Philo of Alexandria’s interpretation of the Jewish cultus

Prax, S.

How to cite:
Prax, S. (1972) Philo of Alexandria’s interpretation of the Jewish cultus, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10137/

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Abstract of Thesis Entitled:

Philo of Alexandria's Interpretation of the Jewish Cultus

Philo of Alexandria holds a significant place in the intellectual environment in which Christianity originated and an examination, therefore, of his thought is of value in appreciating the influences which affected the development of that religion. The aspect of his thought considered in this study is his treatment of the Jewish cultus. The two major English works on Philo published during this century are by H.A. Wolfson and E.R. Goodenough respectively. The former sees Philo primarily as a philosopher and says little of his cultic or mystical interest. Goodenough, however, maintains that Philo transformed the Jewish cultus into a Hellenistic mystery.

Turning to the writings of Philo, his treatment of various aspects of the cult are considered in turn, beginning with the Temple. From this it emerges that, on the one hand, he reads a spiritual meaning into the various parts of the Temple and, on the other, uses the Temple imagery to describe his personal mysticism. This twofold approach is also employed in his treatment of the remainder of the cult, namely the priesthood, sacrifice and the festivals.

It is important that the two methods used by Philo in handling cultic material be clearly distinguished from each other. The spiritualising of the cult is very different from the metaphorical use of cultic imagery to describe another type of religion and passages in which the latter method is being used are not indicative of Philo's attitude to the cult, a fact which Goodenough fails to appreciate. Contrary to Goodenough's view, Philo did not turn the Jewish cultus into a mystery, rather he held it in tension with his personal mysticism in a way which enabled him to remain a practising Jew while continuing his study of mystic philosophy.
PHILO of ALEXANDRIA'S INTERPRETATION

of the

JEWISH CULTUS

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
CONTENTS

Introduction
The Temple
The Priesthood
Sacrifice
The Festivals
Conclusions
Bibliography
Introduction

The environment in which Christianity originated and the influences which affected its earliest development are of a complexity which is made to appear more simple only by the incomplete nature of our knowledge concerning them. Yet such knowledge is obviously essential if we are to reach an understanding of the Christian religion appropriate to our own age. Unfortunately the literature of the opening years of the Christian era which is still extant is comparatively small in quantity and, for the most part, conjectures have to be made as to the conditions prevailing at the time from earlier or later documents. A study of these does reveal certain major factors.

Clearly Judaism as the parent religion is an important part of the background of Christianity but, since the period is poorly documented, the detailed character of the Judaism contemporary with Jesus Christ is often doubtful. The Rabbinic writings were only compiled much later and, while they certainly contain a great deal of older material, it is frequently difficult to assign an exact date to a particular piece of tradition. In general, however, Judaism was in a far from static condition. Religious and political ideals had mingled with each other and the evidence of Josephus points to widespread and intense eschatological expectations, which must have been encouraged by the apocalyptic writings of the preceding two hundred years or more and the desire for deliverance from Roman rule. These expectations found concrete expression in a number of Messianic pretenders who claimed to be able to bring about a new miracle of deliverance for Israel. A typical example is the Egyptian Jew, described by Josephus, who believed that the walls of Jerusalem would collapse at his command, as the walls of Jericho had done for Joshua. (Ant. XX 169-72. Wars II 261-3).

This was also a time when traditional institutions came under criticism, which even the Jerusalem Temple, the focal point of Jewish religion, did not escape. Certain sects objected to the low standard of purity maintained at the sanctuary and withdrew from participation in the cultus to their own communities, in which they practised a more spiritual form of worship. The enormous amount of publicity which has surrounded the discovery of documents belonging to certain of these sects has, perhaps, led to a disproportionate emphasis on their importance in the background of Christianity. However, considered along with the atmosphere of apocalyptic excitement which manifested itself in a number of "Messiahs", they give the impression that conditions were
favourable for the emergence of something revolutionary, not only in the political life of Jewry, but also in its religious life.

However, the forces of change affecting Judaism came not only from within but also from without. Classical Greek culture had undergone major changes since the time of Alexander the Great, when the empire built up by him brought Greek and Oriental culture into close contact and, out of this confrontation, grew the phenomenon which we term Hellenism. In the field of religion the two main features of Hellenism were philosophy and Oriental religion. The outstanding development in philosophy during this period was the emergence of the new philosophies of Epicurus and Zeno which sought to solve the problems created by the new world which Alexander had brought about. Since man no longer felt himself part of a group such as the πόλις an attempt had to be made to satisfy his need for individual happiness and this is the aim of these philosophies. By the beginning of the Christian era, Stoicism had become modified by assimilating on the one hand both popular and astral religion and a great deal of superstition, while on the other revived Platonism. This produced the Eclecticism which was the characteristic philosophy of the early Roman Empire.

This popular religion with which Stoicism came to terms had become increasingly oriental over the period in question. The popularity of the old Olympian deities waned and new deities, such as Serapis and Isis were adopted from abroad. The old gods had been very much associated with the city state and when this passed they tended to fade with it, whereas the mystery cults of these eastern deities, with their stress on salvation, catered for the needs of the new individualism which appeared.

It was, therefore, with this culture that Judaism was brought into contact, and out of this contact there developed a Hellenistic Judaism which is particularly important for the background of Christianity for, like the latter, it contained elements of Semitic and Greek thought and it was from Jews of this type that early Christianity drew the majority of its converts. The characteristics of this type of Judaism, compared with that which became typical of Palestine, were first, a much more liberal attitude to the gentiles as shown by the numbers of ἐκβολευον who became attached to the synagogues, secondly a readiness to enter into discussion with gentiles illustrated by the "Letter of Aristeas" which says they were "ready to hold free argument, to listen to the opinions of others and to consider thoroughly every question that might be raised", and thirdly a universalism which did not restrict salvation to Jews alone.
However, the difficulty in trying to determine the character of this Judaism is that most of the literature which it produced stems from Alexandria and it is a moot point exactly how typical this was of the rest of the Diaspora. Among this literature are such works as the "Letter of Aristeas" which purports to give an account of the translation of the Septuagint while its main aim is to justify Judaism to its gentile critics and even to convert them. The author says that the Jews worship the same god as the Greeks (Zeus) under another name (15-16, 19) which shows how far apologetic will often take a writer. Another work of the same milieu is the "Wisdom of Solomon" which also has a missionary intent, although not perhaps as overt as the previous work. The writer's aim is to deepen the faith of existing Jews and convince pagans of the foolishness of their idolatry and his language reflects the common notions of Platonism current at the time, such as the immortality of the soul. IV Maccabees also seems to have been written by an Alexandrian Jew about the beginning of our period, but this time the influence is more that of Stoic philosophy as seen in his main thesis that reason is stronger than the passions and which he illustrates with a number of rather gruesome examples.

It was works like these which prepared the way for the far more comprehensive synthesis of Greek and Jewish thought to be found in the writings of Philo of Alexandria. It can be seen from the above that Philo represents only part of an extremely varied and complicated situation which surrounded the origin of Christianity, and this must be borne in mind if his importance is not to be exaggerated. However, the study of Philo is particularly relevant to a study of Christian origins for the following reasons. First the sheer fact of chronological coincidence, for Philo was writing at exactly the time when Jesus was preaching in Palestine. Secondly he represented a type of thought, Hellenistic Judaism, which has quite clearly influenced New Testament writings and among whose adherents Christianity rapidly spread. Thirdly they both had the problem of interpreting the Old Testament in terms of a new situation, with Philo it was that created by Greek philosophy, while with the Christians it was that caused by the life and death of Jesus. Fourthly they are both in an apologetic situation in which, on the one hand, they are trying to say something intelligible of a Semitic religion to a Greek audience and, on the other, they are trying to justify that religion to the authorities. The use made of Philo's thought and exegetical methods by some of the Christian Fathers, such as Clement and Origen, is indicative of a special relationship existing between Christianity and Philo. The Fathers themselves certainly felt
this and Eusebius records the tradition that Philo met Peter in Rome. (Church Hist. 2.17). In fact it is extremely unlikely that this ever occurred, but the story is useful in illustrating the attitude of Christian scholars towards Philo.

Philo was a prolific writer and, because of the special interest taken in his works by Christians, a great number of them have survived. Clearly this renders impracticable in a study of this size, a consideration of his thought as a whole. However, one aspect of this which has not, perhaps, received all the attention it deserves in the many works in English and German over the last eighty years, is his interpretation of the Jewish cultus. This is particularly relevant to the study of Christian origins, since both Philo and the early Christians were in a similar position in relation to the cult. The position was that they were unable to participate in the cult at Jerusalem, Philo because he was too far away, and the Christians both for geographical reasons and also because many of them were not Jews. Moreover, they were both directing their missionary efforts toward people who also could not participate. Thus a student of early Christianity cannot but gain by discovering what Philo made of this subject.

Two important studies of Philo have been those by Goodenough and Wolfson who differ as to what they consider to be the overall character of Philo's thought. Goodenough is of the opinion that in Philo's writings Judaism is presented as the true mystery religion, the various stages of which are worked out and described by him. Wolfson, on the other hand, while admitting that Philo does use language borrowed from the mystery religions, believes that this is because these terms were in common use during the period, and because there were reasons why he could apply them in a special sense to an event, such as the covenant, but that they did not reflect the essential character of his thought, which was basically a religious philosophy.

We shall consider Goodenough's interpretation first. His main theme runs as follows. At an early stage the Jews in the Diaspora were greatly attracted towards the religion and thought of their gentile neighbours, but there were two factors which restrained them from expressing this attraction in certain ways. One was that since the time of the revival

1 By Light, Light (The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism) - Yale University Press 1935
2 Philo. Harvard University Press 1947
under Ezra, the cult had not been open to innovation, so Jews could not borrow the rites of the gentile cults. The other was that a Jew could not become an initiate of a gentile religion such as that of Isis and Osiris, and at the same time remain a loyal Jew. These facts partly explain what did happen to Judaism in parts of the Diaspora, which was that it was transformed itself into the true Mystery. Thus one could be a good Jew and yet enjoy the benefits of the mystery religions.

Goodenough admits that it is impossible to trace the stages of this development but he believes that it was a reasonably long process of which, in some ways Philo is the culmination, as well as the most extended source for this kind of Judaism. However, Goodenough asserts that Moses had become identified with Orpheus and Hermes-Tat two centuries before Philo was writing and his method is to examine the character of "mystic Judaism" as revealed in the writings of Philo and then to work back from there, picking out the features of it which other writers displayed in a more fragmentary form. In Philo, he says, the way to God fell into two stages. The first of these was an approach to God through the unwritten law and logos or Sophia and was dissociated from any contact with material things, while the second approached God through those of his Powers which could be represented in the material world, that is the way of the written Law. The latter was for Philo an inferior way, but could serve as an introduction to the higher one. The kind of distinction which existed between these stages was often expressed during this period as two successive initiations within a single Mystery and thus Goodenough quotes the passages in which Philo speaks of a "Lesser" and "Greater" Mystery, e.g. Initiation under Moses is into the "Greater" Mysteries in Cher.49 and initiation into the "Lesser" before the "Greater" Mysteries in Sac.62.

Goodenough deals first with the lower way which he terms the "Mystery of Aaron" since it draws its symbolism from the cultus of the outer shrine, presided over by the Aaronic High Priest. Philo gives three main accounts of this mystery in Vita Mosis, the Exposition and Quaestiones in Exodum. The passages deal mainly with the symbolism of the tabernacle and the robes of the priest and the significance attached to them. The overall character of this symbolism is cosmic and the mystery of Aaron is predominantly a cosmic mystery, its aim being to unite the worshipper with the whole cosmos in the worship of God. Some examples of the symbolism illustrate this. For instance, the altar of incense, claims Goodenough, represents the gratitude of earth and water
(Mos.ii 101) and the seven branched candlestick represents the heaven (Mos.ii 105). Goodenough then continues with Philo’s description and explanation of the High Priest’s regalia (Mos.ii 109-116) which is said to represent the cosmos. The function of the priesthood is indicated by reference to the symbolism of his robes and it is clear that, as might be expected in a cosmic temple, it is a cosmic priesthood. The High Priest’s robes represent the four elements and his mantle the heavens so that when the priest is conducting the ritual, the whole of the cosmos is represented and worships with him. (Mos.ii 133-135). However, this mystery is still part of literal Judaism and therefore not for gentiles for whom Philo has described the mystery twice in De vita Mos. and Spec., but does not invite them to share in it.

Goodenough then goes on to trace the parallels between Philo’s mystery of Aaron, the Hermetica and Plutarch. He finds passages which he describes as striking parallels. In Poimandres 24-26a the mystic hymns the Father accompanied by the stars, which is like the end of Philo’s mystery. In Plutarch’s De Iside Chap.77 p.383c he quotes the passage describing the robes of Isis and Osiris. The conclusion he reaches is that Hellenistic Judaism has drawn into Jewish worship in the mystery of Aaron, thought from the tradition of Isis and the Hermetica. This cosmic interpretation of the cult was not an innovation by Philo, as is shown by the passage in Wisdom of Solomon XVIII 24:

Επί μόρ πολίτευος ἐνδύματος ἤν ὅλος ὁ κόσμος.

Having dealt with the lower way, Goodenough then expounds Philo’s description of the higher way which he calls the "Mystery of Moses". The goal of this mystery, rather than being a union with the cosmos, was a flight beyond it to a direct experience of God τὸ ὄν, and it was this kind of experience which was attributed to Moses, the Self Taught. He finally achieved the vision of the unseen nature, ἡ ἀεικὴς φύσις although it was impossible for him to actually see God. This experience gave him his unique position as hierophant of Israel. The objective symbolism of the greater mystery is drawn from the Holy of Holies, the cult of which was no part of the regular function of the priesthood. The High Priest alone entered it once a year and then he was so blinded by incense that he could not see anything. Also for this occasion he wore only a white robe as opposed to his normal more ornate ones which we saw above were invested with a cosmic significance. The ark which had been in the Holy of Holies, although it had been lost for centuries by Philo’s day, represented for him God and his powers, and so much symbolism was very suitable to represent the approach of the individual
soul, having abandoned material things, to the invisible God. According to Goodenough it is this mystery to which Philo wanted to attract gentiles, since to participate in the mystery of Aaron meant that one had to become a literal Jew and Philo was not interested in making converts of this type.

However, it was not only in terms of the cult that Philo described this mystery, for he also used the stories of the patriarchs to illustrate the progress of the soul along this way to God. He allegorises such incidents as Noah coming out of the ark, to represent him coming out of the body, and Abraham's relation with Sarah to represent his union with Sophia (Abr.100-102). In addition to the patriarchs the cities of refuge are schematized by Philo to represent the Powers of God, three on this side of the river in the material world and three on the other. The soul moves from one to the other towards the Logos. Thus Goodenough detects an underlying unity in Philo's presentation of this mystery - the scheme remains similar whether he is describing it in terms of the cult, or the patriarchs or the cities.

In all this Philo is not, in Goodenough's opinion, merely giving a mystic interpretation of Scripture, he is referring to a definite type of Jewish cultus. He supports this view by citing the frequent use of cultic language by Philo such as robes, secret doctrines, initiations and sacred food. He then quotes two fragments of Philo from Harris. One refers to not revealing the "ἐκεινὴ μυστήρια" to the "ἄνθρωπον" (Harris p. 69). The other to "τραπέζης μεταλαβόντες ἐκεῖνη" (Harris p. 69).

These are used by Goodenough to support his contention that there lies behind these passages an actual cultus. He admits that figurative language from the mysteries had been in use since Plato's time to describe a philosophic mysticism, but says that these references seem to go beyond the figurative. This was Judaism turned into a mystery that rivalled the pagan mysteries. In a later work "Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period" Goodenough goes further in speculating as to the details of this cultus and suggests that the participants wore white robes and perhaps burnt incense as part of their ritual.

Thus Goodenough holds that in Philo Judaism is revealed as having been transformed into a mystic philosophy, which ultimately had as its sources Orpheus, Isis and Iran as these were interpreted by the mystic philosophers of Greek background. This Judaism was so completely paganised that it can best be described as Hellenism presented in Jewish symbols and allegories, of which a large number, but not all, were drawn
from the cult. The publications by Goodenough, which are cited above, are the only detailed examinations of the cultic passages in Philo to be produced in English. They are therefore referred to in the following pages a great deal more frequently than works by other authors which only touch briefly on this aspect of Philo.

Such a work is that by Wolfson, who takes a rather different line from Goodenough. He sees Philo primarily as a philosopher and tends to ignore the mystic element in his writings, holding that he marks a conflation on the one side of Greek rationalism and, on the other, of "native Judaism". All Hellenistic mystic philosophy he dates as later than Philo and, therefore, irrelevant in a discussion of his writings but, in spite of the fact that most rabbinic material can only certainly be dated to a time much later than Philo, he finds no difficulty in positing this material as Philo's source, where a parallel is found.

Because of his primarily philosophical approach, Wolfson does not have much to say concerning Philo and the cult, an aspect of his thought closely related to his mysticism. However, he does give a brief treatment of Philo's use of the language of the mystery religions. He writes, "Now if Philo does happen to use terms and expressions borrowed, for instance, ......from the vocabulary of Greek mysteries, it does not necessarily mean that his philosophy......was really not a philosophy at all but a mystery". Wolfson believes that Philo used these terms in the same way that he used terms from popular religion and mythology, because they were parts of common speech. He explains what he thinks Philo means by the "mysteries" and produces a scheme of what the lesser and greater mysteries implied, gathering together a variety of passages. He says that there are two distinct features belonging to each mystery. First under the heading of the lesser is the taming of the passions and the passing to the life of virtue, and second is the knowledge of God indirectly from his actions or created things. Under the greater mysteries are included, first, the knowledge that there is a virtue which comes straight from God, a guidance to righteous conduct which comes directly by revelation and, second, the direct knowledge of God "apart from his powers".

Thus, summing up, he says that by those who have been initiated into the mysteries, Philo means "men of good native ability and proper education who have succeeded in mastering their passions and in acquiring a true knowledge of the existence and nature of God".(I.49) The reasons for which he calls them mysteries are as follows. First because the true meaning of them is hidden in scripture and has to be
drawn out of it by allegory and, second, as a challenge to the heathen mysteries. However, they are not actually mysteries, but Philo merely makes a comparison between them and the covenant of Israel and God. The use of this language does not reflect the essential character of his religion, but reflects more the language of the literature of his time.

So much for Wolfson's evaluation of the mystery language in Philo, which he does not associate in any way with the cult. When Wolfson does deal with the cult it is to show that Philo owes his thought on this subject directly to "native Judaism". He describes Philo's attitude toward the relation between sacrifice and prayer, significantly enough treating it merely incidentally under a chapter headed "Ethical Theory" and begins his account with the words, "Essentially Jewish is also Philo's attitude toward the relation between sacrifice and prayer", He says that, at the time of Philo, Jews participated in two forms of worship, sacrifice, both vicariously by the Temple tax and personally by journeying to Jerusalem at the festivals, and organised prayer. Philo shared in both these as is shown by the reference to his pilgrimage to Jerusalem (De Provid.2.64). His statements about sacrifice are in common with what Jewish tradition was also saying about them, both stressing that the outward act must be accompanied by a worthy intention. For instance, he parallels Philo, "God does not rejoice in sacrifices even if one offers hectacombs..." (Spec.I.271) with Micah, "Will the Lord be pleased with thousand of rams?" (6.7). He also quotes Spec.I.272. "And indeed, though the worshippers bring nothing else, in bringing themselves they offer the best sacrifices, the full and truly perfect oblation of noble living, honoring God, their Benefactor and Saviour, with hymns and thanksgivings".

This he compares with Hosea 14.3 "We will render for bullocks the offering of our lips" and also with the later views of rabbis after the fall of the Temple, who taught that prayer is a substitute for sacrifice, (Tanhuma Korah,12). However, Wolfson rejects Heinemann's view that Philo thought animal sacrifices were not necessary and that the only true offering was the piety of a God-loving soul. He says that Philo accepted sacrifice as a legitimate form of worship, as long as it was accompanied by right motive and conduct and that, in this, Philo reflected traditional Jewish views.

This is really the extent of Wolfson's treatment of the cult, but there is an incidental reference to the High Priest when he is dealing with the Logos, but not in his cultic setting. He says that the High Priest represents both the incorporeal Logos of the intelligible world.
and the immanent Logos in the visible world, as is shown by the passage which says that his holy vesture has a variegated beauty derived from powers belonging, some to the realm of pure intellect, some to that of sense perception (Migr.18.102). The latter refers to that cosmic symbolism of which Goodenough makes so much and, while this passage in Wolfson adds little to our understanding of this symbolism, its very brevity shows how different his treatment is from that of Goodenough.

Reviewers of Wolfson have generally deplored his omission of the mystical elements in Philo, but the remedy for this does not necessarily mean that one has to adopt a position such as Goodenough's. Indeed, Wilfred Knox applauds Wolfson's rejection of the latter's attempts to read a Jewish mystery into Philo and considers this to be one of the best parts of his book. (JTS vol.49).
We shall now go on to examine those passages of Philo which deal with the cultus, in an effort to determine his interpretation of it. One aspect of the cult will be examined at a time, beginning with the Temple in general and its furnishings, and then the priesthood, sacrifice and finally, the festivals.

First, therefore, the Temple. The Jewish Temple at Jerusalem was, in many ways, a symbol of the common faith which united Jews dispersed as they were throughout the Mediterranean countries. In Flacc. 46 Philo is trying to make the point that Jews are good citizens of the places where they have settled, in spite of the fact that they still retain a sense of loyalty to Jerusalem:

The fact that such a piece of apology is needed indicates the degree to which Jewish loyalties remained centred on the fatherland. Thus the Temple was a great national and a great spiritual shrine, whose prestige was enhanced by both political and religious aspirations, and these two factors combined to produce the kind of fervour centring on the Temple that is seen, for instance, during the Maccabaean revolt.

Officially, it was the only sanctuary of Judaism and the only place where sacrifice could be offered. Hence Jews from all over the Diaspora made pilgrimage to Jerusalem, particularly at the great festivals of Passover, Weeks and Tabernacles, to take part in the worship. However, such a journey was both costly and long, and there must have been many Jews of the Dispersion who had never been to Jerusalem and whose only participation in the life of the Temple was contributing the half shekel tax. This tax was levied on all Jewish men over the age of twenty and also on freed slaves and proselytes and was used for the upkeep of the Temple and its services. It was collected annually in the month of Adar (Shekalim : I. 3.) by the local communities and then sent up to Jerusalem by means of specially selected envoys. Philo refers to this custom in a number of places: e.g. Explaining what men did in synagogues: -

Also:

However, in spite of this seeming solidarity of Jews all over the Diaspora in their support of the Temple, and in spite of the magnificence
of its cultus, the period in question can be seen as one of decline for the Temple. Certainly there were many forces at work which tended to undermine its position. In the eyes of many in Palestine, the Temple was discredited by the worldliness of the priests and the political machinations involved in obtaining the High Priesthood. This question of the behaviour of the priests seems to have been a major factor in causing the schism of the sectarians whose writings are known to us as the "Dead Sea Scrolls". For instance, the author of the Habakkuk Commentary would seem to hold the institution of the Temple in high esteem, but to be very concerned about the impurity of the priesthood. He denounces the "Wicked Priest", who is said to have forsaken God and betrayed the precepts for the sake of riches, (VIII), and the author is obviously concerned about the fate of the sanctuary. However, the action of the "Wicked Priest" has rendered it unclean, ".....Jerusalem where the Wicked Priest committed abominable deeds and defiled the Temple of God". (XII).

The Essenes, too, worshipped separately from the Temple, but sent votive offerings to the sanctuary, a fact which would tend to indicate that they did not reject it on principle. (For this see Josephus, Ant.XVIII 19, εἰς δὲ τὸ Ἑιρον ἄνωθεν αὐτῶν ἐστάλη χρὴστευτες.....). The overall picture, therefore, is one of regard for the Temple as an institution among these people, but also a feeling of inability to participate in a cult which, to them, was impure. Such schisms could not but weaken the position of the Temple.

For Jews in the Diaspora, however, there were different problems with regard to the Temple. They did not visit Jerusalem often enough or for long enough to be aware of the corruption below the surface, but their very distance from the sanctuary was bound to place a strain on their ties with it. The question arises of whether the temple at Leontopolis, founded by Onias IV about 170 B.C. can be seen as an attempt to relieve this isolation from the cult by providing a shrine more accessible to Egyptian Jews. The motives attributed to Onias by Josephus, (Ant.XIII.62-73), are purely personal, namely his desire to secure a reputation, but the latter's account is naturally hostile and consequently too much weight cannot be given to it. No matter what Onias' intentions were, however, Leontopolis did not become a centre for Egyptian Jewry, the focal point of which remained at Alexandria. It was thus never a potent threat to the Jerusalem Temple, but rather an illustration of how developments could take place in the Diaspora, over which the central authorities had no control.
A stronger threat to the position of the Temple was the existence of the synagogues. By this time they were well established and provided, for the majority of Jews, their main place of worship. So thoroughly had they permeated Jewish religious life, that there may even have been one within the Temple itself, to which the priests went during the course of the sacrificial offering, to recite the Shema and Benedictions. In the Diaspora, so far from the Temple, the synagogue was able to achieve an even more dominant position and it is probable that the term "יִשְׂרָאתָא" was used of synagogues. The daily services of the synagogue corresponded to the daily offering in the Temple and, in such a situation, these could not fail to be seen as, in some sense, a substitute for the actual sacrifice. More of this, however, in the section dealing with sacrifice. Here it is sufficient to note that the existence of the synagogue provided a rival to the Temple for people's loyalties. In Legat.191 Philo states that the synagogues are of lesser importance than the Temple: הָלַחְתָּא סְדֶעֳרַמְכָא נָנֶעֳרַמְכָא לְמַלְכָא פֳּרְיַפֶּשֶעֳרַמְכָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא פְּרְיַפֶּשֶעֳרַמְכָא לְמַלְכָא פֳּרְיַפֶּשֶעֳרַמְכָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא פְּרְיַפֶּשֶעֳרַמְכָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא מְנָרָא. But he does think of them as being capable of being defamed. Thus they are for him places of the מַלְכָא הָלַחְתָּא that is of the presence of God. This presence had been specially associated with the Tabernacle, then the Temple and later was extended to include synagogues. Thus, a third century saying, attributed to R.Isaac, reads, "Whence do we learn that God is found in the synagogue? Because it is said, "God standeth in the congregation of God" " (Berakot,6a).

A telling indication of the actual place held by the Temple in the Judaism of this period is the mere fact that the latter was able to survive its destruction. Clearly the Temple was far from being the sine qua non of Judaism by this date, and the inference could be made that the real emphasis had come to lie with the rabbis and the law, even before the Temple was destroyed.

In addition to the forces within Judaism which tended to undermine the prestige of the Temple, there was in the Hellenistic world a general background of questioning of the validity of "יִשְׂרָאתָא חֶסְרוּפְויְיָּא" which is particularly important when studying the attitude of a Jew of the Dispersion, who would be exposed to the influence of such ideas. The ideas referred to can be traced back to Plato, who was followed by Zeno in saying that, in the Golden Age, there had been no temples made with hands, for hands can never make a house worthy of divinity. Plutarch also
questioned hand made images and, while he is a writer later than Philo, he is thought to embody traditions which are representative of the Hellenistic background of Philo's time.

An interesting passage occurs in the Sibylline oracles, the Jewish author of which says, "Happy shall those men be throughout the earth who . . . when they see them, shall disown all temples and altars, vain erections of senseless stones befouled with constant blood of living things and sacrifices of four footed beasts." (IV 24-30) The value of this passage in providing a background for Philo must be tempered by saying that it is normally dated at some time after A.D. 79, and thus not only considerably later than Philo but also after the destruction of the Temple, at a time when perhaps a Jew could afford to be more scathing about temples, although this was by no means a representative reaction.

Acts 7.48 is also cited as an interesting parallel where Stephen, who seems to represent Hellenistic views, attacks the temple "made with hands", ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ὑψιστός εἰς κηρυπολίτως κατοικεῖ.

When dealing with this point of the Hellenistic questioning of temples, Sowers (p. 55) also quotes Cicero De Republica III.14 to show the attitude of Xerxes to temples.

"deinde Graeciae, sicut apud nos, delubra magnifica humanis consecrata simulacris, quae Persae nefaria putaverunt eamque unam ob causam Xerxes inflammari Atheniensium fana iussisse dicitur, quod deos, quorum domus esset omnis hic mundus, inclusos parietibus contineri nefas esse duceret."

True, this does illustrate the view of a fifth century Persian but this seems hardly relevant to that of a Hellenistic Greek. In fact it would seem that the attitude of Cicero himself would be of more value in filling in the background against which Philo flourished, and this is something with which Sowers does not deal. Cicero, of course, disagrees completely with the Persian view, as he says,

"Delubra esse in urbisibus censeo, nec sequor magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasset templo Graeciae dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domus." (De Leg. II 26).
Thus Cicero definitely supports the existence of temples..."ut augerent pietatem in deos......"

However, in spite of the reservations one must have about the above passages, there does remain sufficient evidence to indicate that a questioning of the validity of temples "made with hands" was a part of Hellenistic thought. Moreover it is possible to detect in Philo echoes of these sentiments which he preserves.

Thus Cicero definitely supports the existence of temples..."ut augerent pietatem in deos......"

However, in spite of the reservations one must have about the above passages, there does remain sufficient evidence to indicate that a questioning of the validity of temples "made with hands" was a part of Hellenistic thought. Moreover it is possible to detect in Philo echoes of these sentiments which he preserves.

He goes on to say that, even if the whole earth were turned to gold or something more precious than gold, there would be no place where God's feet could tread. Taken by itself this passage would appear to be a straight indictment of the Jerusalem Temple and an affirmation that God is not to be worshipped in a temple made by man. However, just previous to this statement, in Cher. 92, Philo has been bitterly attacking the pagan worship of the gentiles, describing how they go impurely to the altar and indulge their sensual appetites during the festivals. The denunciation of temples which is quoted above follows on from this description and one feels that here is a case where Philo is carried along by his argument, for it certainly follows that, if temple worship is as debased as this, then it is not worthy of God. It must be noted though that the temples of which he was speaking were pagan ones, and so this passage in its context, is not a direct criticism of the Jerusalem Temple, although it is couched in such terms as would necessarily include the latter. As will be seen in other contexts, though, consistency is not one of Philo's characteristics and it may well be that in his own mind he never applied this to the Jewish Temple, the argument here being completely self-contained.

A passage which does something to undermine this sweeping condemnation of temples is to be found in Cher. 94. Here the pagan celebrants of festivals, whom he is criticising are charged with debasing temple worship: καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἐως οἰκίαις ἡ χαρίας βεβήλωσιν ἀθηναίων ὑπόττον ἀμαρτότατον καὶ δοκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἁπέρ τυχωνον καὶ τῶν ἄγνωστων προσπέλασα βιάζονται. Τὰ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκει πάντα τοῦ ἔργου ἐργαζόμενον, ὥσε ἀπεργάσεται ὁ παρὰ ἀμώνερος, ἵσταται ἄθωτα, εὐκρατεῖ, ἰστελεῖ, ἀμυντεῖ, μυχεῖ, ἀφορίζεται τελεῖται, κόμισιν εὐσέβεσιν, κεκτηθείς ἐστίν ἔστησα, ἁμέναν, ἀθυρμον, κατέργασεται, ἀλήθεαι, βιολοχως ἔργαρτικω Θεοῦ.
So here, far from denouncing temples in principle, he implies that they are basically good, "holy" and "most sacred", and it is only the people who use them who have corrupted them. This is remarkable when one considers that these are pagan temples of which he is talking, and also calls to mind the denunciation of all temples a few paragraphs later. Some explanation, therefore, of this inconsistency ought at least to be hazarded. The first point to note is that, in this passage, it is Philo the Hellenist who is dominant. There is no mention of Judaism and these sentiments might almost have been written by a pagan philosopher. Indeed, it may well be, that Philo is here repeating well known arguments which he has culled from various sources and has not bothered to harmonise.

With regard to his seemingly high opinion of pagan temples, it can be said that in Cher.91-4 his main purpose is an ethical one, that is to condemn the immorality of pagan festivals, and the charge that they desecrated holy temples may be brought in, as it were, as another stick with which to beat them and to show up their guilt even more clearly. Having done this, the point of his argument seems to change as he introduces the idea that God is apprehended, not by the senses, but by the mind, he is "ὁ ἴδωτες Θεός" (97) Once this idea is introduced he proceeds to develop it in a vivid fashion and it is in the course of this development that the first passage which we quoted, condemning all temples, occurs. Thus a possible explanation of the inconsistency which we noted may be that Philo is developing two ideas in juxtaposition which, in fact, are different in character, one primarily ethical, the other metaphysical.

Another passage in which Philo deprecates temples is Immut.8:

καὶ τὸ μὲν ζηρὸν Ὀσω καὶ ἔγλυπα ἀφύκου τῆς ἔλεγη πεποίηται.....

The context here is that sacrifice and the contrast is between the externals of the offering and the reality of it, which is the approach of the soul to God. Philo's argument is that, if one has to purify one's body to go into a temple, how much more ought one to purify one's soul before approaching God.* This passage will be discussed again in the treatment of

*Philo may here merely be repeating a philosophic commonplace.

cf. Epictetus, Discourses II.8.14: καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἄνα ταλαίπωρον τε λοιπῶν πολέμων ὡς πολέμους. Αὐτῷ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ παρόντος ἐσώθη καὶ εὑρήσατο πάντα καὶ ἐπεκύωσε οὐκ ἀρέσκατον εἰς ὑμήμενον καὶ τοιούτος ἔκαθεν ἐν ἁπάντων, ἀλλὰ οὕτως τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ Ἰσχολότε.
sacrifice, but in this context it is sufficient to note that Philo implies that the externals, in this case the actual temple itself, are of less importance than the inner meaning of the worship. The fact that he uses the plural, "τὰ ἱερὰ" means that he is thinking primarily of pagan temples, but there is no reason why the Jerusalem one should not be included among them, since what he says here is not very different from the prophetic denunciation of unrighteous sacrificers.

Philo's attitude to the temple is illustrated also in Sobr. 63. Here he is commenting on Gen. 9.27 where Noah prays "κατοικεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς οίκοις τοῦ Σήμη (Ibid. 59), and one suggestion is that this refers to God. However, Philo continues, κατοικεῖ ἐν ὁλίγοις λέγεται ὁ Θεὸς ὕψω ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ - περὶ ἐκείνης τῆς προσκύνησις περιπετείων - ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς καὶ ἐπιμελέσθη οὐτος τὸν καθιστήνος πολούμενος. This is not really an attack on the Temple but rather the avoidance of an anthropomorphism which would make God actually dwell in a man-made house. The Temple was thought of as in some way the "House of God", I Kings 8.13 and Philo does not want to deny that he is present in it, so he produces this idea of God caring for a particular place, the implication of which is that God is present there in a special way. The tension between the transcendence and the immanence of God was very much felt by Judaism and an effort was made at a comparatively early date to deal with this. The Deuteronomic redactor of Kings poses the problem in the prayer he ascribes to Solomon, "But is God really to dwell with men on earth? The heavens, even the highest heavens cannot contain Him, much less this house which I have built" I Kgs. 8.27. But he also answers it by saying that the faithful pray in the Temple and are heard by Yahweh in heaven. It is His "Name" which dwells in the Temple, I Kgs. 8.17. The final development was that of the "Shekinah", the dwelling, which expressed the gracious presence of God without detracting from his transcendence. Thus what Philo says is not very different from the solution already reached by Judaism, and this passage cannot be used to indicate that Philo did not believe in the divine presence in the Temple.

We have now examined three passages which have been used to support the view that Philo deprecated the institution of a temple, but only in one, Cher. 99, have we found a categorical denunciation of temples and here we have suggested that he is influenced by the metaphysical point which he has introduced and may well be repeating a commonplace philosophical argument. It would be foolish, however, to pretend that Philo is consistent on this point, and all we would wish to say at this juncture is that it is necessary to have reservations about any view which would
claim that Philo was against temples on principle, particularly when
one reads in Prov.II.64 that Philo went up to Jerusalem εἰς τὸ
πατρίδος Ἱερὸν . . . ἐνύξινας Τὸ καὶ Θόου . . .
The grief of Philo as portrayed in the Legatio when he learns that Gaius
has desecrated it, is also cited to show the high regard in which he held
the Temple: ἐπεὶτα συνκλεθένσις πάντες Ἰαβών ἱδίας ἐοῦ
καὶ κοιλὸς Τύχαι ἠθησώμεθα. Leg.190.
This has some value, but must be treated with caution, for this is not a
theological work, nor an unbiased account of what happened at Rome but a
political tract and he could very well here be allowing his political
purpose to control his religious convictions. More conclusive, however,
in determining Philo's attitude to the Temple is Spec.Leg.I.67ff:

τὸ δὲ χειρόκμητον ἔδει γὰρ ὃμαι Ἰαβών μὴ ἀνακόψα
φορᾶς τὰς εἰς ἐνεβίειαν ὑπελοίματι.

The reason Philo gives here for having a temple made with hands is
not very different from the one given by Cicero which was quoted above,
namely that it was "ut augerent pietatem in deos" (De Leg.II26). Their
interests, however, are rather different since, while for Philo piety has
a value in itself, for Cicero it is merely an attitude which is useful to
States in the sphere of politics.

Although Philo's attitude to the Temple is here in favour of it, yet
the word he uses to describe it, χειρόκμητος has a pejorative implication
in it in three other places where Philo uses it of idols as follows,
. . . χειρόκμητος οὔ δέεσται ἑκατὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Θεὸς . . . (Post.166)
πασὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀντιμῶν ἑστὶ τὰ φίλησις ἄρει πρὸς θερμήνειαν τετράθης τῶν
χειρόκμητων. (De Dec.76).

τότε, Γαλικά δέησαν, τὸ ἱερὸν χειρόκμητον οὐδεμίαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεργὰ
παρασεβάζοντο . . . . (Leg.290).

cf. also Plutarch's use of the word with regard to idols De tranq.animi 477
quoted above.

However, in Mos.II.88 the closely associated word χειροποιητὸς is
used of the Temple without any hint of criticism of it, but here it is used
in a context which is dealing with the cosmic symbolism of the Temple and a
parallelism is drawn between God's creation of the All (τὸ ὅλον . . .) and man's
building of the Temple. So man's creation of a sanctuary "made with hands"
has a strong, implied justification in this case, which is not present in
Spec.Leg. I.67 where Philo is writing in an apologetic tone in answer to
what appear to be two charges. One is against the existence of a "ἰερὸν
χειρόκμητον " at all, which he justifies but he is not talking about
temples in general as is shown by what follows:

Προσωπεύει δ' οίς οὔτε πολλάκιον οὔτ' εἰς ταύτα πολλά
κατακεκυκλωμένης ἐκαλέσας ἕπειτα οἵς ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς,
καὶ ἱερὸν ἐν εἰκαὶ μόνον.

Here it is made clear that he is referring only to the Jerusalem Temple and not defending all temples. This in fact constitutes the answer to the other charge which appears to have been that by only having one temple the Jews restricted God to one place. The answer to this is the reference to God as One in the passage above, and in 68 the fact that because people have to come from all over the world the sincerity of their piety is tested. The reason why this particular kind of approach is employed in this passage can perhaps be found in the intended audience of the work of which this is part. According to Goodenough's analysis the Spec.Leg. forms part of the "Exposition of the Law" which was intended for friendly gentiles. Thus what Philo is attempting is an explanation and apology for Judaism and its institutions, and this accounts for the straightforward, comparatively unphilosophical method. He is not here trying to read a significance into the Temple and its cultus for the sake of Jews who worship there, but merely to defend Judaism on a rational level. Hence, in spite of the fact that he mentions the Κόσμος as a temple in Spec.Leg.1.66 he does not make any allusion in 67 to the cosmic symbolism of the temple, of which he makes so much elsewhere, although as we noted above the parallel between God creating the world and man the Temple could be seen as providing a justification of the Temple's existence.

To summarise briefly so far, there have been discerned in Philo:
A denunciation of all temples, in a context which is concerned with pagan ones and therefore probably referring mainly to them, Cher.99.
A more positive assessment of pagan temples in that they can be profaned, Cher.94.

What has not been discovered is an explicit criticism of the Jerusalem Temple. However, the exact position the material temple held in Philo's thought cannot be judged on his explicit statements alone, but must take into consideration the implications of his other concepts. When this is done, the evaluation of his attitude to the Temple has to be qualified in the light of his use of Temple imagery to describe the rational mind and the Κόσμος.

In two passages the means by which the soul becomes the temple of
God is seen as a two way process, in which on the one hand, the soul must purify itself and thus make itself worthy, and on the other, God graciously grants his presence. Thus QE II.51:

"For if, O mind, thou dost not prepare thyself of thyself, excising desires, pleasures, griefs, fears, follies, injustices and related evils, and dost not change and adapt thyself to the vision of holiness, thou wilt end thy life in blindness, unable to see the intelligible sun. If, however, thou art worthily initiated and canst be consecrated to God and in a certain sense become an animate shrine of the Father, (then) instead of having closed eyes, thou wilt see the First (Cause)...."

This kind of ethical exhortation occurs again in Somn.I.149:

There is an interesting parallel here with regard to the character of God's indwelling between this passage and that in which he describes God's presence in the actual Temple, Sobr.63, quoted above. There, as here, the indwelling is not a spatial one but takes the form of God caring for a particular object, in one case the locus of the Temple, in the other an individual soul.

The next passage does not actually describe the soul as the "temple" of God in so many words but does describe it as his "house" and this was a common designation for the Temple as noted above.

This accords a high place to the soul as temple and definitely attributes to it by implication a greater importance than the material Temple at Jerusalem. The same kind of thought is repeated in Virt.188:

Thus from these passages it would seem that, for Philo, the most suitable, particular place for God to dwell on earth is a purified, rational soul.

With regard to the cosmos as the temple of God, in QE II.51, commenting on Ex.25.7, "Thou shalt make me a sanctuary and I shall appear among you", Philo says that the deeper meaning of this is that "God always appears in His work, which is most sacred; by this I mean the world". In the course
of amplifying this statement it is clear that, as with the presence of
God in the soul, this is not an ontological indwelling but is an
appearance graciously granted by God as a result of his beneficence.
However, this remains a very positive evaluation of the material world.

In two other passages, on the other hand, this world is contrasted
with the immaterial world and takes up a secondary position: τὴν δὲ
ἀπεικόνισιν δεικτεῖ τὴν παρατηρεῖν περίτεχνον τὸ ἀγὼντος. δύο γὰρ
ἐνοικεῖ ὑπερήφανον, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν ὄρον, τὸ δὲ ἀνέβησθος. ἀνέβησθος μὲν
οὐ, φύσεως ὁ κόσμος οὐτῶς ἀρατώτως ἵνα ἀνθρώπος ὁ Ἰσαάκ ἄνανθηκός τὸ
παράθεσεν ἔστιν.

(Heb. 75).

Here the immaterial world constitutes a "holier" sanctuary than the
material one. In the other passage Philo is commenting on Ex.15.17f and
says, ὁ τῶν κόσμων ἀγώνιστος ἂν ἄνεβησθος ὅπως ἐν τῇ θεοφανείᾳ ἀπειρόμενος κατεργάσθη
καὶ ἐν ἐνέστησιν ἔπεσε, ὁ ἄνεβησθαὶ τὰς τις ἐν ἐνεστήσιν ἐπαύλησεν.

There is an interesting passage in Plant.126 which illustrates, if
anything, Philo's inconsistency, since he writes, — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνεστήσας
ὁ κόσμος ἐρειν ἀδιάφραστο ἂν γένοιτο πρὸς τὴν θεοφανείαν —
Clearly his thought is often governed by ad hoc considerations, and this
is exactly what appears to have occurred here. He is saying how one cannot
honour God with buildings and outward rites and, carried along by the vein
of his argument, he goes on to write the passage quoted above. In many ways
this would seem to be the language of devotion and is to be distinguished
from the more philosophical passages in which he speaks of the "κόσμος"
as a temple. This latter idea is found also in Plutarch, De Tranq. Animi 47ff.

ιερὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀγὼντον ὁ κόσμος ἔστι .......

A characteristic of the passages noted above, in which Philo sees the
soul and the "κόσμος " as temples, is that, although cultic language is
employed, the cult is not in fact the focus of attention. His main purpose
is to describe God's immanence in both the individual and in creation, and
he does this by using the concept of the Temple. Such a usage is, perhaps,
best defined as metaphor, in that it applies a name to an object to which
it is not literally applicable. Thus the soul is not literally a temple
nor is the "κόσμος " although Philo describes them in these terms.

So far we have detected three "temples" in Philo, the "κόσμος " the
"νοῦς " and the Jerusalem Temple itself and in one passage they are all
spoken of together, from which we can gain some idea of the relation they
hold one to another: δύο γὰρ ὁς ἐνοικεῖ, ἐφάνερθε δὲ ἐν μὲν ὅσε ὁ κόσμος, ἐν
ἀνεβησθαὶ ἄνεβησθαὶ τὸ πρωτόγονος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἔτερον δὲ λογικὴ ὕποψιν,
ὁ χρήσις ὁ πρὸς αὐθεντικὸς ἀνθρώπου, ὁ μίμημα αἰείθατον ὁ τὰς πνευμάτων
εὑρίσκει καὶ θεωρεῖ ἐπιτελεῖν ἔστιν .......

(Somm. Ι. 215).
This section is obviously of considerable importance in determining Philo's view of the High Priest, and this will be considered below, but what should be noticed here is the status of the Jerusalem Temple in relation to the mental "temples" of the "κόσμος " and "λογική γυνη ". The High Priest of the Jerusalem Temple is the "outward and visible image" of the "real Man" who is the High Priest of the rational soul and thus, by implication, the Jerusalem Temple is a "μίμημα ἀισθητοῦ " of the rational soul. According to the Platonic theory of matter which Philo held, the Jerusalem Temple is thus a copy, the archetype of which is the human soul. The relationship is, however, not a simple dual one, since it is complicated by a third term, the "κόσμος ". This is given the highest position of all in Spec.Leg.1.66: Τὸ μὲν ἀναστέω καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἱέρων Θεοῦ λοιπὸν τὸν δυνατὰς κρήνα κόσμου εἶναι . . . .

Thus the "κόσμος ", is the archetype of the human soul as Philo explicitly states in Opif.82: . . . .ο Θεός . . . . ἀρχή μὲν ὑμνωμέν ἵππος, τέλος δὲ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ μὲν τῶν ἐστὶν ἀισθητῶν ἐφάρμοσεν τελείωτας τοῦ δὲ τῶν γνωστῶν καὶ φθάρτων ἄριστος, βραχώς, εἰ δὲ τάλθες εἰπεῖς, σοιαθής . . .

Moreover, the soul is the archetype of the Jerusalem Temple, which has the lowest position, being merely the copy of a copy. Such is the analysis given by R.A. Stewart in his article, "The Sinless High Priest", (New Testament Studies,14, 1967-8). However, it would not seem in fact that the "κόσμος " is the ultimate archetype for in the two passages quoted above, Her.75 and Plant.50, the "κόσμος " as a temple holds a subordinate position to a noetic one, and is itself merely a "μίμημα " of the true archetype. The reason for Stewart's failure to identify the ultimate archetype in this series is, perhaps, due to the fact that his interest centres on the figure of the High Priest, rather than on the idea of the Temple, and the noetic world mentioned above, when seen as a temple, has no distinctive High Priest.

Thus, for Philo, the material Temple at Jerusalem is inferior to the other mental temples, but it does gain its significance largely from the fact that it is a copy of these other temples and so, ultimately, a copy of immaterial reality. The existence of this metaphysical relationship between the "κόσμος " the "γυνη " and the Jerusalem Temple requires a qualification of what has been said above concerning Philo's metaphorical use of the Temple image. It can be argued that, if a necessary relation exists between these concepts, then the application of one to the other is not what is commonly understood as metaphor. However, we are not concerned here to establish that Philo made a conscious use of metaphor in its strict
grammatical sense. Rather we are using this term as a convenience in order to distinguish a use of cultic imagery in which the cult is not the centre of interest. From our present point of view this would still appear to be the most accurate description to use.

Apart from the relationship described above between the Jerusalem Temple and deeper realities, there is also another line of relation, in this case more direct, between the Temple and the unseen world of ideas. Philo describes this relation when he is dealing with the construction of the tabernacle by Moses, to whom is revealed the pattern of the Temple by God on the mountain:

Here there is a straightforward Platonic theory of matter. The Temple is the material object and, as such, is a copy of an immaterial "idea" which, as an act of grace on God's part, was revealed to Moses. It is interesting to note the absence of any cosmic imagery from this passage. The revelation to Moses is purely that of the form of the sanctuary. However, when Philo describes the same incident again at QEn.52, the content of the revelation is somewhat wider:

"For it was indeed proper and fitting to reveal to an intelligent man the forms of intelligible things and the measures of all things in accordance with which the world was made."

Thus what is implied here is that Moses received certain truths of cosmic significance which were somehow embodied in the revelation of the form of the sanctuary. If this is so, then this is a rather more direct revelation, in the sanctuary, of those cosmic truths expressed in the "Kosmos" itself and the rational soul as a microcosm. It is a kind of short-circuiting of the series of archetypes and copies which we examined above.

We now pass on to the other method by which Philo treats the Temple imagery. It has already been noted how he uses the latter in order to describe the religion of the soul and the "Kosmos" and this is to be distinguished from what is now to be considered, namely his spiritualising of the Temple and its furniture. Here the cult is, indeed, the centre of attention, but it is taken to symbolise deeper truths. There is an account of the symbolism given in Mos.II.77-108 and a much more detailed one in QE II.53-106. The two accounts differ somewhat in order. In the former he is commenting on the text of Exodus and consequently follows the biblical order, but in the Vit.Mos. he rationalises his own order, starting with
the outward construction of the tabernacle and moving on to its
design, beginning with the Ark. The order to be followed here is that
of the Vit.Mos.

According to this the first aspect of the tabernacle to be dealt
with are the pillars, Mos.II.77-83. These provide Philo with an opport­
unity to indulge in some elaborate number symbolism after a little
adjusting of the figures to make them right. This is necessary because
in fact the total number of pillars of which the tabernacle was const­
structed was fifty seven which is a patently non-significant number.
However, Philo gets round this by counting only the pillars which would
be visible and so leaves out the two corner pillars. This conveniently
makes the total fifty five (ibid.79), which was one of the "triangular"
numbers of ancient arithmetic. That is it was the sum of the digits from
one to ten and these could be arranged to form an eqilateral triangle and
moreover ten is here described as "σαντελίμα" by Philo, which is the term
Pythagoras is said to have used of it. Thus fifty five is a doubly signi­
ficant number, not only being triangular but also being connected with ten.
Philo, however, has not finished here since he says that if the five pillars
in the propylaeum are excluded then the total is fifty (ibid.80) which is a
significant number since it is the square of the sides of the right angled
triangle, \((3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2)\). The same kind of arithmetic is used in QE
II.93: "...all the visible
columns of the tabernacle altogether amount to fifty, omitting the two
hidden in the corners. And their power is that of a right angled triangle".
He justifies omitting these five pillars in the Vit.Mos. by equating them
with the senses as in QE II.97 which are five in number, and are conse­
quently different from the other pillars in that their bases are brass
wheras all the others have silver bases. This leads him on to yet another
piece of symbolism drawn from this and the fact that all the pillars have
gold capitals: \(\text{έπει δὲ τής ἐν ἑκάσθης κεφαλῆς μὲν καὶ}
\text{ἡμεροκίμων ὁ μὲν, ἐκατόν δὲ καὶ ἱππασι} \text{δόξας τῷ ἔσθεντος,}
\text{ἐκατέτρες δὲ τῷ μὲν ἱππασι} \text{χρυσῆ, καλκός δὲ τῷ ἔσθεντος.}
(Mos.II 82)

The progression of thought is very difficult at this point since at
first the implied contrast is between the brass bases of the five pillars
and the silver bases of the other fifty. However, he then makes this a
contrast between the golden capitals of the five and their brass bases.
Although only a small example it gives a valuable insight into the way in
which Philo worked. That is he does not appear to have much of an overall
plan but rather his symbolism runs on its own accord as it were, one
thought igniting another and so on until a particular line is exhausted. This would seem to be an explanation of the inconsistency between 81 and 82 and can be compared with other examples of Philo's inconsistency noted above. There is a passage in QE II.89 which mentions the pillars but the main point of it is the bar which joins the pillars which he equates with the Logos. In 93 he talks of the four pillars at the end of the inner sanctuary in the following terms,

"The four columns are made solid, but in the tabernacle everything is a symbol of corporeal things, while incorporeal things stand above the tetrad".

The overall symbolism of this passage is clear. Philo sees the four pillars as representing the material world, but the way he arrives at this is more obscure. R.Marcus takes it that Philo equates the four pillars with the four elements of which the material world is made. This is certainly a very Philonic piece of allegory and there is a very close parallel in QE II.85 where the four types of material of which the curtains are made are made to correspond with the elements. However, in this particular context I doubt if this in fact is the case, particularly in view of the following sentence.

"The point is ordered in accordance with the monad, and the line in accordance with the dyad, and the surface in accordance with the triad, while the solid (is ordered) in accordance with the tetrad,....."QE II.93.

This passage is incomprehensible unless understood against the background of ancient mathematics, in which geometry was seen as an application of arithmetic. In accordance with this, fifth century Pythagorean mathematics had made the point correspond to the number One, hence the traditional definition of the point quoted by Aristotle "μονὴ εἶσε ὑμῖν ὕστιν νόμον τῆς εἰκότητος τῆς ἐν τῷ ἔννοιο ἱδέας καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ μύκος καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὸ στεῖοῦ ὁμοοπρόττωσ.

That is from a tetrad. This is a definition of the composition of the form of animal which according to the Timaeus, is the archetype on which the sensible world is constructed.

Thus the tetrad represents the solid, material world which is what Philo uses it to represent here. In view of the fact that he brings in a
mathematical reference, it seems more likely that these ideas form the 
background to this passage, than to a straightforward equation with the 
four elements.

However, he seems to have no little difficulty in keeping the 
symbolism going here, since he has to explain why the four pillars are 
nearer the inner sanctuary than the five, which he deals with in 97, 
equating them, as we noted above, with the five senses. His argument to 
justify this runs as follows. The four pillars represent the sensible 
forms which in turn are the solid expression of the intelligible ideas. 
This would seem to be the meaning of "solidly drawing the progressions 
after the intelligible" QE II.93 although Marcus says the meaning of the 
latter clause completely escapes him. Thus sensible forms mark a border-
line between the material and immaterial - they can be perceived by the 
senses but they point to the intelligible. Hence he is able to say in 97 
"the tetrad ....touches incorporeal things and incorporeal things come to 
an end with the tetrad". As will be shown, for Philo the inner sanctuary 
represents the incorporeal world and thus it is appropriate that the four 
pillars stand between it and the outer sanctuary which represents the 
sensible world. The five pillars, however, representing the senses belong 
wholly to the corporeal world and therefore stand further from the inner 
sanctuary.

Thus the symbolism which Philo reads into the account of the pillars 
of the tabernacle is of a numerical kind, and within this category there 
are two types, both of which he uses. One is of a mystical character in 
which certain numbers have a sacred virtue of their own and thus it is 
sufficient to be able to point to, say, fifty pillars, while the other 
depends on finding a correspondence between a number in the tabernacle 
and one in reality - for instance the five pillars equal the five senses.

In the course of his description of the pillars Philo refers to the 
fact that the Holy of Holies represents the incorporeal world and the 
outer shrine the corporeal, which we have already noted above. This is a 
basic piece of symbolism in his descriptions of the tabernacle and one to 
which he almost constantly adheres. It occurs in several places, for 
instance: διὸ καὶ τὴς μεθορίου κάρας ἀπέσχεσεν τοῖς πέντες. τὰ μὲν 
μάρ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων πρὸς τὰ ἁρταὶ τῆς σκηνῆς. ῥήτερ ἐστὶ 
συμβολικὸς. νοητὰ τὰ δέκατα πρὸς τὰ ὑπαίθρια καὶ τὰς ῥαλίνια. 
钬περ ἐστὶν ἀἰσθητὰ. (Mos.II.82)
It also occurs in a number of passages in the Quaestiones in Exodum 
including:"......the simple holy (parts of the tabernacle) are classified
with the sense-perceptible heaven, whereas the inner (parts), which are called the Holy of Holies, (are classified) with the intelligible world (κατά τον ὀφθαλμόν κόσμον). II 94. "May it not be because the things within (the veil) were incorporeal and intelligible ...?" II.106.

This kind of interpretation is suggested by Josephus Ant.III.123. This is not to say that the inner (parts), which are called the Holy of Holies, (are classified) with the intelligible world (κατά τον ὀφθαλμόν κόσμον). II 94. "May it not be because the things within (the veil) were incorporeal and intelligible ...?" II.106.

However, there is a difference occasioned by the Platonic elements in Philo's thought for, while Josephus says the Holy of Holies symbolises simply "heaven", for Philo it represents the immaterial world of ideas.

We now come to consider the next main constituent of the fabric of the tabernacle, namely the curtains. He allegorises these too in great detail using some of the same features as in the allegory of the pillars such as sacred numbers. These are found in abundance since there are ten curtains, made out of four kinds of material each twenty eight cubits in length and four cubits in breadth which make the total breadth of the curtains forty cubits. These are all significant numbers as he describes:

A word of explanation is perhaps called for here. Four is said to be the essence of ten because if the digits from one to ten are arranged in a triangular fashion, then the side of the equilateral triangle thus formed consists of four units. This passage is also interesting because it exhibits both kinds of number symbolism mentioned earlier, that is the numbers sacred in themselves such as four and ten and also those which are significant because they correspond with something in nature, in this case forty which corresponds with the human gestation period which the ancients calculated as forty weeks. Another point to note is the final construction of the above passage. It follows on from the main clause thus:

**This is informative in that it indicates what relation Philo considered his symbolism to have to the tabernacle for, while we might hold that he**
reads it into the text by more or less ingenious means, he himself believed that he was uncovering an already existing symbolism. For him the tabernacle was actually built with regard for the significant numbers and the symbolism was deliberately planned, which is the force of the final clause above.

The numbers and dimensions of the curtains are also allegorised in QE II. In 84 he remarks on the ten curtains:

"Many a time has much been said about the number ten in other places, which for those who wish to prolong the discussion it would be easy to transfer here. But brevity of speech is liked by us, and it is timely and sufficient that whatever has been said be remembered".

A most uncharacteristic touch!

However, he compensates for this in 87 with a lengthy discussion of the numbers twenty eight and four, which in essence repeats Mos.II.84.

The next step is an allegory of the materials of which the curtains are made. These are four in number; linen or bright white, dark red or hyacinth, purple and scarlet, and are allegorised to represent the four elements.

In De Cong.117 he repeats the same allegory but adds reasons for two of the symbols. This account is also given in QE II.85. The symbolism here is very varied in character, two of the symbols being based on a correspondence of colour and two because they are derived from what they represent. The connections are, however a little strained. Philo is not to be blamed for this since Josephus gives exactly the same symbolism in Ant.III.183 and it would appear that this interpretation was reasonably widespread. It is therefore likely that Philo got it from somebody else.

The reason for the appropriateness of this cosmic symbolism is given by Philo in Mos.II.88.

And again in QE II.85 where he describes the world as the "universal temple" and says that it is right that the temple should be built of such and so many
things as the world.

Naturally the allegory does get a little confused and is not entirely consistent, particularly with regard to the "vell". In Mos.II.87 this is said to be made of the same materials as the curtains and the logical conclusion of this is that they share the same cosmic symbolism. The difficulty does not arise in Vit.Mos. since he merely gives a factual description of how they shield the inner sanctuary. In QE.91, however, he allegorises it as dividing the divine, unchangeable things of the inner sanctuary from the changeable sublunary ones of the outer. He then compares it with the "ethereal and airy substance" which he says "is, as it were, a covering".

Having dealt with the construction of the tabernacle, he then turns to its furniture beginning with the Ark. This was kept in the inner sanctuary which, as was seen above, symbolised the incorporeal world and the Ark is part of this symbolism.

"Having first of all alluded to the incorporeal and intelligible world by means of the Ark...." QE II.83.

According to Goodenough the Ark was of tremendous importance in Philo's religion and he describes it as "the very heart of all that was sacred in the Jewish religion" (By Light, Light p.23). However, in "St.Paul and the Church of the Gentiles", p.33 note 5, W.L.Knox comments on Goodenough's views thus, "Goodenough, By Light, Light p.23, says that it is impossible 'to imagine how intense must have been the emotional associations of the Jews of antiquity with the secret Ark of the covenant'. The impossibility is enhanced by the reticence of the authorities. Philo and Josephus only refer to it when they come upon it in the natural course of their exposition of the narrative of Exodus.....The surviving literature reveals very little veneration for the ark".

There is a further point on the same page of Goodenough's book which also requires comment. In attempting to support his assertion of the extreme, emotional feelings the Jews had for the ark, he says, "Philo speaks of it as though it were still there". There is, of course, one very good reason why in Moses II and Quaestiones in Exodum II he speaks of it thus, and that is because he is commenting on the text of Exodus describing the tabernacle, and from the point of view of the biblical writer it was there. However, it is significant that in Spec.I.72, where Philo is describing, not the tabernacle, but the Temple of Herod, he makes no reference to the ark whatsoever, although he is actually talking about the Holy of Holies.
In fact Goodenough is rather too anxious to schematize the religion of Philo according to his own idea of a mystery religion, a method of Philonic study for which he roundly castigates Wolfson in his review of the latter's book, (JBL 67.p.87). As part of this attempt he tries to attribute to Philo a consistent attitude to the ark, and give it a constant symbolism. However, this can only be done by ignoring some of the data, for in QE.II.54, a passage not noticed by Goodenough in By Light, Light, the symbolism is completely different. Here Philo is answering the question, "Why does he overlay (the ark) with pure gold within and with gold without?" The "deeper meaning" which he gives is that "In nature there is a species which is invisible and one which is visible. The invisible and unseen one consists of incorporeal things, and this (species) is in the intelligible world. But the visible one is made of bodies, and this is the sense-perceptible world. These two (species) are the inner and the outer". Thus here the inside of the ark represents the intelligible world and the outside the sensible. The latter piece of symbolism is entirely inconsistent with that which was noticed earlier, whereby the ark as a whole represents incorporeal things. Here is another example of the way in which Philo will often deal with a text in isolation from other parts of his writings. However, the allegory is not exhausted here for he now goes on to liken the inside of the ark to the human soul and the outside to the body. The connection is made thus:

"Accordingly, the precious gold is allegorically used of the human structure and, as is proper of the soul".

Here again can be seen the close connection between the "Κόσμος" and the soul, what applies to one can be applied to the other, and the realities of both are embodied in the Temple. The inside of the ark is like the soul because they are both invisible, while the outside of the ark and the body are visible. There is then yet another change of symbolism as the inside of the ark is made to represent a pure mind, which again cannot be seen, and the outside blameless deeds which can. There is an interesting parallel to this in Yoma 72b, where, commenting on the guilding of the ark, Raba said, "Any scholar whose inside is not like his outside is no scholar".

Philo continues in QE II.55 which deals with the "wreathed wave" round the ark. This is within the Holy of Holies and therefore, according to Goodenough's scheme, ought to represent something incorporeal, but in fact he likens it to three things all of which belong to the sensible world. First he likens it to the stars and their rotation, then to the corruption of the soul and the body for the mind turns this way and that
while the body flows on, and lastly to human life which is like a sea in that it experiences storms, as its fortune varies.

To recognise the symbolism attributed to the ark by Philo in the above two passages is not to deny that which is stressed so much by Goodenough, that is, the ark as the symbol of the powers of God. This symbolism is undoubtedly there, as when he interprets the mercy-seat as representing the merciful power of God, QE II.61 and Mos.II.96 where, in the latter, he describes the mercy seat as,

\[ ... εὐμβολὸς φυλεκάτερος μὲν τῆς ἔλεως τοῦ Θεοῦ δυσμένεως ... \]

Again he interprets the cherubim as representing the creative and the kingly powers of God,

\[ ... έγὼ δέ πάντα ἐκπορεύομαι δηλοῦσθαι δι' ὑποστηκόν τας παρεββυτάσας καὶ ἐκκυσάτω δύο τοῦ άντων δυσμένεις, τῆς τε Ποιήσεως καὶ βασιλείας. \]

The same allegory occurs in QE II.62.

However, it is not enough to take this symbolism in isolation and merely assert, as Goodenough does, that the ark is a revelation of God and his powers. The ark is this; but it is also a revelation of the soul and the body and of incorporeal and corporeal things. If QE II.54-5 is taken into consideration, then the whole distinction which Goodenough draws between the Mystery of Aaron as a cosmic mystery and the Mystery of Moses as a cult of the immaterial, is brought into serious question, for in this passage cosmic symbolism is found in the Holy of Holies itself.

We now come to the symbolism of the objects of the outer shrine, beginning with the lampstand. There is a brief summary of it in Mos.II.102-3, where it says that it was placed at the south because the luminaries of the sun and moon run their course in the south and thus it figures them. Moreover its seven branches are, εὐμβολὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρὰ τῶν φυλεκών ἀνδράς πλαστῶν. (Mos.II.103.), that is Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, with Sun and Moon. This symbolism is also given in QE II.75, and is found again in Josephus, Ant.III.182. However, it is not confined to Hellenistic sources and is also found in rabbinic literature, for instance Tan.Pekude 2 and Midrash Aggada Ex.38.21, where the seven branches of the candlestick are compared with the seven planets. There is a story in Tosefta Hagigah 3.35 which confirms that this interpretation was known in rabbinic circles, for it describes the Sadducees mocking the Pharisees for purifying the Menorah saying, "Look at the Pharisees who are about to bathe the orb of the sun".

This symbolism is for Philo the answer to the question of why the dimensions of the other furniture are given but not of the candlestick,
for, ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς, ὁ δὲ σύμβολον ἐστὶν ἡ λυξῖς, ἀπεφραγμένης ἑστι (Her. 227) and the same explanation is repeated in QE II.81. Moreover, the fact that it symbolises the heaven also explains why it is made out of pure gold, for the heaven is made out of one element only, QE II.73. The correspondence between the "κόσμος" and the human "ψυχή" which has been noted earlier is found again in the case of the candlestick. In Her. 225 after describing the symbolism of the candlestick as representing the planets, he continues: μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ καὶ Ἰ πρὸς ψυχὴν ἐμφανίσεις αὐτῆς. ψυχὴ πάρα τοιματός μὲν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐκατόν πᾶσι περιέχειν ὡς ἐξέχωσεν ἄνεμεν, μολὼν δὲ γεγομένου ἐξ ἐβδομάδος εἰκότος τομέας ἂν ἐπάνω τινὶ ἢ ἱερὸς καὶ Θεὸς λόγος.

Thus the truth of the hebdomad as it is exists in nature and in the soul is expressed by the candlestick. This then is the cosmic symbolism of the lampstand, which seems not to have been confined to Philo, judging from the evidence of Josephus and the fact that the same interpretation occurs in the Midrashim.

However, it is not the only symbolism which Philo attributes to it for there is what appears at first sight to be a very obscure passage in Her. 216. Philo has just described the candlestick saying that it has six branches with itself in the middle and that it is made out of pure gold, and he continues, τὸ γὰρ ἐν καὶ μόνω καὶ καθαρὸν ὄντος ἔβδομάδα τὴν ἀνατολὴν γεγομένην ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μόνου, μὴ προεχρησάμενον θαλή το παρά πάσαν.

To whom or what this refers is not immediately obvious. However, the only seven to which it can refer are the seven manifestations of God revealed in the ark as the world of forms, the Power of Law, the Power of Mercy, the Creative power, the Royal Power, the Logos and "τὸ ὅν" (QE II.68) or in the cities of refuge as the Power of Mercy, the Positive command, negative command, creative Power, Royal Power, the Logos and "τὸ ὅν". (De Fuga 100). Thus Philo here sees in the candlestick an allusion to God and His Powers and although he does not work out the symbolism in detail, he cannot resist pointing to the connection. Here again is an instance where Philo does not conform to the scheme Goodenough has laid down for him, since according to the latter the candlestick standing in the outer shrine, should represent only cosmic symbols. However, in this passage Philo attributes to it a symbolism which, according to Goodenough, is limited to the Holy of Holies and this is yet another reason for questioning his distinction between the two "Mysteries".

The next item of furniture in the sanctuary with which Philo deals is
the Table. In the very plain description in Moses II 104 he merely says that it is placed at the north with bread and salt on it, for it is the north winds which provide us with food. In Her.226 it is described as

εἴς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν Φυλάκων ἀπετελειμένην κοιναίτην — κύρος

γάρ καὶ συνεδρία ἐπιτίθεντος αὐτῷ, εἰς ἀνάρχην χρήσαν τὰ τῆς

τροφῆς δεόμενα

The symbolism is, however, treated in much more detail in QE II.69. Here the table is "a symbol of sense-perceptible and body-like substance". It also indicates "a kind of communion among those who receive a common share of salt and sacrifices", but more will be said of this in the consideration of sacrifice itself. He then says (ibid.70) that the waves around the table are a symbol of the change of the corporeal world, the same symbolism attributed to the wave around the ark. Finally, the cups, censers, libation-bowls and ladles on the table represent the munificence of God in giving things which we can enjoy (71), while the loaves represent the necessities which he provides (72). Thus the overall symbolism of the table is cosmic, representing the corporeal world.

We now come to the altars of incense and burnt offering. Here we are only dealing with the symbolism of the actual fabric of the tabernacle and thus a consideration of the characters of their respective offerings will be postponed to the section on sacrifice. However, no detail is given of the construction of the altar of incense and thus we pass on to the altar of burnt offering.

In QE II.99 he deals with the symbolism of the length and breadth of the altar, being five cubits by five cubits. As previously, he equates the five with the senses and says this is because the altar is "made for sense-perceptible and bloody sacrifices". A similar type of correspondence symbolism is used in Tan.Terumah 10 where, however, the two fives are made to correspond with the five commandments of the law on either of the two tables. In the following Quaestio he answers the question, "Why is the height of the altar three cubits?" The literal meaning given is that it hides the priests' bellies, but the deeper meaning naturally hinges on the mystical interpretation of the number three. Here it is described as a "three-tiered, dense and full number, having no emptiness but filling up whatever is drawn apart in the dyad". This is then referred to the soul which should have no empty spaces in it. Again this can be contrasted with Tan.Terumah 10 where the three cubits equal the three deliverers that God sent to deliver them from Egypt; Moses, Aaron and Miriam.

This concludes our examination of Philo's account of the sanctuary.
As was said at the beginning of the consideration of the symbolism - it expresses Philo's belief that the tabernacle embodied certain truths which were also embodied in the "κόσμος" and "ψυχή" and in the course of the examination these points have been noted where Philo refers to the two latter. In an unusually concise moment he summarises his attitude to the tabernacle in Her.112:-

"βουλήθεις μέσων καὶ τὴν Θείας ἁρετῆς ἀπ' ύπορκίαν τὴν εἰκόνα ἐπὶ γῆν καταπέμπῃ, δε' ἕλεον τοῦ νέους ἡμῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπειθήσῃ τῇς ἀμείωσος μοῖρᾳ, συμβολικῶς τὴν ἱερὰν σκηνήν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ κατασκευάζεις, ἐφόδια ἀπεικόμενα καὶ μίνημα."
We now pass on to a consideration of the priesthood which served in this sanctuary. It was noted earlier that there were certain factors which, at Philo's time, were tending to undermine the position of the Temple, and it follows that, since the priests were so closely associated with the latter, their position depended to a large extent on the prestige of the whole Temple cult. Thus, as the Law and the synagogue gained in importance in relation to the cult and the Temple, so the position of the scribe gradually rose in significance compared with that of the priest.

However, while this was so in the long term, the priest at this period enjoyed considerable prestige within the synagogue itself, and continued to do so for a time even after the destruction of the Temple, particularly while people still looked forward to a speedy restoration of the cultus. Thus, he took precedence in the reading of the Law:

"The following things have been ordained for the sake of peace. The priest is the first to read, then the Levite, then the Israelite for the sake of peace". (Gittin, V.8)

He was also the only one allowed to pronounce the priestly blessing, (Berakoth, V.4, and for the ritual regulations see Sots, VII.6). From this it can be seen that the priest did have some position of importance even apart from the Temple and the idea of priesthood was meaningful in the context of the synagogue.

This was true not only of the synagogue, for the priesthood also had a significant place among the sectarians of the Dead Sea. These people had cut themselves off from the cultus at Jerusalem because of the impurity and wickedness of the priests there, but they did not reject priesthood as such. So, while the "wicked priest" is denounced, the "Teacher of Righteousness" was also a priest. For instance, the commentary on Psalm 37, explaining verses 23-24, says "Interpreted, this concerns the Priest, the Teacher of (Righteousness....". Moreover, the priests had a definite place in the hierarchy of the community and were, for example, members of the court.

This importance attributed to priests in contexts other than the Temple might seem merely to strengthen their position, but in fact this separation from their normal cultic function also made easier the re-interpretation of the whole concept of priesthood. This process is seen occurring in the Qumran documents, where the whole community is thought of as having a kind of priestly sanctity. So the Damascus rule, commenting on Ezekiel xlv.15, says,

"The Priests are the converts of Israel who departed from the land of
Judah and (the Levites are) those who joined them. The sons of Zadok are the elect of Israel, the men called by name who shall stand at the end of days. It then originally went on to give a list of the names of the members of the community. (DR IV). Thus the concept of priesthood is here widened in a way which could not but be detrimental to the literal priesthood, membership of which depended on birth and physical purity.

When we turn to consider Philo, it is also possible to see in his writings a widening of this concept, both by attributing priestly rank to a community and also to individuals who are not priests. In Philo's case the community, however, is all Israel, and he asserts in Spec.Leg. II.163, in a digression on the Sheaf: ...... ὃν λόγον ἐξελ πρὸς τόλμων ἱερεὺς, τοῦτων πρὸς ἀπασχοῦν τὴν συκομωσίαν τῷ Ιουδαίῳ καὶ Θανάτῳ.

The individuals to whom he accords the priesthood are a very wide group indeed, merely being defined as those who no longer walk in the way of sin: περιήγησε δὴ τοὺς μηκέτι τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐκὼν ἵσταται ὡς ἱερατικόν γέζων ἔσχεκα προσκρέειες καὶ βασιλεύειες, καὶ πρὸς ἱερεὺς ἱσοτιμίαν ἐπαρχομένης. (Spec.Leg. I.243)

The same thought is also applied to the High Priesthood in Her. 82-3, where it is said that one who loves God is truly inside the Holy of Holies though physically he is not: τῶν μὴ δὲ γέζων ἵστατα τῷ ἱερωμένῳ Ἡσοφίᾳ καὶ φιλόθεου ἐξα τῶν περιηγητικῶν ἐστάτα ἐσωτήριας (82), καὶ γὰρ φιλοθεός μὲν ἐστὶν ἐξα πᾶς ἄφροι, καὶ συναγωγικως μὴ ἄκαρπος ἀπολείπεται, ἐσω δὲ πᾶς σοφὸς, καὶ μὴ κτών χάρας ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλους κλήματε γῆς διοικημένους τυράννην. (83).

Hence in these two passages Philo is asserting that the qualification for priesthood is dependent on the moral and religious qualities of the individual, a view which stands in sharp contrast with the orthodox one of the time which saw the main criterion to be one of birth. This amounts to a radical undermining on Philo's part of the very foundations of the hereditary priesthood. However, if he weakened it by extending it in the material world, he also produced the same effect by extending it into the spiritual one, for he often uses the "ἱερεὺς" as a symbol of Logos or Reason and hence the frequent occurrence of the phrase "ὁ ἱερεὺς λόγος"

For example, Melchisedec is a priest, that is Reason, in Leg.All. III.82 ἱερεὺς γὰρ ἐστὶν λόγος... and Reason is described as priest and prophet in Cher.17, οὗ ὅπλων καὶ προφῆτης λόγος... In Deus Imm.134 the priest is the divine reason: ἐσώ τῷ καθὼς ὃς λόγος εἰς τὸν ημῶν καθάπερ τῷ δυνατῷ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ.
The symbolism of 'Ἱερεύς' is not limited to "λόγος" for in the next
section it is Conviction that is described as the true priest, "ὁ Ἱερεύς
οὗτος Ἑλέγχος". Thus Philo not only widens the concept of priesthood
but he also spiritualises it, both of which processes destroy the unique­
ness of the priest's position as it appears in the more orthodox tradition
of thought. This is not to be seen, though, as a deliberate attempt by
Philo to play down the priesthood, for it is still to him the supreme
office: τὴν δὲ μεγίστην ἱερομανθὴν ἁρχήν, ἱεραποσύνην Ebr.126.
This high view of priesthood is also seen in the fact that he makes it
one of the functions of the ideal ruler, who for him is Moses: βασιλεὺς
καὶ μοροθετὴς ὁφείλει μὴ τὰς θεραπεῖς μόνον ἄλλη καὶ
tὰ θεῖα συμπτικάπτειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνω θεῖες ἐπιφορέως
κατορθοῦν τὰ βασιλεύς καὶ ὑπηκόους πράγματα. δὲ ὧν αἰτίαν
ἐδέσε τῷ τοποθέτη τῆς πρώτης ἱεραποσύνης . . . . . (Mos.II.5).
It must be added, however, that this was a common Hellenistic idea of the
monarchy* and not something peculiar to Philo. Possibly more Philo's own
view is Mos.II.131: ἑδόκαμὲν δὲ ἄνωθεν θεοδότος ἐπιτιθῆσαι τῷ
κεφαλῇ δικαίου τοῦ ἱερομανθοῦ τῷ θεῷ, καθ’ ἄνω χράως ἑρμῆτας, προφητικὸν
ἀπόστατι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἱδρυτῶν ἄλλη καὶ βασιλεύς.
Here the priest, while exercising his priestly function, is superior to
the king and thus, consciously at any rate, Philo is not attempting to
diminish the status of the priesthood.

It is only to be expected, however, that this was a common Hellenistic idea of the
monarchy* and not something peculiar to Philo. Possibly more Philo's own
view is Mos.II.131: ἑδόκαμὲν δὲ ἄνωθεν θεοδότος ἐπιτιθῆσαι τῷ
κεφαλῇ δικαίου τοῦ ἱερομανθοῦ τῷ θεῷ, καθ’ ἄνω χράως ἑρμῆτας, προφητικὸν
ἀπόστατι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἱδρυτῶν ἄλλη καὶ βασιλεύς.

Here the priest, while exercising his priestly function, is superior to
the king and thus, consciously at any rate, Philo is not attempting to
diminish the status of the priesthood.

It is only to be expected, however, that Philo, with his extensive
use of Hellenistic concepts, should change the idea of the priest and,
indeed, this is what happens, for it seems likely that his concept of the
priest was influenced by that of the Stoic sage. Thus the priest must lead

*In origin this appears to have been a Pythagorean concept. Thus Stobaeus,
in his "Florilegium" records that Diotogenes outlined the duties of a king
as being threefold, namely military command, legal administration and
priesthood. On the last mentioned Diotogenes is quoted as follows:
τὸ γε μὲν τριτὸν, λέγω δὲ τὸ θεραπεύειν τὸν θεὸν, βασιλεύειν
ἐντέκου. δέι γὰρ τὸ ἁγίον ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων τιμᾶθαι,
cαὶ τὸ ἱερομανθεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱερομανθωτός.

(Stobaeus IV.vii.61)
Moreover, he must be without physical blemish, which Philo takes to symbolise the perfection of the soul: τὸν ἑσπέραν τοὺς Ἐσπεραν καὶ ὄλοκληρον εἶναι τὸν ἑσπέραν προστάτας, τὸν ἑσπέραν ἐστὶν τῷ σώματι λύσθιν ἔχωσιν .... οὐ μὴ δοκεῖ πάντα ἐμβόλως τῷ περὶ φύσιν εἶναι τελειότερος. Spec.Leg.I.80.

Philo is not interested in the priests as they are, but reads into their characters virtues from an outside source and idealises them.

Thus at Quod Det.62 he says that the holy things were not given to ordinary people, but to Levites; ὃς ἰδαφίους κληρον γῆ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ἄρτος οὗτος καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος ἐν οὗ τοις. He continues by saying that only the Creator was deemed worthy of them and they took refuge with Him as true suppliants. Hence Philo makes out of the Levites types of the conduct required of the Soul. He idealises priests and Levites by reading into the priestly office his supreme philosophical ideal and his ascetic concept.

The highest point of this idealising occurs in his treatment of the character of the High Priest, who is a figure of exalted importance in Philo. The reason for this pre-eminent position is largely to be found in his association with the Logos and the reading back of some of the attributes of the Logos to the High Priest. However, as will be seen, this process also operates in reverse and a priestly function comes to be attributed to the Logos. There is thus a cross-fertilisation between the two concepts which helps to account for the particular character displayed by both the High Priest and the Logos in the writings of Philo. This is obviously not the place for a detailed examination of the Logos concept, which is a vast subject in itself, and thus no attempt will be made to give a comprehensive treatment, but rather, merely to deal with those aspects which relate to the High Priest.

First, however, it is only fair to mention an instance where Philo expresses a more traditional view of the function of the High Priest. This is in Spec.Leg.I.229, where he says: .... τοῦ Ἑβραίου ὑπηρέτους ἐστὶν τὸς κορινθίου ὑπερ ὑπάρξιν τῶν Πολιορκεσ ἐσχάτης ἐστὶν τὴς ἐγκυκλίαις ἐσχάτης καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐν θείας ἐν θείας ἐν θείας Θεός. In this passage the High Priest is seen as the servant and representative of the people, and in Spec.Leg.I.116 his function is further defined as being on the borderline between man and God: ἦσθι δὲ μέσον τιμώς ἐν θείᾳ καὶ ἐν θείᾳ καὶ ἐν θείᾳ Θεός.
Thus he is a mediator between the two by the very nature of his position. However, this mediator concept is reinforced by Philo's association of the High Priest with the Logos, for the latter also held a position somewhere between God and man. He portrays the High Priest as a symbol of the Logos in two passages with particular clarity. First Mig.102, where he introduces a consideration of the High Priest's garments with the words, 'Εδώ μέσων καὶ τοῦ ἀρχιερέα λόγου ἐκπέμψεις.

These are variously translated as "If again you examine the High Priest, the Logos" or "......the Logos as revealed in the High Priest". In both versions, however, the thought is the same, that is the High Priest represents the Logos.

The second passage is Fug.108-110. In 108 he writes, λέγομεν γὰρ τῶν ἀρχιερεῖ ὅλως ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ λόγου Θείου εἶναι...... and in 110, with reference to the High Priest's robe, ἐκμυστηκαὶ ἐκ μεν πρεσβύτατος τοῦ Ὀμός λόγος ὡς ἐσθήτα.

Here again the High Priest is identified with the Logos. Having thus established the association of the two in Philo, we continue by illustrating the mediatorial function of the Logos as revealed in his writings. This occurs very explicitly in Her.205: τῶν δὲ ἀρχιερέων καὶ πρεσβύτατος λόγου δωρεῶν ἐξουσίαν ἐξαίρετον ὁ τῶν ἄλλων γεωμέτρας πατήρ, ἑαυτός μεθορίου εἰς τὸ γεωμέτρευμα διακρίνει τοῦ πεπολιτικότος. ὁ δ' ἐαυτὸς ἐκέτης μὲν ἐστὶν τοῦ Ὀμός κηρύξων οἷος πρὸς τὸ ἁρματζητὴν πρεσβύτατος δὲ τοῦ ἱερώνοις πρὸς τῷ ὑπόκουσιν.

Hence the traditional idea of the High Priest as mediator between God and man is supported by this parallel with the function of the Logos of which the High Priest is a symbol.

Apart from exalting the High Priest in this manner, Philo also idealises his character by attributing sinlessness to him, as he asserts in Spec.Leg.I.230: ὁ πρὸς ὁλῆθεως ἀρχιερεύς καὶ μὴ ψυχικῶν ἀμέτοχος ἀμαρτημάτως ἔστιν.

In this passage the tendency to idealise the High Priest would appear to be linked with a desire for a pure mediator, but in other passages the idealisation seems to stem from the influence of external concepts such as that of the Stoic sage. For instance, he should be aloof from sorrow:* μὴ γονέως, μὴ τάκυν, μὴ ἀκεφαλής ευνοίας...... *θυτάμενος......

(Spec.Leg.I.114)

*This was a characteristic of the ideal impassible Stoic. See Seneca, "De Consolatione ad Marciam" passim for the Stoic ideal of the control of grief. Praise of detachment in general is also found throughout the "Discourses" of Epictetus, as can be seen from the chapter headings:

Ek.III Ch.18. ἢτοι οὐ δει πρὸς τὰς ἀναλήμμας ταρασσεσθαι.
III. 24 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προπάθεσιν τοῖς οἷς έφ' ἐνα.
As might be expected, the Logos doctrine also contributes to the idea of sinlessness and this may be seen in Fug.108, part of which was quoted above, where the two ideas are in juxtaposition for, having described the High Priest as a λόγον Ὁθίον he goes on to add, πάντως ἐν τούτῳ ἐκκοσίως μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκοσίως ἀνθρώπως ἀμέτοχος.

It is interesting, however, to note that while Philo is concerned to develop this concept of sinlessness in relation to the High Priest, he has not excised from his writings the more traditional estimates of his person which are found in the Bible. Thus in two passages he admits the possibility of sin by the High Priest:

τὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀρχιερέας ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦν ἱστομένης καὶ ἀκριβῶς ζεύγος — Spec.Leg.I.228.

Her.82.

In spite of these explicit references, the views they express appear to be without significance in Philo's overall idealising of the High Priest and in fact he carries these two concepts of the mediator and sinlessness so far that the very nature of the High Priest is in doubt. He is higher than human in Spec.Leg.I.116:

There would appear to be two main reasons why Philo exalts the High Priest to this position of semi-divinity. One is that in paralleling the function of the High Priest with that of the Logos there has been a feed back of the attributes of the Logos to the High Priest, as was seen above. The other is based on his understanding of Lev.16.17 which contains the regulation that nobody should be present in the Holy of Holies while the High Priest makes atonement. The Septuagint, which Philo seems to have used, reads, καὶ πάσας ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐκκοσίῳ (representing the Hebrew idiom קָפָר בְּיוּדִי). The intended meaning is obviously that there should be nobody in the shrine apart from the High Priest, but Philo takes it that the High Priest will not be a man in the inner shrine. Thus he concludes that the High Priest's humanity is suspended while he is ministering in the Holy of Holies. He asserts this in three passages quoting this verse: καὶ ὁ ἐρευς μὲν ὅτι "ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται" καὶ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐν εἰδικῇ εἰς τὰ ἁγία τῶν ἁγίων, "ἔσω ἄν ἐξέλθων"

Her.84.
Again in Somn.II.189: τὸς δὲν εἰ μὴ ἀμέριστος, ἀρα ἐν Θεός; σύν ἂν εἶπομεν... οὕτω ἀμέριστος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκατέρωθεν τῶν ἄλλων, ὦς ἂν βασιλέως καὶ κεφαλῆς, ἐφαινόμενον.

And later in the same treatise, Somn.II.231: Τούτῳ παραπαtheticον ἐστι καὶ ἄτο θεοθεόν λόγιον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου ἐστίν ἐπὶ τοῖς τευτονίσι ἐπικρατέον

and then quotes Lev.16.17.

Thus the High Priest is "οὐκ ἄμεριστος" but Philo does not call him Θεός. It might be tempting to draw the conclusion that it is Philo's Jewish background which prevents him applying this terminology to a man, in that it is a threat to monotheism. However, this can hardly be the case for he shows no scruple in accepting "Θεός" as applied to Moses: — τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου Κληρον ο Ἀγαθοπροφήτης ἐλάσσε Ἰούδεσ ἐτὶ οὐκ ἐτι Λαγώπης, πρεσβευτες φαραω Θεος — Somn.II.189.

The reason for Philo not calling the High Priest Θεός has to be sought elsewhere and, in fact, it would appear to lie in the symbolism which he attributes to him. As Colson says, "in this narrative Aaron is not called Θεός though Moses is, and this symbolises the relation of the Logos to the Existent". (Loeb Vol V.p.529 note c).

However, in spite of the fact that Philo does not describe the High Priest as Θεός, R.A.Stewart, in the article cited above, feels it necessary to defend Philo against the charge of blasphemy. He does this as was seen in connection with the Temple, by setting out three distinct temples as found in Philo, the cosmos with the Logos as its High Priest, the rational soul, whose High Priest is the real man and the Jerusalem Temple with the Aaronic High Priest. By applying Philo's Platonic theory of matter he then sees the last mentioned as, in his own terminology, an "ektype" of the soul which in turn is an "ektype" of the cosmos. Thus, although the Logos is the archetype of the Aaronic High Priest, he is two removed, and the latter is only, as he puts it, an "ektype of an ektype".

This, he feels, frees Philo from the charge of blasphemy for the High Priest in his writings is literally "not man" and does not bear any relation to actual living High Priests. He concludes that Philo is not very much interested in the earthly High Priest and treats him merely as a peg for allegorisation.

Certainly the concepts of the Logos as High Priest in the cosmos and the real man in the soul could not but, as in the case of the Temple, attract attention away from the earthly institution in Jerusalem, and it is now necessary to examine these concepts. First the High Priest in the Soul. The clearest statement of this is in Somn.I.215:

....νομικὴ γνώση, ὣς ἐστεις ὁ πρὸς ἐλήθειοιν ἀμερίστος....
There is also another explicit allegory in Gig. 52, where the annual entry of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies is applied to the Reason resorting to the sacred doctrines:

> ὁ δὲ περίγραφεν ὅτι εἰς ἑαυτόν ἴδε καὶ ἐνεκολάξετο τοὺς ἀγίους δόμους. Συνάρτησεν ἐξήκησεν ἀλλὰ πώλησα καθὼς πρὸς αὐτὸ φοιτᾷ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ μόλις.

However, there are hints of this idea elsewhere, such as in Somn. II.187, where speaking of the High Priest he says:

> ὅ δὲ περίγραφεν ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἴδε καὶ πᾶσαι αὐξηθή μοι ἡ ἱεράς ἐκκλησίας ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἐν ἰς εὐκλῆς ὁ αὐτὸ ἐκκλησίας ποτὲ τῶν τῆς ἱερᾶς ἁρμῶν βουλὴ τὸ παρατεῖν, ὃ πρὸς ἑρα, ὁ πρὸς ἑρα, ὁ δημοσιοφόρος.

Also in Somn. II.231 where he applies the oracle about the High Priest quoted above, to the good man, and so he can say of the latter, ἔει δὲ μὴ γίνεται τὸτε ἡ ἀνθρώπως, δὴ ὅτι ἐν ὑδίο Θεός, ἀλλὰ λειτουργὸς Θεὸς.

The good man in his individual, spiritual approach to God is thus in a parallel position to the High Priest as he enters the Holy of Holies. This comparison can be seen again in Her. 84, where after the quotation about the High Priest in the sanctuary he says:

> ὅ γὰρ ναῦς, ὃτε μὲν καθαρὸς λειτουργεῖ Θεός, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπως, ἀλλὰ Ἐλευθερία.

Here, true, it is the mind which is compared but the thought is the same, the individual is similar to the High Priest in his approach to God, and the locus of this worship must be the soul.

Attention must now be given to the Logos as the High Priest of the cosmos. It was noted earlier how the High Priest was used as a symbol of the Logos and how this influenced the character of the High Priest in that certain attributes of the Logos were applied to him. However, the association between the two figures can in some respects be described, as it were, as a two way traffic and the Logos seen as High Priest of the cosmos represents the other direction of the flow from the one noted above, for here the function of the High Priest is transferred to the Logos. Thus, once more, Somn. I.215:

> διὸ γὰρ, ὃς ζωλκεῖ ἵππα Θεοῦ ἐν μὲν ὃς ὁ κόσμος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀρχεῖ τοῦ προτόγονου αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος...

From the above it can be seen that, as with the Temple, Philo gives the priesthood a twofold reference, both to the individual soul and to the cosmos and he elaborates the significance of the High Priest by means of a detailed allegory of his clothing. The ankle length robe will be examined first, again following the order of the account in Mos. II.109-135. It is
described briefly and factually in Mos.II.110: ὁ κέω σώμα ὑποδύτης
ἐμετέρας ἴδεας, ὁλοκάρα
μιγήθαινος, ἔως τὸν κατωτέρω καὶ
πρὸς ἑξάχρος μὲρὶ τῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ἑπικειόμεθα· κρυστάλλος καὶ
κόσμικα καὶ ἐκθέως πλήρωμαι.

The significance is then drawn out in 118-121 where the colour of the robe is said to symbolise the air by the same correspondence of colour employed in the allegorising of the curtains. Moreover the air is said to be "πρὸς πᾶν πᾶν ποσύνη", since in stretches down from below the moon to the ends of the earth, as the robe stretches over the priest down to his ankles. The flowers on the border of the robe represent the earth and the pomegranates represent the water on account of their juice, while the bells represent the harmony that exists between earth and water. The position of these decorations on the bottom of the robe is also seen to be significant since earth and water are below the air. Thus Philo finds symbols of three elements in the robe, but it seems he is unable to find a symbol for the fourth, fire, which is not mentioned. This interpretation is the essence of that which is given in QE II.117-120 although there are naturally some elaborations in this generally more detailed account. In 118 he asks, "Why does the opening in the middle of this very same ankle length garment have a hem 'that it may not be ruptured'?" The answer is that the heavy and light elements would rupture if it were not for the Logos, and thus there was need of an opening "of the divine Logos as mediator". The meaning is not quite clear, but the hem of the opening seems in some sense to represent the binding function of the Logos. Philo however, finds yet more in the passage, for the Septuagint, Ex.28.28,calls the opening ἀπετέρωμα and, employing the resemblance between this and the word ετέρωμα he goes on to urge moderation in speech and food both of which use the mouth, and to denounce drunkards who "break out into belchings and burst with insatiable fullness". Thus by an unlikely connection he has managed to continue his theme of rupturing while changing the subject from cosmology to ethics.

A slightly different symbolism is given to the decorations on the hem of the garment in Spec.Leg.I.93 where the bells represent, not the harmony between earth and water, but rather more widely ἀρμονίας καὶ
συμφωνίας καὶ συμβαίνως τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν.

However, a more radically different interpretation occurs in Mig.103:

tὰ σάλματα καὶ οἵ κώδονες διαθέτουσιν οἰκοτύπως εἰμίβολα, ἢ
ὄρασις καὶ ἀνάκοιτα τὰ κριτήρια.

Here the decorations become symbols of the sense-perceptible world and the bells in particular of the sense of hearing. This divergence of
interpretation calls for some comment if it is not to be dismissed merely as the inconsistency of a careless mind, rather than seen as a clue to Philo's method of working. It has been remarked above how Philo often appears to allegorise and argue in self-contained units which are not harmonised with the rest of his writings. This inconsistency that has been noted in connection with the High Priest's robe would appear to illustrate this, but it also does more, in that it shows how Philo's symbolism is controlled by the thought of a particular context, rather than the thought controlled by the symbolism. Thus in Mos.II he is speaking in the context of the cosmic symbolism of the cult as a whole, where the cult is the centre of attention and meaning is read into it. In Mig.102, however, he is defending the position of the senses in relation to the intelligible world and the garments of the High Priest are used incidentally to illustrate the main trend of his argument, the "πέταλον" representing the intelligible world and the decorations of the hem the sensible.

A possible objection to this view can be seen in R. Marcus' interpretation of QE II.120 (Loeb p.172, note 1) where he claims to find all the three types of symbolism attributed to the bells, that is the harmony of the elements, the harmony of the parts of the world and the sense of hearing, in the one passage. Certainly the first two are present for it reads, with reference to the bell it "indicates the harmony and community of the elements" and "has united earth with water", but the bells as representing the sense of hearing are not included. The only basis for Marcus' assertion would seem to be a reference to music, but the main point of this is, not that we hear it, but that by it the "body of the world" is adapted and reformed into a harmony. It is thus difficult to be convinced by this interpretation of Marcus'. This being the case, it would appear that the thesis suggested above is valid and that an instance has been discovered where Philo alters his symbolism to suit the thought of a particular context. It may just be noted here that, if Philo can change the symbolism with this amount of ease, doubt must surely be cast on Goodenough's assertion that there was a widespread interpretation of the cultus which, although differing in detail, was characterised by a unity of purpose in seeing Judaism as a cosmic mystery. His point may be accepted to the extent of admitting that, say, Josephus reads cosmic symbolism into various aspects of the cult, including the one we are considering here, the High Priest's robe: ἡ ἀποστομακρυσμένη δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως χιτών τῆς ἡνίχων λίοντος ζῶν, ὃς ἦσαν οἰκοδόμοι τοῦ πολοῦ, ἐπεκαμένος δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ροιεκόντων ἐπεκαμένος βουιταῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου φόρον.

Ant.III.184.
Here, while the details differ considerably from Philo's cosmic interpretation, one can say that both treatments are basically cosmic, but when Philo's interpretation of Mig.103 is compared with these two there is a basic divergence of purpose and it is this which would appear to weigh against the scheme laid out by Goodenough. However, this is a point which will be taken up later.

The next garment dealt with is the ephod, which is described as follows in Mos.II.111: 

\[ δ' ἐπικρίτου, ἐκτελεστασθέντος ἄργου καὶ τεχνικότατος, ἐπετήμη τελεστήτη κατασκευαστέο τοῖς προερχόμενοις νέοις, ὑακίνθω οὐ καὶ πορφύρα καὶ βύσσεος καὶ κοκκίνως, εὐγενεστεροίου χρυσῷ.

The symbolism of the four types of material as representing the four elements is not drawn out here as was done in the case of the curtains and, instead, the significance of the ephod is made to centre on the two precious stones on its shoulders, the result being that it represents the heaven. There are two possible means of arriving at this symbolism mentioned by Philo, the first one being that the stones represent the sun and moon: 

\[ πρωτόν μὲν γὰρ οὗ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρωμάτων ἐμαράγδου δύο λίθοι περιφέρεις μνημοσύνης, ωσ μὲν οἰκουτεί τῶν, ἀνετρώσω τῶν ἡμέρας καὶ μυκτες ἁγιώτατής ἡλιοῦ καὶ ἐλήθησα.

This is the interpretation which Josephus adopts in Ant.III.185:

\[ δύο δὲ καὶ τῶν ἡλίου καὶ τῆς ἐλήθησα τῶν ἑαρμοδιώτων ἐκάτερα, σιτὶ ἐκσφόρτεσθε την ἀγκεφαλία.

Obviously this view must have been widely known since Philo refers to it as being held by other people and then, at a later date, Josephus uses it. However, Philo prefers another interpretation which sees the two stones as representing the two hemispheres (Mos.II.122) since he feels that this does more justice to the truth, for the moon increases and diminishes in relation to the sun, but the stones are equal to each other as are the hemispheres. Such a view enables him to continue by interpreting the names of the patriarchs which are engraved six on each stone, as the signs of the zodiac, which he repeats in QE II.109:

"The third is the number (of the names) engraved in them, for in each of the hemispheres there happens to be six zodiacal signs...."

Talking of these stones carries him on to talk of the twelve precious stones on the breast of the High Priest of which he says: 

\[ δ' ἐγκεφαλίου τοῖς προεβαρυσιμοίς λογεῖοι Mos.II.112.

They were distributed in four rows of three, and thus Philo holds that they signify the zodiac circle which is divided into four by the seasons, Mos.II.124. The actual λογεῖον itself is treated to a very elaborate
allegory since, naturally, he connects the name with λόγος for instance in QE II.110:

"As its very name shows, it is a symbol of logos". He then continues by playing on the fact that the λογισμός is said to be double and takes this as representing the fact that reason is double, Mos.II.127: διότι δὲ τὸ λόγος έσται τε τὴν πνευματικὴν καὶ τὴν σώματικὴν φύσιν. In the universe, in one form, he says, it deals with the incorporeal ideas from which the intelligible world was framed and, in the other, it deals with the visible objects of which the sensible world was produced. In man one form is inward and of the mind, while the other is outward and of speech. This allegory, relating to reason in man, is also given in QE II.111. There are also references to the Urim and Thummim which in Mos.II.128 Philo, following the Septuagint, calls ἀνάλογος καὶ ἀνεξάκολον saying that they are two virtues of the rational principle which is both true and sets forth all things clearly. In the treatment of the λογισμός the double reference to both the universe and the rational soul, which has been noted previously, is particularly clear.

The significance of the turban has been mentioned earlier and so we pass on to the other part of the head gear which is the golden plate or πέτραμα. The actual construction of this is allegorised in QE II.121 where the plate is said to lack depth and is therefore compared with the geometric surface. Now the surface is incorporeal and so the plate is said to be a symbol of the incorporeal and intelligible forms. This interpretation is also given in Mig.Abr.103: ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ σφαγία ἔστιν ἱερὰ, καθ' ἦν ο Ὁσὸς ἐποίησε τὸν κόσμον, ἤσωματος οὕτως καὶ μονηθῇ. Here is yet another instance where Goodenough's division into two mysteries is contradicted by Philo's symbolism, for according to Goodenough the κόσμος μονητὸς is a stage in the Mystery of Moses (By Light, Light p.96) and yet here it is symbolised by part of the regalia of the Aaronic High Priest, who belongs to the lower mystery.

When it comes to what exactly was written on the plate, Philo gives different answers in two separate accounts. In QE II.122 he says it is, "Holiness to the Lord" while in Mos.II.132 he merely says: ...τῶν τετέρας αἱ γλυφαὶ γραμμάτων ἐκεφαραγμέναι, εἰς ὕσσωμα πνεύματι φαῖεναι· implying that only the divine name was written there. Earlier in the same treatise, (114-5) he has taken the same line and given an account of the virtues of the number "four", not in any way which fits in with the general symbolism of the πέτραμα but merely for its own sake. In connection with this it is interesting to note QE II.123 where the question is
asked, "Why is the leaf placed over the double hyacinthine robe?" The answer is given that the robe is almost black and black is the colour of ink which is opaque. Now the forms are not visible and are represented by the leaf, hence the connection. This is worthy of notice, not just for the very strained symbolism but for the completely different symbolism which is given to the colour of the robe here compared with that of QE II.117, and shows how comparatively unimportant the cosmic symbolism of the robe is for Philo. It can be altered at will to illustrate another point. This would not appear to be the attitude of a person for whom the robe held a fixed place in a cosmic mystery.

By way of conclusion we must mention the linen robe which the High Priest wore once a year on the Day of Atonement to enter the Holy of Holies. This receives only a passing reference in QE II.107 and Spec. Leg.I.84 and none at all in Mos.II. In QE II.107 it is said to be superior to the ornate robe, and that the Father holds in highest honour those things which are adorned only by nature. In Spec.Leg.I.84 the symbolism which Philo attributes to the linen itself is based on the fact that when it is worn the priest offers incense not animals and thus he points out that linen does not come from animals, like wool. One may compare Plutarch De Is. et Os.352E where, speaking of priests' linen garments, he says, 

The usual symbolism of linen, that is representing earth, is not used here in Philo. The same point is made in Ebr.86, but here the setting is not a cultic one, for the ritual of the sanctuary is being used metaphorically of the worship of the individual. Thus the symbolism of the linen robe is really a negative one, the point is not that it represents anything in particular, but rather that it does not represent something which is connected with the ornate robe.

Philo sums up his account of the High Priest's vesture in Mos.II.133 by giving the reason for the cosmic symbolism which he has attributed to it: ἣν' ἄντων εἰς τὰς θεμμαθέως ἐτέθητας πρὸς τὰς ἑράμνας, ἓν' ἕτοιμον ἐν οὗ τὰς παθήσεως ἡγήσατο τε καὶ θυσίας πληρώμενος, εἰς ἔργον ἐκτράπες ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου αὐτοῦ....

There are two points which ought to be noticed in connection with this. One is that it marks a universalising of the Jewish priesthood which will be found again later with regard to sacrifices. The High Priest is offering worship not just for the nation, but for the whole cosmos. The other is that, while the significance of the cosmic symbolism of the sanctuary was that the cosmos was seen as a temple, here the result of
the symbolism is that the cosmos becomes a worshipper, as is made clear in Somn.I.215 where it is said that the intention of the High Priest's robe is 'έμα ευσεβερητι και τὸ κόσμος ἐνθρώπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ ἐνθρώπω'.

Here the idea of the High Priest as mediator merges into that of universal worship. Thus there is some confusion about the exact role of the cosmos and consequently of the High Priest which may be caused by the fact that Philo is not originating this cosmic system but is using already existing ideas both from Judaism and pagan religions. We have already noticed an instance where Josephus employs a similar kind of interpretation to Philo, but such symbolism also occurs much earlier in Judaism in the Book of Wisdom, which is dated by many as being before Philo.

The continuing use of similar ideas in paganism can be seen from the writings of Plutarch, who in De Is. et Os.352 says that some people say the priests wear linen garments because the colour of the flax flower is like the blue which surrounds the heaven, or from those of Apuleius who in the Golden Ass XI 3-4 gives a description of the robes of Isis:

"Per intextam extremitatem et in ipsa eius planitie stellae dispersae coruscabant, earumque media semenstris luna flammeos spirabat ignes: quaquam tamen insignis illius pallae perfluebat ambitus, individuo nexu corona totis floribus totisque constructa pomis adhaerebat".

The concept, common for some time before and after Philo, of the cosmos as the robe of God is seen by W.L.Knox (Pharisaism and Hellenism in "The Contact of Pharisaism with other Cultures") as a natural development of the Platonic-Stoic philosophy which was concerned to find a system of monotheism which could be combined with existing cults. If the whole cosmos is a manifestation of an indwelling divinity, then any part of it can be worshipped, which gives a justification for these cults. The train of thought is naturally alien to Judaism, but Knox believes it is introduced to show that Judaism is aware that God is immanent in creation.

In conclusion it might be said that Philo appears to have a high regard for the priesthood, to judge from some of his utterances but, by treating it as a symbol for something else, as he did with the Temple, he has for all practical purposes weakened the literal institution by transferring the focus of attention to the spiritual world.
Sacrifice

Having dealt with the setting of the cultus, that is the Temple, and also with the priesthood which served in the sanctuary, it is now necessary to consider the rites which were performed there. The chief of these was clearly sacrifice and, indeed, it formed the raison d'etre of the Temple and priesthood. A burnt offering was made twice a day, in the morning and in the evening, called the "continual offering" (נֵסָיַם נֵישָׁמָה) which on sabbath and festival days was surrounded by a variety of other sacrifices. In order to facilitate the orderly making of these offerings and also to ensure that there was a congregation present, the people in Palestine were divided into twenty-four courses, each of which had a class of priests, a class of Levites and a class of laity within it. Each of these courses took it in turn to send deputies to the Temple to do duty and these deputies were called "men of attendance", while the remainder of the members of the course, who did not go to Jerusalem, appear to have gathered in the synagogue at the time of sacrifice for services:

"When the time was come for a course to go up, the priests and Levites thereof went up to Jerusalem, and the Israelites that were of the selfsame course came together unto their own cities to read the story of Creation."
(Taanith, 4.2. Danby). This is interesting because the implication of this custom is that in some way the synagogue service is a substitute for the sacrificial offerings of the Temple. Naturally this particular type of substitution only applied to one twenty fourth of Israel at any time. However, in a more general way also, the daily service of the synagogue was seen as a spiritual counterpart of the Temple sacrifice and the structure of the services reflects the influence of the Temple. In fact, the afternoon service even bears the same name as the original offering to which it corresponds, (נְבָה יָם).

The whole idea of prayer as a substitute for sacrifice can be traced back to some of the Wisdom literature. For instance, Proverbs 15.8

"The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, but the prayer of the upright is his delight".

The ethical interest of the writer overcomes his adherence to the literal act of sacrifice. Ethics is again the motive which makes the writer of Ecclesiasticus assert that observance of the Law and moral acts are as good as sacrifice:

"A man multiplies offerings by keeping the Law; he offers communion sacrifices by following the commandments. By showing gratitude he makes an offering of fine flour, by giving alms he offers a sacrifice of praise".
(Ecclus. 35. 1-2).
However, in other places the author shows his high regard for sacrifice, as at 7.31. It can thus be seen that, under certain conditions, even Jews who were basically orthodox in their view of sacrifice were prepared to spiritualise this view.

Possibly the highest point of spiritualisation of sacrifices in Palestine, before that is the rabbis who taught after the destruction of the Temple, was reached in the writings of the Dead Sea sects who, although they do not seem to have rejected animal sacrifice in principle, had cut themselves off from the Temple and its cultus because they held it to be defiled. They were thus forced to find substitutes for sacrifice. Among these prayer was an obvious choice and thus the Damascus Document speaks of prayer as being preferable to impure sacrifice quoting Prov. 15.8 with approval:

"Let there be sent to the altar of holocaust neither offering nor incense nor wood by the hand of a man defiled by any defilement whatsoever permitting him thus to render the altar unclean: for it is written, "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, but the prayer of the just is like a delectable offering". 11.18-21 (Dupont-Sommer p.153).

Again in the Manual of Discipline, the phrase, "offering of the lips" is used to designate prayer, 9.5. However, the overall thought of the passage in which this occurs seems to be that it is the community which has an atoning power that is more effective than sacrifices:

(The author is referring to the rules just set out for the conduct of the covenanters and says,) "When these things obtain in Israel, as defined by these provisions, the Holy Spirit will indeed rest on a sound foundation; truth will be evinced perpetually; the guilt of transgressions and the perfidy of sin will be shriven; and atonement will be made for the earth more effectively than by any flesh of burnt-offerings or fat of sacrifices". (Gaster, p.67).

Moreover, both among the Qumran Community and the Essenes, the ritual meals of the community came to be institutions which were modelled after the sacrificial meals of the priests and compensated for the Temple offerings.

In the Diaspora, too, a spiritualising of sacrifice was taking place in some quarters, thus in the "Letter of Aristeas" the passage occurs:

However, this is not intended to eliminate sacrifice as is seen from 172 where the High Priest offers sacrifice, presumably to secure a safe
journey for the translators. Just before this, in 170, there is a very interesting section in which the author explains sacrifices in terms of ethical symbolism: καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν προσφερόμενων ἵλενε μόσχαν τε καὶ κρέας καὶ χιμάρων, ὅτε δὲ τὰ τότε ἐκ βουκαλίας καὶ ποιμένων λαβοῦσαν ἔμερα Θεοίς, καὶ μηθεὶς ζῴου, ἄπτος οἱ προσφέροντες τὰς Θεοῖς μηθεὶς ὑπερήφανος ἐματίς εὐσεβείᾳ. Ἐμέλειας κεραμεύει τοῦ διώταξας. Τῆς γὰρ ἐματίς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός τρόπου τὴν προσφέραν παρεῖται ὁ τῆς Θεοίς προσέχω.

The kind of interpretation which the author gives sacrifice here is very similar in character to that found in passages of Philo, as will be seen later. A work which is possibly nearer in date to Philo is II Enoch, but in character it is more remote. However, its mention of sacrifice deserves recording:

"When the Lord demands bread or candles or flesh or any other sacrifice, then that is nothing; but God demands pure hearts...."

Some scholars date this work as belonging to the first century A.D. and believe it to emanate from Alexandria, in which case it forms part of the immediate background of Philo, but the facts about its origin are far from certain.

Harnack sums up the situation in Judaism during this period as follows: "It is beyond doubt that within Judaism itself, especially throughout the Diaspora, tendencies were already abroad by which the temple cultus, and primarily its element of bloody sacrifices, was regarded as unessential and even of doubtful validity". (Mission and Expansion of Christianity i 50). These tendencies can be paralleled with ones which were also at work within the pagan religions. For instance, Zoroaster had abolished sacrifice and many Pythagoreans strictly forbade it, claiming that the injunction came from Pythagoras himself. Apollonius of Tyana is a good example of a neo-Pythagorean who was opposed to sacrifice.* The Corpus Hermeticum contains the idea of spiritual sacrifice being superior to the material sort:

"O Tat, vis suggeramus patri tuo, e ritu ut ture addito et pigmentis precem dicamus deo?" Quem Trismegistus audiens atque commotus ait: "Melius, melius omnare, Asclepi: hoc enim sacrilegii simile est, cum deum roges, tus ceteraque incendere. Nihil enim deest ei, qui ipse est omnia, aut in eo sunt omnia. Sed nos agentes gratias adoremus"; (Asclepius 41).

*Philostratus, "Life of Apollonius of Tyana" Bk.V Ch.XXV and Bk.VIII Ch.VII Eusebius, "Praeparatio Evangelica" Bk.IV Ch.13.
Spiritual sacrifice is also encouraged in Poimandres 31: 

δέκα λογίας Θεοὺς ἀγνάς ἀπὸ τιμής καὶ καρδίας πρὸς ἐκ ἀείτεταμένης, ἀνεκλάλητε, ἐρημητε, ἐκωπή φιλομένες.

Such ideas, therefore, form the background to the developments which were taking place in Judaism. The latter, however, while exhibiting some parallel lines of development, as we have said, with the pagan religions tended to be rather more conservative with regard to the cult. Thus a more moderate summing up of Judaism than that of Harnack is found in Oesterley, "Sacrifice in Ancient Israel". He concludes that in post-biblical literature generally sacrifice was recognised as that which is acceptable to God, but that in some circles more spiritual ideas were taking shape.

We have now reviewed the intellectual environment in which Philo was writing on the subject of sacrifice, and it is inevitable that, with his eclectic method, his thought should exhibit many characteristics of that environment.

His major treatment of sacrifice occurs in Book I of the Special Laws, where he divides the sacrifices into various categories, first into those on the one hand which are general and those on the other which are for the individual and then, secondly, he divides the latter category into three main types, the burnt-offering, the preservation-offering and the sin-offering, as will be seen below. The first distinction is made in Spec. Leg. I.168:

Clearly the outstanding feature of this passage is the universalising of the concept of sacrifice. It is also interesting to note that he does not introduce his universalism in isolation from traditional ideas, but starts with the orthodox concept of the general sacrifices being for the nation, and then corrects this saying that they are really for all mankind.

The question which must be asked here is whether there are any parallels with this during the period under consideration. A first examination might indicate a near parallel in the Manual of Discipline 9.4, Gaster's translation of which is quoted above. In this the phrase occurs, "atonement will be made for the earth more effectively than by any flesh of burnt-offerings or fat of sacrifices". The atonement of which the author of the document is speaking is that wrought by the covenant community and, from this translation, it would appear that it is to be for the whole world and is thus a universalising of atonement. However, the Hebrew at this point is capable of another rendering, for the word which Gaster translates as
"earth" is in fact יָרָא, the meaning of which here is given by Vermes as "the Land" and by Lohse as "Lando," that is Palestine. In the Old Testament the word bears both meanings. Thus in Gen.18.25 it means the whole earth, while in Gen.11.31 it refers to Canaan. Consequently the only means of determining what the word means here is by seeing it both in the immediate context and in the context of the thought of the document as a whole. Both are conclusive. This particular passage begins "When these things obtain in Israel...." and universalism is alien to the thought, not only of this document, but of the total Dead Sea corpus. Hence this passage provides no parallel at all to Philo's universalising of sacrifice.*

Returning to Spec.Leg.I.168, Philo says he will deal first with the general sacrifices and then gives a list of the occasions on which they are offered, starting with the daily offering and going on to the sabbaths, new moons and feasts. However, as all these appear in Philo's scheme as festivals, they will be dealt with in the next section, and we now move on to consider his description of the sacrifices offered for particular people. He gives a systematic account of the various types of individual sacrifice and their meanings in Spec.Leg.I.198-246 and then goes on to deal with the qualities of those who offer sacrifice, 257-72. This is prefaced by a general statement of the purpose of sacrifice, which is of a traditional 'do ut des' character: μίαν μὲν τὴν πρὸς θεοῦ τυράν, τὴν ἄλλην τιμῶν ἐτέρου δὲ αὐτῶν μόνον γιαμένην ὡς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ καλὸν ἐτέρου δὲ τὴν, τῶν θεοτῶν προφητεύσεως ὁφέλειαν, διότι δι' έστιν, η' μὲν ἐπὶ μετονομά σχολῆν, η' δὲ ἐπὶ κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν.


Such a scheme enables him to assign the burnt-offering to the giving of honour to God, the preservation-offering to the obtaining of a share in blessings and the sin-offering to the avoidance of evils. He then goes

*There is, however, a close parallel to this concept in the Talmud, in a saying attributed to R.Johanan ben Zakkai. While this can be dated from its content as originating after the destruction of the Temple, yet it is close enough to be interesting:

"R.Johanan observed, 'Woe to the idolaters, for they had a loss and do not know what they have lost. When the Temple was in existence the altar atoned for them, but now who shall atone for them?" Sukkah 55b. Here as in Philo, the sacrifices are said to have been offered not just for Jews but for all men.
through the types of sacrifice in order, beginning with the burnt-offering. After describing it literally he goes on to spiritualise the various features of the ritual. The fact that a male animal is used is made to symbolise the mind which is superior to sense, as male is superior to female and it is the mind which is the best sacrifice:

The laying of the offerer's hands on the animal is said to represent blameless deeds for by it the person proclaims that his hands have not done evil, (202-4). In 205 the sprinkling of the blood round the altar is given a compressed but complicated symbolism. The blood is described as \( \text{\textit{\text{\%}}} \) in the sense of "life principle" and this is made symbolic of \( \text{\textit{\text{\%}}} \) in the sense of "mind" and thus the libation of blood indicates that the mind should be willing to serve God in all its intentions and deeds. The washing of the belly symbolises the washing away of lust, and that of the feet the fact that the feet of the worshipper should tread the upper air, while the division of the animal into its limbs shows that all things come from one and return to one. Philo explains this by saying that we ought to divide the attributes of God when praising Him and divide the parts of the \( \text{\textit{\text{\%}}} \) when giving thanks for them. Thus in the treatment of the burnt-offering there has been the accustomed reference both to the individual and also cosmic worship, but in this passage they are brought together for under the section already mentioned where he gives the symbolism of the washing of the feet, and says that the worshipper treads the upper air, he continues:

The point to be noted about this passage is the stress which is placed
on the atoning function of sacrifice. He then goes on to give positive reasons why the three parts mentioned above are offered on the altar and this involves him in a description of their physiological functions, which is of no great significance for our purpose, except to illustrate his concern to find a rational reason for every minute ordinance of the Law. An elaborate argument is built on the regulation that only two days are allowed for eating the preservation-offering. The first reason given for this is a factual one, that it is intended to prevent the flesh decaying, but the second reason is rather more significant. It is that sacrificial meals should not be hoarded but should be open to all who have need, for they are now the property, not of the offerer, but of God, 

\[\text{καὶ φιλόδορος ὑπὸ κολασμοῦ ἀπεφήγε τῷ βωμῷ καὶ ὁμοτρίτος τῷ συμπόσιον τῶν τῷ Θεῷ ἐπιτελεύτως} \quad \text{Spec.Leg.I.221.}

This passage introduces another interpretation of sacrifice. Philo has already given one, as we have seen, in Spec.Leg.I.195 which although in a somewhat spiritualised form, basically sees sacrifice as gift, a view held in more recent times by Buchanan Gray. Here, however, the other main theory is put forward, that is the communion theory which we associate with Robertson Smith. By eating in the presence of the deity, and of his food, the worshippers become his table-companions which in the ancient world was seen as a particularly close bond. Philo is, in this passage, introducing something of a new element into Judaism, illustrated by his use of to describe the relationship between God and man, for the Septuagint does not use it in this application. Philo, however, uses it elsewhere of this relationship in Spec.Leg.I.131 where he says of the priests that:

\[\text{κολασμοῦ τῶν καὶ ἐκμισθωτῶν ἀποκεραμέων γίνομαι Ὀργ.} \quad \text{....}
\]

The effect of this is to take some of the sense of distance out of the relationship and, in Hauck's opinion, this idea shows the influence of Hellenism. Philo also uses ὑποκατά of the relationship between man and man in sacrifice. Speaking of the symbolism of the table in the sanctuary, he says,

"..... the table indicates a kind of communion (κολασμοῦ τῶν καὶ ἐκμισθωτῶν) among those who receive a common share of salt and sacrifices".

QE II.69.

He then carries this further in an interesting manner saying:

"For (this) leads to loving one's fellow for one's own sake".

Thus in this passage Philo is saying that the effect of sacrifice is to create a relationship of love between those who participate, an idea which may be of significance for those concerned with the origins of the Christian eucharist. However, Philo goes on to give the concept a characteristic twist by reference to the cosmos:

"But there is nothing anywhere so lovable as the parts of the world made from their own substance. For one who is about to eat and to be made glad by the Father, (who is) the begetter of these (foods), is taught from above to give in exchange and return the benefit as if to brothers by the same father and the same mother".

The point of this is that it gives the effect of sacrifice an extra validity in that the participants conform with the nature of the cosmos, which was the aim of the Stoics. Thus sacrifice reveals cosmic truths.

We now resume the thread of Philo's argument and go on to the third reason why two days are allowed for the consuming of the preservation-offering which is as follows:

Spec.Leg.I.222.

Thus, here, we are back in the realm of individual, spiritual worship the truths of which are indicated by the ritual ordinance. It is, perhaps, instructive to review here some of Goodenough's assertions about Philo on sacrifice in the light of this verse. In defence of his idea of the higher and lower mysteries he draws a sharp distinction between the altar of incense and that of burnt offering in Philo, saying that the one is for man's spirit while the other is for his material aspect. This is based on Spec.Leg.171: ..... ἐς ἑιδικὰ ταὶ μὲν ἐναλλὰ συναρτιστά υπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν ἐκδόμων, τὰ δὲ θυμίωματα υπὲρ τοῦ ἡμερουχίου τοῦ ἐς ἡμῶν λογικοῦ πνεύματος ..... 

Goodenough is obviously very concerned to maintain this distinction for he also argues that Philo preferred the higher mystery, symbolised by the incense offering, and probably burnt incense as part of his private worship in Alexandria. There are two things which ought to be noted about this. First is that the distinction in Spec.Leg.I.171 is not a simple one between the spirit and the body, but rather between the higher and lower parts of the φυτή, and thus the respective spheres of influence of the two types of offering are not as clearly defined as Goodenough might imply.
Secondly, granted the distinction in this verse, it stands in clear contradiction to Spec.Leg.I.222 which was quoted earlier, where the offering of animals is on behalf of both body and soul. This kind of inconsistency has been noted earlier in Philo's writings and it is clear why it occurs in this instance. Philo is again, as we asserted earlier, moulding his symbolism to suit what he is trying to achieve in a particular passage, thus in Spec.Leg.I.171 he is trying to explain the relationship between the altars of incense and burnt-offering, while in 222 he is trying to explain why two days are allotted to the eating of the preservation offering. His purpose governs his symbolism. In the face of this, however, it is clearly impossible to attempt to erect an orderly system of thought out of Philo's writings, by selecting only those passages which agree with a pre-conceived plan, yet this is exactly what Goodenough would appear to be doing. Not surprisingly he does not notice Spec.Leg.I.222.

Concluding his argument in Spec.Leg.I.223 Philo, having said there is a day each for the body and the soul, says that as there is no third thing, it is forbidden to eat of the sacrifice on the third day, and he who even so much as tastes of it has his sacrifice rejected, ὃν προσήκομὲν ἀθάνατον, ἀνεπίμερον, βεβηλὸν, ἀσκαθάρτως, ὃν ἄργας κρέας, ἢ γαστρόμαργα, θυσίων οὐδὲ ἐνπρέπει ἐπιθετήμενος.

The significant point about this is the reason why the sacrifice is rejected, not merely because the ritual law has been infringed, but because by breaking it, the offender shows that he does not understand the deeper meaning of sacrifice which Philo has here expounded. Here Philo seems to imply that the knowledge revealed in his allegories of the Law is of obligation.

Philo now goes on to deal with the "praise-offering" which he includes under the heading of the "preservation-offering". This is to be offered by the person who has been exceptionally fortunate in his life and thus is under an obligation to requite God. He should do this, says Philo: ὕπαρκτος τε καὶ εὐσκλημονεμόνως καὶ εὐχαρίς Θεοῦς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐχαριστίας... Spec.Leg.1.224.

Here sacrifice is just one of a number of "εὐχαριστίας" not said to be either better or worse than hymns, benedictions or prayers. He again mentions the length of time allowed for its consumption which, in this case, is only one day and this is so that the offerer will make his repayment without delay.

The final major category of sacrifices is the sin-offering. Philo makes a great deal of the different victims prescribed for the High Priest
the ruler and the commoner, but the account is fairly factual and straightforward. The greatest significance of the passage is that it contains Philo's teaching on the sinlessness of the High Priest which has already been reviewed, but it does also contain some hints as to Philo's attitude to sin in general which in turn affects the way in which he thinks it ought to be put right. This attitude is highlighted if Philo's account is compared with the passage in Lev.6.2-7 on which it is based. Thus in Leviticus the plain statement is made: καὶ ἔσται ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήσει καὶ πανηγυρεῖσιν. καὶ ἀποδείξεται ἀπὸ τοῦ άρτισμοῦ ἡ ἁμαρτία, κ.τ.λ.

6.4.

Philo, however, introduces the idea of the offender's conscience convicting him:

καὶ ἐκτός τοῦ σωτῆρα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐξελθὼν ὧν τοῦ εὐνεκτοῦ ἐλείξεις .

The significant word is "ἐξελθὼν" for it indicates the locus of which Philo is thinking. The individual is not accused as being guilty before God, but in his own mind and, moreover, the accuser is himself. Philo goes on to say that, if the person confesses and verifies his repentance by restoring the property to the injured party, then he is to be forgiven. In the Septuagint there is no mention of forgiveness until the priest has made atonement for the person:

καὶ ἐκτάσεται περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁ ἔρευς ἑκατότητι κυρίου, καὶ ἀφεθῇ περὶ αὐτὸς περὶ ἐυδοκίμου τῶν ἐποίησεως καὶ ἐπλημμέλησεν αὐτῷ.

6.7.

In contrast to this, by the time Philo comes to mention the offering in the Temple, there seems little left for it to achieve. Verbally he retains the old idea, saying that the person is to go to the Temple in order to make the offering, but what has gone before has rather removed the force from this statement, and what follows does so even more. He says that the offerer is to take with him to the Temple, παρὰ κλητοῦ ὡς μεταξύ τῶν κατὰ τῇ ἐλεύθερον, ὡς ἐματαιῶς ἐν συμμορφώσει αὐτοῦ ἐφέρωμεν τῇ τινὶ θεῶν ὀνόμα τοὺς ὀνόματος καὶ πρὸς ἡγεῖον ἤ φανταστήθη

( ibid).

Thus the credit for ridding him of his sin is accorded to what happened within his own soul and not to the sacrifice, and he appears to be already cleansed when he comes to make the offering. The same idea is expressed in a negative form in Mos.II.107: καὶ μετὰ γὰρ ἁγιών καὶ ἁδικοῦ, ἀπέτυχεν καὶ ἀπέτυχεν ἡμείνας καὶ εὐχὶ χαὶ παλαίφυμοι παντελεῖν χορομένοι ἐνδεκεχόμενοι.

The determining factor which decides whether the sacrifice will be accepted or not is not, according to the view expressed here, present in the sacrifice itself, but resides in the offerer. Nothing objective happens in the sacrifice to atone for the worshipper and he should already, as it were, have
saved himself. Moreover, the whole image of sin as a sickness of the soul in Spec.Leg.I.237 stresses its inward and individual character, so different from the objective guilt before God which is found in the Septuagint. The consequences of sin for Philo here would seem to be something like the death of the soul rather than judgement by God. Philo has, therefore, weakened the concept of sacrifice by denying it a real function in atoning for sin, although here he does not draw the logical conclusion from his thought, that sacrifice might be unnecessary. It is doubtful whether Philo even realised the weakening effect of his thought in this context on the material institution of sacrifice, for we have already seen how he explicitly states its atoning function in Spec.Leg.I.215 and this seems to be yet another example of Philo's explicit defence but implicit undermining of the cult which has been detected with reference to the Temple and the priesthood.

He continues by giving reasons why the sin-offering is consumed in the Temple, by priests, in one day. The reasons are straightforward and rational and of no great significance for us. The whole account of the regulations for sacrifice is concluded by a description of the Nazirite Vow (Spec.Leg. I.247-256) which Philo sees as combining the three offerings and showing the connection between them. An interesting point in this section occurs in I.254 where Philo interprets the casting of the Nazirite's hair into the sacrificial fire as an offering of himself. He says it would be sacrilege to defile the altar with human blood, but the Nazirite had vowed to bring himself and therefore he had to give some part of himself and, although it could not be brought to the altar,

Θεαίαις γὰρ εἴδεις συναγκαζὴν, γενόμενος ἄλλη φλογὸς ἐρωτα.

This interpretation of the burning of the hair does not occur in the Septuagint. In itself it seems a very crude concept of sacrifice for Philo to introduce but in fact it fits in well with his idea of individual worship and spiritual sacrifice which will be illustrated more fully below. Thus it is that such a crude concept is more useful to illustrate Philo's idea than those found in the Bible, where actual human sacrifice is sufficiently close a reality to make the writers reticent about drawing such an analogy.

The next stage, to which Philo now moves, is a description of the qualities required of those who offer sacrifice, (257). These people, he says, should be pure in body and soul which are purified each in their own way: .... γυνὴ μὲν δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὰς Θεαίας εὐπρεπετίστομένων ἔχοντας.

I.258.

With this Philo has run the full range of interpretations of animal sacrifice in terms of the body and the soul. In Spec.Leg.I.171 it seems to be for the material side of man, in I.222 it is for both body and soul and
finally here it is for the soul alone. A clear illustration of Philo's flexible improvisation of symbolism and a caveat to those, like Goodenough, who wish to create a superficial order out of Philo's thought. The reason for such symbolism here is again to be looked for in the context and it is because he wishes to go on to say that sprinkling purifies the body:

εἴματε δὲ διὰ λουτρῶν καὶ περίτεσιν ἔτεινεν...

The soul, he says, is higher than the body and then he asks, concerning the soul: τις ὅμως ἡ ταύτης καθαρσεῖς; 259.
The answer which follows illuminates Philo's idea of the atoning process of sacrifice. The animal is free from blemish, having been selected as being the best of many, by priests who are experienced in judging. This provides an analogy for our scrutiny of our characters: εἴη γὰρ μὴ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν λογιζόμεν ταύτα κατέχει, ἐκκύψας τὰ ἐμπατήματα καὶ ὥσεις ἐν ἀπαυγῇ τῷ βίῳ κηλίδας ἀπεμάχει (ibid).

Thus by presenting us with a symbol of the reformation of our characters, the sacrificial victim encourages us to action. According to this the effect of sacrifice is purely subjective and the offering does not have an objective result. However, he at least implies in this passage that something happens during sacrifice, albeit subjective and that it does have a "saving" quality, for we noted earlier, when considering Mos.II.107 that any saving had to be effected independently of the offering itself.

Philo shows how completely he has changed the emphasis of the literal law when he says, referring to the law: εἴτε οὖν τῶν θυσιών φρονίσεις ἐκτὸς, ἡμιμηθήσας ἐκῇ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τῶν θυσιῶν, ἵνα περὶ μὴ ἁμαρτωλός πάθος κηροίσεις. 260.

Later in the same treatise he expresses this idea again: δει γὰρ τῶν μέλλοντα θύειν εἰκότες θαυμάζει, μὴ εἰ τὸ ἱερεῖον ὁμοιοῦν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ διάνοια ὀλοκλήρως αὐτῷ καὶ παρατηθῇ καθέστηκε. Spec.Leg.I.283.

Here, however, the connection between the literal law and the moral precept which Philo draws from it, is severed. In section 260 the ritual law was helpful in that it provided an example to be copied in the field of morals, but in this passage it is merely a distraction to be ignored.

He now deals with the sprinkling of the offerer's body to purify it. The water which is used for this ceremony has had added to it the ashes of the red heifer, a fact which Philo finds to be of great significance, for he uses the ashes and the water to represent the two elements of which our bodies are composed, namely earth and water. Being sprinkled with this mixture gives the individual knowledge of himself and how he is made which precludes conceit, that is he gains a kind of cosmic knowledge and becomes
aware of the fact that he is part of the cosmos and will return to it:

Φίλος τις τοις μετέκολλος φασίν τοις τετράκετος θεασάς το εσώμα \( \phi ακτύς \) και την γυρωτίπρο Τό Σύμωνος.(266)

He then sums up the requirements for offering sacrifice thus: 

\( \alpha κυκλω \) ους μετέκολλος φασίν τοις τετράκετος θεασάς το εσώμα \( \phi ακτύς \) και την γυρωτίπρο Τό Σύμωνος.(266)

Elsewhere he forcefully argues the necessity of moral apart from ritual purity when offering sacrifice in what appears to be the context of pagan religion:

\( \alpha κυκλω \) ους μετέκολλος φασίν τοις τετράκετος θεασάς το εσώμα \( \phi ακτύς \) και την γυρωτίπρο Τό Σύμωνος.(266)

However, although these may be pagan temples, Philo considers the worship to be addressed to the one God. The implication is again that the body is less important than the mind, that is the ritual requirements of less import than the moral. In passing, it is interesting to note that in this passage prayer does not in any way detract from or act as a substitute for sacrifice, but is a natural accompaniment. The importance of the purity of the mind in worship is also stressed by Cicero:

"Caste iubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet, in quo sunt omnia: nec tollit castimoniam corporis, sed hoc oportet intelligi, cum multum animus corpori praestet observeturque, ut casta corpora adhibeantur, multo esse in animis id servandum magis nam illud vel aspersione aquae vel dierum numero tollitur; animi labes nec diurnitate evanescere nec omnibus ullis elui potest". De Legibus II.24.

Returning to Philo, the theme of cosmic worship noted in 266 recurs a little later:

\( \alpha κυκλω \) ους μετέκολλος φασίν τοις τετράκετος θεασάς το εσώμα \( \phi ακτύς \) και την γυρωτίπρο Τό Σύμωνος.(266)

This has moved far away from any literal cleansing into the realm of individual worship. However, in the next section the cleansing by wisdom is seen merely as a preliminary to entering the Temple, which will be for such a person his true home. Having entered he is to offer himself as a victim. In spite of the vividness of the phrase this is obviously not meant to be taken literally, and the fact that Philo can make this statement without qualification means that he can assume that his reader will take him figuratively. This spiritual offering of the self is then contrasted with the material offering of the immoral person to whom Philo says:

\( \alpha κυκλω \) ους μετέκολλος φασίν τοις τετράκετος θεασάς το εσώμα \( \phi ακτύς \) και την γυρωτίπρο Τό Σύμωνος.(266)
God, he says, possesses all things and does not need even these, but he does rejoice in the will to love Him. Another contrast is then drawn between the rich offerings of the wicked person, and the poor offerings of flour made by the righteous person, the latter being accepted by God. The same kind of contrast is drawn in Plant.108: ἀλλὰ γὰρ, εἴποι τ' αὖ ἀυτοῖς..., ὥσ τοις μὲν γνώμην κεχρημάτως ὑποτείνουσι, καὶ καθ' ἄμεσα ἡμᾶς ἐκατον βοῶς ῥυόμεθα, ἡμετεροφεσθής, τοὺς δ' ἀσυμπαθείς, κἂν μητρὶ Θὸς θεῦ παράπαυς, οὐ παρεκκλησία.: 

Here the righteous do not have to have any offering at all. However, the thought of the passage in Spec.Leg.I.270–2 is on the whole confused and the locus of the worship which Philo describes seems to change abruptly from the individual soul to a corporate setting. The exact locus is important for when talking in the context of the individual soul the emphasis on the spiritual offering does not necessarily imply the abolition of the material act, since it can accompany it. What it can do is merely to add depth and significance to that act. However, if one emphasises another type of offering on the material plain, then it is a direct rival to the traditional offering and the two cannot co-exist. This could be what Philo is doing in I.272: καὶ μέσων μεθ' ἑτερον κομίσσων, αὐτῶν φέρουσι πλήρωσι καθεραφαθεὶς τελεότατη τὴν ἀριστείαν ἀνάγοντες Θεῖας, ὦ μνώσι καὶ εὐχαριστίαις τῶν εὐεργεσίας καὶ εὐτύχειας Θεοῦ. 

This almost seems to read like an apology for the validity of synagogue worship, claiming for it an equal status with the Temple cult. Certainly "ἐν ναῷ καὶ εὐχαριστίαι" were major elements in the liturgy of the synagogue and it may be that here Philo is speaking as a Diaspora Jew who feels that his usual mode of worship is equal to that which takes place in Jerusalem. However, in view of the fact that he goes on to speak of the worship of the individual mind, it would seem more likely that these hymns and thanksgivings are seen as purely individual worship, even when vocally expressed. In another passage in Plant.126 even these vocal ones are excluded: Θεῷ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται γνώσεις εὐχαριστίαι δι', άλλα δὲ ἔσται πολλοὶ κατασκευαζόντων ἄνωτεραν Θεους..., άλλα δὲ ἔσται παρ' ἐμνώσι, οὕτως οὐκ ἡ γεγομένη ἐσται φαντα, άλλα οὕτως ἡ λείψεις καὶ καθαρότατος τοῦ ῥηθέντος κακίας καὶ ἀνάβλητε.
that this spiritual worship is as good as sacrifice, but sacrifice is
unworthy and spiritual worship is the only kind permissible. However, the
mere fact of the worship being spiritual does not mean that it will be
automatically accepted for it must also be rendered by a pure, God-loving
person: `εν δόσεως καὶ δίκαιως κένει βέβαιος ὡς θυσία, κἂν
τὰ κρέα σκανητῆς, μαλλὰ δὲ καὶ τὸ παράσχειν μὴν ἐν
προσώπῳ ἐστίν. ὡς ὁ πληθὺς ἔστερει τῆς ἕκκλησις
πλὴν ἡμῶν Θεοφιλεῖς εὐθέως;
Mos.II.108.

It is this spiritual worship of the individual which, in Goodenough's
opinion, constitutes the "higher way" or Mystery of Moses, in contrast to
the material cult itself. The goal of this 'Mystery', he says, is God
Himself whereas the end of the cultus is merely union with the cosmos. In
the light of this assertion, the continuation of the above quoted passage
is significant: ὡς τὸ ἐνυμπρετον ἀφαιρετεται καὶ ἀκάματον
ἐπιθέεται πάρα θεῷ συμβατωμένης ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ
τῇ παλιτῇ κόμῳ.

Here the end of worship which Goodenough would class as part of the
Mystery of Moses is seen as union with the cosmos, thus providing another
damaging exception to the generalized theories which he puts forward.

Philo supports his idea that the smallest offering of the righteous
man is superior to the elaborate offerings of the unrighteous, which he has
put forward in Spec.Leg.271-2, by, in the next section, citing the example
of the two altars. Thus he contrasts the altar of burnt-offering, which is
built of unhewn stone, with the altar of incense which is built, he says,
of gold, the one standing publicly in the outer court while the other stood
within the first veil and was only seen by priests who were in a state of
purity. ἓς οὖν δὴν ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ βραχύτατον λιβανωτῶν
παρ' ἀνδρὸς ἔστιν παρὰ ὥστε μονίας ὁ θεοὶ ὁμίχλες μυρίων Ὄρεματων,
όθε δὲ τὰς ἑραυνίας μὴ σφόδρα ἐστεῖλαι ὅτι.

Moreover the precedence of the altar of incense is also indicated by
the fact that the daily burnt-offering cannot be made until the incense has
been offered. Thus he concludes: τὸ δ'ἔστι συμβολον οὐχ
ἐστέρον τινὸς ἡ τοῦ παρὰ θεοῶν μὴ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ
καθαυτομείκον εἶδεν τιμίων, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαυτότατον τοῦ
Θουατος πνεῦμα λογικῶν.
In Quaestiones in Exodum, the altar of incense again has the pre-eminence, but for a rather more metaphysical reason. In Quaestio 102 the altar of burnt-offering is said to be made of bronze, which material belongs to things of earth, since wars are made on earth and bronze was used by the ancients to make weapons. To support this he cites Homer. The altar of incense, however, is made of gold which belongs to incorporeal and intelligible things (ἐν ἀσωμάτοις καὶ ἀνεπότης). It is worth noting that, when Philo's purpose is not to contrast the two altars, the symbolism which he attributes to the incense altar can be quite different: μεσοῦ μὲν τῷ ὑμιματάργου, ἡς καὶ ὤδατος σύμβολον εὐχαριστίας......Mos.II,101.

The symbolism here explains why the altar is in the middle of the "vestibule" between the veils, because earth and water are in the mid-position in the universe. This change of symbolism is obviously relevant when considering Goodenough's theory which was mentioned above, that Philo used the altar of incense to represent the higher mystery of spiritual worship of God, for here it is very much part of Goodenough's lower or cosmic mystery. Moreover, Goodenough is not even consistent within his own writings for while he uses the above theory in "Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period" voLIV, he has already in "By Light, Light" used the passage from Mos.II,101 to support his idea of cosmic worship within the lower mystery. Thus, page 97-8, he says, "In the center is the altar of incense, symbol of the gratitude (εὐχαριστία ) of earth and water......". His assertion is that in the Mystery of Aaron the worshipper joins the cosmos in its adoration of its Maker. However, leaving aside his double use of the incense altar which he makes no attempt to harmonise, his interpretation of this passage is extremely doubtful. Colson translates it as "gratitude for earth and water", and, in view of the following clause this would seem to be the correct version:

Thus the meaning of the passage is that the participants in the cult give thanks to God for the cosmos, rather than joining in its worship, which is a quite orthodox, Jewish concept in accord with the sentiments of the "Benedictions", as opposed to the Stoic ideas of universal worship which Goodenough tries to read into Philo at this point.

Finally the two altars are used metaphorically in Ebr.87 where they are applied to the two aspects of man's life, the outer and the inner. The altar
of burnt-offering represents the public side of life: "οτός κατὰ μέσον τοῦ περιβαλλομένου τοῦ βίου καὶ διώκοντας καὶ σφηκόντας καὶ πάντων ὥσπερ περὶ εὖμα δέξει ποιήσαι πρόωςυ, ὡς μὴ μυρίσας ἀπέχθανοι κρίσεως ἀγάθα μετὰ τὰ θυσιά τευτερείως τετελθεῖσα τὰ περὶ ἐὖμα.

But the altar of incense represents the mental side: κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἑυμυρίων ἀρχάριοις, ἀγάριοις, ἀλογιστοις, τοῖς ἐκ λογισμοῦ μονοις χρησταίοι, ἀ λυσιατίκαι καὶ τοῖς ἐνθολομαίοις ἀπεκάθεναι.

In many ways this contrast illustrates the dilemma in which Philo constantly felt himself to be, torn as he was between the contemplative and the practical life. As he says: Ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε φιλοσοφία σκολάζομαι καὶ θεωρία τῶν κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ . . . ἐφεδρεὶς δόρα μι τῶν ἄρχαλώτων, ὁ μισόκαλος φθονος, ὁ εὐλογίως ἐπιτεκτόνος ὁ πρῶτος ἐπιλεκτικος καθελκών πρὸς βίων ἢ με καθαλεῖν εἰς μέγα πέλανος τῶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ φυσικών.

Spec.Leg.III.1&3.

Thus Ebr. 87 would seem to be a vivid portrayal of this kind of tension, rather than any straightforward assertion of the superiority of spiritual worship and, although it uses cultic imagery, it is really speaking of the whole of life. Philo has, therefore, treated sacrifice in a variety of ways ranging from a factual consideration of the various regulations, to various degrees of spiritualisation and finally to a metaphorical use of its imagery in which it is entirely detached from its original cultic context. In the last mentioned, the process is not an elucidation of sacrifice in terms of other ideas, but an elucidation of man's life in terms of the sacrificial altars, and sacrifice is no longer the focus of attention. Colson, in fact, claims that sacrifice has little meaning at all for Philo apart from the spiritual and, indeed, as with the Temple and the priesthood the reading in of a spiritual meaning does distract from the literal institution of sacrifice. However, perhaps the main cause of this weakening of sacrifice is the denial of any real function to it by Philo in atoning for sin. This was noted by Liddon in his Bampton Lectures for 1866:

"The priesthood and the sacrificial system, instead of pointing to man's profound need for pardon and expiation, are resolved by him into the symbols of certain cosmical facts or theosopthic theories". (Lecture II, page 69).

The same point was taken up at a later date by H.Wenschkowitz in his
work "Die Spiritualisierung der Kultusbegriffe";

"Finally the whole significance for religion of the institution of sacrifice rests on the belief in the atoning power of sacrifice..... In Philo, however, a tendency towards superficiality of consciousness of sin cannot be denied, in spite of his ethical parenesis. From this it follows that Philo cannot attribute any special significance to atonement ...... Philo is in no way interested in sacrificial atonement. One sacrifices essentially for the reason that it is commanded. The chief thing, however, is the cult of the pious individual in the depths of his soul". (Quoted by R. Marcus in "Recent Literature on Philo (1924-1934)", a study included in "Jewish Studies in memory of G.A. Kohut" ed. by Baron and Marx).

It was seen above how, although Philo retained verbally the idea of sacrifice atoning for sin, it was not in fact a real part of his thought, and the real atonement took place in the soul of the individual by repentance. This shift of emphasis in Philo has led Buchanan Gray to assert that he prepares the way for the loss of material sacrifice in Judaism after the destruction of the Temple, but bearing in mind the rejection of Philo by the mainstream of orthodox Jewish thought it is difficult to see how he could have had such an effect.
The Festivals

Having considered the character of the cultus on ordinary days, it is now necessary to examine what happened on special occasions, that is the festivals. Those either ordained in the Law or mentioned in the Old Testament are seven in number:

The Sabbath, the regulation for which is given in Ex.20.10, that there will be a complete cessation of labour.

Rosh Hodesh or Day of the New Moon which was marked by special offerings as prescribed in Num.28.14.

Pesah or Passover which included the slaying of the Passover lamb and the eating of unleavened bread. It lasted from the 14th to the 21st of Nisan, but those who were in a state of impurity or distant from home could celebrate it during the corresponding period of the following month, Num.9.6-12.

The first and seventh days were marked by abstention from work.

Shabu'ot or Weeks which was seven weeks after Passover and was the feast of the harvest, including the offering of the new meal. It, too, was celebrated by a cessation of work.

Yom Teru'ah or Blowing of Trumpets occurred on the first day of the seventh month. It appears to have been a particularly sacred New Moon day. No work was done on this day also.

Yom ha-Kippurim or Day of Atonement occurred later in the seventh month, on the tenth day. There was an absolute prohibition of work on this day on pain of excommunication.

Finally there was Sukkot or Booths, which was held from the 15th to the 22nd of the same month, Tishri, and no labour was done on the first and eighth days.

These feasts can be divided into two main types, first those which are dependent on the harvest, namely Passover, Weeks and Booths, and secondly, those which are connected with the moon which comprise the rest. Of these, the feasts in the first group are by far the most important, being the great pilgrim feasts at which male Israelites were supposed to appear at the Temple in Jerusalem, and their significance was increased by the fact that they came to be associated with some important event in the history of Israel. Thus Passover was related to the Exodus, Tabernacles was a reminder of the wandering in the wilderness and Weeks was associated at a later date with the giving of the Covenant at Sinai. They thus came to be predominantly feasts of commemoration rather than apotropaic in character. This illustrates the process of reinterpretation to which the festivals were submitted, a
process which can be seen continuing in the Book of Jubilees about the later half of the second century B.C. The purpose of the author is to advocate a new calendar, a solar one instead of a lunar one, for calculating the festivals of the religious year, and the nature of his subject causes him to say something about the various festivals. For instance a new explanation of the origin of the Day of Atonement is given, namely that it was inaugurated as a day of mourning in Israel because on that day Jacob grieved at hearing the news about the death of Joseph:

"For this reason it is ordained for the children of Israel that they should afflict themselves on the tenth of the seventh month - on the day that the news which made him weep for Joseph came to Jacob his father". (34.18)

Tabernacles is also connected with events different from those which it was normally held to commemorate, thus in chapter sixteen it is connected with the birth of Isaac and in chapter eighteen with his sacrifice. Finally the feast of Weeks is associated with the covenant of Noah;

"He set His bow in the cloud for a sign of the eternal covenant that there should not again be a flood on the earth to destroy it all the days of the earth. For this reason it is ordained and written on the heavenly tables, that they should celebrate the feast of weeks in this month once a year to renew the covenant every year". (6.16-17)

Thus the festivals are given fresh interpretations in this work, but the new ideas all lie well within the Hebraic tradition.

There are two interesting links between the thought of the Book of Jubilees on the festivals and that of the Dead Sea corpus. The first is that they both appear to use the solar calendar and the second is that Jubilees associates the Feast of Weeks with the covenant, while the Covenanters are thought by many to have celebrated their annual renewal of the covenant during this festival. Here, then, is an example of the Qumran community adapting a festival to suit their own particular needs, while still retaining some continuity with the rest of Jewish thought. Their interpretation of the other festivals is not known but they appear to have retained seven feasts at intervals of seven weeks and their observance is enjoined in chapter six of the Damascus Document;

"They shall keep the Sabbath day according to its exact interpretation and the feasts and Day of Fasting according to the finding of the members of the New Covenant......"

Thus, although separated from the main body of Judaism, they continue to observe the festivals after their own fashion.

The interpretation of the festivals in Judaism was, therefore, not
static, but Philo's reinterpretation of them is far more radical than anything which had been done so far in Judaism. We shall examine first Philo's attitude to festivals in general and then go on to consider each feast separately. It was seen above how in Spec.Leg.I.168, and also in I.190, Philo gives the general sacrifices a universal significance and how the occasions on which they are offered are all regarded by Philo as being festivals. The implication of this would appear to be that the festivals share in the universal character of the burnt-offerings. However, a sin-offering was also made on each day of a festival, Spec.Leg.I.190, and this also indicates the character of a feast: τις οὖν δείκτης, ἡ δέ ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἤμισυ ἔφασεν ἡ φονεία τὰς ἐν ἔνδρυμαν ψυχὴν βεβαιῶσαι, φρονήσει τὸ έξαρχην λαβένων τοῖς Θεοτόκες Θεοτόκες καὶ παλαιόν ἐκτομήν; I.191.

Thus he moves from the universal reference to the individual, going on to say that the soul of the worshipper should be as free from blemish as the victim of the burnt-offering. This exhortation to celebrate festivals in a pure and moral way is emphasised by the other reason he gives for the sin-offering which is that festivals are times of special temptation to sin resulting from the cessation of work and the festal food and drink. In order that they should be helped to resist this, Moses called the people to the sanctuary: ἐκαὶ κακὸν τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν ὑπομένων καὶ λεγόμενον διὰ τῶν κυριατάτων σεβομένων, ὄφεως καὶ ἄκοις, ἐνκρατείας ἕκα καὶ εὐσεβείας ἁγίωσει; I.193.

Here the ritual of the festival is seen as stirring up the better nature of people and indicates one of the functions which Philo obviously thought the Temple cultus could fulfil, that is a kind of dramatically acted, ethical exhortation. The sin-offering also helps them to resist sin, for Philo believes that one who is seeking forgiveness for old sin, will not commit new.

Thus, as Philo says at the beginning of I.193, the Jews are not allowed to celebrate their festivals in the manner of other nations, a distinction which is made even more clearly in De Cherubim, where the Jewish festivals are seen as belonging to God and celebrated truly by Him alone, while the pagan nations have their own festivals which are characterised by all kinds of immorality.
He therefore appears to believe that there is something objectively different about the Jewish festivals from the pagan ones, not just brought about by the different behaviour of the participants, but by the fact that they are God-centred and that by celebrating them the worshippers somehow join in the activity of God. This would seem to apply to any Jew who kept the literal festival in a moral way, but he who realises the fact will go further:

Here Philo is spiritualising the idea of the festivals and pointing out their deeper meaning, but this spiritual side is not meant to supplant the literal keeping of the festivals as he emphasises in Mig.92:

Thus, while the spiritual meaning of the festival is important for Philo and is often very elaborate as will be seen, it is well to bear in mind this assertion of the necessity of their literal observance. Consciously, at any rate, Philo had no intention of undermining the festivals of Judaism. We now go on to examine Philo's treatment of the festivals in detail and for this purpose the order of the account given in Book II of the Special Laws will be followed. This opens with the words:

The attraction of ten for Philo has become apparent elsewhere in his writings, it is a "τέσσαρες άριστος" as he says here but the festivals have required a little schematising on his part to bring them up to this number. To this end he includes the "feast of every day", and treats "Unleavened Bread" and the "Sheaf" as separate festivals in their own right. His almost exclusive attention to the Pentateuch is illustrated by the fact that he prefers to obtain ten feasts out of what it contains, rather than use the later feasts which Judaism observed such as "Purim". He then starts his treatment of the various feasts with that of "every day":  

Thus Philo is quite aware that this statement may cause some surprise but, as is shown by such a concept, he is working not from contemporary Jewish practice but from the written Law. He appears to get the idea of making it one of his festivals partly from Num.28.3 where the commandment for the daily offering stands at the head of the list of offerings for the various feasts. However, since it lacks any strong cultic reference as a feast he
is able to use this as an opportunity for passing general remarks on the life of virtue and the keeping of feasts. Thus he says that if we did lead lives of virtue, then the whole of life would be a continuous feast, II.42. Having made virtuous living the prime constituent in keeping a festival, he is then able to go on to universalise the concept by saying that all who practise wisdom and lead a blameless life "να παραβαφέσ η παραβάφνος" naturally keep the whole of their life as a feast.

It is interesting to note that the distinction is between Greeks and barbarians rather than between Jews and gentiles, which would tend to suggest that Philo is here using a Hellenistic idea rather than a Jewish one or something which he has developed within a Jewish framework, and this is supported by the fact that a similar idea is found in Plutarch attributed to Diogenes: "Αμμα ετ του Διονύσου, εκ τω ευ Λακεδαιμονίων ἡμῶν ὁ κοίμησις παρακεκεραυνομένων εἰς ἑορτήν παύω καὶ φιλοτιμούμενον ἀμφότερον εἶπεν, 'Αναθί ού πᾶσαν ἡμέραν ἑορτήν ἡγείται;" De Tranq. Animi 477c.

However, although the idea is basically Hellenistic, it is the arrangement of the list in Numbers, mentioned above, which enables him to incorporate it in his scheme of festivals. Thus the origin is not quite as simple as Colson would suggest in his footnote, "The idea of the feast of every day comes from Num.xxviii, xxix" (Loeb vol.VII p.334). It is, however, much closer to the mark than Belkin's comment on this festival, "It is fruitless to look either in Jewish or Greek literature for its origin" (Philo and the Oral Law p.192) since we have seen that Philo's concept has its roots in both.

By contrast with the virtuous, says Philo, the wicked can never really keep a feast at all because they are so tormented by their guilt (49-50). In fact Moses thought that such was the unhappy lot of the human race that men could not hold a feast at all in the true sense. At this point Philo gives an interesting definition of what he considers to be the true sense of holding a festival: εὐθυφρονόμενος καὶ ἐντρυφάς Θεορία τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ταύτα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν φύσεως καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ πρὸς ζῷα λόγων καὶ πρὸς λόγους ἔργων. II.52.

It is seen as an essentially cosmic activity and the true celebrant of a festival contemplates the cosmos with joy and seeks to be conformed with nature, which was the goal of the Stoic. He also tries to achieve a certain integrity of character. Moses is said to have thought this such a difficult achievement, that he ascribed the true holding of a festival to
God alone, an idea which was encountered above in Cher.86 and is present in Sacr.111 if Colson and Whitaker's alternative translation is followed:

εὐφροσύνη, τόσο τόσα δὲ αἱ καὶ τοὺς δὲ εὐφρόσυνος τέλειας, τέλειας

If "οὐ λόγος" is taken as referring to God then here again He is the only one who can keep a festival. However, Philo holds that joy is not entirely confined to God for, while He is the only one who possesses unmixed joy, yet the creature can experience joy mixed with sorrow and in Spec.Leg.II. 54-55 he takes Sarah and her laughter as a symbol of this.

Next for consideration is the Sabbath which is the sacred seventh day and this fact is enough to enhance its significance in Philo's thought. However, the way in which he refers to the number seven in Spec.Leg.II.56 is obscure if the background is not borne in mind. He says that some have called it "παρθένων" and "ἀμήνα" and some καρός, the meaning of which is far from clear until seen in the light of a passage such as Stobaeus, Ed.1.1.10 where he says: Πυθαγόρας πλησίας οικονομία που κάθε 

Here the derivation of the attributes "παρθένων" and "ἀμήνα" is made clear for they were applied to Athene, the myth relating that she was born from the head of Zeus. This raises an interesting point, for Philo refers to this myth in terms of seven being begotten by the father of the universe alone: εἰκὸν τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ἁλῶν .... Spec.II.56. The "father of the universe" when encountered in Philo would normally be taken as referring to the Jewish God but here the reference of the myth is to Zeus and it seems that the two are being identified. A possible objection to this identification is that this passage is just a quotation of other people's views and therefore not applied by Philo to his God. However, in Moses II.210, the same idea occurs namely that seven is "ἐκ μονοῦ πατρὸς ἐπαρέβειαν " and in this passage it is attributed, not just to "some people", but to Moses and the presumption is that seven was begotten by the Jewish God, who is thus worked into the Greek myth. Consequently this appears to be a bold identification of Yahweh and Zeus by Philo and a radical piece of syncretism unusual for a Jew.

Returning to Philo's consideration of the number seven he thus calls it a manly number suited for leadership. The other name attributed to it by
Pythagoras, καθότι is also commented on by Philo, saying it is called thus because seven is involved in many of the highest perceptible things such as the seven planets. It also has a cosmic reference from the Jewish point of view, for the world was created in six parts and on the seventh day it was perfected. Six has two factors, three the male and two the female and seven reveals what these have produced, thus the seventh day, γενέθλιος τοῦ κόσμου δύνατος ἀρ σπαγαρεύοντο Spec.II.59.

The same thought as that in Spec.Leg.II.56-9, is found in Mos.II.209-10, where seven is described in the same terms and the Sabbath is the "birthday of the world," ἡμὶ ἑορτάζεται μὲν ὡρασίως, ἑορτάζει δὲ γη καὶ τὰ ἐξακολούθησαν ... Mos.II.210.

Thus the sabbath has a cosmic aspect commemorating the creation of the world and celebrated by it. In Spec.Leg.I.170 where he is dealing with the offerings made on the sabbath, it is again referred to as the "birthday of the world" but the statement is made:

ἐστόχως ἡγομένως ἡμὶ ἐβδομήνα.

This is given as the reason why the daily offering is doubled on the sabbath because he wished to assimilate it to the perpetuity of the daily offering.

Having dealt with all the implications of the sabbath being the seventh day, Philo goes on to deal with the commandment to abstain from work on that day. This is given a rational explanation as providing men with an opportunity to rest from their labour, so that they can return to it refreshed, and also a more spiritual one in that it gives men a chance to exercise themselves in higher pursuits: προτείνει γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸτε βελτίωματος τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ θάνατον Spec.Leg.II.61.

For this purpose the Jews repair to the synagogues which are described as, διασκεδαστικὰ φρονήσεως καὶ δοσολογίας καὶ άνθρωπίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρτεσιν ... ibid.62.

The whole passage is strongly apologetic in character as Philo exalts the Jewish sabbath in terms which would tend to recommend it to Hellenistic readers. In Mos.II.21 his propaganda takes a different form in the assertion that the Jewish sabbath is so venerated by all men that it is universally observed by Greeks and barbarians: τὸς γὰρ τῆς ἐρήμου ἐκάλυμμα ἐβδομήνα οὐκ ἐκτετήθη ἡμέρας πάσης καὶ ῥαστών ἀυτῶ τε καὶ τῶν πλατείας οὖν ἐκένθερος μόνων ἄλλα καὶ διούσις, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὑπογυίους πείδοις;
This universal outlook should be compared with the exclusiveness* of the Book of Jubilees:
"The creator of all things blessed it but did not sanctify all peoples and nations to keep the sabbath thereon, but Israel alone". 2.31.

Returning to the Special Laws, Philo says in section 65 that fire is forbidden on that day since it is the source and origin of life necessary for other things and in 66-8 he gives the reasons why slaves are also forbidden to work, ending in 69 with the explicit statement, " ἀνθρώποι γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλοι οὐκείς". By way of conclusion, he then explains that the regulation is also extended to animals.

A deeper symbolic meaning is given to the Sabbath rest in Mig.91:
μὴ γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἐξήλθεν διακόμησα μὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ γενέσθαι, ἀπροφασίᾳ δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ γενέσθαι δίδομαι ἕστε......

Here the rest of man on the Sabbath is symbolic of the relationship which his activity holds to that of God.

The next festival dealt with in the Special Laws is that of the New Moon II.140 and Philo gives a number of reasons why this should be included among the feasts. First is that it is the beginning of the month and the beginning always deserves honour. Secondly because at that time the moon regains its brightness and nothing in heaven is without light. Thirdly the sun, the stronger heavenly body, illumines the moon, the weaker, and this is taken by Philo as symbolising the obligation of men to help others. Fourthly in its revolution the moon ends where it begins and this teaches us to make our ends like our beginnings, which will only be achieved if we control our passions with our reason:

ἐὰν λογικῶς τὰς πρῶτας ἡμερόμενοι ὁρμᾶς...... II.142.

Lastly the moon renders many services to the earth, in creating tides and causing changes of weather and thus helping the maturing of crops and fruits. For all these reasons the New Moon is to be honoured as a feast. Philo here produces a mixture of ethical and semi-scientific reasons for celebrating this festival and, as frequently elsewhere, the former are based on conformity with the cosmos.

In Spec.Leg.I.177 he deals with the offerings which are to be made.

* For a further consideration of Jewish particularism with regard to the Sabbath, see the article by Manson, "Mark 2.27f" in "Coniectanea Neotestamentica xi in honorem Antonii Fridrichsen" (1947) pp 140-2.
at this feast, which are ten burnt-offerings. Ten is for Philo, as has been seen, "ἀριθμὸς τέλεως" and this is appropriate here since the month which the moon takes for its cycle is also "τέλεως". Moreover the division of the ten is also appropriate since the two calves represent the waxing and the waning of the moon respectively, the one ram the "λογὸς εἰς" by which she does this and the seven lambs the seven phases of the moon. The offering of wine and oil is a reference to the maturing function of the moon which was mentioned in Spec.Leg.II.143. The appropriateness of the offerings is thus explained by pointing out their correspondence with various aspects of the moon, and generally the account is, if anything, of an ethical rather than a mystical character. There would, therefore, seem little basis for Goodenough’s bald, unsupported statement, "The New Moon is a cosmic Mystery". (Introduction to Philo, p.208), or even for his more guarded assertions in his article in "Quantulacumque" that the cosmic mystery lies behind the festival of the New Moon, although it is not specific.

The fourth festival in Philo’s scheme is the Passover which has a much more prominent place in his writings than any of the three previous ones. In Spec. Leg.II.145 he refers to it as "τὰ διαφορετικὰ, ἢς Ἑβραών Πέσηκα πατρίω γιάττη καλοδεία," He then goes on to say how for this day all are raised to the dignity of the priesthood and make their own sacrifice, whereas for the rest of the year only the priests can do this. The reason he gives for this is an historical one, that the people were so delighted at escaping from Egypt that they spontaneously offered sacrifice without waiting for a priest, and this was sanctioned by the Law once a year. "εἰς ἡμῶν κατὰ παλαιὰ ἀρχαιολογίαν ἡσσωρεῖται" says Philo in section 146, but of course his implication that the people offered sacrifice after they left Egypt, does not accord with the biblical account in which they sacrifice before they leave. A different reason for the practice is given in Q.E.1.10:

"Because, in the first place, it was the beginning of this kind of sacrifice, the Levites not yet having been elected to the priesthood."

That is, it was because there were not any priests in existence. He also adds a more spiritual reason in this passage:

"...because the Saviour and Liberator...deemed them (all) equally worthy of sharing in the priesthood."

A further reason, arising out of these two, is that he wished that the particular priesthood should be derived from the priesthood of all Israel rather than the other way round and finally a characteristically Philonean ethical reason is given. It is because he wished the head of
every household to act in a pure way, that is like a priest.

In Spec.Leg.II.147 he gives an allegorical explanation of the festivals which recurs many times in his writings: ὁ θεὸς ἐστὶ τῇ ῥήτᾳ τρέπεις πρὸς ἀληθείαν ἐξός ψυχῆς καθαρεύω συμβεβηκεῖν τῇ διαβασίᾳ.

The reason for this is that it represents the "Diáphis" of the soul from the body and the passions. In Q.E.I.4 a much more elaborate exposition is given starting with the "Diáphis" from place to place made by the Israelites, going on to the "Diáphis" of man from youth to age and that of the mind from the bad to the good, and ending with the "Diáphis" of the soul from the body and the mind from the senses. Thus he fills in the various types of "passing over" which exist between the two extremes of the historical event of the Israelites and the mystical flight of the soul.

It is interesting to note that this allegory is based on a completely different understanding of the "passing over" from that which is found in the bible. In the latter it is the passing over of the angel of God over the Hebrews, whereas Philo takes it to refer to the passing over from Egypt. It may just be possible that he unintentionally misunderstood the biblical account in this way, but it looks very much as if his allegory has influenced his interpretation.

In addition to being given the spiritual meaning set out above, the imagery of the Passover is also used to illustrate other themes, where the focus of attention is not the Passover itself but the theme under consideration. Thus in Mig.25 the main interest is the idea that the ordinary soul must leave the body in haste so that it will not be deflected by temptations and the Passover illustrates and confirms that this is what it must do: θείας γὰρ μετὰ σπουδῆς δεῖν ὁλοκληρώσας τὸ πάσχα, τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἔρπιγμα τῆς διαφασίας, ἐξήνευσος ἀληθείας γνῶσις καὶ προθυμίας εν καρπῷ, ὅταν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἀμετακτείνη ποταμική διαφασία.

In Quis Her.252-5 he is arguing in a confused way that the zeal for good implies a zeal to flee from evil and the Passover is one of a number of instances used to illustrate this: ἐργοδόταις σωτὰς Ἀριμνοτι τῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεστίλλοντος ἐπὶ ἀπόλαυσιν Μωσῆς καὶ θεμπαλιῶς μετὰ σπουδῆς παρακήλεσε τῷ Πάσχα ἐσθόλει, τὴν ἀπὸ τούτῳ διαφασίας εὐδοκεῖσθαι. (Her.255).

The theme in Leg.All.III.151-4 is the relationship between the soul and the body. He says that, because we have bodies, we have to take some thought for their needs, but they must be controlled by reason and
illustrates this by means of Dt. 23. 13. The Passover is then introduced merely to confirm the lesson of the latter text, and the aspect he emphasises is the fact that the Hebrews are ordered to gird up their loins Ex. 12.11 when crossing from Egypt, that is the passions: "ἐκαὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴς διοβόλης αὐτῶν, ὦ κατείγισεν Πάσχα, προστάττετε τὸς ἐσφυρὸν περικύδων", ἵπτος εὐχεστάλθη τὸ ἐπιθυμίας.

(Leg. All. III. 154)

Finally there is another example of this kind of use of the Passover in Leg. All. 92-4. The theme is that ἐλευθέρων is inferior to ἑλευθερία and this is illustrated by two passages from the bible. The first is the story of Ephraim and Manasseh in Gen. 48, which tells of how Joseph brought his two sons to his father Jacob to be blessed. Jacob does this but crosses his hands over so that his right hand rests on the younger one, Ephraim, instead of on Manasseh, explaining it by saying that Ephraim will be superior. Philo identifies Manasseh with ὑπερήφανος and Ephraim with ὑπερήφανος. The other illustration is that of the two Passovers. The people who sacrifice in the first month deserve the more praise and correspond with Ephraim, but those who sacrifice in the second month are given an inferior place by Moses and correspond with Manasseh.

Other details of the Passover ceremonies too are both invested with a spiritual meaning and used metaphorically. The sheep, for instance, is used to symbolise "progress" (QE I. 3), a meaning which is derived from its name πρόβατος and is applied to the progress of the soul in virtue. In QE I. 8 this progress is further explained as that from the female gender to the male, that is from the material to the incorporeal. This symbolism is also employed metaphorically in Leg. All. III. 165, where Philo says:

..... διὰ τὴν προκοπήν, τὸ πρόβατον, ἐλευθερών ..... 

The herbs are also given a symbolism in QE I. 15 where their literal meaning is that of the bitterness of the life of the Hebrews as slaves, while the deeper meaning is the bitterness which a person who has repented feels towards his old life. In Cong. 162 it is the discomfort, which most men think they would experience by getting rid of passion that is represented by the herbs, but the herbs are only used along with the incident at Marah in order to illustrate the theme of bitterness.

The command that every body shall "number sufficient for himself" (Ex. 12. 4) is taken in QE I. 6 as a command to equality and moderation. A surviving Greek fragment of this Quaestio sums up the interpretation:

ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἵπτος εὐχεστάλθη τὸ "μυστήριον ὑλῆς"

In Quis Her. 192-3, the theme of equality is being pursued and this
commandment is used to illustrate it, while in Leg.III.165 it is used to encourage the soul in the principle of "μηδὲν ἁγαθὸν". The forward step, symbolised by the sheep quoted above, is consequently to be taken "μὴ ἀνέτρως".

Finally there is inevitably some number symbolism included in the account. In Spec.Leg.II.149 the fact that the feast falls on the fourteenth day of the month and that fourteen is twice seven, shows that seven appears in all things worthy of honour. The Passover is used to illustrate the fact that God is the tenth in Cong.104-6, where it is said that there are eight parts in heaven, that is one for the fixed stars and seven for the wandering planets, one part in the world for earth and water and thus God their maker is the tenth. The Passover is used, together with a number of other instances, to illustrate this because the Passover lamb is commanded to be chosen on the tenth day of the month.

This double use of Passover imagery, on the one hand a spiritualising and on the other a metaphorical use of it, which has been detected above makes possible an understanding of the difficult passage in Sacr.62 where, referring to the Hebrews who crossed over out of Egypt, he says:

παρόν μόνον δοκοῦσιν ὅρθως βεβουλευθηκάν ὀε πρὸ τῶν μεγάλων
Τούτων τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια μυθιστάτες.

Here the Passover appears to be "τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια" as opposed to the greater mysteries, and the conclusion might be drawn from this that Philo saw those who celebrated the Passover as being initiated into the first stage of a mystery. However, this is not so, for the main interest of the whole passage 60-64 is with the individual soul, as is shown by the exhortation following the reference to the Passover:

ταχέως οὖν αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσω, ἐ προηγαθε 64.

This quest of the soul is expressed in various metaphors, one set of which is drawn from the mystery religions, and one from Jewish cultic myth, in this case that of the Passover. A metaphor of the former type is used in section 60: "....πῶς τελείως μέτοχες γεμομένη τελετῶν μὴ δειν ἐκ τῇ μυστήρια ἤλθον...".

The focus of attention here is not the mystery religion, but the vision of God which the soul seeks. Similarly with the Passover metaphor, it is the taming of the passions which is the centre of attention and not the Passover itself and it is this control and escape from the passions which is described as "τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια". Here the two sets of metaphors are conflated, but the literal imagery is not important compared with the progress of the soul and thus Philo does not think of the Passover as the first stage of a mystery.
There would, at first, appear to be an example of rabbinic application of mystery language to the Passover at Exodus Rabbah 19.6, where it says that another nation shall not know its mysteries (יִרְאֶהָם). The degree to which this may be considered a technical use of the word depends on the view taken of the word's derivation. Jastrow, in his Dictionary of the Talmud, ad loc., seems to imply that it is a direct derivative of יָדַע for he cites this as the root verb immediately after the word in question. If this is accepted, then the meaning is no more than "hidden things". Krauss, however, (Lehnwörter ad loc.) cites the word as a transliteration of μυστήριον. He further points out that יָדַע is often incorrectly used as a plural, but is in fact singular. So, on this view, it is a loan word from the Greek and thus would be more capable of bearing a technical interpretation in this context.

Yet another theory has been advanced by W.L.Knox, (St.Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, p.227), which takes account of both the Hebrew and the Greek factors in the word's etymology. Knox holds that μυστήριον was first transliterated into Hebrew as יָדַע. This was then assimilated to יָדַע by the change of the ג to ד. He goes on to claim that at Exodus R. 19.6 the word is used in its Hellenistic sense. However, his etymology for the word by no means demonstrates this conclusively, for once the assimilation to יָדַע had taken place, it is at least possible that the meaning may have been influenced to such an extent by the root verb, that it meant no more than "secret". Moreover, to claim that the rabbis described the Passover as a "mystery" in the Hellenistic sense is to attribute to them an unusually syncretistic interest, while to say they regarded it as a "secret" to be hidden from other nations, only reflects that particularism which was noted above in connection with the Sabbath.

Goodenough has tried to argue that Philo saw the Passover as a mystery, by employing a fragment (Harris p.75) which refers to the "sacred table" (ἱερὰς ἑορτὰς). This, he claimed, could very well be a reference to the Paschal meal celebrated in a mystical form by Alexandrian Jews, (By Light, Light p.261). Later, however, in his "Introduction to Philo" he is forced to admit (p.204) that there is no evidence for such independent mystic rites, but qualifies this by saying that mystic philosophy may have been applied to Jewish observances. On Goodenough's own views these observances cannot include the Passover, for he follows Moore in asserting that the Passover could only be celebrated in Jerusalem at the time of Philo. (By Light, Light p.261-2).

His argument for a mystical form of the Jewish Passover would have
carried more weight if he had been prepared to admit the possibility of a Passover rite, celebrated in the Diaspora before the destruction of the Temple. A case can be made for such a rite, which would probably have emphasised the Hametz element of the festival. However, even assuming that this was the case, it would be unusual to find Philo talking in this amount of detail concerning contemporary Jewish practice. Apart from a few general references to the synagogue, he confines himself to dealing with rites found in the Law. If any context is to be posited for this fragment, that of the worship of the soul, expressed in terms of mystery religion, would appear to be far more characteristic of Philo than that of the Paschal meal.

Philo's whole use of language drawn from the mystery religions is an extensive topic in itself, but as he does not use this language in cultic contexts, it is really only of peripheral concern for our purpose. It is unfortunate that undue prominence has been given to it in this sphere by Goodenough's application of mystery concepts to Philo's treatment of the cultus.

The next feast to be dealt with is that of Unleavened Bread. This he gives both a national and a cosmic reference, (Spec.Leg.II.150). The former because it is connected with the Exodus and the latter for a number of reasons as follows. First, because the month in which the feast occurs is the first month, and it is the first month because the Spring is a likeness of the creation:

(Spec.Leg.II.151).

Secondly because the feast begins on the fifteenth day of the month at the full moon when there is no darkness, ibid.155 and thirdly because it lasts for seven days which, as many times elsewhere, is a good thing from Philo's point of view, for God intended seven to be "τὰς ἀρχὰς οἰκείας, καθ' ἣν ὁ κόσμος ἐκδημογένετο".

(Spec.Leg.II.151).

The fourth reason is that the fact that the first and last days are holy corresponds with the natural harmony on a musical instrument between the intermediates and the extremes. These four reasons show why the feast corresponds with nature and the cosmos. He also gives both a national and a cosmic reason for the fact that the bread is unleavened. The first is that the Hebrews left Egypt in such haste that they brought the dough unleavened, which is the reason given in the bible, Ex.12.39, and the second is that the bread is thus imperfect and corresponds with the imperfection of the crops which in spring are, as yet, unripe. (Spec.Leg.II.158). Alternatively, he says, others hold that unleavened bread is a gift of
nature, while leavened is a work of art. He then continues: έπει ούν έστειλ ή ἔκφραση έστιν, καθάπερ εἴδειξε τῆς τοῦ κόσμου νεώσεως ὑπόσχεσα, τοὺς δὲ παλαιστάτους... ἀναμνησάς τινας τοῦ κόσμου δυρεαίς ξεδιστρόφος μήτε τῆς ἕσων παρευπαρεύσης, οiêuνται τοῦ ποιοῦ ἔσχεθη ἔτη τῷ καλῷ... ibid.160.

It is thus a call to a more ascetic way of life.

In Cong.161 unleavened bread is used to illustrate the theme of affliction, since it is called "ἄρτου κακοσελακ" and in 168 it is said that the shew-bread in the Temple is derived from the unleavened bread of this feast. This festival, too, therefore exhibits the characteristic features of spiritual meaning and metaphorical use of its imagery.

The next festival is that of the Sheaf which occurs during that of Unleavened Bread. This offering is a first fruit of the land of Israel and also the whole world: ὥσ τεκε διὰ οὗ ὀποιηθηκα καὶ οὗ θέου ἐκκεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὀποιηθηκα ἄνθρωπον γένος κοινήν.

Spec.Leg.II.162. Philo thus universalises the festival, and continues with the passage on the Jews as the priests of the world which was mentioned in the section on priesthood. The reason, he says, that they are priests is that they alone worship the true God, and then follows an apologetic passage where he says that the Jews ought not to be accused of inhumanity since they are in fact so good willed to men everywhere, "ὡς τὰς τε εὐχαὶ καὶ ἱεραίς καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους τῶν ἁμαρτίων ἐπιτελεῖς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ ἑρατείας ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐκκεν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων......

Spec.Leg.II.167. Here the universalising is applied not just to this festival but to all of them. The overall character of the passage, is however, apologetic rather than theological and this assertion of universalism seems to be motivated here by the desire to answer the charge of "ἀντικριτικ". This is supported by the fact that, when speaking in a spiritual context, the note of universalism is absent. Thus in Somn.II.75: δεί πώς καὶ ἡμετέρα ἐξαιρέτω έστι οὗ ὁμόθεν θέου φρόνιμως πληθύν οὗ ὑπεντε, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄπο τῆς ἑρατείας γῆς.

This is spiritualised to mean that when the soul enters the land of virtue, it should offer a first fruit to God.

In Spec.Leg.II.168 he turns his attention to the significance of the feast for the nation, which is as a thanksgiving for the fact that they possess land and that it is good land, and then he further narrows the
terms of reference down to the good it does the individual. It has three main advantages. First it makes us remember God, secondly by it we make requital to Him who gives the good harvest and thirdly, on the human level, we learn to be grateful to benefactors. The reasons are then given why the sheaf is of barley, namely that it shows inferior grain is not censured and it would be irreverent to offer something designed to give pleasure such as, presumably, wheat. Philo has thus used the festival of the Sheaf as an opportunity for expounding his concept of thanksgiving and, because of this, it has assumed an importance greater than that which it is accorded either in the bible or in Jewish tradition.

Philo calls the Sheaf a "προσορτος" of the feast of Weeks or Pentecost and, indeed, they are linked in that they are both harvest feasts, Sheaf marking the beginning of the barley harvest and Weeks the end of the wheat. Naturally the calculation of the length of time between the Passover and Pentecost gives Philo an opportunity for some number symbolism. Philo counts it as fifty days from the Sheaf, which was the Pharisaic reckoning, and fifty is significant because it is seven times seven, plus the sacred monad ςτς εστιν ὅραματος Θεοῦ εἰκῶν .

Spec.Leg.II.176.

However, fifty is also important for another reason in that it is the sum of the squares of the sides of the primary right-angled triangle. Philo then argues that, if the sum of the sides which is twelve, represents the zodiac cycle, then the sum of the squares, fifty, must represent something superior: Τῶν Ἐκ Παράδειγμα Τῷ Κρέιττῳ, Ἡ Πεντέκομας, Ἡ Πάντως Ἀνάμισσος Φύεις .

Spec.Leg.II.178.

He gives two reasons why the feast is called "πρωτογενὴςμας". One is that the first produce of the young wheat is brought, while the other is that wheat is the best and, therefore the first, of the sown crops. Next follow three reasons why the loaves which are offered at this feast are leavened in contrast with the usual custom which forbade leaven to be brought to the altar. The first is that they are going to be eaten by the priests, although this is not a very compelling reason since the unleavened shew bread was also eaten by them. However, leaven is also said to stand for two other things, on the one hand for food in its most complete form, on the other for joy which is the rising of the soul. This is a characteristically Stoic definition of "μέθυα". The joy in this case is the possession of the fruits of the harvest, on account of which, ἄξιον γενότομος εὐχαριστεῖν Πολλομένους διάφορος τῆς περὶ τὴν δόμον καὶ τὴν δια Φειδήν διὰ τῶν ἐξουσιών ἄρτων εὐχαριστεῖν .

Spec.Leg.II.185.
Finally he concludes by saying that loaves are offered, not meal, because nothing is lacking in the way of food at harvest time, and two loaves are offered because one stands for the past and the other for the future.

Pentecost is referred to in Spec.Leg.I.183-5 where the sacrificial offerings are detailed. A different symbolism is attached to the preservation offerings made at the feast from the one normally given them, for here they are said to symbolise the preservation of food from all mishaps. Finally the customary metaphorical use of the feast’s imagery occurs at Sac.87 where speaking in the context of the worship of the soul he says: 

Having reviewed Philo’s treatment of Pentecost, we are now in a position to evaluate Goodenough’s statement concerning this feast, “The First Fruits, with the leavened cake, are even more elaborately a symbol of partaking of mystic food, divine sustenance, manna, the Logos” (Introduction to Philo,p.208). It is difficult to see how such an interpretation can be extracted from the evidence, for nowhere does Philo see the loaves as mystic food. In Spec.Leg.II.184 he does say that the leaven is a symbol of “ἐντελεστάτης καὶ ὀλοκλήρου τροφῆς” but he is not exalting the character of the bread rather he is trying to justify the presence of the leaven at all and continues, with reference to the food, “ἡς ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐρέως ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἡμέραν χρήσει κρίττονα καὶ λυτελεστέρα.”

Hardly mystic food, merely no worse than is used every day. Moreover, the consumption of the loaves is said to be done by the priests and the loaves are merely classed together with all the other offerings which are brought to the altar, (ibid.183). This is very far from a symbolic partaking of the Logos, as Goodenough suggests.

One final footnote needs to be added to the account of this feast, and this concerns the reference in Vit.Contemp.65 where Philo says of the Therapeutae: 

Both Conybeare (Vit.Contemp.p.313) and Colson (Loeb vol.IX p.152) take this as Philo expressing the opinion that Pentecost is the greatest feast. However, there are two ways of interpreting this passage. One is to take it to mean that there was a feast every fifty days, which is the view taken by J.Milik in “Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judaea”, (n.2,p.92) who parallels it with the Qumran calendar found in Cave IV. On this view,
there is no reference to Pentecost at all. The other view does see it as referring to Pentecost, and the phrase "after seven sets of seven days" is taken to mean the period after the Sheaf. Vermes, who argues for the identification of the Therapeutae with the Essenes and the Qumran community, says the reason it is referred to here as the chief feast is that this was the feast of the renewal of the covenant, as portrayed in Manual of Discipline I.16-III.12. (Durham University Journal 1959-60). However, one does not have to adopt his extreme view of the identity of the three types of community, to see that Philo is here not expressing his own view, as Colson and Conybeare assume, but is giving that of the Therapeutae. It is for them, not Philo, that Pentecost is the "chief feast" and so this passage does not necessarily reveal anything about his attitude to the festival.

In Spec.Leg.II.188-92 there is an account of the next feast of the year, namely the "Trumpet Feast" which marks the beginning of the civil year. Its name comes from the custom of sounding the trumpet in the Temple, he says, when the sacrifices are brought in, and the feast is given a twofold significance by him, derived from this custom. The first is a national one and relates to the sound of the trumpet which was heard on Sinai at the giving of the Ten Commandments: "φωνὴ τῆς εὐλαμπροσ ἡχεὶ μένα " (Ex.19.16). This made known to the whole world that a great event had taken place. It is interesting that Philo here links the giving of the Law with this feast, whereas later Jewish tradition associated it with Pentecost, but this would seem to be a result of two different approaches. Philo, working from his Greek bible, was led to his conclusion by the verbal coincidence of εὐλαμπροσ whereas the rabbis arrived at theirs by calculating the supposed dates of the first Passover and the giving of the Law, which placed the latter at about the time of Pentecost.

The other significance of the feast is a universal one. It is derived from the fact that the trumpet is a military instrument used in war, and the latter is compared with the war waged by nature against agriculture. Thus the Law ordained that the trumpet should be: "ἐπὶ εὐχαριστίᾳ τοῦ εὐημεροτοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ εὐημεροφύλακος . (192).

The unusual association of this feast with the harvest should be noted.

In Spec.Leg.I.180 the sacrifices to be offered on this feast are described. These are double since it is a double feast, being both a New Moon and the beginning of the sacred month. However, the calves are not doubled: Τοῦ βραβευτοῦ δεκαώρατος ἄκιμωτος φύσει μονάδος πρὸ διαφερῆς διάδοσις χρησάθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐημεροῦ. An instance of number symbolism being used to explain a seeming inconsistency in the Law.
S. Belkin in "Philo and the Oral Law" points out that, while the rabbis prescribed a horn not a trumpet for this feast, the Septuagint and Philo both take it as a trumpet, (p. 211). He then goes on to argue from Philo to contemporary Alexandrian practice saying that "had the horn been blown on New Year in the Alexandrian synagogues, Philo would have discussed it further and would not have discussed it merely as a Temple ceremony". (p. 213). This, however, does not necessarily follow since it has become increasingly apparent during this study that Philo was working almost exclusively from the written Law and he rarely mentions contemporary practice. Thus the reason Philo associates the blowing of the trumpets with the Temple, is not because he "must have heard of the Jews gathering near the Temple in order to hear the sound of the horns, or as he calls it, the trumpets", (p. 214) but because the locus of the feasts and worship described in Lev. 23-24 is the tabernacle.

On the tenth day of the month opened by the Trumpet Feast, occurs the Day of Atonement a Fast which Philo now describes. He defends its position as a feast against those who would say that it has none of the characteristics, saying that such people are ignorant of "τής προς Ὀληθείας εὐφροσύνης " Spec.Leg.II.194. It is in fact the greatest of the feasts a "ἐνθάδε ἐνθάδε" or as the Greeks would say" ἐβσομάδα ἐβσομάδαν".

There are several reasons for this pre-eminence. First is the self-restraint which it involves which, if practised with regard to food, is easy to extend to the other desires. Secondly because the whole day is spent in prayers for forgiveness and, thirdly, because at the time it is held the harvest is gathered in and the fast indicates the proper place of food. (Again the association with the harvest is to be noted). By doing this people show their trust is in God and not food, who nourishes us as is shown by his gift of manna in the wilderness: έιμι... μετὰ φροντίδοις τῶν χορηγοῦντος τῶν χορηγῶν Θεομένων καὶ προσκυνώσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἐρήμωσιν ὑμαῖν καὶ ἐκδικημοιονεὶς γεραίρωσεν. Spec.Leg.II.199.

The feast is held on the tenth day of the month and this calls forth from Philo a brief summary of the virtues of ten. The significance of this is that, by basing the feast on ten, Moses prescribed the best form of nourishment for us, which is made possible by fasting namely "διανείσαι καὶ καλαπρωδία ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς πῦρης." (ibid. 202). Lastly the feast reminds those who are enjoying good fortune of what misfortune is like, so that they may be grateful for what they have.

In Spec.Leg.I.186 he asserts that even the irreligious observe this
feast as well as the religious. He then points out a double significance based on the sacrifices which are offered. First it is a feast and, therefore, it has the same sacrifices as the sacred month days and secondly it is a purification, hence the sacrifice of a ram and one kid and the freeing of the other kid in the wilderness.

Mos.II.23 repeats the emphasis on the high standard with which the feast is kept: τίς δὲ τὴν λεγομένην μητέραν οὐ τεσσάρες καὶ προεκυκλείς δὲ ἑτούς......;

He then goes on to contrast it favourably with the Greek "holy month".

Apart from these treatments of the Day of Atonement, there are the accustomed passages in which the feast is used metaphorically in the sphere of the mind and soul. Thus in Gig.52 the fact that the High Priest could only enter the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement is used of Reason resorting to the sacred doctrines, while in Post.Cain.70 the scape-goat is used as a symbol of the "ἐλπίς βίου ". The two goats are used in Plant.61 to represent two attitudes of mind, one of which belongs to the "γυμνὰ ἐσπαθί " (58) and the other to the "Αβαμ νιό " (60). Of these attitudes, seen as the goats, " ὁ ἀποδεμνώμων μὲν οὖ ὁ ἄλλος τὸ αὐτοῦ (τιμή) αὕτη προέκλητοςτις, ὁ δὲ νέασσα φυγαδεύσατος..... (61).

To sum up, therefore, Philo makes the Day of Atonement not only a fast, but a feast and also an expression of the Greek dualism between the body and the soul, for on this day the latter is freed from the distractions of the body.

The final festival is that of Tabernacles which is said to occur at the autumn equinox, a fact which suggests to Philo two morals. The explanation of the first of these contains some interesting imagery for, he says, it teaches that we should honour equality and hate inequality: ἢ μὲν νηρὸς δικαλουμένης ἑστιν, ἢ δὲ ἀδικίας ἀρχή τε καὶ πηγή, καὶ ἢ μὲν ἀδικίαν φωτός, ἢ δὲ σκότους εὐγενέσις. Spec.Leg.II.204.

The references to the "fountain" and "light" recall the Temple ritual connected with this festival of pouring out a libation of spring water and illuminating the Temple with many lights. The second moral is that we should give thanks to God for the fruits of the harvest, a sentiment which is derived from the word for autumn, "μετόπωρον" which means "after-fruitage".

The command that the people should live in tents during this festival is given two reasons, (ibid.206-9). First is that, now the harvest is gathered in, the farm workers no longer have to live in the open air guarding the crops. This connection with the harvest is interesting because modern
scholars are of the opinion that these tents or booths originated with the temporary dwellings erected in the vineyards during the vintage season. The second reason is the one given in Lev.23.43, that it is a reminder of the wandering in the wilderness. Philo, however, carries this further saying that it teaches men to remember misfortune when they are enjoying good. This is both a θητον (Spec.Leg.II.208) and also helps in the practice of virtue since it makes people grateful and thus they worship God, lest their fortune should change.

The festival begins on the fifteenth day of the month, at the equinox, when there is no darkness and, also, it has an eighth day called the θετον which marks the end not only of this feast, but of all the feasts of the year. An eighth day also has a symbolic significance in that it is the first cubic number and represents solids, which agrees with the stability of the feast caused by the relief from anxiety for the people now that the crops are harvested.

In Spec.Leg.I.189 there is a purely factual description of the sacrifices made during the festival, of which no explanation is given at all, while in Dec.161 Tabernacles is referred to, together with Unleavened Bread, as "τας μετέστης τότε εορτάς". The latter has some parallel in Josephus' description of the feast as "παρὰ τοῖς Εβραίοις ἀναμνήστης καὶ μεμνήστης" Ant.VIII.100. Plutarch also describes it as the greatest of the Jewish feasts in Quaest. Conv.IV.6: "τῆς μεμνήστης καὶ τελεστήμης έορτής παρὰ τοῖς τελεστήμης έορτάς ......

The latter two writers, however, merely reflect the fact that Tabernacles did hold a pre-eminent position in Judaism, whereas Philo is arguing its importance from the fact that it occurs at the equinox and, in fact, Philo calls several of the feasts the "chief feast" for example Pentecost and Passover so that he does not have a single major one.

In volume four of "Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period" Goodenough, arguing from the fact that the Temple is not mentioned in Spec.Leg.II.204-13, says that this account represents the rite celebrated in Alexandria. He has some difficulty with the fact that the lulab and ethrog, which he believed were used there, are not mentioned, but explains this by saying that they are omitted because they are too Jewish for Philo's Gentile readers. However, as has been observed above, Philo rarely mentions contemporary Jewish practice and certainly does not appear to base his exposition of the law upon it. He is writing a commentary, for the most part, on the Pentateuch and this is what he is doing here, and we would expect his writing to be influenced by the content of the passage which he
is explaining. This would certainly seem to be the case in this instance, for in Lev.23.39-43 there is neither any mention of the Temple, although it is assumed that the locus of the festival is the tabernacle, nor any mention of the lulab, and it is this fact which causes the omission from Philo's account. He is thus commenting on a written passage and if any contemporary Jewish rites are at the back of his mind, they are those in the Temple which are reflected in his choice of imagery.

Goodenough's further assertion in the same volume that the symbolism given to the number eight, in dealing with the last day of the festival, represents the transition from the immaterial to the material of the One, and thus the eighth day is a transition upwards for us, is also without foundation. He attempts to reinforce this interpretation by seeing in the term "\( \zeta \xi \sigma \o\sigma \o \)" a reference to the Exodus which was seen by Philo as a passing from the material to the immaterial. However, what Philo is attempting to do in this passage is justify the addition of this eighth day at all, and uses this symbolism to do so, while he uses the word "\( \zeta \xi \sigma \o\sigma \o \)" because it is in his text at Lev.23.36. That Philo was not thinking of the transition from the material to the immaterial, is shown by the fact that the aspect of the symbolism on to which he fixes is the stability implied by the solids which eight represents.

The generally unsatisfactory nature of this treatment by Goodenough of Tabernacles which we have criticised above, is pointed out by Nock in his review of "Jewish Symbols" in Gnomon vol.27, 1955. He quotes Goodenough on Philo's idea that the tents remind us of the fathers in the wilderness, "Thus Tabernacles is the eucharist of the mystic journey from the world of matter and sin to that of spirit", but goes on to say that this "means no more than "forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit" (Virg.Aen.I.203)".

It would therefore seem that Goodenough is so anxious to read into Philo his own ideas of what he means, that he fails to do justice to the actual meaning which Philo gives to this festival, namely that it is a harvest festival with commemorative associations with the sojourn in the wilderness.

This concludes the consideration of the festivals in Philo. As with other aspects of the cultus, in spite of his insistence on their literal observance, the effect of his treatment would probably be to weaken the outward institution, for he transfers much of the emphasis to the state of joy and thankfulness of the soul which the festivals express. This change of emphasis has also brought about a change in the conception of time in relation to the festivals. In their primitive stage of development the
festivals are thought to have been largely apotropaic and thus the attention is on the present, later they become commemorative and therefore much of the attention is switched to the past, while in Philo it comes full circle again as the attention is fixed more on the present spiritual and moral state of the participant in the festival. However, the traditional commemorative element is not ignored, by any means, as has been observed, and there are references to the wilderness, the Exodus and the giving of the Law. Moreover, the harvest associations of some of the festivals are not only retained, but also extended to other festivals which did not traditionally have this association. Such an interpretation of them seems to be far from mystical and it is therefore difficult to agree with Goodenough when he says of festivals in general in Philo, "The traditional Jewish associations with the Festival are entirely ignored, that the mystic Jew may find in them a means of escape from the material, a medium for partaking of the Logos". (Introduction to Philo, p.209).
Conclusions

We may now set out some of the general characteristics of Philo's treatment of the cultus which have emerged in the course of this study. A fact which has become increasingly clear is that there is a discrepancy between many of his explicit statements about the cult and the overall character of his treatment of this aspect of Jewish worship. On the one hand he professes an unswerving allegiance to the regulations of the ritual law, while on the other making it impossible to attribute any real efficacy to the rites prescribed by that law.

An example of this occurs in his insistence on the necessity for the material cult in Mig.89-93, parts of which have been quoted above and here he asserts that the spiritual meaning, which can be read into an ordinance, is no substitute for observing it. This can be contrasted with the total effect of his treatment of the cult which is to transfer attention away from the material cultic institutions to the spiritual realm. Thus, to take just one example, it has been seen how he evacuates sacrifice of any real significance by emphasising the approach of the soul to God which lies behind it, to the exclusion of any atoning function carried out by the act itself. Thus, while he consciously expresses a loyalty to orthodox Judaism, the character of his thought makes this seem at times a rather hollow claim.

Consonant with his professed adherence to the material cult, is his explicit statement of the subordinate position held by Greek philosophy which is found in De Cher.104: ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐγκυλίου τῶν προαιδρημάτων μελέτης τῶν πρὸς κόσμου τῆς φύσεως ὡς ἐστίας ἠρητάκα. Here the learning of the schools is seen as being nothing more than the ornaments of the soul and not its foundation. However, the spiritual worship of God by the soul which has been constantly encountered in this study is in fact founded on concepts drawn from Greek philosophy rather than Hebrew thought. For instance the dualism between the material and the immaterial forms the whole basis for the flight of the soul to God as it passes from one realm to the other, a flight which is illustrated by the crossing of the Red Sea. Again this dualism is present in several passages dealing with the Ark which sometimes represents the intelligible world as opposed to the sensible, and similarly with the "ἵππος" which formed part of the High Priest's headgear. Another example of this dependence on Greek philosophy is the use of the Stoic idea of the importance of conformity with the "κόσμος" and man as a microcosm. This is clearly connected with the strong ethical element in Philo's thought, since conformity with
the "κόσμος" is one of the motives for pursuing virtue, and here again it is to be noted that his ethics are essentially Greek in character. From this it can be seen that Greek philosophy is far more than an ornament in many aspects of his thought and this another instance of Philo diverging in practice from what he asserts in theory.

It is interesting to note that the explicit statements lie on the side of loyalty to Judaism, while the tendencies of his thought carry him away from this. Thus he is not criticising the cult when he reads into it a spiritual meaning. This is important since, if it is not borne in mind, superficial parallels may be drawn between Philo and the writings of the Qmran community. Similar tendencies in both have been noted above and this can be partly accounted for by the similarity of their situations, both being isolated from the cult. The underlying motivation, however, is entirely different for, while the Qmran covenants rejected the impurity of the Temple cultus, no such criticism is present in Philo's writings which might account for the contrast in his thought mentioned above. Ritual purity has no real intrinsic interest for Philo. Indeed, when he comes across a regulation of this type, he tends to impart to it a moral significance, as in Spec.Leg.I.80 where he takes the regulation that a priest should be without physical blemish to symbolise the perfection of the soul. Philo's Greek outlook in the field of ethics is here again evident and this fact also distinguishes him sharply from the Qmran writers. Thus Philo does not have reservations about the Jerusalem cult in the same way as the sectarians of the Dead Sea. We therefore have to look elsewhere for the roots of the contrast in his thought which is being examined.

A possible reason for it is his apologetic motive. This would account for both sides of the contrast, the open assertion of loyalty to Judaism and the departure from the norm of orthodoxy as he seeks to express this Judaism in the categories of the gentile, Hellenistic world. It is certainly not unusual for an apologist to be led into heresy by his own zeal to make himself intelligible to those for whom he is writing. However, while there are strong apologetic elements in Philo's writings which have been noted above, yet merely to describe them as an apology for Judaism would quite obviously be far from satisfactory. When Hellenistic thought forms are encountered in Philo, they do not appear merely as those of his audience into which he is translating what he wishes to say. Rather they appear very much as part of his own way of thinking and he in no way gives the impression of handling alien concepts. Thus it is impossible to say that one side of the contrast lies in Philo, while the other lies in the gentile world to whom he
addresses his apology, for the fact is that both sides are present in Philo himself. Finally it must be added that, if his works are intended solely as an apology, then, viewed from our standpoint, they are not a very effective one. This is particularly so in his treatment of the cultus, since a work which transfers the attention away from the literal institutions of the cult to the meaning behind them, is not really designed to recommend those institutions to others. His writings did, however, meet the needs of the early Christian church, who were not concerned with maintenance of the literal cult but did want to be able to extract some meaning from the cultic passages of the Old Testament.

The existence of this apologetic motive is admitted by Goodenough, but for him it is only one of a number of factors which lead to the total transformation of Judaism into a twofold mystery religion. However, throughout this study instances have been noted where Philo diverges from the scheme set out for him by Goodenough, according to which there should be a "mystery of Aaron" confined to the outer shrine, and a "mystery of Moses" connected with the inner shrine. In fact this division has been shown to be false and elements from both so-called "mysteries" have been found in either part of the shrine.

Another fact which weighs against Goodenough's theory is that a reading of Philo, in his words, "with the grain" (Introduction, p. 20) does not inevitably lead to that theory, for it has proved possible to produce an alternative exposition of Philo's treatment of the cultus without reference to a twofold mystery, except to note where Goodenough's theory does not hold good. The fact is that there is only one instance of Philo actually using mystery language in a cultic passage and that is with reference to the Passover, (Sacr. 62). Even here it is not used of the cultic aspect of the feast, but of the "myth" of the crossing of the Red Sea. Thus it is really Goodenough himself who imports the concept of a "mystery" into this facet of Philo's thought.

The most positive value of Goodenough's view is that it does justice to the large mystical element in Philo, an aspect which is totally ignored by Wolfson, whose estimate of Philo is consequently less than adequate. However, the fact remains that this mystical element is far from being as organised and schematic as Goodenough holds. It would indeed appear that any attempt to force an external plan on to Philo's thought is exposed as inadequate if full attention is paid to the way in which he is working, which is from the text of the Pentateuch. It is the subject matter contained in this text which, to a large extent, determines the content of his work,
rather than a logical selection of topics made to illustrate a set of basic principles, and this is what makes it so difficult to detect an underlying plan that will account for all the facets of his thought. The difficulty is increased by the manner in which he treats scripture. Generally he does not seek to impose an overall order of his own on the Pentateuch, but takes the passages in comparative isolation from each other, bringing the whole of his thought to bear on each one. He then appears to hang as much of his thought on a passage as it will support and then moves on to the next where the process is repeated. The result of this is that there may be a considerable overlap between his commentary on one passage and that on another, and the same ideas appear in different contexts.

In the course of this study it has become evident that Philo treats cultic passages of the Old Testament in one or more of three ways. First there is plain exegesis of the text, attempting to draw out its literal meaning. Some of the explanations may seem rather fanciful to us, but they represent the nearest Philo gets to doing justice to the original meaning of a passage. Examples of this type of exegesis occur throughout the Quaestiones, where Philo frequently gives the literal meaning of a text first. For instance, QE II.100: "Why is the height of the altar three cubits?". The answer he gives first is that it is just high enough to conceal the lower part of the priest's body when he is ministering at it. This is the literal interpretation which is followed by a more spiritual and symbolic one.

This brings us to Philo's second method of treating a text, which involves reading into it a spiritual significance probably not intended in the original. As has been seen this method is employed extensively, especially in the De Specialibus Legibus and the Quaestiones. Just one example will be given here. In QE II.69 the table is said to be "a symbol of sense perceptible and body-like substance".

Finally there is the third method which has been encountered and this is the use of cultic material to describe some aspect of Philo's personal and mystical religion of the soul. In these passages the focus of attention is not centred on the cult, but on the soul, and the former is used in a way which is best described as metaphorical. The use of Passover imagery in Sacr.62 is a good example of this.

Having thus begun by establishing these points about the way in which Philo worked, it is now possible to draw certain conclusions about his thought in the light of them. First is that he saw the Temple cultus in terms of that personal, spiritual religion to which we have already referred.
This is what he is doing in the second method of working mentioned above, by which he reads into a cultic text the truths of this inner religion of the soul. Thus, for example, the offering of the incense can represent the approach of the soul to God. Second is the reverse of this, namely that he saw his spiritual religion in terms of the Temple cult, and this corresponds with the third method above, which is the metaphorical use of cultic imagery. It is important that these two types of passage be clearly distinguished from each other since, while the former can be used to throw light on Philo's attitude to the cultus, the latter is not really saying anything about the cult at all. It is dealing primarily with the religion of the soul. The result of not giving full weight to this distinction can be seen in Goodenough's works, in which he frequently takes these metaphorical passages as if they said something about the cult, a procedure that helps him to maintain his view that Philo saw the cult as a mystery religion of the soul.

Parallel to this metaphorical use of cultic imagery is his use of imagery drawn from the mystery religions, that is he also sees his spiritual religion in terms of the mysteries. If the conclusions reached above in connection with this metaphorical use of the imagery of the Temple cult are borne in mind when considering his use of "mystery" language, then an exaggeration of the importance of this language will be avoided. That is it cannot be taken to be referring to the mysteries themselves, for the centre of attention is likewise here the religion of the soul, and the imagery of the mysteries is purely metaphorical.

Two negative conclusions may also be drawn. One is that, quite obviously, Philo did not see the mysteries in terms of his spiritual religion as he did with the Temple cult. The other is that no place has been found in this analysis for the conclusion that Philo saw the Temple cult in terms of the mystery religions, as Goodenough claims that he did. In fact it would appear highly unlikely that Philo would wish to make such an identification, in view of his explicit hostility to the mysteries. It is therefore erroneous to picture Philo as attempting to resolve a tension between the Temple cultus and the mystery religions. The poles of his thought are in fact much more satisfactorily to be seen as the cultic passages of the Pentateuch on the one hand, and a vividly experienced personal religion, expressed primarily in Hellenistic terms, on the other, and it is these which he is trying to reconcile by transferring the imagery of one to the other and vice versa. Seen in this way, Philo's interpretation of the Temple cultus is largely determined by the tension between his personal and his institutional religion.
In Philo's case this tension is exacerbated by the fact that his institutional religion belonged to one culture, while his personal religion belonged to another. The former, which included the Temple cult, he experienced primarily in an indirect form in the Septuagint and this naturally made strong claims on his loyalty. For him to have abandoned his Jewish heritage would have been unthinkable and also highly unlikely when he was a member of a self-conscious and persecuted minority. However, the Jewish religion in itself does not appear to have provided him with any kind of living faith or experience of the transcendent, for these both stem from his personal mysticism. It is from this that Philo draws his real inspiration and it is this which provides the dynamic for his thinking. His main concern cannot be said to be the keeping of the Law of Moses, as should be the concern of an orthodox Jew. Philo's attention is centred on the state of his soul in its progress towards God, a progress which was furthered, not by Jewish ritual, but by contemplation and asceticism of a completely Greek type. This is why Philo's treatment of the cult basically undermines it, because it does not play a significant part in his spiritual life. His loyalty to Judaism could be said to be more cultural than religious.

Nevertheless, this loyalty remained very real and it was obviously necessary for him to work out a system which could accommodate both it and his personal religion. From our standpoint, as we read his works, the synthesis which he created may often appear unsatisfactory and contrived. There are many passages which seem to illustrate C. Siegfried's judgement that Philo has "that model lack of clarity which, in conjunction with an extraordinary susceptibility, makes it possible for a large variety of contradictory ideas to coexist in one mind..."* Yet, when all this has been said, no matter how unsatisfactory his system may appear to us, the fact remains that, for Philo, it was a success, since he was able to remain a practising Jew, while still continuing, "φιλοσοφία ἐκκλησίας καὶ Ὀσωρίας ταῦτα κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ" (Spec.III.1)

* Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments (1875) p.223.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Texts, Greek:

Hebrew:

Journals
JBL. Journal of Biblical Literature.

Books and Articles
BELKIN, S. Philo and the Oral Law. Cambridge (Mass.), 1940.
An Introduction to Philo Judaeus. Newhaven, 1940.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNOX, W.L.</td>
<td>&quot;Pharisaism and Hellenism&quot;, in The Contact of Pharisaism with Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultures, (Judaism and Christianity vol. II); edited by H.Loewe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London, 1937.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity, (Schweich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vol.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCUS, R.</td>
<td>&quot;Recent Literature on Philo (1924-34)&quot;, in Jewish Studies in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOCK, A.D.</td>
<td>Hellenistic Mysteries and Christian Sacraments. Mnemosyne S.IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHROYER, M.J.</td>
<td>Alexandrian Jewish Literalists. JBL 55, pp 261-84.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHURER, E.</td>
<td>History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ. English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOWERS, S.G.</td>
<td>The Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews. Basel Studies of Theology,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>