XVI. 69. 7., where he has Philip making successive invasions of Illyria and Thessaly (see below, 6. 3.). His last reference to Philip had been at XVI. 60. where Philip had returned home to Macedonia following the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council which had decided the fate of the
Phocians (cf. note on 5. above). There are other references to Philip's operations following the Peace of Philocrates, which can be found in some of the orators: in 344 he tried to get the Spartans to give up their claims to Messene; he gained influence in Argos and Arcadia, and when Athens tried to counteract this influence in the Peloponnese, she found that Philip's attentions were not altogether unwelcome in the area (Demosth. VI. 13. XIX. 260ff.).


Arrian has Alexander making a speech to his Macedonian troops at Opis, in which he lectures to his men on the subject of their pastoral origins, and how his father, Philip, had taught them to wear clothes instead of skins and had transplanted them from the hills to become civilised city dwellers (Arrian. *Anab.* VII. 9. 2-4.). This policy of Philip seems to have developed particularly now, after the peace of 346, and it can also perhaps be seen in the great number of gold staters issued at this time and continuing down to 336 (cf. Seltman 1933, 201.). Hammond sees the "...encouragement of local loyalties within the Macedonian army, the promotion of the gifted to the privileged ranks of the Companions or Foot-Companions, and the magnetic personality of Philip himself...creating the 'one kingdom and one people' which was to be inherited by Alexander and the Successors" (Hammond 1959, 559.). A parallel for this action of Philip could be found in the synoecism of Attica by Theseus, whereby separate council-halls and magistracies were merged into one (Thuc. II. 15. cf. Hammond op. cit. 68.).

6. 3. *Conpositis ordinatisque Macedoniarum rebus Dardanos ceterosque*
finitimos fraude captos expugnat.

PW RE XIX. 2284. links this campaign against the Dardanians with that against the Illyrians recorded by Diodorus. This deep penetration into their lands is here regarded as securing the frontier once and for all against their invasions (cf. Trog., prosl. VIII.). Diodorus says that Philip in 344/3 invaded Illyria with a large force, ravaged the country, made himself master of several towns and returned laden with booty (Diod. XVI. 69. 7.). Further information about this campaign is supplied by Didymus, who relates that Philip was pursuing Pleuratus the Illyrian, Pleuratus being a dynastic name of the Ardiaei, and that he received a serious wound in his right leg (Didym. in Demosth. XII. 37ff. 64ff.). Hammond, in commenting on this sentence of Justin, thinks that the 'fraude' may be a reference to the peace treaty which Philip made with Bardylis in 358 and that, whether or not this campaign occurred before or after the defeat of Pleuratus, the southern Dardanians were the object of his attack, a people who may have formed the kingdom of Bardylis and his son Cleitus. In that case the Dardani were included in the general term "Illyrians" (Hammond in ABSA 1966, 245-6.). Ellis considers that the Ardiaeai under their king, Pleuratus, are here meant (Ellis 1976, 136.), but there seems to be no reason why Philip should not have reduced both kingdoms on this campaign.

6. 4-8. Sed nec a proximis manus abstinet; siquidem Arrybam, regem Epiri, uxori suae Olympiadi artissima cognitione iunctum, pellere regno statuit atque Alexandrum, privignum eius, uxoris Olympiadis fratrem, puerum honestae pulchritudinis, in Macedonian nomine sororise arcessit, omnique studio sollicitatum ape regni simulato amore ad stupri consuetudinem perpulit, maiora in eo obsequia habiturus sive conscientiae pudore sive regni beneficio. Cum igitur ad XX annos pervenisset, ereptum Arrybae regnum puero admodum tradit, scenestus in utroque. Nam nec in eo ius cognitionis servavit, cui ademit regnum.
et eum, cui dedit, inpudivum fecit ante quam regem.

While Diodorus notes the involvement of Philip in the succession of Alexander (brother of Philip's wife Olympias) to the Molossian throne (Diod. XVI. 72. 1.), there are important differences between his account and that of Justin-Trogus. For instance, Diodorus says that Arymbas (his spelling for Arbybas) died after a rule of ten years, leaving his son Aeacides (father of Pyrrhus) as his heir, but that Alexander, with the backing of Philip, succeeded to the throne. This discrepancy is noted by Grote, but not commented on (Grote 1888 IX, 429. n. 3.). Thirlwall draws attention to a later reference in Justin-Trogus to an Arbybas, who is described as having a son, Neoptolemus, the father of Olympias (mother of Alexander the Great) and Alexander, who occupied the throne of Epirus after him (Thirlwall 1850, 19. n. 1. Justin-Trogus. XVII. 3. 9ff.). Justin-Trogus goes on to say that this Alexander, who died in a war with the Bruttii, was succeeded by his brother, Aeacides, who was the father of Pyrrhus.

A family tree of the royal house of Epirus can be assembled using the accounts of Plutarch (Pyrrh. I.) and Pausanias (I. 11.) in the main, and drawing on Smith and Hammond for additional details (Smith 1880, passim. Hammond 1967, passim. See fig. 2.). From this it can be seen that Diodorus' statement does not conflict with the succession details supplied by Plutarch and Pausanias, except that he could have made matters clearer by pointing out that Alexander was cousin to Aeacides. While Justin-Trogus may appear to have made two errors, firstly when he says that Neoptolemus was the son of Arbybas (instead of brother) and secondly when he describes Aeacides as the brother of Alexander (instead of cousin), in the latter case P. Treves has shown that the use of the word 'frater' to describe the relationship between Alexander I and Aeacides is quite acceptable as being consistent with Alexander being described as 'privignus' ("adoptive son") of Arbybas. In the absence of further evidence the
Achilles

Pyrrhus (Neoptolemus) = Andromache

Molossus  Pielus  Pergamus

Tharypus (fl. 420s)

Alcetas I

Neoptolemus I = ?

Troas = Arrybas  Olympus = Philip II  Alexander I = Cleopatra (of Macedon)

Alexander III  of Macedon

Neoptolemus II  Cadmea

Arrybas = Troas

Alcetas II  Aeacides = Pthia (died 313)

Pyrrhus  Deidamea  Troas

fig. 2.

THE ROYAL HOUSE OF EPIRUS
first 'error' must stand (Treves in AJP 1942, 129ff.).

By his intervention in Epirotic affairs Philip was probably endeavouring to safeguard himself from the south-west, and indeed it may be that he had been thinking along these lines since his marriage with Olympias in 357. Following Ellis' chronology and reasoning, Philip will have arrived in Epirus for the second time in 350/49 on a war footing (although we know no details), removed Alexander from Epirus to complete his education in Macedonia, and altered the status from that of king to regent. This will mean that Alexander was about twelve at the time, since Justin-Trogus says that the young man was twenty years of age when Philip conferred the kingdom on him (see 7. below). Ellis argues that the ten years from the death of Neoptolemus to this point would accord with the ten year reign ascribed to Arrybas by Diodorus (who probably confused his expulsion in 342 with his death—cf. Treves, loc. cit. Diod. XVI. 72. 1.). This would mean that from 360 to 350 Arrybas was king, and from 350 to his expulsion in 342 he was regent for Alexander.

That Arrybas died in exile has been deduced by Treves, who shows that 'in exilio consenuit' used earlier by Justin-Trogus in reference to Arrybas has this meaning rather than "grew old in exile" (Justin-Trogus. VII. 6. 12.). Treves' argument for this meaning of consenesco is based on an analysis of its occurrence in other historians, and that it was a common Silver Age meaning is strengthened by its occurrence in another passage of Justin-Trogus, where he shows that Diodorus and Trogus have drawn on a common source (probably Ctesias) and that the word 'consenuit' has survived in Justin's paraphrase with the meaning "spent the rest of his life" (Justin-Trogus. I. 2. 11. Diod. II. 21. 2. cf. Treves, loc. cit.). Ellis draws attention to the fact that not even Justin-Trogus suggests that there was any violence involved in this expulsion, and so it can be reasonably assumed that Arrybas withdrew to Athens (cf. Tod ii, 173 = IG II², 226) as a result of some sort of agreement with Philip (Ellis 1976,
In considering the last section of this chapter, dealing with Philip's alleged relationship with the twelve-year-old Alexander, it would be as well to take the passage in conjunction with Diodorus XVI. 93. 3ff., where it can be seen that Philip was on at least two other occasions attracted to males (cf. note on IX. 6. 5-6. below for Philip's tendency towards paedophilia).

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END OF BOOK VIII
BOOK IX

1. 1. *In Graeciam Philippus cum venisset, sollicitatus paucarum civitatium directione et ex praeda modicarum urbium quantae opes universarum essent animo prospeciens, bellum toti Graeciae inferre statuit.*

This very general comment of Justin-Trogus is practically worthless in historical terms. 'In Graeciam Philippus cum venisset' could refer to Philip's arrival at Thermopylae in 346 to put an end to the Sacred War, although he had virtually reached Thermopylae six years earlier with a similar objective before being driven back in the face of strong opposition. Equally this could be an anticipatory look at Philip's arrival at Elatea at the end of 339. It is important to decide what Justin-Trogus means by 'Graeciam' in the first line of this sentence. If he intended the reader to understand Greece proper, that is the mainland south of Thessaly and Epirus, then the reference to plunder from Greek cities suggests that this was not before 339 (unless these Greek cities were colonies outside Greece proper, such as Olynthus, Perinthus and Byzantium), but if he meant what a Roman would understand by Greece (that is the Roman province of Achaea, which included Thessaly and Epirus and was for part of its history joined to the province of Macedonia), then the reference could be to the period following Philip's early interventions in Thessaly from about 353/2. However, in view of the position of this sentence at the beginning of Book IX coming immediately before the attack on Byzantium in 340 and following on from the last mention of his intervention in Greek affairs (his treatment of the Phocians in 346), the most likely explanation of the clause 'In Graeciam Philippus cum venisset' is to be found in Philip's arrival at Thermopylae in 346, although it is practically obscured by the rhetorical explanation of his presence in Greece. 'bellum toti Graeciae inferre statuit' is nonsense. At the most Philip was drawn rather reluctantly after the breakdown of the
Peace of Philocrates into a final struggle with Athens during the
course of which many of the other Greek states, including former
enemies of Athens alarmed by Philip's advance, supported her in the
last vain attempt to withstand Philip at Chaeronea.

1. 2. In cuius emolumentum egregie pertinere ratus, si Byzantium,
nobilem et maritimam urbem, receptaculum terra marique copiis suis
futurum, in potestatem redegisset, eandem claudentem sibi portas
obsidione cinxit.

Trogus' prologue to Book VIII ends with the words: ...et rex Epiro
datus Alexander ejecto Arybbas, et frustra Perinthos oppugnata.
However, as we have seen, Book VIII of the Justin-Trogus epitome ends
only with the expulsion of Arrybas—there is no reference to
Perinthus at all. Then at the beginning of the prologue to Book IX
are the words: Mono volumine continentur haec. Ut Philippus a
Perintho summotus, Byzantii origines, a cuius obsidione summotus
Philippus Scythiae bellum intulit. Again in Justin's epitome of Book
IX there is no mention of Perinthus.

Diodorus, who gives a lengthy and detailed description of the
siege of Perinthus, gives as the immediate reason for an attack on
Byzantium the fact that this city had been keeping Perinthus well
supplied with its best officers, soldiers and equipment. This
naturally caused some embarrassment at Byzantium, being now deprived
to a large extent of its own means of self-preservation (Diod. XVI.
74. 2. - 76. 3.).

In considering the phrase 'eandem claudentem sibi portas' the fact
that there is even any mention of closing the city gates in the face
of a hostile force presupposes the possibility, as so frequently
happens in Greek history, of internal treachery. Perhaps, on the
other hand, this is a reference to the negative reply of the
Byzantines to Philip's request for an alliance against Athens (cf.
Demosth. XVIII. 87.). It could be however that the closing of the
gates was a simple precaution against a surprise attack.

Diodorus says that the Athenians voted to send a fleet to the assistance of Byzantium, having reckoned that Philip had broken his treaty with them, and that this took place *while* Philip was besieging Byzantium (N.B. present participle πολιορκούντος, not necessarily because Philip was besieging the city. Diod. XVI. 77. 2.). Indeed Hammond does not regard Philip's attack on Byzantium as a breach of the peace treaty, since Byzantium had not been a signatory on Athens' side in 346 (Hammond 1959, 563.). The sequence of events surrounding the despatch of the fleet is laid down clearly by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his first letter to Ammaeus, where he quotes Philochorus twice. According to Dionysius, in the archonship of Theophrastus (i.e. 340/339) both the Athenians and Philip blamed each other for beginning the war; he goes on to say that the reasons for the war and the date of the violation of the peace treaty are clearly to be found in the sixth book of Philochorus' *Attica*. He then quotes Philochorus as saying that in the archonship of Theophrastus Philip attacked Perinthus by sea, but having failed he brought up engines of war against Byzantium and besieged it. Dionysius then says that Philochorus sets out the allegations made by Philip against the Athenians in his letter to them, and returning to Philochorus, he quotes that writer as saying that the people listened to the letter and to a speech by Demosthenes, who recommended war, and then passed a resolution to pull down the column, on which had been inscribed the terms of the peace treaty and alliance with Philip, to equip a fleet and in every way to prosecute the war energetically.

The letter from Philip to the Athenians, referred to by Dionysius, was probably that quoted by Demosthenes XII (cf. Thirlwall 1850 VI, 71. Hammond 1959, 563.). Hammond summarises the contents of the letter well: in the letter Philip "...announced his intention to retaliate for actions taken by Athens in contravention of the treaty of peace and alliance: slave raiding in Thrace by Diopeithes, torturing a
Macedonian envoy, selling into slavery the crews of merchantmen bound for Macedonia, raiding the coast of Thessaly, negotiating for alliance with Persia against Macedon, and refusing every offer of arbitration" (Hammond loc. cit.). Chares was despatched by the Athenians with a fleet to relieve Byzantium, but he was regarded with suspicion, and it was not until Phocion arrived that any success was achieved (Plut. Phoc. 14. 2ff.).

1. 3-4. Haec namque urbs condita primo a Pausania, rege Spartanorum, et per septem annos possessa fuit; dein variante victoria nunc Lacedaemoniorum, nunc Atheniensium iuris habita est, quae incerta possessio effecit, ut nemine quasi suam auxilia iuvante libertatem constantius tueretur.

According to Thucydides, Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out in command of a Hellenic fleet, including twenty ships from the Peloponnese and thirty from Athens, which, after subduing most of Cyprus, went on to besiege Byzantium, at that time in Persian hands, and succeeded in taking it probably in the autumn of 478 B.C. (Thuc. I. 94.). Pausanias then set up a bronze cauldron at a place called Exampaeus, at the entrance to the Pontus, dedicated to Poseidon with the following inscription which Athenaeus regarded as impudent and arrogant (Ath. XII. 156.):

\[
\text{μνάω ἀρχαῖα θεάθηκε Ποσειδάωνι ἀνακτή
 Ποσανάς, ἀρχαῖοι Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχρόου,
 ἔτι Πόντου ἐπὶ Εὔβοιαν, Λακεδαμόνιος γένος, ὦ ἡρωί
 Κλεομπρότου, ἀρχαῖας Ἡρακλεος γένεσι.}
\]

Herodotus also mentions the setting up of this cauldron by Pausanias (Herod. IV. 81.).

Isidorus also states in very similar language that Pausanias was the founder of Byzantium with the words: Hanc (Constantinopolim) conditam primum a Pausania rege Spartanorum, et vocatam Byzantium, vel quod tantum patet inter Adriaticum mare et Propontidem, vel quod
Quite what Justin-Trogus and Isidorus mean by calling Pausanias "the founder" of Byzantium is not clear, although if he were in possession of the city for seven years there was certainly plenty of time for him to make such great alterations to the city and its organisation that he could well have been honoured by the inhabitants with the title of "founder". Other examples of the origin of cities found in Justin-Trogus are Tarentum founded by the Partheniae (III. 4. 11ff.), Brundisium founded by Diomede (XII. 2. 7.) and many Italian cities Adria, Pisae, Spina, Perusia and Thurii founded by Greeks (XX. 1. 6ff.) and indeed in many other places throughout the whole work.

That the city was alternately in the hands of the Spartans and Athenians can be seen from the following summary of its allegiances: from 478 it was part of the Athenian empire, although it revolted from Athens in 440-39 and 411-08, until it fell under Spartan control after the battle of Aegospotami in 405. It then joined the anti-Spartan sea league formed after the battle of Onidus in 394. Under Athenian influence from c. 390 it became an ally of Athens from c. 378 to 357, as it did also now when Philip laid this siege, 340-339 Plut. Phoc. 14. cf. OGD² 1970, 186.]

1. 5-6. Igitur Philippus longa obsidionis mora exhaustus pecuniae commercium de piratica mutuatur. Captis itaque CLXX navibus mercium et distractis anhelantem inopiam paululum recreavit.

According to Philochorus, Philip seized 230 Athenian merchant vessels which had been awaiting Chares for safe escort to Athens with their cargoes of corn and hides. Jacoby in his commentary on the Philochorus fragment regards the words καὶ ἐπικρίνων τὰ πολέμια διέλυε as showing that Philip regarded the Athenians at this time as his enemies (hence the use of the definite article τὰ), though not necessarily implying a formal declaration of war by the Athenians, and
therefore he sees the act of seizing the vessels as a straightforward warlike move (FrGH III b. Philoch. frg. 162. = Didym. in Demosth. 45ff.). This is at variance with Justin-Trogus, who clearly sees this as an act of piracy. Jacoby thinks that both Trogus and Didymus have Theopompus as their source (FrGH loc. cit.). Perhaps the figure of 170 ships (although Theopompus gives this as 180- Didym. loc. cit.) reflects the difference between the total number of ships (τα παντα in Philochorus) and the actual enemy (Athenian) ships (τα πολεμικα), thus implying that Philip let sixty ships go (cf. Hammond 1959, 564.) Ellis suggests that the ones he let go were perhaps Chian and Rhodian neutrals (Front. Strat. I. 14. 13. Ellis 1976, 179.). The cargoes included corn and hides (as mentioned above), as well as a great deal of money, which certainly supports Justin-Trogus' words 'inopiam... recreavit'. Philochorus also says that Philip used the wood (presumably from his dismantling of the ships) for his siege machinery (μεγαλυκατα).

1. 7. Deinde, ne unius urbis obpugnatione tantus exercitus teneretur, ...

The beginning of this sentence could almost have referred to the missing account in Justin-Trogus of the siege of Perinthus, when Philip split his force, leaving one detachment under his best generals and with the other half making a sudden attack on Byzantium. Here he presumably has decided that it is unsound economically to tie up the whole of his army in siege work, and so, leaving sufficient troops to maintain the blockade of Byzantium (and Perinthus, unless this siege has now been terminated), he sets out to gain some plunder to offset the expense of the sieges (cf. below, end of sentence 9.).

It would probably be as well to consider at this point the course of and end to the siege of Byzantium, even though Justin-Trogus makes reference to its raising at 2. 10. Diodorus says that Philip was alarmed at the fact that the Athenians had sent a strong fleet to the
aid of Byzantium, assisted by the Chians, Coans, Rhodians and others, and so he broke off the siege of the two cities—Diodorus had referred to the concurrence of the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium at XVI. 76. 3-4.— and made a peace treaty with the Athenians and the other Greeks who were opposing him (Diod. XVI. 77. 3.). Justin-Trogus supplies a completely different reason for the raising of the siege, in that Philip withdrew his blockade and marched straight into Scythia to deal with Atheas (see 2. 10. below).

An important point to consider here is whether Diodorus is accurate in his statement that Philip made peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας τοὺς ἐναντίονένοις. Since the accounts of Philochorus and Demosthenes indicate that there was continuous hostility between Athens and Philip from the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium down to the battle of Chaeronea (FrGH loc. cit. Demosth. XVIII. 145.), it does not seem likely that there was a peace made between Philip and Athens, although there is no reason not to accept that Philip made peace with the other Greeks— the people of Perinthus, Byzantium, Chios, Cos and Rhodes etc. (cf. Grote 1888 IX, 447. n. 1., but see also Demosth. XVIII. 230. P-W RE XIX. 2291. regards the inclusion of Byzantium by Diodorus as false.). Hammond also accepts a peace with the other Greeks— he makes no mention of Athens— on the grounds that they would not wish to fall into the hands of the Persians, who had probably assisted Byzantium as well (Hammond 1959, 564. cf. also Ellis 1976, 183-4. For possible Persian involvement cf. Arrian. Anab. II. 14. 5.).

...profectus cum fortissimis multas Chersonensi urbes expugnat,... There does not seem to be any other authority for this statement of Justin-Trogus, other than a possible reference (undated) by Demosthenes (XVIII. 139.), unless this were to follow on from the situation given by Frontinus, whereby we are told that Philip was prevented from capturing the Chersones— because the ships of the
Byzantines, Rhodians and Chians were holding the transitum, but after some cunning diplomatic manoeuvres and negotiations Philip slipped past the enemy, who were off their guard, and suddenly sailed into the angustias freti (Front. Strat. I. 4. 13b.). Ellis, accepting an expedition to the Chersonese at this point, thinks it unlikely that the Macedonian troops spent time on capturing cities, but points out that they did ravage the countryside to some extent (Ellis 1976, 184, cf. Demosth. XVIII. 139.).

1. 8. ...filiumque Alexandrum, decem et octo annos natum, ut sub militia patris tirocinii rudimenta deponeret, ad se accessit. Plutarch tells us that while Philip was away besieging Byzantium, Alexander was left behind as regent in Macedonia at the age of sixteen (Plut. Alex. 1.). This would make the date c. 340/339, since Alexander had been born on 20th July 356 (cf. R. Lane Fox 1973, 43.). He would not have been eighteen until July 338, but the battle of Chaeronea took place probably on 2nd August 338, which only gives just over a month at the most for this period of instruction by his father (or whatever Justin-Trogus regards as being 'rudimenta'), if we accept the 'octo annos natum' as accurate. Plutarch says that while Alexander was regent in Philip's absence he subdued a rebellious Thracian tribe, the Maedi, and founded his first city, Alexandropolis, to commemorate this success (Plut. loc. cit.). It would seem that the most likely time for Philip to have taken Alexander under his wing for the purpose of broadening his military experience (for Alexander had probably acquired his 'rudimenta' before his expedition against the Maedi, although it is quite possible that the victory against this tribe was in reality gained by one of Philip's experienced campaigners, using the young prince as a figurehead) was his expedition into the Chersonese after the siege of Byzantium in 339, towards the end of which Alexander would have celebrated his seventeenth birthday. Ellis concludes that Justin—
Trogus' statement here is a confused reference to the elevation of Alexander to the position of regent in Macedonia while Philip was engaged in the siege of Byzantium (Ellis 1976, 289. n. 15.), but Ellis seems to have disregarded Plutarch's other comment about Alexander's victory over the Thracian Maedi, a victory which could easily have occurred during the campaign of Philip in the Chersonnese, with the father not being too distant from the son he was instructing. While the matter must remain in doubt, this sentence of Justin-Trogus must not be rejected on the grounds of not being confirmed by other sources.

1. 9. In Scythiam quoque praedandi causa profectus est, more negotiantium inpensas belli alio bello refecturus.
Perhaps Justin-Trogus here anticipates his later remark in 2. 5. that Philip, having discovered that Atheas no longer required any assistance, wished to have some part of the expense of the siege of Byzantium met. Certainly he here suggests that Philip's reason for an expedition into Scythia was to obtain spoil to fill his coffers which were being drained by the expensive siege of Byzantium. This seems rather awkwardly placed as a motive when we find in the next sentence Philip's aid being invoked by Atheas, via the people of Apollonia, in his war with the Istrians, this being a perfectly valid motive for an expedition to Scythia (see below, 2. 1.). Perhaps the answer is to be found in regarding 2. 1-9. as a flash-back to recap a situation prior to the one whereby Philip moves into Scythia with hostile intent towards Atheas. Possible confirmation of this can be found in an examination of Trogus' prologue to Book IX, of which the second and third sentences run: Byzantii origines, a cuius obsidione submotus Philippus, Scythiae bellum intulit. Repetitae inde Scythicae res, ab his temporibus, in quibus illa prius finierant, usque ad Philippi bellum, quod cum Athea, Scythiae rege, gagat. Unde reversus

..........
The omission in Justin-Trogus of the 'Scythicae res' referred to in the prologue could well explain the awkwardness of reading from 1. 9. to 2. 1.

2. 1. Erat eo tempore rex Scytharum Atheas,…

Strabo, in a section dealing with the regions between the Borysthenes and the mouth of Lake Maeotis, says of Ath(e)as: 'Ατρεας δὲ δοκεῖ τῶν πλείστων ἥρκει τῶν ποιήσεων βαρβάρων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Φίλιππον πολέμησα τὸν Ἀμύνταο (Strab. VII. 3. 18.). Another direct reference to a war between Atheas and Philip can be found in Lucian Mακροβίοιο, where, in a passage discussing the deaths of kings and their ages at death, we find: 'Ατεας δὲ Σκυθῶν βασιλεὺς μαχόμενος πρὸς Φίλιππον περὶ τῶν Ἰστρὸν πόλεων ἔπεσεν ὑπὲρ τα ἐνενήκοντα ἔτη  γεγονότοι. The two remaining references to Atheas are to be found in Clement of Alexandria, who says that Atheas told the people of Byzantium in a letter: μὴ βλέπτετε προσόδους ἐμαυ, ἵνα μὴ ἐμή ἑποι ὑπὲρ ὑμετέρου ὑπὲρ πῶτος (Clem. Alex. Strom. V. 5. 31. 3.)—this could be taken as indicative that Atheas would have been willing to join with Philip in action against Byzantium, although there is no direct evidence for this—and Frontinus, who, in a reference to a battle between Atheas and the Triballi, describes how Atheas tricked the enemy into believing that he had reinforcements coming by using herds of cattle brought up behind the Triballi by his own spear-waving women, children and other non-combatants (Front. Strat. II. 4. 20.). This trick is also mentioned by Polyænus as being played by the Scythians on the Triballi, although he makes no mention of the Scythian king (Polyen. Strat. VII. 44. 1.). Plutarch says that Atheas wrote to Philip claiming that while Philip was the ruler of the Macedonians who had learned to fight against men, he was the ruler of the Scythians who could fight against both hunger and thirst (Plut. Moral. 174. F.).

E. H. Minns asks whether Atheas was a Scythian or a Getan (called
Scythian because he lived north of the Danube) on the grounds that there does not seem to have been a great effort on the part of the ancient writers to distinguish between Scythians and Getans in this region. He illustrates this by pointing out that after Alexander had driven back the Triballi in 336 he crossed the Ister and defeated the Getae on the north bank (Minns 1913, 123.). Later, according to Justin-Trogus, while Alexander was in the east, one of his generals, Zopyrion, who was in Thrace, advanced against the Scythians and was defeated and killed along with his army of 30,000 men (Just.-Trog. II. 3. 4. XII. 1. 4. 2. 16.). However, according to Quintus Curtius Zopyrion, who was governor of Thrace, was overwhelmed with his whole army by storms and gales (rather than by the enemy), while making an expedition against the Getae (Quint. Curt. X. 1. 43.). In these events can be seen a Scythian policy of westward expansion, possibly with the aim of occupying the west coast of the Black Sea. Certainly it would seem that their influence stretched down the coast beyond Istrus at least as far as Apollonia (see next note).

...qui cum bello Histrianorum premeretur, auxilium a Philippo per Apollonienses petit, in successionem eum regni Scythiae adoptaturus; The HJ Istriani here referred to are generally supposed by commentators (cf. e.g. Lemaire 1823, 204. n.) to have been the inhabitants of Istria (or Istrus), a colony of Miletus, situated south of the Danube estuary. Herodotus mentions this Milesian colony, and Ammianus Marcellinus refers to it as being quondam potentissima civitas (Herod. II. 33. Amm. Marc. XXII. 8. 43.). However, Thirlwall finds it strange that a Greek city of this period is being ruled by a king and invading the Scythians, and so he feels that "they have taken the place of the Triballians". He finds confirmation for his idea in the reference in Frontinus to the war between Atheas and the Triballi (Front. Strat. II. 4. 20.), and he thinks that the Triballi would have realised that they had been the target of Philip's
soldiers' first advance into Scythia in response to Atheas' request (Thirlwall 1850, 77. n. 2.). It is perhaps also worth noting that in the Lucian extract referred to above Atheas and Philip fought περὶ τῶν Ἰστρῶν πολιῶν. Could this in some way have been the cause of confusion to Justin-Trogus? The most recent observation is that of Ellis, who, while he thinks the most normal reference would be the people of Istros, feels that 'rex Istrianorum' makes the identification suspect. He accepts Schaefer's suggestion (surely this was Thirlwall's suggestion, as noted above?) that the Istriani were the Triballi (Ellis 1976, 290. n. 27.).

Apollonia was also a Milesian colony (Strab. VII. 319.), but little heard of until the Roman era, when, for example, Marcus Lucullus transported a colossal statue of Apollo from Apollonia to the Capitol (Plin. N.H. XXXIV. 39.). It is impossible to assess whether Atheas really did promise to adopt Philip or whether the people of Apollonia took it upon themselves to put this offer to Philip.

2. 2. cum interim Histrianorum rex decedens et metu belli et auxiliorum necessitate Scythas solvit.

If by 'metu belli...Scythas solvit' Justin-Trogus means that the Scythians were no longer in danger of losing the war, then this fits in quite well with the planned Scythian westward expansion referred to above. However, if this sentence means that the Scythians were freed from their fear of being at war with the Istrians, the implication would be that the Istrians had taken the initiative in declaring the war on the Scythians, a war which the latter evidently did not want and which had no connexion with their policy of expansion. Again it is perhaps strange that in a fourth century Greek colony there could be such a profound effect on the outcome or continuation of a war as a result of the death of one man.
2. 3-4. *Itaque Atheas remissis Macedonibus nuntiari Philippo iubet, neque auxilium eius se petisse neque adoptionem mandasse; nam neque vindicta Macedonum egere Scythas, quibus meliores forent, neque heredem sibi incolumi filio deesse.*

If the first part of this message was to make it clear to Philip that Atheas had in no way wanted his help, nor had he promised adoption, the mocking second part was clearly designed to annoy Philip and provoke direct conflict between the Macedonians and Scythians. The sentence is well balanced in construction.

2. 5-6. *His auditis Philippus legatos ad Atheam mittit inpensae obsidionis portionem petentes, ne inopia deserere bellum cogatur; quod eo promptius eum facere debere, quod missis a se in auxilium eius militibus ne sumptum quidem viae, non modo officii pretia dederit.*

Philip, who was still besieging Byzantium during this exchange of messages with Atheas, had run into financial trouble, as noted in 1. 5-6. above; he must have seen in this expeditionary failure a further drain on his stretched resources and possibly, on their return, trouble from the men who had been sent to Scythia and who clearly had not been paid. In making this request for compensation Philip undoubtedly felt quite justified. By 'officii pretia' Justin-Trожus may be suggesting that the Macedonians arrived in time to perform some sort of service for Atheas, but the reference to officium may simply be the fact that they arrived in Scythia prepared to render assistance. If the former is the case, in the absence of any further corroborative detail, one can only speculate on the nature of the service and on whether it was given before the death of the king of the Istrian.

2. 7-9. *Atheas inclementiam caeli et terrae sterilitatem causatus, quae non patrimonii ditet Scythas, sed vix alimentis exhibeat,*
If it is assumed that Atheas and his Scythians lived on the European section of the Steppe, an assumption which is based on the fact that he seems only to have been involved with peoples on the west, e.g. Macedon, the Triballi, Apollonia, Istria etc., which included amongst its rivers the Volga, Don, Dnieper, Bug and Dniestr (which were very rich in fish and fertilised the valleys which contained much game), then the Scythian king’s claim that his people had to suffer "inclementiam caeli" and 'terrae sterilitatem' is entirely false and was clearly being used as an excuse to avoid paying Philip. Moreover iron and copper were in very plentiful supply, and gold seems to have been very easily obtainable from the Scythians further east (cf. T. Talbot Rice 1957, 35-6.). It is true that the climatic drawbacks instanced by Atheas could have been applied to the Scythians of the far north-eastern end of the Steppe or even the Asiatic section, which experienced very cold winters and intensely hot summers, but for reasons already advanced Atheas could have exaggerated about the climate in his part of Scythia. On the other hand this could be a typical Mediterranean view, based on general hearsay—like many beliefs about Britain—, and the whole idea about the climate being an important factor in Atheas' reply to Philip may be a composition by Trogus without authority.

2. 10-11. Quibus inrisus Philippus soluta obsidione Byzantii Scythica bella edgreditur. praemissis legatis, quo securiores faceret, qui muntient Atheae: dum Byzantium obsidet, vovisse se statuum Herculi, ad quam in ostio Histri ponendam se venire, pacatum accessum ad religionem dei petens, amicus ipse Scythis venturus.

The circumstances surrounding the raising of the siege of Byzantium have been covered in an earlier note, 1. 7. Confirmation of this
expedition may be seen in the list of people conquered by Philip on his way to a position of supremacy given by Diodorus, a list which includes the Scythians (Diod. XVI. 1. 5.), and also in two references by Aeschines, one mentioning his being away in Scythia at the time of the Amphictyonic meeting at Delphi in spring 339, and a little further on a reference to his having returned from a Scythian expedition (Aeschin. III. 128. 129.).

A statue to Heracles would be a perfectly natural thing for Philip to vow, in that he was descended from Heracles through Caranus (cf. Plut. Alex. 2. 1.).

3. 1. Sed revertenti ab Scythia Triballi Philippo occurrunt: negant se transitum daturos, ni portionem praedae accipiant.

Justin-Trogus is the only source for this encounter of Philip with the Triballi, whom Thucydides describes as being an independent tribe in Thrace along with the Paeonians, Treres and Tilataeans (Thuc. II. 96. 3-4.). In 424 Sitalces, the Odrysian king of Thrace, had organised an expedition against the Triballi, but this had ended disastrously and resulted in his death (Thuc. IV. 101.). The next reference to the Triballi after Philip's unfortunate experience with them is the account given by Arrian of the Battle of Lyginus between Alexander and the Triballi in the spring of 335, whereby Alexander defeated them comprehensively. The Triballi lost 3,000 men, while Macedonian losses were reckoned at eleven cavalrymen and about forty infantrymen (Arrian, Anab. I. 2.).

As already mentioned above in the note on 2. 1., it seems generally to be accepted that it was the Triballi, rather than the Istriani, who were at war with Atheas and his Scythians at the time of the request for help from Atheas to Philip (cf. also Front. Strat. II. 4. 20.).
3. 2. Hinc iurgium et mox proelium; in quo ita in femore vulneratus est Philippus, ut per corpus eius equus interficeretur. Demosthenes in listing the injuries sustained by Philip in his building up of supremacy includes the loss of his eye, the fracture of his collar bone and the mutilation of his hand and leg—τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον... (Demosth. XVIII. 67.), while Plutarch in a reference to Philip's bravery cites the occasion of his receiving a wound in the thigh while fighting the Triballi (Plut. De Alex. M. Fort. 331 B.). This will have been a very serious wound indeed if the spear passed far enough through Philip's thigh to kill the horse on which he was riding, and it is not surprising he was given up for dead by his men (see next note).

3. 3. Cum omnes occisum putarent, praeda amissa est. Ita Scythica velut devota spolia paene luctuosa Macedonibus fuere. Presumably a report was spread that Philip had been killed and there was consequently a breakdown of discipline and morale leading to some disorder, enabling the Triballi to carry off Philip's newly acquired Scythian booty. 'devota' will here mean "cursed" as it does at Justin-Trogus XIV. 4. 10., where it is used with capita in apposition to the vocative vos, meaning "cursed wretches". Devotus in the sense of execrabilis, detestandus and maledictus is used generally in poetry and in post-Augustan prose (cf. Ov. Fast. VI. 738. Quint. v. 6. 2. Hor. Od. III. 4. 27.). Perhaps Justin-Trogus regards the booty as cursed because after all the trouble taken to acquire it (i.e. having a battle with Atheas) it had proved to be rather poor in value (there being no gold or silver) and now Philip had almost been killed trying to convey it back to Macedonia.

3. 4. Ubi vero ex vulnere primum convaluit, diu dissimulatum bellum Atheniensiibus infert,...}

This is somewhat inaccurate as regards renewal of war with Athens,
although the abrupt transition from Philip's encounter with the Triballi to conflict with Athens could well be put down to Justin's abridgement. Justin-Trogus' statement implies that Philip decided to declare war on the Athenians, whereas he was in fact invited by the Amphictyonic Council to take command of the Amphictyonic forces in a new sacred war against the Locrians of Amphissa (Demosth. XVIII. 152.).

Grote comments on 'diu dissimulatum' as follows: "This expression is correct in the sense that Philip, who had hitherto pretended to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose to be against Athens, at the moment when he seized Elatea. Otherwise he had been at open war with Athens ever since the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, in the preceding year" (Grote 1888 IX, 463. n. 1.). The new sacred war had been brought about in the following way: at a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in April 339 a councillor representing the Locrians of Amphissa proposed that the Athenians be fined fifty talents for setting up in a new temple at Delphi some shields which they had captured in the Persian War with Xerxes together with the inscription: 'Αθηναιοι ἀπὸ Μητων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε ταμαντία τῆς Ἐλληνσίου ἔμαχοντο (Aeschin. III. 116.).

Aeschines himself turned what could have been a very embarrassing confrontation between Athens and Thebes into a counter-attack on the Locrians of Amphissa on the grounds that they had committed sacrilege by their cultivation of the sacred plain and exacting harbour dues at Cirrha. Aeschines was so successful at diverting the Council's attention towards this sacrilege that, after some rioting at Cirrha leading to the destruction of the harbour in an angry clash between the Delphians and Locrians, a special meeting was called at Thermopylae to decide the fate of the Locrians for their sacrilege. Neither Athens nor Thebes attended this meeting, and the command of the war against the Locrians was entrusted to Cottyphus of Pharsalus, the president of the Council (Demosth. op. cit. 151. Aeschin. III. 128.). He was not particularly successful in raising troops, and so
the command fell to Philip who had now returned from Scythia. It has been suggested by P-W RE XIX. 2292. that Philip had deliberately tried to provoke a sacred war between Athens and Thebes, but at the time of the election of Cottyphus as leader Philip was still in Scythia (Aeschin. ibid.), and so this would make any direct involvement in Greek politics at this time on his part impossible. However, before his seizure of Elatea, Philip was clearly trying to disrupt relations between Athens and Thebes (Demosth. XVIII. 165.).

3. 5. ...quorum causae Thebani se iunxere, metuentes, ne victis Atheniensibus veluti vicinum incendium belli ad se transiret. Thebes' alliance with Philip (cf. Justin-Trogus VIII. 2. 2.) had weakened of late for several reasons: her long standing friendship with the Locrians of Amphissa caused her to side with them in the new sacred war, and while Philip was away in Scythia Thebes seized Nicaea, near Thermopylae in central Greece, and expelled its Thessalian garrison (Didym. ad Demosth. XI. 44f. cf. Ellis 1976, 189 and n. 37.). Furthermore, Philip may well have been suspicious of Thebes' friendship with Persia, especially after he had been opposed by Persian troops in Thrace (Arrian. Anab. II. 14. 5. cf. CAH VI, 258.). Also Philip had deprived Thebes of Echinus (Demosth. IX. 34.).

In his capacity as commander of the Amphictyonic forces, Philip moved south and occupied Cytinium and Elatea (Philoch. frg. 135, FHG I. 406.) Diod. XVI. 84. 2.). Hammond outlines the strategy clearly when he shows that since the Thebans were in occupation of Nicaea, thus causing access through Thermopylae to be blocked off, Philip crossed the mountains to Cytinium from where he sent a message to the Thebans asking them to hand Nicaea over to the East Locrians. Having then swiftly advanced to Elatea, obstructing the route from Thebes to Nicaea, he proceeded to garrison and refortify this former Phocian stronghold (Hammond 1959, 566.).

If it had not been clear to the Athenians and Thebans earlier what
Philip's intentions were, they must have been in no doubt now. News of Philip's presence at Elatea was received at Athens with great alarm. At a dawn meeting of the Assembly on the Pnyx Demosthenes proposed an alliance with the Thebans, and he and some other envoys and generals were sent to Thebes (Diod. XVI. 84. 5. - 85. 1.). There they found ambassadors from Philip asking the Thebans either to join him in an invasion of Attica or to give him free passage through Boeotia (Demosth. XVIII. 213.). The Athenians asked the Boeotians for an alliance against Philip, promising to give Boeotia command of the armies, that the command by sea be shared by both, and that the Athenians would pay two-thirds of the cost of the war and that they would support Theban dominance over the smaller Boeotian cities (Aeschin. III. 142-3.).

3. 6. Facta igitur inter duas paulo ante infestissimas civitates societate legationibus Graeciam fatigant: communem hostem putant communibus viribus submovendum;
The terms of alliance proposed by Athens to Thebes were undoubtedly very favourable to the Thebans, but, as Hammond remarks, the Thebans made a very courageous decision in accepting them, since it involved them in another sacred war and also in the breaking of their oath of allegiance to Macedon (Hammond 1959, 566.). According to Plutarch, it was largely owing to the powerful oratory of Demosthenes that the Thebans were won over to an alliance with Athens (Plut. Demosth. 16. 3). This had obviously not been expected by Philip, who was now sufficiently concerned about the turn of events to send embassies both to Athens and Thebes to propose peace. These overtures of peace were turned down by both states, though Demosthenes had to speak eloquently, and against the opposition of Phocion, to keep the enthusiasm for war going (Aeschin. III. 148ff. Plut. Demosth. ibid. Plut. Phoc. 16. 1ff.).

By the expression 'paulo ante' Justin-Trogus is referring to the
Sacred War with Phocians covered above (VIII. 1. 8ff.) when the Athenians and Spartans took the side of the Phocians against the Thebans. This war had been brought to a close by the surrender of the Phocians to Philip in 346.

There is no detailed record of the various embassies sent round Greece to muster forces against Philip. Demosthenes says that he was responsible himself for making alliances for the Athenians with the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians and Corcyraeans, and that an army of 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry was built up from this (Demosth. XVIII. 237.). Confirmation of this may be seen in a passage of Plutarch where he lists as members of a league against Philip Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Megarians, Leucadians and Corcyraeans and then, through the efforts of Demosthenes, the Thebans (Plut. Demosth. 17. 4.).

3. 7. neque enim cessaturum Philippum, si prospere prima successerint, nisi omnem Graeciam domuerit.

Philip's conquest of Potidaea, Amphipolis, Pydna, Olynthus etc. had brought him the mastery of the Thracian coastline, but it had also brought him into conflict with Athens, as had his attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium, which threatened the Athenian corn supply through the Pontus. Thus Philip in his struggle for political power was inevitably led to the conclusion that his Balkan empire could not be secured without Greece. But apart from political considerations there was a very strong cultural pull from involvement with Greece. Philip clearly realised that Macedon would not be able to dominate a Balkan empire if she deprived herself of the intellectual development which would result from a close relationship with Greece. His appointment of Aristotle as tutor to the young Alexander would seem to reflect this policy (Plut. Alex. 7. 2. Quint. I. 1. 23.).
3. 8. 

Motae quaedam civitates Atheniensibus se iungunt; quasdam autem ad Philippum belli metus traxit.

See sentence 6 above for the alliances made by Athens with Euboea, Achaea, Corinth, Megara, Leucas and Corcyra. Philip attempted to gain support from the Peloponnesians (other than Achaea, Megara and Corinth), but they remained neutral, and so he had to turn towards the Thessalians and Dolopians for assistance (Demosth. XVIII. 63f. 156.). Pausanias supplies evidence for the neutrality of the Messenians and Eleans; he refers to the Arcadians as having deserted the Greeks who were hard pressed at Chaeronea against Philip and his Macedonians, and he also says that they did not fight on the Greek side against Philip, though they did not actually oppose the Greeks (Paus. IV. 28. 2. VII. 15. 6. VIII. 6. 2.). Ellis points out that Philip had quite a lot of support in central Greece, probably from Phocis, Locris and most of the Amphictyons to the north-west and the west (Ellis 1976, 196.).

3. 9. 

Proelio commisso, cum Athenienses longe maiore militum numero praestarent, adsiduis bellis indurata virtute Macedonum vincuntur.

Justin-Trogus has omitted details of military operations between the formation of the Theban-Athenian alliance and the battle of Chaeronea. Chares and Lysicles were chosen as generals and the entire Athenian army was sent into Boeotia and they were received by the Thebans with great cordiality (Diod. XVI. 85. 2. Aeschin. III. 140. Demosth. XVIII. 215.). Two engagements seem to have followed in which Philip came off the worse: Demosthenes calls these two skirmishes ... τῶν πρώτων μάχαι, τὴν τ΄ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ τὴν Χελμερνῆν ... (Demosth. ibid.). These then must have taken place in the autumn of 339 and the winter of 338. Then followed the restoration of several Phocian cities by the allies, including Ambrysus which was fortified with a very strong double wall (Paus. X. 3. 36. 3.). Also Phocion was sent in the spring with a fleet to attack Macedonian
shipping in the Hellespont area (Plut. Phoc. 14. 3. cf. Hammond 1959, 565.). Also in the spring of 338 Philip turned on Amphissa and having tricked the Athenians and Thebans with a false despatch he gained its surrender (Polyaen. IV. 2. 8.). The Macedonians now pushed eastward through Delphi towards Boeotia causing the allies to withdraw from Parapotamii and take up their position at Chaeronea (Polyaen. IV. 2. 14.).

With regard to the numbers involved in the battle, Diodorus supplies information which conflicts with this statement of Justin-Trogus. After numbering Philip's forces at more than 30,000 infantry and at least 2,000 cavalry, he says that although both sides were well matched in courage Philip had the edge in numbers and generalship (Diod. XVI. 85. 5.). J. Kromayer shows that this statement of Diodorus is untrue (Kromayer 1903, 190.), and Ellis accepts that the Greek allies were superior in numbers (Ellis 1976, 197.). This is yet another of those famous battles in history with the tradition of a larger army being defeated by a small trained force (cf. e.g. Marathon, Thermopylae and the Spanish Armada). Justin-Trogus' 'Athenienses' must surely include the Thebans and other allies. Possibly the latter were omitted as this seems to have been a general reminiscence of Athenian glory on the part of Justin-Trogus.

The omission of the name of one of the most famous battles in Greek (and perhaps world) history together with the scant notice Justin-Trogus takes of the tactics and course of the battle seem to point to a singular lack of interest on the part of either Justin or Trogus (or both of them) in the details of battles. Comparing this account with Justin-Trogus' accounts of Alexander's battles at Granicus (XI. 6. 10ff.), Issus (XI. 9. 9ff.) and Arbela (XI. 14. 1ff.) it will be seen that the matters of concern to Justin-Trogus are the fact that a battle is joined (prima...congressio, proelium... committitur, proelium committitur (ibid.) and here proelio...commissus), though he does not concern himself with strategic details leading up
to the actual engagement but rather anything of an anecdotal nature which caught his imagination, the numbers of men involved (with particular notice being taken of superiority of numbers on either side), the outcome and casualty lists for each side and in particular the valour and heroism of the combatants either as a whole or as individuals (e.g. the Athenians below and Alexander at XI. 14. 5.). He does not appear to be interested in the strategy and tactical skill of the opposing generals.

As far as other accounts of the battle of Chaeronea are concerned, only Diodorus provides a continuous narrative, but this is rather vague and uncertain in places and, as Hammond points out, biassed towards the Athenians (Hammond in Klio 31 (1938), 201.). Polyaenus describes the manoeuvre Philip made which enabled him to create a gap in the Greek line (Polyaen. Strat. IV. 2. 2-7.). Plutarch mentions the part played by Alexander leading the Macedonian left and breaking through the gap, and also the destruction of the "Sacred Band" of the Thebans (Plut. Alex. 9. 2-4. Pelop. 18. 5.). Some geographical details about the positioning of the Greek camp are to be found in Plutarch (Plut. Demosth. 19. 2.). For a thorough assessment of the evidence for the battle of Chaeronea, see Hammond in Klio 31 (1938), 186ff.

3. 10. Non tamen inmemores pristinae gloriae cecidere; quippe adversis vulneribus omnes loca, quae tuenda a ducibus acceperant, morientes corporibus texerunt.

While Justin-Trogus must have included the Thebans and other allies last time he referred to 'Athenienses', here, even though he has not supplied a change of subject, one cannot be certain whether he means the Greeks generally or just the Athenians. Was Justin-Trogus an admirer of the Athenians? (cf. VIII. 2. 8f.) If so, he probably shares Diodorus' pro-Athenian bias. For the heroic deaths here with wounds in their fronts cf. Tacitus Hist. III. 83: ...et cecidere omnea...
contrariis vulneribus versi in hostem: Diodorus says that more than a thousand Athenians were killed and more than two thousand captured, and that many of the Boeotians were killed or captured (Diod. XVI. 86. 5-6.).

3. 11. Hic dies universae Graeciae et gloriæ dominationis et vetustissimam libertatem finivit.

What Justin-Trogus means by 'gloriæ dominationis' may be gleaned from his description of Greece above as ...etiamunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regum certe gentiumque semper victricem et multarum adhuc urbium dominam... and the Greeks as being ...orbis terrarum vindices... (VIII. 4. 7-8.). The liberty of Greece seems to have been a theme of the Historiae Philippicæ, as there are further references to attempts by the Greeks to recover their liberty, at the time of Roman involvement with Philip V, e.g; Neo multo post tempore fiducia Romanorum tota Graecia adversus Philippum ape pristinae libertatis erecta bellum ei intullit, and also after the defeat of Nabis by Flamininus: Sed libertate Graeciae restituta deductisque ab urbibus præsidii... (Justin-Trogus XXX. 3. 7. XXXI. 3. 2.).

4. 1. Huius victoriae cellide dissimulata laetitia. Denique non solita sacra Philippus illa die fecit, non in convivio risit, non ludos inter epulas adhibuit, non coronas aut unguenta sumpsit, et quantum in illo fuit, ita vicit, ut victorem nemo sentiret.

In complete contrast to this, Plutarch says that Philip was overjoyed, got drunk and in an insulting fashion recited the beginning of the decree introduced by Demosthenes in a versified form:

Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παλαινεὺς τὰς ἑτερὰν ἑπεν. (Plut. Demosth. 20. 3.)

Diodorus says that after the battle Philip set up a trophy, gave up the dead for burial, gave sacrifices to the gods for his victory and rewarded some of his own men for their service. He then goes on to say that Philip drank heavily after dinner and celebrated his victory.
by parading amongst the prisoners and mocking them. Diodorus relates how the orator Demades who was one of the prisoners halted Philip in his tracks with the remark: Βασιλεύ, τής τύχης σοι περιθείσης πρόσωπον Ἀγαμέμνονος αὐτὸς ὅωκ ἀκροχών πράττων ἐργα Θερσίτου; This led Philip to come to his senses immediately, and he not only congratulated Demades on his brave outspokenness but also freed him, and on listening to a further speech from the orator he set free all the Athenian prisoners without ransom and concluded through ambassadors a treaty of friendship and alliance with Athens (Diod. XVI. 86. 6.- 87. 3.). Theopompus comments on Philip's heavy drinking on this occasion, although he does not state that he in any way insulted the Athenian ambassadors, whom he invited to dinner and with whom he later revelled (Theopomp. frg. 262. in FGrH IIb. 586.).


Whether or not Philip held a permanent post as ἤγερμος of the peace, rather than ἤγερμος or στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ against Persia has been the subject of some discussion, notably by T. Ryder, who, after an examination of those passages in Diodorus referring to Philip as ἤγερμος and also other references to ἤγερμονια by the same author, concludes that there was a permanent ἤγερμος, irrespective of specific campaigns, e.g. against Persia, and that Philip was that ἤγερμος (Ryder 1965, 154ff.). Philip was at pains to exploit his victory in such a way as to strengthen his main aim of the unification of Greece under him. This would not be achieved by the wholesale destruction of defenceless Greek states.

4. 4. Atheniensibus, quos passus infestissimos fuerat, et captivos gratis remisit et bello consumptorum corpora sepulturae reddidit, reliquiasque funerum ut ad sepulchra maiorum deferrent ultru hortatus
At first there had been panic at Athens (Demosth. XVIII. 195. Lycurg. Contr. Leocr. 16, 39, 44.), but the people soon set about the task of defending the city (Demosth. ibid. 248. Lycurg. loc. cit.) probably because the position was not felt entirely to be hopeless in view of Athens' continued naval superiority, as reflected in the defeat inflicted on Philip by Phocion and his fleet in the Hellespont area (Plut. Phoc. 14. 5.), and also the fact that she could almost certainly withstand any siege Philip might try to mount (cf. P-W RE XIX. 2295.). In the event, however, Philip had no wish to destroy Athens. Making use of the Athenian orator, Demades, who had been taken prisoner at Chaeronea, Philip opened negotiations with the Athenians, who then sent back an embassy which included in its numbers Phocion, Demosthenes and Aeschines (Suda. s. Δημοσθένης. Plut. Phoc. 17. Aeschin. III. 227. Demosth. XVIII. 282ff.). Demosthenes refers to the mild and humane treatment of the Athenians by Philip (Demosth. XXII. 3.).

It is interesting to note how Justin-Trogus, in dealing with the settlement with Athens, leaves out the important details of the treaty, such as the fact that Athens had to give up her maritime league (although she was able to retain the Thracian Chersonese, Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros, Delos and Samos, and acquired Oropus from Thebes), and became an ally of Macedon, while Philip on his part promised not to cross the border into Attica (for Samos cf. Plut. Alex. 28. 1. for Oropus cf. Paus. I. 34. 1.). Pausanias says that Philip made a verbal agreement with the Athenians, but did them a particular wrong in that he took away the islands and thus ended Athenian naval supremacy (Paus. I. 25. 3.).

Diodorus confirms that Philip released all the Athenian prisoners without ransom (Diod. XVI. 87. 3.). The same author has a later reference where he is describing Philip's moderation towards those whom he conquered. He says that Philip went out of his way to ensure
that the unburied corpses received burial, and he released more than 2,000 prisoners without ransom and sent them home (ibid. XXII. 4. i.). Polybius confirms the releasing of prisoners without ransom as does Plutarch, who makes reference to the bodies of the dead being brought back from Chaeronea and solemnly reburied (Polyb. V. 10. 4. Plut. Demosth. 21. 2.). Polybius also says that the bones were conveyed back to Athens under the guidance of Antipater (see below) and he adds that Philip gave clothes to the majority of those who were released. Polybius comments that Philip, following this wise policy at little cost to himself, achieved a very important result—Athenian cooperation in his schemes (cf. also Polyb. XXII. 16. 2. for a similar account). C. Roebuck, in discussing Philip's settlements with the Greek states in 338, points out that Philip was influenced as much by practical considerations, in wishing to avoid prolonged resistance from what was still a very powerful naval base and also to avoid upsetting its economic stability, as he was by his Philhellenic sentiment, and so it was in his best interests to achieve a rapid settlement with Athens (Roebuck in CPh 43 (1948), 80f.).

Lemaire, in commenting on this sentence, draws attention to two other passages in Justin-Trogus where he makes similar references to corpus and reliquiae in juxtaposition: ...corpusque regio more sepeliri et reliquias eius maiorum tumulis inferri iussit. This order was given by Alexander for the burial of Darius (XI. 15. 15.). The other passage is later in this book (IX. 7. 11.), in reference to Pausanias, Philip's assassin, where Olympias was said to have ...refixum corpus interfectoris super reliquias mariti cremavit... (Lemaire 1823, 207.).

4. 5. Super haec Alexandrum filium cum amico Antipatro, qui pacem cum his amicitiamque iungeret, Athenas misit.

Polybius mentions (as has been noted above) that Antipater was sent by Philip to Athens, but this was to accompany the bones of the dead,
apparently with no extra brief in respect of negotiations about the
peace. Polybius does not mention anything about Alexander
accompanying Antipater (Polyb. loc. cit.). An inscription dated to
336 B.C. (Tod. ii. 180.) which refers to a grant of proxeny to
Alc'Imachus in Athens at this time is mentioned by Ellis as evidence
that Antipater, Alexander and Alcimachus escorted the Athenian dead
home (Ellis 1976, 295. n. 81.). Hyperides refers to the people making
Alc'Imachus and Antipater Athenian citizens and proxeni (Hyper. frg.
B 19. in Minor Attic Orators. II. Loeb 1954, 579.), although this
cannot be correct since at this time citizenship and a grant of
proxeny were not given together, and so it may be that either Antipater
or Alcimachus received the citizenship and the other the grant of
proxeny. According to Pausanias both Philip and Alexander received
statues at Athens (Paus. I. 9. 4.). Certainly the evidence of
Hyperides and the inscription mentioned above would seem to bear out
the 'amicitiam' object of their visit, although negotiations about
'pacem' were in all probability left to the embassy (whose members
included Demades, Phocion and Aeschines) sent out from Athens to
Chaeronea (Demosth. XVII. 282. Aesch. III. 227.).

4. 6. Thebanorum porro non solum captivos. verum etiam interfectorum
sepulturam vendidit.
This sentence could have two meanings in that either Philip sold into
slavery those of the Thebans whom he had captured and he ransomed the
bodies of those whom he had killed, or he sold his Theban prisoners
back to the Thebans and also sold them the right to bury their own
dead, though this was hardly a normal procedure. Lemaire, who notes
these alternative interpretations, sees the meaning of 'porro' - either
in the sense of contra or of autem - as the determining factor
(Lemaire 1823, 208.). Grote and Pickard-Cambridge both think that
Philip sold the prisoners into slavery (Grote 1888, 488. CAH VI, 264),
and that the Thebans obtained the right to bury their dead either by
paying for it (Grote) or with great difficulty (Pickard-Cambridge), whereas Thirlwall and Ellis reckon that the Thebans had to pay a ransom for the return of their prisoners, and likewise for the return of their dead (Thirlwall 1850, 110. Ellis 1976, 199.). However, these two interpretations are not incompatible. Justin-Trogus appears to refer to auctioning the prisoners ('somewhere in Boeotia), and the Thebans would tend to offer the higher prices.

Diodorus gives no details of the settlement with Thebes save that Philip maintained a garrison in Thebes (Diod. XVI. 87. 3.). Pausanias refers only to the setting up of the garrison and the restoration of the Plataeans to their homes (Paus. IX. 1. 8. 6. 5.).

4. 7. Principes civitatis alios securi percussit. alios in exilium redeglt. bonaque omnium occupavit.

aliquem securi percutere is a classical expression for beheading someone (cf. Cic. In Pisonem. 34, 84.). This account of Justin-Trogus from sentences 7 to 10 appears to be without any corroborative evidence from our other sources. There was certainly no mercy shown to the Thebans, and Ellis sees this to be not so much vindictiveness as necessary to destroy Theban power (Ellis 1976, 199.).

4. 8. Pulso deinde per injuriain patriam restituit. Ex horum numero trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit.

Ellis suggests that these 'pulsos' may have been exiled at the time the Thebans decided to seize Nicaea (summer 339) and to make an alliance with Athens (November 339), but there is no way of proving this (cf. Ellis 1976, loc. cit.). Presumably the 300 'rectores' and 'iudices' comprised an executive body with the power of governing in the political sense (a rector is a general word for ruler or governor, cf. Hor. Epist. I. 16. 24. Suet. Vesp. 8. Aug. 89.) and also in the judicial sense (judex). It would seem unlikely that 'iudices' and 'rectores' are being used here in any sort of technical
sense. Schaefer draws attention to a distinction to be made between
the actions of Philip and those of the restored exiles (Schaefer 1887
III. 2, 20.). While Justin-Trogus goes on to describe the trials
conducted by the restored exiles (see 9-10 below), he has nevertheless
implied that Philip himself was responsible for the executions, exile
and confiscations of property (see 7 above). Roebuck points out that
Philip did make arrangements for Demades to receive land in Boeotia,
referring to Suda, who says that the orator ... κτήμα ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ
παρὰ φίλημασι δωρεᾶν ἐλαβέν. (Suda s. Δημήτριος 415.), but regards
the purge as exaggerated because of the number of anti-Macedonians
who were in a position to oppose Alexander in the revolt of Thebes in
335 (Diod. XVII. 8. 1ff. Roebuck in CPh 43 (1948), 80. n. 43.).

4. 9-10. Apud quos cum potentissimi quique rei eius ipsius criminis
postularentur, quod per iniuriam se in exilium egissent, huius
constantiae fuerant, ut omnes se auctores faterentur meliusque cum re
publica actum, cum damnati essent quam cum restitutum contenderent.
Mira prorsus audacia: de iudicibus vitae necisque suae, quemadmodum
possunt, sententiam ferunt contemmnuntque absolutionem, quam dare
inimici possunt, et quoniam rebus nequeunt ulciscxi, verbis usurpant
libertatem.

Having made it clear that Philip had put some Thebans to death,
banished others and seized their property, Justin-Trogus now proceeds
to describe the trials conducted by the restored exiles which led to
more of the above treatment. Roebuck feels that Justin-Trogus is
loosely regarding Philip as responsible for this further purge
(Roebuck, loc. cit.), and Justin-Trogus does seem to be emphasising
the whole episode. Perhaps refusal to beg for mercy was a theme of
particular interest either to Justin or to Trogus.
5. 1. **Compositis in Graecia rebus Philippus omnium civitatum legatos ad firmandum rerum praesentium statum evocari Corinthum iubet.**

Apart from the treaties arranged with Athens and Thebes described above, Philip entered into a number of arrangements with other Greek states. In central Greece Plataea and Orchomenus were restored (Paus. IX. 1. 8, IV. 27. 10.), and Ellis has shown that the Boeotian League remained in existence, once again acting "as a federal body and no longer as the mere instrument of Theban domination" (Ellis 1976, 201.).

To secure the western flank Philip installed a garrison in Ambracia (Diod. XVII. 3. 3.), and from the fact that some pro-Athenian Chalcidian leaders sought refuge in Athens, it may be that he installed a garrison in Chalcis to keep a watch on the activities of the Euboean League (Aeschin. III. 85. 87. cf. Ellis 1976, 202.). Philip next moved into the Peloponnese, now if not earlier receiving the surrender of Corinth and Megara, and he cut down Spartan territory by assigning areas of it to Argos, Messene and the Arcadian League (Polyb. IX. 28. 33.).

It was now that Philip invited the Greek states to Corinth in the late autumn or winter of 338/7 for a conference. This was in fact a preliminary meeting at which Philip presented his ideas for maintaining peace as well as putting forward his plans for an invasion of Persia, and the delegates were no doubt instructed to discuss Philip's proposals at length in their own states during the winter (cf. Ellis 1976, 203f. and 298 n. 121.).

5. 2. **Ibi pacis legem universae Graeciae pro meritis singularum civitatum statuit. consiliumque omnium veluti unum senatum ex omnibus legit.**

According to Diodorus Philip made it known to the Greek states both publicly and privately that he wanted to discuss the affairs of Greece, to which end a 'κοινὸν συνέδριον' assembled at Corinth, war against Persia was successfully proposed, and Philip, being elected 'στρατηγὸς
\(\text{υποκράτωρ}\), fixed the amount for their contributions for the war (see below. Diod. XVI. 89. 2-3.). Diodorus seems to be referring to a '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' which was already formally constituted, before he has informed us of its inauguration, but Ryder shows that he has over-compressed his narrative in trying to concentrate on the war against Persia. He points out that there was a Common Peace treaty as evidenced by Diod. XVII. 9. 5. and that "...there was a situation when there was a synhedrion and a Hegemon (even if the first had not met and the second had not been appointed) but when there had been no official word of a Persian War" (Ryder 1965, 154.).

As far as the conditions of the treaty which were ratified at Corinth are concerned, the members were bound to go to the help of the injured party, a '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' of representatives of the Greeks was instituted to determine who was the injured party, the decrees of the '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' were binding on all cities, although all cities were nevertheless free and autonomous, and the office of '\(\text{ηγεμών}\)' was instituted to carry out the decisions of the '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' (Tod. ii. 177. Demosth. XVII. 6, 8, 12 and 15-16.). Ryder considers that there is no evidence to suggest that Philip concluded an alliance with the Greeks separately from the peace treaty just outlined, partly because if Philip were already '\(\text{ηγεμών}\)' (cf. 4. 2-3. above) and in command of the projected Persian expedition, he would not need to make a further stipulation about friends and enemies, and partly because if he were already '\(\text{ηγεμών}\)' and had negotiated an offensive and defensive alliance with the Greeks, he would not have needed a vote on the issue of war against Persia.

The relationship of the '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' with the individual cities was such that they were represented in proportion to their size and importance with an appropriate number of votes, their representatives were empowered to act independently of their home states and the '\(\text{συνέδριον}\)' was the supreme authority after the '\(\text{ηγεμών}\)'. These conclusions are J. A. O. Larsen's, and he is generally supported by Ryder (cf. Larsen in Cph 20 (1925), 314f. Ryder op. cit., 160.).
5. 3. Soli Lacedaemonii et regem et leges contemperunt, servitutem, non pacem rati, quae non ipsis civitatibus conveniret, sed a victore ferretur.

Plutarch states that μόνοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι... όυτε συνεστάτευσαν ουτε τοοτοις (so. Philip and Alexander) ουτε τοις μεταξ' Μακεδονικοι βασιλεύσων, ουτε εις συνέκριν κοιλαν εσελθον ουτε φόρον θνέηκαν (Plut. Moral. 240 A.). Further confirmation that they did not make any formal agreement with the Macedonians can be found in Strabo, who says that they did not yield totally to the Macedonians but ... φυλάττοντες την αυτονομίαν ερν ειχον περι πρωτεύων αει προς τε τους άλλους Ελλήνας και προς των Μακεδόνων βασιλεάς (Strab. VIII. 365.). Pausanias refers to a Spartan victory over the Macedonians when Philip invaded Laconia, in that a detachment of Philip's army was defeated while plundering the coastal districts. The Spartans then set up a trophy outside the walls of Las, which Pausanias says was ten stades from the sea and forty stades from Gythium (Paus. III. 24. 6.). Philip was in fact assisted in his attack on the Spartans by the Eleans (Paus. V. 4. 9.). Polybius, in a speech attributed to Lyciscus the Acarnanian given at Sparta, has Philip invading Sparta, cutting down crops and trees and burning homes, and ultimately by assigning some Spartan territory to Argos (Paus. II. 38. 5. II. 20. 1.), Tegea (Theopomp. frg. 238. cf. Beloch GG 1922, III. 1. 575. n.1.), Megalopolis (Livy. XXXVIII. 44. Paus. VIII. 35. 4.) and Messenia (Tac. Ann. IV. 43. 3.), severely curtailing Spartan power and influence (Polyb. IX. 28.).

The accounts of Pausanias and Polybius would seem therefore to confirm Justin-Trogus' comment on the Spartan attitude to Philip, although they also supply hints as to the consequences of this attitude, namely an invasion of Laconia (cf. Ellis 1976, 204.) which, despite some spirited resistance (e.g. near Gythium), led to the partitioning of Spartan territory rather than its destruction.

The phrase 'servitutem non pacem rati' would seem to continue the
line of thought Justin-Trogus was pursuing above at 3. 11. He certainly seems keen to bring home the point that the Greeks lost their freedom under Philip's generalship.

5. 4. **Auxilia deinde singularum civitatum describuntur, sive adiuvandus ea manu rex oppugnante aliquo foret seu duce illo bellum inferendum.**

Diodorus says that Philip prescribed the numbers of soldiers to be provided by each city for the συμμαχία (Diod. XVI. 89. 3.). Tod shows that the congress (συνέδριον) would have the power to instruct the ἢγεσίματος to muster whatever size force he considered appropriate for the emergency (Tod 1948, ii. 177. 17-22.).

5. 5. **Neque enim dubium erat imperium Persarum his apparatibus peti.** This seems clearly to have been Philip's main military objective in respect of the Congress of Corinth. Diodorus has Philip speaking about war against Persia immediately after saying that a congress was called at Corinth, and indeed he had commenced chapter 89 by saying that Philip, now that he had broken the confidence of the leading Greek cities by his victory at Chaeronea, wanted to make war on the Persians for their destruction of the Greek temples (in the fifth century Persian Wars). Therefore, he says, ἐν Κορινθίᾳ τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ συναχθέντες, he succeeded in getting the Greeks to elect him στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος, and he began to make preparations for the campaign (Diod. XVI. 89. 3. See above for discussion of Philip's position as ἢγεσίματος at 4. 2-3.). Polybius discusses the reasons for war against Persia, firstly under Philip and then under Alexander. He sees the real reason as being the lack of Persian opposition to Xenophon and his troops in their retreat (401/400 B.C.) and likewise to Agesilaus and his force (396/395 B.C.), which led Philip to compare the Persian cowardice and idleness with his own military efficiency and that of his soldiers, and to see that
war with Persia promised great rewards. Polybius goes on to say that Philip used as a pretext for war the argument that it was his duty to exact vengeance from the Persians for their treatment of the Greeks (Polyb. III. 6. 9ff.). This same theme of punishment for wrongs inflicted on Greece is followed by Arrian, who has Alexander sending a letter to Darius referring to the harm done by his ancestors in invading Greece and Macedonia, pointing out in addition that the Persians had started the trouble by assisting Perinthus against Philip and sending a force under Ochus into Thrace which was then under Macedonian rule (Arrian. Anab. II. 14. 4.). Again this theme is picked up by Diodorus, who states that Alexander was generous in his treatment of the Greek cities in Caria, saying that the freedom of the Greeks was the reason for being at war with the Persians (Diod. XVII. 24. 1.).

Ellis feels that technically this proposal of war against Persia did not fall within the scope of the congress of Κοινῆς ἡγεμονίας unless it could be demonstrated that punishment for the spoliation of sacred places (rather than the destruction of Greek cities and citizens) was required for the present general security, and as an immediate punishment of the sins of the Persians in respect of their sacrilege to satisfy the gods. Ellis continues by speculating on Philip's own motives: his need to "ease the military pressures within his own society; that it might provide a unifying influence among the Greek states,...that he needed the sort of money that was to be won in Asia Minor or beyond; that he saw the virtue of Isocrates' proposal to settle colonies of the restless, dispossessed, war-produced elements in Greece that provided ready mercenaries to serve any wealthy tyrant" (Ellis 1976, 208.).

5. 6-7. Summa auxiliarum CC milia peditum fuere et equitum XV milia. Extra hanc summam et Macedoniae exercitus erant et confinis domitarum
gentium barbaria.

Diodorus says that Philip ἐξαγαγεῖ το πλῆθος τῶν συμμαχών στρατευτῶν returned to Macedonia (Diod. XVI. 89. 3.). Thirlwall, Grote and D. G. Hogarth all regard Justin-Trogus' figures as very exaggerated and almost certainly completely wrong (Thirlwall 1850, 113. n. 1. Grote 1888 IX, 494. Hogarth 1897, 137.). Hogarth points out that Alexander crossed over to Asia with not more than 40,000 men two years later, this figure of his presumably being based on Diodorus' detailed breakdown of the troop list of Alexander (which totalled 32,000 foot and 4,500 horse: Diod. XVII. 17. 4.) together with Justin-Trogus' identical total figures (XI. 6. 2.), Plutarch's 30,000 - 43,000 foot and 4,000 - 5,000 horse (Plut. Alex. 15. 1.) and Arrian's οὖ πολλὲς πλεῖστος 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse. (For further confirmation of these numbers from ancient sources cf. C.B. Welles in the Loeb edition of Diodorus 1963, vol. VIII. 164. n. 2.). It seems therefore that the figure of 200,000 foot and 15,000 horse is exaggerated, especially when, as can be seen from the next sentence, this figure did not take into account the army of Macedonia and the barbarians 'confinis domitarum gentium'. In Alexander's army referred to above Diodorus says that the infantry comprised 12,000 Macedonians, 7,000 σύμμαχοι, 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians, 1,000 archers and τῶν Ἀγρίων καλομένων, and the cavalry numbered 1,800 Macedonians, 1,800 Thessalians, 600 τῶν 5' ἀλλων Ἑλλήνων, and 900 Thracian and Paeonian scouts. Surely the numbers of troops raised by Philip can not have been far removed from these figures?

5. 8. Initio veris tres duces in Asiam Persarum iuris praemittit, Parmenionem, Amyntam et Attalum,...

According to Diodorus, Attalus and Parmenion were sent as an advance party for an invasion of Persia (cf. sentence 5 above) with part of the Macedonian forces and instructions to liberate the Greek cities,
while Philip himself went about obtaining divine approval from the oracle at Delphi (Diod. XVI. 91. 2.). Polyaenus describes Parmenion and Attalus as having 10,000 men facing Memnon (Polyaen. Strat. V. 44. 4.), and Diodorus refers to a mixed force of Macedonians and mercenaries facing the Persians in the Troad (Diod. XVII. 7. 10.). R.D Milns suggests that there were probably about 1,000 cavalry, comprising 400 mercenaries and 600 Macedonians (Milns in JHS 1966, 167).

E. Badian believes that it was unlikely that when Alexander became king he nullified or altered the mandate given to Parmenion until he had time to turn his attention to matters in Asia, being occupied with Illyrian and Greek problems on his accession to the Macedonian throne (Badian 1966, 37ff.), but Ellis points out that the expedition had set off in about March 336, and Philip died in July, which left very little time for progress, and indeed since there were great preparations being made for the main expedition at the time of Philip's murder indicating a late summer or autumn start, Ellis thinks that any orders Parmenion may have got would not extend beyond the end of the campaigning season for 336 (Ellis 1976, 220.). However, in a footnote, Ellis goes so far as to say he thinks it unlikely that Parmenion was following any orders at all, since the death of Philip and the subsequent appointment of Memnon in 335 by Darius III to recover the Persian losses of 336 would mean that the Macedonians were likely to be trying to hold on to their gains of 336 rather than acting upon orders from Macedonia (Ellis op. cit. 305. n. 48.). Ellis' comments seem rather confused and contradictory. Surely Parmenion must have set out with some form of instructions (however limited as regards the time allocated for them before the main expedition arrived)—after all, communications were very slow and it would have been very difficult to monitor the advance party's progress.
5. 9. *cuius sororem nuper expulsa Alexandri matre Olympiade propter stupri suspitionem in matrimonium receperat.*

This marriage probably took place in the spring or summer of 337 (cf. Ellis 1976, 211.). Satyrus says that she was Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, and sister of Hippostratus (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557b - c), and this is confirmed by Plutarch (Alex. 9.), Pausanias (VIII. 7. 7.), Aelian (V.H. XIII. 36.) and Diodorus (XVI. 93. 9. XVII. 2. 3.), although there seems to be some confusion in the latter as to the relationship between Attalus and Cleopatra, in that Attalus is said to have been her nephew (δέκατος) in the first reference, and her brother (δέκατος) in the second. Plutarch uses the word ὀδηγός "uncle" for Attalus, and Pausanias ἀδελφής "niece" for Cleopatra. It would seem more likely that this was the relationship, although it is interesting that both Diodorus (in one place) and Justin-Trogus, who are the main sources for Philip's reign, should have a brother/sister relationship for Attalus and Cleopatra. Arrian says she was called Eurydice (Arrian. Anab. III. 6. 5.)

Ellis goes into the question of the divorce of Olympias in detail. He maintains that there is no evidence for Philip divorcing Olympias— even Justin-Trogus' statement here, he feels, does not imply divorce in a modern sense— since modern commentators have often tried to make artificial distinctions between 'wives' and 'concubines' in dealing with the marriages of Macedonian kings (and especially so with the mother of Alexander the Great) to the extent that they have obscured the accepted (even by the Greeks) polygamy amongst the Macedonian kings. While Ellis accepts that his own comments are purely and necessarily speculative, he does make the perfectly sensible point that, since a wife's main virtue was the provision of children (sons as potential heirs, and daughters for diplomatic marriages) and from six marriages (see below in 8. 3. for details) Philip had gained only two sons, it was perfectly reasonable for him to take another bed
partner (Ellis op. cit. 212. 303. n. 20.). In any case one of these sons, Arridaeus, was apparently mentally sick, thus reducing the effective number of heirs to one, Alexander (for Arridaeus, see below at 8. 2.). This need not mean that Alexander and Olympias were being passed over, since it was most unlikely that Philip, with the Asian expedition imminent, would let the Macedonian throne appear to be destined for (as yet) unborn issue from a new marriage. The anger of Olympias and Alexander, however, is a perfectly understandable human reaction to the situation and, although tempers were lost (cf. below 7. 3-4.) and Olympias and Alexander departed from Macedonia (voluntarily, below 7. 5.) Philip clearly wanted them back in Macedonia for his wedding and, more importantly, surely, in the case of Alexander, for the Asian expedition.

6. 1. Interea, dum auxilia a Graecia coeunt, nuptias Cleopatrae filiae et Alexandri, quem regem Epiri fecerat, celebrat.

The 'auxilia' are those referred to above at 5. 4. The arrangements for and course of this wedding and the subsequent murder of Philip are covered in detail by Diodorus XVI. 91. 4. - 94. 4. Diodorus does not give Philip any motive for arranging this marriage between his daughter Cleopatra and Alexander of Epirus (see above, VIII. 6. 4-8., for earlier dealings between Philip and this young man), but it has been interpreted by modern historians (e.g. Grote, Thirlwall, Pickard-Cambridge and Hammond) as a move to neutralise Epirotic opposition to Philip, Olympias having fled to the court of Alexander of Epirus after the row between Philip and his son Alexander concerning the insulting remarks of Attalus (see below, 7. 3-4.).

6. 2. Dies erat pro magnitudine duorum regum, et conlocantis filiam et uxorem ducentis, apparatibus insignis.

Diódorus supplies much detail about the magnificence of this occasion: this included musical contests and sumptuous banquets for the many
friends and guests Philip had invited from all over Greece, the receiving by Philip of golden crowns from individuals and cities, including Athens, a state banquet, games and grand procession, which included twelve richly adorned statues of the gods and a thirteenth statue of similar magnificence portraying Philip himself (Diod. XVI. 91. 4ff.). The two kings were of course Philip ('conlocantis filiam') and Alexander of Epirus ('uxorem ducentis'). Ellis sees the occasion as an exercise in public relations (Ellis 1976, 222.), and certainly Philip must have been encouraged by, for example, the conferment of a golden crown from Athens (Diod. loc. cit.).

6. 3. Sed nec ludorum magnificentia deerat: ad quorum spectaculum Philippus cum sine custodibus corporis medius inter duos Alexandros, filium generumque, contenderet,...

These games were to be the central event of the second day of the celebrations, and Diodorus speaks of spectators for the games flocking into the θεατέρων while it was still dark, ready for the big parade which would herald the start of the games (Diod. XVI. 92. 5.). The 'magnificentia' is probably a reference to the statues already mentioned in the previous note. Diodorus says that Philip, who was wearing a white cloak, gave orders that his bodyguard should follow him at a distance in order to demonstrate that he was protected by the goodwill of the Greeks, and did not need weapons to protect him (Diod. XVI. 93. 1.).

6. 4. ...Pausanias, nobilis ex Macedonibus adulescens, nemini suspectus, occupatis angustiis Philippum in transitu obturcavit diemque laetitiae destinatum foedum luctu funeris facit.

According to Diodorus, Pausanias was τὸ μὲν γένος Μακεδών ἐκ τῆς Ὀρεστίδος καλούμενος, τὸ δὲ βασιλέως σώματοφύλαξ... (Diod. XVI. 93. 3.). After filling in the background information about Pausanias (see below, in the next note), Diodorus goes on to
say that he left horses by the city gates and came to the entrance of the theatre (πρὸς τὰς εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἰσόδους) with a Celtic dagger (κέλτικὴν μάχαραν) concealed under his cloak. He then waited until Philip was left alone, as a result of his instructing the friends who were accompanying him to enter the theatre and the guards to keep their distance, and plunged the dagger through the king's ribs (Diod. XVI. 94. 3.).

The details of the story of Pausanias' grievances are given in the next note, but, as E. Badian has remarked, the important question is not whether one should believe that a personal motive such as that attributed to Pausanias could have been an acceptable explanation for the murder, but rather how and why this old wound of Pausanias' should have opened at this particular time, possibly eight years after the event (Badian in Phoenix 17 (1963), 247-8.). Arrian hints that Persian bribery could have been involved, although this was not suggested at the time (Arrian. Anab. II. 14. 5.). Badian goes on to show that of the three Lyncestian nobles, who might have been expected to make a bid for the throne after the assassination, two appear to have been taken by surprise by the events, were accused of being implicated and immediately executed, while the third brother, Alexander, who was Antipater's son-in-law, at once acknowledged Alexander, Philip's son, as the new king and did homage to him, although he too was to be executed eventually. Then through Parmenion the new king engineered the death of Attalus, who was both popular with the army (and consequently very powerful) and had also insulted Alexander himself (Diod. XVII. 2.).

Badian concludes therefore that Philip's death "...fits into the pattern of Macedonian court politics and the life and career of Alexander the Great" (Badian op. cit. 250.).
The story of Pausanias' grievances is well documented in Diodorus (XVI. 93. 3ff.), and Plutarch makes a clear reference to it (Plut. Alex. 10.). According to Diodorus, Pausanias became a hermaphrodite and ready to accept ἐρωτας from anyone who was willing. This upset the second Pausanias to such an extent that, after taking Attalus into his confidence about the insult and about what his intentions were, he sacrificed his life a few days later in a battle with the Illyrians by exposing himself to the blows being aimed at Philip. Later, back in Macedonia, Attalus invited Pausanias to a banquet, got him drunk on unmixed wine, and then handed him over, unconscious, to some muleteers (ὀρεωκόροις) for abusive treatment (εἰς ὑβρίν καὶ παροινίν ἐταρικόν). Clearly it is the second sentence of Justin-Trogus' comments on Pausanias which is being dealt with by Diodorus, but with no explanation as to why he was treated in this way at the banquet by Attalus. The first sentence would seem to suggest that at some time before the banquet episode Pausanias had suffered some form of 'stuprum' at the hands of Attalus 'per iniuriam'. As to what this involved there is no evidence at all, but since Pausanias was very good-looking Attalus may also have indulged in paedophilia.
Diodorus says that as soon as Pausanias recovered from the effects of the wine, deeply resentful, he accused Attalus in front of the king. Philip apparently sympathised, but was unwilling to take any action against Attalus, whom he had just elected as one of the generals for the advance party for the Asian campaign in view of his military ability, and who was also the uncle of the young Cleopatra whom he had just married. And so Philip showered the young man with gifts and promoted him in the bodyguard (Diod. XVI. 93. 8.). Justin-Trogus differs from Diodorus only in that by 'non sine risu' he suggests that perhaps Philip was not quite as sympathetic as Diodorus would have us believe, and in the time factor, in that according to Justin-Trogus the murder of Philip would seem to follow fairly soon after the banqueting incident and its sequel, whereas Diodorus' account, particularly at the beginning of chapter 94, where Pausanias ... εμεταθετον φυλαττων την ὀργήν ... is encouraged in his desire for revenge by the sophist Hermocrates, under whom he was studying. Welles, in his commentary on Diodorus, while admitting that the circumstances surrounding Pausanias and his grievances cannot be dated exactly, suggests that they could have occurred as early as 344 B.C. (Diod. Loeb 1963, vol. VIII. 98. n. 1.).

The 'honoratum...ducatu' refers of course to Attalus' appointment as one of the generals of the advance party mentioned above in 5. 8. The clause 'quam ab adversario non poterat' refers most likely to the fact that Philip had refused to punish him, but in any case Attalus was by now in Asia.

7. 1. Creditum est etiam inmissum ab Olympiade, matre Alexandri, fuisse, nec ipsum Alexandrum ignorum paternae caedis extitisse; Diodorus makes no mention of either Olympias or Alexander being implicated in the murder, but Plutarch quite explicitly states that most of the blame attached itself to Olympias because she had urged
on Pausanias, and Alexander also incurred some suspicion because, on being approached by the injured Pausanias who was bemoaning his treatment, he quoted from Euripides' *Medea*: τον δόντα καὶ γήματα καὶ γαμομένη, which could be interpreted to mean that he was suggesting that Pausanias should murder the person who was giving the bride (Attalus), the bridegroom (Philip) and the bride (Cleopatra). Plutarch does go on to say that Alexander sought out those who had participated in the plot and punished them, and that he was angry with Olympias' treatment of Cleopatra (Plut. *Alex.* 10. see below, sentence 12.).

7. 2. *quippe non minus Olympiada repudium et praeslatam sibi Cleopatram quam stuprum Pausaniam doluisse.*

If Olympias was involved in the murder, then this motive is a perfectly understandable and human one, whatever the technical meaning of 'repudium' may be (cf. note on 5. 9.). It would seem from Plutarch that Olympias was a jealous and sullen woman (Plut. *Alex.* 9.).

7. 3-4. *Alexandrum quoque regni aemulum fratrem ex noverca susceptum timuisse: eoque factum, ut in convivio antea primum cum Attalo, mox cum ipso patre iurgaret, adeo ut etiam stricto gladio eum Philippus consectatus sit aegreae a filii caede amicorum precibus exoratus.*

That Alexander had no real need to fear for his future accession to the throne has been pointed out already (see note on 5. 9. above), but that he was worried about this can be seen from his reaction to Attalus' remark. Again, as in the case of Olympias, Alexander's reading of the situation is a human and understandable one.

The main account of the incident with Attalus here alluded to by Justin-Trogus is to be found in Plutarch: at the celebrations for Philip's marriage to Cleopatra, her uncle, Attalus, who was drunk, ventured to declare that he hoped that a legitimate successor to the kingdom of Macedon might be born to Philip and Cleopatra. Alexander
furiously asked Attalus whether he considered him to be a bastard and hurled his wine cup at him. Upon this Philip also rose in anger and drew his sword, not against Attalus, but against Alexander, and was only prevented from killing him by falling over as a result of the amount of wine he had drunk. Alexander then made a mocking remark about the man who was about to cross over to Asia being unable to cross from one couch to another. He then left Macedon with Olympias—see below next sentence, 5. (Plut. Alex. 9.). Satyrus repeats the same story of the remark made by Attalus, an exchange of wine-cup throwing but no words from Alexander, and no reaction from or even mention of Philip (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557d.). Ellis draws attention to two ways in which this incident can be viewed, either that Philip agreed with Attalus about producing a legitimate heir, or that he had a sudden drunken fit of temper (assuming that the Justin-Trogus/Plutarch version is to be believed), but he does not commit himself to either view (Ellis 1976, 215.). On the whole, the second view would seem more tenable if Ellis' views on Alexander's position in the succession are to be followed (ibid. 216.).

7. 5. Quamobrem Alexander ad avunculum se in Epirum cum matre, inde ad reges Illyriorum contulerat:

Plutarch and Satyrus agree that Olympias went to Epirus—Satyrus says the kingdom of the Molossians—and that Alexander went on to Illyria, after escorting his mother safely to Epirus. The 'avunculum' is Alexander of Epirus, referred to below in sentence 7, and above in 6. 1. (Plut. Alex. 9. Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557.).

7. 6. vixque revocanti mitigatus est patri precibusque cognatorum aegre redire compulsus.

Plutarch tells the story that Demeratus, a Corinthian who was a ξένος ... τῆς οἰκίας , came to see Philip, and upon the latter's enquiry as to whether the Greeks were agreeing with each other, Demeratus
replied that it was very fitting that Philip should be concerned about Greece when there were such great disagreements and crises in his own household. In this way Philip was brought to his senses, and he summoned Alexander home with the help of Demeratus' negotiations (Plut. Alex. 9.). That Philip was reconciled both to Alexander and Olympias is pointed out elsewhere by Plutarch (Plut. Moral. 179c.).

7. 7. Olympias quoque fratrem suum Alexandrum, Epiri regem, in bellum subornabat pervicissetque, ni filiae nuptiis pater generum occupasset. The meaning of 'occupasset' here must be that of catching a person before he is able to carry out his purpose (cf. OLD fasc. 5. 1976, 1235.), and here Philip clearly forestalled any future trouble from Alexander by making him his 'generum'—the word is used anticipatorily here—through marriage with his daughter.

There is no other authority for this statement, but it would be a perfectly reasonable move under the circumstances. Perhaps it was when this proved futile by the engagement of Alexander of Epirus and Cleopatra that Olympias resigned herself to the fact that she would gain nothing by remaining out of Macedonia and so accepted the invitation to return with her son. Philip was renowned for his marriages of convenience, usually involving himself and whatever campaign he happened to be pursuing at the time (cf. Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557.), and here he is using a marriage for his daughter as a political expedient.

7. 8. His stimulus irarum utrique Pausaniam de inpunitate stupri sui querentem ad tantum facinus inpulisse creduntur.

cf. Plut. Alex. 10. This has already been discussed under 7. 1.

7. 9. Olympias certe fugienti percussori etiam equos habuit praeparatos.

Diodorus had said that Pausanias had himself organised his escape
horses at the city gates, and then after he had struck the fatal blow he ran for the gates and ... τοὺς ἕτερας πέραν τῆς φυγῆς ἔθενυ ἵππους (Diod. XVI. 94. 3.). It has already been noted that Diodorus in no way implicates either Olympias or Alexander in the murder, but it is perhaps worth noting that Plutarch, who is quite sure of Olympias' involvement and highly suspicious of Alexander's behaviour, finds no place for corroborative evidence in the form of involving Olympias in the escape bid with the horses.

7. 10. Ipse deinde audita regis nece cum titulo officii ad exequias cecurrisset, in cruce pendentis Pausaniae capiti eadem nocte. Qua venit, coronam auream inposuit, quod nemo alius audere nisi haec superstite Philippi filio potuisset. There is possibly some geographical and temporal difficulty here. From the fact that Olympias hurried to the funeral when she heard of her husband's death, and she placed a gold crown on the head of Pausanias the same night that she came, it would seem to be implied that she had a certain amount of distance to cover before she could get to the scene. We are told by Diodorus that the wedding was taking place at Aegae—did Philip's funeral take place there, or was his body taken back to the capital at Pella? The royal burial ground of the Macedonian kings was apparently at Aegae, which was the cultural centre of Macedonia, even though Archelaus had moved the capital to Pella (cf. Hammond 1972, 153. Ellis 1976, 40.). Pausanias points out that Alexander's body was on its way back to Aegae when Ptolemy persuaded the Macedonian soldiers to hand over the body to him to be buried at Memphis (Paus. I. 6. 13.). Justin-Trogus has earlier remarked on the superstition that a change of burial ground from the royal one at Aegae for Alexander led to the extinction of the royal line after him (Justin-Trogus VII. 2. 4.). From the last two passages it can be surmised that Philip's burial place must have been Aegae. Where then was Olympias during the wedding celebrations? If she were
present at Aegae, as some scholars have assumed, why does she arrive in haste at night? After all, the murder had taken place during the day, and with the last time reference in Diodorus being the parade forming at sunrise (Diod. XVI. 92. 5.), it would seem more likely to have been in the morning. Perhaps Justin-Trogus has parts of two different accounts, one directly implicating Olympias on the spot (assisting with the horses), and the second one bringing her from a distance (Epirus?) on hearing the news and arriving at Aegae in time for the funeral.

\[\text{...in cruce pendentis Pausaniae...}\]

According to Diodorus, Pausanias, in running for the gates and horses pursued by bodyguards including Leonnatus, Perdiccas and Attalus (probably the son of Andromenes, a close friend and contemporary of Alexander. cf. Welles in Loeb vol. VIII of Diodorus 1963, 101. n. 2.), although he had a good start, tripped over a vine and was then killed by the javelins thrown by Perdiccas and his followers (Diod. XVI. 94. 4.). Whether he was subsequently affixed to a cross to be displayed as a grim example of what happens to assassins who are caught must remain a matter for conjecture, although there may be a precedent for this procedure to be gleaned from Diodorus, who has Philip hanging Onomarchus apparently after he had been killed along with 6,000 Phocians and mercenaries- cf. note on VIII. 2. 4. above. (Diod. XVI. 35. 6.).

\[\text{...quod nemo alius...potuisset...}\]

Justin-Trogus really goes to town in the next few lines in heaping incriminating evidence on Olympias, finishing with the outrageous statement in the last sentence of the chapter that she appeared to be afraid that it should not be clear enough that she had been responsible for the promotion of the crime. The 'superstite' is, of course, Alexander. Quite what Justin-Trogus meant by saying that no other
person would have dared to do this act while a son of Philip was still alive is not altogether clear. Since he has told us during the course of this chapter that Alexander was not unaware that his father was to be killed, that he feared his stepmother's son by Philip as a possible rival to the throne, that he had quarrelled with his father and had been reconciled to him with difficulty, surely, in the eyes of Justin-Trogus, he would not be likely to exact terrible vengeance from anyone caught putting a golden crown on his father's assassin's head.

7. 11. Paucos deinde post dies refixum corpus interfectoris super reliquias mariti cremavit et tumulum ei eodem fecit in loco parentari-que eidem quotannis incusua populo superstitione curavit. Ellis finds this part of Justin-Trogus' account completely incredible. He regards it as inconceivable that stories of this action of Olympias could have been in circulation at the time, and prefers to suggest that they may have formed part of a later tradition in vogue at the time of Cassander's successful propaganda campaign against Olympias, resulting in her condemnation and death at Pydna in 316 (Ellis 1976, 225. cf. Edson in Hesperia 1949, 87.). This seems to be sound reasoning, and acceptable in def of further evidence.

7. 12. Post haec Cleopatram, a qua pulsa Philippi matrimonio fuerat, in gremio eius prius filia interfecta, finire vitam suspendio coegit; spectaculoque pendentis ultionem potita est, ad quam per parricidium festinaverat. According to Satyrus, the daughter's name was Europe (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557d.). As noted above in 7. 1. Alexander was reputedly angry with Olympias because of her savage treatment of Cleopatra while he was away (Plut. Alex. 10. 4.), but Plutarch supplies no details of this treatment. Pausanias' version has Olympias dragging Cleopatra and her baby son on to a bronze cauldron and so burning them to death.
A son by Cleopatra is also mentioned above by Justin-Trogus in 7. 3. as being a threat to his succeeding to the throne. Justin-Trogus later has Alexander giving orders for his brother Caranus, aemulum quoque imperii, to be put to death (Justin-Trogus XI. 2. 3.). Diodorus says that Cleopatra had given birth to a παιδίον only a few days before Philip's death (Diod. XVII. 2. 3.).

Green and Lane Fox both try to fit in time for two children to be born to Philip and Cleopatra before the death of Philip (Green 1974, 87ff. Lane Fox 1973, 503.), but Ellis, claiming that all the sources agree that Cleopatra bore only one child and in fact only had time to do this, thinks that Caranus did not exist (Ellis 1976, 301-2 nn. 1. and 4. 306. n. 54.). Ellis' claim of only one child goes against his own observations, namely that Justin-Trogus twice mentions a son, the second time by name, as well as the daughter in this sentence. Ellis is probably right in regarding the 'filia' here and the παιδίον of Diodorus as the daughter Europe mentioned by Satyrus, but his argument that Philip and Cleopatra did not have time to produce two children does not take into account the possibility of a child having been produced earlier by an adulterous relationship between Philip and Cleopatra, a child who would have been regarded by the Macedonian people as illegitimate, having no claim to the throne. Hence in marrying Cleopatra, assuming the Macedonian establishment would still have regarded the bastard child with suspicion and certainly not having as strong a claim to the throne as Alexander, Philip might be able to gain a legitimate (i.e. produced manifestly in wedlock) heir. This at any rate might explain the drunken remark of Attalus about a legitimate heir—legitimate as opposed to the illegitimate Caranus, rather than as opposed to Alexander (who thus misinterpreted the term as referring to himself).

Whether or not Ellis is right in disregarding the existence of Caranus, what is clear from this sentence and the other authorities mentioned, is that Olympias seems to have been responsible for the
deaths of Cleopatra and her new-born child. The second half of the sentence—...'spectaculoque pendentis'...—sees, in Justin-Trogus' eyes, the culmination of the fury of the slighted Olympias in her brutal murder of Cleopatra and her child and the revenge satisfactorily achieved. Again Justin-Trogus displays a woman in a very black light (cf. Eurydice in VII. 5. 4ff.).


The 'gladium' is referred to by Diodorus as a κέλτικήν μίξαραν, and indeed a description of the weapon is to be found in Aelian, who says that ...το τοῦ Παυσανίου ξίφος, ὡς τὸν Φίλιππον δειχνότατό, ἐρμα ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς λαβής διαγεγυμνέον ἐλεφάντινον (Aelian, III. 45. Diod. XVI. 93. 3.). Aelian had just been describing an oracle whereby Philip was to beware of a chariot. Cicero also refers to the carving on the sword of quadrigulas against which Philip was warned to be on his guard (Cic. De Fato 5.)

7. 14. Quae omnia ita palam facta sunt, ut timuisse videatur, ne facinus ab ea commissum non probaretur.

As if Justin-Trogus is not satisfied that his reader has by now grasped the idea that Olympias is indisputably guilty of the promotion of the crime, he finishes off the section with this rather absurd and unnecessary comment, which seems to amplify his dislike for her. On the other hand it may amount to no more than emphasising that she seemed to glory in the crime.

8. 1. Decessit Philippus XL et septem annorum, cum annis XXV regnasset. According to Arrian, this took place in July 336—...άρθρον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων (Arrian, Anab. I. 1. 1.). Pausanias says that Philip was 46 (Paus. VIII. 7. 6.), and Diodorus says that he ruled for 24
years (Diod. XVI. 95. 1.), as does Eusebius (in Diod. frgs. of VII. 15. 2.). Satyrus says he reigned for 22 years (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557d.), but if he came to the throne in 359 and reigned until July 336 this makes a maximum reign of 23½ years, and therefore, if he was 46 when he died, he must have been born in 382.

8. 2. **Genuit ex Larissaea salatrice filium Arridaeum, qui post Alexandrum regnavit.**

This Thessalian dancing girl ('Larissaeo scorto' in XIII. 2. 11. below) was called Philinna (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII. 557d.), and Philip will have married her (inferring this from the 'variis matrimoniis' in the next sentence) in late 358 or early 357 (see next note). According to Plutarch, Arridaeus was Philip's son ... ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀδόξου καὶ κοινῆς Φιλίννης ..., and that he was lacking in intellect because of a disease of the body, which had been brought on by drugs administered by Olympias, having apparently been quite normal and intelligent as a boy (Plut. Alex. 77. 5.). Diodorus refers to Arridaeus as having an incurable mental illness (Diod. XVIII. 2. 2.). After the death of Alexander in 323, Arridaeus was made king jointly with Alexander's posthumous child by Roxane, Alexander IV, taking the name Philip Arridaeus and the title of Philip III (Diod. XVIII. 2. 4. Justin-Trogus XIII. 3. 1.), although he was actually manipulated by Perdiccas, Antipater, Polyperchon and Cassander. In the end he was captured and killed by Olympias in order to secure control of the Macedonian throne for herself and Alexander's son, Alexander IV (Diod. XIX. 11. 1ff. Justin-Trogus XIV. 5. 10.).

8. 3. **Habuit et multos alios filios ex variis matrimoniis regio more susceptos, qui partim fato, partim ferro perierē.**

Satyrus gives the most detailed list of Philip's wives and offspring: Audata of Illyria, by whom he had a daughter, Cynna; Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas; Nicesipolis of Pherae, by whom he had
Thessalonice; Philinna of Larissa, by whom he had Arridaeus; Olympias by whom he had Alexander and Cleopatra; Meda, daughter of the Thracian king, Cothelas; and finally Cleopatra, niece of Attalus, by whom he had a daughter, Europe. Thus, according to Satyrus, Philip had a total of seven wives, four daughters and two sons (Satyr. ap. Ath. XIII 557d.). This passage of Satyrus has been the subject of much discussion: see, for example, Beloch 1923, III. 2. 68ff. Ehrhardt in CQ 1967, 297. Griffith in CQ 1970, 69-70. Green 1974, 27ff. and 515n. Ellis 1976, 211ff. and 302 nn. 4-11.

Beloch first recognised the unsatisfactory chronology of the list, and the later commentators have agreed, although Griffith disagrees with Ehrhardt about the date of the marriage with Philinna: Ehrhardt had suggested 353 as the most likely, at the time when Philip assisted the Thessalians against Pherae, but Griffith points out that Arridaeus would only be fifteen years old at the time of Pixodarus' wish to have him married to his daughter (337), too young for a Macedonian or Greek boy to be married (Griffith cites W. K. Lacey 1968, 106ff. 212. 313. nn. 10-11.), and that the marriage should be dated to 358 or early 357, at the time of Philip's earlier dealings with Thessaly, and Ellis concurs with this. The fact that Lacey cannot supply Griffith with any evidence for boys marrying at the age of fifteen must not be taken to mean that this never happened, but on balance Griffith is probably right in giving 357/8 for the marriage with Philinna and the birth of Arridaeus.

As far as the other marriages are concerned, Philip will have married Audata in 359/8, at the time of his early Illyrian campaigns (cf. Ellis 1976, 47f.), Phila possibly in 359 or even earlier (ibid. 46.), Nicesepolis in 352 (cf. Ehrhardt 1967, 297., who points out- and Ellis agrees with him- that, since the daughter of this union, Thessalonice, was most likely to be so named as a result of Philip's victory over Onomarchus in 352 (cf. Beloch 1923, III. 2. 69.), a date very close to that victory would seem to be indicated), Olympias in
357 before the birth of Alexander in the summer of 356 (cf. VII. 6. 10. above and Ellis 1976, 62.), Meda in 342 at the time of Philip's alliance with her father, Gothelas (cf. Ellis 1976, 166.) and Cleopatra in 337 (cf. 5. 9. above).

As to the deaths of the various children, Cynna, daughter of Philip and Audata, met a violent though apparently heroic death at the hands of Alcetas and a Macedonian army in the political struggle following the death of Alexander (Polyaen. Strat. VIII. 60.). Arridaeus was put to death on the orders of Olympias in 317 (Justin-Trogus XIV. 5. 10.). Alexander died in 323 as the result of a fever lasting eleven days, although Justin-Trogus and Arrian suggest that he was poisoned (Justin-Trogus XII. 13. 10ff. Arrian. VII. 27. 1.). However, as Plutarch points out, it was five years before any suspicion of poisoning arose, and it seems unlikely that this was the case (Plut. Alex. 77. cf. Lane Fox 1973, 471.). Thessalonice was murdered by her son Antipater in 295 B.C. (Paus. IX. 7. 3. Diod. XXI. 7.). Cleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias, was assassinated on the orders of Antigonus in 308 B.C. (Diod. XX. 37. 5.). Europe was murdered by Olympias as described above in 7. 12. in 336 B.C. It would seem therefore that only Alexander, of the six children, died 'fato', while the other five died 'ferro'- hardly any real justification for 'partim...partim', especially in view of Justin-Trogus' own insinuations about Alexander being poisoned, unless he refers to some more not mentioned by Satyrus.

8. 4-6. Puit rex armorum quam conviviorum apparatibus studiosior, cui maximeae ones erant instrumenta bellorum: divitiarum quaestu quam custodia sollertior. Itaque inter cotidianas rapinas semper inops erat. Certainly from all the authorities comes ample evidence that Philip spent a good part of his reign in campaigns against various neighbouring states, and it is perhaps worth noting that the Macedonians (whether or not Philip was actually in the field with them, although
he seems usually to have been so) were engaged in some form of fighting each year of his reign, with the possible exception of 343 which concluded with Philip sending his final offer of peace to Athens. That his war budget was not inexhaustible has already been noted above by Justin-Trogus in 1. 5., where he describes Philip's efforts to raise money by plundering during his lengthy siege of Byzantium. For further discussion on Philip's army and foreign policy in general, see Ellis 1976, 231ff.


Justin-Trogus concludes what has been a generally hostile account of Philip with this character assassination, which comes as no surprise. If one examines Justin-Trogus' own account for examples of 'misericordia', there are only two occasions where Philip could in any way be said to have been acting from this sentiment, and both of these occasions involved the Athenians: at VII. 6. 6. he allowed the Athenians to go home unmolested and without ransom, after he had trapped them with a Macedonian army at the time of the Athenian attempt to place Argaeus on the throne at the beginning of Philip's reign (cf. the note on this sentence), and at IX. 5. 4. he again treated the Athenians lightly when he returned their prisoners without ransom, and gave up the bodies of their dead for burial after the battle of Chaeronea.

It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the number of times that Justin-Trogus accuses Philip of acting with 'perfidia', or some similar expression. It is especially evident in the section following on from VIII. 3. 1., and in sentence 6 of that chapter the expression *bello pari perfidia gesto* occurs.
8. 8. **Blandus pariter et insidiosus, adloquio qui plura promitteret quam praestaret: in seria et iocos artifex.**

There are many occasions when Philip played one party off against another— for example, the ambassadors from the Thessalians and Boeotians against the ambassadors from the Phocians, Spartans and Thebans in VIII. 4. 3ff.— and this duplicity certainly brought him success in his foreign policy. Justin-Trogus' claim that Philip promised more than he could fulfil seems a little strange: there is no obvious occasion to which this could be linked, and so it may perhaps be seen as rhetorical exaggeration.

That Philip had a sense of humour can be seen from comments preserved by both Plutarch and Polyagenus, in so far as these can be believed (Plut. Moral. 177c – 179d. Polyagen. Strat. IV. 2. 6.).

8. 9. **Amicitias utilitate, non fide colebat. Gratiam fingere in odio, instruere inter concordantes odia, avud utrumque gratiam quaerere sollemnis illi consuetudo.**

Again this is so generalised that very little can be gleaned from it other than the observation that Justin-Trogus is amplifying his point made in the previous sentence that Philip was 'blandus pariter et insidiosus'. 'utrumque' presumably means "both sides" in any given situation where Philip might have been faced with differing views amongst his friends.

8. 10. **Inter haec eloquentia et insignis oratio, acuminis et sollertiae plena, ut nec ornatui facilitas nec facilitati inventionum deesset ornatus.**

The point Justin-Trogus seems to be making here is that since Philip was so devious in his character and his actions, this was reflected in his ability to make speeches in a most eloquent and clever, yet devious, manner.
8. 11. **Hui Alexander filius successit et virtute et vitii patre maior.**
cf. Diod. XVII. 2. 1. Plut. Alex. 11. Arrian. Anab. I. 1. Justin-Trogus eulogises Alexander after his death, saying of his mother Olympias that she ...profecto maius humana mortalitate opus utero tulit...; and of Alexander himself that he was a man ...supra humanam potentiam magnitudine animi praeditus (Justin-Trogus XII. 6. 1ff.). However, Justin-Trogus makes no further assessment of Alexander's character, leaving it in this form of parallel assessment with Philip's character.


This device of antithesis is also used by Justin-Trogus at VII. 6. 3-5, where it was seen possibly as a survival of a portion of the original Trogus (cf. the note on this section above). One is at once reminded of a similar comparison of two famous people's characters given by Sallust in his account of the Catiline conspiracy, where Cato and Caesar are compared (Sallust, Cat. 54.). Important features evident
in this chapter of Sallust are brevity, the use of antithesis and a
colourful use of asyndeton in presenting a vivid picture of events to
the reader, all of which demonstrate the influence of Thucydides (cf.
P. McGushin 1977, 271.).

The main exponent of parallel assessments of character is of
course Plutarch. At the end of nineteen of the twenty-two pairs of
lives there is a formal comparison (συγκρίσεις) of the two careers and
characters, which, being often forced and fanciful, concentrates on
contrasts rather than similarities, and its historical value is often
doubtful. The comparison reveals a rhetorical tradition (cf. F. Focke
in Herm. 58 (1923), 327f.), and is quite long-winded, touching on
Greek and Roman traditions in general.

There seems therefore to be a much closer link between the passages
of Justin-Trogus and Sallust. Each passage is short (twenty lines
each), making a considerable use of antithesis in very short phrases
or sentences. Both concentrate on contrasts, although the list of
contrasts is broken occasionally to ascribe a similar or identical
quality to each: e.g. *igitur eis genus, aetas, eloquentia prope
equalia fuere...*(Sallust. 54. 1.) and *Vini nimis uterque avidus...*
(Justin-Trogus 8. 15.). The main difference is of course that Sallust
is comparing two characters whom he admires, whereas Justin-Trogus is
faced with two characters he clearly finds distasteful.

It is quite likely that Trogus has used this passage of Sallust as
a model for his comparison of Philip and Alexander, which is perhaps
not surprising as he was a younger contemporary of Sallust, and
moreover his father had served in the army under Julius Caesar and was
afterwards his private secretary, so Trogus may well have shared
Sallust's admiration for Caesar. He was certainly familiar with the
works of Sallust, as he criticises that writer and Livy for going
beyond the limits of history by their use of direct speeches merely
to display their own eloquence (XXXVIII. 3. 11.)

END OF BOOK IX
APPENDIX

The Macedonian Royal House

CARANUS
(mid 8th cent.)

COENUS?

THURIMAS or TURIMMAS

PERDICCAS I
(c650)

ARGAEUS

PHILIP I

AEROPUS I

ALCETAS

AKYNTAS I
(c540 - 498)

ALEXANDER I
(c498 - 454)

Aridæus
(k. of Elimeia)

(Continued on next page)

(Co continues)
* See fig. 1 on p. 37 for the wives and offspring of Philip II
(1) Ancient authors cited

Note: The names of the ancient authors are preceded by the abbreviations used in the text.

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<td><em>A History of Greece</em>, ten volumes</td>
<td>London 1888</td>
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<td>Hammond</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td><em>A History of Greece to 322 B.C.</em></td>
<td>Oxford 1959</td>
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<td>(2nd edn. 1967- N.B. pagination and content for Macedonia unchanged)</td>
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<td>Hogarth</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td><em>Philip and Alexander of Macedon</em></td>
<td>London 1897</td>
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<td>Jones</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td><em>Pausanias: Description of Greece</em>, vol. IV (Loeb)</td>
<td>London 1935</td>
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<td>Kromayer</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td><em>Antike Schlachtfelder</em>, vol. I</td>
<td>Berlin 1903</td>
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<td>Lane Fox</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td><em>Alexander the Great</em></td>
<td>London 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macurdy</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td><em>Hellenistic Queens</em></td>
<td>Baltimore 1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sordi 1958</td>
<td>M. Sordi: La lega Tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno, Rome 1958.</td>
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Badian, E:  'The death of Philip II', *Phoenix* 17 (1963), 244-50.


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(iii) General works of reference and other abbreviations


CAH = Cambridge Ancient History

CQ = Classical Quarterly
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CPh</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHG</td>
<td>Fragmenta Historiorum Graecorum, ed. C. and T. Müller, five volumes, Paris 1878-85.</td>
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<td>Gronovius 1719</td>
<td>Historiae Philippicae cum integris commentariis J. Bongarsii etc., Curante A. Gronovio, Leiden 1719.</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin 1873-</td>
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<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLD</td>
<td>Oxford Latin Dictionary</td>
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<td>PW RE</td>
<td>Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll: <em>Real-Encyclopädie d. Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</em>, Berlin 1893-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suda</td>
<td><em>Suidae Lexicon</em>, ed. A. Adler, five volumes, Leipzig 1928-38.</td>
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