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A STUDY OF THE CLIENT KINGS
IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE

J. D. EVERATT

A Study of the Client Kings in the early Roman Empire

When the city-state of Rome began to exert her influence throughout the Mediterranean, the ruling classes developed friendships and alliances with the rulers of the various kingdoms with whom contact was made. During the great military struggles which heralded the end of the republic, it became clear that the general who could count on the clientship of the powerful kingdoms within Rome's sphere of influence would have a decided advantage over less fortunate rivals.

Moreover when Octavian, later Augustus, became the sole ruler of the Roman world after the battle of Actium, these client kingdoms were an important factor in the defence of the Roman Empire, and Octavian insisted that their kings became the personal clients of the emperor.

Augustus saw beyond the former uses of these kings, as military supporters in battles for supremacy, and realized their full potential to a unified empire - some client states he used as buffers against more remote hostile nations, others protected trade routes and others maintained a sense of national identity, whilst introducing the Pax Augusta to their troublesome subjects. At the same time the emperor realized the annexation of some of these kingdoms was necessary and desirable, and so the gradual transformation of kingdoms into provinces began.
Augustus' successors found that their predecessor, who had inherited so many small but potentially powerful clients, had set a good example in dealing with them. The Julio-Claudians and Flavians continued the process of romanization and annexation, and new clients were only contemplated when the legions needed support or a respite from warfare; only in Armenia did the clientship pose problems. Trajan, the warrior-emperor, was the first to attempt to annex all his clients and his failure showed the wisdom of Augustus' settlement - a settlement which lasted for several centuries.
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PREFACE

In examining the development of relations between the government at Rome during the early Roman Empire and the various client states which existed during this period, I have attempted to clarify and explain policies and events which, during less detailed studies, I had not been able to investigate in sufficient depth. To me and, I suspect, to many others, the words "client kingdom" became almost synonymous with "Armenia", or at least with "Asia Minor". Certainly, after a year of research, that connection has been modified.

The footnotes, which appear at the end of the chapter to which they refer, consist of references to the authorities, both ancient and modern, from which I have gleaned my information, but in several cases I have found it necessary to use these notes to explain and expand the main text.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Mr. R.P. Wright, whose help has been invaluable in the compilation of this thesis. His high standard of scholarship has aided me in picking out many flaws in my arguments which I have attempted to eliminate, and his rules for presentation, though rigorous, have benefitted me greatly. Any errors which remain are the result of my own negligence.

I should also like to record my thanks to all those who have helped me during this study; to Mrs. K. Hollis, who has patiently and laboriously deciphered my hand-writing to type the thesis; to Mrs. I. Parkin, who has agreed to type the Greek symbols; to the staff of the Classics Department of Durham University, who have provided facilities and encouragement throughout my period of study in their department; and especially to my parents, whose support has been invaluable during my five years as a student, for without
their encouragement such a long and enjoyable period of study would have been impossible.

J. D. Everatt.

August, 1971.
Abbreviations and Bibliography

A. Periodical and Serial Works.

(Cited more than once)

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<td>Archaeologia, 1770-</td>
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<td>BCH</td>
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<td>BMC, Name</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Development of the Relations between Rome and her Dependent Allies.

As the political, military and economic resources of a state expand, so that state begins to extend its influence over weaker neighbours. It must then decide what form this influence is to take, and there are two main policies to adopt. The first of these is a military invasion, which, if successful, enables the dominant power to subjugate its neighbour and assume complete control of the defeated country's government and resources; it was by this means that Adolf Hitler hoped to increase the power of Germany's Third Reich; his annexations led to the Second World War in 1939. The second method is not quite so drastic; for a variety of reasons, the dominant state may wish to influence the policies of its neighbours without imposing total dependence. In this way the subject country is allowed a certain degree of self-government whilst acknowledging the right of its overlord to impose limitations on its policies. Modern examples of such satellite states are the communist countries of Eastern Europe; they are nominally independent, but any decisions which are not in accord with the policies of the U.S.S.R. are soon reversed on the application of political pressure from Moscow. (1)

The course of action to be taken depends on the sociological and political natures of the oppressor and the oppressed, and as the power of Rome expanded throughout Italy and beyond, the governing classes found it necessary to employ both methods of control in varying degrees.
An important factor in the establishment of alliances and relations between two states or two individuals was the system of guest-friendship which had existed in Homeric times (2), and which spread throughout the Mediterranean as Greek influence expanded. The high degree of contact between Greece and Italy ensured that these friendships were widespread throughout the Italian peninsula, and it seems probably that the city of Rome and its ruling classes enjoyed many such relations with foreign rulers and states during the early centuries of its existence. Originally these arrangements of hospitium and amicitia were made between states or individuals of equal rank, and any obligations undertaken in such contacts were reciprocal, but as the political and economic power of Rome and her nobles increased, it seems likely that the term 'amicus' began to indicate relations between a superior and an inferior rather than between equals; just as a noble in Rome established a circle of clientes who received financial rewards in return for their support, so Rome herself and her individual statesmen fostered amicitia amongst foreign rulers and states, who received the military and economic support of Rome in return for a certain amount of obedience to Rome's wishes. In this way, amicitia became another term for clientship. (3)

Obviously this system of client relationships soon became an integral part of Roman foreign policy, but it was not used to the exclusion of other means of control. The standards of civilization were higher in the Eastern Mediterranean than they were in the West, and the system of amicitia was not accepted amongst the tribes of Western Europe. Therefore Rome followed a policy of direct annexation in the West, and Spain, for instance, was subdued by force of arms rather than by the use of client kings. But in Italy and further east, even before the Second Carthaginian War, Rome had discovered the
principle of the free client state; by making alliances of friendship firstly in Latium, then throughout Italy, then beyond, the Roman senate realized that, without committing either party to legal obligations, it was possible to bind foreign states to Rome by means of moral obligations by including them amongst the amici of Rome. (4)

In this way Rome extended her influence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, and not only the cities of Greece, but also the great kingdoms in Asia Minor and Egypt were included among the friends of Rome. Agreements made by Roman generals were regarded as agreements with the Roman state, for the generals were merely representatives of the senate. Thus even when Flamininus gave legal autonomy to the cities of Greece in 196 B.C., those cities were expected to respect Rome's will, as an indication of their gratitude. (5)

As long as the client states were prepared to accept Roman guidance on matters of foreign policy, the senate were prepared to refrain from interference in their internal affairs, but it was inevitable that at some stage the internal policies of a client state would conflict with the desires of Rome, and thus it was only a matter of time before the senate tried to influence the internal affairs of a kingdom.

The first recorded instance of such an attempt was in 182 B.C., when Philip of Macedon sent his son, Demetrius, to Rome as an ambassador. It appears that the senate tried to persuade Demetrius to take over his father's throne. (6)

Despite this unsuccessful attempt, Rome's attitude to client states in the east changed drastically after the defeat of Macedon at Pydna in 168 B.C. Previously Rome had exerted a minimum of influence
on the states of Greece, but with the balance of power now swinging in Rome's favour she began to take a firmer hold on her eastern allies. In 165 B.C., Rhodes was compelled to accept an alliance which made her a client state of Rome, and shortly afterwards the senate attempted to secure a change on the throne of Pergamum. Although this was unsuccessful, Pergamum was humbled.

But even more important were the two customs which arose after the battle of Pydna. Firstly, the heirs of various client kings in the east were sent to Rome to be educated, thus allowing Roman influence to spread even further; secondly, on the death of a king, the successor found it expedient to seek recognition for his own rule. Thus not only did Rome hold the various kingdoms in a client relationship, but she was also able to decree who should hold the throne of these kingdoms. The eastern kings were now truly dependent on Rome. (7)

Thus by the middle of the second century B.C., the Roman senate exerted a firm control over her client kings and kingdoms. So powerful was Roman overlordship that certain kings even bequeathed their kingdoms to Rome in their wills. (8)

The influence of Rome had now grown to the extent that most of the kingdoms with which she had contact were her clients - i.e. the various bodies politic were the clients of the Roman senate. But parallel to this development, the influence of individuals also expanded. Relationships of hospitium and amicitia had developed between Roman families and private families all over the Mediterranean. As Roman power became dominant, so the power of her citizens increased, and a Roman citizen's foreign amici became his foreign clientes. If a Roman politician could include among his clientes a king or an important public figure in a foreign country, then his career in
public life was assured; indeed, his influence abroad could become so great that he could influence Roman foreign policy. An example of this is the kingdom of Numidia; after the Second Punic War Masinissa of Numidia was given his throne by Scipio Africanus, and on the latter's death the clientship was transferred to Scipio Aemilianus. Therefore, when Masinissa died in 148 B.C., the disposal of his kingdom was entrusted to Aemilianus, and he was able to further Rome's interests by dividing the duties of kingship amongst Masinissa's sons, thus weakening the kingdom. (9)

It became almost essential for a Roman politician to enjoy a large amount of support from abroad, and important figures such as Sulla and Marius were greatly aided by their foreign clients. It also became clear that the politician who could command the support of several legions as well as holding the clientship of the powerful eastern client kingdoms could exert tremendous influence on Roman policy, and the consequences of this can be seen in the career of Pompey. This general already commanded the support of many clients in Italy and the west when he set out for the east in 67 B.C. The successful conclusion of the wars against the pirates and against Mithridates enabled Pompey to resettle Asia Minor, Syria and Judaea. By the time this task was completed in 64 B.C., the general and his armies had traversed most of the eastern Mediterranean, settling the affairs of the provinces and recognising or appointing kings in the various client kingdoms. In this way, Pompey not only re-asserted the client relationship between Rome and her subject states, but also built for himself a powerful network of foreign clientes, for most of the eastern kingdoms were obliged to Pompey for the recognition of their thrones. Indeed, Pompey was able to amass a sizeable fortune by demanding payment for services rendered. (10) Moreover, the general was able
to count on the support of these kings in any wars he might have wished to undertake.

Pompey's great army of clientes both in Italy and abroad were his allies in the struggle for political power in Rome during and after the first triumvirate, but his defeat at Pharsalus and his death in Egypt freed the eastern client kings from their loyalty to one man, although the client relationships of their kingdoms with Rome still remained. Caesar found it necessary to campaign through Asia Minor and Africa to obtain the support of the kingdoms, and he achieved this in various ways; some monarchs, for example Cleopatra, transferred their allegiance to Caesar on the arrival of the victorious general; whereas others were replaced by nobles who had openly supported Caesar. (11) In one instance, that of Juba I of Numidia, a loyal Pompeian, the king's forces were defeated in battle and his kingdom annexed. Thus Caesar had consolidated his personal supremacy, and it had become clear that the ruler of the Roman world must not only be able to command the support of the armies, but must also be able to include as his clients the rulers of the various kingdoms on the limits of the expanding Roman empire.

After the death of Caesar and the defeat of his murderers at Philippi, the members of the second triumvirate were given command of the empire; Octavian received most of the western provinces and received the clientship of the few western kingdoms, but Antony, whose command was in the east, gained the allegiance of the important client kingdoms of Asia Minor and Syria. Antony decided to base his power on indirect rule through these client kings, and when the battle for supremacy with Octavian ended at Actium, the victor inherited a large number of client states whose loyalty had lain with his rival. It was by now obvious that the sole ruler of the Roman Empire must obtain
the personal clientship of these foreign kings to secure his rule. The ways in which Octavian obtained his security and the treatment which his successors gave to the various kingdoms are discussed in subsequent chapters.

The legal position of client kings is far from clear; the ancient customs of amicitia and hospitium were informal arrangements which required no written agreements, but on the other hand, Rome's agreements with foreign states were often sealed by written documents. It seems likely that the client kings were bound to Rome by strong moral obligations, strengthened by various types of legal treaty. As Mommsen points out (12), the agreement of clientship was admissible for an unlimited time between two cities, i.e. Rome and her dependent, regardless of changes in government; but a similar contract between a native king and a Roman citizen was isolated, and ceased at the death of either participant. Thus, after the time of Augustus, the native kings made individual agreements with the Roman emperor, and at the death of either party the agreement ceased. Rome usually demanded a renewal of the contract, and so the death of a king was followed by a plea for recognition from his successor, and the accession of a new emperor was followed by applications for recognition from existing client monarchs. It is important to note that when this contract was ended at the death of a king, the emperor was entitled to refuse to issue a new agreement, and could take over the government of the kingdom without transgressing any law. (13) Thus the policies of the early emperors which led to the annexation of various kingdoms on the death of their kings, was in accord with the law.

Yet there can be no doubt that Rome's overwhelming military might enabled her to keep a close control over her subject states, and
very few client kings were able or willing to attempt to prosecute the emperor for his transgressions. If they did, they were quickly removed, for the emperor's power was supreme.
Notes to Chapter I.

1. Note the attempted 'liberalisation' programme in Czechoslovakia during the 1960's. When the Moscow government found that its requests for the reversal of this policy were ignored, Soviet armed forces invaded Czechoslovakia in August, 1969, and imposed a pro-Russian government.

2. For a description of this system, see M.I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, 1956, 109-114.

3. This argument follows the reasoning of E. Badian (FC, 11-13)

4. Badian, FC, 53.

5. Badian, FC, 74.

6. Badian, FC, 94. However it is by no means certain whether this incident was true, or merely a fabrication by Philip's elder son, Perseus, who was jealous of his brother's success (H.H. Scullard, The Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C., 1935, 291)

7. Badian, FC, 105-111.

8. For example, Attalus III of Pergamum in 133 B.C., Cyrene in 96 B.C., Bithynia in 75/4 B.C. (H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 2nd ed., 1959, 28 and 93).

9. Badian, FC, 125 and 137.

10. Badian estimates that Pompey demanded 1,650 talents from Ariobarzanes II before he would allow the king to inherit his father's throne (Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, Oxford, 1967, 82-3)

11. For example, Mithridates of Pergamum was granted the eastern part of Galatia and the vacant realm of Bosporus, in place of Pharnaces, who had openly campaigned against Caesar, even after the death of Pompey.


13. Ibid., II, 856.
CHAPTER II

THE AUGUSTAN RESSETLEMENT

Augustus' policies in Europe.

In the far west, the boundaries of direct Roman government had reached the natural barrier of the Ocean before Augustus came to power. Yet, although no external dangers threatened, Augustus was compelled to act.

The first annexation of Spain had taken place as early as 197 B.C., but Augustus can justly claim Gallias et Hispamias provincias ... pacavi. (1) The tribes of north-west Spain had been continuously troublesome, and in 26 B.C. Augustus himself took the field against the Cantabri; he was partially successful, but trouble flared up again, and Agrippa, in 19 B.C., employed ruthless methods to complete the pacification. (2)

Since Spain was divided into provinces directly governed from Rome, Augustus permitted no local kings or chieftains. Hill-tribes were resettled in valleys, new towns were developed in the north-west and veterans were settled amongst the previously rebellious tribes. The spread of towns, roads and trade all helped in the romanization of the Iberian peninsula.

Augustus' policy in Gaul followed the same pattern. Julius Caesar had conquered Gaul as far as the English Channel, and since none of the boundaries was directly assailable by barbarian tribes, Augustus continued the policy of romanization. (3) Gallia Comata as a whole was divided into three provinces - Aquitania, Lugdunensis and Belgica - with Lugdunum as the capital, and the extension of Latin rights to many native cities, the building of roads and the settlement of military colonies all helped in the
romanization of Gaul. Augustus himself took a great interest in this area, personally superintending the census in 27 B.C., and in 16-13 B.C., he travelled through Gaul mollifying unrest caused by an avaricious native administrator, Licinus.

Britain.

Augustus' attitude to Britain was of necessity different. The tribes of Britain could have provided a threat to the northern coasts of Gaul, but they were divided under several kings and this disunity probably persuaded the princeps that he need take no action. Cassius Dio tells us that Augustus went to Gaul in 27-26 B.C., with the intention of attacking Britain (4), and Horace speaks as if the annexation of the island was inevitable. (5) However, C.E. Stevens discusses Augustus' attitude towards Britain at the beginning of his reign, and decides that after 26 B.C., it was no longer possible to "walk into" Britain, therefore he abandoned the idea of conquest, for it would have required too great a force. (6) It seems likely that Augustus had little intention of invading Britain, but kept these proposals alive to remind the Roman people that a conquest trans Oceanum was possible; he had no desire to weaken the defences of the empire by withdrawing legions from more essential tasks. Yet the emperor did not disregard Britain completely; he seems to have attempted to establish Roman influence over chieftains in the south-east, whose tribes were nearest to the Gallic shores; when Dubnovellanus and Tincommius were driven from their kingdoms, Augustus received them as suppliants in Rome (7), which would suggest that they had enjoyed the friendship of Rome before their flight. Moreover, Tincommius' successors, Epillus and Verica, used the Latin title rex on their coins, and were obviously under Roman influence (8); they may well be the British kings, who, as friends of Augustus, set up offerings in the Capitol. (9)
Yet the emperor felt no obligations towards these kings; he made no attempt to reinstate Dubnovellaunus and Tincommius, and the former's successor, Cunobelinus, was not a friend of Rome. (10) Augustus seems to have decided that the British kings did not present a serious military threat, therefore he was content to continue trade with Britain, yet leaving the island outside the Empire. Probably a few of the native chieftains enjoyed client or semi-client relationships with the emperor, but Augustus was unwilling to consider military intervention beyond the Channel.

Germany.

The protection of Germany was a more serious problem to Augustus. Julius Caesar had established the Rhine as the boundary of direct Roman rule, but the ease with which the river could be crossed meant that the threat of invasion by the powerful tribes on the east bank was always present (11); despite strained friendships with these tribes, there were occasional invasions of Roman territory, and the long frontier was difficult to patrol; therefore Augustus was unwilling to leave the position as it stood.

However, there was little possibility of establishing client kings on the right bank of the Rhine, for the chieftains of the many tribal units could not be trusted, either by each other or by Rome, and the establishment of a pro-Roman king in any of these tribes would have unified the others against this intrusion by Rome; the need to keep the German tribes divided precluded the use of client kings.

The danger of raids across the Rhine by Germanic tribes, such as those of 29 B.C., and 17 B.C., persuaded Augustus that annexation of Germany east of the Rhine was the best course of action; moreover this annexation was to advance the frontier to the Elbe, thus shortening the European boundaries of Roman rule. (12)
With this policy in mind, Augustus sent his stepson Drusus to Germany in 12 B.C. In the four campaigns before his death in 9 B.C., Drusus prepared the ground for an advance to the Elbe, and his brother Tiberius continued the advance in 8 B.C. Several tribes were forced to submit to Roman arms, and two of these, the Suebi and Sugambri, were transferred to the left bank of the Rhine. (13) The emperor was unwilling to allow any tribes to enter a client relationship with Rome, although he was prepared to give asylum to displaced monarchs, presumably helping them to create unrest among their own people, and thus weakening German resistance to Rome. At least two German kings sought refuge at the court of Augustus: Maelo of the Sugambri and the king of the Marcomanni and Suebi. (14)

Maelo, whose name, according to Strabo, was Melon (15), probably fled to Rome before the final subjugation of the Sugambri in 8 B.C. The flight of the king of the Marcomanni and Suebi must also have taken place before this date, for the Suebi were transferred across the Rhine with the Sugambri, and the Marcomanni had been driven eastwards by Drusus in 9 B.C. Although the name of this king cannot be reconstructed (16), he cannot be identified with the next king of the Marcomanni of whom we know, Maroboduus; this fugitive was almost certainly an earlier chieftain, who had authority over the Suebi also.

The Marcomanni were now the main threat to Augustus' plan, for although they had retreated from Drusus, they had not been defeated. Therefore the emperor began to isolate them. Some time after 8 B.C., L. Domitius Ahenobarbus settled the Hermunduri on the land which the Marcomanni had vacated. (17) The Hermunduri must have been allied to Rome, so the Marcomanni now had enemies established to their west.
At about the same time, a legate of Illyricum crossed the Danube, routed a host of Bastarnae, and set up an inscription to record it. (18) He seems to have succeeded in securing the Middle Danube, and thus isolated the Marcomanni, under Maroboduus, from the east.

In A.D.49, Tiberius was sent to Germany once more, and in two campaigns in the north conquered tribes as far as and beyond the Elbe. (19) Only the Marcomanni now prevented the complete annexation of Germany, and with Maroboduus surrounded by Roman allies, Tiberius planned a converging attack on Marcomannian territory (20) in A.D.6. However, at this point, Augustus' policy received a setback when news reached Tiberius of the Pannonian revolt; the need for an immediate retreat forced him to come to terms with Maroboduus. For the first time, Augustus was compelled to recognise a Germanic tribal chieftain as a friend and ally of Rome (21); this was not planned as a suitable policy, for only the force of circumstances compelled the emperor to do it.

Furthermore, whilst Rome was preoccupied with the Pannonian revolt, her influence in Germany waned. The tribes forgot their own differences and planned to shake off the few ties that Tiberius' alliances had imposed. Their unification against Rome became obvious when Augustus' policy received its final shattering blow.

In A.D.9, Quinctilius Varus was withdrawing from the Weser to the Rhine through the Teutoburgian Forest when he was attacked by a German army under Arminius, chief of the Cherusci. Three legions were wiped out, and the Romans lost all east of the Rhine. Tiberius, and later Germanicus, reorganised the defence of the river, but Augustus' plan of annexation to the Elbe was now lost.

Yet Arminius himself proved that Augustus' decision not to
trust German chieftains was correct, for he was a chief who, as a Roman citizen, had served in the auxiliaries and reached equestrian rank. Perhaps the emperor had hoped to install him as a client king, but his treachery was a direct cause of Augustus' failure. Perhaps the boast item Germaniam qua includit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albia fluminia pacavi (22), was not as heart-felt as the cry Quinctili Vare, legiones redde (23).

The Alps.

However, before Augustus could consider expanding the northern frontier, he had found it necessary to protect the passes between northern Italy and Transalpine Gaul to the west, and Illyricum and Greece to the east, for during the civil wars hostile tribes had caused trouble to armies using these passes.

In 25 B.C., communications to the west were ensured when Terentius Varro defeated the Salassi, and in the eastern Alps, P. Silius Nerva, the prefect of Illyricum in 17-16 B.C., reduced all the tribes from the valleys from Como to Lake Garda, thus making safe the passes to the east.

Shortly afterwards, two interesting measures were taken further south. In 14 B.C., the Alpes Maritimae were annexed to form a small province governed by a military prefect; this was done to check the native Ligures who had been troublesome. But, in complete contrast, fourteen civitates or tribes in the Alpes Cottiae were placed under Cottius, the son of their former king, who received the title of praefectus (24), and who was, for all practical purposes, a client king. Why did Augustus make Alpes Cottiae a client kingdom when he had annexed Alpes Maritimae? Presumably the troublesome nature of the inhabitants had necessitated it in the latter case, whereas in the former, the firm yet peaceful control of a native
ruler could not be bettered by any Roman administration. It was many years before Alpes Cottiae became a Roman province.

The date of Cottius' appointment is unknown, for the inscription, dated between 1st July, 9 B.C., and 30th June, 8 B.C., almost certainly commemorated an event of a few years earlier. Possibly, Cottius' position was clarified at the same time as the annexation of Alpes Maritimas.

Further east, the operation of Nerva in 17-16 B.C. had repercussions; Cassius Dio says that Noricum, formerly a kingdom (25), was brought under direct Roman rule as a result of revolts which Nerva had settled. (26) However, the campaigns of 15 B.C. were more decisive; in that year, Tiberius, attacking from Gaul, and Drusus, moving northwards from Italy, conquered all the tribes as far as the Danube. Now the province of Raetia was formed, and it seems reasonable to follow Strabo (27) in assuming that Noricum was annexed at this time. Here there is a contrast with Alpes Cottiae, for in Noricum the client kingship was abolished. (28)

Thus by 14 B.C., the Alps were securely under Roman control, and a trophy set up near Monaco in 7-6 B.C., records this; the text is preserved by Pliny. (29) It states the simple facts of the conquest, but does not show the human element in the settlement, that three hostile tracts were annexed and placed under strict Roman rule, whereas between them a group of cities retained its independence under its own king.

The Danube.

East of Noricum, the extension of Roman rule to the Danube was essential, for the valley of the Save in Pannonia provided the only land route from Italy to Macedonia.

However the region was far from easy to conquer, and despite
several campaigns (30), it was not until until 9 B.C., that the
Roman conquest of Pannonia appeared to be complete. Even then
the revolt in Pannonia in A.D.6., proved that Roman rule was far
from secure, and Pannonia and Illyricum were not recovered until
A.D.9. At this time, Augustus formally annexed the area (31),
and placed it under an imperial legate, for no native rulers could
be trusted.

On the Lower Danube, the situation was similar, with
frequent raids by trans-Danubian tribes into Roman territory. (32)
Augustus continued his policy of annexing troublesome regions when
Moesia became a military province, probably in A.D.6. (33)

The emperor had attempted to quieten this frontier by
means of alliances with tribes north of the Danube (34), but if
any oath of friendship or clientship was ever made, it was not
kept. (35) As in Germany, it is unlikely that Augustus ever
considered trying to establish a client relationship with the
native tribes.

**Thrace.**

To the south of Moesia lay the kingdom of Thrace, where
Octavian found the situation different from that of the other states
in this area. After Licinius Crassus had ejected the Bastarnae in
29 B.C., Thrace needed a unifying factor, and Octavian decided that
annexation by Rome was an unnecessary step, so he left the tribes
of Thrace under Rhascuporis I.

However, each tribe seems to have had its own local leader,
and in 11 B.C., Vologaesus persuaded the Bessi to revolt; Rhascuporis
was killed, and his uncle, Rhoemetalces, was driven out. L. Calpurnius
Piso, the governor of Pamphylia, was ordered to put down this rebellion,
and after three years of hard fighting, he regained control. (36)
Augustus was then left with the problem of how to govern Thrace. Elsewhere he had brought rebellious peoples under closer Roman control, but again he decided the looser control of a client king was sufficient in Thrace, and Rhoemetalces was given the throne. The decision seems to have been a wise one, for Rhoemetalces succeeded in maintaining a peaceful kingdom until his death, between A.D.9 and 12; he even raised a force to help Tiberius in Pannonia. (37)

But when Rhoemetalces died, Augustus made a change in the system; Thrace was divided into two parts, one of which was ruled by Rhoemetalces' brother, Rhascuporis, and the other by the former king's son, Cotys. (38) Perhaps the geographical divisions of Thrace, or the emergence of two clearly definable political factions amongst the tribes persuaded the emperor to divide Thrace into two kingdoms. Rhascuporis was given the more difficult portion, probably because of his superior ability, and fear of Augustus would curb any excessive ambitions.

So Thrace remained a client kingdom throughout Augustus' reign, although so many of her European neighbours were annexed. It would appear that the small tribal units of Thrace needed a native ruler who could give them a sense of national unity, and at the same time maintain their sense of independence, whereas military annexation would have cost Rome much in time and resources, as Piso's campaigns had proved. Yet so great were the divisions within Thrace that Augustus found it necessary to divide it into two smaller units, thus creating a situation in which rivalry and ambition could grow.

Augustus seemingly considered that the frontiers of the Empire in Europe could only be protected by a complete annexation of the lands adjoining them; the barbarians beyond the Rhine and
the Danube had to see Roman forces guarding Roman territory before they would desist from attack, and several tribes within Roman boundaries had to be kept in check by a constant military presence. Obviously the princeps considered the Germans and eastern Europeans too uncivilized and untrustworthy to honour a client relationship.

The emperor did allow tribal kings and chiefs to seek his help, but those who came had been driven from their kingdoms, and were merely seeking refuge. Only three client kingdoms were maintained in Europe, and these were suffered for reasons other than defence. M. Julius Cottius, king of Alpes Cottiae, was not even given the title rex, but remained a praefectus - obviously his loyal service was rewarded by the gift of the nominal control of his own people when other native rulers, after defeat, were replaced by Roman governors.

Maroboduus of the Marcomanni, the second client king recognised by Augustus, found his kingdom preserved only by the whim of fate, for Tiberius was already attacking him when he was recalled to Pannonia. He could not leave the frontier undefended with Maroboduus hostile, so the German became an ally of Rome.

Thrace also remained a client kingdom - not to defend the frontier, but merely as an expedient measure to preserve the unity and pro-Roman policy of the country. The European frontiers were not breeding grounds for client kings.
The Eastern Frontier.

The importance of the domains bordering the eastern Mediterranean had become obvious during the struggle for power which followed the murder of Caesar. Antony needed the support of the whole of the eastern empire if he was to meet the threat of Octavian with the largest possible force. To this end he had not attempted to change the political structures of the states in Asia Minor, but merely ensured that the kings of these states supported him. Any country whose allegiance was in doubt was given a king who would unquestionably follow his benefactor.

Hence Amyntas was given the kingdom of Galatia, although he had been only the secretary of Deiotarus, the previous ruler. His domain was increased by the addition of Pamphylia and Lycaonia from the province of Cilicia. Similarly, the kingdom of Cappadocia was granted to Archelaus in the same year. Polemo, the king of Pontus, undertook a journey to the Parthian court as an envoy for Antony, and was rewarded by the extension of his kingdom to include Lesser Armenia. Cleopatra herself received Coele-Syria, Cyprus, the Syrian coastline, parts of Ituraea, Judaea and Nabataea, Crete and Cyrene. Even if these lands were never received, they were certainly promised. Antony's love of monarchy even embraced his sons by Cleopatra: Alexander Helios was to receive Armenia, and Ptolemy Philadelphos the rest of Syria.

Thus, when Antony faced Octavian at Actium, the majority of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean were ruled by client-kings, with Antony as their overlord and benefactor.

However, the defeat and subsequent death of Antony left the east with a new master. Augustus could proudly boast "Provincias omnis, quae trans Hadrianum mare vergunt ad orientem ... recipieravi,"
but he does not mention that in 31 B.C., as Octavian, he inherited a host of client kingdoms as well as provinces. They had to be won over by friendship or fear, for their nominal independence gave Rome no constitutional ties over them.

Antony's policy had been formed whilst he considered the threat from the west; he supported so many client kingdoms because the vassals, with their thrones secure, would in turn support their patron. But once the east and west were unified, such a policy was no longer valid. Octavian had to look beyond the client kingdoms and estimate the dangers threatening the boundaries of Roman influence.

The primary problem was that of Parthia: the Parthian Empire was the only power that could seriously threaten Roman influence in Asia Minor, and it was important that no settlement should allow Parthia to challenge Roman supremacy. Octavian realized that it was impossible and undesirable to annex all territory as far as the boundaries of Parthia. Apart from the impracticability of a campaign so far east when Italy itself was in turmoil, the sudden appearance of Roman legions on their borders would have provoked the Parthians into an aggressiveness which, as previous encounters had shown, the Roman army was ill-equipped to tackle. On the other hand, Octavian must have been unwilling to leave the situation as it was. There were only three provinces in Asia Minor (44), and between these and the Parthian Empire stood several large states whose kings had fought against Octavian at Actium. If he ignored these kings, they might take offence and turn to Parthia, but if he dealt with them too harshly, they might seek Parthian help to gain revenge. Octavian wisely gained the support of these kings by allowing most of them to remain on their thrones when they offered their allegiance to him, although some were not officially recognised as friends of Rome for several years.
The importance of trade must also have been in Octavian's thoughts. Articles of luxury were imported from China and India for the high society of Italy; these goods came overland, and exorbitant tolls were imposed as they passed through Parthia and the lesser eastern kingdoms. No doubt the Roman government would have preferred to take possession of the caravan routes, but at the beginning of Augustus' reign, such considerations had to be ignored.

Galatia.

The most westerly of the client kingdoms in Asia Minor was Galatia; it included not only Galatia itself, but also Lycaonia, Pamphylia, Isauria, Western Cilicia and Pisidia. The king, Amyntas, had been set up by Antony, but Augustus allowed him to remain, and several coins testify to his rule. (45)

However, Amyntas died in 25 B.C. and, although he had sons to succeed him, Augustus decided to annex the kingdom (46); part of Western Cilicia was transferred to the kingdom of Archelaus (47), but the rest of Amyntas' realm formed the new province of Galatia.

Thus Augustus began the policy of annexation which gradually enveloped the whole of Asia Minor, but it is doubtful whether at this time it was a consciously defined policy. Possibly Amyntas bequeathed Galatia to Rome, for Strabo talks of the collection of an inheritance(48), but no doubt Augustus regarded its incorporation into the empire as a necessity. There were undoubtedly substantial financial benefits, since several important trading cities were situated in Galatia, but Augustus must have been more concerned with security; the mountains of Pisidia and Lycaonia harboured fierce tribes who were almost invincible in their mountain strongholds. Not least of these were the Hispanicides, and Amyntas had made several attempts to reduce them; he succeeded in capturing most of their fortresses, including Cremna,
but fell into an ambush, and met his death at their hands. Augustus must have been concerned about this disorder, and no doubt pursued a policy of annexation with the intention of bringing in Roman forces to stamp it out. Presumably the Homanades were restrained at first, for Agrippa was not called upon to campaign against them during his command in the East (49), but they became troublesome later, when P. Sulpicius Quirinus was sent against them in A.D.1. These tribes were probably the reason for the foundation by Augustus of military colonies in the province (50) at Antioch, Olbasa, Comana, Parlais and Cremna.

Thus the death of Amyntas and the unruliness of the native tribes provided the emperor with a suitable excuse for the annexation of Galatia. The security of the empire was certainly improved by this decision.

Cappadocia.

To the east of Galatia lay the kingdom of Cappadocia, under Archelaus. Despite Archelaus' obvious allegiance to Antony, who had driven out the previous king to accommodate him (51), Augustus allowed him to remain on his throne. Indeed, Archelaus seems to have been a very able ruler, for Augustus made no attempt to replace him, and he became well-honoured in his kingdom, as his coins testify. (52) Moreover, we learn from an inscription (53), that Augustus thought so highly of Archelaus that he added parts of Cilicia to his kingdom. The date of this enlargement is not certain, but it seems likely that Archelaus received part of the kingdom of Amyntas when it was annexed.

However, the influence of Archelaus was to extend even further, for Strabo tells us that he married Pythodoris, the queen of Pontus. (54) This marriage, which must have been sanctioned, if not arranged, by
Augustus was of the utmost importance, for it brought together two kingdoms which covered all eastern Asia Minor from the Euxine to the Mediterranean, and thus set up a barrier to infiltration from the east.

So, in the figure of Archelaus, we have an example of Augustus' willingness to employ a client king in a peaceful relationship beneficial to both parties.

Cilicia Amanus.

However, Augustus’ attitude was not always so benevolent. The Amanus region of Cilicia had been ruled by King Tarcondimotus I who supported Antony. He was succeeded by his son Philopator, but after Actium, Octavian deposed Philopator because of his father's allegiance to Antony. (55)

It was not until 20 B.C. that the kingdom was restored to another son of Tarcondimotus I, who became Tarcondimotus II. (56) It is uncertain why Augustus waited so long to restore this kingdom; perhaps he was reluctant to allow a king whom he did not fully trust to occupy a kingdom so near to the important province of Syria; Parthian infiltration into Cilicia could have endangered the position and communications of the Roman forces in Syria.

The length of the reign of Tarcondimotus is also uncertain, for we next hear of the kingdom of Cilicia at the death of King Philopator in A.D.17. (57) Perhaps Tarcondimotus was succeeded by his son, Philopator, but the fact was relatively unimportant, and therefore not mentioned by the historians.

However, it may be possible to equate Tarcondimotus with Philopator, thanks to the revision of an inscription by J.G.C.Anderson (58)

\[ ... ] 10 REGIS TARCONDI
MOTI PHILOPATORIS F (ilio)
STRATONI DVR(IV)RIS\]
Here the king is given both names of Tarcondimotus and Philopator; perhaps the latter was an honorary cognomen. This helps in an interpretation of the events at the beginning of Augustus' reign. Philopator who was deposed in 31 B.C., and Tarcondimotus, set up as king in 20 B.C., may well be the same person. If the Philopator who died in A.D.17 is also the same man, we have a reason for Augustus' delay of eleven years before he handed over the kingdom: a man who lived until A.D.17 would have been relatively young in 31 B.C., and Octavian would have thought it imprudent to allow a child to rule in such an unsettled area, therefore he kept more direct control until the king was old enough to take over. (59)

The above inscription also throws light on the position of client kings in Roman policy. Strato, the son of king Tarcondimotus, was a Roman citizen and a duumvir in Antioch; he represented a stage in the transfer from monarchy to Roman magistracy, thus hastening the Romanisation of subject peoples who were to be incorporated into the empire.

Pontus.

To the north of Cappadocia lay Pontus, which Antony had given to Polemo in 37 B.C., adding Armenia Minor in 36 B.C. (60). Polemo had been one of Antony's most active allies, but he had won his kingdom from a dynasty backed by Parthia, therefore Octavian, no doubt reluctant to upset the existing balance of power, allowed Polemo to remain. However it was not until 26 B.C. that the king was officially recognised as a friend and ally of Rome. (61)

He proved an able and loyal ruler, and when the king of Bosporus, Asander, died in 17 B.C., Augustus helped Polemo to extend his kingdom and thus reunite the two parts of the old Mithridatic empire. Thus possible dangers from tribes outside the Roman sphere
of influence would be obviated, and the north-eastern frontier would be stabilized. M. Agrippa was sent to Sinope in 14 B.C., and conducted a campaign which resulted in Polemo's marriage to the widowed queen of Bosporus. Unfortunately this was a short-lived union, for Polemo and his queen separated after a year, and Dynamis schemed to regain her kingdom. (62)

After this estrangement, Polemo married Pythodoris, a grand-daughter of Antony, and produced three children by her. (63) Of these, Zeno later became king of Armenia, Antonia Tryphaena married Cotys of Thrace, and Polemo aided his mother in Pontus.

Despite this fruitful marriage, Polemo I continued his struggle to retain control of Bosporus, and there was intermittent warfare until 8 B.C., when the death of Polemo put an end to attempts at union. (64)

However Pythodoris proved an able ruler in her own right, for on the death of her husband she continued to rule Pontus with increasing success, and her marriage to Archelaus of Cappadocia (65) allowed her to succeed where her first husband had failed - in extending her domain.

From these events, a clear piece of Augustan policy emerges. The princeps realized that a large kingdom friendly to Rome in eastern Asia Minor would act as an important buffer against attempts to attack the empire from outside. The first attempt to produce such a kingdom failed, for despite Agrippa's forces, the peoples of Bosporus were unwilling to accept Polemo as their king. However, the marriage of Archelaus and Pythodoris, with the subsequent union of their kingdoms produced an excellent barrier to protect the important provinces of Asia and Bithynia.

Within Pontus we have an example of a kingdom granted as a gift for services rendered. Lycomedes, the priest-king of Comana,
27.

had been an adherent of Antony; after Actium, Octavian deposed him, and gave the tiny kingdom to Medeius, who had supported him against Antony. (66) The relative unimportance of this kingdom is shown by the fact that we do not hear of it again.

Bosporus.

The Bosporan kingdom, situated on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea, was of such importance that it was essential for Rome to be in alliance with it, if not actually in control.

Economically it was important because the region was the major source of food for northern Asia Minor and the Aegean, which was especially important when Roman armies were campaigning in Asia Minor.

Strategically, the kingdom provided outposts against the hostile tribes of the hinterland. To the east were the Scythians and to the north and west the Sarmatian tribes; if these were allowed to control the north coast of the Black Sea, they could seriously disrupt trade. Similarly, it was important to police the coasts to control piracy, and Rome could impose this duty on a client king without taxing her own resources.

Asander was the king during the time of the Roman civil wars (67); as far as we know, he took no part in the war between Antony and Octavian, but he was regarded as a friend of Rome, as an inscription testifies. (68)

During his reign, Asander performed his duty of protecting the frontier, for he fought off Scythian and Sarmatian invaders. (69) He died in 17 B.C., leaving his widow, Dynamis, in control. A successor soon appeared, when a certain Scribonius married Dynamis, claiming that he had received the throne from Augustus (70), but the emperor, eager to unify the kingdoms of Pontus and Bosporus, sent Agrippa and Polemo against Scribonius. (71)
On his arrival Polemo found that the people of Bosporus had put the usurper to death, but were equally unwilling to accept him as king. Although the Pontic forces were victorious in a battle, it was not until after the campaign of Agrippa from Sinope that Polemo was accepted. Even so, the marriage of Polemo and Dynamis cannot have lasted very long, for Polemo married Pythodoris and produced three children by her before his death in 8 B.C. Allowing four years for this, he can have been Dynamis' husband for no longer than two years.

After the estrangement, the war continued until 8 B.C., when, on Polemo's death, Dynamis' claim was no longer contested. Nevertheless, she must have wondered if she would be allowed to retain her throne, for she had killed Augustus' chosen representative; but the emperor was preoccupied with campaigns elsewhere at this time, and Dynamis appears to have received the title of 'friend of the Roman people'. (72)

The theory that, after her marriage to Polemo ended, Dynamis fled to the king of a native tribe and gained his support by marrying him is put forward by M. Rostovtzeff (73); I doubt whether such a close union was arranged, for between 8 B.C. and A.D.7 coins are issued which bear the heads of Augustus and Agrippa and the monogram ΑΣ, undoubtedly that of Dynamis. (74) She appears to have ruled alone until A.D.7.

The next king of whom we have any knowledge is Aspurgus, who was ruling in A.D.16/17. (75) However, two coins in the British Museum do show the head of a king: on the obverse of both there is the head of Augustus, whilst on the reverse is a beardless male head; the first can be dated to A.D.2, and the second to A.D.10. (76) Thus the same ruler was on the throne in these two years, and from A.D.10 coins bearing the monogram of Aspurgus appear. (77)
seems possible that Aspurgus ruled as the consort of Dynamis during the last few years of the Queen's life, and continued as the sole ruler after her death.

Moreover, with the failure of Augustus' plan to unite Bosporus and Pontus, Rome appears to have been content to leave the Bosporan throne to be sorted out by the natives, merely insisting that the overlordship of Rome be recognised.

**The Caucasus.**

Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea lay the region of the Caucasus Mountains. This rugged area was controlled by the Albani and the Iberi, and Augustus was happy to form alliances with both. (78)

According to Cassius Dio, Canidius Crassus had conquered the two tribes in 36 B.C., and Pharnabazus, king of the Iberi, and Zober, king of the Albani, helped Antony in the civil war. (79) They probably merely transferred their allegiance after Actium.

These two tribes were in a very important position, for any Parthian advance into Armenia could be hindered by attacks from the north, and later emperors made use of the Iberi and Albani in campaigns in Armenia. No doubt Augustus was glad to use these two kings to form the northern end of the chain of client kingdoms by which the eastern empire was to be protected.

**Commagene.**

The small kingdom of Commagene, bordered on the north-east by Armenia, on the north-west by Cappadocia and on the south-west by the province of Syria, was of the utmost importance to Augustus, for its south-eastern boundary was separated from Parthia only by the river Euphrates. The princeps could not afford to alienate its king, and thus run the risk of allowing Parthian influence to spread westwards.
Therefore, in 31 B.C., Mithridates II, although an adherent of Antony, was allowed to remain. Indeed, Octavian fervently supported him against his brother Antiochus; when the latter murdered an envoy sent from Commagene to Rome, Octavian had him brought before the senate, tried and put to death. (80) D. Magie points out that this is the first known example of a foreign prince subjected to a trial before the Roman senate. (81)

However, a change occurred in 20 B.C.; Mithridates II died, or was deposed, and Augustus gave his throne to another Mithridates, still a boy, whose father had been put to death by the previous king. (82) The imposition of a child would give Augustus great influence.

Mithridates III was succeeded presumably by Antiochus Epiphanes III, who died in A.D. 17. (83) The silence of the sources about the internal affairs of Commagene leads to the assumption that Augustus' policy was successful during the rest of his reign.

**Armenia Minor.**

This was another kingdom of small size but considerable importance, since it faced the Parthian client state of Armenia Maior. The kingdom had been given to Polemo of Pontus in 36 B.C. (84) by Antony, but in 31 B.C., Octavian took it from him and placed it in the hands of Artavasdes, a former king of Media Atropatene, whose friendship with Antony had caused his expulsion by Parthia. His clientship in Armenia Minor was an astute move by Octavian, for his enmity with Artaxias in Armenia Maior ensured his loyalty.

But on the death of Artavasdes in 20 B.C., Armenia Minor once more ceased to be a separate kingdom; it was joined to Archelaus' kingdom of Cappadocia, presumably because Augustus wanted a king he could trust and who had the resources to defend the borders. (85)
The kingdom of Armenia Maior was Augustus' greatest problem; it is connected to the plateau of Asia Minor on the west and to the Iranian plateau on the south, and therefore both Parthia and Rome could claim that, geographically, it belonged to their respective spheres of influence. Whichever power held the clientship of Armenia had an advantage in a military confrontation, because it possessed a corridor into enemy territory.

But Octavian inherited a hostile situation; in 36 B.C., Artavasdes, the king of Armenia, had been an ally of Antony, but had failed him at the crucial moment, resulting in a defeat by Parthia. Therefore Antony seized Artavasdes and his three sons and sent them to Egypt; the king was put to death, and Antony proposed to give the kingdom to Alexander Helios, but Artaxias, Artavasdes' eldest son, escaped and regained Armenia when Antony's attention was called to the west. (86)

When Artavasdes of Media Atropatene, an ally of Antony, had been deposed by Parthia, Artaxias was safe in his kingdom; he joined in an alliance with Parthia, and thus was hostile to Rome when Octavian assumed control. Tacitus blames Antony for the situation. (87)

Three possible courses of action were open to Octavian: he could conquer and annex Armenia; he could leave it independent and hostile; or he could establish a client relationship.

Annexation or the establishment of a client king might have involved Rome in an expensive war with Parthia, and this Octavian was not prepared to undertake, although public opinion in Rome may well have favoured avenging earlier defeats at Parthian hands. Therefore his settlements with the kings of Asia Minor safeguarded against the invasion of Roman territory from Armenia: to the north, the Iberi and
Albani threatened, to the west, Pontus, Armenia Minor, Cappadocia and Commagene were all loyal to Rome. As an additional safeguard, Octavian took Artaxias' two brothers from Egypt to Rome as hostages, whilst keeping a refugee claimant to the Parthian throne, Tiridates, in Syria as a menace to Phraates of Parthia.

Initially then, Augustus allowed Armenia to remain independent and hostile, and although he took adequate precautions to safeguard Asia Minor, there can be little doubt that he was merely waiting for a favourable opportunity to improve this unsatisfactory situation.

This occurred in 23 B.C., when Phraates asked for the return of his son, and Augustus agreed, on condition that the Roman standards captured by Parthia were returned. The agreement was carried out in 20 B.C., when the romanizing party in Armenia asked for Artaxias' brother, Tigranes, to be installed as king. (88). Tiberius was ordered to advance into Armenia with an army, and this show of force had its desired effect; Phraates would not fight and agreed to return the standards lost by Crassus, Decidius Saxa and Antony. Meanwhile Artaxias had been murdered, and Tiberius was able to install Tigranes II as king of Armenia, personally placing the crown on his head. (89) Therefore Armenia became a client kingdom, despite its Parthian sympathies arising from race and geography. It was a source of great pride to Augustus; coins were issued proclaiming Armenia capta (90), and he boasted that he could have made Armenia into a province. (91) This claim was a little unrealistic; perhaps the situation in 20 B.C. would have allowed Augustus to annex Armenia, but such action would almost certainly have provoked a war with Parthia - which the emperor wished to avoid.
After the events of 20 B.C., Augustus mentions nothing in the Res Gestae until 1 B.C., but Tacitus throws some light on the intervening years:

neque Tigrani diuturnum imperium fuit, neque liberis eius, quamquam sociatis more externo in matrimonium regnumque. Dein iussu Augasti impositus Artavasdes, et non sine olade nostra deletus (92)

It appears that Tigranes II was succeeded by his children, Tigranes III and Erato; the date is uncertain, but Cassius Dio says Tiberius was given the tribunician power and a command in Armenia to deal with this situation, but he went to Rhodes in retirement. (93) The date of this retirement was 6 B.C., therefore Tigranes II must have died shortly beforehand.

Dio speaks of Armenia becoming estranged since the death of Tigranes; presumably Tigranes III and Erato were turning eastwards in their politics as well as in their customs and were making overtures to Parthia. Therefore Augustus gave the kingdom to Artavasdes, who may have been the brother of Artaxias and Tigranes II from Rome.

But the emperor's policy failed when Artavasdes II was deposed; in view of Tigranes' letter to Rome asking for the kingship in A.D.1, and Augustus' hopeful reply because he feared a war with Parthia (94), it seems likely that Tigranes III and Erato drove out Artavasdes with Parthian aid, thus necessitating Roman action.

Augustus accordingly sent out his grandson, Gaius:

Augustus accordingly sent out his grandson, Gaius:
This account must be considered parallel to that of Tacitus:

Tum Gaius Caesar componendae Armeniae deligitur. Is Ariobarzanesen origine Medum ob insignem corporis formam et praecellentem annum volentibus Armeniis praefecit. Ariobarzane morte fortuita absu小巧pto stirpe eius haud toleravere temptatore feminae imperio, cui nomen Erato, saque brevi pulsa, incerti solutique et magis aene domino quam in libertate profugum Vonones in regnum accipiant (96). Tacitus names Ariobarzanes, his son, Erato and Vonones as the monarchs in the same period.

There is no doubt that Gaius was in the east from 1 B.C. until his death on February 21st, A.D. 4. On his arrival in Armenia, the throne was vacant, since Tigranes III had been killed in war, and his consort Erato had abdicated. (97) However, despite Tacitus' assertion volentibus Armeniis, Gaius appears to have had to impose Ariobarzanes by force - he received injuries, which later proved fatal, at the siege of Artagira. (98)

Ariobarzanes was succeeded by his son Artavasdes (99) despite Tacitus' haud toleravere, for coins testify to his reign. (100)

But the successor of Artavasdes is uncertain; if, as Tacitus claims, Erato did replace him, she probably did so with Parthian help, and Augustus had a motive for omitting it from the Res Gestae. But this would have been her third time on the throne, and Tacitus may have mistaken the order of her return to power. Certainly Augustus would have been compelled to place his own candidate, Tigranes, in Armenia with a show of force which would almost certainly have been noted by one of the authorities.

It is preferable to assume that Tigranes IV succeeded Artavasdes, as Augustus records; perhaps his rule was so brief
that Tacitus does not think him worthy of mention.

However Augustus does not record later events in Armenia. Vonones appears to have been driven from the Parthian throne to which Augustus had sent him in A.D.10 (101), and to mention him as king in Armenia would have meant recording a failure in Parthia. However, Josephus says that Vonones never actually received Armenia, but Artabanus, king of Parthia, gave it to one of his sons, Orodes, in A.D.15. (102) Nevertheless, it seems likely that in the years between the expulsion of Vonones from Parthia (103), and the accession of Orodes, Vonones was king of Armenia, whether or not he was officially recognized in Rome.

Such were the difficulties Augustus faced in Armenia. His desire to strengthen the buffer states of the east by making Armenia a client kingdom provided him with several problems. As long as Parthia was weakened in some way, the aim was easy to achieve, but when Parthia was strong enough to act, Roman pride threatened to bring a confrontation, and displays of military power were necessary. Augustus' successors were to find the same difficulties in attempting to follow his policy.

Parthia

As we have seen, Augustus' policy towards Armenia depended greatly on his relations with the King of Parthia; his fear of Parthian intrusion in the east impelled him to seize any opportunity of gaining an advantage over the King of Kings. Augustus' inactivity in Armenia between 30 B.C. and 20 B.C. was possible because Tiridates, a pretender to the Parthian throne, and one of Phraates' sons were held in Roman territory (104); any aggression by the Parthian king, Phraates, would have resulted in the execution of his son and the invasion of Parthia by Tiridates, backed by Roman troops. Tiridates
had been king of Parthia from 36 B.C., but when deposed by Phraates in 30 B.C., he fled to Syria. Phraates established friendly relations with Octavian, but as a safeguard, the princeps allowed Tiridates to remain in Syria, and received Phraates' son as a hostage. (105) In 23 B.C., the king sent envoys to Rome asking for the return of both hostages, whilst Tiridates appeared in person; Augustus brought them before the senate, and when that body referred the decision back to him, he refused to hand Tiridates over to Phraates, but sent back the king's son on condition that the Parthians would return the prisoners and standards captured in the defeats of Crassus and Antony. (106)

These standards were received in 20 B.C., when Augustus was able to make Armenia into a client kingdom; this was a great diplomatic achievement, but Phraates was not in a position to refuse, since internal strife may well have added to his problems. At this time the Parthian king was almost reduced to the position of a client because of his submission, and Augustus claimed: Parthos trium exercitum Romanorum spolia et signa reddere mihi supplices amicitiam populi Romani petere coegi (107). Perhaps Augustus exaggerated his power, yet Horace's laudatory poems express the same superiority. (108) There was certainly official rejoicing over the triumph, as coins testify. (109)

Rome's ascendency over Parthia seems to have continued for more than a decade, for Augustus further claims that Phraates sent all his heirs to Rome (110), the act of a true client king. However Josephus offers an explanation which preserves Phraates' independence, if not his wisdom (111); Josephus claims that an Italian concubine of Phraates persuaded him to send his legitimate sons to Rome, thus ensuring the succession for her own son Phraataces.
The four heirs sent to Rome were Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes, Vonones and Phraates; they were handed to M. Titius, who was legate of Syria from 11 to 8 B.C. (112). Two of them died in Rome (113), whilst two survived to become kings of Parthia: Vonones was sent to Parthia by Augustus, and Phraates by Tiberius. (114)

With these princes safely in Rome, Phraataces succeeded Phraates in 3/2 B.C. (115), and Rome's influence continued; the king met Gaius on the Euphrates in A.D.1 and agreed to renounce Armenia. (116)

The coins of Phraataces date to A.D.4 (117), and then those of Orodes begin. Phraataces was replaced because he was not truly an Arsacid (118), but Orodes himself cannot have been very popular, for Augustus received envoys asking for one of Phraates' sons to be sent from Rome (119), and the emperor, seeking to increase his influence, sent Vonones. The date is uncertain, but Suetonius tells us that the envoys were sent on by Augustus to Tiberius whilst he was in Germany in A.D.4. (120) The coins of Vonones begin in A.D.8 (121), so presumably he gained the throne in A.D.7 or 8.

However, Vonones was not popular, since the Parthians resented his Roman influence, and he was deposed by Artabanus, king of Media Atropatene. (122) Vonones was still issuing coins in A.D.11/12 (123), but Artabanus first minted in A.D.10/11 (124), and obviously by this date he had begun to replace Vonones.

So Augustus' influence in Parthia ended. He had tried throughout his reign to influence the Parthian kings, and at first internal struggles for power and the possession as hostages of various heirs to the Parthian throne enabled him to do this successfully, but after the death of Phraates, Augustus' influence
decreased, and the Parthian threat made the client kingdoms of Asia Minor increasingly important.

**Media Atropatene**

The kingdom of Media Atropatene, south-east of Armenia Minor, was ruled by Artavasdes until Antony's support was withdrawn. Then Parthian and Armenian pressure forced Artavasdes into exile. (125) Octavian's decision to leave Armenia in Artaxias' hands meant that Media was far beyond the influence of Rome, therefore Artavasdes was given Armenia Minor. (126)

However, Augustus claimed to have given Media to Ariobarzanes, the son of Artavasdes (127); presumably the establishment of Armenia Major as a Roman client kingdom enabled him to extend his influence eastwards, and Ariobarzanes was installed in Media in or shortly after 20 B.C.

The barrier of client kingdoms facing Parthia was further increased, but Roman influence in Media was only transitory; Ariobarzanes was the last Roman supporter we hear of, and by A.D. 10 the Parthia Artabanus was king of Media. (128) It seems that the kingdom was too distant for Augustus to maintain his influence.

**Adiabene**

When Artaxares, the king of Adiabene on the Upper Tigris, fled his throne, Augustus gave refuge to him, and thus continued the policy seen on the northern frontiers; he maintained the exiled king as a pretender to his throne, thus causing internal divisions within the kingdom. (125)

**India**

According to Augustus' claim (129), Indian kings sent envoys to Rome; despite the statement that they came often, only
two embassies are recorded: the first was in 25 B.C. (130), and the second in 20 B.C. (131).

It is not possible to claim that Augustus fostered client kings in India, for Rome received many articles of luxury from the region and Augustus made alliances and agreements with the suppliers only for the purposes of trade.

Florus counts the Chinese amongst the friends of Rome (132), presumably for the same reasons, but E.H. Warmington assumes that Florus confuses the Seres with the South Indian Cherass. (133)
The Syrian Frontier

In the confrontation with Parthia, it was not only the Armenian question that had to be considered. The Euphrates was the border of the Parthian Empire, and reached its westernmost point one hundred miles east of Antioch in Syria. Rome had to maintain safety in this region by making Syria a military province so that any incursion by Parthian forces could be countered speedily. But, further south, deserts difficult to cross separated Parthia from Roman spheres of influence, and Augustus decided it was safe to leave this area in the hands of client kings.

Judaea

Herod the Great had been proclaimed in Rome as king of Judaea in 40 B.C., but did not take up his throne until 37 B.C., when C. Sosius captured Jerusalem from the Parthians. Herod owed his throne to Antony and was an important ally for Antony's cause.

However, at the time of Actium, Herod was involved in the defence of his kingdom against marauding Arabs, and as soon as he learnt of the defeat of Antony, he sent envoys to Octavian. Partly because of this speedy submission and partly because Herod was bringing unity to Judaea, Octavian allowed him to retain his throne.

Herod did much for his country on the material level (134), and therefore received continuing support from Augustus. His influence for peace was such that in 23 B.C., his kingdom was increased by the addition of Trachonitis, Batanaea and Auranitis, territories east of the Jordan. (135) These areas were taken from Zenodorus, who had encouraged and benefitted from increasing brigandage; his anger was aroused at having his territories reduced, and Agrippa was sent to Syria to dissuade him from causing trouble.

Three years later, Augustus himself was in Syria when news
reached him of Zenodorus' death (136), and he increased Herod's domain still further by granting him the rest of Ituraea. (137). The emperor clearly was willing to increase the power of client kings who were loyal and who provided a unifying factor in their own domains.

After 20 B.C., Herod seems to have been secure in his rule, despite various intrigues set in motion by the sons of his several wives, for he retained the support of Augustus and his territory remained intact. It is interesting to note that at Herod's request, his brother Pheroras was given the tetrarchy of Peraea (138), although no doubt Herod himself retained the ultimate control of the area.

Despite the opposition of the orthodox Jews, only once did Herod incur the displeasure of Augustus: in 9 B.C. a dispute arose with Syllaeus of Arabia Petraea (139) and, without waiting for the emperor's decision, Herod attacked; but, despite his annoyance, Augustus decided to retain the status quo.

But when Herod died in 4 B.C., the emperor was forced to review the situation. In Herod's will, which he had constantly revised during his last years because of the plots of his various sons, he bequeathed his kingdom to Archelaus, with the following exceptions: Herod Antipas was to receive the tetrarchy of Galilee and Peraea, and Philip that of Gaulanitis, Trachonitis, Batanaea and Paneias; Herod's sister, Salome, was allotted the cities of Iamneia, Azotus and Phasaelis. (140) Antipas was displeased at this allocation, but Archelaus wisely sent the will to Augustus for official ratification.

The emperor was now faced with a difficult decision. Herod the Great had proved a strong unifying force amongst these
small but troublesome territories, and it seems likely that Augustus would have preferred to keep the whole kingdom under one ruler. Yet Herod's sons had proved their readiness to take up arms against one another on previous occasions, and to deprive two of them of their bequest would almost certainly have resulted in civil war; in addition Augustus probably doubted the ability of any one of them to produce a leadership as strong as his father's. Therefore he accepted Herod's will in part, but made suitable modifications. Archelaus became ethnarch, not king, of half of Herod's kingdom, i.e. Idumaea, Judaea and Samaria, and Augustus promised to raise him to the kingship if he proved worthy of it. Antipas received Galilee and Perea and Philip's tetrarchy was increased by the addition of those parts of Ituraea which has father had received from Zenodorus in 20 B.C. Salome received her inheritance. (141)

Antipas and Philip reigned for many years, and were allowed to issue bronze coins with the emperor's head on the obverse, and their own titles on the reverse. (142)

But Archelaus was in a different position. His relative independence is shown by several coins in which the emperor's head does not appear. (143) On the other hand, Archelaus was never considered worthy enough to be raised to the kingship, so no coins survive which credit him with the title of βασιλεύς. His reign proved troublesome; for whilst he was in Rome, waiting for the ratification of his father's will, a certain Simon, a slave of Herod the Great, took control and styled himself King of Israel. (144) Another pretender, Athronges, succeeded him and Quintus Varus, the governor of Syria, had to restore order. (145)

In the tenth year of Archelaus' reign both Jews and Samaritans found his cruelty so intolerable that they appealed to Augustus; Archelaus was summoned to Rome and banished to Vienne
in Gallia Narbonensis. (146)

At this point Augustus decided that the important position of Judaea, situated as it was between Egypt and Syria, and so near to Parthia, demanded more direct control, therefore 

Obviously the threat of war between the various factions of Judaea necessitated direct Roman rule, and it was this rather than any high degree of romanization which compelled Augustus to annex Archelaus' kingdom. His contentment with peaceful rulers is shown by the long reigns of Herod Antipas and Philip.

Ituraea.

The kingdom of Ituraea was incorporated into the realm of Herod the Great in 20 B.C., but before this time it had been a separate client state.

During the period of the second triumvirate, the king of Ituraea, Irsanias, had allied with Antony, but he was put to death by Antony and Cleopatra; the date of his death is uncertain, for Josephus records it in 40 B.C., and Cassius Dio in 36 B.C. (148) Antony then gave Ituraea to Cleopatra. (149)

After Actium, the area became ruler-less, and the lease was given to a certain Zenodorus (150), until his death in 20 B.C. (151)

Arabia Petraea

To the south and east of Judaea were the deserts of Arabia, inhabited by several obscure tribes. The Sinai peninsula and the region to the east of it was the homeland of the Nabataean tribe, called Arabia Petraea, after the principal city of Petra.

Obadas, the king of the Nabataeans, was not officially a "friend of the Romans", but an alliance must have existed, for in 25 B.C. he supplied auxiliaries to Aelius Gallus for an expedition
to Southern Arabia. Augustus himself mentions this expedition (152), but according to the accounts of Strabo and Cassius Dio (153), it was not a success; disease and privation decimated the army, and although the Romans reached Mariba, the capital of the Sabaeans, they failed to capture it.

The treachery of Syllaeus, the guide and leader of the Nabataean contingent, is given as the reason for this failure. Certainly the Nabataeans must have been concerned for the safety of their own caravan routes, but without Syllaeus' help the Roman army could not have crossed the Arabian peninsula, and in Syllaeus' trial at Rome some fifteen years later no charge of treachery on this campaign was brought against him. Although the effects of Gallus' campaign were minimal, Strabo records that both the Sabaeans and the Nabataeans became subject to Rome.

However, any clientage which was established in 24 B.C. cannot have been taken very seriously, although no trouble is reported in this area until 10-9 B.C. Obadas remained as king of Arabia Petraea, but possibly because of his increasing old age, Syllaeus gradually assumed power. (154)

Syllaeus, as the rejected suitor of Herod's sister Salome, began to foster revolt against Herod by harbouring rebels who made attacks on Judaea and Syria, and by encouraging sedition in Trachonitis. (155) Herod's appeal to Saturninus, the governor of Syria, was upheld, and Syllaeus was ordered to repay sixty talents lent by Herod to Obadas. Syllaeus decided to appeal to Augustus and travelled to Rome.

But whilst he was there, Obadas died and Aeneas assumed the throne. (156) Augustus was angry because Aeneas, who changed his name to Aretas, had not sought permission to rule; his temper was not improved when Herod attacked Arabia. Syllaeus took
advantage of these two incidents to find favour with the emperor, but Aretas wrote to Augustus accusing Syllaeus of several crimes including regicide and eventually he was tried in Rome and executed. Augustus was inclined to give Petraea to Herod, but the latter's old age and troublesome sons decided him against this; moreover, Aretas' presumptuousness had been mollified by a formal request for the throne, and as the only remaining contender, Augustus granted his request. (157) Aretas received his throne in 9 B.C. and ruled unhindered for almost fifty years.

Emesa

Rome had little contact with tribes beyond the limits of Arabia Petraea, but in one case Augustus was compelled to interfere. The tribe of the Emesenes had been ruled by Iamblichus I (158), who had supported Antony, but in 31 B.C. the latter had him put to death (159), and his brother Alexander obtained the sovereignty by bringing accusations against Octavian.

After the battle of Actium, Octavian was able to obtain revenge: not only did he deprive Alexander of his throne, but also humiliated him in the victory parade in Rome, and finally put him to death. (160) Alexander's relative unimportance left him without the diplomatic protection of an Amyntas or an Herod, and Octavian was able to exact vengeance for personal attacks. (161)

However, in 20 B.C. the kingdom was given back to the royal family during Augustus' great eastern settlement, for Iamblichus II, the son of Iamblichus I, received the throne. (162) Obviously the emperor felt that on this frontier, the tribal chiefs would prove more efficient than Roman governors.

Thus Augustus seems to have been content to allow the south-eastern corner of the empire to remain in the hands of client
kings. No doubt he felt that the Semitic and Arabian tribes could best be governed by one of their own people, as later events proved. However loyalty to Rome was enforced, and the legions in Syria were quick to stop any military offensives. The appeals to the emperor by Archelaus, Antipas, Aretas and Syllaeus prove that Augustus took a very real interest in the client kingdoms, and the annexation of Archelaus' kingdom shows his refusal to persevere with unpopular monarchs.
The African Kingdoms

The north coast of Africa had long been under Roman influence, and since the defeat of Jugurtha there had been no threat to their superiority. The vast Sahara desert to the south of the coastal strip protected the Empire from any serious threat of invasion, and it was of little strategic importance whether Rome ruled directly, through provincial governors, or indirectly, through client kings.

Egypt

The one exception was Egypt, where control was vital to Rome; it was an important trading centre at the confluence of trade routes from three continents, and it supplied Italy with a large proportion of its grain. At the same time its proximity to the eastern and southern frontiers gave it military importance, which was increased by the knowledge that attacks on North Africa from the south would come mainly via the Nile valley.

Julius Caesar had made Egypt into a client kingdom, but this semi-independence had proved extremely dangerous during the second triumvirate. Antony's alliance with Cleopatra had shown that the financial resources of Egypt could be used to provide the basis of an empire in the eastern Mediterranean which could threaten the military supremacy of Rome. Octavian could not afford to grant Egypt a large degree of independence, and the opportunity for complete annexation came when Cleopatra committed suicide in 30 B.C. (165)

Octavian disposed of the children of Antony and Cleopatra by various means: Antyllus and Caesarion were slain, Cleopatra Selene was married to Juba (164), and Alexander Helios and Ptolemy Philadelphos were spared as a favour to their sister. Their ancestral domain was annexed to the Roman Empire (165), but it did not become an ordinary
imperial province; Egypt was regarded as something between a province and the personal domain of the emperor (166), and senators had to receive special permission from the emperor to visit it.

Octavian showed outstanding political insight in adopting this policy, for the Egyptians had always believed that their monarch was divine; the institution of normal provincial procedure in Egypt would have introduced the annual governorship, and even the most reverent Egyptians might have had difficulty in believing they were presented with a new god every year. Therefore Octavian introduced a system by which he himself was successor to the Pharaohs, receiving divine honours, and his prefects were regarded as viceroys of a god.

Thus the emperor disposed of one of the largest and most important client kingdoms. The political, economic and military advantages of this move were so great that he could not afford to leave Egypt under its own kings; even Tacitus approved of his action. (167)

**Ethiopia**

Within six years of the annexation of Egypt, the legions stationed on the Nile were called upon to repulse an attack from Ethiopia. It seems that Augustus was planning an exploratory expedition into the kingdom (168), and Candace, queen of Ethiopia, encouraged by Gallus' failure in Arabia (169), decided to forestall this by taking the offensive.

C. Petronius, who succeeded Gallus during 24 B.C., had to meet the invasion; he gathered an army and advanced into Ethiopia, driving the invaders from Egypt; on capturing the Ethiopian capital, Napata, he withdrew, but an attack on the Roman garrison at Premnis
necessitated a further campaign in the following year. (170) Candace begged for peace and sent envoys to Augustus in Samos. These were received favourably and the emperor remitted the tribute imposed on the queen. (171)

Ethiopia can hardly have been regarded as a client kingdom and no doubt Augustus was happy that the country to the south of Egypt had become an ally of Rome. He showed no further desire to influence the internal affairs of Candace's realm, and as long as Egypt was not troubled, he was happy to retain the frontiers established by Cornelius Gallus. (172)

**Numidia**

After the battle of Thapsus in 46 B.C., the king of Numidia, Juba I, committed suicide and his son, Juba II, was taken to Rome to grace Caesar's triumph. (173) He was well treated in Italy, and seems to have obtained the favour of Octavian, for he was present in the campaigns in the east. Certainly Juba benefitted in the settlement after Actium, when he was married to Cleopatra Selene and restored to his father's kingdom. (174)

However, Numidia had been governed from Rome for sixteen years, and its habitants must have reached a high degree of romanization - indeed, the majority were Roman citizens. (175) Therefore Augustus reorganised Numidia as a province, but he was unwilling to deprive Juba of a throne and transferred him to Mauretania.

**Mauretania**

Whereas Numidia became a province after being ruled by a client king, the reverse seems to have applied in Mauretania. The rulers of Mauretania, Bocchus and Bogud, had been Cassarians, but after Caesar's death, Bocchus in eastern Mauretania supported Octavian, and Bogud in the west favoured Antony. In 38 B.C., Bogud campaigned
in Spain, and an uprising at home was aided by Bocchus. The latter then took control of the whole kingdom, and his rule was later confirmed by Octavian. (176)

However, Bocchus died in 33 B.C., and it would appear that Mauretania became a province. Certainly no king was appointed, and the government was conducted from Rome. (177)

Yet in 25 B.C., Mauretania was returned to the hands of a client king when Juba II was transferred from Numidia. (178) This would appear to be a retrogressive step, but Augustus must have had a reason for it. Perhaps the large numbers of Roman citizens in Numidia necessitated its annexation, but to rid North Africa of all its client kings, necessitating the patrol of the long frontier from the Atlantic to the Red Sea by Roman troops, would have required too many troops for such a peaceful frontier. Therefore Augustus decided to economise on his forces by returning Mauretania to his trusted friend who had already proved himself fit to rule.

Juba seems to have ruled well, and was so popular with his subjects that they paid him divine honours after his death. (179) His fame as an author was well known, and his works are often mentioned by extant authors, especially Plutarch and Pliny, but his martial fame was not so great. In A.D. 6, the Gaetulians, fearful that their romanized king would bring direct Roman rule, revolted, and it took a Roman army under Cornelius Cossus to restore peace. (180) The difficulty of this campaign is shown by the fact that Cossus received the title "Gaetulicus" and was awarded triumphal honours.

Augustus' policy towards the client kingdoms of North Africa seems to have been one of convenience, rather than a series
of delicate diplomatic manoeuvres. The annexation of Egypt was necessary for the safety of the principate, but in Juba's two appointments, we can see that the emperor was taking note of the internal situations of the countries concerned.

Whereas the appointments in the east were made with a view to establishing a bulwark against Parthia whilst maintaining an uneasy peace, in Africa there was little danger of invasion to threaten the safety of the empire (181), and Augustus was able to concentrate on the romanization of the various peoples with a view to their full participation in the empire.

Conclusion

From this survey of Augustus' relations with client kings, it is clear that kings were not used consistently throughout the empire; the emperor realized that the usefulness of client states was limited by geographical and sociological factors, and his policies were formulated accordingly.

Central and northern Europe had no tradition of static population structures; the nomadic tribal units were acquainted with very few of the sophisticated delights of civilization, and their primary skill was that of warfare. A series of client kingdoms to protect Roman settlements would have been useless, for the European nomads would merely have driven them out one by one. They could only be halted by means of a consistent military frontier guarded and patrolled by the army. So Augustus employed only one client king, Maroboduus, on the European frontier, and he owed his alliance to circumstance rather than policy. Of the other two kingdoms in Europe, both well within the boundaries of Roman influence, one was given a king as a unifying factor and the other was, in practice, a province with a permanent native governor.
However, in the eastern Empire the situation was different. The peoples of the Hellenistic east were used to the government of monarchs, and belief in their semi-divine powers made their political affiliations extremely important to Rome, for they had great influence over their subjects.

It had become almost traditional for Rome to use these kingdoms as a buffer against the unified military strength of the Parthian Empire; Augustus' attitude towards them falls into two parts. The first phase was apparent whilst Parthia held influence in Armenia: Octavian, who had fought against all the eastern kings at Actium, needed their support as soon as the battle was won, for the empire had to be guarded against Parthia. So the kings of the larger client states kept their thrones, and one by one were recognised as "friends of Caesar". Nevertheless, several less important monarchs lost their thrones as a warning to the others, thus allowing Roman government to work alongside other kings.

But Augustus' policy changed in 20 B.C.; the establishment of a pro-Roman king in Armenia, and the reduction of Parthia almost to the status of a client state herself, enabled Augustus to return several of the smaller states to their respective royal families. A trend towards large kingdoms as more effective buffer units can also be seen in the emperor's encouragement to unite by marriage the royal houses of several states.

Under this acceptance of client states in the east, Augustus may have been advocating a policy of romanization with a view to peaceful annexation. Galatia was ready to be included in the empire on the death of Amyntas, and similar moves by succeeding emperors suggest that the romanization process was consciously encouraged.

However, on the African frontier there was no need for the client states to act as buffers, for they were employed merely
as stop-gaps until the native populations were ready to enter the empire.

Augustus employed client kings as buffers against Parthia, as factors in the process of romanization and as the basis of national unity; his policies seem to have been basically sound in that he met no open resistance from the kings themselves, and he certainly provided precedents for his successors, as far as they chose to follow his guidance.
Notes to Chapter II

1. RG 26.

2. Velleius Paterculus, II, 90.

3. Yet some military campaigns were necessary - notably that of M. Messalla against the Aquitani in 27 B.C., and in the previous year, C. Carinas against the Morini.


7. RG 32.


10. see Appendix I.

11. It is significant that the barbarian invasions which led to the ultimate disintegration of the Western Empire came from this direction.

12. By conquering all the tribes as far as the Elbe, the European frontier would extend along the Elbe and the Danube. This line was shorter and straighter than the Rhine-Danube line, but the man-power needed to conquer and patrol this region would have been immense, and this may explain Augustus' subsequent failure to carry out his plan.


14. RG 32.


16. The last three letters are -rus (RG 32).

17. Cass. Dio LV 10A, 2-3. The Marcomanni must have moved eastwards from the Black Forest region, and by the time of Ahenobarbus' campaign were living to the north of the Upper Danube.

18. IIB 8965. This inscription is rather fragmentary, but it gives part of the legate's name: -cius. This unknown general could possibly be M. Vinicius, who followed Ahenobarbus as legate of Germany (A.D.1), so could have done so in Illyricum a few years earlier. see Cq XXVII, 1933, 144-8.

19. RG 26,4. These tribes included the Semnones, the northern neighbours of the Marcomanni, and the Cimbri, who sent their holy kettle to Augustus as a sign of submission (Strabo VII, 293).
20. Sentius Saturninus would march east from Moguntiacum, the troops in Raetia would march northwards to meet him, and Tiberius himself would cross the Danube from Illyricum and attack from the south-east.


22. RG 26, 2.


27. Strabo IV, 206.

28. However, Noricum did not become a separate province; Cassius Dio's account is needed when he says: (οι Παυσάνιοι) αιτθη ομολογησαν, και τοις Νορίκοις αίτιοι τῆς αὐτής δουλείας έγένοντο (LIV, 20, 1-2) - Noricum was incorporated into the province of Pannonia, and therefore one governor was in control of both.


30. The campaigns included those of Octavian in 35-33 B.C., Licinius Crassus in 30-29 B.C., Agrippa in 13 B.C. and Tiberius in 12-9 B.C.

31. RG 30, 1.

32. There were raids in 30-29 B.C., 16 B.C. (Cass. Dio LIV, 20), 10 B.C. (Cass. Dio LIV, 36), one of uncertain date, probably repulsed by C. Cornelius Lentulus (Suet. Aug. 21; Florus IV,12), and A.D.6 (Cass. Dio IV, 30).

33. The first attested imperial legate is A. Caecina in A.D.6 (Cass. Dio II, 29, 3.), though possibly P. Vinicius, consul in A.D.2, was an earlier legate (ICRR, I, 654)

34. RG 31, 2.

35. The Bastarnae had been defeated by the campaign of Crassus, but the Sarmatae were involved in the raids of A.D.6. Dessau (Ils. 986) shows that even under Nero, the Bastarnae, Scythae and Sarmatae had to be put down.


38. Tac. Ann. II, 64.
40. 36 B.C.
42. Cass. Dio XLIX, 41.
43. RG 27, 3.
44. These were Bithynia, Asia and Cilicia.
45. BMC, Galatia etc. pp. 2-4.
47. see below, 23.
48. Strabo XII, 577.
49. 16-13 B.C.
50. RG 28, 1.
52. BMC, Galatia etc. p. 44, no. 1., dated to the year 18-17 B.C.
53. IG II, 3430.
54. Strabo XII, 556.
59. There seems to be no evidence for another king on this throne, and it may be that Augustus was slow to recognise a king not yet of age, therefore Tarcondimotus and Philopator may be the same person. However, this theory is purely my own speculation, and modern scholars, e.g. D. Magie (II, 1337-8) regard Tarcondimotus and Philopator as two individuals.
62. see below, 28.
63. Strabo XII, 556.
64. Strabo XI, 495.
65. see above, 23-24.
67. His reign began between 47 and 43 B.C. - BMC, Pontus etc, p.xxxi.
68. IGGR I, 874.
69. Strabo VII, 311.
71. see above, 26.
72. IGGR I, 875 and 901.
73. JHS XXXIX, 1919, 88ff.
74. A.I. Berthier - Delagorde, Bulletin of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, XXIX, p.111ff., nos. 35-43, pl. 2 and 3.
75. IGGR I, 906.
76. BMC, Pontus etc, p.49. On the first is the date 8YE - year 299 of the Bosporan era, A.D.2, and on the second ZT - year 307/A.D.10.
77. JHS XXXIX, 1919, 88ff.
78. RG 31, 2.
83. see below, 97.
89. Suet. Tib. 9.
90. Mattingly, BMC I, p. 4, nos. 18ff.
91. RG 27, 2.
95. RG 27, 2.
99. Cassius Dio (LV 10a, 7) calls him 'Ἀρτάβαζος
100. EMC, Galatia etc, p. 101.
101. see below, 37.
104. RG 32, 1.
106. Cass. Dio LIII, 33, 2; see above, 32.
107. RG 29, 2.
108. Horace, Epistulae I, 12, 27.
110. RG 32, 2.
112. Strabo XVI, 748; P-W, s.v. M. Titius, 18.
113. JJS 84, 2; CIL VI, 1799.
114. see below, 109.
117. BMC, Parthia, p. 139, II (tetradrachms)
119. RG 33.
120. Suet. Tib. 16.
121. BMC, Parthia, p. 143, no. 1.
123. BMC, Parthia, p. 143, no. 5.
124. BMC, Parthia, p. 146, no. 1.
125. RG 32, 1.
126. see above, 30.
127. RG 33.
129. RG 31, 1.
130. Orosius VI, 21, 19.
132. Florus II, 34.
133. Warmington, p. 37.
139. see below, 44.
142. BMC, Palestine, p. 228 no. 1, etc.
143. BMC, Palestine, p. 231-5.
151. see above, 40-41.
152. RG 26, 5.
158. Strabo XVI, 753.

161. The only other execution after Actium was that of the equally unimportant Adiatorix, the son of a tetrarch in Galatia, who killed all the Romans in Heracleia shortly before Actium. He too was a prisoner in Octavian's triumph, and was put to death with his son (Strabo XII, 543).

164. see below, 49.
165. RG 27, 1.
166. H. Idris Bell, CAH X, chap. X.
168. Strabo XVI, 780.
169. see above, 43-44.
170. For a discussion of the precise dating of these two campaigns, see S. Jameson, JRS LVIII, 1968, 71f.
171. Strabo XVII, 819-821.
172. ITT 8995.
174. Cass. Dio II, 15, 6. Cassius Dio clearly states that Juba was restored to his father's kingdom, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I have accepted this in my text. However, it seems strange that a territory which had been a Roman province for sixteen years should revert once more to a kingdom. It is more likely that Juba's first appointment was in Mauretania.
177. Cass. Dio XLIX, 43.
179. Lactantius, De Falsa Religione I, 11.

181. However, there were occasionally minor uprisings on the eastern and southern frontiers of Africa. Cornelius Balbus undertook a punitive expedition against the Garamantes of Tripolitania in 19 B.C., P. Sulpicius Quirinius against the Marmaridae of Cyrenaica some time before 12 B.C., and Cossus Cornelius Lentulus against the Gaetulian nomads of the south in A.D. 5. Later, trouble was caused by Tacfarinas (A.D. 17-23) and the Garamantes (A.D. 70).
CHAPTER III

Europe under Augustus' Julio-Claudian Successors.

Augustus' long reign had seen the emergence of clearly defined frontiers in Europe beyond which barbarian tribes should not pass, but his policy did not include the use of client kings. The first emperor preferred to keep the warlike tribes in check by military rather than diplomatic means, and so the northerly limits of the Roman provinces were guarded by army installations rather than buffer states. During the fifty years following the death of Augustus, his policy was modified, with varying degrees of success.

Britain.

The twenty-two miles of water which separated Britain from the provinces of Gaul had seemed to provide sufficient security against invasion, and Augustus had deemed it unnecessary to send forces across the Channel; he was content to allow Roman influence to spread slowly to the Belgic tribes in the south of Britain, as his coins show. (1)

His immediate successor, Tiberius, determined to follow the same policy, and the literary authorities record no dealings with Britain during his reign. It is to the coins of this period that we must turn, and C.E. Stevens (2) calls on the evidence presented by D.F. Allen (3) to trace Tiberius' policy towards Britain.

We have seen that Epillus and Verica, the kings of the Regni and Atrebates, had issued coins with the title rex (4), but soon after Tiberius' accession, the title disappears from Verica's coins (5), and Roman coin-types of Epillus appear in east Kent
without the title *rex*. Presumably Tiberius wanted to modify Augustus' sphere of influence, and allay suspicion of a bogus conquest, therefore he denied the British chieftains the title of king. On the other hand, the appearance of Epillus' coins in east Kent suggests that Rome's friends held all the south-eastern corner of Britain, and therefore Roman territory was unlikely to suffer any unexpected attacks.

However, Epillus seems to have been expelled from Kent in c. A.D. 25 by Cunobelinus. The latter issued Roman coin-types, but his friendship with Rome may well have been suspect, for his sons Epaticcus and Caratacus made inroads from the north on the kingdom of Verica. Stevens suggests that Cunobelinus was unwilling to attack personally, and could disown his sons if Rome disapproved of their advance. During Tiberius' reign, Rome seems to have lost a little of her influence over the kingdoms in Britain.

Nevertheless; Rome was still a place of refuge for exiled Britons, and in A.D. 40, the emperor Gaius received the surrender of Adminius, a young British prince who had been expelled by his father, Cunobelinus. Suetonius refers to Cunobelinus as *rex Britannorum*, which suggests that the latter was effecting some kind of national unity, at least in south-eastern Britain. In the face of such a situation, Gaius may well have decided to invade the island; he certainly advanced to the Gallic coast, where the famous events recorded by Suetonius took place. Whether or not Gaius actually planned an invasion, as Tacitus asserts, is uncertain, but the fact remains that the Roman army did not embark, and the British kings were left to their own devices for a few more years.

Yet the conquest of the southern kingdoms of Britain must by this time have become a political, military and economic necessity and Gaius' successor, Claudius, seized an opportunity
to effect this, when Verica, the pro-Roman king of Surrey and Sussex, was expelled and fled to Rome to seek help. (14)

Therefore, in A.D.43, four legions under Aulus Plautius Silvanus landed in Britain. Cunobelinus had died only months before, and his sons, Togodumnus and Caratacus were defeated on the Medway; Claudius himself conducted a battle north of the Thames, entered Camulodunum, and established it as the capital of the new province of Britannia. (15)

However, the conquest of Britain had only just begun, and Claudius' general realized the impossibility of conquering a totally hostile country: it was necessary to rely on the support of some local chieftains to protect the flanks of the Roman advance. Therefore we see in Britain the emergence of three client kings who were important strategically rather than politically.

The first of these was Cogidumnus, who inherited the kingdom of Verica, in Sussex. An inscription found at Chichester verifies his unusual position (16), for it shows that Cogidumnus was not only rex, but also legatus Augusti, which, with its implied senatorial rank, was an unusual position for a barbarian nobleman to hold. Nevertheless this honour, coupled with the more mundane grant of citizenship, ensured the loyalty of this king for many years, as Tacitus verifies. (17) Cogidumnus' friendship was vital to the early invaders, for it allowed Vespasian to advance westwards into Dorset and Wiltshire, and the king's reward may well have been assistance in the building of the magnificent palace at Fishbourne, near Chichester, which can have been built only by Cogidumnus. (18)

The second of these client kingdoms was that of the Iceni, in East Anglia, who guarded the right flank of the Roman
advance towards the northwest. (19) But the king Prasutagus (20),
was not as successful as Cogidumnus, for when P. Ostorius Scapula
ordered a general disarmament in A.D.47, the Iceni revolted. (21)
Nevertheless, Prasutagus continued as king until A.D.60. (22)

Whilst the armies were campaigning in the south-west
and against Caratacus in Wales, the north could not be disregarded,
and it seems likely that Cartimandua, the queen of the Brigantes,
whose realm covered modern Yorkshire and Lancashire, entered into
an alliance with Rome. Certainly she helped Rome in A.D.51, when
she handed over Caratacus who had taken refuge after his defeat. (23)
But Cartimandua's subjects were not to remain as clients, for as
Tacitus says (24), the wealth and prosperity gained from Roman
favour was her ruin. She divorced her husband, Venutius, and
married his armour-bearer, Vellocaetus. But Venutius retained
the support of his tribesmen, who rebelled; Cartimandua was
rescued with difficulty by Roman forces and Venutius, who inherited
her throne, remained hostile to Rome. The dates of these events
are obscure (25), but the reference occurs in Hist. III, 45, and
if Tacitus' chronology is correct, Venutius must have been troublesome
in A.D.69.

However, the surrender of Carataucus by Cartimandua in
A.D.51 resulted in the former being taken to Rome and exhibited
to the populace. (26) Claudius then erected the following
commemoration of his victory over the British kings:

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pontific[i a maxim. trib. notes]tat. XI cos V im[p XX... patri
d[evictos sine] u[e]l[a in deditionem accipere] gent[aeque
b[arbaras tran]s Oceanum] pr[imus in d[ici]onem populi Romani
redegerit]. (27)
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Although Claudius proudly boasted of his victory over eleven British kings, his successor, Nero, inherited a province in which three clients, Cogidumnus, Cartimandua and Prasutagus, helped to keep the peace.

Of these, Cogidumnus remained loyal throughout his reign, and the south remained secure. An inscription found at Chichester, which must have been set up during Cogidumnus' reign, shows the king's acceptance of Nero as his overlord and emperor. (28)

But the other monarchs were not so reliable. I have already dealt with Cartimandua's dethronement, which must have taken place during Nero's reign. Tacitus gives two different dates for Venutius' rising. In the Annales (29) he says Aulus Didius Gallus was the governor who rescued Cartimandua, therefore the revolt must have taken place before A.D.57. In the Historiae (30) he says Venutius was encouraged to rebel by the discord in the Roman armies caused by the civil wars of A.D.69. Presumably the trouble began early in Nero's principate and had not been settled by the time of his death.

Yet the loss of Prasutagus was even more dangerous for Roman rule in Britain. The king died in A.D.59-60, naming as co-heirs the emperor and his own daughters. (31) In the absence of a male heir it was decided to add the territory of the Iceni to the province. Prasutagus' widow, Boudicca, was flogged and their daughters violated. This outrage, coupled with the fear of further trouble in their provincial status, impelled the Iceni to revolt, and Camulodunum and Londinium were destroyed. Only a brilliant victory by Suetonius Paulinus, the governor, saved the province. This near calamity showed that Claudius' policy of protecting his advance with client-states had been correct, and proved the folly of attempting to incorporate kingdoms into the
empire before they had become romanised.

From this evidence it is clear that, during the time of the Julio-Claudian emperors, the Roman attitude towards Britain changed, for a policy of gradual infiltration became one of direct annexation. However Claudius found that he was able to use inter-tribal rivalries to enlist some British chieftains as friends and allies, who, unlike the clients of Asia Minor, were pro tempore allies, useful as strategic units in a campaign. Once Rome had a foothold in Britain they could be absorbed into the province, although the revolt of the Iceni proved that this might not be too easy, and only Cogidumnus survived as a friend and ally to Rome beyond the first twenty years of Roman rule.

Germany

Augustus had always relied on his armies to keep the German tribes out of Roman territory. His distrust of the warlike Germanic chieftains was shown by his refusal to enrol them as client kings, and only Maroboduus became a friend and ally of Rome, obtaining this position merely because of Tiberius' recall to Pannonia. (32)

Tiberius, whose campaigns had taught him much about the Germans, followed the same policy. He allowed Germanicus to campaign across the Rhine (33) to restore prestige lost by Varus' defeat, but he did not intend to advance permanently, and as soon as that prestige was restored, Germanicus was recalled. Tiberius was convinced that the German tribes, when left to their own devices, would quarrel amongst themselves. (34) He was soon proved to be right, for as soon as Germanicus returned, war broke out between Arminius and Maroboduus; the Suebi did not like Maroboduus' title of king, and many of his subjects turned to
Arminius. (35) Maroboduus appealed to Rome, as a friend and ally, but Tiberius refused, since Maroboduus had not helped him. Maroboduus was defeated.

Tiberius' policy of keeping his enemies divided and weak was certainly successful, for in A.D. 18 Maroboduus was expelled by one of his own exiles, Catualda. (36) The former king fled across the Danube to seek asylum, and Tiberius allowed him to settle in Ravenna, where he remained until his death in A.D. 36.

Catualda suffered the same fate, for he was driven out by the Hermunduri and given refuge at Forum Julii in Narbonese Gaul. Tiberius thus had two kings whom he could use as a threat to troublesome German tribes.

However the followers of these two chieftains promoted an interesting decision by Tiberius:

\textit{barbari utrumque comitati ne quietas provincias immixti turbarent, Danuvium ultra inter flumina Marum et Cusum locantur, dato rege Vannio gentis Quadorum.} (37)

For the first time, Rome settled a Germanic people outside the recognised limits of Roman territory and imposed on them a king from another tribe. Thus Rome had a client state on the north bank of the Danube to break the shock of possible invasions.

Yet this was to be an isolated case. In A.D. 28, the Frisii, near the mouth of the Rhine, rebelled against excessive taxation and defeated the army of L. Apronius, the legate of Lower Germany (38), but Tiberius made no effort to reconquer them.

Gaius, Tiberius' successor, took an active interest in the Rhine armies, and was the first reigning emperor to campaign with his troops in this region, but even so he seems to have had little contact with Germans beyond the Rhine. Suetonius and
Cassius Dio (39) report that Gaius indulged in futile campaigns which resulted in the "capture" of some of his own troops; however Balsdon (40) seems to have interpreted these events correctly. He suggests that Gaius hastened to the German provinces in A.D.39 to forestall a conspiracy by Gn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, the legate of Upper Germany, and found the German legions had suffered from lax discipline. He appointed Servius Galba, the future emperor, as the new legate of Upper Germany, and together they organised military exercises (Suetonius' "games") which succeeded in restoring a suitable standard of discipline. Obviously, Gaius was in no position to dictate to German chieftains, but Galba was able to repel German raids into Gaul. (41)

Thus in A.D.41 Claudius inherited eight well-organised legions on the Rhine, but his predecessors had followed a non-aggressive policy. It had been twenty-five years since a large Roman force had campaigned beyond the Rhine, and the German tribes on the left bank, encouraged by Roman inactivity, must have been growing in strength. The failure of Tiberius to reconquer the Frisii in A.D.28 probably encouraged contempt for Rome. This growing German power in the north was encountered in the first year of Claudius' reign; P. Gabinius Secundus, the governor of Lower Germany, met and defeated the Chauci, recapturing the last eagle lost by Varus. (42) However, in A.D.47, the Chauci caused further trouble, when, with the Frisii, they attacked Roman shipping at the mouth of the Rhine and raided the Gallic coast. Gn. Domitius Corbulo was sent as governor to Lower Germany, and, after restoring Roman discipline which had once more grown lax, brought warships up the Rhine, sank the German fleet and ejected their leader, Gannascus. (43)
Corbulo was eager to subdue the Frisii completely, but Claudius, unwilling to advance beyond Augustus' frontier, forbade it. Nevertheless the Frisii were settled on lands delimited by Corbulo, and they were given a senate, magistrates, and laws. Thus Claudius set up the first Roman client state beyond the Rhine, but it was not a kingdom, for Corbulo had driven out and killed Gannascus, and the Frisii were given a Roman constitution. Yet the withdrawal of Roman troops left no Roman overseers to implement this settlement, and the disregard for Rome shown by the Frisii in A.D. 57 (44) would suggest that the success of this state as a client was short-lived.

Yet in the same year (45), a more important client state was set up in Germany. According to Tacitus (46), the Cherusci, from the Weser watershed, asked Claudius to give them a king, since their nobility had been almost annihilated by civil wars. Presumably the son of the great Arminius who had been brought up at Ravenna (47) had died, and the only remaining member of the royal house was Italicus, Arminius' nephew, whose father, Flavius, had fought with Germanicus against the Cherusci. (48) Italicus himself had been brought up at Rome and was a Roman citizen, and Claudius probably hoped to achieve by diplomacy what his predecessors had failed to do through force of arms. Certainly the emperor thought it important that: *illum* (Italicum) primum Romae ortum nec obsidem, sed civem ire externum ad imperium. (49)

If Italicus' reign had been successful, an important advance in Roman policy would have taken place, for the protection of the Rhine by means of client kingdoms had never before been attempted. However the German love of freedom impelled an anti-Roman party to oppose Italicus. At some stage in his rule, he
defeated them in battle, but he was later expelled, being restored only with the help of the Langobardi. Tacitus says that throughout his reign: (Italicus) per laeta per adversae res Cheruscae adflictatabat. (50) No more is heard of Italicus, so presumably Claudius' policy was successful in that for a time a pro-Roman king was established beyond the Rhine, and the Germans were divided amongst themselves.

To the south of the Cherusci lived their enemies, the Chatti. Galba had checked them in A.D.41 (51) and they remained quiet for nine years, but in A.D.50, a marauding raid into Upper Germany was crushed by the governor, Publius Pomponius Secundus. (52) The Chatti, fearful of being trapped between the Romans and the Cherusci, surrendered a few survivors from Varus' disaster, and sent envoys and hostages to Rome. By this act it seems likely that they acknowledged subservience to Rome, and may well have become a vassal state. Claudius seems to have built a line of client states to protect the northern frontier.

Yet in the same year, a client king north of the Danube received a setback. Vannius, the king of the Suebi, Marcomanni and Quadi, who had been set up by Tiberius (53), was attacked by Vibilius, the king of the Hermunduri, and his nephews, Vangio and Sido (54); Vannius appealed to Rome. If the appeal had come from a king in Asia Minor, doubtless Claudius would have sent help, but the Roman policy of non-intervention in inter-tribal wars was evident here. Just as Tiberius had refused aid to his 'friend', Maroboduus, so Claudius declined to help Vannius. He merely offered a safe refuge to the chief, and ordered the governor of Pannonia to post troops along the Danube to protect the losers. Vannius was defeated and sought refuge with the Roman fleet on the Danube; he and his followers were granted land in Pannonia, and his nephews shared
his kingdom. The wisdom of Claudius' policy was then proved, for Tacitus adds that Vangio and Sido remained loyal to Rome; the frontier had been preserved, and the vassals kept weak.

Thus, when Nero succeeded Claudius, the Northern frontier from the Weser to the Waag was protected by states loyal to Rome. The emperor's attention had been turned to Britain, and Nero showed no desire to advance into Germany. However the Romans were forced to take action in Northern Germany, for in A.D.57 the Frisii, who had been given a Roman constitution ten years before (55), migrated to rich grazing ground between the rivers Lippe and Ems. (56) Obviously they regarded themselves as independent. However, L. Dubius Avitus, the governor of Lower Germany, ordered them to obtain Nero's permission for the move. Despite a deputation of their chiefs, Nero refused, and a small show of force persuaded them to return.

The vacant land was then occupied by the vagrant Ampsivarii. (57) Despite reminders that they had always been allies of Rome, Avitus crossed the Rhine and drove the invaders into the forests of Central Germany. Rome thus showed she was capable of maintaining a firm control on the east bank of the Rhine.

Further south, two tribes who were vassals of Rome quarrelled in A.D.58. A dispute over boundaries led to a war between the Chatti and the Hermunduri; the latter were victorious, and in honouring a vow they slaughtered many of the Chatti. (58) This cannot have been unpleasing to Nero, for the Chatti had always been warlike, and had only been subdued in A.D.50 after raiding Roman territory. (59)

Once Augustus had abandoned any attempts to annex Germany, his Julio-Claudian successors followed his example. The valley of
the Rhine had become a frontier beyond which the barbarians should not pass; the Rhine legions, when properly disciplined, were adequate to repel an invasion, and the fleet patrolling the river prevented the native tribes from crossing as they pleased (60), the only exception being the Hermunduri. (61) Tiberius followed Augustus' advice to the letter, for, after Germanicus' campaigns, no Roman army crossed the Rhine, although Vannius ruled beyond the Danube under the aegis of Rome. Claudius was more imaginative in that he protected the northern empire by a series of client states - yet these differed from client kingdoms in other parts of the empire, for they were not included in the empire itself, but remained beyond the sphere of Roman arms. His successor was content merely to maintain the situation he inherited.

Besides the basic security of the river frontiers, there was another reason for forbidding advance: Syme says that "the responsibility and the glory of war could not be resigned to a subject, conquest must be achieved, if at all, by or at least in the presence of the emperor himself". (62)

**The Alpes Cottiae**

Among the high passes of the Alps, Augustus had left only one area under a native ruler; that was the kingdom of Alpes Cottiae under Marcus Julius Cottius, who was officially *praefectus* of the region. Because of his loyalty, he was allowed to remain by Tiberius, who called on him to supply troops to stop a civil disturbance in Pollentia. (63)

The next reference to Marcus Julius Cottius is by Cassius Dio (64) under the year A.D. 44. and presumably this was the son of the man recognised by Augustus in 9 B.C. The loyal service of both father and son was rewarded by Claudius when he allowed the latter to be given the royal title for the first time, an action the
equivalent of a peerage in the New Year Honours List, which made little practical difference either to Cottius or to his subjects.

However, during the reign of Nero, Cottius died, and:

item Alpium defuncto Cottio in provinciae formam redegit. (65)

Presumably the inhabitants of the kingdom were sufficiently romanised to be included in the empire on the death of their king.

The date of this annexation is uncertain, but Pliny (66) includes the Cottiani amongst those who had received the ius Latii. Nero granted this privilege to the Alpes Maritimae in A.D.64 (67), and he probably extended it to the Alpes Cottiae at the same time. This would suggest that Cottius died shortly before this date.

The Danube

If the Julio-Claudian emperors felt unable to trust the tribes of Germany, even less did they trust the tribes beyond the Danube, north of the province of Moesia. No attempt was made to make clients of the Daci or Sarmatae.

However, an inscription found at Tivoli tells of Roman contact with these tribes. (68) Tiberius Plautius Silvanus, a governor of Moesia during the latter half of Nero's reign, settled 100,000 natives from the northern bank of the Danube within the province, on lands given to them by Rome. Thus eastern Europe had a barrier against invasion. But Silvanus proved Roman superiority beyond the Danube. In A.D.62 he crushed a disturbance among the Sarmatae whilst half his army was serving in Armenia. He then received token of goodwill from the kings of the Daci, Bastarnae and Roxolani, and deposed the king of the Scythians in the Crimea. Whether he advanced by land or sea is unknown.

Henderson (69) sees in this advance an attempt to control the coast of the Black Sea. Certainly by A.D.63 Roman arms must have reached as far as the Crimea, but there is no evidence to
suggest a general advance north of the Danube. The alliances with the native tribes were in no way meant to establish permanent client kingdoms, for only the control of a coastal strip was feasible. Unfortunately the civil war of A.D.68, enforcing the recall of legions, removed all subsequent traces of this policy begun by Silvanus.

**Thrace**

Thrace had been divided into two kingdoms by Augustus on the death of Rhoemetalces I. (70) This division had been geographically and politically obvious, for the cultivated and civilized south and east, with its Greek culture, contrasted with the tribal, mountainous north and west, bordered by the military province of Moesia.

Rhascuporis, the king of the wilder section, soon became ambitious, and shortly after the death of Augustus, began to encroach on the kingdom of Cotys. Tiberius, anxious to retain Augustus' settlement, ordered the kings to keep the peace and Cotys readily obeyed, but Rhascuporis treacherously captured his rival and seized the whole of Thrace. Tiberius replied by sending a letter by Latinius Pandusa, the governor of Moesia, that Rhascuporis should surrender Cotys and present himself before the senate, but the king put Cotys to death. On the death of Pandusa, his successor, Pomponius Flaccus, a friend of Rhascuporis, enticed the Thracian into a Roman military post, where he was made a prisoner. Rhascuporis was tried before the senate, convicted on the evidence of Cotys' widow, Antonia Tryphaena, and banished to Alexandria, where he was killed whilst attempting to escape. (71)

Tiberius now had to reorganize Thrace. As always, he wanted to retain the Augustan settlement, so, in A.D.19, he provided new monarchs for the two kingdoms. Rhascupris' son, Rhoemetalces II, was given his father's kingdom, for he *paternis consiliis adversatum*
and an inscription found at Philippi verifies this appointment. (73)

The southern kingdom was also given to the children of its former king, but since they were not yet of age, a former praetor, T. Trebellanus Rufus, was appointed to act as regent. (72) Obviously Tiberius was unwilling to risk the exploitation of the young kings in such a situation.

Yet this settlement was odious to the tribes of northern Thrace whose love of freedom forced them to rebel against Roman rule. In A.D. 21, anger against Rufus and Rhoemetalces, who was criticized for not avenging his people's wrongs, led to a revolt by the Coelaletae, the Odrysae and the Dii. These three tribes acted independently; one plundered its own neighbourhood, another crossed Mt. Haemus to seek support from outlying tribes, and the third besieged Rhoemetalces in Philippopolis. Divided in this way, the rebels were easily crushed by Publius Vellaeus, who was presumably Flaccus' successor in Moesia, and Rhoemetalces regained his kingdom. (74)

However, a more serious revolt took place four years later, when the Thracians objected to the system by which their auxiliaries would no longer be able to serve in Thrace. Various mountain tribes sent envoys to Rome, threatening war, and C. Poppaeus Sabinus conciliated them until he had prepared an army. This force, together with loyal native auxiliaries provided by Rhoemetalces, restored the authority of Rome and her client king. (75)

After this date, we heard of no further trouble in Thrace during the reign of Tiberius. Although he followed his predecessor's policy without question his diplomacy must be admired; he ejected Rhascuporis without a major war, and he took thought for the love of freedom of the native population, although two minor revolts did take
place. His choice of Rhoemetalces II as king is attested by the fact that the last twelve years of the latter's reign were peaceful. Yet Tiberius did not, so far as we know, replace the praetorian regent in the southern kingdom, for we hear nothing of the restoration of Cotys' children.

These three sons had been brought up in Rome with Tiberius' nephew, Gaius, and when the latter received the principate, he found thrones for his friends. Rhoemetalces was the one who received his father's kingdom. (76) The fact that this Rhoemetalces was the son of Cotys is shown by an inscription found at Maroneia (77) and he became the third Thracian king of that name.

But what of Rhoemetalces II, the king of the other part of Thrace, for the literary sources do not mention him after A.D.26? The date of his death is unknown, but R. Neubauer (78) argues that there were two Rhoemetalces alive and ruling in A.D.37/8. This view has been generally accepted.

Gaius' imposition of Rhoemetalces III may have thrown the country into disorder, for Claudius soon found it necessary to annex the kingdom. The date of this annexation lies between A.D.46 and 48 (79), and the incidents which led up to it are surrounded in mystery, but it appears that Rhoemetalces was murdered by his wife (80) thus throwing the kingdom into confusion. However, we do not even know whether the last surviving king was Rhoemetalces II or Rhoemetalces III. (81)

Yet the fact remains that Claudius annexed Thrace. Although the action was technically contrary to Augustus' recommendation not to extend the empire, it was in complete agreement with his example, as Augustus had annexed Galatia. (82) The royal house had been very loyal to the Empire, but the peoples of Thrace had been opposed to their kings, and internal strife had
necessitated the use of Roman troops on several occasions. Direct government made it possible to control the tribes of Thrace by a unified command.

Conclusion

Augustus' firm belief that Roman power in Europe had reached its most defensible boundaries was meant to provide a guide-line for his successors. Tiberius faithfully followed this maxim, and his caution resulted in twenty years of stagnation along the Rhine and Danube.

Seldom did the legions cross these great rivers, and the emperor seemed totally unconcerned in anything beyond the provinces: even the Augustan settlement in Thrace was imitated, as if it were a divine command.

Gaius' principate was too short for a consistent policy to emerge, so it remained to Claudius to use his imagination in adapting Augustan policies as the situation demanded. It was he who launched the successful invasion of Britain, and began to use client kings strategically, to protect his armies' advances and he was the first to employ client kingdoms amongst the more civilized of the Germanic tribes, to protect the dubiously defensible water frontiers. Yet Claudius could also see that in some cases more direct rule was necessary, as his action in Thrace shows. Nero followed Claudius' example, but his experience with the Iceni and Frisii taught him not to rely on the client-ship of Germanic tribes; even allies remained outside the empire.

On the whole, Augustus would have approved of the use which his descendants made of client-kings in Europe. They were used mainly to protect the provinces and any rebellion was quickly crushed; distrust of northern European tribes did not allow the
Julio-Claudian emperors to take the risk of including in the empire areas of indirect rule on the Northern frontier.
Notes to Chapter III.

1. see above, 11.
2. Essays presented to O.G.S. Crawford, 1951.
4. see above, 11.
6. Ibid., 33.
7. Ibid., 25.
8. Ibid., 24-27.
13. V.J. Scramuzza, The Emperor Claudius, chap. XI.
16. CIL VII, 11; RIB, 91.
17. Tac. Agric., 14, 2.
this revolt was led by Andedrigus; Allen's study of the coins
of this period (Arch. XC, 1944, 38-40) makes no mention of a
chief named Andedrigus at this time. An Antef . . . had
held a prominent position approximately forty years earlier.
22. see below, 66.
24. Tac. Hist. III, 45
25. Tacitus (Ann. XII, 40) says they took place over several years.

27. CIL VI, 920; IIS 216. For the year indicated, imp. XXII, XXXI, XXXIV, or XXXV must have occurred.


32. see above, 14.

33. A.D. 14-16.


40. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, The Emperor Gaius, chap. III.


44. see below, 72.

45. A.D. 47.


53. see above, 68.


55. see above, 70.
59. see above, 71.
60. Tac. Hist. IV, 64.
61. Tac. Germ. 41.
63. Suet. Tib. 37, 2.
66. Pliny, NH III, 135.
68. CIL XIV, 3608; ILS 986.
70. see above, 18.
73. BCH, 1932, 203.
77. IGRR I, 829.
78. Hermes X, 1876, 145-152.
79. In their various Chronica, Eusebius dates it to A.D.46, as does Cassiodorus, whilst Hieronymus puts it in the year A.D.48. The earlier date is preferable, for a κοινωνία of Thracian cities for the worship of the Caesars appears from this date (IGRR I, 707).
80. P-W s.v. 'Ρωμαίοι γένος
81. P-W s.v. Thrake Geschichte.
82. see above, 22.
CHAPTER IV

The Client Kingdoms of Asia Minor under Augustus' Julio-Claudian Successors

The client kingdoms which Augustus fostered in Asia Minor were important to Rome, for political, strategic and economic reasons. The sociological development of this region had enabled Augustus to trust the monarchs to keep their subjects relatively loyal to themselves and to Rome, and thus the emperor was able to safeguard the trade routes and to provide a reliable system of buffer states to keep the menace of Parthia out of Roman spheres of influence. It was clearly impossible for Augustus' successors to extend these spheres of influence without committing themselves to a dangerous war with Parthia, therefore in this respect the empire in Asia Minor remained static under the Julio-Claudian emperors.

However, with the annexation of Galatia in 25 B.C., Augustus had shown that he was not unwilling to increase direct rule from Rome, if this could be achieved peacefully. This was a policy which his successors continued. Nevertheless, the security of the empire was always the first consideration during this period, and annexation was rarely attempted if there was a risk of provoking Parthia.

Lycia

An example of this policy of annexation was Lycia; situated between Asia and Pamphylia in the south-western corner of Asia Minor, Lycia had never been a client kingdom. The federation of cities which controlled the area had never given the Roman government any reason to interfere, therefore they were allowed to remain independent.
However, in A.D. 43, civil strife broke out in Lycia, and Claudius, eager to gain glory for his new regime, ordered the district to be included in the empire and added it to the prefecture of Pamphylia. (2)

Thus, although Claudius did not interfere with a kingdom, he showed his willingness to include hitherto free peoples in the Roman jurisdiction.

Cappadocia

Yet, in his annexation of Lycia, Claudius had more than the example of Augustus to turn to, for Tiberius had not been slow to incorporate the kingdom of Cappadocia into the empire.

In A.D. 17, Archelaus was summoned to Rome by Tiberius and tried before the senate. The charges may well have been false, and Archelaus was not convicted, but we do not know whether or not the trial was concluded, for Archelaus, worn out by the indignity of the trial and by old-age, died in Rome. There seems to be no other reason for this unfortunate episode than that offered by Tacitus: Tiberius wanted to annex Cappadocia because he bore a grudge against Archelaus, who had ignored him whilst he was in Rhodes. (3)

Yet the situation in Armenia provides a clue to the eagerness of Tiberius to gain control of Cappadocia. The installation of a Parthian prince on the Armenian throne (4) must have led to anxiety for the safety of Asia Minor. Roman control of Cappadocia would enable Roman forces to guard the Melitene crossing of the Euphrates, and thus protect the main route from the Euphrates to the west coast of Asia Minor. The strategic importance of Cappadocia cannot have escaped Tiberius, and, on the death of Archelaus, he immediately reduced Cappadocia to the status of an imperial province under Quintus Veranius. (5)
Cilicia Tracheia.

But not all of the kingdom of Archelaus was incorporated into the new province of Cappadocia. The old king had been granted the coastal region of Cilicia Tracheia by Augustus (6), and Tiberius, perhaps feeling a twinge of conscience at his treatment of a king who had been loyal to Rome for more than fifty years, granted this region to Archelaus' son, also named Archelaus. Despite Tacitus' silence, an inscription found in Athens proclaims: ὁ δῆμος βασιλέως Ἀρχελάου υἱὸν Ὀρχέλαου (7)

and Archelaus was certainly in control in A.D.36, when he had to receive help from the governor of Syria to put down a rebellious tribe. (8) It is not unreasonable to suppose that Archelaus was given his kingdom on his father's death.

Archelaus cannot have outlived this rebellion, for in the following year, A.D.37, Cilicia Tracheia no longer remained as a separate kingdom. As soon as he received the purple, Gaius returned Commagene to its royal house, and added this part of Cilicia to the kingdom of Antiochus Epiphanes IV. (9)

Cilicia Tracheia remained part of the kingdom of Commagene for over thirty years, but the rule of Antiochus was not without incident. In A.D.52, the tribes who had caused trouble for Archelaus again revolted, and Antiochus had to use bribery to subdue them. (10)

But, because of its attachment to various other kingdoms, this region of Cilicia remained a client kingdom throughout the reigns of the Julio-Claudians. Perhaps the emperors were unwilling to burden their own troops with the responsibility of subduing the mountain tribes.
Cilicia Amanus.

Augustus had restored Cilicia Amanus to its royal house in 20 B.C. when Tarcondimotus was given the throne. At the beginning of Tiberius' reign, a certain Philopator was ruling in Amanus (11) but the relationship of this Philopator to Tarcondimotus is uncertain (12); however he did not survive Augustus by long for in A.D. 17, Philopator died. (13) As in Cappadocia, Tiberius seems to have used the death of the monarch as an opportunity for annexation. Tacitus records that the inhabitants were desirous of Roman rule, and Amanus was probably added to the province of Syria, along with Commagene, whose king had died at about the same time.

Cilicia : Olba.

The district around Olba in Cilicia Tracheia was of religious importance, for, towards the end of Augustus' reign, a high priest named Ajax issued coins which proclaimed his overlordship of the neighbouring regions. (14) Those coins which are dated indicate that his priesthood began in A.D. 10/11, and continued into the reign of Tiberius.

The next coin we have indicates that Marcus Antonius Polemo was high-priest of Olba and dynast of the neighbouring tribes (15), but it is not possible to date this coin accurately, for it merely refers to the tenth year, which could be the tenth year of the era which began in A.D. 10/11, or of Polemo's own tenure of the office. The latter is more likely, for the former would put his accession in A.D. 19/20, during the reign of Tiberius, but no reference to this Polemo appears in literature until the end of Claudius' reign, when Polemo married Berenice, the sister of Agrippa. (16)

Polemo seems to have been raised to the kingship during
his rule, for Magie (17) identifies him with the M. Antonius Polemo whose name appears, together with the title βασιλεὺς, on a coin with the head and titles of Galba (18), and with the ruler of Olba whose coins are inscribed Πολέμωνος βασιλεὺς. (19)

Marcus Antonius Polemo cannot be identified positively, but attempts have been made (20) to equate him with the son of Pythodoris of Pontus, who, as a private citizen, helped his mother to rule. (21) If this equation is correct (22), it seems likely that this Polemo was reluctant to rule Pontus as king, and so, when the son of Cotys of Thrace was granted the kingdom of Pontus in A.D. 38, the son of Pythodoris accepted the priesthood of Olba. Obviously Rome was willing to compensate her loyal servants.

Pontus.

At the death of Augustus, eastern Asia Minor from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean was united, for Pythodoris, the queen of Pontus, was married to Archelaus, king of Cappadocia. The death of Archelaus and the subsequent annexation of his kingdom by Tiberius broke up this union, but the emperor allowed Pythodoris, now widowed for the second time, to continue her rule in her own kingdom. This she did with the aid of her elder son who remained a private citizen. (21)

The silence of the authorities on the affairs of Pontus between A.D. 17 and A.D. 37 probably pays tribute to the wisdom of Pythodoris' government, yet we are given no clue to the date of the queen's death. Possibly she died before A.D. 37 and the kingdom was taken over by her elder son, still in a private capacity; possibly Rome assumed more direct control; but probably, like Dynamis before her (23) and Queen Victoria after her, Pythodoris continued to rule despite advancing years, and met her death in the same year as Tiberius.
Therefore, on or shortly after his accession, Gaius found the throne of Pontus empty, καὶ Πολέμωνι τῷ τοῦ Πολέμωνος
υἱῷ τὴν καταφών ἀρχήν...ἐκαρίσατο. (24) This Polemo was
the son of Cotys of Thrace and Antonia Tryphaena (25), and
therefore the grandson of Polemo I of Pontus, not his son as
Cassius Dio states. He had been brought up in Rome with the
young emperor, and he and his two brothers were provided with
kingdoms by their friend.

Cassius Dio seems to have been unaware that there were
two Polemos, for he claims that in A.D.41 Claudius reallocated the
Bosporan kingdom, thus depriving Polemo of the Bosporan lands in
his kingdom, but gave him in compensation parts of Cilicia. (26)
The province of Cappadocia divided Cilicia from Pontus, and it is
unlikely that Claudius would unite two regions so far apart under
one monarch. In any case, Josephus clearly distinguishes between
Πολέμων τὴν Πόντου κεκτημένος δυναστείαν (27) and Πολέμων, Κιλικίας
δὲ ἦν οὗτος βασιλέα. (28) The king of Olba was Marcus Antonius
Polemo (29) and the king of Pontus was Julius Polemo. (30)

However, Cassius Dio raises a further problem, for he
clearly states that Polemo was deprived of Bosporus in A.D.41.
Unfortunately there is no other evidence that Polemo II ever ruled
in Bosporus; indeed there is evidence to the contrary, for a coin
indicates that a certain Mithridates was king of Bosporus in
A.D.39 (31), during the period of Polemo's rule in the same kingdom,
according to Cassius Dio. Whether Polemo ever ruled Bosporus must
be debatable. Perhaps he governed only a small part of the kingdom,
whilst Mithridates retained control of the rest. He certainly
received no more than limited recognition in his Bosporan dominions,
and Claudius found it expedient to recognise the existing situation
by making official the rule of Mithridates.
But once the limits of his kingdom in Pontus had been defined, the reign of Polemo remained uneventful. Presumably he was a wise ruler who angered neither his master nor his subjects, and thus his reign was not thought to be worthy of mention by the literary authorities. He did, of course, issue coins, and these appear with his name on the obverse, and the head of Claudius, and later Nero, on the reverse. (32)

The administration of Pontus under Polemo II seems to have been trouble-free, but for no apparent reason, he suddenly abdicated his kingdom at some time during the reign of Nero (33) and the emperor turned Pontus into a province. Unfortunately Suetonius gives neither reason nor date for this extraordinary abdication, but from other evidence it is possible to arrive at a satisfactory explanation.

Henderson (34) claims that Eutropius (35) dated the annexation to A.D.66, and that the revolt in A.D.69 (36) was due to annexation; in fact, Eutropius puts no date to his statement that Polemo gave up Pontus, and Tacitus' words indicate that in A.D.69 only Anicetus, the leader of the revolt, was angry at annexation because of his loss of position. No definite date can be assumed from this.

The coins of the area give a much more realistic clue, as Henderson says. The coins of Trpezus, Neocaesarea and Zela start a new dating era in A.D.63 (37), and such a change must have indicated a change in government.

If Polemo abdicated in A.D.62 or 63, what possible reason could he have? Pontus possessed the port of Trpezus from which a military invasion of Armenia could be launched. In A.D.62/3, Rome was in the middle of her critical struggle with Farthia over the clientship of Armenia, and military strength
was extremely important. Perhaps pressure was exerted on Polemo to cede his realm so that a Roman army could be stationed to the north-west of Armenia.

But even if Nero had no military motives, the annexation of Pontus after its king had left was an obvious move. The people of Pontus had been ruled by client kings for over a century and had caused no trouble. The standard of romanization may have been high, and by A.D.63 most of the population was probably ready to come under the direct rule of Rome.

**Bosporus.**

The looser control by Rome of this kingdom north of Pontus meant that it did not interest the historians and so our knowledge of it is rather uncertain. Augustus seems to have insisted that its kings should recognise the overlordship of Rome, but he did not interfere with the choice of monarch. Unfortunately the emperor seems to have insisted on his own head on coins of the area, and since the coinage is our main source of information, we must decipher the kings' monograms rather than read their actual names.

From A.D.10, coins with the monogram \( \overline{\alpha P} \) appear (38), and from A.D.14 this becomes \( \overline{BAP} \). Coins with this monogram have been found for the year A.D.37 (39), but whose monogram was it? The editor of *BMC, Pontus, etc.* claims that it belonged to a king Rhascoporis. However, a deed of manumission found at Phanagoria proclaims that a king Aspurgus, a friend of Rome, was ruling in A.D.16-17 (40), and a further inscription records that he was a friend of Caesar. (41)

Therefore it would appear that Aspurgus was the client king of Bosporus during the time of Tiberius, and E.H. Minns (42) suggests that the monogram \( \overline{\alpha P} \) is that of Aspurgus, and when Tiberius recognised him as a king (\( \kappa \alpha \tau \lambda \varepsilon \alpha \varsigma \)) it became \( \overline{BAP} \).
But with the death of Aspurgus in A.D. 37 (43), the situation becomes rather confused. The literary authorities tell us that Mithridates was given the throne in preference to Polemo in A.D. 41 (44), but by A.D. 49, Cotys I was king of Bosporus and Mithridates was trying to regain his throne. (45)

However, I have already shown that Mithridates was in control in A.D. 39-40, and Polemo did not rule Bosporus. (46) Moreover, a coin of Cotys proves that he was on the throne in A.D. 45/6 (47), therefore the probable dates of Mithridates' rule are A.D. 39/40 - A.D. 44/5. Who then ruled after Aspurgus but before Mithridates?

There are several clues to this problem. Mithridates and Cotys were brothers (48), and the sons of Aspurgus (49); a coin appeared proclaiming Gepaepyris as queen (50), and another coin had ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΗΘΡΑΔΑΤΟΥ on the obverse, and ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΗΣ ΓΕΠΑΕΡΠΡΟΣ on the reverse. (51) Obviously Gepaepyris was either the wife or mother of Mithridates. But coins with the monogram survive, dated to A.D. 37/8 - 39, and this monogram also appears on coins of Cotys. (52) Most of the letters of the queen's name can be picked out in this monogram, and Rostovtzeff (53) claims that Gepaepyris was the wife of Aspurgus, who ruled alone after the death of her husband, and then with Mithridates, Aspurgus' elder son. This explanation succeeds in making sense out of a very obscure situation.

What of Rome's attitude to these monarchs? So far as we know, there was no interference with Aspurgus or Gepaepyris, but Mithridates set a precedent in issuing coins which showed his name rather than a mere monogram. Minns (54) sees this as a sign of revolt against his position as a vassal, and this theory is supported by the fact that Cotys replaced his brother in A.D. 45. A Roman garrison under A. Didius Gallus seems to have supported
Cotys at the beginning of his reign. (55) This shows the importance of the Bosporan kingdom to Rome, for Claudius obviously insisted on complete subservience to protect the shores of the Black Sea against the hostile tribes beyond.

Cotys was ruling in Bosporus in A.D. 45/6 (56), but the next extant coin of his reign was not issued until A.D. 48/9, which probably reflects Mithridates' attempt to regain his throne. (45) Mithridates seized control of the Dandaridae and formed an alliance with Zorsines, chief of the Siraci. Cotys, together with C. Julius Aquila, the equestrian in command of the few Roman troops remaining in Bosporus, organised his defence and entered in alliance with Eunones of the Aorsi. They also received the assistance of the Legion VI Victrix. (57)

An advance by the Roman, Bosporan and Aorsan troops was very successful, if ruthless, and Zorsines was quick to save his subjects by surrendering to the Romans. Mithridates then realized his position was hopeless and threw himself on the mercy of Eunones. He was escorted to Rome, but was treated mercifully by Claudius, on the plea of the Aorsan chief.

Thus, by A.D. 49, Cotys was in firm control of Bosporus, and the war with Mithridates had improved the defences of the empire, for Claudius had succeeded in stabilising Bosporus and entered alliances with the Aorsi, the Siraci and the Dandaridae, thus strengthening the barrier against the tribes of Scythia and against Parthia.

Cotys remained as king of a peaceful Bosporus for the rest of Claudius' reign, and inscriptions show that he was just as secure during the early years of Nero's principate. (58) However, the last extant coin issued by Cotys is dated to A.D. 62/3 (59), and from this date nothing is known of Cotys. Hence it is
impossible to say whether he died or was deprived of his throne, or continued to reign beyond A.D.63.

Josephus reports that in A.D.66 the peoples of the Bosporus region were kept in order by three thousand hoplites and forty warships (60), but these could have been under the control of the Bosporan king just as easily as a Roman governor.

B.W. Henderson (61) links this apparent total subjection by Cotys with the campaigns of Plautius Silvanus north of the Danube and the annexation of Pontus. He puts forward the theory that Nero intended to complete the subjugation of the coasts of the Black Sea; which seems to be the only way to explain the disappearance of a monarch in Bosporus.

However, the revolt of Vindex destroyed any plans for the Black Sea, and very shortly after Nero's death a monarch issued coins in Bosporus. An extant coin has the head of Vespasian on the obverse, that of Titus on the reverse, and bears the monogram (62). This is the monogram of Rhescuporis which appears on other coins during the Flavian period, and the coin was issued in A.D.68. Obviously, Rhescuporis was quick to recognise the emperor who was proclaimed in the east, and the Bosporan kingship regained its client relationship.

This kingdom presents an interesting study into the attitudes of the Julio-Claudian emperors. Tiberius was prepared to let Aspurgus run his country without interference, but Gaius was unwilling to settle the succession, and may even have granted the kingdom to Polemo with a wave of his hand. It was left to Claudius to deal with the ambitious Mithridates, and he succeeded in strengthening the frontier. Nero may have wished to extend Roman control even further, but his plans were left too late, and in A.D.68, Bosporus enjoyed the same relationship with Rome that
it had in A.D.14.

The Caucasus

Antony had been the first Roman to form alliances with the tribes of the Caucasus region, and Augustus continued these friendly relations. Whilst Armenia remained the most important factor in the struggle between Rome and Parthia, it was vital for the emperor to retain the friendship of the peoples to the north of Armenia. Yet Augustus allowed the alliance to remain passive; Tiberius was the first emperor to use the military support of the Caucasian tribes.

In A.D.34, the death of Artaxias, king of Armenia, had resulted in Artabanus, the Parthian king, placing one of his own sons, Arsaces, on the Armenian throne. (63)

Tiberius then began negotiations with Pharasmanes, the king of the Iberi, reconciled him with his brother, Mithridates, and offered the Armenian throne to Mithridates. The Iberians persuaded the Armenians to murder Arsaces, and a Caucasian army captured the capital, Artaxata; Artabanus replied by sending another son, Orodes to regain Armenia, and the two armies prepared for battle. However, Pharasmanes had strengthened his force by alliances with the Albani and some of the Sarmatae, and the Iberians defeated the Parthian army and drove Orodes out of Armenia. Artabanus himself then mobilised another army, but was dissuaded from attempting a further invasion of Armenia by the news that the governor of Syria, Lucius Vitellius, was preparing to cross the Euphrates.

This was perhaps Tiberius' greatest diplomatic triumph. Without involving the Roman army in any direct warfare, he regained the Armenian throne for a Roman client king, and strengthened Rome's allies in the Caucasus.
Gaius did not interfere with the Caucasian kingdoms although he did deprive Mithridates of his throne. (64) But Claudius was not slow to encourage Mithridates to regain Armenia, backed by his brother's resources (65), and again it was the army of Pharasmenes which gained control of the kingdom, although Claudius did send a Roman force to reduce the mountain fortresses.

For the second time an emperor had secured the settlement of the Armenian question by a conflict between Iberia and Parthia, with Rome taking little action. However this policy was soon to prove embarrassing, for in A.D. 51 Pharasmenes, anxious for his own position in the face of his son's ambition, helped this son, Radamistus, to attack Mithridates in Armenia. (66) Mithridates fled to the Roman auxiliary garrison at Gorneae; the commander, Caecilius Pollio, attempted to deter Pharasmenes from his invasion and persuaded Mithridates to meet his attacker, but Radamistus treacherously put his uncle to death. Here Roman caution, prompted by the fear of provoking Parthia, overcame the desire to punish an over-presumptuous client king, for the governor of Syria, Ummidius Quadratus, refused to redress the crime committed by Pharasmenes and his son. He was probably unwilling to drive Radamistus into an alliance with Parthia. Radamistus was crowned by Julius Paelignus, the procurator of Cappadocia. Quadratus, feeling Roman pride had suffered a crippling blow, led a force into Armenia, but was recalled, ne initium belli adversus Parthos existeret (67), and the crime of Pharasmenes and Radamistus was allowed to stand. For the first time, a client king had, by force of arms, overthrown the imperial policy in Armenia, and Claudius, fearful of a Parthian war, had failed to act.

But Claudius had at least retained the friendship of Pharasmenes, and this was to prove useful to Nero, for the Iberi
were ready to help in further wars in Armenia. In A.D. 58, Pharasmenes prepared to help in the Roman war against Tiridates and another Caucasian tribe, the Heniochi, overran remote areas of Armenia. (68) Pharasmenes' reward was received in A.D. 61, when he was given the part of Armenia which bordered Iberia to add to his own kingdom. (69)

But Nero could not have been very happy with the security of his client kingdoms in the Caucasus. In A.D. 35, the Albani had been allied to Pharasmenes (70), but at some time before A.D. 51, the king of the Albani had been involved in hostilities with the Iberi. (71) We do not know whether or not these differences were settled, but it appears unlikely, for, towards the end of his reign, Nero began to assemble an expedition which was to advance to the Caucasus against the Albani (72); unfortunately, the death of Nero and the ensuing civil wars caused this expedition to be abandoned. However, it is obvious that the security of the Roman client states had suffered a serious blow since the time of Augustus. Perhaps the policy of the Julio-Claudians made this inevitable: Tiberius had attempted to manage the affairs of the east by diplomacy rather than by force, for he had allowed Pharasmenes a free hand in Armenia. Gaius had then withdrawn Roman interest in Armenia, and Claudius had only regained it by reviving Tiberius' policy. Pharasmenes' growing disregard for Rome was shown by his expulsion of the Roman-nominated king of Armenia, yet Claudius was unwilling to punish him. This refusal by Rome to show her military strength beyond her own provinces must have fostered contempt amongst states on the fringe of the empire. At last Nero realized that the Roman alliances in the Caucasus needed to be enforced by an expedition, but he realized too late, and in A.D. 68, Roman influence in the Caucasus was weaker than it had been fifty years earlier.
Augustus' policy of maintaining a client king on the boundary of Armenia in Commagene, although successful, was quickly reversed by Tiberius.

In A.D.17, Antiochus Epiphanes III of Commagene died. (73) According to Tacitus, the majority wanted the kingdom to be turned into a province, but Josephus records that the masses wanted a monarch, and only the men of substance favoured provincialisation. (74) Tiberius, eager at this time to strengthen the border with Parthia, annexed Commagene and joined it to the province of Syria. (75)

We do not know whether or not this arrangement was satisfactory, but in A.D.37, Gaius reversed his predecessor's policy by giving the kingdom back to the son of Antiochus, who became Antiochus Epiphanes IV. (76) Gaius even enlarged the kingdom by adding the part of Cilicia previously ruled by Archelaus (77), and gave Antiochus the profit which had accrued during the Roman administration of the province.

Yet, despite this action, Gaius' policy showed inconsistency, for he soon deprived Antiochus of his kingdom. Neither Josephus nor Cassius Dio give any reason for this, but it must have been the result of the emperor's personal whim rather than any misgovernment by Antiochus, for Claudius restored Commagene to its king as soon as his principate began. (78)

Antiochus remained a loyal vassal of Rome under Claudius. In A.D.49, C. Cassius Longinus took an army into Commagene to defend the Euphrates' crossing at Zeugma (79), and in A.D.53 Antiochus himself was able to put down a revolt of the Cietae in Cilicia Tracheia. (80)

The military importance of Commagene was further demonstrated during Nero's reign; in A.D.54, Antiochus was ordered to prepare an army to invade Armenia (81); this invasion was abandoned, but four
years later the king helped Corbulo's invasion by attacking the regions nearest his border. (82). Antiochus received his reward in A.D. 61 when Nero granted him the part of Armenia which bordered Commagene (83), and he was still on his throne when Nero's reign ended.

Clearly the Julio-Claudian attitude to Commagene was not consistent. Augustus had wanted to protect the provinces of Asia Minor with a series of client kingdoms of which Commagene was one, but Tiberius, who in other areas followed in his predecessor's footsteps, annexed this kingdom only three years after Augustus' death. Perhaps Commagene had reached a high degree of romanization, but in view of the fact that there was opposition to the annexation (84), this seems unlikely. Yet a more reasonable explanation is not difficult to find. Antiochus Epiphanes IV, the son of the king who died in A.D. 17, was deprived of his throne in A.D. 72 by Vespasian (85) and lived in Rome for several years after this. Therefore he can have been little more than an infant when his father died; it is not surprising that Tiberius was unwilling to entrust the kingdom, which was in such an important strategic position, to a child. Perhaps he joined Commagene to Syria so that the governor of the latter could act as regent in the kingdom, just as a regent was appointed in Thrace in A.D. 19 (86); it seems a reasonable surmise that Tiberius may have forgotten to restore Commagene to its rightful king when he came of age, and it was left to Gaius to correct this oversight when he came to power in A.D. 38.

Yet why did Gaius immediately take the kingdom away from Antiochus? Perhaps this was the whim of a madman, but perhaps Antiochus needed a little instruction in the administration of his realm. Certainly after his restoration by Claudius, the king seems to have ruled well and his loyalty to Rome was unquestioned. The
increase of his kingdom by Nero testifies to the gratefulness of the Roman government.

**Sophene**

Across the Euphrates, east of Commagene, was the district of Sophene. Originally it formed part of Armenia, but Pompey had taken it from Tigranes in 66 B.C. (87), and Sophene appears to have been under Roman influence from that time; it was added to the kingdom of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (88), and possibly it formed part of the province of Cappadocia under the annexation of A.D.17.

However, Nero saw the necessity of a separate command in this region to guard the Isoghli crossing of the Euphrates, and the route leading across the Taurus mountains into Mesopotamia, Therefore, in A.D.54, (Nero) regionem Sophenen Sohaemo cum insignibus regis mandat (89). The emperor thus installed a client king in a kingdom which was of the greatest strategic importance, for Sohaemus could guard the main routes eastwards. Nero realized that a client king in this position would be less provocative than a Roman military governor, yet could safeguard Rome's interests.

Sophene's strategic importance is seen during the war with Vologaeses, later in Nero's reign, for an inscription shows that Rome quartered a legion in this client kingdom, even though this was not normal practice. (90)

**Armenia Minor**

Augustus' attempt to form an extensive client state in Asia Minor had united Armenia Minor with Cappadocia under Archelaus in 20 B.C. So, in A.D.17, Armenia Minor was included in the new Roman province of Cappadocia. (91)

Yet, as in Commagene, Gaius reversed the policy of Tiberius, for, in A.D.38, Armenia Minor became a client kingdom under Cotys,
the son of Cotys of Thrace. (92) Perhaps Gaius was merely providing a kingdom for his friend, but in view of his policy in Armenia Maior (93), he seems to have wanted to reduce Roman commitments in the east, and guarded the frontier by reverting to client states.

Claudius allowed Cotys to remain in his kingdom, but, in A.D. 47, the king incurred imperial displeasure, for, whilst Iberian forces were struggling to place Mithridates on the throne of Armenia Maior, they were hindered by Cotys, to whom some of the Armenian leaders had turned. He seems to have wanted to help the anti-Roman party, and it took a letter from Claudius to pull him back into line. (94)

Claudius appears to have persevered with Cotys, but as soon as Nero came to power, a change took place in Armenia Minor. Presumably Cotys died, for we do not hear of his expulsion, but it is perhaps significant that a new royal house was instituted. Nero, eager to ensure the loyalty of the kingdom, gave it to Aristobulus, the son of Herod of Chalcis. (95) The king was expected to help in the proposed campaign against Armenia, and received the reward for his loyalty when, in A.D. 61, his kingdom was increased by the addition of the neighbouring portion of Armenia Maior. (96)

The importance of Armenia Minor in Roman policy under the Julio-Claudians is obvious. Tiberius was unwilling to reverse Augustus' policy, and so the kingdom was included in the large Roman province of Cappadocia, but Gaius preferred to bound Armenia Maior with client kingdoms, so Cotys was installed. Claudius needed to remind the king that Rome was his overlord, and Nero preferred to give the kingdom to a more trustworthy friend. Since Parthian influence was so great in Armenia Maior during this period, Gaius, Claudius and Nero had to maintain a loyal king in Armenia Minor,
and in this at least they were successful.

**Armenia Maior.**

Augustus' greatest problem in safeguarding the eastern empire had always been Armenia Maior. Whenever the king of Parthia had faced trouble within his own empire, Rome had been able to impose the monarch of her choice on the Armenian throne, but any restoration of Parthian unity enabled the Great King to counteract this Roman domination with the threat of military confrontation. Yet Augustus' policy was the only one which would protect the provinces of Asia Minor without the need for a conquest of Parthia, therefore his successors found it necessary to attempt to maintain this balance of power.

Unfortunately, the last years of Augustus' reign had seen a rise in the power of Parthia, and so Tiberius inherited a situation which demanded his immediate attention. Vonones had been sent by Augustus, in A.D. 10, to take over the Parthian throne (97), but he had been expelled and seized instead the throne of Armenia; yet Augustus, realizing that the recognition of Vonones in Armenia would record his failure in Parthia, refused to sanction Vonones' rule. Even after Augustus' death, Tiberius refused to grant the throne to Vonones; his reasons were Vonones' cowardice and the threat of war from Parthia. (98) Without Roman support, Vonones' throne was insecure, and in A.D. 16 he fled to Syria. Whether he surrendered himself to Creticus Silanus the governor of Syria (99) or was summoned (100) is uncertain, but he seems to have been well treated because of his Roman education.

His abdication left the throne of Armenia vacant, and Josephus says that the Parthian king, Artabanes, gave the kingdom to one of his sons, Orodes. (101) But Josephus is the only authority to mention this, and it seems likely that the historian
placed this sentence out of context. It should refer to A.D. 36, when Artabanus sent Orodes to avenge Arsaces. (102) Presumably the Armenian throne remained vacant after the abdication of Vonones.

Tiberius could not have been happy with this situation, and so Germanicus was given maius imperium for the eastern provinces in A.D. 18, in order to reach a settlement in Armenia. A highly satisfactory solution was found, for the Armenians had decided that a certain Zeno, the son of Polemo I and Pythodoris of Pontus, should be their next king. Germanicus travelled to Artaxata and crowned Zeno, amid great pomp which was designed to deter Artabanus from interfering. The new king further pleased his subjects by taking the Armenian name of Artaxias. (103) The problem was thus ideally solved from a Roman point of view, for a pro-Roman king had been installed who was popular with his subjects, and he had received the royal diadem from the hands of the chosen heir of the Roman empire, just as Tiberius himself had crowned Tigranes in 20 B.C., and Gaius crowned Ariobarzanes in A.D. 1. (104) Zeno's links with Rome were remembered with pride by the peoples of Asia Minor, for an inscription from Smyrna recalls his descent from Antony (105), and Armenian coins depict his investiture by Germanicus. (106)

Tiberius seemed to have found the solution to the Armenian question, for Zeno's reign proved to be peaceful, and for fifteen years the Roman and Parthian empires seemed to have forgotten their disputes. Yet, with the death of Zeno in A.D. 34, the old quarrel was resurrected. By this time; Artabanus had forgotten his fear of Germanicus and had begun to despise the diplomacy of Tiberius as the policy of an old and unwarlike man. Therefore, as soon as the Armenian throne became vacant, he placed one of his sons, Arsaces, on it. (107)

Tiberius called upon his diplomacy again, for without involving the Roman army in any serious warfare, he succeeded in
giving the Armenian throne to Mithridates, the brother of the Iberian king (108), despite Artabanus' attempts to aid Arsaces, and, on the latter's death, to replace him with Orodes. At the same time, the emperor almost succeeded in establishing a Roman client king on the Parthian throne. (109) Tiberius' policy, which followed that of Augustus, was more successful than that of his illustrious predecessor, for his skill in placing both Zeno and Mithridates on the Armenian throne, whilst allaying any threat from Artabanus, was so adept that not a blow was struck by a Roman legionary.

Yet, despite its success, Tiberius' policy was reversed by Gaius; Mithridates was recalled to Rome, deprived of his kingdom and imprisoned. (110) Gaius did not appoint a successor, so from the recall of Mithridates to his recovery of the throne in A.D. 43, Armenia was completely abandoned by Rome. Why did Gaius adopt a policy so contrary to that of his predecessors? As Balsdon points out (111), there were three possible policies open to the Romans. They could annex Armenia to hold a defensible frontier in Mesopotamia; they could nominate the Armenian monarchs and thus hold the suzerainty; or they could abandon Armenia to the Parthians.

Gaius realized that Rome was unable to follow the first course, for her military resources were too small; the second course had been followed by Augustus and Tiberius, and the constant trouble proved its inadequacy. Gaius had seen that as soon as Parthia was strong enough to place a usurper on the Armenian throne, Rome was forced to act, and he decided that to abandon Armenia would be to lose little of practical value; by reinstating Armenia Minor and Commagene as client kingdoms, the system of buffer states surrounding Armenia would be sufficient to check Parthian advances beyond the Euphrates. Certainly, for a few years, Gaius' policy was successful
for the abandonment of Armenia did not result in an immediate invasion by Parthia.

However, Claudius was not prepared to continue Gaius' policy, for he realized that Roman withdrawal beyond the Euphrates would encourage Parthian aspirations to more valuable parts of the empire, and this withdrawal, which appeared to be an act of weakness, would have a bad effect on the morale of his government.

Therefore Claudius sent Mithridates to resume his throne, helped once more by his brother (112), but he was not able to effect this policy by diplomacy alone. The resistance which Mithridates met suggests that the Armenians had been under Parthian influence, and Claudius was obliged to send in Roman troops. The Roman garrison at Gorneae, firmly established by A.D. 51 (113), was probably established at this time. Claudius, in reverting to Augustus' policy, had succeeded in re-establishing the balance of power, but at the cost of direct Roman military intervention.

Yet the failure of Tiberius' and Claudius' policy was not caused by Parthia. The freedom which they had allowed Pharasmanes of Iberia in installing his brother on the Armenian throne rebounded on Rome in A.D. 51, when Pharasmanes replaced Mithridates with his own son Radamistus. (114) Claudius' refusal to allow Ummidius Quadratus to uphold Roman pride by opposing the usurpation was to have serious consequences for Vologases, who was well established on the Parthian throne in A.D. 52, saw that the Armenians were unhappy with their king and that Rome was not prepared to intervene. Therefore he invaded Armenia and expelled Radamistus; a severe winter and lack of food forced him to withdraw in turn, but Radamistus' cruelty drove the Armenians to revolt. Radamistus was expelled again (115), and Vologases was able to install his brother, Tiridates, as king, so Armenia became a vassal state of Parthia.
So Claudius' policy in Armenia proved a dismal failure. He had tried to follow the example of Augustus and Tiberius by relying on diplomacy rather than force, but his undue reliance on vassal-states and his unwillingness to oppose Parthian advances by a legionary campaign resulted in the loss of Armenia and the growth of the threat from Parthia.

Thus Nero inherited a grave situation in Armenia, just as Claudius had done, for, in A.D.54, the Parthian party was firmly in control of Armenia, and the way was open for an invasion of Roman provinces. Nero was anxious to alleviate the situation, and sent Cn. Domitius Corbulo, a most impressive strategist, to command an army against Armenia, but when Corbulo arrived in the east in A.D.55, he found his troops totally unfit for war. Luckily, Vologaeses had to face a revolt in Hyrcania, so he too had to withdraw from Armenia, and was prepared to give hostages to Rome. Thus the threat of a Parthian advance was alleviated. (116)

For two and a half years, Corbulo let Tiridates reign undisturbed, whilst he retrained his Roman troops who were no longer an efficient fighting force after their long period of inactivity, and Vologaeses was too involved in Parthia to be a menace. But in the winter of A.D.57/8, Corbulo advanced into Armenia, hardened his army in the mountains, and in the spring of A.D.58, marched on Tiridates, aided by Antiochus of Commagene and Pharasmenes of Iberia. When Tiridates asked for peace, Corbulo disclosed Nero's terms, that Tiridates must receive his crown from Nero; obviously the emperor was prepared to sacrifice actual for nominal suzerainty.

However, Tiridates rejected these terms, so in the following year Corbulo advanced on Artaxata. Tiridates fled, and the capital was taken without a fight; yet Corbulo was unwilling to withdraw in view of Tiridates' continued freedom and the possibility of a Parthian
attack from the south. The general decided to destroy Artaxata and march on to Tigranocerta. (117) This march was extremely hazardous, and resulted in abandoning lines of communication, but Corbulo's success justified the risks he had taken; by the end of A.D. 59, Corbulo controlled Tigranocerta, and thus he could deny access to Armenia from Parthia. In A.D. 60, Tiridates made an incursion into Armenia from Media, but Corbulo drove him out and began to harry all Armenians who were hostile to Rome. By this time, the annexation of Armenia was an established fact, but Nero realized that to maintain this annexation would require a large permanent force, therefore he decided to return to the Augustan policy of actual suzerainty. Therefore, in the summer of A.D. 60, Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaus of Cappadocia, arrived in Armenia, to be installed as king by Corbulo. The general left Tigranes with five thousand men, and further strengthened Armenia by enlarging the client kingdoms on its borders. Corbulo then retired to Syria to take up a new governorship. Thus by the end of A.D. 60, Rome was in a strong position, with their nominee on the Armenian throne and a strong strategic advantage. There seemed to be no reason why an Augustan policy should not work at last. (118)

Vologaesus' empire was free from trouble by the beginning of A.D. 61, but the Parthian king was unwilling to invade Armenia, and thus provoke Rome; if Tigranes had been content to rule peacefully, the settlement might have been permanent. But Tigranes wanted compensation for the territory he had lost to client kings on the north and west, so he attacked Media Adiabene. Monobazus, the satrap of Media, threatened to ally with Rome if he did not receive help, so Vologaesus was compelled to act: he sent Monaeses and Tiridates into Armenia whilst he himself threatened Syria. Corbulo replied by dispatching two legions into Armenia, but the rest of the
army had to remain in Syria. In reply to Corbulo's request that Armenia be given a separate commander, Nero appointed Cassennius Paetus to attack from Cappadocia, but when the campaigning season ended, Corbulo and Vologasses agreed to withdraw all troops from Armenia. Thus Tigranes' action had been costly to Rome, for not only was the king ejected, but Armenia was also left undefended. Once again Nero's policy had failed; therefore he decided on the course of action, and ordered Paetus to annex Armenia. At the beginning of A.D.62, Paetus immediately advanced into Armenia, without waiting for reinforcements or building a secure base camp, aiming to reach Tigranocerta. But once again an invasion was halted by the approach of winter and the lack of supplies, and Paetus scurried back to Rhandeia. Meanwhile, Vologasses had failed to force the Euphrates' crossing at Zeugma, and turned his attention to Armenia. Paetus sent a plea for help to Corbulo, but Vologasses, seizing on Paetus' error in dividing his force, defeated half his army and besieged Rhandeia. Corbulo set out to help Paetus, but when he reached the Euphrates, remnants of Paetus' army straggled into his camp, for Rhandeia had surrendered. Once again Corbulo had to negotiate with Vologasses, and for the second time both armies evacuated Armenia. (119) Therefore, in A.D.62, Armenia was in the same position as in the previous winter, but Nero's policy of annexation had been crushed.

Yet Vologasses had agreed to send envoys to Rome, and in A.D.63 these arrived, announcing Vologasses' intention to allow Tiridates to inaugurate his rule before the Roman army and statues of the emperor. This nominal suzerainty had been Nero's earliest policy, but the defeat of Paetus had been more than Roman pride could endure, and Nero rejected the terms. Paetus was recalled and dismissed, and Corbulo was given the command of all the forces in the east; this great command was politically dangerous for the emperor, and his trust
in Corbulo's loyalty was a great compliment to the general.

Corbulo took four legions into Armenia, and so great was the fear he instilled into the Parthian army that Tiridates and Vologaseses immediately sued for peace. Corbulo chose Rhandea as the place of meeting, and amid great ceremony, Tiridates laid his diadem before an effigy of Nero, to receive it again in Rome. (120)

Tiridates set out for Rome in A.D. 65, and saluted Nero as master at Naples. In Rome, the diadem was placed on his head by the emperor himself during a magnificent ceremony (121), and the problem of Armenia came to a peaceful conclusion for a time. This final settlement was a compromise by both sides, for Nero had to give up his designs of actual suzerainty, and Vologaseses had to concede to the granting of the throne by the emperor of Rome, but it was the only policy which could bring a lasting peace.

This peace would not have satisfied Augustus, for the Augustan policy was one of actual suzerainty, which did not include support for the brother of a Parthian monarch. However Augustus could only steer his policy successfully if Parthia was preoccupied. Tiberius steered the same course, and was more successful than his predecessor, for he did not embroil Roman troops in petty warfare, and his main protégé, Zeno, died a natural death. However it was at his death that Tiberius' policy was seen to fail, for it seemed the installation of each client king would provoke counteraction from Parthia. Gaius' novel policy of withdrawal was successful in that peace was achieved, but if it had continued, Parthian arms would probably have advanced well into Roman territory. It was for this reason that Claudius reverted to Augustus' policy.

Unfortunately, Parthia was stronger than she had been twenty years before, and was soon able to oppose a pro-Roman king in Armenia. Therefore the efforts of Claudius resulted in the loss of Armenia.
Nero realized the failings of actual suzerainty, and tried other policies, with no success. By A.D. 63, Rome was facing an empire almost as strong as her own, and the only conceivable outcome, apart from a military confrontation, was a compromise. This compromise enabled Nero to succeed where his predecessors had failed, for without losing prestige he established the only settlement which could bring lasting peace and foster friendship between Rome and Parthia. The extent of that friendship between the emperors was so great that at Nero’s death, Vologasses sent a letter to the senate, begging them to honour the memory of the former emperor. (122)

Parthia.

Augustus had known that his attempts to produce a peaceful settlement in Armenia depended largely on the friendship of the Parthian king, and therefore he always attempted to hold an advantage over the King of Kings, either by installing him with a Roman army, or by holding his sons as hostage. But at the end of his reign this policy had collapsed, when the romanized Vonones had been driven out, and Artabanus III had seized the Parthian throne. (123)

Tiberius also attempted to prove his ascendency over the Parthian king. In A.D. 18, Germanicus’ settlement in Armenia was successful because Artabanus feared Rome’s military power, and this fear restrained the Parthian during Zeno’s reign, but by A.D. 35, Artabanus had grown more arrogant, and on the death of Zeno, he placed his son, Areaces, on the throne of Armenia. Tiberius then remembered Augustus’ policy.

He planned to give Armenia to Mithridates (124), but he also listened to the request of some Parthian nobles who wanted Phraates, the son of Phraates IV, to be sent from Rome to be their king. Tiberius saw a chance to undermine Artabanus, and readily complied. (125) Phraates died in Syria, so another Parthian
Tiridates was sent out. Tiridates was escorted by Lucius Vitellius, the governor of Syria, to the Euphrates, and prepared to cross into Mesopotamia (126); to meet this threat, Artabanus had to abandon his incursion of Armenia. This failure led many Parthians to support Tiridates, and Artabanus fled his throne in despair. Tiridates and Vitellius advanced, and when they were met by Parthian supporters, Vitellius retired to Syria, confident that he had supplied a pro-Roman king to Parthia.

But the rule of Tiridates was to be short-lived. He was crowned at Ctesiphon by the military commander-in-chief, the Surena, but a rival faction turned again to Artabanus, and marched to meet the new king. Tiridates decided to retire to Mesopotamia, but the mass desertion of his forces compelled him to flee to the safety of Syria. (127) Thus Tiberius' attempt to impose a romanized king on the Parthian Empire failed, just as Augustus had failed with Vonones. The emperor realized the danger of sending a further expedition, and made no opposition to the restoration of Artabanus.

Yet the dangers which the Parthian king had overcome had shown him how perilous opposition to Rome could be. He decided to make peace with Rome and in A.D. 40 he met Vitellius on a bridge over the Euphrates, did obeisance to the images of Augustus and Gaius, and undertook to send his son, Darius, as a hostage to Rome. (128)

The friendly relations between Gaius and Artabanus, due in part to the respect felt in Parthia for a son of Germanicus and also to the internal uncertainty in the Parthian empire, were soon lost, for, by A.D. 43, Artabanus had been succeeded by his three sons. Inevitably these sons fought for the throne. (129) After several years, Gotarzes emerged as the sole ruler, and the faction opposed to him appealed to Claudius, asking for Meherdates, a son of the
former king, Vonones, to be sent from Rome. Claudius regarded this petition as an acknowledgement of Roman suzerainty, and, mindful of the precedents set by Augustus and Tiberius, ordered C. Cassius Longinus, the governor of Syria, to escort Meherdates to the Euphrates. Once beyond the reach of Roman forces, Meherdates met with no success; he was defeated by Gotarnes, and instead of gaining the throne lost his ears. Thus Claudius achieved no more success in an attempt to install a king in Parthia than Augustus had with Vonones, or Tiberius with Tiridates. All three emperors had responded to a plea from a Parthian faction, and all three pretenders had been driven out in a very short time.

Claudius made no further attempt to interfere in Parthia. Gotarzes was succeeded by Vonones II, who was followed by his son Vologases I. The wisdom of Vologases was apparent when he began by conciliating, not murdering, his brothers; Pacorus became king of Media, and Tiridates was to be placed in Armenia. The impact he made on Roman policy, and his eventual friendship with Nero have already been discussed.

The Julio-Claudian emperors seem to have been obsessed with a desire to humiliate Parthia. Augustus' attempts to make Parthia a client state met with little success, especially in the later years of his reign, but still Tiberius and Claudius tried to follow his example. Gaius was the first to establish a working alliance with Parthia, but it was left for Nero to achieve a sensible arrangement, for only an alliance based on the equality of the two empires could be successful.

Ceylon.

It is perhaps worth noting that, during the reign of Claudius, the king of Ceylon sent four envoys to Rome. This embassy cannot be regarded as a basis for clientship, but
Conclusion.

At the beginning of the empire, the Armenian question was the major problem for the Roman government. Augustus had attempted to solve it by surrounding Armenia with client kingdoms which were to act as buffer states against possible Parthian invasions. However his willingness to admit Romanized peoples into the empire is shown by his annexation of Galatia.

This policy formed the basis for the succeeding four emperors. Tiberius, as always, attempted to follow Augustus' advice to the letter, and his treatment of Armenia was successful. Yet direct Roman government advanced substantially during his reign with the annexation of Cappadocia, Commagene and Cilicia Armenia. But in following Augustus' lead in one way, he had disregarded it in another, for the western limits of Armenia were now bounded by Roman provinces, i.e. by Commagene, and by Sophene and Armenia Minor which formed part of the province of Cappadocia.

On the other hand, Gaius has been accused of reverting to the policy of Antony in re-establishing client kingdoms. In fact, he seems to have kept to Augustan policy with one exception. His answer to the troublesome problem of Armenia was to abandon it; as Tiberius had extended the provinces right up to the Euphrates, Gaius wanted to restore some client kingdoms if any buffer states were to exist. Therefore Commagene and Armenia Minor were given back to kings, and a new ruler was established in Pontus. It must also be remembered that Tiberius had promised a kingdom to the three Thracian princes; Gaius merely honoured that promise. Rome certainly seems to have lost nothing by Gaius' policy, for she experienced no trouble from these kingdoms.

Yet Claudius did revoke one Gaian decision: he restored
Roman influence in Armenia. In this and in every other case Claudius followed Augustus' lead, and he showed even more caution than Tiberius, for only one annexation is recorded during his reign, and that concerned a tiny confederation of cities. Claudius' rule brought only stagnation to Asia Minor, and his unwillingness to use force resulted in the loss of Roman influence in Armenia. (136)

However Nero and his advisers restored the prestige lost by Claudius. Nero realized the failings of the Augustan policy in Armenia, and eventually found the correct solution. This settlement allowed him to continue with the annexation of a more romanized area, for the large kingdom of Pontus was brought into the empire during the latter part of his reign.

It is significant that the Julio-Claudians were aware of their military capabilities, for no attempt was made to interfere with the kingdoms on the fringe of Roman influence; Iberia and Bosporus were allowed a large degree of freedom, and Parthia was not directly opposed.

Undoubtedly the major influence on the Julio-Claudian attitude to the client kings of Asia Minor was the Great King of the Parthian empire. It is unfortunate that a friendly relationship was only established for the last three years of the dynasty.
Notes to Chapter IV

4. See below, 102.
6. See above, 23.
7. IG II, 3434.
11. IGRR III, 895.
12. See above, 24-25.
14. BMC, Lycaonia etc., p. 120 no. 7 - p. 123 no. 17.
15. BMC, Lycaonia etc., p. 123 no. 18.
21. Strabo XII, 556.
22. But see Appendix II.
23. See above, 28.
25. IGRR IV, 145.
29. See above 36, and Appendix II.


31. Minns, PL. VII, no. 10.

32. BMC, Pontus etc., pp. 46-47.


34. B.W. Henderson, The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero, 480.

35. Eutropius VII, 14.


37. BMC, Pontus etc., pp. 46-47 and Fl. X, 1-5.

38. JHS XXXIX, 1919, 88 ff.

39. BMC, Pontus etc., p. 50, no. 5.

40. IGRR I, 906.

41. IGRR I, 879.

42. Minns, PL. VII, 3; p. 601.

43. His monogram disappeared in that year, and we must assume that he died.

44. Cass. Dio IX, 8, 2.


46. See above, 88.

47. BMC, Pontus etc., p. 52, no. 1.


49. Minns, PL. VII, 20; CIG II, p. 95.

50. BMC, Pontus etc., p. 51, no. 1.

51. BMC, Pontus etc., p. 51, no. 5.

52. Minns, p. 599, 595.


54. Minns, p. 597.


56. BMC, Pontus etc., p. 52, no. 1.

58. *IGRR* I, 876 and 880


64. See below, 103.


68. Tac. *Ann. XIII*, 37. Whether it was the Heniochi or the Moschi who aided Rome is uncertain, because the text is corrupt.


77. See above, 85.


85. See below, 146-147.
86. See above, 76.
90. *CIL* III, 6741; *ILS* 232 of Cornaeus, see below, 104.
91. See above, 84.
93. See below, 103.
97. See above, 37.
102. See below 103; *FIR* 2, 1155; Lenschau, *P-W* s.v. Orodes.
104. See above, 33.
105. *IGRR* IV, 1407.
108. See above, 94.
110. Tac. Ann. XI, 8, 1; Cass. Dio LX, 8, 1.
113. Tac. Ann. XII, 45, 3.
115. Radamistus fled to Iberia, where he was put to death as a traitor by his father in A.D.58 (Tac. Ann. XIII, 37, 3).
123. See above, 37.
124. See above, 94.
128. See Appendix III.
133. See above, 104-109.
134. Warmington, p. 44, places this embassy before A.D.50.
135. Pliny, *HN* VI, 84.
136. But it must be remembered that the great military commitment in Britain probably made further advance in the east impossible.
CHAPTER V

The Syrian and African frontiers

under Augustus' Julio-Claudian successors.

Augustus had kept a careful watch on the kingdoms on the south-eastern fringe of the Roman empire. He preferred to allow the Semitic and Arabian peoples to be governed by their own leaders, but the legions stationed in Syria were ready to intervene if any serious trouble arose. The only Roman province in Asia to the south of Syria was Judaea, which Augustus had annexed in A.D.6, and it was surrounded by tetrarchies under foreign kings. Yet, despite Augustus' benevolence, the rivalries of the Semitic peoples and their leaders were a constant source of trouble to his successors.

Judaea.

Although Augustus had annexed the troublesome regions of Idumaea, Samaria and Judaea, and formed them into the province of Judaea, other parts of Herod the Great's kingdom were not annexed: Herod Antipas reigned as tetrarch of Galilee and Peraea, and his brother Philip was given the tetrarchy east of Galilee which included Gaulanitis, Trachonitis and parts of Ituraea. (1)

Tiberius was happy to keep this arrangement, and Philip and Antipas appear to have ruled well, in that their realms required no Roman intervention. They continued to consider Rome as their mistress, as their coins testify. (2)

However, in A.D.34, Philip died, after ruling his tetrarchy for thirty-seven years. The peaceful nature of his reign no doubt led Tiberius to believe that the peoples of Trachonitis and Gaulanitis had achieved a reasonable degree of romanization, and so he annexed the tetrarchy to the adjoining province of Syria. (3) Thus he pursued the Augustan policy of annexation on the death of a king,
and at the same time enlarged the important military province of Syria.

Yet, as happened elsewhere, the accession of Gaius heralded a change of policy. In A.D. 37, the former tetrarchy of Philip was detached from Syria and given to Herod Agrippa, a grandson of Herod the Great. Agrippa had been arrested and imprisoned by Tiberius, but his friendship with Gaius secured his release on the old emperor's death; Gaius' policy of providing kingdoms for his friends was thus continued, but the tetrarchy remained under the same royal house.

The kingdom was increased to include the district of Abila which at one time had formed part of the kingdom of Ituraea. So Gaius restored the situation which had existed before the death of Philip, with two subject states to the east of the province of Judaea.

However Herod Antipas had brought his kingdom to the attention of the emperor, for shortly before the death of Tiberius, Herod had married his niece, Herodias, and divorced the daughter of Aretas the king of Arabia Petraea. Aretas avenged his daughter by defeating Antipas in battle, but the latter appealed to Tiberius, and the emperor ordered Vitellius the governor of Syria, to march on Aretas. However, when the news of Tiberius' death reached Vitellius, he withdrew his forces, and the quarrel was not resolved. Yet Antipas must have felt humiliated by the defeat in battle, and the appointment of Agrippa as a king increased this humiliation, for his status was inferior to that of his nephew. Moreover, Antipas' wife was jealous of the position of her brother, Agrippa, and persuaded her husband to petition the emperor for elevation to the status of king. Therefore Antipas sailed to Rome, but his plea was countered by an accusation from Agrippa, who maintained that the tetrarch was conspiring against Rome, and pointed to Antipas' collection of weapons as proof. Gaius condemned Antipas and Herodias to exile.
The date of this is uncertain, but a coin in the British Museum shows that Antipas was still tetrarch in A.D. 39-40 (7), and as he was certainly deposed by Gaius, the most likely date is A.D. 40. So Gaius united the tetrarchies of two of the sons of Herod the Great under one man, and elevated Agrippa to the rank of king. Yet Gaius' treatment of the Jews in Judaea was not so benevolent, for his anger was aroused when an altar to the emperor at Jamnia was torn down, and he ordered Petronius, Vitellius' successor in Syria, to set up an imperial statue in the temple at Jerusalem. (8) The religious fervour of the Jews was inflamed by this, and Petronius ventured to warn the emperor of widespread resistance by the whole Jewish people. His advice provoked Gaius to command him to commit suicide, but the death of the emperor nullified both these orders, and it was left to his successor to restore peace.

Claudius was helped in gaining the principate by Agrippa, who seems to have been the most important adviser to the new emperor in the confusion following the murder of Gaius; therefore Claudius rewarded his friend by confirming his rule and enlarging his kingdom by the addition of Judaea and Samaria. He also confirmed the grant made by Gaius of the territory of Abila, adding the mountainous region of the Lebanon from imperial territory. (9) By this action, Claudius reversed the policy of his predecessors, for Judaea ceased to be a Roman province, which it had been since A.D. 6., and the kingdom of Agrippa thus was equal to that of his grandfather, Herod the Great. Claudius' motives must have been more than the desire to reward friendship, for this reversal of the Augustan policy was contrary to Claudius' other actions on the Eastern frontier. The emperor must have realized that direct contact between Romans and Jews had produced dangerous situations, for the Jews possessed a
sense of independence in government as well as in religion, therefore he attempted to remove this danger by allowing a Jewish king, whom he could trust, to rule the whole country.

At the same time, Claudius granted a favour to Agrippa by giving the kingdom of Chalois, in the Lebanon valley, to the latter's brother, Herod. (10)

Agrippa seems to have restored order to the districts of Judaea, and in this respect Claudius' policy was successful, but there can be little doubt that the emperor kept a watchful eye on Agrippa's ambition. An attempt to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem was reported to Rome by Vibius Marsus, the governor of Syria, and a letter from the emperor was needed to persuade Agrippa to desist from this refortification. (11) Shortly after this, Marsus visited Agrippa at Tiberias in Galilee and found him entertaining Antiochus, king of Commagene, Sampsigeramus of Emesa, Cotys of Armenia Minor, Polemo of Pontus and Herod of Chalois. Agrippa may have been merely honouring his friends, but Marsus' suspicions were aroused, and the kings were ordered to depart (12); Rome could not condone such a convention of monarchs, especially when their kingdoms had all at one time or another been vassals of Parthia, and Marsus' action was correct, even if his suspicions were not.

Unfortunately, Claudius' arrangement was to last for only three years, for in A.D. 44 Agrippa died; Claudius was advised not to give the kingdom to Agrippa's son, Agrippa II, who was only sixteen, for the likelihood that a mere youth could control the Jewish factions was very remote. Therefore, not only Judaea, but also the rest of the kingdom became a Roman province, and Cuspius Fadus was appointed procurator. For the first time, Claudius attempted to control the whole of Judaea by means of an imperial procurator. (13)
However the rule of the Herodian family was not totally eclipsed by this annexation, for Herod, Agrippa's brother, continued to reign as king of Chalcis, with official recognition as a friend of Claudius. (14) On his death, in A.D. 49, Claudius did not assign his kingdom to one of his sons, but seized the opportunity of raising Agrippa II to the kingship, and gave him his uncle's kingdom. (15) It is possible that Claudius hoped that Agrippa II would prove as able as his father, so that he could eventually be given the whole kingdom, for the Roman procurators, Fadus, Tiberius Alexander and Cumanus, had found great difficulty in controlling the various factions in Judaea. The first step towards the reconstitution of the kingdom took place in A.D. 53, when Claudius granted to Agrippa II the territory which had once been the tetrarchy of Philip, and he added also the district of Abila. Agrippa II received this kingdom at the expense of his former realm, for Chalcis was taken from him, and its fate remains uncertain. (16) The new king was not slow to consolidate his position by means of marriage alliances, for his sister Drusilla was married to Azizus, king of Emesa, and later to Felix, the procurator of Judaea, whilst Mariamne, the daughter of Agrippa II, was married to an influential Jew named Archelaus; at about the same time Berenice, the widow of Herod of Chalcis and sister of Agrippa II was married to Polemo of Cilicia. (17) Whether or not Claudius intended to return the whole of Judaea to the Herodian family is unknown, for his death put an end to his plans. However, Nero continued the friendship between Rome and Agrippa II, for in the first year of the new principate, Agrippa II was given part of Galilee, including the cities of Tiberias and Tarichaeae, and Julias, a city in Peraea, was added to the grant. (18) Clearly Nero favoured the rule of a client king in this region. In return for this increase in his territory,
Agrippa was expected to aid in the proposed expedition into Armenia. (19)

Yet Nero did not make any further additions to Agrippa's kingdom, and he seems to have held no desire to unite Judaea under one king. There were two reasons for this; firstly, the Jews proved extremely troublesome under all the Roman governors appointed by Nero, and secondly, Agrippa himself was not popular amongst his own countrymen. During the procuratorship of Festus (A.D. 60-62), Agrippa II built an extension to his palace in Jerusalem which overlooked the temple. The eminent men of Jerusalem then built a wall which blocked this view, and when ordered by Festus to demolish it they appealed to Nero. The emperor allowed the wall to stand. (20) Agrippa's unpopularity grew when, during the procuratorship of Albinus (A.D. 62-64), he enlarged Caesarea Philippi and renamed it Neronias, and at the same time transferred to Berytus most of the ornaments of his kingdom: his subjects considered that they had been robbed to adorn a foreign city. (21) But despite his unpopularity, Agrippa II was loyal to Rome, and although his kingdom was not further increased by Nero, neither was it decreased.

But the conflict between Romans and Jews in the province of Judaea was inevitable whilst Rome governed directly. This tension grew during Nero's reign until it erupted into revolt in A.D. 66. The emperor took appropriate steps; in February, A.D. 67, T. Flavius Vespasianus was appointed as legate to promote the war (22), and C. Licinius Mucianus became governor of Syria for the years A.D. 68 and 69. (23) Vespasianus reduced the districts of Judaea one by one, and when he returned to Rome to receive the principate, his son Titus was left to conduct the final siege of Jerusalem. The fall and sack of the city in A.D. 70 heralded the end of the Jewish state, although Judaism survived as a recognised religion.
Judaea remained a province, but a senatorial governor was appointed, who commanded the legion permanently garrisoned in Jerusalem.

What of Agrippa II during this war? He remained loyal to Rome, providing troops for the campaigns; he supported Vespasian on several occasions (24), and even set out for Rome to speak to Galba. (25) Agrippa took the field in person with Cestius Gallus (26), and was present in the final assault on Jerusalem. (27) His loyalty to Rome was unsurpassed and he proved a valuable asset to Roman fortunes. The value of Agrippa II is proved by the length of his reign which extended beyond the Flavian period.

Yet the Julio-Claudian treatment of Palestine shows how little they understood the temperament of the Jewish people. Tiberius attempted to follow the Augustan policy of supporting a province bounded by tetrarchies, and his annexation of Philip's tetrarchy follows the policy he maintained elsewhere in the east. Gaius did reverse this annexation, but his subsequent actions show that he knew even less of Jewish zeal for freedom. At least, Claudius realized that a client kingdom was a better solution than annexation, and in Agrippa I he found a king who was acceptable to both sides, but at his death, there was no-one strong enough to unite the Jews in peace, and once again Judaea became a province. Agrippa II did not emerge as a figure who could rule the whole of Palestine, and in A.D.66 Nero was compelled to realize that there were only two ways of ending strife in Judaea: either the Jews must be allowed complete independance or they must be completely crushed. Obviously no Roman government would allow a subject people to become completely free, so the Jews became the victims of their own fervour and their state was destroyed.
Ituraea.

The kingdom of Ituraea, with its three important cities of Chalcis, Abila and Area, had been added to the kingdom of Herod the Great in 20 B.C., but when Herod's kingdom was divided up, no mention was made of Ituraea. It is possible that the kingdom was divided into tetrarchies, for we know that in A.D.29 the district of Abila was ruled by Lysanias the tetrarch (28); presumably Tiberius allowed Lysanias to rule undisturbed, but by A.D.37 he had died or had been displaced, for Abila was added to the new kingdom of Agrippa I (29), and from this time the district was linked with Galilee.

Of Chalcis we know nothing until A.D.41, when Claudius granted it to Herod, the brother of Agrippa I. At his death in A.D.49, the district passed to Agrippa II (31), but was taken away when Agrippa's kingdom was expanded to the south in A.D.53. From this time the fate of Chalcis remains uncertain; it may have been given back to Agrippa II, or added to the province of Syria.

The third district of Ituraea, that of Area, was ignored by the authorities until A.D.38, when Gaius created a kingdom by giving it to a certain Sohaemus (32), thus establishing a king to complement Agrippa I.

Sohaemus ruled, presumably peacefully, until A.D.49, and on his death, Ituraea was annexed and added to Syria; thus Claudius continued the Augustan policy of annexation. However Beer (33) points out that, although a large part of Sohaemus' kingdom was annexed, a small section continued to be governed by a vassal, whose name was Varus, until A.D.53, when it was joined to the reconstituted kingdom of Agrippa II. (34) This Varus, who was a relative of Sohaemus, probably his son, remained as a subordinate of Agrippa, and took charge of his master's domain whilst Agrippa was aiding
It appears that Claudius succeeded in annexing the client kingdom, but was reluctant to ignore the claims of Sohaemus' descendant, so he allowed Varus to rule a smaller district which was eventually incorporated into another kingdom. Thus the kingdom of Ituraea disappeared.

**Arabia Petraea.**

Arabia Petraea was ruled by Aretas, king of the Nabataeans, who had been confirmed in his kingdom by Augustus in 9 B.C. (36) Although Rome showed no desire to interfere in his domain, Aretas realized the importance of imperial friendship, and in A.D.18, he entertained Germanicus and Piso at a sumptuous banquet, whilst the emperor's nephew was visiting the east. (37)

We hear nothing more of Aretas until the last years of Tiberius' reign, but then he almost provoked a war with the legions in Syria. Aretas' daughter had been married to Herod Antipas, but when Herod returned his wife to her father, Aretas took up arms, using the pretext of a boundary dispute, and defeated Herod's army. (38) Herod appealed to Tiberius, who ordered Vitellius to march against Aretas, and the governor of Syria had already begun his campaign when news reached him of Tiberius' death, he therefore returned to Syria to await instructions from the new emperor. Had Tiberius lived it is likely that the kingdom of Aretas would have been absorbed.

However Gaius did not continue with the war, for he may have remembered Aretas' friendship with Germanicus. Indeed it seems possible that the new emperor increased Aretas' kingdom: Hartmann, (39) points out that when Paul journeyed to Damascus, probably in A.D.39, the city was ruled by the ethnarch Aretas. The imperial coinage of the city goes only as far as A.D.34, and it is not unlikely that Gaius presented Damascus to Aretas.
However this favour must have been granted towards the end of Aretas' reign, for Hartmann adds that the king's coinage and inscriptions continue up to the forty-eighth year of his rule, therefore Aretas must have died in A.D.40.

Aretas' successor in this client kingdom is not recorded in ancient literature, but A. Grohmann (40) states that a study of the native coins reveals the next king to be Malichos II. This king was not given the city of Damascus, but his rule in Arabia Petraea was lengthy, and he was still on the throne in A.D.69, when he supported Titus with an auxiliary corps at the siege of Jerusalem.

The Julio-Claudians seem to have known the importance of enjoying friendly relations with the powerful Nabataean kingdom, for such friendship safeguarded the troublesome Semitic kingdoms from outside interference. It was fortunate that the death of Tiberius prevented a war, for Rome would have found it difficult to subdue the nomadic Arab tribes whilst struggling to keep the peace in Judaea.

Emesa.

After Augustus, in 20 B.C., restored Iamblichus to the throne of Emesa, now Horns, (41), the Emesenes disappear into obscurity; presumably they remained vassals of Rome, but we know nothing of changes in the kingship, yet, by A.D.18 there must have been a change, for Alexandros, a citizen of Palmyra, was allowed to undertake a mission on behalf of Germanicus to Sampsigeramus of Emesa. (42) Presumably Sampsigeramus was king in Emesa by this time, and Benzinger (43), assumes that this king was a descendant of the Sampsigeramus whom Pompey encountered. (44)

Sampsigeramus' reign continued into the time of Claudius, and when Agrippa I was given a kingdom, the king of Emesa was eager to establish close bonds with him. Therefore Sampsigeramus' daughter, Jotape, was married to Agrippa's brother, Aristobulus (45),
and Sampsigeramus himself was present at Tiberias for the meeting of kings which was disbanded by Marsus. (46)

It is uncertain when Sampsigeramus' reign ended, but he had certainly been replaced by A.D. 53, for in that year Azizus of Emesa married Drusilla, the sister of Agrippa II (47); this marriage was of short duration for Felix, the procurator of Judaea, took Drusilla from her husband. (48) Azizus cannot have ruled in Emesa for long, for in A.D. 54, he was succeeded by his brother Sohaemus. (49)

An inscription testifies that this Sohaemus, whose full name was C. Julius Sohaemus, was the son of Sampsigeramus, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that Sampsigeramus was succeeded by his elder son, Azizus and, on the latter's death, the younger son attained the throne. (50)

Thus in A.D. 54 Nero gave both Emesa and Sophene (51) to a king named Sohaemus; Stein (52) points out that the two kingdoms were too far apart to have been ruled by one man, therefore there must have been two Sohaemus.

The marriage ties between the families of Sohaemus of Emesa and Agrippa II indicate that their political attitudes were the same, and Sohaemus certainly appears to have been willing to aid Rome. In A.D. 66 he helped in the Judaean campaign by sending Auxiliaries to Cestius Gallus (53), and he was present at the siege of Jerusalem in A.D. 69. (54) Moreover, Sohaemus was not slow to acknowledge Vespasian as emperor in the same year. (55) Thus Rome maintained Emesa as a client state during the rule of the Julio-Claudians, and the support which she received from the Emesenes was gratefully received.
Augustus' successors followed a consistent policy in the south-eastern corner of the empire; the deserts which separated the Roman and Parthian empires could best be patrolled by native kings, and it was desirable that these kings be vassals of Rome. Therefore the Julio-Claudian emperors fostered client relationships with Arabia Petraea, Emesa, and with Agrippa II. Further west, the annexation of Ituraea and its addition to Syria enabled the Roman armies to keep a closer watch on Judaea, but the problems which the Jews presented to Rome were ultimately settled only by the destruction of the Jewish state.

North Africa.

The number of client kingdoms in North Africa had been reduced by Augustus, and by the end of his reign, only Mauretania remained under a king. The commercial contact which Rome had with the African coast, and the increased wealth which this produced, resulted in the ready acceptance of Roman provincial rule, and there was only one instance of revolt in Africa under the Julio-Claudians.

The emperors seem to have been content to accept the Sahara desert as the boundary of Roman rule, and indeed, it provided an insurmountable barrier against any attack from the south. However there was a certain amount of curiosity about the peoples to the south of Egypt, and this was manifested when Nero sent a small expedition up the Nile which advanced as far as Ethiopia. (56) This was almost certainly an expedition for scientific rather than military advancement.

But, further west, Tiberius faced a rebellion in Numidia. This region had become a province in 46 B.C., but it is possible that some of the tribes in the interior wanted to resist any extension of Roman rule. In A.D.17 a Numidian named Tacfarinas deserted from a Roman auxiliary force and led a revolt which spread to parts of
Mauretania. M. Furius Camillus, the governor of Africa, was required to defeat the rebels. (57) But in A.D.20 the war was renewed. L. Apronius drove Tacfarinas back, but the revolt could not be subdued (58), and it was not until A.D.23 that P. Cornelius Dolabella ended the war by defeating Tacfarinas, who fell in battle. (59)

Obviously this war had repercussions in Mauretania. Augustus had given this kingdom to Juba II, who ruled peacefully, but by A.D.23 he had been succeeded by his son, Ptolemy. (60) The new king's youth and inexperience led some of his subjects to join Tacfarinas' revolt, but when the revolt was subdued, Tiberius saw no reason to disturb the Augustan arrangement, and Ptolemy remained in his kingdom.

But when Gaius succeeded Tiberius, he reversed the former policy; for in A.D.40 he ordered Ptolemy to Rome and put him to death. The authorities give two reasons for this: Cassius Dio (61) says that Gaius coveted Ptolemy's wealth, and put him to death in order to confiscate his possessions; Suetonius (62) says the king was executed for daring to wear a purple cloak. The emperor's action was certainly inconsistent with his policy in the east, where he restored several kings to their ancestral thrones, but perhaps it was not the whim of a madman. Mauretania was annexed to form two new provinces, and, as Balsdon (63) points out, there were advantages in this annexation. There were several Roman colonies in Mauretania which, under a client king, had become anomalies, and at the same time, the support that Tacfarinas had found in Mauretania suggested that more stringent control was needed. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Gaius needed to accompany annexation with the murder of a seemingly loyal king.

The murder of Ptolemy and the annexation was met by a
rebellion of the Mauretanians under the freedman Aedemon (64), and the revolt continued into Claudius' reign; it was eventually suppressed by two brilliant campaigns by Suetonius Paulinus and Hosidius Geta in A.D. 41-42. Claudius then divided Mauretania into two provinces, with Mauretania Tingitana in the west and Mauretania Caesariensis in the east. (65)

Thus the last client kingdom in Africa was eliminated; Claudius and his successors had no cause to regret this annexation, and it is unlikely that, if the kingdom had remained, North Africa would have achieved such a high development of culture and prosperity during the following century.
Notes to Chapter V.

1. See above, 42.
2. BMC, Palestine, p. 228 no. 5; p. 230 no. 7.
4. Jos. Ant. Jud. XVIII, 237. It is important to note that Agrippa became a king, not a tetrarch.
17. Jos. Ant. Jud. XX, 139-146.
22. A. Momigliano, CAH X, 858.
23. FIR², I, 216.
29. See above, 120.
30. See above, 122.
31. See above, 123.
33. P-W s.v. Ituraea.
34. Jos. BJ II, 247.
35. Jos. BJ II, 487. Although this passage refers to him as Noarus, Josephus refers to the same incident in Vita, 48 ff., and calls him Varus.
36. See above, 45.
39. P-W s.v. Aretas IV
41. See above, 45.
42. J. Cantinesau, Syria, 1931, 116 ff. no. 18.
43. P-W s.v. Emessa.
44. Diodorus XI, 16.
46. See above, 122.
47. Jos. Ant. Jud. XX, 139.
50. CH III, 14,387A; II 8958.
51. See above, 99.
52. P-W s.v. Schoenmus
56. Seneca, Q. Nat. VI, 8, 3-4.
60. Tac. Ann. IV, 23.
64. Pliny En V, 11; Cass. Dio IX, 8, 6ff.
CHAPTER VI.

Flavian Policy and Client Kings.

The success of the attempts by the Julio-Claudian emperors to win the loyalty of the peoples on the fringes of the Empire was tested during the two years which followed the deposition of Nero. For the first time since the civil wars which terminated the Republic, legions from several provinces of the Roman Empire marched on Italy, hoping to establish their own champions as emperor of the Roman world. The struggle which caused the overthrow of four emperors within eighteen months took place almost entirely south of the Alps and during this time the frontier provinces were left with very meagre defences. This confusion provided an ideal opportunity for hostile states and unwilling allies to attack and plunder Roman territory, but such was the loyalty and friendship that previous emperors had engendered amongst the client kings and the newly annexed kingdoms that interference from provincials was minimal. The only former kingdom which proved troublesome was that of Pontus, which had been a province for only five years. Anicetus, a freedman of the former king, took up arms, but his revolt was soon crushed by one of Vespasian's generals. (1) Yet, in Europe, the less civilised tribes beyond the limits of Roman arms provided problems. Venutius of the Brigantes continued his struggle against the northward advance of the Romana in Britain (2), whilst in Lower Germany a Batavian leader, Civilis, led a revolt against Vitellius, which, on the latter's death, became a general revolt against Rome. At the same time the Roxolani, the Daci, and the Sarmatae crossed the Danube and attacked Roman installations; they were driven back with difficulty. (3)
It would appear that the Augustan policy of fostering client-kings in the eastern and southern Empire was successful, for only one minor uprising occurred in these areas during the troubled years of A.D. 68 and A.D. 69, but Augustus and his successors had been unable to follow the same policy in Europe. Their unwillingness to foster client kings beyond the Rhine and the Danube, coupled with the inability to subdue so many strong and warlike tribes, meant that Rome was no nearer solving her problems in the north than she had been ninety years earlier. Augustus had to solve other more pressing problems, but with the relative peace in the east which followed the conclusion of the Jewish War, the Flavian emperors had to give more thought to their relations with the kings and chieftains of the tribes of Europe.

Britain.

The strategic importance of the three client kingdoms in Britain had declined as the Roman armies established control over the southern portion of the island. Prasutagus' kingdom had been annexed on the death of the king (4), although firm control over the Iceni was established with difficulty. The flight of Cartimandua from her kingdom and the establishment of her husband, who was hostile to Rome, presented Vespasian with his major problem in Britain. Unless the Brigantes could be subdued or brought under a friendly monarch, no Roman frontier in Britain was safe. The emperor abandoned the prospect of protecting the armies with a client king, a policy which had already proved unsuccessful, and in A.D. 71, sent out Petilius Cerealis as governor of Britain. Cerealis advanced against the Brigantes and defeated them in a series of battles. Their territory was overrun if not actually conquered. This policy of military conquest was continued by Julius Frontinus, Cerealis' successor, who subdued the warlike Silures of South Wales. (5)
However one client king in Britain still continued to rule; Tacitus (6) states that: *quaedam civitates Cogidumno regi donatae - is ad nostram usque memoriam fidissimus mansit* ... It is impossible to establish the exact date of the annexation of Cogidumnus' kingdom, and Stein (7) merely mentions that the king was still ruling in the time of Tacitus. Yet the phrase 'ad nostram usque memoriam' suggests that Cogidumnus was no longer on his throne at the time of the composition of the 'Agricola'. (8)

It is not unreasonable to suppose that Cogidumnus' kingdom was used as a base for Vespasian's campaigns in the south-west during the early years of the invasion, and as a reward for his loyal service, the Flavian emperors allowed the king to build his magnificent palace at Fishbourne and to remain on his throne until his death. (9) Unless Cogidumnus, who had presumably reached manhood in A.D.43, lived well beyond his allotted span, he must have died during the Flavian period, and at his death his kingdom was incorporated in the province of Britannia. (10)

Yet Cogidumnus was the last client king to be fostered in Britain, for Vespasian and his sons relied on a policy of military annexation to effect the submission of the tribes of Northern Britain. The military achievements of Cn. Julius Agricola carried Roman arms deep into Scotland and established a large legionary fortress at Inchtuthill on the Tay, with auxiliary forts even further north at Cardean and Stracathro. (11) Agricola consolidated his successes, especially in northern England, by building forts and roads, but he was unwilling or unable to protect his advances by making alliances with the barbarian tribes; he did give refuge to an Irish prince, (12), but since no attempt was made to attack Ireland, no alliance was made.
The recall of Agricola to Rome (13) and the subsequent withdrawal of a legion from Britain weakened Roman interest in advance. Moreover our knowledge of events during the later years of Domitian's reign is very scanty; the military outposts in Scotland seem to have been abandoned before Domitian's death, and the fortress at Inchtuthill was systematically demolished even before it had been fully occupied. It seems likely that the Tyne-Solway line formed the Trajanic frontier, and no attempt was made to form client relationships with tribes to the north.

**Germany.**

Once Augustus' dream of a military conquest of Germany had been abandoned his successors made diplomatic contacts east of the Rhine to back up the military garrisons on the west bank; the tribes on the right bank of the river had been brought into alliance with Rome by various agreements, and the area seemed to have accepted a reasonably peaceful settlement.

Yet discontent, which had lain dormant for some years, appeared during the civil wars of A.D.68-69. Julius Civilis, a Batavian, led a German uprising, allegedly against Vitellius and in support of Vespasian. Yet when the Flavian armies gained control of Italy the German revolt continued, and it was not suppressed until A.D.70, by Petilius Cerealis and Annius Gallius. Most of the tribes who had revolted seem to have returned to their old allegiance on their old terms, but it is unlikely that Vespasian felt completely at ease with the German situation. For this reason several measures were taken during the Flavian period. The line of the Rhine was guarded by new stone fortresses, and the legions were restored to their former number - four legions in Lower Germany, and the same number in the upper province. (14)

Measures were also taken against the less trustworthy
tribes east of the Rhine. The Bructeri between the Lippe and Ems, had been formidable enemies, not least because of their fanatical devotion to their priestess Veleda. It is not known whether they were punished immediately for their part in Civilis' revolt, but at some time between A.D. 75-78, Rutilius Gallicus defeated the tribe and captured Veleda. (15) Thus Vespasian was willing to interfere in the leadership of the tribe. At some later date, probably towards the end of Domitian's reign, Rome was able to reinstate a Bructerian king who had been driven out by his subjects; obviously the Flavians, like Claudius, were keen to preserve at least a semblance of vassalship. (16) Rome's predominance is further shown by Tacitus when he records a massacre of 60,000 Bructeri in the presence of a Roman army by neighbouring peoples friendly to Rome. (17) This incident cannot be dated, but it does illustrate the success of the Flavian policy.

Yet the most important Flavian advance took place in the region between the upper Rhine and the upper Danube, known as the Agri Decumates. Vespasian realised the failure of attempts to control this area by means of vassal chieftains, and the events of A.D. 69 had shown the necessity of increasing the mobility of the army by shortening the distance between the Rhine and Danube frontiers. Therefore the emperor decided to annex the region. Roads were built across the Black Forest from the Rhine to the Danube, and it seems likely that a military campaign took place in A.D. 73-74, when Pinarius Cornelius Clemens, the governor of Upper Germany, received triumphal decorations. (18) The construction of a series of forts (19) shows that Vespasian was prepared to defend Roman territory by more trustworthy means than client kings.

This policy was continued by Domitian, yet the last Flavian emperor expanded his father's policy by advancing deep
into German territory, and in A.D. 83, campaigned beyond the Rhine and crushed the Chatti. (20) The reasons for this attack are uncertain; perhaps Domitian aimed at forestalling a Chattan attack, and, in addition, he saw the need to be known by his troops and he wished to gain a military reputation rivalling that of his father and his brother. (21)

Domitian established a series of wooden watchtowers and earth and stone forts in the Wetterau region, which created a new frontier beyond the Rhine. (22) The Chatti retreated beyond this line of forts, but the emperor had succeeded in dividing northern and southern Germany, and this great easterly extension helped to provide security for the whole frontier.

Yet Domitian was not forgetful of friendly tribes; the Mattiaci, whose land had been included in the newly enclosed territory, received compensation for the forts built on their possessions (23); moreover, the king of the Cherusci, Chariomerus, had been driven out by the Chatti because of his friendship with Rome. He regained his throne but alienated some of his supporters by sending hostages to the emperor; his lack of support led him to appeal to Domitian, and he received financial aid; the emperor realized the king could be useful, but was unwilling to support him, as a client, with military aid. (24)

It seems likely that Domitian also succeeded in compelling the Chatti to respect Roman territory by means of a treaty. (25) Perhaps this was a result of the revolt of Saturninus, when a German tribe was unable to aid the rebellion because a sudden thaw melted the surface of the Rhine. (26) This tribe may have been the Chatti, for further evidence of their aggression is provided by the burning of wooden towers between the Lahn and the Taunus around this time. (27)

The completion of the link between the Wetterau and the
Neckar, which joined the Rhine and Danube frontiers, was achieved during the later years of Domitian's rule (28), thus drawing a definite and distinct line between Roman and non-Roman territory.

The appearance of these man-made frontiers may well have created the impression that Rome was preparing to wash her hands of allies outside the line of forts. If so, this would explain the hostility of the Marcomanni and Quadi, north of Pannonia, who had been allies of Rome since the time of Augustus. The kings of these tribes, Sido and Italicus, had fought in the Flavian Armies in A.D. 69 (29), but friendly relations were broken when neither tribe sent help during the Dacian War of A.D. 88-89. Domitian marched to Pannonia after settling the rebellion of Saturninus in A.D. 89, put to death members of an embassy who were making excuses, and promoted a war. But it would seem that the tribes had been making preparations, for Domitian's army was defeated. (30) It seems likely that the Iazyges joined in the war, for at the termination of the Dacian War, a column under Velius Rufus took the Iazyges in the rear. (31) At about the same time, Domitian made alliances with, and gave help to, the Semnones and Lugii who faced the rear of the German rebels; (32) thus the emperor used vassal tribes to isolate his enemies. Yet the problem was not settled, for another Suebo-Sarmatian War followed. The Suebi (33) and the Iazyges crossed the Upper Danube and crushed a legion. (34) Domitian seems to have put an end to the war with the aid of a legion from Upper Germany.

Despite this unrest, the Flavian policy seems to have been successful, for the Rhine frontier, with its line of permanent forts rather than client kings, no longer remained a continual source of trouble. Augustus' mistrust of German chiefs seems to have been justified by the actions of Vespasian and Domitian.
Dacia

The Flavian period witnessed the emergence of a new king who proved very troublesome to Roman supremacy on the Danube. The tribes of north-eastern Europe had long been a threat to the security of the eastern part of the Empire, but their raids across the Danube had been followed by quick retreats; the civil war of A.D.68-69 proved an opportunity for such raids, and the Roxolanian invasion of A.D.69 was followed by a Dacian assault on legionary fortresses in Moesia. Mucianus, on his way to Italy, repelled the invasion. In the following year, the Sarmatae crossed the Danube and killed Fonteius Agrippa, the governor of Moesia. His successor, Rubrius Gallus, drove out the invaders and built a number of forts to prevent a recurrence of these raids. These defences, and the return of settled government in Rome, which allowed the armies to resume their allotted task, precluded further invasions, and the reigns of Vespasian and Titus produced no crises along the Danube.

However, shortly after Domitian's reign began, the Daci formed a kingdom under a new leader, Decebalus, who seems to have been exceptionally skilled in warfare. In A.D.85, the Dacians crossed the Danube and slew in battle Oppius Sabinus, the governor of Moesia, and so Domitian himself marched to meet this threat with the praetorian guard and its prefect, Cornelius Fuscus. This army seems to have restored order in Moesia, but Domitian, deciding to forestall further invasions, sent Fuscus and his army across the Danube. Unfortunately this army was crushed, Fuscus was killed, and a standard was lost. This defeat was a serious affront to the emperor, who seems to have accompanied his forces in Moesia; accordingly he gathered another army, and probably in A.D.88 Tettius Julianus advanced into Dacia to avenge Fuscus. He met Decebalus at Tapae and inflicted a heavy defeat on
the Dacians. (40) The way to Decebalus' capital was then open, but Julianus failed to take it. Possibly he was wary of being trapped in the difficult mountainous country and suffering the same fate as Fuscus; more probably, he intended to wait until the following year, by which time rebellion had broken out in Upper Germany and the emperor's attention had been diverted.

Domitian's success in Germany was quickly countered by his defeat at the hands of the Marcomanni and Quadi (41), and the emperor felt that the prosecution of the Dacian War would prove too great a strain on his resources. Therefore he asked Decebalus to consider a truce and the Dacian, no doubt mindful of his defeat at Tapae, agreed. (42) At this point Domitian instituted a policy which his predecessors would have regarded as untenable. Not only did he recognize a tribal warlord as a friend of the Roman state, but he even agreed to his coronation in Rome, similar to that of Tiridates in A.D.66. (43) Decebalus was unwilling to travel to Rome, and so the diadem was placed on the head of his subordinate, Diegis. (44) Moreover, the Emperor realized that a client king in Dacia would serve a very useful purpose in protecting Roman possessions, and Decebalus received financial aid, skilled workmen and engineers, and a promise of annual payments. (45) Thus for the first time a client king in Europe, who could be regarded as nominally subject, received financial rewards for future services.

Bosporus.

The kingdom of Bosporus, through which Rome was able to control the coasts of the Black Sea, had been granted to Rhescuporis during the civil war of A.D.68-69. (46) Many scholars, including Cagnat and Latyschev, regard A.D.77 as the first year of Rhescuporis' reign, but the evidence points to an earlier date. Apart from the coin of Rhescuporis bearing the heads of Vespasian and Titus, dated
to A.D. 68 (47), an inscription which gives Rhescuporis the title of king can certainly be ascribed to the year A.D. 71 (48).

Rhescuporis appears to have had a long reign. An inscription shows him to have been ruling in A.D. 80 (49), and many coins from Bosporus proclaiming him as king show the head of Domitian on the reverse. (50) Unfortunately only one of these bears a date, and that can be ascribed to the year A.D. 87. (51)

Presumably Rhescuporis must have died shortly before the end of the Flavian period, for the first coin of the next king, Sauromates I, is dated to A.D. 96, the first year of Nerva's reign. (52) The latest dated coin which bears the name of Rhescuporis is from the year A.D. 91-92 (53), so he must have died shortly after this and was succeeded by Sauromates.

Cilicia Olba

That Rome supported a Marcus Antonius Polemo on the throne of Olba and its surrounding districts up to the time of Galba, I have already shown (54); however it is by no means certain when this king's reign ended. G.F. Hill (55) points out that by the time of Domitian, the king had ceased to rule, for a coin showing:

Obv. ΔΟΜΙΤΙΑΝΟΥ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ
Rev. ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΛΑΛΕΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΕΝΝΑΤΩΝ

can be dated to a year before A.D. 81, as Domitian is only 'Caesar' and not yet 'Augustus'. Therefore the region had no king by A.D. 81, although it is by no means clear whether Polemo was dead, or had been deprived of his throne.

There can have been no great economic or strategic advantage in the annexation of such a tiny kingdom, and presumably this is an instance of an area being absorbed into the empire on the death of its king.
King Antiochus IV of Commagene was a loyal ally of Rome; he had put down a revolt in his kingdom in A.D. 53, and assisted Corbulo in his Armenian campaigns. (56) The king was especially loyal to the Flavians; he had been among the first to swear allegiance to Vespasian (57), and assisted Titus in the siege of Jerusalem (58); moreover his elder son, Epiphanes, had been wounded fighting against Vespasian's enemy, Vitellius. (59)

But his kingdom, which included Cilicia Tracheia (60), was the only country which separated the important military provinces of Galatia, Cappadocia and Syria, on which the defence of the east rested. According to Magie (61), Vespasian planned to increase the size and strength of Galatia by annexing Commagene, and this would also make easier access to Asia Minor from Syria.

Yet it would have been impossible to depose Antiochus without a pretext; therefore an excuse was found (62): Antiochus and Epiphanes were accused of having formed an alliance with Parthia; Vespasian, apparently believing the charge, ordered Caesennius Paetus, the governor of Syria, to carry out expedient measures. Paetus invaded Commagene, and the king fled to the Cilician part of his kingdom, together with his wife and daughters; but Antiochus' two sons remained in Commagene and prepared to resist the Romans; it may well be that Epiphanes and Callinicus took over the throne for a brief time, for a coin from Selinus in Cilicia describes each of them as 'a great king'. (63) These two princes met the Romans in battle and were not unsuccessful, but when it became well-known that Antiochus had fled, the native troops refused to continue with the war. Epiphanes and Callinicus were forced to take refuge with the Parthian king, Vologaeses, and Commagene was left to the Romans. At first Vologaeses treated Antiochus' sons with honour, but when
he was visited by the legate Velius Rufus, he willingly handed the princes over. (64)

Antiochus was arrested at Tarsus and sent to Rome in chains. However the emperor may have felt a pang of conscience, for once in Rome, Antiochus and his family were treated with the greatest respect, and they were allowed to live at peace in the capital. Indeed, one of the sons of Epiphanes attained the rank of consul. (65) This treatment of the royal family shows that their deposition was the result of imperial policy rather than their own misdemeanours.

Commagene and Cilicia Tracheia were once more annexed to Syria, and Rome obtained possession of the crossing of the Euphrates at Samosata.

The date of this annexation is uncertain. Hieronymus (66) puts the re-annexation of the Greek states freed by Nero and of Cilicia Tracheia and Commagene in the year A.D. 76, but Josephus (67) dates it to the fourth year of Vespasian's reign, A.D. 72. This earlier date is preferable for it is confirmed by coins of Samosata, which show an era beginning in A.D. 71. (68)

These events in Commagene show Vespasian's determination to improve the existing defences of the empire. As in Europe, he was unwilling to extend the limits of the empire, but at the same time, he was prepared to supersede a successful client king for strategic reasons.

The Caucasus.

Julio-Claudian influence over the kings of the Caucasus region had gradually diminished since the time of Augustus, and the threat of anti-Roman activities in the area north of Armenia appears to have been a cause of concern to Nero. (69) Vespasian inherited this problem, and countered the constant barbarian attacks
by increasing the forces in Cappadocia. (70)

Yet the attacks continued, and a serious incursion took place at about the same time as the annexation of Commagene. A band of Alani raided Media and Armenia, forcing the Median king to pay them a hundred talents, and almost capturing Tiridates, king of Armenia. (71)

Two years later, Vologases asked for some Roman troops to use against the Alani, but Vespasian refused. (72)

The Iberi were the most important Roman vassals in this area, and Vespasian used their kingdom to protect the empire against the Alani. He helped Mithridates, who had inherited the throne from his father Pharasmanes (73), to fortify the town of Harmozica, which commanded the southern end of the Dariel Pass through which the Alani invaded Asia. (74) This help, a precedent for Domitian's aid to Decebalus, bound the Iberi to Roman friendship and preserved the safety of the provinces of Asia Minor. After the fortification of Harmozica in A.D. 75, we hear of no more trouble in the Caucasus during the Flavian period.

Sophene

Nero had given the tiny kingdom of Sophene to Sohaemus in A.D. 54, so that the king could guard the Isoghli crossing of the Euphrates. (75) However this is the only positive reference to Sohaemus of Sophene. Certainly a king Sohaemus gave his allegiance to Vespasian (76), took part in the Jewish War (77), and supported the emperor in the war against Antiochus of Commagene; (78) but these could equally well be references to Sohaemus of Emesa, who was an active supporter of Rome. (79)

In the absence of concrete evidence, a possible explanation is that Sohaemus of Sophene ruled for only a short time, and at his death, or dethronement, his kingdom was incorporated in
the province of Cappadocia. This may have happened at any time, but the presence of permanent Roman garrisons in Sophene during Corbulo's war in Armenia (80), would suggest that the kingdom had become part of a province long before the end of Nero's reign.

**Armenia Minor**

Vespasian's plan to create a vast administrative unit from the Black Sea to the Taurus mountains was implemented in A.D. 72. The client kingdom of Commagene was not the only country to lose its independence at this time, for Armenia Minor was also absorbed into the province of Galatia. Although the literary authorities do not mention the removal of Aristobulus from the throne, T. Reinach (81) showed that the latest known coin of the king can be dated to A.D. 70-71, whilst Nicopolis, a city in Armenia Minor, began to issue its own coins in A.D. 71-72, the beginning of a new era. Presumably confirmation is provided by a coin dated to the forty-third year of the Armenian state, issued in the seventeenth year of Trajan's reign. (82)

This annexation shows that even at the beginning of his reign, Vespasian was eager to strengthen Roman control over the west bank of the Euphrates, and thus present invaders from the east with the prospect of advancing into a Roman military province at every point along the upper reaches of the river. Yet it seems likely that the emperor did not totally cast aside Aristobulus, who had proved a loyal ally to Rome. The view that in lieu of Armenia Minor, Aristobulus received Chalcis in Syria is held by Wilcken (83), Reinach (84) and Stein. (85) This rests entirely on an identification with the Aristobulus, 'king of the so-called Chalcidice', who, according to Josephus, (86), led troops to the aid of Paetus in his seizure of Commagene. This seems a reasonable assumption, since Aristobulus was the son of Herod, who had been king of Chalcis (87),
and it is probable that Vespasian, on depriving him of Armenia Minor, restored him to his father's kingdom.

If this theory is accepted, Josephus' assertion that Aristobulus was king of Chalcis at the time of the expedition into Commagene, indicates that Vespasian annexed the kingdom of Armenia Minor before turning to Commagene. The evidence suggests that the annexation of Armenia Minor took place late in the year A.D. 71, and that of Commagene was effected in the following year.

Armenia Maior.

The problem of Roman and Parthian rivalry over the kingdom of Armenia Maior seemed to have been solved by Nero in A.D. 66. (88) This settlement, by which Tiridates, the Armenian king, received his diadem from the hands of the emperor, satisfied both Roman and Parthian pride, and Armenia Maior was able to enjoy a period of peace in which the scars left by the wars of A.D. 57 to A.D. 63 could be repaired. Vespasian was content to enjoy nominal suzerainty over the kingdom without imposing too forcefully the will of Rome.

Nero had given permission for the rebuilding of Artaxata, destroyed by Corbulo in A.D. 59 (89), and sent skilled artisans to Armenia to aid the work (90); in return Tiridates named the city Neronia. (91) The rebuilding programme must have continued into the Flavian period, and the work was no doubt hastened by the raid of the Alani in A.D. 72-73, in which Tiridates was almost captured. (92)

An interesting insight into the fortification of Armenia is provided by an inscription found at Garni in 1945 (93), which commemorates a dedication by a certain Menneas, a stonemason, to king Tiridates. Mme. Trever argues that the inscription refers to Tiridates I, not to later kings of the same name who ruled in the third century A.D. If this is the case, then the inscription can be dated to A.D. 76-77, and it is possible that the stonemason
was one of those engaged from within the Roman Empire, who helped Tiridates to fortify his kingdom against attacks from the north.

Domitian continued his father's policy of peaceful co-existence beyond the Euphrates; Armenia Maior was one client kingdom which the Flavians were happy to retain.

Parthia

The friendship established in A.D. 66 between Nero and Vologases proved invaluable to Rome, for whilst such amity existed, the eastern Roman Empire was unlikely to be attacked by Parthian armies.

Moreover, Vologases' personal affection for Nero led him to support Vespasian, whom he no doubt regarded as the enemy of those who had displaced Nero. The Parthian king offered to help Vespasian in his bid for power by sending forty thousand cavalry bowmen. (94) Vespasian, reluctant to appear in Rome backed by oriental troops, politely declined.

Vologases made a further attempt to combine Roman and Parthian forces when he suggested a combined campaign to drive out the Alani after their attack on Media and Armenia. (95) Vespasian again declined. Yet despite these two rebuffs, Vologases remained an ally of Rome until his death, and this alliance was probably the result of his affection for the memory of Nero rather than his fear of Roman arms, as Aurelius Victor suggests. (96)

The memory of Nero remained an emotive force in Parthia, even after Vologases had been succeeded by Artabanus IV, and in A.D. 79 the appearance of an imposter led to friction on the eastern frontier. A certain Terentius Maximus, claiming to be Nero, gained support in Asia, and journeyed across the Euphrates. Artabanus IV welcomed him and made preparations to restore him as emperor. (97) The crisis quickly passed, for an unsettled political scene may well
have compelled Artabanus to reconsider his plans. However this
confrontation may well have been the occasion on which Ulpius
Traianus, governor of Syria from A.D. 75 to A.D. 79 and the father
of the future emperor, won his 'Parthian laurel'. (98) He
appears to have been awarded triumphal decorations (99), but this
does not necessarily mean that warfare took place, for similar
honours had been awarded for diplomatic successes. (100)

The peace between the two great empires continued into
the reign of Domitian, yet twenty years after Nero's death, in
A.D. 88, another false Nero almost provoked a Parthian war. With
the Roman armies occupied in Dacia and Germany, a war in the east
would have been disastrous, and once again diplomacy had to be
employed to persuade the Parthian king to surrender the pretender. (101)

Thus during the Flavian period the Parthian kings were
treated with the respect due to equals. No attempt was made to
impose Roman will on the Parthian Empire, which Augustus and his
successors had been all too ready to do. The result of this policy
was a peaceful co-existence which brought unparalleled security to
the eastern part of the Roman Empire.

Palmyra

Vespasian's attempts to increase the security of the east
seem to have included Palmyra, which had hitherto been independent. (102)
This state was situated in the Syrian desert between Damascus and the
Euphrates; the barren terrain was extremely difficult to cross,
especially with an army, and its economy was based on profits from
the caravans which crossed the desert. The inherent difficulties
of a military conquest had ensured Palmyra's independence in spite
of the two great military powers between which it was placed, and this
was the state of affairs even as late as A.D. 77, when the elder Pliny
finished his Historia Naturalis. (103) Yet there is evidence that
Vespasian had already begun to extend Roman control into the desert. A milestone set up in A.D. 75 (104) informs us that Ulpius Traianus (105) was building a road which ran from Palmyra to Sura on the Euphrates. Yet this does not mean that Palmyra was in Roman hands by this time; Vespasian may merely have been marking the boundary of Syria, and there is no evidence that Palmyra was part of the Roman empire until Appian, writing almost a century later, included it amongst the provinces of the empire. (106)

But although the Flavians did not annex Palmyra, clearly Roman influence was extended, and the security of the provinces of Asia Minor improved.

The Kingdom of Agrippa

Agrippa II, whose kingdom was composed of the former tetrarchies of Batanea, Trachonitis and Abila, had proved his loyalty to Rome and to the Flavians during the Jewish War. (107) This loyalty was recognised by the imperial government, and the king was allowed to retain his throne, despite the tighter control imposed on Judaea by Vespasian.

There seems to have been a close friendship between the Flavians and Agrippa, and Titus is said to have considered marriage to Agrippa's sister, Berenice. (108) In A.D. 75, Agrippa and Berenice visited Rome, and the king was granted praetorian rank (109), an extraordinary honour for a client king. Moreover, Agrippa was allowed to issue coins which included his own name and title as well as that of the emperor. (110) These coins were issued throughout the Flavian period, and Agrippa seems to have ruled peacefully.

Yet it is impossible to know when Agrippa's long reign ended. Coins appear which are dated to the thirty-fifth year of his reign (111), which would suggest that Agrippa was still alive in A.D. 95; yet the existence of two dating systems make individual
dates uncertain. On the other hand, an inscription giving both
dating systems belongs unquestionably to A.D.92 (112), which remains
the latest date at which Agrippa can be said with certainty to have
been alive. He was dead by the time Josephus wrote his
autobiography (113) but the date of this cannot be fixed definitely.
Despite the arguments of various scholars, no precise date can be
given for Agrippa's death; it occurred between A.D.92 and 100. (114)

The death of the king brought to an end the client
relationship which the region east of the Jordan had enjoyed. The
firm grip which Rome had maintained over Judea since the destruction
of Jerusalem meant that a mediator between Jews and Romans, in the
shape of a client king, was no longer needed, and so Agrippa's
kingdom was annexed and divided between the provinces of Syria
and Judea. (115) For the first time direct Roman rule extended
east of the Jordan.

Chalcis.

The principality of Chalcis in the Lebanon valley seems
to have been used as a convenient sinecure by the government in
Rome. There Agrippa II served his apprenticeship as a ruler from
A.D.49 to 53 (116); after A.D.53, the fate of Chalcis remains
unknown until A.D.72, when a certain Aristobulus is known to have
been its ruler. (117) It seems likely that he was given this
command as compensation for the annexation of Armenia Minor, his
former kingdom. (118) Once again Chalcis fades into obscurity,
but Benzinger (119), quoting numismatic evidence, puts forward the
theory that Domitian annexed Chalcis to the province of Syria some
time after A.D.92. It is not unreasonable to assume that this
annexation coincides with that of Agrippa's kingdom, when the
possible absence of loyal native rulers enabled the emperor to
strengthen the eastern frontier by enlarging the important military
province of Syria.

Emesa.

The loyalty of Sohaemus of Emesa (120) continued into the Flavian era. In A.D. 72, the king supported Caesennius Paetus on his expedition to Commagene (121), but we hear nothing more of the kingdom of Emesa, and presumably it was brought under direct Roman control at some time after A.D. 72. An inscription (122) refers to Sohaemus as 'a great king and a friend of the emperor and the Roman people', but it also credits him with several Roman magisterial titles. Syme (123) interprets these titles as offices held after the annexation of Emesa, and in view of the subsequent fate of the kingdoms of Agrippa and Aristobulus, it seems likely that the Flavian emperors absorbed Emesa within the empire, although the exact date is not known.

Arabia Petraea.

The peace which the Flavians brought to the east is reflected by the sparseness of evidence for events in this region after the end of the Jewish War; we learn nothing from literary sources of the relations between client kings of the Nabataeans and the imperial government. However, A. Grohman (124) reveals a little of the history of the kingdom from a study of the numismatic evidence. Malichos II, the king of Arabia Petraea at the beginning of the Flavian period, supported Titus with an auxiliary force at Jerusalem; furthermore, Roman troops seem to have been stationed in his kingdom to protect the caravan routes and collect taxes. Malichos was succeeded by his son, Rabilos II, who ruled at first with his mother, and later with his wife. Rabilos was still on the throne when Domitian died.

It appears that the Flavians were content to allow the
Nabataeans to retain their client relationship with Rome, although imperial control over the caravan routes may well have been increased. The prevalent peace made drastic change unnecessary.

Vespasian and his sons displayed a new attitude to client kings. The failures of the Julio-Claudians to establish useful permanent client kingdoms in Europe, and the traditional impermanence of European loyalties highlighted by the support for Civilis, led Vespasian to make no use of client kings in Britain or along the Rhine and Danube. Out of kindness, the Flavians allowed Cogidumnus to retain his power, but he played only a minor part in their scheme, for the emperor preferred the more trustworthy protection of Roman legions. Domitian modified his father’s policy when he found himself compelled to negotiate at the end of the Dacian War. Possibly the emperor would have preferred to crush Decebalus, but this would have strained the resources of the Empire, and so Domitian was driven to recognise the Dacian monarch as a client king; for the first time a client king in Europe was given payment for guarding the borders of Roman provinces.

In Asia Minor also, Vespasian introduced changes. Client kingdoms within the recognised limits of the Roman Empire soon were annexed, and the military provinces were enlarged; and when a suitable period of time had elapsed after the destruction of Jerusalem, the less troublesome Semitic peoples were brought under direct Roman administration.

The only client kingdoms suffered by the Flavians were those which were beyond the limits of direct Roman rule; the geography of these territories did not promise easy conquest, and providing they were content to accept Rome as their overlord, she was content to allow them to guard the frontier.
Notes to Chapter VI.

2. See above, 66.
4. See above, 66.
5. Tac. Agric. 17.
7. P-W s.v. Claudius, 117.
8. c. A.D. 98.
9. See Appendix IV.

10. The assumption of E. Hubner (Hermes X, 1876, 398-399) that Tacitus' Cogidumnus was succeeded by his son [Cogi] dubnus (CIL VII, 11) is accepted by no modern authorities.

12. Tac. Agric. 24
13. c. A.D. 84.
15. Statius, Silvae, I, 4, 89-93.
17. Tac. Germ. 33.
18. IJS, 997
20. Frontinus, Strat. I, 1 and 8; II, 3 and 23.
22. JRS, LIX (1969), 158-159.
27. P-W s.v. Limes, 587.
31. ILS, 9200.
33. i.e. the Marcomannii and the Quadi.
34. Cass. Dio, LXVII, 5, 2; Suet. Dom. 6; Tac. Agric. 41.
38. Cass. Dio, LXVIII, 9, 3. For a discussion as to whether the standard lost was that of a legion or of the praetorian guard, v. E. Ritterling, P-W, s.v. Legio, 1569f; R. Syme, JRS, XVIII (1928), 46.
41. See above, 142.
42. Cass. Dio, LXVII, 7, 2.
43. See above, 108.
44. Cass. Dio, LXVII, 7, 3.
46. See above, 93.
47. Minns, PL VII, 23.
48. IGRR, I, 903.
49. IGRR, I, 881.
50. BMC, Pontus, etc. pp. 54-56, no. 2-13.
51. BMC, Pontus, etc. p. 54, no. 1.
52. BMC, Pontus, etc. p. 51, no. 1.
53. PIR I, III, B44, p. 129; Kahrstedt, P-W, s.v. 'Ρησοδορίς, 623.
54. See above, 86-87.
56. See above, 97-98.
57. Tac. Hist. II, 81
60. See above, 85.
61. Magie, I, 573-574.
63. BMC, Galatia etc. p.xlvii.
64. IJS, 9200.
65. IJS, 845.
66. Hieronymus, Chron. s.a. 76.
68. BMC, Galatia etc. p. 117, note.
69. See above, 96.
70. Suet. Vesp. 8, 4.
71. Jos. BJ VII, 244-251.
73. M.N. Tod, JRS, XXXIII (1943), 85.
74. IGGR, III, 133.
75. Tac. Ann. XIII, 7; see above, 99.
76. Tac. Hist. II, 81.
79. See above, 129.
80. IJS, 232.
82. i.e. A.D. 114/5. See Revue des Études Anciennes, XVI (1914), 283 f.; Magie, II, 1435, n.21; F. Cumont, Anatolian Studies presented to Sir W.M. Ramsay, 118.
83. P.-W, s.v. Aristobulos, 10.
85. PWB, I, 1052, p. 206.
88. See above, 108.
89. See above, 106.
90. Cass. Dio, LXII 6, 6; cf. Domitian’s help to Decebalus.
92. Jos. BJ VII, 244-251.
94. Tac. Hist. IV, 51; Suet. Vesp. 6, 4.
95. Jos. BJ VII, 244-251; Suet. Dom. 2; Cass. Dio, LXV, 15, 3.
96. Aurelius Victor, Epit. IX, 12.
99. IIR, 8970.
102. See R. Syme, CAH XI, 139; F. Cumont, CAH XI, 859-860.
103. Pliny, HN V, 88.
104. H. Seyrig, Syria, XIII (1932), 271.
105. See above, 152.
106. Appian, Proooem. 2.
107. See above, 125.
110. BMC, Palestine, p. 240, no. 7. N.B. Under Nero, Agrippa’s coins were dated from A.D.53; under the Flavians, they were dated to a new era, which seems to have begun in A.D.61.
111. BMC, Palestine, p. 247, no. 58.
112. ICRB, III, 1127.
115. Syria, XLII (1965), 32.

116. See above, 123.


118. See above, 149.

119. P-W, s.v. Chalkia, 15.

120. See above, 129.


122. IHS, 8958.

123. CAH, XI, 139.

CHAPTER VII

The Use of Client Kings after the Flavian Period.

The Flavian policy of protecting Rome's possessions by military rather than diplomatic means had resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of client kings dependent on Rome. Moreover, the establishment of frontiers defended by the legions rather than by vassal kings seems to have provided greater security to the empire, for, by A.D. 96, the areas which were causing the most concern were those guarded by client kingdoms, i.e. the Dalmatian provinces and the provinces of northern Asia Minor. These regions were to form the theatres for Trajan's famous campaigns.

Dacia.

The protection of the provinces immediately south of the Danube had proved Domitian's greatest strategic problem; he had driven back with difficulty attacks north of Pannonia by the Marcomanni, Quadi, and Iazyges (1), and his settlement with Decebalus, king of the Daci, had been little more than a compromise. (2)

Shortly after Domitian's death, his successor, Nerva, seems to have been faced with further trouble on the Upper Danube, but the evidence suggests that the Suebi were defeated and peace was restored shortly before the accession of Trajan in A.D. 98. (3)

When Trajan succeeded to the principate, the problems on the Danube proved to be his primary concern. The emperor spent the winter of A.D. 98-9 on the south bank of the river, and it seems likely that Decebalus had begun to put into effect a plan to unite Rome's enemies. (4) Certainly Trajan decided to forestall a revolt by the Daci by invading Dacia before Decebalus' power should grow too great. After a short period in Rome, the emperor set out for the Danube early in the year A.D. 101. (5)
Roman forces under Trajan advanced towards the Iron Gate Pass, whilst a second column crossed the Danube lower down. (6) The Dacians retreated before the Roman advance, until they reached Tapae at the entrance to the Iron Gate Pass, where an indecisive battle was fought. (7) Trajan held his position for the winter and in the spring of A.D. 102, prepared a new line of attack via the Red Tower Pass (8); he met no resistance, but Decebalus sent at least two embassies to sue for peace. No terms were agreed and Trajan continued his campaign, dividing his force to march on the Dacian capital, Sarmizegethusa; the capture of various Dacian fortresses ended any serious resistance and Decebalus, to save the siege and destruction of Sarmizegethusa, surrendered. (9) Trajan now had the opportunity to remove the king, whose loyalty had been questionable, but the emperor realized that Decebalus, if trustworthy, could be a useful bulwark against invaders from the north. Therefore Domitian's settlement was repeated; Decebalus was reinstated as a client king, although Roman garrisons were stationed at Sarmizegethusa and in some mountain fortresses; in addition, the Dacian artillery and engineers were to be surrendered along with the Roman deserters who had fought in the Dacian army, and the fortifications were to be pulled down. (10) In the winter of A.D. 102, a Dacian embassy appeared before the senate to secure a formal peace, and Trajan, on his return to Rome, received the title of "Dacicus". (11) Thus Trajan achieved an important military victory over the Daci, but he was unwilling to attempt an occupation of large areas north of the Danube; he preferred to follow the example of his predecessors in using Decebalus' kingdom as a buffer against attacks from the north. Possibly the emperor considered that the forces needed to police the mountainous areas of Dacia, inhabited by hostile tribesmen, would be too numerous to make the venture profitable; accordingly he pinned
his hopes on the loyalty of Decebalus, despite the king's unreliability under Domitian.

But the peace did not endure for long. Decebalus paid little attention to the clauses of the treaty, and broke them one by one (12), eventually, in A.D.105, overrunning part of the territory of the Iazyges, Rome's allies. Trajan had no option but to declare war, and set out for the Danube to conduct the campaign in person. Decebalus captured the Roman garrisons in Dacia, and seized others on the Danube; Trajan relieved the latter on his arrival in Moesia, but to rescue those inside Dacia and to put an end to Decebalus' plots, he had to attempt the total defeat of Dacia.

With this in view, the Roman forces crossed the Danube early in 106 at Drobetae. The Dacian army retreated before this advance, and as it did so, Decebalus' allies disappeared. The king made attempts to conciliate Trajan and then to poison him (13), but the Roman advance continued to the gates of Sarmizegethusa. In the late summer of A.D.106, the capital fell; Decebalus escaped to the north, but his capture was inevitable, and eventually, surrounded by Roman forces, he committed suicide. (14)

The emperor now had to decide what to do with Dacia. The treachery of Decebalus had made it almost impossible to reconstitute the region as a client kingdom, but it would not be safe as a province whilst so many tribes were hostile to Rome; therefore Trajan reduced the number of tribesmen: fifty thousand prisoners were condemned to the amphitheatres and many Dacians emigrated northwards; these were replaced by settlers from other parts of the empire, and Sarmizegethusa became a Roman colony. (15)

Thus Trajan was compelled to annex the only formally recognised client kingdom in Europe, and in doing so he extended Roman rule beyond the Danube for the first time; by this he
achieved a promise of stability which had been lacking for over a hundred years.

Yet it seems that Trajan did not scorn the policy of making payments to local chieftains to protect Roman provinces, for, shortly after Hadrian's succession, the king of the Roxolani, Rasparaganus, complained of the diminution of his subsidy. (16) This would suggest that the payments began during Trajan's reign, when the emperor realized that the extension of the empire did not necessarily make its boundaries any safer from attack.

As with Decebalus, even subsidies did not protect Roman territory, for on making his complaint, Rasparaganus invaded Dacia. Hadrian mobilised the Moesian legions and hurried to the Danube, where he met the Roxolarian king and settled the dispute peacefully. However, not long afterwards, Rasparaganus was living at Pola, in Istria, having received the imperial names of Publius Aelius. (17) Perhaps Hadrian interned him in honourable exile after the raid into Dacia, or perhaps the king was expelled by his subjects after making a dishonourable settlement with the emperor.

Despite this, Trajan's policy seems to have been successful. He abandoned the old Augustan policy of keeping Roman troops south of the Danube, and protecting the northern bank by a series of client kingdoms. Instead, by the annexation of Dacia, he drove a wedge of Roman territory deep into the heart of the hostile tribal lands, and thus divided the areas of resistance. Yet Rome was still unwilling to rely solely upon her own troops to protect the frontier, and the payments to the Roxolani show that alliances with native tribes were still considered important.

Bosporus.

The kingdom of Bosporus had long been a client kingdom of Rome, and the advantages for both parties were such that no tension
is recorded between the kings of Bosporus and the Roman emperors.

Sauromates I had attained the Bosporan throne shortly before the death of Domitian (18), and he remained a loyal friend of Rome throughout the principates of Nerva and Trajan. (19) The latest recorded coin of Sauromates can be attributed to A.D. 121 (20), and his successor, Cotys II, was on the throne by A.D. 123. (21) Cotys too remained a friend and ally of Rome, but he did not outlive Hadrian, and probably in A.D. 132 the clientship passed to Rhoemetalces. (22)

The long succession of Roman client kings in Bosporus had thus been unbroken since Augustus' principate; it was to continue into the fourth century of the Empire (23), for a client kingdom on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea safeguarded the corn route from the Crimea, allowed Rome to delegate the responsibility for keeping piracy under control, and provided Rome with a buffer against attack from the north-east. At the same time, Bosporus could keep her independence, yet enjoy the economic and military advantages of her powerful mistress.

The Caucasus.

After the fortification of Harmozica by Vespasian in A.D. 75 (24), invasions of Armenia by the Alani ceased, and the tribes of the Caucasus region were happy to continue their client relationships with Rome.

The peaceful situation in the East allowed the maintenance of the status quo in the Caucasus; but when Trajan decided to conquer Armenia, he had to reaffirm the loyalty of the client states to the north, so that the northern flank of his advance would be protected. Therefore, when the Emperor reached Satala in Armenia Minor in A.D. 114, he was met by various client kings of the Caucasus region. Anchialus, king of the Heniochi, found that his allegiance
was rewarded with gifts (25); and Julianus was installed as king of the Apsilae (26); even trans-Caucasian kings were honoured, when Trajan gave a king to the Albani, and made firm alliances with the kings of the Iberi, Bosporani and Colchi. (27)

Possibly these kings gave aid to Trajan in his Parthian campaigns of A.D.115-116, and it is certain that Amazaspus, the king of Iberia, fell in battle in Parthia, for an epitaph states that he was buried at Nisibis, and his bones were later transferred from Mesopotamia to Rome. (28)

Amazaspus was the brother of king Mithridates, and a Mithridates had been king of the Iberi during Vespasian's reign. (29) However, as M.N. Tod points out (30), there is a chronological difficulty in identifying the Mithridates of A.D.75 with the Mithridates of the early part of Trajan's reign. Possibly a second Mithridates succeeded the first, both as clients of Rome, and on the death of the second, he was succeeded by his brother, Amazaspus. (31)

With the ultimate failure of Trajan's Parthian War, the position of the Caucasian client kings reverted to that of A.D.113; they acknowledged the nominal suzerainty of Rome, but had little contact with the emperor; their main purpose was to guard the northern boundary of Armenia. However, in A.D.129, Hadrian toured the east, and on arriving at Samosata, invited those who had paid homage to Trajan fifteen years before, to renew their bonds of friendship. Anchialus of the Heniochi was once again present, and several smaller tribes received kings and lavish gifts from the emperor. (32) A notable absentee was Pharasmenes, king of Iberia, who probably succeeded Amazaspus in A.D.116. However, Hadrian showed friendship to Pharasmenes, and an exchange of gifts took place. (33) Yet the loyalty of the Iberian king does seem
to have been questionable, for towards the end of Hadrian's reign, an invasion by the Alani which overran Media and endangered both Armenia and Cappadocia, was said to have been instigated by Pharasmanes. (34) The king was probably summoned to Rome to explain his conduct (35), but he arrived after Hadrian's death, and established a new friendship with Antoninus Pius. (36)

This conduct of Pharasmanes typified Rome's problem. She needed to maintain the clientship of the Caucasian tribes to act as a protection to the kingdom of Armenia, yet the absence of Roman troops in the vicinity gave the various tribes a sense of freedom and independence which occasionally caused their loyalty to falter. Nevertheless, only Claudius and Hadrian had found that Iberian actions differed from imperial policy, and the situation had soon been rectified. Whilst Roman client kings ruled in Armenia, Rome kept her alliances with the Caucasian kings.

Armenia Maior

The situation in Armenia Maior since A.D.66 had been that a Parthian noble ruled, on condition that he received his diadem from the hands of the emperor in Rome. (37) The Flavians had been happy to retain this arrangement (38), and it appeared that the Armenian question had been settled:

However, in A.D.113, the old problem arose once more. Axidares, the second son of Pacorus, king of Parthia, had been given the kingdom of Armenia, presumably with Rome's consent; but when Osroes, Pacorus' brother, succeeded to the Parthian throne, the rightful heir, Pacorus' elder son, Parthamasiris, was left without a throne, and so Osroes attempted to depose Axidares and give Armenia to Parthamasiris. (39) Trajan was now faced with the situation which most of the Julio-Claudian emperors had met: a Parthian king was ruling in Armenia without the consent of Rome. To the warrior-
emperor who had ended the Dacian threat, this position was untenable, and Trajan prepared to open hostilities. He left Italy in the autumn of A.D.113 (40), but when he reached Athens, he was met by envoys from Osroes, who brought gifts and asked for peace. They claimed that Axidares had proved unsatisfactory to both Parthia and Rome, and begged the emperor to present Parthamasiris with the Armenian diadem. (41) This concession, which was all Rome had asked since Nero's time, gave Trajan an opportunity to retire with honour, but he refused Osroes' gifts with the reply that he would do what was necessary when he reached Syria.

Trajan's intention now became clear, and the western Parthian satraps must have felt very apprehensive; indeed one of them, Abgarus of Osroene, sent an embassy to Antioch to obtain Trajan's friendship (42), and Rome could claim a client kingdom within the Parthian Empire.

Trajan continued his preparations, and detachments from five legions were gathered at Antioch. (43) The emperor intended to take control of Armenia before meeting the Parthians, and so he marched northwards through Commagene and Cappadocia to Satala, in Armenia Minor, where he was met by the Caucasian client kings. (44)

Meanwhile Parthamasiris had tried to placate Trajan by sending him two letters, in the second of which he did not use the title of 'king', and requested that Marcus Junius, the governor of Cappadocia, be sent to him. Junius' son went to the Armenian king, whilst Trajan advanced to Elegeia in Armenia. Shortly after his arrival, Parthamasiris presented himself and laid his diadem at the emperor's feet, expecting to receive it back; but the troops immediately hailed Trajan as Imperator, and the latter explained to Parthamasiris that Armenia was now a Roman province. The
Parthian protested that he had not been defeated or captured, but had come of his own free will to receive the diadem, just as Tiridates had done; he was told that Armenia now belonged to Rome, but that he himself would be allowed to live. (45)

By this action, Trajan deliberately abandoned Augustus' policy of controlling Armenia by means of a client king, in favour of a policy of annexation. Obviously he felt that the military power of Rome was now so great that she could withstand any opposition which Parthia might provide. Thus, late in A.D.114, Armenia became a Roman province. (46) The first and only governor was Lucius Catilius Severus (47), whose province covered Cappadocia and Armenia, and T. Haterius Nepos was the procurator. (48) Shortly afterwards, Parthamasiris was murdered on the ground that he was attempting to regain his kingdom by violence. (49) Trajan was now convinced that Armenia was secure, and he prepared to invade Parthia.

Whilst Trajan's army was campaigning in Parthia, Armenia remained a Roman province, but the failure to establish Roman rule over the Parthian Empire (50) meant that, on the death of Trajan, his successor, Hadrian, was faced with the prospect of increasing Roman arms and continuing the war, or returning to the pre-Trajanic policy. He decided to abandon all conquests east of the Euphrates, and, like Nero before him (51), Hadrian realized that to retain Armenia as a province would be strategically impracticable. It became once more a client kingdom. (52)

Unfortunately, we cannot be certain of the name of the new king. Shortly before the end of Hadrian's reign, an invasion by the Alani was ended when they were bribed by a certain Vologases (53); Henderson (54) suggests that Vologases was the Armenian king, but the lack of evidence can neither confirm nor deny this suggestion.
The results of Trajan's campaigns confirmed the opinion that suzerainty over Armenia was vital to Rome, but the permanent annexation of the kingdom would be difficult to maintain. It appeared that the Augustan policy, modified by Nero, was the least hazardous, and Hadrian was happy to revert to it. The position of Armenia was to change little. It remained a client kingdom for many years, but Roman armies frequently had to interfere to retain Rome's influence.

Shortly after Hadrian's death, Vologaeses II of Parthia prepared to invade Armenia after being snubbed by Antoninus Pius, and only a diplomatic letter from the emperor dissuaded him from doing so. (55)

On Antoninus' death in A.D. 161, the next Parthian king, Vologaeses III, invaded Armenia, defeated a Roman army, and placed a Parthian, Pacorus, on the Armenian throne; it was not until A.D. 164 that Lucius Verus was able to reaffirm Rome's suzerainty by giving the kingdom to Sohaemus. (56) Yet Sohaemus' position was by no means secure, and eleven years later he was driven out, only to be reinstalled by Thucydides, a subordinate of the governor of Cappadocia. (57)

In A.D. 215 the peace was again broken when Caracalla, attempting to emulate Alexander the Great, deposed the Armenian king and annexed the kingdom. (58) However, the Armenians rose in revolt, and were not pacified until Caracalla's successor, Macrinus, appointed the former monarch's son as ruler. (59)

Roman rule in Armenia seems to have ended shortly before A.D. 260. The king, Chosroes, was assassinated by a Persian agent and his son forced to flee into Roman territory. Shapur the Persian then invaded Armenia and despite the efforts of Valerian, Rome was unable to regain control of the kingdom. (60)
Thus, after three centuries of suzerainty in Armenia, Rome lost control of the area. Always the thorn in the side of Roman foreign policy in the east, at last the problem had been taken out of her hands.

Parthia.

Although Trajan's conquest of Armenia had been uncontested, no Parthian embassy came to him to ask for peace, which was tantamount to an insult. The emperor decided on further conquests, and, late in A.D.114, he marched southwards from Armenia into Mesopotamia; the region fell almost without a struggle, and became a new Roman province. Various local princes submitted to the emperor, and when he reached Edessa, Abgarus of Osroene met him, formally submitted, and became a friend and client of the emperor.

During A.D.115 and 116, Trajan's conquests continued. He crossed the Tigris, annexed Adiabene as the province of Assyria, and captured the Parthian capital, Ctesiphon. When he reached the head of the Persian Gulf, Trajan even expressed his regret that his age prevented him from continuing to India.

But the Roman conquest had been too superficial, and in the summer of A.D.116, whilst the emperor was in Babylon, a revolt broke out in the new provinces of Assyria and Mesopotamia, and the Roman garrisons were either expelled or massacred. Trajan sent three armies to put down the revolt, and, although one was defeated, peace was restored. However, this rebellion compelled Trajan to consider his policy towards Parthia; we do not know whether he had intended to divide the whole Parthian Empire into Roman provinces, but the revolt of Sanatruces had shown that permanent annexation was out of the question, for it would require far too large an army to maintain the peace. Therefore Trajan preserved Roman prestige by making Parthia a client kingdom;
Parthamaspates, a son of Osroes, was crowned by the emperor in Ctesiphon (65), and for the first time (66) Rome could claim that Parthia was a vassal state. (67)

Yet the revolt was not completely subdued; Trajan was forced to abandon the siege of Hatra and started to return to Antioch, hoping to continue the campaign in the next year. Unfortunately, the emperor did not accompany his generals in the campaigns of A.D.117. He fell ill and died at Selinus, in Cilicia. (68)

Trajan lived to see the beginning of the disappearance of his conquests, for the revolt in A.D.116 had resulted in a portion of Armenia being given to Vologaeses, the son of Sanatruces, as the price of peace (69); similarly Eupropus, on the right bank of the Euphrates, was evacuated by Roman forces, probably in A.D.116-117 as a concession to Parthamaspates. (70)

Shortly after Trajan's death, all his conquests east of the Euphrates were abandoned, for the Parthians rejected Parthamaspates (71), and Hadrian realized that to regain and maintain the Parthian conquests was beyond Rome's military strength.

Therefore Hadrian re-established the Augustan policy, with the Euphrates as the eastern boundary of the Roman Empire; Mesopotamia and Assyria were given back to the Parthian monarch, Osroes and Armenia became once more a client kingdom (72); the rejected Parthamaspates was given a minor principality on the borders of the Roman Empire, perhaps Osroene. (73)

Thus peace between the Parthian and Roman Empires was restored. Hadrian was regarded as a friend by the Parthian king, and in A.D.129, the emperor returned Osroes' daughter to Parthia, and promised the return of the royal throne, both of which Trajan had sent to Rome. (74)
The rivalry between Rome and Parthia continued long after Hadrian's death; Antoninus' diplomacy averted a war with Volagaeses II (75), and Lucius Verus later drove Volagaeses III out of Armenia (76); at the same time, Avidius Cassius repelled Parthian forces from Syria and advanced into Mesopotamia. His capture of Ctesiphon compelled Vologaeses III to sue for peace in A.D.165, and Osroene became a Roman vassal state. (77)

The conflict was renewed in A.D.195, when Vologaeses IV of Parthia and Abgarus VIII of Osroene supported Niger in his claims to the principate. On Niger's defeat by Septimius Severus, the latter led a punitive expedition, to which Abgarus submitted and was allowed to keep his throne. Two years later the emperor invaded Parthia and captured Ctesiphon; mutinies in his army compelled him to retire from Parthia in A.D.199, but the provinces of Osroene and Mesopotamia were added to the Roman Empire. (78)

Severus' son and successor, Caracalla, was the next to attempt the defeat of Parthia. In A.D.215, he failed to provoke Vologaeses IV to declare war, but in the following year a new Parthian king, Artabanus, refused to give his daughter in marriage to Caracalla; therefore, the emperor crossed the Euphrates and won a minor victory. But Caracalla was assassinated in A.D.217, and the new emperor, Macrinus, who was loath to continue the war, was defeated by Artabanus. Peace was restored when the king accepted a large indemnity. (79)

Yet shortly afterwards, Artabanus fell, and a new Persian dynasty, the Sassanids, took control of the Parthian Empire. (80) Rome, who had shown a gradual tendency to treat the Parthian kings as equals (81), found that the military power of the Sassanids demanded equality, and from the time of their accession Rome's thoughts turned to defence rather than expansion.
Arabia Petraea.

The kingdom of the Nabataean Arabs had remained loyal to Rome during the reign of the Flavians, but the incorporation of Agrippa's kingdom (82) increased the likelihood of the annexation of the neighbouring territory, Arabia Petraea. (83) Therefore, when the king of the Nabataeans, Rabilos II (84), died shortly before A.D.106, Trajan ordered A. Cornelius Palma, the governor of Syria, to occupy the kingdom. (85)

Palma encountered some opposition (86), but he successfully annexed the region; part of the kingdom was joined to Syria, but the more southerly portion became a separate province with Bostra as its capital. (87)

By this annexation, Trajan followed Augustus' example of the ultimate annexation of client kingdoms in the east. Yet the emperor no doubt had other motives, for he foresaw an improvement in the trade routes with India. Eutropius tells us that the emperor stationed a fleet in the Red Sea (88), and in A.D.107, Indian ambassadors arrived at Trajan's court, no doubt encouraged by improved communications (89); the trade routes were further increased by the road built from the Gulf of Akaba to the cities of Syria by C. Claudius Severus, the governor of Arabia Petraea in A.D.113-114. It would appear that the kingdom of the Nabataeans was annexed for economic, rather than political or strategic, reasons.

Nerva and Trajan inherited from the Flavians an empire of which boundaries were clearly defined and defensible; on very few frontiers were client-kings allowed to protect Roman territories. Trajan's belief in Rome's military power would allow no threat to Roman supremacy to go unpunished, therefore he prosecuted wars against any client king who was not fully obedient. Decebalus' disloyalty
resulted in his death and the annexation of his kingdom, and Parthian interference in Armenia led to the latter becoming a province and the occupation of Ctesiphon by Roman troops. The only client kings suffered by Trajan were those beyond the effective reach of Roman arms, in the Caucasian mountains, who were yet prepared to be fully subservient to Rome.

But the failure of Trajan's Parthian expedition led his successor to fix the limits of the Empire. Parthia was given up, and Armenia once more became a client-kingdom. Yet by the end of the reign of Hadrian, Rome's military power was so superior to that of her neighbours that very few client kings were needed to give her strategic support. The only possible military threat could come from Parthia, and only on this frontier were client kings needed.
Notes to Chapter VII

1. See above, 142-144.

2. See above, 144.

3. Pliny, Pan. 8; Ins, 2720.

4. Pliny, Epistolae, X, 74, 16.

5. Cass. Dio LXVIII, 6; The Roman legions left Italy on March, 25th, A.D. 101 (Ins, 5035).

6. The sources for this war are scanty. Cassius Dio gives a brief account (Cass. Dio LXVIII, 8-14), and Trajan's Column gives a guide to its course. However, I quote R.P. Longden (CAH XI, 225): "Since the topographical indications in Dio are of the slightest, the principal guide to the course of the war is the Column of Trajan itself with its spiral band of reliefs. The historical value of these sculptures has been severely challenged, and it is true that without an adequate written narrative it is likely to remain impossible to unlock their secret to a demonstration; but that they do embody a chronological record which we should easily recognize if, like the public for whom they were designed, we had other knowledge of the events portrayed, is unquestionable, and an historian is entitled to make the best use he may of their evidence."

This argument follows that of Sir Ian Richmond (PBSR XIII, 1935, 1ff) and is taken more recently by F.A. Lepper (JRS LIX, 1969, 254f).

7. Trajan's Column represents the battle as a Roman victory, and Cassius Dio says Decebalus was defeated, but he admits that many legionaries died, and Trajan does not appear to have succeeded in capturing Dacian defence posts.


16. Vita Hadriani, 6, 6-8; P-W s.v. P. Aelius Raspergarus.

17. CIL V, 32, 33.

18. See above, 145.
19. BMC, Pontus etc. p. 51, no. 1; p. 57, no. 2. 
   IGRR I, 882, 883.
20. BMC, Pontus etc. p. 57, nos. 6 and 7.
21. IGRR I, 884.
22. BMC, Pontus etc. p. 61, no. 2 shows that Cotys was still on the throne in A.D.132. An inscription from Panticapaeum (IGRR I, 877) proves that Rhoemetalces had succeeded to the throne in A.D.133.
23. BMC, Pontus etc. pp. 63-81.
24. See above, 148.
27. Festus, Brev. 20, 2; Eutropius, VIII, 3.
28. IGGR I, 192; PIR², A555.
29. See above, 148.
30. M.N. Tod, JRS XXXIII, 1943, 86.
31. PIR¹, M459.
32. Vita Hadriani, 13, 9; Arrian, Periplus Maris Euxini, 11, 2-3 Roos. Malassas, king of the Lazoi, received his throne from Hadrian, as did Rhesmagas of the Abaskoi and Spadagas of the Sanagci.
33. Vita Hadriani, 17, 10; 21, 13.
35. Magie, I, 659.
36. Vita Antonini, 9, 6.
37. See above, 108.
38. See above, 150-151.
39. R.P. Longden, JRS XXI, 1931, 13 and 25. This explanation is based on the likely assumption that the text of Arrian, Parthica, 37 and 40 Roos, were spoken by the Emperor.
40. Arrian, Parthica, 35 Roos; R.P. Longden, JRS XXI, 1931, 1f.
42. Cass. Dio LXVIII, 18, 1.
43. These were 1) VI Ferrata (ILLS 2726, 9471)  
    2) X Fretensis (ILLS 2727)  
    3) XVI Flavia Firma (ILLS 2660)  
    4) IV Scythica (ILLS 1062)  
    5) Either III Cyrenaica or VII Claudia (ILLS 2083)

44. See above, 166-167.


46. The date was not later than August, 114 - R.P. Longden, JRS XXI, 1931, p. 10 n. 4.

47. ILS 1041.

48. ILS 1058, 1338.

49. Cass. Dio LXVIII, 18, 3a; Eutropius VIII, 3.

50. See below, 172-173.

51. See above, 106.

52. Vita Hadriani, 21, 11.


54. B.W. Henderson (The Life and Principate of the Emperor Hadrian, 1923, p. 138 n. 3), from an argument by Bossevain (Hermes XXV, 1890, 336); Magie I, 609f.

55. Magie I, 659f.

56. Magie I, 660f.


58. Magie I, 685.


60. Magie I, 707f.


64. Cass. Dio LXVIII, 29, 4-30, 2.


66. See above, 36. Despite Augustus' diplomatic triumphs, Parthia was not actually a vassal state.

67. For coins proclaiming Rex Parthis Datus, see Mattingly - Sydenham RIC II, p. 291, nos. 667-668.

69. Cass. Dio LXV, 9, 6 - placed after LXVIII, 30 in Dio's text by Bossevain (Hermes XXV, 1890, 329f) and followed by R.P. Longden (JRS XXI, 1931, 17).


72. See above, 170.

73. Vita Hadriani, 21, 10; P-W s.v. Parthamaspatas.

74. Vita Hadriani, 13, 7-9; 21, 10.

75. See above, 171.

76. See above, 171.

77. Magie I, 661-2.

78. Magie I, 672ff. NB There was at this time both a province and a client kingdom of Osroene.


82. See above, 154.

83. R.P. Longden, CAH XX, 236f., states that there was a need for provincial control of Arabia Petraea to protect the potentially rich Decapolis area, and to take full economic advantage of the trade route between the Red Sea and Syria.

84. See above, 155.


86. Amm. Marc. XIV, 8, 13.

87. Eutropius VIII, 3; A. Grohmann, P-W s.v. Nabataioi.

88. Eutropius VIII, 3-4.

The development of client kingdoms in the early Roman Empire: a summary.

The last one hundred years of the Roman Republic had seen almost continuous civil warfare, for generals and senatorial leaders had consistently taken up arms, in attempts to gain an advantage over their rivals for power. Although the limits of the Roman Empire were pushed outwards during this century, especially by the armies of Pompey and Julius Caesar, military conquests tended to increase the ambitions of the successful generals, persuading them to turn towards Rome and contend with their rivals. Therefore armies became as large as possible, and alliances with kingdoms and tribes beyond the empire were made, with the intention of making one army more powerful than another. Therefore it is hardly surprising that when Octavian finally brought the civil wars to an end by defeating Antony at Actium in 31 B.C., the political and military affairs of the Roman Empire were in turmoil. The new leader realized that stability must be reached in both these fields before Rome could look beyond the internal struggles for leadership and begin to make consistent efforts to expand and defend the empire. In order to dispel fears that he would lead a military dictatorship, Octavian reduced the number of legions by more than half, keeping only those which he thought were vital to the security of the empire (1), and instituted a clearly defined foreign policy. Octavian took as his guide the senatorial policies of one hundred and fifty years before, that barbarians must be overcome by open aggression and expansion, whereas cultural equals or superiors should become subordinate but not dependent. (2) The result of this was that Augustus did not foster client relationships along the European frontiers, preferring to protect Roman provinces by military
means. He did allow native kings from beyond the Rhine and Danube to seek refuge in Roman territory (3), but these were refugees whom the emperor hoped to use as pretenders to keep their tribes divided. The only king beyond the boundaries of Roman rule who became a client was Maroboduus, for Augustus was unable to defeat him in battle. (4) The Cottian Alps, whilst officially a client kingdom, appear to have been little more than a province with a native governor (5), and therefore Thrace was the only European kingdom which Augustus purposely maintained as an independent client state; the uncivilized nature of the Thracians and political divisions within the kingdom made it unsuitable for direct Roman rule, and the emperor obviously thought that a native king would provide a unifying factor in Thrace. (6)

Yet in the east Augustus' policy was different. After Actium, he had to win the support of the eastern kings, who had aided Antony, for if they had turned to Parthia, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean would have been endangered. By recognizing the kings of Asia Minor as friends of Rome, Augustus not only ensured their loyalty but also preserved the trade routes to the Far East, thus protecting Rome's economic interests. Nevertheless the emperor was willing to extend the Empire and improve Rome's position in Asia Minor by peaceful means. Galatia was annexed on the death of its king (7), and Augustus encouraged the amalgamation of Cappodocia and Pontus by a marriage tie, producing a kingdom which spanned Asia Minor and would have been a severe obstacle to an army invading from the east. (8)

Augustus' policy in the east was aimed at strengthening Roman territory against Parthia, and to this end the emperor thought it imperative that Rome should maintain a client king in Armenia Maior. His diplomatic triumph in 20 B.C. enabled him to maintain a firm hold on Armenia, and his substantial influence in Parthia itself ensured the success of his eastern policies. (9)
In North Africa, there was no serious threat of invasion from the south, and Augustus saw no need to protect Roman territory by means of buffer states; therefore Egypt was annexed after the death of Cleopatra, and the emperor acquired it as a personal possession. Yet the geography of Mauretania presented grave problems for direct rule, and it was advisable to entrust at least part of the long North African frontier to a native ruler; and so Juba II received the kingdom as a reward for his loyalty.

By his policies the first emperor was able to stabilize and determine the defence of the empire. His use of client kings was based on the strategic and sociological conditions of the various frontiers, and his decisions were to be followed by most of his successors.

Certainly Tiberius followed Augustus' advice; in Europe, the only advance across the Rhine was by Germanicus in A.D. 14-16, and as soon as the last of the standards lost by Varus had been recovered, he was recalled. Tiberius even refused help to Maroboduus, although he did settle one king north of the Danube. On the eastern frontier, Tiberius also followed his predecessor. On the death of a client king, he annexed the kingdom rather than appoint a successor; in this way Cappadocia, Cilicia Amasia, Commagene and Armenia Minor became Roman provinces. Yet in following Augustus this far, Tiberius overlooked another Augustan principle. By bounding Armenia Maior with Roman vassal states, Augustus had ensured that a Parthian attack through Armenia would still have to break through a chain of client kingdoms before reaching Roman territory. Tiberius annexed these kingdoms, so that the western borders of Armenia were bounded by Roman provinces. Perhaps his policy was right, for it ensured that Roman legions could be stationed nearer to Armenia, enabling invasion to be resisted with
greater speed and effectiveness.

Nevertheless, Gaius reversed the actions taken by Tiberius; he saw that Roman suzerainty in Armenia Maior would be a continual source of rivalry between Parthia and Rome. Therefore he recalled the king of Armenia (15), abandoning it to Parthian influence, and reconstituted Armenia Minor and Commagene as client kingdoms; thus he ensured that the new boundary of Roman influence was still protected by client kings. (16) Only in Mauretania did Gaius continue Augustus' policy; he called Ptolemy to Rome, executed him, and prepared to annex his kingdom; but it is erroneous to call this action truly Augustan, for Augustus would not have approved of the murder of a seemingly loyal client king. (17)

Claudius' succession saw a return to Augustan precepts; Mithridates was returned to Armenia with the aid of Roman forces (18), and the annexation of Mauretania was completed; moreover, the kingdom of Ituraea was annexed on the death of its king and its addition increased the military importance of Syria. (19) But Claudius considered that Augustus' policy in Europe was out-dated, and that an advance of Roman rule was possible. Therefore he invaded Britain, and the early years of the invasion saw the emergence of a new kind of client king; three local chieftains, Cogidumnus, Prasutagus and Cartimandua, became allies of Rome, and were used to protect the flanks of the Roman army as the conquest was consolidated. (20) Claudius also attempted to form Roman vassal states on the east bank of the Rhine; in A.D.47, the Frisii were given a Roman constitution, and Italicus was sent to the Cherusci as their king; moreover the Chatti seem to have accepted subservience to Rome. (21) However, it is important to note that although Claudius established these tribes as vassals of Rome, they cannot truly be called client states, for their domains were outside the areas of Roman military control and the
emperor undertook no obligation to help them. Thus, when Vannius of the Marcomanni was attacked and appealed to Rome as a friend, he received no aid. Nor did Claudius entirely forget Augustus' example, for when it proved impossible for a client king to retain control in Thrace, Claudius annexed the kingdom. (22)

Nero accepted Augustus' policies as they had been modified by Claudius, and his apparent lack of interest in foreign affairs is reflected in the fact that he only acted where he had to. During his reign it was necessary to end two of the client relationships in Britain, and only the loyal Cogidumnus was allowed to retain his throne. (23) Yet once again it was Armenia that demanded the emperor's attention. Claudius' preoccupation with the west had allowed the Parthians to encroach on Roman clientship in Armenia Maior, and Nero was compelled to meet the problem. After an unsuccessful attempt to abolish the client kingship by direct annexation, the campaigns of Corbulo resulted in the emperor's acceptance of nominal rather than actual suzerainty (24); this settlement persuaded Nero to protect the states bordering Armenia; Polemo of Pontus was ousted and his kingdom annexed, to facilitate the access of Roman troops from the north (25), and Roman forces were stationed in the client state of Sophene. (26)

Despite the actions of Gaius in the east, and Claudius' policy in Europe, the main principles of Augustus' policies were adhered to by the Julio-Claudians. They seem to have been successful, for few client kings caused serious trouble to Rome. The only exception was Armenia Maior, and it appeared that the modification made by Nero in reducing the kingdom from actual to nominal suzerainty had succeeded in establishing a lasting peace with Parthia.

The Flavian emperors modified Augustus' policies even more. Julio-Claudian failures to protect the European frontiers by means of client kings persuaded Vespasian to use more direct methods.
He kept the tribes east of the Rhine in check by shows of force, and protected the Roman provinces by building a series of forts between the Rhine and the Danube. (27) Domitian followed his father's lead as far as possible, but his failure to defeat the Daci resulted in the institution of a new client king, Decebalus. (28) The emperor would, no doubt, have preferred to annex Dacia, but this would have resulted in a weakening of defences elsewhere. In the east, the Flavians also showed their unwillingness to rely on client kings. Kingdoms adjacent to Roman provinces were annexed on the death of their kings (29), and Armenia Minor and Commagene, strategically important in protecting the borders of Armenia Maior, were deprived of their kings shortly after Vespasian's rule began. (30) The only client kings suffered by the Flavians were those beyond the recognised limits of Roman rule.

Trajan agreed with the Flavian ideals rather than those of Augustus. He regarded the power of Roman arms as being so great that no client states should exist unless they admitted complete subservience to Rome. Therefore Decebalus was crushed and his kingdom annexed (31), and the threat to the settlement in Armenia resulted in the Parthian campaigns. For a short time, no client kingdoms existed within the empire, but Trajan then installed a Roman client on the Parthian throne. (32)

However, after Trajan's death Hadrian realized that the resources of the empire were not great enough to maintain Trajan's conquests, and he was happy to return to Augustus' policy in accepting an independent Parthia, with Rome's exercise of nominal suzerainty over Armenia Maior. (33) This settlement, perhaps the most important point in Augustus' policy, remained in force until the collapse of the Parthian Empire.

Thus imperial policy towards client kings developed, but it is equally important to note the distinction between the status of the
various client kings. In assessing the reasons for the establishment of client relationships, I have distinguished four types, each important to Rome, but each receiving different privileges and concessions.

The first category included those kings who became clients solely for military reasons, of which the three kings in Britain were the most important examples. They were temporary allies whose purpose was to protect Roman forces whilst conquest was made secure, and as soon as the more hostile regions were under Roman control, the kings found that their lands were absorbed into the Roman province; if they resisted, they were crushed. Clearly Rome intended these clientships to be temporary, and of tactical rather than strategic importance.

Secondly, let us consider relations with tribes in northeastern Europe; Rome did not attempt to form true client relationships with them on a reciprocal basis, for they were regarded as untrustworthy and culturally inferior, being useful only on the battle field. Tribes which accepted Rome's sovereignty seldom did so for more than a generation, for an anti-Roman leader always appeared to overthrow those who had prostituted their independence by alliances with Rome. Obviously such tribes were never absorbed into the empire and served merely as buffers against even more barbaric tribes further away from Roman influence.

The third category of client kingdoms were more permanent and much more important to the prosperity of the empire; these were states beyond the easy reach of Roman arms who yet served a useful purpose to the government in Rome: the Nabataean Arabs preserved Rome's trade links with India and the Far East until they were absorbed into the empire by Trajan; the kings of Bosporus kept the Black Sea free of pirates and protected its rich eastern coast from the ravages of
inland tribes; and the kings in the Caucasus mountains protected Armenia and Cappadocia from northern marauders, and at the same time aided Roman interests in the conflicts with Parthia. The increased importance of this type of client is marked by the emperors' insistence that these kings obtained recognition of their rule from Rome and that their coinage depicted a Roman head as well as, or even in place of, a native portrait. These kings would have been difficult to subdue, but their friendship was invaluable to Rome, and it continued far beyond the reign of Hadrian.

But the fourth category was undoubtedly the most important; the kingdoms in Asia Minor, including Thrace, those south of Syria and those in North Africa were well within the accepted limits of Roman influence, and were regarded as an integral part of the Roman Empire. Often they received Roman garrisons and Roman colonies, and their kings were held in honour by the emperor, senate and people. In return they were expected to bow to the jurisdiction of Rome and to adhere to Roman foreign policy, even to supply forces for Rome's foreign wars. These contacts inevitably produced a high degree of romanization in these kingdoms, and eventually they were absorbed into the empire.

The one exception was Armenia Maior, which faced an equal degree of contact with Parthia, and thus became the joint possession of the two empires. If Rome could have gained permanent control of this kingdom, she would have been the complete mistress of her own sphere of influence, but never was Roman power strong enough to counteract pressures from the east, and Armenia, Rome's most important client kingdom, remained her greatest problem.
Notes to Chapter VIII.

1. Octavian did not embark on his policy of demobilisation until 29 B.C., after he had toured the eastern Empire to ensure the loyalty of all those who had supported Antony. The 60 legions which had existed at the time of Actium were eventually reduced to 28.

2. E. Badian (Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, Oxford, 1967, 7f.) expounds this policy.

4. See above 14.
5. See above 15.
7. See above 22.
9. See above 31-38.
10. See above 47-48.
11. See above 50.
12. See above 67.
13. See above 68.
14. See above 112.
15. See above 103.
16. See above 112.
17. See above 131.
18. See above 104.
19. See above 126.
20. See above 64-65.
21. See above 70-71.
22. See above 77.
23. See above 66.
24. See above 108.
25. See above 89.
26. See above 99.
27. See above 140.
28. See above 144.
29. Chalcis, Emesa and the kingdom of Agrippa II were absorbed in this way. See above 154-155.
30. See above 146-147, 149.
31. See above 164.
32. See above 172-173.
33. See above 173.
APPENDIX I.

Dubnovellaunus and Tincomarius

See D.F. Allen, Archaeologia XC, 1944, 1-46.

Dubnovellaunus in Essex.

Dubnovellaunus possessed territory on both sides of the Thames. Several types of coin were found in Essex, especially a single type of stater (PL II, no. 39). The polished style, more skilled than previous coins, suggests a Kentish craftsman. Most of the staters of Cunobelinus at Camulodunum seem to be descended from the horse of Dubnovellaunus in Essex (PL III, 1-12). They too have the palm-branch, though it is placed above instead of below the horse, and the ears of corn on the obverse was suggested by a pattern such as that on the staters of Dubnovellaunus.

Therefore it is probable that Cunobelinus succeeded Dubnovellaunus at Camulodunum, driving him to retreat, either into exile or across the estuary into his Kentish kingdom. It is impossible to give a date to this, but it may have been the occasion for Dubnovellaunus' appeal to Augustus.

Dubnovellaunus in Kent.

The first coinage found in the coastlands of Kent is inscribed with the name Dubnovellaunus, but only in the area east of the Medway (PL I, 29-34). Gold, silver and bronze coins have been found, and they are different from and more numerous than those found in Essex; presumably this was his main, and therefore earlier, realm. The details of his career are uncertain, but he appears to have held his main kingdom in Kent. At some time he conquered the tribe of the Trinovantes north of the Thames estuary - the lettering appears to be later than on those in Kent (E instead of II, VS instead of 02).
But the similarity between the bronze coins suggests they were simultaneous. He was expelled from Essex by Cunobelinus, and at about the same time, he appears to have been replaced in Kent by a ruler names Vose ... (PL. I, 36).

Either of these events could have been the cause of his appeal to Augustus.

Tincommius (Allen, 6).

That Tincommius succeeded his father, Commius, as king of the Regni and Atrebates is proved by his coins, which followed the pattern of those of Commius. His date is proved not only by the fragment of his name in RG 32, but also by two silver coins (PL. I, 12-13), which are copies of a Lugdunum issue of Augustus between about 15 B.C. and 12 B.C. (cf. Mattingly, BMC I, 561-3 and 564 or 450ff).

C.E. Stevens (Essays presented to D.G.S. Crawford, 338) sees these Roman coin-types as evidence of an attempt by Augustus to check the aggrandisement of Tasciovanus, king of the Hertfordshire Belgae. Moreover, the flight of Dubnovellaunus and Tincommius must have disturbed Augustus' diplomatic balance in Britain. The Celtic nature of Dubnovellaunus' coins suggests that he was not an ally of Rome, but Tincommius was under some Roman influence, and Augustus possibly continued treaty arrangements with his successors. The title rex actually appeared on the coins of Epillus and Verica (Allen, PL. I, 15, 17-19) and they may well have been regarded as client kings by the emperor.
APPENDIX II

Marcus Antonius Polemo

G.F. Hill (Num. Chron XIX, 1899, 201f), in equating Marcus Antonius Polemo with the elder son of Pythodoris and Polemo I, follows Mommsen in giving the following family tree:

\[
\text{Polemo I} = \text{Pythodoris}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polemo II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polemo I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Marcus Antonius Polemo} \quad \text{Zeno} \quad \text{Antonia Tryphaena} = \text{Cotys}
\]

H. Dessau (PIR, P405-6) gives a different interpretation:

\[
\text{Polemo I} = \text{Pythodoris}
\]

\[
\text{Polemo II}
\]

\[
\text{Marcus Antonius Polemo}
\]

Accepting the assumption that Marcus Antonius Polemo was the successor of Ajax, high priest of Olba during Augustus' reign, Hill's interpretation is chronologically preferable, for Polemo II must have begun his rule at approximately the same time as Marcus Antonius Polemo.

However, Dessau's explanation must not be ruled out, for the change of title from \(\alpha \rho \chi \iota \rho \varepsilon \delta \varsigma\) and \(\delta \upsilon \nu \sigma \tau \eta \varsigma\) (BMC, Lycaonia etc. p. 123 no. 18) to \(\beta \alpha \sigma \iota \lambda \epsilon \delta \varsigma\) (Coll. Wadd. 4427) could indicate that there were two rulers with the name of Marcus Antonius Polemo, of whom the first began to rule during the reign of Tiberius and was succeeded by the second, who was on the throne in Galba's time. If this were so,
then the second could have been the son of Julius Polemo (Polemo II of Pontus - v. Pap. Brit. Mus. III, 1178). However, I think that the names Marcus Antonius would be unlikely to appear in the same branch of the family as Julius, and a second Marcus Antonius would probably have been the son of the first Marcus Antonius, and therefore the cousin of Julius Polemo.

Further speculation is possible, but in view of the fact that the primary assumptions of Mommsen and Dessau were founded on few certainties, it would be unprofitable to continue.
APPENDIX III.

The date of the meeting between
Artabanus and Vitellius on the Euphrates.

Cassius Dio (LIX, 27, 3) and Suetonius (Gaius, 14 and Vit. 2) say this meeting took place during the reign of Gaius. Josephus (Ant. Jud. XVIII, 101-105) places it during Tiberius' reign, and E. Taubler (Die Parthernachrichten bei Josephus, 33ff) accepts Josephus' dating, arguing that the historians who were hostile to Tiberius begrudged him this success. J.C.C. Anderson (CAH X, 749-750) agrees, adding that no Parthian king would have done obeisance to Roman standards and images of Roman emperors unless at sword-point. Whilst I agree that this obeisance may well be a Roman embellishment, I prefer to think that the meeting took place during Gaius' reign for the following reasons:

1) The evidence of Cassius Dio and Suetonius, together with Tacitus' silence in Ann. VI, 44, which suggests that he mentioned the meeting during his account of Gaius' reign.

2) The respect one might expect a Parthian monarch to feel for a son of Germanicus, who had settled a Roman client on the Armenian throne in A.D.18.

3) Gaius' recall of Mithridates of Armenia, leaving the kingdom open to Parthian influence, must have pleased Artabanus.

4) The chronology of the whole episode. Zeno had not died until A.D.35. After this, Artabanus placed his son on the Armenian throne, a Parthian embassy was sent to Rome, and Phraates set out for the east. He died in Syria and Tiridates was then sent out. It is unlikely that he crossed the Euphrates before A.D.36. Tiridates was successful in attaining the Parthian throne, and Artabanus was forced to flee. Artabanus had to gather new support and was successful in
expelling Tiridates, but I find it hard to believe that he had regained complete control by the beginning of A.D.37. Even so, it is unlikely that he would have been able to reach the Euphrates and arrange a meeting before the death of Tiberius on March 16th, A.D.37. (Tac. Ann. VI, 50). The meeting with Vitellius must have required much thought by Artabanus, and in view of the fact that Tiridates of Armenia was not crowned until A.D.66, three years after agreement was reached, I regard A.D.40 as the most likely date for the meeting.
APPENDIX IV.

Cogidumnus and Fishbourne

The connection between Cogidumnus, Fishbourne and Chichester cannot be proved, but B.W. Cunliffe makes several convincing observations in *Excavations at Fishbourne*, vols. I and II, Leeds, 1971:-

p.13 There were three possible occasions when Tiberius Claudius Cogidumnus might have gained imperial favour:

1) as a reward for help in the Claudian invasion.
2) for support in the Boudiccan revolt.
3) as a supporter of Vespasian in A.D.69.

p.14 Did Cogidumnus live at Fishbourne? "Again, conclusive proof is not available, but the picture offered fits all the known facts, and is, at the least, a likely explanation of the evidence."

pp. 75-76 The Palace at Fishbourne: "The driving force behind the construction must have been someone with a strong desire for things Roman, supported by considerable wealth. Here we must anticipate the next section of the report, by saying that within a short time the masonry building or, better, 'proto-palace' was vastly expanded to create a palace of unsurpassed magnificence which, it will be argued, may well have belonged to the local client king, Cogidubnus. Could it not be that the progression from timber house to proto-palace, over the period c. 45 to c. 75, represented the gradual increase in wealth and status enjoyed by the king? An explanation in these terms would make good sense of both the observed sequence and what little written evidence there is, but it could never be proven."
"The implications, then, are of a continuity of function and perhaps ownership, and of use by a high-ranking official thoroughly conversant with Roman taste, whose illusions of grandeur were acceptable to the central government. The imperial governor is one possibility, but at this time, it would have been Frontinus or Agricola, whose preoccupation with the west and north would surely have prevented the leisurely use of a southern residence. Moreover, for an official residence to be placed in the territory of Cogidubnus, on the very door-step of his town, would have been an enormous insult to a king whose loyalty was so prized. It is indeed far more reasonable to suggest that the palace was owned by Cogidubnus himself. Its growth from a modest late-Claudian timber house may well have echoed the fortunes of the king, on whom territories and honours were forced by Rome. Moreover, the Audience Chamber would have been quite in keeping for a local king who was also a Roman senator (legatus Augusti). If this attribution is correct, it is interesting to speculate why, early in the reign of Vespasian, the small proto-palace should have been so enormously enlarged. It may, however, be that under Vespasian the king received his senatorship, perhaps as a reward for support in A.D. 69, when Vespasian was struggling for power. It was not unlike Vespasian to react in this way to his supporters, and a sudden rise in status would neatly explain the change from the proto-palace, suitable for a king, to a palace more fitting for a king and senator. The matter will always remain in the realms of speculation, but the explanation has the virtue of being internally consistent."
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