Church, state and society in the thought of F. D. Maurice

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How to cite:
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CHURCH, STATE AND SOCIETY
IN THE
THOUGHT
OF
F.D. MAURICE

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1973
The year 1972 marked the centenary of the death of F.D. Maurice, the great Anglican divine and Christian Socialist leader. This event sparked a renewed interest in his life and thought, and several new books have appeared. In this dissertation I wish to examine his legacy to modern Christians. The Victorian society in which his thought is rooted is no longer. Modern technology which was only just beginning then has now reached mammoth proportions, and the problems which accompany a capitalist economy have grown accordingly. Yet Maurice speaks to the modern man, as the great interest in his thought in the past two or three years has indicated. Once he is examined in his own setting, his valuable insights into the meaning of human life and society can be applied to our own society. I have taken as the main question, "What is of value in Maurice's thought now that the Christian State has disappeared?" This requires an examination of his notion of the Divine Order, Kingdom, Church, the State, and the relation of the Church to the State in particular and to society in general. The principal works I have used for this study are The Kingdom of Christ (1842) and Social Morality, although other writings have been referred to which support the arguments he has made in those two major works.

The problems of his language and thought are many; most prominent are the relation of secular to sacred, the divinization of the State and society, and his identification of the Kingdom of God and Christ with the empirical Church. Bearing in mind that special blend of conservative and radical elements in his thought, I have found three major contributions to modern Christian life:
his notion of the Church as sacrament of the Kingdom; his attempt towards a political theology which should have resulted in revolutionary change in social structures; his feeling that the Church must retain its transcendent character and be true to its purely religious (therefore critical) message. It is this last which links his thought to many modern writings on the Church, including those of Paul Tillich, and which provides one answer to the complex question of the position of Christians in the modern world.
The purpose of this study is to examine critically the ecclesiology of F.D. Maurice and its relationship to his political thought. To put it a different way, I wish to examine in Maurice's main writings his theology of the Church and its relation to the State and to society. I will proceed in the following way: first, his societal concept, that of the "Divine Order" or "Spiritual Constitution" of man's life, second, his concept of the Kingdom of Christ, third, his idea of the Church, fourth, his theory of the State or Nation, and finally, his doctrine of the Church's relation to that State and to society, specifically the Church of England's relation to the nineteenth century state of which Maurice is speaking. The principal works referred to are 1. The Kingdom of Christ, volumes I and II, and Social Morality.

It is unnecessary here to give a summary of Maurice's life and his place in nineteenth century thought. Christensen has given a comprehensive survey as has C.E. Raven, and a detailed account was given by his son, Frederick Maurice, in his collection of his father's letters. His importance as a theologian cannot be doubted, as the main body of works written about him in the mid-twentieth century attest. Recently there has been a renewed interest in Maurice, since the centenary of his death in 1972.

1. F.D. Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ. (2nd ed.) (London: James Clarke and Co., 1842. Reprinted, 1959. Original reprint by Hivington, 1842.) Hereafter referred to as KC I or KC II. (First edition quotes will appear as KC I (1838). There were three volumes in the first (1838) edition.)


3. See bibliography for details of Christensen, Raven, and F. Maurice, Jr.
and two books have appeared: one by Olive Johnson Brose who describes very well the blend of conservative and radical elements in Maurice's thought; the other, by Frank McClain, which looks at the influence of Maurice's background on his theology. There is also an interesting article in the Harvard Theological Review by James W. Clayton which will be discussed below. It is a tribute to Maurice's thought that theologians writing today who speak from a totally different historical perspective are still challenged by his prodigious writings. The latest expositors of his thought have seen the need not only for more study of Maurice's sometimes chaotic, "unsystematic" works, but also for an approach from the particular standpoints of modern philosophy and political theory as well as theology. However, to do this accurately and without immediate prejudice against what might be termed his "Victorian" outlook and conservatism, Maurice must be properly located within the nineteenth century world view which he sometimes transcended, yet of which he was a true representative in many ways. Particularly helpful for this purpose is a new work by G. Kitson Clark which is dedicated to the memory of F.D. Maurice and to King's College, London.

Clark discusses the period from 1832 to 1885 as a series of "phases" rather than "periods" which can be distinguished from one another. He stresses a continuous development rather than any sudden change, but bearing this in mind, there are two significant

dates around which his "phases" revolve—1832 (First Reform Act) and 1867 (Second Reform Act). Until 1832 the "old order" of society prevailed, although the seeds of change were already being sown at the close of the eighteenth century with the large increase of population which contributed to the overcrowded urban conditions and poverty generally associated with the England of the Industrial Revolution. Although the Church of England was only one section of the religious community and the role of the non-conformists in the "condition of England" question cannot be overlooked, nevertheless Clark singles out clergymen and interested laity of the Church of England for his study. He says in this connection: "Since the Church was an 'established Church' the ideas and practice of its clergy and laity were likely to bear a close relationship to the old theory of government and social ethics..."

In Clark's view the old conception of social morality rested on the assumption of a rigid hierarchy in society not only sanctioned by "immemorial custom" but also believed to be necessary to preserve "that order which made civilized life possible." In the old conception this hierarchy was seen in terms of "duties":

In this old conception, therefore, society depended for its ordered existence on the maintenance of a social framework in which everyone did his duty in that state of life into which it should please God to call him. Since the duties were different, and it was necessary for their proper performance that one human being should be subordinated to another, it was necessary that the order be hierarchical...

Since for the operation of the system it was necessary to accept the principle of private property it was necessary to permit a grossly unequal distribution of property, always accepting the proviso that property

8. ibid. p. xvii.
9. ibid. p. 5.
had its duties as well as its rights. And since it was God who had appointed these necessities, then the system which they imposed must be sanctioned by His law against which it would be impious to complain... 10.

Although the moral defects of this view of social life are obvious, Clark maintains that this very system of social ethics which could condone monstrous injustices would also be the springboard for the progressive development of the State and demand services from those who accepted it which members of a more equitable system might not have regarded as within their personal obligations. Whereas public morality is today communal—that is, only the community can adequately provide for the problems of modern society as we see them—in the old order it was a matter of personal charity and individual conscience. The wealthier a man was, the more burdensome was his responsibility for the poor and the workers who came under his jurisdiction. This way of handling the social problem depended on volunteers (especially clergymen), and it became inadequate as the process of urbanization extended and the need for professionals in every field increased.

Toward the middle of the century the new wealth made available by industrialization encouraged a new philosophy and hope that in place of a hierarchical society based on hereditary wealth and position, there should come into being a progressive society based on enterprise, hard work, frugality, and free contract which would determine its values and rewards by the workings of untrammeled competition. But Clark points out that to a poor person it might be to greater advantage to be the lowest rank of

10. Ibid. p.8.
11. Ibid. p.8.
12. Ibid. p.16.
a divinely-ordained hierarchical system than to be the loser in a society of free competition, or one of the examples of "the undeserving poor whose moral failures were responsible for their condition."

Clark characterizes the concept of the State before 1832 in a way which we will see corresponds to Maurice's notion:

The State was a Christian community. It was ruled by a king, who had been anointed and crowned and who had before the altar promised to do justice and observe the law. The members of the State were all members of Christ's Church, indeed Church and State were but aspects of the same society, either working in the uneasy partnership that prevailed in medieval Europe, or fused into the more complete unity described by Hooker. Therefore the moral content of the State was defined by the fact of its Christianity, the sanctions behind its claim to obedience were rooted in scripture and the Christian religion, and the law of God prescribed what must be the limits to its claims. 14.

On this view, the clergy had an essential role in the social and political life of that State. A parochial clergyman owed his parishioners the same kind of duty a landowner owed his tenants. The Bishops were still represented in the House of Lords, and the ecclesiastical parish had been adapted for the purposes of secular administration. It was just beginning to be realized in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century that a clergyman ought to receive a special training as a man whose way of life ought perhaps to differ from that of a layman more than in the past.

As many Conservatives feared, the Reform Act of 1832 seemed

13. ibid. p.17.
15. ibid. p.30.
16. ibid. p.50.
to herald changes that were to break up the old order of society. Among the important measures passed were: the Irish Church Act, the act abolishing slavery in the British empire, a factory act, and important legal reforms setting up a judicial committee of the Privy Council. In addition, Catholic emancipation had been enacted in 1829. In 1834 the reform of the Poor Law took place. But after that year the political activism of the Whigs died down, and in 1841 we find Robert Peel, leader of a new Conservative Party, stepping into the Prime Ministers office. This party had the support of the landed gentry and of the Church:

In supporting the Conservatives the clergy were supporting much that was instinct with class selfishness and injustice, while several of the evangelical clergy openly encouraged that virulent popular hatred of Roman Catholicism which bedevilled England's relations with Ireland during most of the nineteenth century. 17.

But Parliament repealed the Corn Laws in 1846 and Peel was driven from office, splitting the Conservative Party. After this for thirty years the course of politics was indecisive, with neither party able to secure control of the House of Commons.

Although the Reform Act had left power in the hands of those with whom it had always resided, it served to loosen the ties between the Church and the State by increasing the power of dissenters who denied to the State all but minimal moral power. It is into this climate that F.D. Maurice came as an ordained clergyman of the Church of England in 1834, and it was to this problem, the relationship of the Church to the State in the face of the threat of disestablishment and the secularization of education, that he addresses much of his work, both in theory and by practical ex-

17. ibid. p.61.
periment. For Maurice, as we shall see in detail, disestablishment was unthinkable, since the Church and State should be inseparable. They complemented each other— the Church giving moral direction and the State carrying out legislative and executive functions. On the issue of education Maurice opposed many Radicals who advocated the imposition of a universal system of education on the country. Rather, Maurice felt it was the duty of the Church as well as her right to educate the nation. Like Gladstone, Arnold, Coleridge, Burke, and even Bentham, Maurice saw the need for a wider moral authority for the State than it could receive from the fact that it protected life and property. The problem arose when this wider moral authority was connected with the Church of England at a time when the need to extend toleration for any form of personal belief was making itself felt. But, as Clark notes, given mid-nineteenth century conditions, neither Maurice's view, nor the alternative which precluded the State's propagation of any religion or object which went beyond the basic necessities of life could work consistently.

The two biggest problems currently facing the nation mid-century were education and public health, both of which were concerns of Maurice and the Christian Socialist group. Clark characterizes the educational ideals of the nineteenth century in this way: attendance at a day school and even a Sunday school was seen to benefit the child in secular terms for it would clearly be to advantage to know how to read, write and have some arithmetic; but it was natural for a mid-century clergyman to think that the most urgent need was for religious education which would not prepare

18. ibid. pp.79-80.
a child for this life, but for the next, and give a man comfort and peace at the last. He goes on:

The emphasis on religious teaching upset the balance of much education, the emphasis on the formularies of the Church made cooperation with Dissent difficult, and the belief that training in the knowledge and practice of religion might teach the poor to live better-regulated lives and abstain from such activities as rioting, rick-burning, poaching, or other forms of subversion that menaced the social order had morally dangerous possibilities...

Maurice placed considerable emphasis on education, though this really requires a special study which cannot be attempted here. It is true that he saw theology as the crowning glory of all studies which sheds light on every discipline. He is, however, far from falling into the trap of using religion as an opium-dose since his whole theology stressed the Gospel as a message of liberation and the Church as "Communist in principle."

His foundation of the Working Men's College is evidence for his concern to destroy the idea of socially-stratified education and to combat the notion that persons of "lowly" status had no need of the intellectual and spiritual advantages even of elementary education. However, the question raised in the years following the Reform Bill of 1832 was how far is it legitimate for the State, or any other body, to impose on the children in its charge a particular set of opinions in controversial matters. Before 1830 two answers had been given: the first sprang from the old conception of the organic unity of Church and State; the established Church was a fundamental part of the constitution of society, and its teaching was part of the truth on which society rested. It was therefore right to teach the doctrines of the established


Church in the schools of the State. The second answer was that of the non-Conformists who maintained the absolute right of individuals to make up their own minds; and, except where urgent need existed, the State had no right to teach anything at all. We will see the tensions in Maurice's attempts to deal with these views in Chapter Three. However, after 1830 neither answer was admissible. "On the one hand it was no longer possible to base a policy on the union between Church and State, and on the other the Government had accepted the fact that it had undoubted educational duties." The question remains for us today:

All educational systems must inculcate a morality, even if it is only what purports to be a permissive morality. All moralities are founded upon dogma, even if it is only what purports to be the dogma of agnosticism. It will always be a matter of importance who shall choose the dogma taught in the schools—Church, State, parent or teacher. 24.

The clergy were also involved in medicine and public health, but with the development of the medical profession and the founding of hospitals, the clergy's assistance in this area tended more and more toward the spiritual or psychological. Social policy in this period rested on the common assumption that in dealing with poverty, the only healthy policies were those which encouraged self-help; in addition, many felt that poverty was the result of moral failure on the part of the individuals to help themselves. But Clark states that it was also a common assumption that the individual might be impoverished owing to circumstances beyond his control, a reservation which raised the question of what circumstances were to be considered unavoidable and

22. Clark, op.cit. p.129.
23. ibid. p.129.
24. ibid. p.139.
what power over an individual's behaviour was credited to them. The prevalence of disease when investigated revealed living conditions in which it was unlikely an individual could help himself, but recognition of this state of affairs was coupled with a view which associated bad living conditions with moral error. Thus clergymen saw sanitary reform as important for eliminating the "occasions of sin" so to speak. Even so, although there was a movement to improve housing, the economic conditions which would enable people to maintain new homes remained unchanged. In short, in the period before 1867 both with regard to education and public health, the old system of individual responsibility and local initiative in which the clergy had an important part to play had failed.

The Second Reform Act in 1867 signalized the final acceptance of democracy and enfranchised a large number of working class voters. This marked the beginning of a new phase in which was passed into law a Trade Union Act (1871) (amended 1876), Conspiracy and Property Act (1875) which replaced the "obnoxious Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871" and the act of 1875 which replaced an old law of Master and Servant. The powers of the State were increasing rapidly in this phase so that political theorists often speak of a transition from "the period of laissez-faire" to the period of "collectivism". Leading Churchmen had seen the failings of the old system, and now they looked toward a period of increased social activity on the part of the State, with the Church acting in close and friendly cooperation. This expectation was doomed to disappointment. As Clark says: "The secular State

27. ibid. p.228.
would act not so much as an ally of the Church but as a substitute for it, taking over many functions of the Church, but not its creed." There were many reasons why this was so. The State was the agent of a community in which there existed a multiplicity of beliefs, so the State must seem agnostic. Social programs had to become increasingly professional, no longer relying on untrained clergy and volunteers. The objects of social policy were considered by men with a secular point of view, and no longer solely by those with a Christian motive. In addition, as the State evolved its programmes for social welfare, it developed agencies to effect the programmes and no longer relied on the organization of Church of England parishes. Also between 1860 and 1880 agnosticism swept through the more highly educated groups in the country including leading figures at Oxford and Cambridge; men who in the last century would have been leading Churchmen became the agnostic architects of the secular State in the late nineteenth century. This mistrust of the Church was the result of controversies, propaganda, repugnant doctrines of eternal punishment, the inerrancy of the Bible, and forensic explanations of the atonement. Maurice did much in his theology to correct these misguided applications of the theological enterprise. His constant attempts to bring out what was significant in the positions of sectarians and apply his considerable abilities to bind up wounds in controversies, his reinterpretation of the doctrine of eternal punishment for which he was asked to leave King's College, his openness to the new study of Biblical criticism, were all

major contributions to increased understanding in the Christian religious world. Clark adds a further point:

The established Church had been compromised by its close association with the old secular order of society, but its theory, and, potentially, its practice and morality, had been focused on an authority that transcended the needs, and remained outside the scope of the will, of the community; and by the end of the seventeenth century men in Britain had learnt that the nature of that authority guaranteed to men and women the right of dissent.

For dissent implies the recognition of a value that transcends the community's will. This is the positive aspect of Maurice's dislike of democracy. Although democracy has been accepted, and had been by the late nineteenth century, as a foundation principle of a modern State, we shall see that Maurice felt that it would become a tyranny of the people rather than a contribution to human freedom. This would in fact be the case if the nation lost the principle of belief in a value which transcends the mere majority will.

At the end of the nineteenth century the paramount question was, "What kind of society would men have to accept?" Clark asks how Christianity would manage in a new society of democratic and secular values:

Marxist Socialism rejected Christianity and regarded the institutions which had fostered it as the result of the exploitation of the workers. Even a milder form of social democracy would be likely to be agnostic, and to call into existence all-embracing public services which would leave little room for voluntary actions and independent opinions... But even without Socialism that question (the position of Christianity) was posed by the collectivist State.

It is to this issue that Clark devotes his final chapter. The

30. Not the "religious world" in the sense in which Maurice uses it- that of sectarian differences and bitterness.
31. Ibid. p.236.
32. Ibid. p.313.
33. Ibid. p.313.
question formulates itself thus:

If the State was to be entrusted with this great increase of power it must be credited with sufficient moral authority to justify its use of power; and should be directed by a philosophy which should inform it what it could and... what it could not do. Whence, then, should it get that authority, or who would give it that philosophy? 34.

These questions were asked by Gladstone and Maurice in 1838-9, and it is interesting that intelligent Churchmen in 1868 were giving the same answers. They believed collaboration with the State was still possible, "where the clergyman was sensible and played his part with discretion." The view that the State was a divine creation no less so than the Church, expounded by Maurice thirty years before, was still accepted by many clergy. Llewellyn Davies wrote in 1868: "The idea of a national Church is strictly in harmony with such hopes and aims, implying as it does that a Christian nation should publicly confess its Christianity." For Maurice, it was by their union that the Church and the State could be credited with the moral authority to carry out national tasks. Should they be disunited, the public acknowledgement of such an authority which would enable the State to fulfil its sacred function would not exist.

There had been two processes going forward since 1830 which to some extent have not reached their full development even today: the progressive disestablishment of the Church of England, and the progressive secularization of society and the State. It is

34. ibid. p.316.
35. ibid. p.316.
36. W.L.Clay, Essays on Church Policy. (1868) pp.73-4 & p.84; Quoted in Clark, op.cit. p.317.
Ironic that those who wished for the disestablishment of the Church, that is, religious Dissent, have now to deal with a society and State which leave little scope for the development of the spiritual values they were asserting by their wish to leave all men free to develop religiously unimpeded by an external authority whether ecclesiastical or political. As Clark sees it, the achievement of secular ends by the State requires an organization so powerful and all-embracing, and so complete a concentration on secular objects that it leaves little room for the observance of the spiritual value which is protected by the right to dissent itself. "The working principle of the secular State was not to be respect for individual freedom but the necessity of compulsion."

Maurice's view of the complementary aspects of the Church's relation to the State contained some unresolved problems.

Supposing the law of the State did not embody the life-giving principle which is embodied in the Church, supposing the distribution of property it protected was unjust, the principles it tolerated were contrary to the precepts of Christianity, how far were the representatives of the Church permitted to go to rectify matters? 40.

Maurice was faced by this question in the movement for associations. At all costs Maurice wished to avoid an appeal to secular authority rather than to the law of God which it was the Church's duty to promulgate. The question as he saw it took the following form: "How far is it appropriate or legitimate to draw on spiritual

38. ibid. p.332.
39. ibid. p.332.
40. ibid. pp.332-3.
authority to commend secular means in order to secure a secular objective?" I think Clark does not see the full range of Maurice's thought on this issue. On the one hand Maurice believes, as we shall see, that society is divine and so the concept of "secular objectives" is foreign to him; on the other hand, there is a tension in Maurice between the potential and the actual Kingdom which does not fully resolve itself— he engages in work for cooperation only to withdraw on account of the inner contradiction found there. His belief in a Divine Order already present caused him to assert society's divinity "as it stands not as it may become;" and political activity which sought to reorganize that society on democratic and socialistic principles seemed to him to deny that divinity. This is an area in Maurice in which we see the blend of radical and conservative elements which Olive Brose discusses.

However, as Clark puts it, the Church and the State have not been formally separated to this day, but have gradually been thrust apart. It is our task to discover if anything of value remains in Maurice's thought if the "Christian State" has disappeared.

41. ibid. p.334.
42. Life II, p.137-8.
43. Brose, op.cit.
The point which Maurice wished to examine in his work *The Kingdom of Christ* was: "whether a national society and a universal society be in their natures contradictory and incompatible; or whether they have been only made so by certain notions which interfere with the universality of the spiritual body as well as with the distinctness of the national body." In other words, he wished to show reasons for his belief that the Church in England was at once a national and a universal body, and how different Protestant sects and the Romanist Church limited both universality and national distinctness. He begins by discussing more widely the evidence for a "divine order" to human existence. It is to this "spiritual constitution" that this chapter will be devoted.

From the histories of Quakerism, Pure Protestantism, and Unitarianism, Maurice takes the idea of a spiritual kingdom as representative of all these sects. Again he sees in the arguments of philosophers an interest in questions like whether there exists a distinct spiritual world or whether one is only created from this common world, whether God exists or not. He sees the common people searching for such a constitution, attempting to construct a universal society. He concludes, "it is equally impossible for men to be content with a spiritual society which is not universal, and with a universal society which is not spiritual." And so he believes that a spiritual and universal society is involved in the very idea of our human constitution. This is demonstrated not by philosophy but by Scripture. Here is the crucial point.

1. KC I, p.42.
2. Ibid. p.223.
Maurice's arguments fall down when subjected to a close, critical reading as long as he tries to argue from a secular view (with which he is totally unsympathetic.) But he can and must be dealt with from the point of view of revelation because he views all history as sacred and as the unfolding by God of truth to man. So it must be with this orientation in mind that we further examine his inquiry "whether there be on this earth a spiritual and universal kingdom, which the different religious systems have not been able to supersede or destroy; which is likely to make itself manifest when they have all perished; and with which we of the nineteenth century may have fellowship."  

Maurice notices first that in every form of Protestantism, the fact that the children of believers are accepted into the fellowship without being "consciously redeemed" persons, is evidence for the universality of the Kingdom ("Christ's redemptive act" might be a better phrase here) in Christian practice. Also according to the "schemes" of philosophers of his time, it is impossible to organize a universal society (which demands a situation in which men must be individual, separate units, according to Maurice) while the distinction of families still prevail. Men are "bound together by a certain law, which may be set at naught, and made almost utterly inefficient, but which cannot be entirely repealed." "The glaring fact of family life" which proves men are not units seems to me a false use of the terms involved. Men are both individuals and members of families, in that order of priority. The family experience may be less real to some than to.

3. ibid. pp.228-9. In this phrase, Maurice uses "Kingdom" to refer to the visible Church on earth as well as a possible reference to the eschatological kingdom. It is not clear in the latter case when the "manifestation" of this Kingdom will come.

others, but the experience of individuality is common to all. However, Maurice uses the fact that men exist in families to support his belief that a spiritual and moral constitution for mankind exists. There is an "inevitability" of discovering that every man exists in a family, and so too it is inevitable that man recognizes he is in "relationship"—like it or not, man is in society. Maurice's transition from "men exist in families" to "man is in society" or "in relationship" is only confusing because of a moral loading of the word "relationship" toward something positive or good, and is disturbing because of changing ideas about "family" structure and parental roles. Maurice is using as a model the Victorian "family" which was hierarchically structured and is therefore naturally led towards a patriarchal view of society and government. Certainly he was right to point out that man is in society. We shall discuss this further in Chapter Three.

Maurice speaks of the two-fold condition of man: he is in a world of objects and is in relationship. The former, his "circumstances", describes sensual objects, the latter relates to a state of being. The phrases, "having bad hearing" and "being a bad brother" both indicate a lack of harmony between man and his condition, but the latter implies "that there need not be this want of harmony, that he is voluntarily acting as if he were not in a relation in which nevertheless he is, and must remain." (We might describe such an act as anti-social.) We call the family state "natural" as we also call the savage state, or independent state, "natural". Be it natural or not, Maurice regards the independent state as one of moral evil— the wilful escape from the recognition that we are members of a "family". Man is not independent from his brothers in society. By "individual" Maurice meant "over against others"

5. ibid. p.230.
rather than in its generally accepted meaning: he would use the word "personal" to describe man as a unique being who is in relation constantly with his fellows. But the identification of individuality with selfishness shows a slightly different use of the word "individual" from the one Maurice himself uses when he describes man before the law in Social Morality and later in The Kingdom of Christ, volume I. But it suggests his view that law cannot make man moral, it can only proscribe anti-social acts. In spite of the confusing terminology, we can affirm the conclusion that man is in relationship, and that traditionally his first relationship is with mother and father or others acting in that capacity. It is his state, like it or no, but it is one from which he has the freedom to rebel. One must recognize, of course, the positive moral meaning attached to the word "relationship". Obviously man does not have the freedom to rebel from his state of social relationships in the neutral sense without serious personal consequences: death, isolation as a hermit, or perhaps being institutionalized as a psychotic.

So far Maurice is only placing man in his condition by asserting that he is in society and had the freedom to act out of harmony with that fact. Man is political, social, moral. Maurice anticipates the question, "How could you call that spiritual which had no reference to religion?" In other words, why talk of a "spiritual constitution" of mankind? He answers that all primitive peoples "have connected the ideas of fathers, children, husbands, brothers, sisters with the beings whom they worshipped."

6. ibid. p.231.
7. ibid. p.231.
For him, this observation makes the transition to the religious sphere: the idea of relationship (and more specifically, the idea of family) extends to the very beginnings of man's religious impulse. Man comes to a perception of "objects with which we do not sensibly converse" through his family relationships; man worships because of the feelings and affection he experiences in his family (tribe). Yet there is the development of that "savage wish for independence" which Maurice concedes did not imply the dissolution of family bonds, but rather was the indication that "men were meant for other bonds than these, not perhaps of necessity incompatible with them..." the bonds of a national community. So it would seem by this reasoning, that out of man's tendency toward "individualism" or moral evil came something good and more advanced than a patriarchal society- the nation. Why, then, did he criticize philosophers who based a concept of society on men as individuals? It seems a contradiction of his own thought. This is another instance of radical-conservative elements existing side by side in Maurice: he criticized the philosophers as a protest against laissez-faire capitalism and the possible anarchy of individualism. Yet he based the founding of nations on the very evil he deplored. It is also interesting to question why he calls the nation a more advanced society than a patriarchal one, given his notion, as we shall see, of the monarchy in Britain as ideally a father/king institution. This is perhaps a further example of the double radical-conservative feature of his thought.

Several facts are observed from a study of nationhood:

8. ibid. p.233.
One is that in every organized nation at its commencement there is a high respect for family relations, that they embody themselves necessarily in the national constitution; another is, that there is a struggle between these relations and the national polity, although they form so great an element in it...

The tension exists in law. Law addresses each man as an individual, and so from this point of view is the direct opposite of a "relationship"—law acts as if men were single units and not members of a whole society. On the other hand, it forbids those anti-social acts which make fellowship impossible, and in this way law declares to man a spiritual constitution to his life. And so "a nation, like a family, would seem to possess some of the characteristics of a spiritual constitution." Again Maurice anticipates an argument about the word "spiritual" when he has only maintained that a nation and its laws foster human relationship. If by spiritual is meant "intellectual", Maurice maintains that there are "abundant proofs" that where no national feeling exists, there is an imperfect exercise of intellectual power. And if the word is used in the sense of "voluntary", he sees that the nation is meant for creatures who have wills, that it can be negated by the free choice of man to act at variance with the established laws.

(From this all one can infer is that the members of a nation exhibit moral characteristics.) The question remains whether there are religious characteristics connected with national life, as in family life. Having used "spiritual" to denote both moral and intellectual aspects, he now becomes more specific in his use, claiming that in early nations (Greece, for example) the unity of national and domestic relations exhibited itself in religious belief—the gods were both fathers and kings. Thus by "spiritual

constitution" Maurice means one which exhibits all three characteristics: intellectual, moral, and religious. To say a nation possesses some of the characteristics of a spiritual constitution is to say that it is comprised of men who are spiritual beings in the broad sense of social, intellectual, moral and religious, and that its laws foster (or should foster) good human relationships.

The family experience was common to all men, yet itself was narrow, excluding non-members. The nation bound many together, yet was limited to a small locality, and therefore proved to be exclusive. The idea of a universal polity only came into being with the emergence of empires. With the empire was connected a religion, universal as the empire itself: the emperor was the god. This situation Maurice calls a "universal world" ("world" meaning creation out of harmony with itself, man not living in true relation to his real constitution). He goes on in The Kingdom of Christ to discuss the opposite of this- the universal Church.

Maurice never really departs from Scripture when he analyses history because he sees all history, all human action, as directed toward the author of all, the God of Abraham, the Father of Jesus and of us all. He turns, however, particularly to Scripture to give us evidence of the spiritual constitution of mankind.

In the Old Testament the idea of a covenant between God and man is predominant, and if we look at the call of Abraham and his acceptance, we see that the covenant was made with a family: Abraham the patriarch accepts in faith the promise of God that he will be the father of many descendants, and from his seed would all the families of the earth be blessed. Maurice sees the fact that he was father of a tribe as essential to his calling: "The fact of his relationship to God is interpreted to him by the feeling
of his human relations, and his capacity of fulfilling them arose from his acknowledgement of the higher relation." Maurice sees this first faith-experience as an indication that man cannot know God only through the marvellous wonders of nature, but also through the sacred bonds of relationship. "That there is a God related to men and made known to men through their human relations, this was the faith of Abraham, the beginner of the Church on earth." The Abrahamic family was cut off from the rest of the world in order to witness to its true order. It had to be exclusive at first in order to be truly universal. Part of the promise, Maurice stresses, is to become a nation... a nation in which tabernacle, priesthood, sacrifices, law, led the thoughts of the Jews to that Unseen Power which was above families and nations. The Lord was present with His people. The law, both civil and religious, was God-given, a reminder of His presence. All kings ruled in virtue of the covenant and were directly responsible to God. No king, priest or judge had the right to look upon himself as having intrinsic power - he was a servant of the Lord. Having started as a family and progressed to a nation, how did the Jewish polity avoid the same pitfall of becoming a "universal empire" which so many ancient polities failed to do? Some of these other polities were patriarchal, the king being regarded as a father. Maurice answers: "If we are to believe the Bible, the king is not merely a father, he is something more; his position has its ground in the acknowledgement of an unseen absolute Being, whose relations to men lead up to the contemplation of Him in Himself." Without

11. ibid. pp.239-240.
12. ibid. p.240.
13. ibid. p.245.
the ground of its existence resting in the Father, the Jewish polity would have reverenced the king as mere power; would have lapsed into idolatry; the covenant forgotten, it would have exhibited all the qualities which Maurice attributes to "so-called patriarchal government" of which the divine right of kings theory was an aspect. Maurice's theory distinguishes itself from that of "so-called patriarchal governments" and "divine right of kings" only in his requirement that the king recognize his dependence upon God. As he well knows, the Jewish kings were not always faithful, but the covenant was ever renewed with the intercession of prophets, and the Spirit of God led Israel to become witness again to the true relationship of God to mankind.

As promised by God, a son of Abraham and David comes into the world to establish a Kingdom. Every act and word of Jesus reveals that the Kingdom is "at hand". He tells us the principles of his Kingdom in the Sermon on the Mount; every parable is prefaced with "The kingdom of heaven is like..."; all conversations with his disciples relate to the character, and establishment of the Kingdom; he is arraigned as a king, and dies as King of the Jews. The Kingdom was a very Jewish expression of a universal reality which even the Pagans felt—relationships have meaning, that the purpose of law and national institutions is to uphold these relationships which ultimately rest on God's relation to man. For Maurice this indicates that the Kingdom was the simplest expression of the idea of the divine order of mankind—it expressed what was already evident in Jewish life especially

15. ibid. p.249.
and in all life. (Maurice says that the Evangelists portray Jesus as proclaiming a kingdom as opposed to the kingdom, and this usage betrays an identification in Maurice between the "kingdom" proclaimed by Jesus and the Church. We shall see later how the two are related in Maurice.)

If there is a problem in the fact that the Evangelists often regard the Kingdom as a political state, perhaps one which would supersede that of Rome, and that they also record such words as, "My kingdom is not of this world," Maurice found no difficulty here. The Kingdom of David, he says, was both of the world and different from the world, standing on the principle which most other nations rejected, that the visible king is a type of the invisible and reigns in virtue of the covenant. Therefore there was no contradiction in assuming that the new Kingdom established by Christ was the "kingdom promised to David", and yet was in "the highest sense a kingdom not to be observed by the outward eye, a kingdom within, a kingdom not of this world." By this it would seem that Maurice saw the Kingdom proclaimed by Jesus as both internal (or individual/spiritual) and external (or national/political)—a kingdom within, implying total personal transformation and faith, and a Kingdom "promised to David", a political order standing upon the covenant principle. He wrote elsewhere:

The necessity of confessing a Kingdom of Heaven within—a Kingdom of Heaven ever present with us now; different in kind from the visible world, but affecting it, swaying its movements continually—has been with me an overwhelming one. 17.

This "national" eschatology, according to Schnackenburg, repre-

sents the thoughts and sentiments of the broad mass of Jews in the
two centuries prior to Christ and in the time of Jesus and the
early Church. He goes on to say:

The idea that predominated, the usual and ordinary
idea, was that God would send the Messias-king, the
'son of David', and through him restore the kingdom
of Israel, with the ancient glory of the re-united
tribes, liberated from foreign occupation and poverty
but at the same time restored to a true service of
God and a holy fulfillment of the Law. 18.

But the fact that the Jewish national hope was directed toward
an earthly kingdom refounded on the covenant of Yahweh does not
imply that the kingdom Jesus announced as imminent was the
"kingdom promised to David." Jesus himself repudiated the no-
ton of a political messiah—Zealots tried to enlist him in
their cause, others tried to make him king. "This basic miscon-
ception of the purely religious nature of the Messias (Servant
of God) led to his estrangement from the masses and was perpetu-
at ed in the official indictment posted on the cross." Schnack-
enburg maintains that the purely religious character of Jesus'
message accounted for its universality. In this respect it would
not be tied to a particular polity or historical moment in time,
but could be applied universally to all men for all time. Maur-
ice would recognize this aspect, but his insistence on the nation-
al/political characteristic limits somewhat his view of univer-
sality.

By his expression of the double nature of the kingdom we ob-
tain another glimpse into his idea of the nation in nineteenth
century terms embodying and proclaiming the divine order and the

19. ibid. p.96.
kingdom of God. For the kingdom to be truly universal, according to Maurice, it had to start in the promise to a particular nation and develop outward to all. Because the Jewish political order was corrupt, having lost the "family and national character" which it once possessed, its leaders could not accept Jesus' message of relationship—his relationship to his Father in heaven, man's relationship with his fellows. Those who listened to Jesus and realized the truth of his criticisms of this corrupt establishment naturally expected his contrasting proclamation of the kingdom of God to operate on an earthly, political level. But, Maurice quickly adds, although the words of Jesus were directed to the children of the covenant, yet he gave them a sense of humanity, enjoining them to tell the Good News to all nations. For the kingdom was spiritual and universal, all hope of redemption reaching its fulfillment there. Although it necessarily had a Jewish character and a particular historical framework—Jesus, the son of God, particularized the covenant, so to speak,—the Incarnation was a cosmic event, with eternal consequences for mankind, and it could not be limited in any way by its concreteness in time. So the work of the apostles as Maurice sees it was to proclaim a "universal society" which had as its basis the revelation of the name of God—Jesus Christ as risen Lord. The description of this universal society is found in the Acts of the Apostles, and for him this is the history of the foundation of the Church. He uses "Church" here as a synonym for "universal society" and for "kingdom" (the one proclaimed by Jesus which came only slowly into man's consciousness by the gradual revelation of God.) 

20. KC I, p.255.
the human conditions of the kingdom— the organization of the first Christians in the light of the Resurrection.

If the foundation of this kingdom were the end of all the purposes of God, if it were the kingdom of God among men, the human conditions of it could no more passed over than the divine; it was as needful to prove that the ladder had its foot upon earth, as that it had come down out of heaven. 21.

Since of course the foundation of the kingdom was in fact the "end of all the purposes of God", then the true duty of Acts, according to Maurice, is to tell of the organization of a universal Church, that is, the "human conditions of the kingdom". This is clear but we are here on dangerous ground. It is one thing to say that the foundation of the kingdom was the end of all God's purposes, but it is quite another to say that the Church is this end. Maurice quite suddenly changes his language from kingdom or universal society to Church (see KC 1, p.255) making it evident that he identified the two. Further, so far he has omitted any reference to "kingdom" which refers to the eschatological kingdom of God of which Schnackenburg speaks. He is referring strictly to the Church and to a spiritual order of creation, but makes no express reference to Christ's second coming until the end of volume two. It remains for us to examine how closely he fuses the "kingdom" and the Church.

As we saw it is generally recognized that the Jewish hope for redemption around the time of Jesus was national and messianic; according to Schnackenburg, it also had an apocalyptic, or cosmic and eschatological reference. These two aspects were originally independent but gradually they intermingled, without, however,

achieving complete harmony. The uniqueness of the preaching of Jesus was the imminence of the reign of God - it was "at hand". The Jews already believed in the kingship of God ever-present in His rule of Israel, which would one day come to fulfillment on the "Day of the Lord". Jesus proclaimed the nearness of this day:

It must be insisted emphatically that the idea of God's reign in his (Jesus') mouth referred always to God's eschatological kingship, though he was familiar with the notion of God's continuous government of the universe and took it for granted. But when he refers to the 'reign of God' he is not dealing with this. His ordinary usage of the term applies to God's eschatological kingship...

Again:

As announced by Jesus, the reign of God is not an awareness of God's sovereign power over the universe or of God's kingship over Israel, long established and still enduring, though both of these concepts are presupposed. It is the announcement of God's kingship in its full realization, fully active, eschatologically irrevocable. 24.

It is certain that Maurice sees Jesus' use of the term as including both the awareness of God's power and sovereignty over the universe (the "divine order"), and God's special or representative kingship over the Israelite monarchy (of which that monarchy was the type). Perhaps it may be claimed that Maurice's "kingdom" meant the fully realized eschatological kingdom as well which he occasionally identifies with the Church, but his emphasis on the "realized" kingdom, and lack of attention to the future total transformation of the cosmos limits his view. At least he deals more explicitly with the presupposed awareness of God's sovereign power over the earth, and its expression in the Hebrew monarchy.

23. ibid. p.81.
24. ibid. p.82.
Where Maurice uses the term "kingdom of God", Schnackenburg employs "reign of God". There is a significant distinction between the images each projects. "Kingdom" connotes a spatial meaning, whereas "reign" suggests a temporal one. Schnackenburg states that the Hebrew mind represented God's kingship not as a spatial "kingdom" but as an exercise of royal rule, and that this way of thinking determined the usage of the New Testament 'basileia tou theou'. Spatial images emerged only for the perfect eschatological reign of God, and justifiably since then there would be no further spheres more or less subordinate to God, but God is 'all in all'. By his use of the spatial image of a kingdom, Maurice easily falls into a confusion of the reign of God and Christ with the Church (communal and institutional). Cullmann's view is similar to Schnackenburg's here. The Regnum Christi and the Church are closely related but not identical. They belong to the same period of time, but the Kingdom of God is a purely future event. Christ's death and resurrection provide the basis for the present realization of the Regnum Christi, but His Second Coming will be its end. Maurice's use of a spatial image coincides also with his emphasis on realized eschatology which contributes to the conservative political stress in his thought.

Christensen's general view of Maurice's concept of the divine order may shed some light here. It is somewhat condensed and may not do justice to Maurice's views as a whole, but it indicates something of the argument: "In Christ, God had created and preserved a 'Divine Order'. This Divine Order had its origin in the


love of God and was preserved only by this love. It was a living reality which always surrounded every human being and provided him with everything he possessed..." Christensen feels that the Divine Order in Maurice is "synonymous" with the kingdom of Christ— an existing reality in which man was already living.

D. Cupitt’s article, "Mansel's Theory of Regulative Truth" states that Maurice had a belief in the "adequacy and finality of our present knowledge of God" through the revelation of the Word— Jesus Christ. We can discover more about Christ, but we cannot discover anything more about God apart from Christ who is the complete revelation of the Father. In this limited sense, he argues, Maurice's eschatology was realized rather than futurist.

One result of a realized eschatology which does not properly emphasize the future kingdom and which too closely identifies Church with Kingdom of God is mentioned by Torrance as a medieval viewpoint:

Likewise the Church was regarded as impregnated with the Kingdom of God, so that the pattern of the kingdom embedded in the earthly structure of the Church could be read off the historical consciousness of the Church by the teaching office. Here the Eschaton is so domesticated and housed within the Church that far from standing under final judgement the Church dispenses it by her binding and loosing, far from being repentant and reformable, the Church can only develop according to her own immanent norms which correspond to the fixed pattern of the kingdom.

Maurice's well-known reluctance to support organizations formed to remedy social ills which he certainly recognized perhaps stemmed in part from his emphasis on the realized Kingdom. Ludlow,


29. Eschatology. (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1952) p.37. (Four papers.)
his friend and associate, criticizes him thus:

... it does seem to me that you are liable to be carried away by Platonic dreams about an Order, and a Kingdom, and a Beauty, self-realized in their own eternity, and which put to shame all earthly counterparts that it becomes labour lost to attempt anything like an earthly realization of them... I do not think this is Christianity. 30.

Rudolf Otto characterizes the eschatological kingdom preached by Jesus as "wholly other" and describes the purely futurist interpretation thus:

The idea, however, of such an eschatological order, i.e., the idea that righteousness as a state of sanctification, and that blessedness are not possible in an earthly form of existence which God will give; that they are not possible in this age but only in a new age; that they are not possible in the world but only in heaven, and in a Kingdom of heaven- this idea is the hidden mainspring in the formation of eschatological, as distinct from merely messianic conceptions. 31.

We can find in Maurice (not particularly in The Kingdom of Christ) a blend of the emphases mentioned above. He had an eschatological (in Otto's terms, not necessarily in Schnackenburg's) as well as messianic view of the Kingdom of Christ. But, taken to extremes, both emphases, whether on a realized or a completely future kingdom, can lead to or be combined with a conservative political attitude. Maurice saw the danger of a futurist view (like the one described by Otto) which portrays the other-worldly kingdom as a reward for patience with one's lot on earth. As Ludlow says, it would make the reform of society "labour lost". Although Ludlow accuses him of holding this view, Maurice says elsewhere that man must get away from "the notion of Heaven which makes us indifferent to the future condition of the earth." However, it is his real-

ized view which led him to think that the Divine Order was embodied in the institutions of the nation, and that since the Kingdom was fully realized by the fact of the Incarnation and Redemption of Jesus Christ, all that was needed was a recognition of this fact for society to be put straight. This view also Ludlow could not accept, and he felt one must not assume that the existing social structures are embodiments of God's love which only needed individual changes of heart to result in the reform of society and the establishment of the truth of the Divine Order.

Although Maurice refers to the Kingdom of God in the Old Testament, his primary reference to the Kingdom is in connection with the new covenant of Jesus Christ. His main work, *The Kingdom of Christ*, is in fact about the Church. Not only does he confuse the Kingdom of God with the Church, but he also sees the Kingdom of Christ as identical with the Kingdom of God (having used the words "Kingdom of Christ" to designate both the reign of Christ and the Church). Schnackenburg distinguishes the three concepts by saying that the Kingdom of God is the final fulfillment of His reign, the complete realization of the eschatological kingdom at the end of time when the entire cosmos, the Church and reign of Christ and of God are brought into one unity. The reign of God in its present form should not be called "kingdom" because in English this suggests something completed and realized. It would be theologically sound to call the period between the resurrection of Jesus and the Parousia the "reign of Christ", but "kingdom of Christ" best refers to its perfect state (identical with the eschatological

kingdom of God). Of the Church he says:

We should distinguish the 'Church' from the reign both of God and of Christ. The close relations of the Church with the reign of God in the present, in the context of the history of salvation since the Resurrection, are best explained in terms of the reign of Christ. For God's present reign is expressed in the concrete by the reign of Christ. This is not, however, restricted to the Church. It extends to the entire cosmos. 34.

And when the universal Church fulfills her earthly task, she is merged in the kingdom of God, and Christ "delivers his royal power to the Father." 35.

Seen in these terms the Kingdom of Christ described by Maurice is easier to understand. Much of his terminology clouds rather than illuminates his powerful concept. The Kingdom has its roots in the old order (politico-religious) of the Jews, but Christ came to fulfill that order and extend its geographical boundaries as well as its scope of understanding. He commissioned his apostles to teach the new revelation to all men. At the same time, the Incarnation made manifest to man in the most profound way who God is, the nature of His love for men, the nature of man's relationship with his brothers. This Incarnational theology was the foundation of Maurice's doctrine of the Divine Order. Davies says of him:

One of the secrets of his greatness was that he saw life whole and saw it in the light of Christ. The master light of all his seeing was the Incarnation. "...I was sent into the world," he writes, "that I might persuade men to recognize Christ as the center of their fellowship with each other, that so they might be united in their families, their countries..." 36.

The message "the kingdom of heaven is come" is based on the assertion that He whom the Jews rejected is at the right hand of the

34. *ibid.* p.355.
Father, that there is an actual mediator between God and man; that He has overcome the enemies of man. It is the proclamation not of a doctrine, but of a Person. As many have observed, Maurice refused to make sin and the fall the basis of theology. He sees the world as created through the Eternal Son:

I grant you that it is very wrong to speak as if He had merely devised a scheme as a remedy for the consequences of the fall. Christ was before all things, and by Him all things consist. In Him He created men, and His Incarnation, though it came later than the fall was really in God's purpose before it. 38.

In the Incarnation, Christ comes not as an alien invader into an unknown foreign land, as Ramsey puts it, but as man's own maker into human lives of which He is already the indwelling principle. Christ obtained dominion over humanity "when He did not abhor the Virgin's womb, when He mingled with the ordinary transactions of men, blessing their food, their wine, and their marriage feasts." 39.

The Son of God who had been ruling from the beginning of time took flesh, sinful as it is, that He might reclaim all for the servants of His invisible Father. It was Maurice's belief that it was impossible for man to know the Absolute and Invisible God as man needs to know Him without the Incarnation. "If there was no person who was actually one with God and one with man, the gulf must remain forever unfilled." 40.

40. KC II, p.271.
man, but He took upon Himself the form of a servant. Jesus was
the "only begotten Son of God" because He took no glory to Himself,
but only testified to His Father. The heroes and saints of old
are not superior men but fulfilled a serving role within Christ's
kingdom, and it is obvious that Maurice saw this to be the function
of the ministry as well. There were universal aspects to the
servant-role:

Admit (Christ) to be the centre of (heroes and saints) and
they all fall into their places; each has had his separate
protest to bear, his appointed work to do. Though he may
not have known in whose name he was ministering, his minis-
try, so far as it was one of help and blessing to mankind,
so far as it implied any surrender of self-glory, may be
referred to THE man, may be hailed as proceeding from Him
who took upon Him the form of a servant. 42.

Just as the Israelite nation was the bearer of God's covenant,
and the Church was the bringer of Christ's good news, so Christ
Himself had concentrated in Himself the glory of God so that it
would be diffused through many: "That there may be sons of God in
human flesh; men shining with the glory of God, reflecting His
grace and truth; there must be One Son who has taken human flesh,
in whom that full glory dwelt, who was full of grace and truth." 43.

This is a constantly recurring theme in Maurice: the concentration
of God's grace in one nation, one Person, one Church which allows
it to redeem all mankind into its essential unity.

The Incarnation is the key to the theme of universality in
Maurice not only in terms of the redemption of all peoples but also
in terms of the redemption of man both body and soul. He says:
"We accept an Incarnation because we ask of God a Redemption not
for a few persons from certain evil tendencies, but for humanity
from all the plagues by which it is tormented." 44. Christ has

42. ibid. p.88.
43. ibid. p.88.
44. ibid. pp.84-5.
come into contact with the world's actual condition; relieves it of its actual woes; recognizes not the exceptions from the race, but the lowest types of it as brethren with Himself and as children of His Father; proves man to be a spiritual being, not by scorning his animal nature and his animal wants, but by entering into them, bearing them, suffering from them, and then showing how all the evils which affect man as an animal have a spiritual ground, how he must become a citizen of the kingdom of heaven, that everything on earth may become pure and blessed to him. 45. He accuses Churchmen of having forgotten "that Christ took a human body, and spent the greater part of His time on earth in healing the sicknesses of it" and that they have not confessed "that the body and the earth are as much redeemed and regenerated by Him as our spirits..." 46. As a result of this then, the law of God's kingdom to Maurice becomes one of service; a man must be anywhere blessed if he has the knowledge of God and is His willing subject; everywhere accursed if he is ignorant of God and at war with Him. 47. Because Christ has submitted to and conquered temptation and death, man is not under the power of the tempter any longer; he does not have to resign himself, in fact should not, to evil and the physical representations of it (poverty, disease, ignorance). Christ has conquered sin and death and man must likewise extirpate evil for the kingdom to be perfectly realized. Obviously this radical notion has much to do with Maurice's engagement in the Christian Socialist Movement.

45. ibid. pp. 91-2.
46. ibid. pp. 175-6.
47. ibid. p. 137.
The centrality of the doctrine of the Incarnation for Maurice had great bearing on his concept of the relationship of the Church to the State. Christ in His person forever joined heaven and earth, the divine and the human, the holy and the secular. As Christensen says: "The fundamental view of Christian Socialists was to protest against "dividing life into a religious and secular sphere- a division that was deeply rooted in Evangelical and Tractarians alike." Maurice wrote:

...society and humanity are divine realities, as they stand, not as they may become... (one must) call upon the priests, kings, prophets of the world to answer for their sin in having made them unreal by separating them from the living and eternal God who has established them in Christ for His glory. 49.

Maurice believes human society is divine because of Christ's entry into it. Charles Davis argues against this viewpoint when he defines the sacred as being essentially the unknown beyond man's experience and knowledge. Though man can glimpse it, its inner nature remains hidden. "What is properly sacred is in principle beyond man's understanding." Society is in principle within the sphere of man's investigation and analysis- it is not transcendent. Therefore Maurice's view tends to sacralize an area of experience which is really "secular". In Davis's view, "To sacralize natural forces or society is not only inimical to modern science, but also a denial of Christian faith." He goes on to say:

48. ibid. p.218.
51. ibid. p.15.
52. ibid. p.17.
With undiscerning enthusiasm for a unified view of the world, Christians sometimes proclaim that Christianity has abolished the distinction between the secular and the sacred. This is in fact untrue, both historically and theologically. Christianity introduced, and doctrinally requires, a radical distinction between the two realms. It unites the secular and the sacred in a unity of order, but it refuses to identify them. 53.

There are many instances in Maurice where his notion of the Divine Order interferes with his active concern to remedy social ills. His support of Associations ceased when he realized that to support them was to say that the present economic system was itself corrupt. For example, he states:

God's order seems to me more than ever the antagonist of man's systems; Christian socialism is in my mind the assertion of God's order. Every attempt to bring it forth I honour and desire to assist. Every attempt to hide it under a great machinery, call it Organisation of Labour, Central Board, or what you like, I must protest against as hindering the gradual development of what I regard as the divine purpose, as an attempt to create a new constitution of society, when what we want is that the old constitution should exhibit its true functions and energies. 54.

The Divine Order also contributed to his devotion to the old institutions of monarchy and aristocracy in Britain, and led him into the ambivalence of uniting them with socialism:

...my own deepest convictions (are) that the voice of the deliverer must come from the voice of the king... Let the true idea of aristocracy as the witness of the lordship of the spirit over the flesh express itself legitimately... I stand upon my old English ground... I must have Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Socialism, or rather Humanity, recognized as necessary elements and conditions of an organic Christian society. 55.

We will investigate Maurice's idea of nation or state in relation to the Church(Kingdom) and the general problems which arise from his language about sacred and secular in the following chapters.

53. ibid. p.17.
54. Life II, p.44.
55. ibid. pp.130-1.
We have seen the centrality of the kingdom in Maurice's thought, and have explored a few of the linguistic problems connected with it. Having also touched upon the relation between sacred and secular which is developed in Maurice by his Incarnational theology, our next task is to see how he conceived the Church, and then, what relation the Church has to the State and to society as a whole. We must begin by investigating Maurice's characterization of the Church.

One significant stress is that the Church is not a system invented by man but a universal society created by God which was founded on the revelation and atonement of Jesus Christ for man. Much has been said of Maurice's "system-phobia" so it is unnecessary to belabour the point. His fear of parties and sects stemmed both from the religious situation of his day, in an England suffering from the social stratification of the Industrial Revolution, the ever-widening gap between the clergy and the working class, and the religious world divided into Anglicans, Romans, Dissenters, Broad Churchmen, and so on; and from his personal experience of diverse religious convictions and practices in his family. He simply felt that the Kingdom of Christ was an existing reality, and it was not for man "to create forms of organization in which true brotherhood of love and fellowship could be expressed; God Himself had placed man in a 'Human Order' with 'human relationships'". This led to Maurice's well-known difficulties with the movement for Associations. He was reluctant to create a party or organization which would deny the Divine Order as much as he was critical of the religious establishment for "dosing our people with religion

when what they want is not this but the Living God..." and for giving them a "stone for bread, systems for realities..."  

Man was dependent upon God and could create nothing by himself. Davies maintains that Maurice insisted upon the priority and initiative of God in His self-revelation to all men and that this is central to his theology. Just as theology cannot be the systematization of individual experiences, but rather the knowledge of God through His own gift of Himself, so too, the Church cannot be a human invention (according to Maurice and Davies) but God-given through Jesus Christ who came to establish it. Maurice himself states in the dedication of *The Kingdom of Christ*:

> In this way there rose up before me the idea of a CHURCH UNIVERSAL, not built upon human inventions or human faith, but upon the very nature of God Himself, and upon the union which He has formed with His creatures: a Church revealed to man as a fixed and eternal reality by means of which infinite wisdom had itself devised...  

What does he mean when he says the Church is not built upon human inventions or human faith? According to Davies, Maurice's assertion that the Church is a "body instituted by God" shows a tendency to minimize the role of man. It approximates to that type of popular opinion among Christians which stifles criticism of the institutional Church and perforce restricts change because "God made it so". Is Maurice omitting to recognize the dynamism of truth, and thereby reducing the Church to a static and fixed institution? Or is he merely stressing in this way the initiative of God as a warning to sectarians? He was writing, after all, to a member of the Society of Friends, and was defending the "Church principle"

over against the "sect" and "Quaker" principles, and deliberately avoiding too precise a dogmatic definition. Yet it is from these "hints" that we must extract some idea of his concept of the Church. To look at their positive side we can say that human inventions fade with the passage of time and are subject to failure, whereas God is ever-present with His people. Human systems distort truth and become self-important—become sects, "bodies formed by the combination of certain men who agree in reverencing the name of Christ or who have the same opinion respecting His doctrines." And indeed Maurice often states that the Church is only narrow and cruel when she apes the sects, and assumes the character of a sect, has distorted truth when it felt it was truth's only possessor, and became self-important only when it recognized a human leader in place of its true and only Head, Jesus Christ. He writes:

The English Church I look upon as merely one branch of the true Church; and every system, whether called Evangelical, Liberal, Catholic, or purely Anglican, which has been invented by the members of the Church in former times and in our own day to express that notion of the Church, I look upon as 'of the earth earthy', and as much carrying within it the seeds of destruction as the systems of the different sects which have revolted from her.

The Church is thus more than the sects which compose it.

(The Church) has been preyed upon by diseases of all kinds in the shape of human systems: by the Romish system...by Protestant systems...Yet in spite of these...the Church, I think, is coming forth, and will manifest itself as something entirely distinct from them all—distinct, too, from the faith which exists in the minds of those who spiritually dwell in it, though requiring it and sustaining it.

He sees the Church as fixed and eternal in the context of God's faithfulness to His people, recognizing its own idolatry and faithlessness throughout its history which to Maurice has been the source of its sectarian divisions in the present time.

A second aspect of his conception of the Church is the image of "the people of God" deriving from Hebraic thought. We have already discussed his development of the "Kingdom" as a Jewish concept and its basis on the patriarchal "family" of Abraham and his seed. Maurice believes that the Kingdom Christ came to found is the Church, "the Church (is) the child the Jewish polity had for so many ages been carrying in its womb." The family history of Israel embodies "the principles which must hereafter be seen in the nation and in the church." In his essay "On the Unity of the Church" he claims:

The earlier records (O.T.) speak of a nation called out by God to be the witness of His presence and government; the later records (N.T.) have no connexion with these—have no distinct meaning of their own—if they do not describe the expansion of a national Society into a human and universal Society. Thus the Church as witness takes as its model the Hebrew nation, thereby avoiding an exclusiveness which would limit its eternal message to one group of men or one point in time. And in the present day it is evidence for that which Israel did of old:

The Church it seems to me exists in the world as a witness to mankind that there is a continual, divine gracious government over it; as a witness to each nation that God is not less a king over it than he was over the Jews... The Church is to tell men, that if God was a Redeemer of old, He is a Redeemer now; that if He was the

judge of kings, priests, nobles in old times— if He called them to account... He does so still. 12.

The universality of the Old Testament subsists in God's choice of one people to be for the blessing of all. 13.

Two more characteristics of the Church are interwoven in what we have just said. One is his description of the Church as a universal Kingdom, and the other is his notion of the Church as a sacrament of the Kingdom and sign of God's universal love for all men. It is this crucial aspect of his thought which both exhibits the prophetic character of his writings as well as brings into focus all the difficulties of language with which we have already dealt. The purpose of the Church is to declare first that God's kingdom is at hand, is a spiritual reality in which man as man is living and which he is invited to recognize. Thus its purpose is to tell the world the truth about its own existence:

...to proclaim to men their spiritual condition, the eternal foundation on which it rests, the manifestation which has been made of it by the birth, death, resurrection, and ascension of the Son of God, and the gift of the Spirit. 14.

By proclaiming the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Trinity, the Church attempts to show not only God's will for His people but the true pattern and foundation on which all human reality rests.

Maurice would maintain that the Church is God's universal Kingdom upon earth and at the same time sacrament or sign of that Kingdom. Maurice does not himself call the Church the "sacrament of the Kingdom" but this description fits his thought. The Church

13. ibid. p.269.
was to him the *efficacious* sign of man's redemption. This poses for us the problem of reconciling the two images of universal Kingdom and sacrament of that Kingdom. He says in *The Kingdom of Christ*: "I have maintained on the authority of Scripture that the Catholic Church is emphatically a kingdom for *mankind*, a kingdom grounded upon the union which has been established in Christ between God and man..." True, it is for mankind in the sense that Christ's saving act was universal (and certainly not directed at one small group of men) and the Church's message is directed to all men. But the Church is also the body of believers, baptized in the Name of the Trinity. This aspect of the Church which Maurice fully recognizes is one of witness- the Church makes men aware of the truth that the Kingdom is realized in Christ Jesus. In fact:

Where, I ask of you, would be the blessing to mankind of Christ's death, if there were none to bear witness of it, none to claim the universal fellowship which it is meant to establish? We see that the world is not united in the acknowledgement of God or of the Mediator, not united to each other in one Lord or one faith. How, think you, can it be shown to them that there is such a Lord, such a Mediator, such a bond between all appointed witnesses? And who must these be? I answer all nations who, through God's mercy, have heard the Gospel of Christ, and have confessed it to be true; all who by baptism have claimed the privilege of belonging to His Church. 16.

In the Church's role of sacrament of the Kingdom to the world, it cannot be identified with the Kingdom of God as Maurice's language at times indicates. And by its very definition as sacrament to the world, the Church cannot be seen as a universal society- it witnesses to non-believers and its membership is a small per-


censurate of the world's population. However, Ramsey interprets him thus:

He viewed the Church not only as the home of the redeemed but as the sign that God had redeemed the whole human race and the whole human race was potentially in Christ. This led him to combine an insistence upon the definite character of the signs of the Church's constitution with an unwillingness to define the Church's present boundaries. 17.

The word "potentially" is essential here. Maurice often uses terms which have a fulfilled sense as well as his own sense of potential fulfillment. When he says the Church is universal, it is with recognition of the things which prevent it from being so: ignorance, sin, poverty, deprivation, and so forth. Yet to speak as if all men are actually in Christ's Church is to confuse the institution and union of believers with the reign of Christ in which all men live whether they recognize it or not. And to speak of the Church as God's universal kingdom ("The Catholic Church has established itself in the East and West and is acknowledged by God as His Kingdom upon earth...") is to place too much emphasis on the signs of the Kingdom (in the fully revealed, cosmic sense of parousia of which he has said nothing thus far in The Kingdom of Christ) and not enough on the eschatological Kingdom itself. "Fulfilled" language is misleading in the human situation as it has been so easy for the Church to consider itself the end and fulfillment of Christ's message rather than the sign and witness of God's eschatological proclamation. His unwillingness to define the Church's present boundaries and his recognition of the difficulties which this involves is much to his credit since Christians of the time seemed to find little difficulty in defining them.

17. A.M. Ramsey, op.cit. p.34.
And so it is with care that we must read Maurice's language on the Kingdom/Church, holding it together in our minds with his doctrine of the Church as sign and witness of God's love and redemption of man. "The Church is the living Witness and Revelation of (God's) love, or it is good for nothing."

Cullmann points out that the Regnum Christi is over all political, social, economic institutions, is over humanity. The Church's sphere is confined to the earthly community and therefore has a more restricted meaning than the Regnum Christi. The Church is not subordinate to it but rather is its heart and centre. The Divine Spirit is at work on earth but has not yet entirely taken hold of all earthly bodies. It is not a perfected world although Christ has conquered death; yet it remains as does sin. The Church as community is everywhere but does not necessarily coincide with creation. One can say that the Church is conscious, whereas members of the Regnum Christi are unconscious participants in the reign of God in the world.

It is in the context of the Church as sacrament of the kingdom that Maurice opposes it to the World. He sees each as a form of universal society, one of which is the expansion of the family and national principle, and the other is its destruction. The World, in Scripture, describes a situation in which man follows his natural, by which Maurice means selfish, tendencies. The World is society out of joint with itself, not recognizing its relation to God through Jesus Christ or how its members should relate to each other. The World is "the society which is bound

together in the acknowledgement of, and subjection to, the evil selfish tendencies of each man's nature." The Church is the opposite of this society; it must be distinct from it: "In losing its distinctness it loses its meaning, loses to all intents and purposes, though the words may at first sound paradoxical, its universality." Its universality is therefore maintained by its radical ability to transcend and thus to criticize the world by its very existence. This point is essential. It contains within it the entire question of the relationship of the Church to the State and to society to which we will soon turn our attention.

Although distinct from the World, the Church will always contain elements of it. In Theological Essays he says:

The World contains elements of which the Church is composed. In the Church these elements are penetrated by a uniting, reconciling power. The Church is, therefore, human society in its normal state; the World, that same society irregular and abnormal. The world is the Church without God; the Church is the world restored to its relation with God, taken back by Him into the state for which He created it. Deprive the Church of its Centre, and you make it into a world... 23.

But by calling the Church "human society in its normal state", Maurice is bending the use of the word "normal" to mean what would be better phrased as "redeemed" or possibly "engraced". Then to call the Church "the world restored to its relation with God" is ambiguous. Is Maurice here slightly altering the meaning of World from the Johannine sense of the Kingdom of Darkness into an identification with the secular (creation or nature in its totality)? (Perhaps the use of World and world lends it more confusion.) If this were so, then it would be clearer to speak of the "reign

22. ibid. p.261.
of Christ" in both instances rather than the Church. Davis points out that it is dangerous to identify the "World" in a Scriptural sense with the secular. "Not only is there through the working of grace a fund of goodness outside the Church, but evil within it. The frontier between the kingdom of darkness and the kingdom of light does not coincide with the boundary of the visible Church." With this Maurice would seemingly agree, except that by calling the Church "the world restored to its relation with God", he is either using "Church" so loosely as to equate it with the reign of Christ ( with which it should not be equated but from which of course it cannot be separated) or he is talking about something with a visible boundary... the unchurched or secular realm is where the World begins. In another place he states more plainly: "By the Christian principle we understand that which refers everything to God; by the secular principle we understand that which refers everything to self." The problem is this: how does he reconcile a seeming denial of the sacred/secular distinction (through a specific application of his Incarnational theology about which we shall have more to say) with a notion of the Church as "distinct from the World" when at the same time he can be understood as identifying "World" and the secular realm?

His identification of the World with secular society is only apparent. He uses "secular" in a different sense from that of Davis. Vidler deals with his opposition of the Church to the World in this way: Since Christ is the Head of the whole human race (Maurice) and all men are redeemed by Him, is there no place left for what the New Testament calls the ecclesia or Church as a

distinct society? Are the Church and the world simply alternative names for humanity? He immediately replies that this is of course far from being the case; yet his posing the question indicates a possible ambiguity. He quotes the passage from *Theological Essays* (quoted above, p.48) and submits that Maurice's intention was to protest against a separation of the Church and the world in the tradition of Manicheism, and of a philosophy which sees the Church as an inevitable rival to the secular order (world, as Vidler calls it here.) (Vidler sees the present situation worsening- the Church and the world becoming more opposed; he cites the fact that in some countries the Church is taking the role of a resistance movement. He concludes, "It is seasonable for us them to attend to Maurice's warning against the perils in this cleavage..."

Maurice believed that God loves the world- why, therefore, should the Church war against it? Because, he answers, the "World" is not the secular order in Maurice, but is sinfulness, the Kingdom of darkness. He writes: "The Church is the witness to the only true foundation of States, nations, families, and all human order. They become the world in an evil sense (as the Church itself may become a world) only in so far as they set themselves up to pursue their own ends, insofar as they become organized selfishness..." (Surely, then, the Church as a resistance movement should be consistent with Maurice's ideas- in this way it remains distinct and opposes institutionalized corruption in all its forms.)

Maurice writes:

The world, considered as apart from God- considered as

27. *ibid.* p.66.
a society which frames its maxims and its practice without reference to Him—this world is condemned to a very hopeless kind of darkness... 29.

The Church is the witness for the true constitution of man as man, a child of God, an heir of heaven... this world is a miserable, accursed rebellious order, which denies this foundation, which will create a foundation of self-will, choice, taste, opinion... in the world there can be no communion... in the Church there can be universal communion; communion in one body by one Spirit. 30.

Is not the world the secular realm? In the first part of the quotation, in Davis's terms, it would seem that Maurice is describing the secular order; but in the second part he is speaking of moral evil. It is uncertain whether Maurice would see that by Davis's definition he was identifying the two. Maurice would not say "in the world there can be no communion" if he meant it in a non-Johannine sense of the secular or human order. He always speaks of the natural ties of family life and the communion found in good human relationships. And so he continues to use the word "world" in the sense of moral evil. Vidler remarks that the world "denotes a principle on which men are naturally inclined to organize their lives," and is not a society or organization that is separate from the Church. Yet Maurice speaks of the Church and the world as two forms of universal society which must be distinct from each other. However, he always recognizes the crossing of the borders of definition.

The Church then is a witness against the principles of the "World", and with this Davis agrees: "The visible Church does however stand over against the kingdom of darkness, because it is the permanent expression or visibility of the sacred reality of grace and has received Christ's promise that evil will never overcome it." 32. Like Maurice he sees that "the sins of its mem-

30. Life I, p.166.
32. Davis, op.cit. p.74.
bers may damage but never totally destroy its holiness as Christ's Church." How can the universality of the Church be provided if it is a witness-Church? The witness that it bears is outward-going, all-embracing, manifesting the unity of all men, and its non-exclusivity guarantees its very universality. Maurice writes:

What is this Catholic Church? If you mean by that question, what are its limits? Who have a right to say that they belong to it? I cannot answer the question; I believe only one can answer it; I am content to leave it with Him. 34.

What are these principles to which the Church bears witness? To Maurice they are facts rather than ideals of notions, and the facts are expressed in the visible signs of the Church's life—the sacraments of the Church. These are described in The Kingdom of Christ as "signs in the present day of the existence of a spiritual and universal body upon the earth," which "identify that body with the one spoken of in Scripture," and which "are an effectual witness against the world." The Sacraments are the "necessary form of a revelation, precisely because they discover the Divine nature in its union with the human, and do not make the human the standard and measure of the Divine." It is the very nature of sacraments to be undogmatic..."To dogmatise about God is to assume that man does not receive the knowledge of God from Him, but imputes the forms of his own intellect to Him. Here again Maurice is asserting the priority of God in His self-

33. ibid. p.74.
34. Vidler, op.cit. p.81. Passage from Epistle to the Hebrews, cxxiv.
35. KC I, p.261.
36. Life II, p.495.
37. ibid. p.495.
revelation to men.

A key feature of his view of the Church is to be found in his doctrine of Baptism, for Baptism is the sign which distinguishes members of the kingdom (Church) from the human race:

...And by an outward rite such as baptism, I obtain the distinction I want between the family and the race to which the family is to be a witness, by that I assert the universality of God's redemption in Christ, by that I assert also that redemption to be of the sheep in each of us, not of the goat which is given over to everlasting perdition... 38.

In Scripture we see that the announcement of the Kingdom by the Baptist is immediately connected with the baptism of Jesus himself, with the revelation that Jesus is the beloved son of the Father, with the start of his public ministry.

The Baptism of the Spirit was thus the formation, out of a particular nation, of a universal society having its home both in earth and Heaven; witnessing of God's love and gracious purposes to all the kindreds of earth; witnessing that they are, as spiritual beings, under the direct government of God Himself. 39.

The apostles are urged to baptize in the name of the Trinity everyone who accepts their teaching, and so the sign of baptism is connected with the universal quality of the Kingdom from the very beginnings of its revelation. Indeed "this declaration (to Nicodemus) of the transcendental character of the new Kingdom is joined to the words, 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.'" And so Maurice concludes that the Gospel writers believed baptism to be the sign of admission into "Christ's spiritual and universal kingdom" which says to each baptized person, "This is your position; according to the conditions of it you are to live..." It is a call to

38. ibid. p.242.
40. KC I, p.263.
41. ibid. p.264.
the individual to take up his real relation to God in Christ, and
is a sign to the world that this relation is that of every man,
holding a responsibility with it to live in that relation and not
to deny the sacred truth to which it bears witness—life in and
through Jesus Christ. In Maurice's words:

Baptism declares man's true and right constitution to
be that of union with God, and separation from Him to
be a violation of that only order according to which,
as reason and experience alike show, he can live. 42.

In his criticisms of Quaker, Anti-Paedobaptist, Modern Protestant,
Philosopher, and Roman Catholic views on baptism, several main
points emerge. The first is a recognition of man's need for out-
ward signs which express real, spiritual truth—we use the things
of earth as pledges of a real "union with Heaven". The second
is that every man, woman, and child stands in that relation to
God whether he is a conscious believer or not. (The universality
of the reign of Christ.) The third is similar: while men can act
out of harmony with the principles of the Kingdom, and may not,
despite their baptism, have been consciously converted, and there-
fore are not members of Christ, this should not lead to the con-
clusion that there are two kingdoms, one real and spiritual, the
other outward and visible. The fact of sin does not alter the
reality of the relation to God. The fourth is that baptism does
not exclude the rest of the world of non-Christians, but rather
it relates a spiritual constitution for all mankind. It testifies
to the fact that "all attempts of men to reduce themselves into
separate units are contradictory and abortive." 43. It declares
relationship among men and of men with God, and its truth goes
deeper than the various sects of both East and West.

42. KC II, p.2.
43. KC I, p.280.
Suppose then I find this baptism into the Divine Name as the form which has been recognized by Greeks, Romanists, Protestants of all classes and opinions, for these twelve or thirteen hundred years... that seems to me as complete a declaration to all these Greeks, Romanists, Protestant nations, as I can imagine, of Him in whom they are living, moving, having their being, a far graver protest than it is possible to invent against their divisions and hatreds... 44.

The fifth is that the sacrament is not an event which brings a new nature to a man, but "affirms a man to be in a certain state and affirms the presence of a Spirit with him who is able and willing to uphold him in that state and to bring his life into accordance with it." The baptismal state does not disappear with sin; the relation is constant even though sin puts man into a false or marred relation with himself and with God. Although Maurice's language on this point is rather strained, he does emphasize the accomplished fact of the full redemption of the human race to which the sacrament bears witness, rather than a transitory act whose effects could be lost and regained. He wrote to Kingsley: "... it has been the effort of my life to assert a ground for men's sonship to God, which is deeper than any external rite and which is grounded on the eternal relation of God to man in the Living Word."

The Creed is a sacrament of the Kingdom in its own way. It is an act of allegiance, according to Maurice, connected with baptism. By baptism we are acknowledged as spiritual creatures, united to a spiritual being. By the Creed we claim our spiritual position and assert our union with that being. The Creed is

44. Life II, p.495.
45. KC I, p.288.
46. Life II, p.271.
47. KC II, p.5.
the confession of faith not in propositions but in the Name into which we have been baptized... "belief in a name, not in notions."

"The Name denotes that which a Person is in Himself, His own character." The Creed then is a personal expression or affirmation of belief in God that is distinguished from particular systems of doctrine and partial ideas about God. This is evidence for its universality, since ordinary people everywhere can unite in its confession without being familiar with theological controversy. Its simple form preserved the truth of God's revelation from all the obscurities of men's systems of truth. Maurice hoped that it would unite all of Christendom- in it Protestants might discover the principles of the Reformation, Greeks might discover that "centuries of alienation have been unable to deprive them and the West of these common symbols," that the Churches looking to Rome for unity might find in the Creed the "charter of their liberation."

Although forms of worship vary from country to country and are expressive of nationality, so have certain forms of prayers and rites survived through the ages, linking the present with the past, the Church in one land with the Church in another. The universality of the Kingdom is again expressed in liturgy which gives man concrete bonds with his fellows in Christ. In Maurice's words:

If anything is to break down the barriers of space and time, it must be the worship of Him who is, and who was, and who is to come... if anything is to bring those at one whom these accidents of our mortality are separating, this must be the means. 51.

48. ibid. p.6.
50. KC II, pp.18-19.
51. ibid. p.21.
For Maurice, prayer is social. Against those who wish to dispense with formal rites he argues that the whole point to prayer is not to develop our own individuality and selfishness through petitions, but to join with a community asking the help of a Father... "the prayer of the congregation is not an aggregate of such individual prayers, but the prayer of a body, each member of which professes to have renounced his own selfish position, that he may come as one of a family to seek the Father of it." 52.

What does individual petition accomplish? Are the needs of each human being not the things which are common to all? Unfortunately worship has become a badge of separation among Christians, rather than the sign of the unity of the Kingdom. However, Maurice maintains that while these separations "are the effects of our choice, not of (God's) will," the prayers and rites which have survived from the earliest times are the most powerful witnesses for the unity and universality of the Kingdom/Church.

Of all the forms of worship, the Eucharist has occupied a central place in the history of Christianity, and it is this sacrament which embodies the living idea of the Kingdom as Maurice sees it. This remembrance of the death of Christ is the central act of fellowship in the Christian community. The Passover, which signified the earlier covenant of Yahweh, was the most purely national and strictly sacrificial of all feasts. The Eucharist, on the other hand, proclaims the new covenant of God in Jesus, and has carried on proclaiming it throughout the ages, giving the Church "permanency, coherency, and vitality." 54.

Although the

52. ibid. p.27.
53. ibid. p.21.
54. ibid. p.48.
first Eucharist was a Passover feast, a national event of the Jews, Jesus gave it a new and purely religious meaning, bound up with his death and resurrection, which displaced the cultural ties with Judaism, and reveals its truly universal significance for all men, for all time. Man's self-will and disobedience prevents him from communicating with God and with his fellows. The sacrifice of Jesus on the cross which removed the obstacle to one, removed it to the other. Communion makes real to man the revelation of the new order, as he recognizes the meaning of "the cross" (the entire redemptive act of Christ) for his life.

As the sacraments all embody the whole character of the new dispensation, so the ministry of the Church presents Jesus, the minister, to the world. This phenomenon also shows the universality and permanence of the Kingdom of Christ (Church), as everywhere the Christian message is believed, there are ministers who serve the people by interpreting the Scripture and administering sacraments. Maurice now summarizes his argument so far. We have discovered a "series of facts... all proving the existence of a universal and spiritual society..." As all the signs of this society exist for men's sakes, so they require the agency of men.

And upon the character of this agency must depend the whole character of the kingdom itself. It may be something else, but it is not a commonwealth, not a kingdom according to any admitted sense of the word, if it have not certain magistrates or officers. 57.

Here he uses imagery which portrays the Church as the organized people of God— the institutional Church, with its hierarchy the sign of its being a Kingdom in some political sense.

55. Compare p.26 of this paper. Maurice here agrees with Schnackenburg.

56. KC II, p.87.

57. ibid. p.87.
The question is what kind of ministry is consistent with the character of the Kingdom as portrayed in its other signs. The answer is: one of self-sacrifice and service, absolving and binding together in unity. Just as the Jewish ministers were from the first told by God that their service was to transcend national limitations, so the disciples of Jesus were charged to baptize all nations, healing, breaking bread, forgiving, in the manner in which Jesus had done so. Jesus was not training the disciples to be saints, rather he was training them to serve; their role was action.

Maurice now tries to make a case for the episcopal form of ministry, but his arguments lie open to criticism from different sides. He says that the commission to the apostles would involve a change in their numbers and circumstances of jurisdiction, but not in the nature of their office or institution, therefore the countries who have preserved the episcopal institution have preserved one of the appointed and indispensable signs of a spiritual and universal society. He arrives at this conclusion by the argument that the apostles were to "perpetuate the existence of the kingdom...in the manner in which our Lord Himself had established it," that is, in the episcopal form. This identification of the episcopate with the apostolate and the argument from domini-cal institution to immutability of form tends to overlook historical development. Later in contesting the expected objection of the Presbyterian he admits that the offices of overseer and presbyter were difficult to distinguish from each other; yet the whole Church for thirteen centuries, and the greater part of the Church for sixteen centuries has believed that "such an officer as the one who is understood by the word Bishop is meant to exist in it." 59.

58. ibid. p.91.
59. ibid. p.113.
What is his role? To continue in the same function as the apostles-to be witnesses of Christ's resurrection. Maurice is not really influenced by arguments about presbyters and overseers, but rather sees the essential role of the ministry as modelled on that of the apostolate. Jesus founded the Kingdom/Church upon the apostles; the Bishops, whom the Church has always recognized, were the successors of the apostles; therefore, the episcopate is involved in the very essence of the Church. The argument is from tradition. 60.

One might argue here, as Kün­g does, that the essence of the Church is expressed in changing historical forms; although essence and form cannot be separated in real terms, they are not identical. Essence is permanent but dynamic— not immutable in form; that is, in its expression. Davis makes a few pertinent remarks on the subject:

The transition from the apostles, eyewitnesses of Christ and leaders of the first community, to a permanent hierarchy of bishops with apostolic authority not derived from the general community is a transition that the New Testament itself does not make nor compel one to make. 61.

And:

Here reference is made to tradition. The formation of an episcopal hierarchy was the manner in which the Church in fact structured itself in the first centuries, and in doing so it claimed to be preserving its continuity with the apostolic community. (This Maurice claims for it.) Granted; but what follows is that in its past historical situation that was the appropriate manner for the Church to structure itself, resist contemporary forces of disintegration and thus keep its identity with the apostolic community. In that sense it could claim to be obeying the intention of Christ and the apostles. It does not follow that, whatever the social, political, and cultural developments that occur, the particular structure then chosen should be regarded as invariable and imposed upon every age and area of the Church by the institution of Christ. 62.

The last part of the quotation discloses the weakness of Maurice's

62. Ibid. p.130.
argument as an answer to the question: "whether the form which Christ Himself gave to the infant kingdom was the form which it was to retain throughout all future circumstances of its development." Maurice gives an affirmative answer; in fact, he doubted whether such a universal and spiritual society of the type which his argument required could exist without retaining this form. He proceeds to ask other similar questions: "whether the office of the apostles was to be defunct when the particular circumstances which made the name appropriate had ceased to exist," and more generally, "whether the fruits of the Incarnation ceased with the time when our Lord left the world..." But even if we acknowledge the necessity of an apostolic office which would carry out the work of bringing Christ to mankind, absolving, celebrating the Eucharist, serving, healing, and even if we acknowledge that the fruits of the Incarnation have not ceased with Christ's ascension, it still leaves the question of form an open one, especially with its implication of immutability. Certainly Maurice allows that specific functions of priests and bishops will change:

The changes which have taken place in the condition of this office we suppose to be changes as to name, as to the number of the persons filling it, as to the limits of their government; changes some of them presupposed in the very existence of a body which was to have an unlimited expansion; none of them affecting its nature or its object. 65.

But this does not allow for change of the form itself. That is because Maurice sees a continuing need for the apostolate with which he identifies the episcopate. The Church is without meaning,

63. KC II, p.114.
64. ibid. p.114.
would not exist, without Bishops (apostles). He says:

Bishops being as we believe the witnesses and representatives of Christ's universal kingdom, are the very instruments of our communion with other nations. If there be no such institution—no apostleship—in the Church now, then the Church has lost its universal character; then the idea of the Church as existing for all space, and all time, perishes; then the commission, 'Go ye into all nations,' has no persons to whom it is directed. We cannot recognize a Church without Bishops.

It would appear that Maurice identifies the ministry with its particular historical manifestation: the episcopate; just as he identifies the Kingdom of God and Christ with the Church, its sign and sacrament. However, he sees the Bishop as witness, not in himself, but in his office, to Christ's saving message, and the official handing-down of this office is a witness to order and permanence within the kingdom/Church. Yet the point can be made that the abuse of a good institution (individual sin) is very different from the use of a bad one (the institution itself is no longer appropriate). The question then takes the form, "Is the episcopate itself a true form of ministry which clearly exhibits in both its essence (ideally, in other words) and in its forms (practically) Christ's revelation to men?" Because Maurice defines episcopacy as apostleship, its essence is guaranteed to be a true sacrament of the Church, and he cannot admit any other possibility. In this way, human sin and "secularity" (as Maurice calls it) may creep into the office of bishops, but this does not imply that the form itself is corrupt or outmoded (to take a milder stance than those against whom he argues). If the Bishop lives up to his true role of apostleship, secularity would not infect the institution, and it would remain valid in spite of the way in which it has historically worked out in practice. Maurice's argu-

ment requires the retention of the apostolate in some form by the Church as a sign of its order and permanence and universality. The episcopate should do this; Maurice recognizes that it has not always lived up to its "true nature". As Maurice would agree, the Church reveals what it is (its essence) through its signs, one of which is the ministry. But if the forms of the Church or the signs of its essence have become outmoded and have revealed themselves to be tied to a particular organizational structure corresponding to the Constantinian period, (thus losing the very transhistorical, universal character, their purely religious character, which Maurice wishes to guarantee), will he not allow for a change in forms to try to remove the clouds from the symbols for modern man to see again the clarity of the Church's essence?

And how would this provide for the aspect of permanence which Maurice sees as important for order and unity? The permanence of the essence of the sign would remain, but its form might change if practical needs required. This is not an argument for abolition of the episcopate. But Maurice does less than justice to the arguments of the Presbyterians. The sign could change in form to reveal its own essence which in turn reveals the essence of the Church more clearly. An argument for "permanence" should not exclude dynamism, but the "permanence" on which Maurice insists is too easily confused with the notion of the Church as a sort of state in which there are officers and "ambassadors" to other nations, a language perhaps connected with his view of a family-like monarchy. The arguments which he advances for the ministry as a witness to the Church's universality are well-taken insofar as the apostolate is to all nations (although a separate priestly class), uniting the various Christian communities over the world.
But among members of the Church itself, it might be argued that the official ministry had failed in its duty to witness to universality by the fact that until now it has been confined to men only. Maurice himself mentions the role of women in his section on Ministry in *The Kingdom of Christ*. He says:

... it is nothing to us that, under the old economy, there were prophetesses as well as prophets, and that during the interval between the establishment of the Christian Church and the destruction of the Jewish Commonwealth, this part of the system may, like all its other mere accidents, have been gradually disappearing indeed, but not have actually ceased... But when the Apostle of the Gentiles announced, that he would have women keep silence in the churches, we perceive at once that the principle which had been all along asserted in the regular organization of the Jewish Church, now that the formal constitution had been brought into union with the spiritual power, was to become a universal law. If St. Paul had merely suggested this rule as one which was expedient, in order to meet Jewish and heathen prejudices, we easily admit that the Omnipotent Spirit might be expected at different periods practically to annul it. But if he was actually restraining a practice common among both Jews and heathens, and if he was doing this professedly upon principles connected with the divinely appointed relation of the sexes to each other, we can have no doubt that the Spirit of Order, by the mouth of his chosen witness, was announcing the law of his own commonwealth. 67.

That Maurice sees the exclusion of women from the ministry as an "eternal law" is excusable from a nineteenth century point of view, but casts suspicion on his doctrine of permanence and universality portrayed by the ministry. With the advent of a new consciousness about the role of women in society, it is no longer possible to talk about the "divinely appointed relation of the sexes". This case points out the distinction between individual failings in the ministry and corporate, institutionalized faults. The view that women should be excluded was seen as an eternal and universal law within the essence of the ministry. In this case we would want to change the form from one tied to an historical and cultural view—

point which is now being challenged and will soon be outmoded, to one which more fully exhibits the universality of the ministry and of the Church—the inclusion of women into orders.

Maurice successfully argues for an apostolate which is a permanent sign of unity and universality in the Church. His argument breaks down when he identifies the apostolate with the episcopate without taking fully into account the case for Presbyterianism. As Davis points out, the ministry has undergone considerable doctrinal development, until it has become a priestly class possessing a priesthood different in essence from that of the rest of the faithful. This development was initially sound—the ministry is a particular and important function within the Christian community, especially as a realization of the priesthood of the Church as united to Christ. It is a particular sharing in the priesthood of Christ in that sense. But, as Davis goes on to say, this development has led to "the degradation of the laity, obscuring of the nature of Christian life and mission, the distortion of Christian liturgy into hieratic ritual and eventual fossilization..." Maurice would attribute this to human sin, and the structuring of the Church into a religious system, and admittedly this is partly the case. The point is that if the Church had seen the episcopate as merely the apostolate, these negative aspects might not have developed. Instead the function of the episcopate has become obscured by its identification with a monarchical hierarchy. Maurice may be indeed asserting the "true principle" of episcopacy, but by arguing for it in terms of "bishops" rather than "apostles", he confuses the form with the

69. ibid. p.141.
essence. It is the form (which he sees as permanent and therefore unchangeable) to which we wish to allow the possibility of modification (in terms of its power structure), while still retaining the essence of apostleship which Maurice so admirably sets out here.

All these signs of the kingdom are founded on the revelation to man of Jesus Christ, and the Scriptures are the historical/inspirational account of that revelation. The Bible (from Old Testament to New) reveals a constitution which is declared to be the divine constitution for man. It both interprets and is a sign of the kingdom, declaring its spiritual and universal quality. The Bible is not an isolated document, but the Word of God in the context of the divine order of creation in which man finds himself. As the Bible is the revelation of the kingdom, it must always be seen in union with the Church—they are the mutual interpreters of each other. "The Church exists as a fact, the Bible shows what that fact means. The Bible exists as a fact, the Church shows what that fact means..." 70.

The Church, then, as sacrament, and the sacraments of her own existence, are indispensable earthly manifestations of the divine life revealed in Jesus. We need these structures and symbols to make present to us in a more concrete way the events described in Scripture which have radically influenced human society. But these must be linked to truth as it unfolds to man over the centuries. The reason for dwelling upon ministry for so long is that the arguments Maurice makes here are so similar to those he makes with regard to the Church and to society in general. His criticisms are accurate and timely; yet his sense of order and "permanence" in the sense noted above, and his love for the institutions of the

70. KC II, p.164.
Church and the nation, tended to stop him from progressing beyond a sort of liberalism. We shall see more of this radical-conservative blend in the following chapter on Church and State.

To sum up his definition or description of the Church:

The Church— it seems to me— is a part, the highest part of that spiritual constitution of which the nation and the family are lower and subordinate parts; implied in the acts we do and the words we speak, established before all worlds, manifested as the true and everlasting kingdom when the Son of God died, rose and ascended on high, testified as the common property and inheritance of men by certain forms and ordinances which convert it from an idea of the mind into an actual reality for all who will enter into it and enjoy it, and which prove God to be true though all men be liars. 71.

CHAPTER THREE

CHURCH AND STATE

I

We now look at the relation of the Church to "National Bodies". As Davies points out, Maurice had an extremely high view of the State which he believed to have a divine origin. He acknowledges his indebtedness in this area to S.T. Coleridge in the Dedication of The Kingdom of Christ:

The little book upon Church and State you will suppose, from the title and character of these volumes, that I am likely to have studied still more attentively... It seems to me that the doctrine which I have endeavoured to bring out in what I have said respecting the relations between Church and State, is nothing but an expansion of Mr. Coleridge's remark respecting the opposition and necessary harmony of Law and Religion, though... I have departed from his phraseology and have even adopted one which he might not be inclined to sanction. 1.

It would perhaps enlighten us to look at that work and discover its significance for Maurice's thought.

By the "idea" of the State or Church, Coleridge means:

that conception which is not abstracted from any particular form or mode in which either may happen to exist at any given time, nor yet generalized from any number or succession of such forms or modes, but which is produced by a knowledge or sense of the ultimate aim of each.

He uses "idea" in much the same way as Kung uses "essence"; later he states that there is a correspondent scheme of means which to some extent (though inadequately) represent the idea, what Kung might call the "forms". The essence of both the Church and the State, then, is discovered by knowing the ultimate aim of each. Although a thing's ultimate aim cannot be separated in real terms from those forms or modes in which it finds expression, they are not identical. In the case of the Church we could say that its

1. KC I, p.12.

ultimate aim was revealed in Scripture and in Jesus Christ, and its forms were reflected upon later. But what about the State? Maurice and Coleridge believed that the State had divine support as much as did the Church, and so its ultimate aim was and is revealed or "sensed" by men through divine inspiration prior to the existing institution as we know it.

Coleridge goes on to say that this sense of the ultimate aim of a thing can exist in men unconsciously and even be incapable of expression. (It takes on the character of a religious experience which cannot be adequately expressed in words.) Men obtain the idea in this sense prior to any actualization of it, whereas Coleridge defines "conception" as an abstraction from forms or modes already in existence. Thus, in the case of the State, men could sense the ultimate aim of a polity and group themselves even unconsciously into a political organization such as the State. But the actual form that it takes is perhaps not the one best fitted to express the idea, given man's imperfection, and the perpetually active principles of compensation and compromise. (Perhaps this "unconscious" sense of an ultimate aim would be better expressed as "not fully developed". Some level of consciousness has to be achieved but all the implications and later developments need not be realized in order to have an idea of a State.)

The two great interests of any State are permanence and progression. When men recognize their true constitution as social beings and agree upon certain laws and institutions, permanence demands that the rightful removal of these should occur only when the conviction of their inexpediency is as general as that of their fitness when first instituted. But this is not to say more
than that the possibility of change must be allowed, and so pro-
gression is guaranteed.

Out of the idea of the State arises the idea of its Constitu-
tion- the duties and rights of those in the State. Historically,
the constitution governed what forms of polity and institutions
were established- the result was a "gradual realization of the
idea..." and:

because it is actually, though even because it is an idea,
not adequately, represented in a correspondent scheme of
means really existing; we speak, and have a right to
speak, of the idea itself, as actually existing, that is,
as a principle existing... in the minds and consciences
of the persons whose duties it prescribes and whose rights
it determines. 3.

Also it is real because it is the "final criterion by which all
frames of government must be tried." 4. State is used here in a
large sense which comprises the Church; Coleridge also uses it in
a narrow sense in which it is in antithesis to Church, as in the
phrase, "Church and State". Just as the two opposite principles
of permanence and progression operate in a State, so they form the
basis of the unity of the State in the narrow sense (England).

Acknowledging the rights of property, the determined boundaries
and common laws which unite a people into a nation, Coleridge be-
lieves that the permanence of the State is connected with land
(owners) and progression with the industrial and professional classes.
The balance of the two is seen in the House of Lords and House of
Commons with the king as the beam of the scales. This is the
idea of that State in the narrow sense, not its history. Its ul-
timate aim is to balance permanence with progression and thus to
provide for the well-being and just treatment of its citizens.

Whether it does this successfully is of no importance- it is gradu-

3. Ibid. p.19.
4. Ibid. p.19.
ally realizing its ultimate aim. Thus Coleridge divides the subjects of the State into two orders: landowners and citizens (including the manufacturing and distributing class and professionals). Landowners were subdivided "by the nature of things common to every civilized country" into Major and Minor Barons. These are the preservers of permanence and are opposed to the "citizens" who work for progression. He goes on: "I scarcely need say, that in a very advanced stage of civilization, the two orders of society will more and more modify and leaven each other, yet never so completely but that the distinct character will remain legible..." The Minor Barons, the lower of the two ranks of landowners, will tend to side with the "citizens" in political sympathies. But it is provided in the Constitution that a majority of votes are needed in both Houses (which represent Landed Interest and Personal Interest) to secure legislation. Neither House will ever have enough support from the other to take over the rights and privileges of the aristocracy, nor the rights and franchises of "citizens". In addition, "the notion of superior dignity will always be attached in the minds of men to that kind of property with which they have most associated the idea of permanence: and the land is the synonyme of country." He concludes that this is how the English constitution of the State has developed in accord with the ultimate aim of balancing permanence and progression. The idea of the State (in the wide sense) was presupposed before the State (in the narrow sense) came into being, just as the law (lex, mater legum) was presupposed as the ground of the very first law of state ever promulgated in a land.

5. ibid. p.28.
6. ibid. p.31. (Coleridge's spelling of "synonym").
Like Maurice, Coleridge takes the Hebrew nation as representative of the principle in question. Their institutes received God's sanction, but could have existed otherwise. It is here that he refers to the opposition between law and religion. One should not confuse "the inspiring spirit with the informing word, and both with the dictation of sentences and formal propositions..." nor confine "the office and purpose of inspiration to the miraculous immission or infusion of novelties." The Levitical institution was more the result of God's inspiration to men in general than to a particular (Jewish) people. Jewish law, then, "forms no part of religion at all in the Gospel sense of the word,- that is, religion contradistinguished from law; the spiritual as contra-distincted from the temporal or political." From these ideas he derives the notion of a National Church which is not a religious but a cultural body. "A National Church may exist and has existed, without, because before, the institution of the Christian Church, as the Levitical Church in the Hebrew, and the Druidical in the Keltic, constitutions may prove." This National Church was the "permanent learned class" who were "the immediate agents and instruments in the work of increasing and perpetuating the civilization of the nation." This is not the same as the Church of Christ in any nation, although historically one could say the two were identical. Gradually, however, the custodians of civilization detached themselves from the National Clerisy (National Church) and became the link between the theologians and the people. But

7. ibid. p.36.
8. ibid. p.37.
9. ibid. p.xvi.
10. ibid. p.xvii.
Coleridge does not think that this separation of the learned class from the historical Church of Christ should annul the rights of those who remained both in the Church of Christ and in the National Clerisy. Problems arise here in the face of pluralism and toleration. Dissenters should not have to pay for the support of a Church from which they dissent, but because they are citizens, must pay for the upkeep of the National Church which guards English culture. The objection is made that funds for this purpose are in fact received by the ministers of the Christian Church in England, but Coleridge counters with the statement that they only received such funds because they are "now the only representatives, as formerly the principal constituents, of the National Church."

According to Coleridge, the Christian Church is not a kingdom or realm of this world, nor a member of any such kingdom or realm; it is not opposed to any particular State in either a broad or a narrow sense; it is in no land national, and the national Reserve (Clerisy, National Church) is not entrusted to its charge. It is only the opposite to the World in the Biblical sense and is the "counterforce" of evils and defects of States in the abstract. Yet we must neither confuse the National Church with the visible Church of Christ, nor must we separate the two! The Christian Church has ministers of its own, while the National Church has ministers whom the Nation, through its Constitution has created trustees of the National Reserve (culture) and who can be dismissed by the State, paid by the State, and so forth. The first could be called an ecclesia- men called out of the World; the second might be called an enclesia- men called out of the

11. ibid. p.124.
realm making an estate of the realm. He goes on to say that the ministers of one Church may and should be ministers of the other. Will not a conflict of interest arise—especially in the relationship of this dual-ministry to the State?

When further it is said that the Bishops of the Church of Christ have no vocation to interfere in the legislation of the country it is granted; but with this parallel assertion, that the Prelates of a National Establishment, charged with the vast and awful task of preserving, increasing, and perpetuating the moral culture of the people, have a call to be present, advise and vote in the National Council... 12.

There is much to be said in criticism of this view of the State, the Church, and society in general. My purpose is to criticize Coleridge's theories insofar as they are representative of a view of society which Maurice shared and which in my view should no longer obtain in our own age. My criticisms are moral and therefore subjective.

First, men form states through divine inspiration as in the case of the Jewish polity. Although he mentions various forms of inspiration, and does not mean a specific dictation by God of how to form a State, I would prefer to use the term "level of consciousness" to describe the formation of the Jewish "State" or States in general. The concept of divine inspiration of any sort reveals that "sacralized" view of the State which is inimical to modern secular man. Today the State is considered secular, that is, 13. within the range of man's intelligence, and its "divinity" is no longer to be reckoned with, although other forms of divinization might be discussed, such as the mystique and power of the American government and flag, and so forth. Coleridge's description of the development of the Jewish law reveals his realization that there was a need for a wider moral authority for the State.

than mere protection of its citizens could give. I agree that such a need exists, but it is not to be found in the "divinization" of the State.

Second, the aim of Coleridge's State is the balance of permanence and progression. I would prefer to talk in moral terms of social, economic, spiritual justice and equality.

Third, Coleridge believes that the forms of the State contributed to "a gradual realization of the idea" or its ultimate aim, although perhaps they have never fully expressed it. In our day, institutions are alienated from those whose benefit they should be procuring, and are not contributing, and have not contributed, to a gradual realization of the ultimate aim of justice and equality. Also his belief in "progress" could be challenged: for example, we now have more efficient ways of killing the entire world population than ever before. Is this "progress"? His view of progressive improvement is influenced by the Industrial Revolution and needs more careful examination in our day.

Fourth, even if the forms of the State do not adequately express its ultimate aim because of man's imperfection, they should be an attempt to express the idea. An alienated form can only express alienation or else it is positively evil, actively perpetrating violence and injustice. To wait, as Coleridge wishes, for the inexpediency of the form to be generally realized (and then only can it be changed) when the "moral culture" of the people is preserved and propagated by a privileged class called the National Church is to wait for revolution from the top down, rather than from the oppressed and therefore revolutionary class. When money, power, and influence, belong to those in the privileged class whose values are taught universally, there is no scope at all for criticism of the system.
Fifth, Coleridge says permanence is connected with land owners and progression with the mercantile class. He speaks of this structure as if it were unchangeable, for example, by saying that the notion of a superior dignity will always be attached in men's minds to that kind of property with which they have attached the notion of permanence, that is, the land and Landed Interest. He disregards the fact that on the Continent the land had been distributed to the peasants, for example in the French Revolution, and so the notion of the landed gentry maintaining permanence in the State no longer obtained. In addition, classes are not permanent fixtures in any State or at any particular period as he implies. The "progressive" class has changed from the bourgeoisie (mercantile class) to the proletariat, and so the mercantile class of his day has become the guardians of permanence and even of "civilization".

Sixth, he justifies the class society of his time; speaks of the necessity of an aristocracy, an estate called the National Church of intellectuals which should not be separated from the visible Church of Christ, and a lower class. He claims that this is the correspondent scheme of means which represents, albeit imperfectly, the idea of the State and not its history. I disagree with this view of the State- both with its aim and forms.

Seventh, to call an intellectual elite a Church is to confuse the issues at hand and to complicate unnecessarily the problem of the relationship of the Church to the State in the narrow sense. Because he maintains that this elite must never either be separated from, nor confused with, the visible Church of Christ, he cannot allow the educational function to be taken away from the ministers of Christ's Church because they are the "only representatives of the National Church" who "alone" have a commission to carry on
the work of civilizing the Nation. This National Church is built into the very constitution of the State and will not fall until that constitution dissolves, a sign of which, he rightly perceives, is the divorce of scientific from religious education... the secularization of education. Although cultural guardianship is necessary, it need not be Christian. Then, the Church of England may fall, but the Church of Christ in England will remain to distinguish itself from the world. It is this last point which may well be the positive contribution of Coleridge to our discussion and to Maurice's thought. Religion as summed up in the Christian Church opposes the world, not the State in either the broad or narrow sense. (It is not a battle between the institutions as such but against false consciousness, although the destruction of institutions may be necessary as well.) Religion points out the defects in law and in the Constitution of the State. At least in theory, the Christian Church is the critico-creative force in matters of State. This Maurice and Coleridge share with many modern writers on the Church. The problem is how in practice a Church (and especially an established Church) can achieve this.

* * * *

We shall see how Maurice's analysis of the State and its relation to the Church (with which Coleridge does not fully deal) corresponds to any of the ideas which have just been expounded. Using the development of the Hebrew nation as his model, we find his views on the Nation or State both in Social Morality and in The Kingdom of Christ.

In his lectures on Social Morality, Maurice divides his subject into three sections: the Family, the Nation, and Universal Society. He sees the Family as the ground of the other two be-
cause it is the "primary fact of man's existence" in that every man has a father and mother. He opposes those social theorists who consider mankind as a multitude of units. Man cannot be considered in isolation; only as a member of a Society. As we saw in Chapter One of this dissertation, Maurice tends to oversimplify when he deals with the family as the basis of society. The biological fact that men have mothers and fathers does not necessarily imply a "family" in the sense in which Maurice uses the term. For him, a "family" is not a neutral category, but something benevolent and loving. He says, too, that men are always striving to be units, to break the relationship they have with others. Here, as we saw in The Kingdom of Christ, "unit" is not simply "a person" but rather, "a person over against other persons; an individual; a self-centred ego." Again, "relationship" is not a morally neutral term denoting social interaction of good or bad character, but for Maurice is a loving, or good, interaction denoting "fellowship". The fact that man is born into society, that is, into a network of social relationships, does not stand in need of proof. At least the family relation is not absolutely required to establish this fact. No matter with whom a child interacts first in his life, if his actions are consciously directed toward another, he can be said to have a social relationship, he is in society. It could be argued that it is in line with the view implied in Maurice's later thought that society is itself (or should be) based on a family model and should be politically structured as such. It is interesting to note that Maurice sees "the family principle" as the basis of the Church: he calls Christendom "a Society based on the Family principle." But it is also true that he claims authority and obedience as principles of society,

and he finds these principles in the family model. However, as we shall see, he does not make the family the model for the formal Nation or State. He distinguishes domestic morality or family principles from national morality or legal principles. This distinction leads to his conclusion that communism cannot be the basis of the State. And so, it would seem that he sees society, but not the State, as based upon the family, yet in other places he advocates the political structure of monarchy (modelled on the Hebrew experience of patriarchal monarchy) which would indicate a preference for political organization on the family principle.

Maurice goes on to argue that as soon as men recognizes a father (an author of his existence) he is recognizing authority. This authority is not to be confused with "dominion" which merely expresses the relationship of man to his property. Authority implies trust and requires obedience. Maurice says that authority and obedience are fundamental principles of society in his time. He studies the facts of domestic life: the love which a father has for his son, the respect which a son has for his father, the mutual dependence in the husband-wife relationship, the loving brother-sister relationship, the just and respectful master-servant relationship, all of which he sees as models for political and social relations. In all the above relations are contained the two great principles of authority and obedience: the father has loving authority over his son, the son obeys the father with respect; the husband has authority over his wife, and she obeys in joy; the brother first born has a natural authority over other brothers; and sisters, because of "the differences of Sex" ac-

15. ibid. p. 71.
knowledges an authority in their brothers and obey. Maurice is here describing the Victorian (middle class?) family. But even in the most ideal sense, Maurice's family model is not necessarily good for society in general. The kindly father ideal is basically hierarchical, as are all the relationships here expressed in spite of love and respect, and fosters inequality, paternalism, and more specifically, monarchy. The authors of "Slant Manifesto" cite the family model as an example of "liberal" thinking which reduces all problems to an individual change of heart and which accepts the structures of class and authority as naturally those of parent and child provided they are infused with love and generosity:

In this way the system can be attacked while remaining quite intact. The image of the family provides a basis for attack on a society's lack of love, but ironically reinforces the sense of authority, structured and unequal relationship, paternalism, and individual generosity. 16.

Maurice describes how the ideal picture of the family is disturbed by the fact of Property... setting husband against wife, father against son, brother against brother, the root of all divisiveness among family members. He asserts:

(The two principles of property and family life) will be always fighting in every man to whatever Society he belongs; democratical, aristocratical, monarchical. If he admits the principle of Property in any case to be the ground of his connexion with one of his own race, that principle becomes predominant in his whole life; if the domestic feeling is stronger in him that the feeling of possession, that will work itself out in him till it leavens his thoughts of everyone with whom he is brought into contact. 17.

In fact, the disorder of ancient nations, like modern ones, was connected with the disposition to treat men as property. This is not only manifested in blatant slavery—buying and selling of human beings, but in "a tendency... strengthened rather than weakened by

the mercantile dogmas which have supplanted the old feudal dogmas. The habit of regarding separate possessions as the basis of Society, as the end which all Society exists to secure" leads to the feeling that between men there is no relation or bond except that which money has created. But Maurice here is still speaking in Domestic terms- the terms "master" and "servant" ought not to be abolished but treated with even greater reverence. He is not speaking of the Legal or National State, but only of the family or household where "manners" are formed. "...this essential part of the domestic ethos attains its highest development when there is a reciprocal reverence between the Master and the Servant."

This reverence must remain hierarchically structured, however, and has to do with the kind of "individual generosity" of which the Slant authors speak.

The notion of family is carried into Maurice's concept of the Nation. The Nation is a collection of individuals, but all individuals are primarily of a family. The difficulty is to reconcile these two positions. The Nation is under a Law- the terms imply each other. This sense of law is very mysterious; Maurice claims for it a transcendent quality in that "it sets at nought the dignity of birth, the advantages of position." Law puts on each man a sense of his obligation, a sense of a wrong which may be done to him or which he may do. The Law stamps an obligation on the relations of family and addresses each member individually. It declares a respect for human life first of all; secondly it declares a respect for property. Although human life is far superior to

18. ibid. p.95.
19. ibid. p.97.
20. ibid. p.140.
21. See Chapter One, p.21 ff. of this dissertation.
property, the law gives new weight to property in giving each man the right to say "this is mine." He says:

A Law attempting to create Communism or assuming Communism as its basis is a contradiction in terms. It must recognize separate ownership; it must forbid each man to interfere with that which his neighbour owns. 22.

Later, in summing up his views, he says:

I have said that Property is one of the characteristics of a Nation, that the sense of Property appears in us along with the sense of Law. I have said also that the refusal to call anything which they had their own was one leading characteristic of the Universal Family on its first appearance in Jerusalem. No law had affirmed or could affirm such a principle; the Apostles uniformly treated it as lying wholly out of the range of law... 23.

I can see no reason why law which asserts the dignity of human life cannot assume Communism as its basis. The fact that it addresses each man individually does not necessitate the presupposition of private property, or more specifically, private ownership of the means of production. If Maurice were here merely describing the function of law in his day, his description would be entirely apt. Law cannot be divorced from the society in which it exists; it sums up human experience in society and sets out certain generally agreed upon principles (as Coleridge maintains). But Maurice is saying that law in general must recognize, not merely that it actually recognizes, values peculiar to a capitalist economy. This is disputable.

All this is not to say that a sense of law, or sense of justice cannot ever escape a majority belief and transcend what later generations would see as "petty-minded ideas". Maurice cites the example of gold-diggers in California in whom a sense of possession and lust for gold was overcome by a few law-abiding citizens who called forth in the suffrians a sense of order which they must not

22. SM, p.147.
23. ibid. op.336-7.
transgress. And surely we could see that in much legislation on social justice and civil rights, it is not necessarily a numerical majority who change discriminatory policies on the statute books. But the concept of justice is dynamic and cannot be completely contained in one social and economic structure. It is both part of the present social consciousness and can transcend that consciousness. With this I think Maurice would agree, but his exclusion of law from a Communist nation somewhat reduces the force of his arguments.

The second characteristic of a Nation is its language. Words hold the Nation together and at the same time distinguish it from other Nations. The attempt to have one common language throughout the world denies the uniqueness of each locality’s cultural heritage. Maurice rightly warns against the danger of assuming that English will or should become the universal language. Yet his slightly nationalistic phrasing betrays his nineteenth century consciousness when he says, "...We have been made trustees of a glorious Language because we are citizens of a glorious Nation."

The Law of which he has spoken is not a mere abstraction but commands the obedience of the citizen to those who are its administrators. Thus, the third aspect of the Nation is its Government. He considers the forms through which governments maintain law and describes the dangers attached to each. In monarchy, loyalty may be exercised most simply and naturally because its focus is on one man or woman; the danger lies in exalting the man or woman above the Law. The office of the King upholds the law, not the individual himself. In aristocracy, which has checked the king in the past (he cites the example of the Magna Carta), there is the danger that the nobles will claim to be exempted from law by the fact

of their privilege. True loyalty to a Government by aristocracy
consists not in the maintenance of privilege but in the insistence
that those who administer shall have no exemption from the duties
of other citizens, and "no indulgences for their transgressions".
In a democracy, all can acknowledge a loyalty to those laws and
administrators whom they have chosen; but because the people them­
selves have chosen laws and ministers, disloyalty in a democracy
leads first to anarchy and then to despotism. Each form of govern­
ment is suited to different countries- real loyalty is exhibited
by the citizen who, although he sees the faults of his own form
and the benefits of other forms elsewhere, struggles to understand
and correct his own form of government by applying the very laws
and principles on which it stands. He criticizes those who wish
to impose their form on all the world- especially those who believe
democracy to be the only tolerable form for the universe!

Also, he argues against those who regard the monarch as
merely an ornamental appendage to the true government of England.
This view, he says, equates Government with Administration, and
sees Government as "an instrument for securing certain external
advantages to the inhabitants of a country, in any given period,
(as) having no relation to the past or the future." He criti­
cizes those who wish to destroy the form of having an aristocracy
merely because "it begets a base flunkeyism". Rather, the aris­
tocracy represents those family sympathies common to all; a here­
ditary chamber does much to elevate national life. He concludes

26. ibid. p.194.
27. ibid. p.197.
by stating:

We are not to maintain that Nations are only good and true when they have a Sovereign and a House of Peers, and a House of Commons. But since this is the form of Government under which we have been nurtured, which has moulded the thoughts of us and our fathers, our loyalty to it will be the best security that we honour the institutions and desire the growth of every other Nation. 28.

The question which Maurice does not treat is whether any of these forms of government, or blends of them, contains within itself, in its essence, an injustice or breaking of Law. The question does not arise for him precisely in this form; again he is concerned rather with abuses of the forms than with the forms themselves. Hereditary titles and wealth, the crown, are part of the natural order of things for him. In this he is very much a man of his age.

Maurice finally moves on to the universal society, the world. (On first reading, it would seem he is using "world" in an ordinary, non-Biblical sense.) Just as the patriarchal society became the legal or national society, so the age of Nations passed into the universal age with the emergence of the Roman Empire. This empire was characterized by a decline in family life, an emperor who regarded the law as something which could be arbitrarily proclaimed from his mouth, a language which no longer expressed the deepest and truest parts of Roman life, an imperial dictator, a mighty army, and the worship of the empire in the person of the emperor. Maurice sees this world empire as morally reprehensible, a fact which indicates his identification of the Roman world with the Biblical sense of World.

In the midst of this universal empire which was a "world do-


29. The fourth characteristic of his Nation is that of War. He says that Nations were born in strife, and goes on to defend a just war theory. I have not gone into detail here because it is not relevant to the discussion, but must be mentioned.
minion", there arose another universal yet contrasting society: Christianity. This "universal family" was not bounded by divisions of countries or languages, not exposed to the vicissitudes of arms, professed belief in an invisible Head, spoke not of a religion but of a Kingdom. At its first mention in the Gospels, this Kingdom is "at hand", not "in some distant region or in some future state." Christ speaks of this Kingdom as that of a Father setting forth not only an individual but a social morality. Jesus makes enemies of the Jews by claiming God as His Father; He was crucified by Romans who feared His Kingship. Maurice makes much of the manifestation of God as Father in Scripture because it corresponds to the structure of society as He sees it and as he thinks it should be—a Family. He argues against the idea that the apostles were expecting the imminent end of the world: this would be contradictory to their own teaching that the universe had been redeemed by Christ and been reclaimed from its destroyers, and to their proclamation of a "polity for men". Indeed the Christians proclaimed a kingdom which seemingly rivalled the one of Rome; the martyrs testified to the "radical opposition of the two Polities; how one stood on force, the other on sacrifice..."

Maurice goes on to say:

The belief in an invisible and righteous Government, a Government over men, over the earth, was involved in the original idea of the Church... But while they (Christians) lived in the confession of an actual King over men they were witnesses for the authority of lawful kings in the former days and in the days to come; of kings, I mean, who should not reign after their own pleasure. 33.

The last conclusion does not follow: Christ as king of all men is

30. SM, p.266.
31. ibid. p.268.
32. ibid. p.283.
33. ibid. p.291.
far different from even the saintliest, most fatherly king on earth. The acknowledgement of the kingship of Christ is not necessarily an acknowledgement of the authority of actual kings in a twentieth century setting. This is an example of Maurice's combination of a religious metaphor or concept with a particular form of government with which he was familiar, but which was being challenged even in his day by the advocates of democracy. Maurice believed that the Fatherhood of God makes evident the Brotherhood of man, and further that this truth can best be expressed in a fatherly king within a society based on a family. But paternalism and inequality are the basis of a monarchical form of government, regardless of the good intentions of benevolent kings and queens. Maurice is speaking of the Christian state as the ideal. Our main question remains: does anything of value remain in his thought once the Christian state has disappeared? Our understanding of his ideas is necessarily limited and must be influenced by post-Industrial Revolution events. Perhaps Maurice would not have been wrong to connect monarchy with a Christian polity of the Kingdom of God in former days, especially in his ideal sense of a Family, when industry had not been developed so extensively and capitalism had not left its mark of suffering and enslavement. Of course, "Family" as an ideal would mean something very different today—probably less patriarchal and more democratic. But to identify the two in the years after Marx had written is to ignore that criticism of society which revealed so clearly the injustices of which Maurice was aware through his social work, and to attribute those injustices to a sinfulness in individuals rather than a major flaw in the whole system.

Continuing his historical study, Maurice examines the Christian empire following Constantine's Edict of Milan. He sees the King-
dom of God and the earthly kingdom as real as it had been in the first centuries. Whatever Constantine's motives for establishing a Christian empire, whether of expediency, political foresight, or faith (an unlikely event, according to Maurice) he did not change the Roman empire's characteristics of despotism and moral decline, but only Easternized it, according to Maurice. He set the Church up at his side in Constantinople and gave its officials special privileges and distinctions. "The rulers and officers of the Christian body performed that sacrifice to the imperial Image which the martyrs had suffered death for refusing." The Church fathers stood alone as powerful influences on the society in which the ecclesiastics were servants of the emperor. And so the question of whether a Christian empire is possible continued under the most favourable conditions for a whole millenium, but according to Maurice it contained a flagrant contradiction:

Such a revelation of the name and character of God and His relation to His creatures as the Christian's Creed and the Lord's Prayer take for granted cannot coexist with an Empire such as that which Augustus established, which Constantine transferred to a new city and consecrated with new names. All who adhere strongly to the Polity which is described in Scripture as the Kingdom of Heaven must be in hostility to this kingdom, must, however little they may aim at that result, be working for its subversion.

The discovery that a Christian empire will not be true to Scripture does not rule out for Maurice the possibility that a Christian State or Nation might be the truest mode of operations. The Christian must work for the subversion of the empire's total control of the Church (as Maurice saw in the Constantinian experience) and its "dominion" over its subjects, its earthliness, and so on,

34. ibid. p.297.
35. ibid. p.314.
but he must support his Nation (which has an Established Church) which has "authority" over its sons, and has a link with the Kingdom of God realized on earth and to be gained in heaven. Again, the blend of conservative and radical elements reveals itself in his thought.

After the unsuccessful attempt at having a Christian empire, the Popes tried to have a universal Church which would exist within the political state, have a common tongue (Latin), submerge all national distinctions. Although Maurice believes that "the foundations of that Social Life were discovered by those (Churchmen) who spoke of the Family for all mankind," the announcement of that Family, tied as it was within Latin limits, was hindered from true universality, and by the glorification of celibacy, which destroyed that feeling of a connection between the Universal Family and any particular family. This society degenerated into one of political intrigue, tyranny and corruption, schism, Popery, and a "distinctly Italian flavour"! The Universal Father was also a political ruler and owner of land. Indulgences were being sold—money could buy salvation, money which was taught to be the greatest power in the world at that time. But resistance to these abuses is to be found in the emergence of National characteristics in the Church in every land, thereby asserting the true Universal Family which could not be made into a Latin Church only.

The Reformation brought with it a restatement of salvation for all men. But according to Maurice, Luther's message was individual rather than social: "He was the champion of an individual life, an individual morality." Yet in its individuality it pro-

37. ibid. p.322.
38. ibid. p.353.
claims a social and national morality by freeing Statesmen and Legislators from a doctrine of papal indulgence which denied the sanctity of law by promising redemption to those who could buy indulgences after their crimes. Thus Luther proclaims (unwittingly?) a national morality over and against an evil Rome's so-called universal morality which was in fact narrow and cruel. In England particularly the problem crystallized into a controversy about "the dependence of the Clergy on the native Sovereign or on the foreign Bishop." Under Henry VIII Englishmen testified for the sacredness of their nation's life against those who undermined domestic relations in the interest of a supposed universal and spiritual society. Henry had no notion of allowing sects to develop in his realm, and so persecuted Catholics and Protestants alike to maintain the true Universal Family with the National Sovereign at its Head.

Maurice's history was particularly coloured by a nineteenth century outlook. His vehement rejection of "Popery" and glorification of Henry VIII's role in the "English Reformation" are quite out of proportion in a modern historical approach. The main point he was trying to make was that a National Church could witness most clearly to the universality of the Church of Christ. He was building upon the same model as that of the Hebrew nation discussed in Chapter Two above. However, to have the king the Supreme Governor of the Church, and the temporal ruler the head of the ecclesial community in any nation, is perhaps prone to as many difficulties and corruptions as those into which the Papal kingdom fell. It is here we find the interesting question of the function of the Church in a society in which the visible Church of Christ

is headed by a political ruler. How true can the Church be to religious principles when it stands in such close proximity to a purely secular entity such as the State in our day. This relationship is further explicated in the next few paragraphs of Social Morality.

In the reign of Elizabeth I, England learned the lesson that:

There are two bodies needful for the good order of every state, one a governing, one an educational body; that if the last assumes the province of the first it must fail, that if the first assumes the province of the last it must fail; that they must work co-ordinately if the nation is not to become feeble through want of external law or internal life. The distinctness and cooperation of these two factors of national existence we commonly express by the phrase, 'Union of Church and State,' which may be abused to many sectarian purposes and receive many perverse interpretations, but which, when it has been purified of the baser elements that have mingled with it, will be found, I think, to express the secret of English stability. 40.

To this union contributions were made by the individuality of the Calvinist and the universality of the Romanist, together with the nationalism of the Englishmen. Maurice's criterion of judgement on its value is based upon the consideration of whether the Church gives a higher tone to statesmanship, and the State gives a more practical direction to the thoughts and acts of Churchmen. "Not producing these fruits it carries within it fatal signs and seeds of dissolution." Maurice goes on to say that often the "Union of Church and State" has been wrongly conceived; the State is seen to require the aid of a spiritual society and provides the funds for its operations. Rather, he argues, the State has often hindered the accumulation of revenues and the misappropriation of funds by the ecclesiastical authorities.

Much of what Maurice says here is based on Coleridge's interpretation of the "National Church": distinct but not separate from

40. ibid. pp.370-1.
41. ibid. p.371.
the governing body. Although Coleridge's National Church seemed to have less to do with the English Church as Maurice sees it, it has the same expressed function of education. Coleridge stated this function as cultural guardianship, whereas Maurice's view is more specifically moral in its expression because he is still speaking of the Church as Kingdom of Christ and "Universal Family". But both men presuppose a Christian Nation where Church membership is part of citizenship. The modern problem is one of secularization both of the governing and educational bodies in the State, and the divorce of cultural enhancement from religion. These problems were just beginning in the period in which Maurice and Coleridge were writing. Maurice dispenses quite easily with criticism of the State's financial relationship to the Church; Coleridge at least sees the objections of dissenters as valid from the point of view of conscientious objection, but claimed that the fact of their citizenship implicitly justified support for the educational body in the State, the National Church.

It is true, perhaps, as Maurice says, that the Union of Church and State in England has been the "secret of English stability." Sociologists of Religion in the present day would see religion and the Church as supports for social and cultural norms ("stability").

One of the abiding general propositions of sociology is that religion serves the central and crucial function in society of supporting what has been variously called social integration, social solidarity, and social cohesion. 42.

This is true of both types of societies (England and America) one in which Church and State are legally separated, and the other in which the Church is "established", and therefore is no proof that establishment necessarily compromises the radical nature of the Church. The same sociologists go on to say:

That the Church is being informed by more than it is informing the values of the larger society is an indicator that our society no longer appeals to religious suprasocial authority and its sanctioning system to validate its norms. It is also a sign that organized religion is committed, implicitly at least, to maintaining the society as it is rather than to fostering its regeneration along lines formulated by the Church. In this latter sense, religion is indeed making a contribution to social integration though perhaps on terms which compromise its distinctly religious character. 43.

The problem for us is whether stability in this sense is desirable either in Maurice's day or our own from a religious point of view. And it is a question of whether an Established Church can be an effective critical and creative force in society as it should be, and whether an establishment can avoid the criticisms which Maurice justly applies to the Roman Church, decay into a political state, total control, and denial of true universality. It could be argued that an Established Church is in danger of becoming a mere appendage of the State, paid to preserve those values which support the socio-economic system, become nationalistic, and so forth. Of course the criticisms of establishment become more sharply defined in the secular State of the present day, whereas Maurice was presuming a Christian society and government.

The questions which were beginning to occupy men's minds at the advent of the seventeenth century were formulated thus:

The Individual and National Morality bore a noble protest against the Money Worship of the Church which professed to be Universal. That was the beginning of the protest, and never ceased to give it vitality. But individuals and Nations are the conservators of property; they cannot shew us any human basis for Society which can prevent Property from being accepted as the basis of it. Where is this human basis to be sought for? Who can tell us of it? 44.

With the French revolution appeared the concept of brotherhood.

Up until this time the philosophers from Hobbes to Kant with whom


44. *SM*, p.373.
Maurice deals have not sufficiently shown us the human basis for society which we clamour for as men. Is it in brotherhood that it is found? Not in a brotherhood which did not recognize a Universal Fatherhood. As Maurice rightly notes, this brotherhood could not be manifested in institutions which regarded men as Possessors and merely wished to secure them in their Possessions. "Wherever there had been the conception of a Universal Society by the most exalted Philosophers, by the simplest peasants, a certain Communism had mingled with it." Underlying the schemes which have developed from that conviction is the belief that "somehow or other there must be, or there must be formed, a Human Family...capable of embracing all men (in principle)." His solution then is to reveal that this brotherhood is established in a society which takes the form of a Family, not an empire, a Family which reflects that relationship of all men to a Father in Heaven (that is, the Church). Cannot secular society also reveal the principles of Communism and brotherhood which he claims for the Church?

Maurice looks at the present situation and sees a demand for a "people", not a set of aastes...a universal fellowship. Church and State are both riddled by sectarianism and cannot satisfy this demand alone. What is needed is a proclamation of the Spirit of God to regenerate social life and bind up wounds. Without a principle capable of defending humanity against selfishness, "political economy will never be able to defend itself against the natural instinct of monopoly..." Jesus Christ has presented to us this principle. The Kingdom will be realized more fully when all the

45. ibid. p.413.  
46. ibid. p.414.  
47. ibid. p.458.
institutions of society as they existed in Maurice's day reflect that principle of love. The step Maurice fails to take at the conclusion of these lectures on Social Morality is the one which connects the principles of a universal morality which he has set out to society rather than just the Church. In sum he says that the Church is the universal society which can give men the true and only basis for a universal morality of justice and freedom; the Church is communist in principle; the State cannot be communist in principle because it is the conservator of individuals and private property:

The State, I think, cannot be Communist; never will be; never ought to be. It is by nature and law Conservative of individual rights, individual possessions. To uphold them it may be compelled (it must be) to recognize another principle than that of individual rights and property; but only by accident; only by going out of its own sphere as it so rightly did in the case of factory children. But the Church, I hold, is Communist in principle; Conservative of property and individual rights only by accident; bound to recognize them but not as its own special work; not as the chief object of human society or existence. The union of Church and State, of bodies existing for opposite ends, each necessary to the other, is, it seems to me, precisely that which should accomplish the fusion of the principles of Communism and of property... 48.

It is beneficial to preserve individuality in a good sense, and therefore it is good to retain national characteristics rather than subjugate them to a false "universal" society like Rome (yet he says earlier that the early Church was not bound by national or linguistic divisions!) He does not advocate a restructuring of society around the Church principle, yet from his own logic it would seem to be desirable. He sees the nation as modelled on those conceptions which sprung out of the Hebrew monarchy; yet he is speaking of a Christian State—can he not see it as being modelled on those which sprang from the New Testament?

* * * *

Another look at the question is taken in *The Kingdom of Christ*. He again begins with the Hebrew nation. The Ten Commandments presuppose certain principles, all of which can still be found in modern European society. They presume an Unseen Being who is a deliverer and Lord; they presume a worship of Him; an invoking of His Name; they presume the institution of a week, with the distinction of the seventh day as a day of rest; they presume the existence of the "Paternal Relation" which conditions the abiding in the land given to the nation; they presume community, the institution of marriage, the institution of property, existence of tribunals; they presume a "bond of Neighbourhood." Although these principles were particular to the Jewish nation, a look at history reveals their being common to the life of every ancient nation, especially the notions of the sacredness of life, paternal relation, marriage, property, worship and the majesty of Law. "Be that as it may, not only some of these institutions, but all of them, exist among ourselves." Although national (tied to a particular time and place) and not universal, like Baptism and the Eucharist, they reveal the principles of national life to modern Europe; and although they derive sanction from legislation, the legislators must appeal to men's faith in a Divine Being who governs all. So, the Divine Order here revealed is a model for society today, having set the seal upon institutions such as marriage and property in Jewish life. We, too, must "acknowledge the sanctity, the grandeur, the divinity of national life..." We are "compelled to admire" those qualities of Jewish national life, courage, self-discipline, order, faith, all of which "were connected with the conviction that national life

is a more precious thing than individual life, and that hundreds of thousands of individuals are cheaply sacrificed for the sake of preserving it."

(This latter remark resembles the philosophy of the U.S. government concerning Vietnam!) But all the questions nations have to ask today, although not specifically mentioned in the Jewish history, should be referred to the great principle therein expressed—every nation has the Lord for its King. The principles of national society common to all nations as nations must be preserved:

It is idle to say, But where do you find the authority for wars, oaths, or punishments in the New Testament? I do not find the authority for any of the distinct institutes of national life in the New Testament... there was no distinct precept respecting property in the New Testament; the first sign of the existence of a Church was that of men not calling their goods their own, but counting all things common... 53.

But neither was marriage encouraged since the Kingdom of Christ was the Kingdom of the risen life. And so Maurice believes that we must judge each modern situation in the context of the Gospel's main doctrines.

This is an interesting and prophetic remark in the light of the present theological interpretations of the Christian in the modern world. In Rahner's thought, the question poses itself, how is the theologian to know anything about the modern world precisely in its modernity from revelation? Rahner's thesis is that a prediction exists in Scripture which is not in the nature of an advance description of our time, but an illumination of the future which still leaves it dark. We have no blueprint for action in modern times from revelation; there is never any age which is the

52. ibid. p.179.
Christian age, nor any culture which is the Christian culture. This means two things: that there are always Church and State, redemptive history and secular history, grace and nature; and, that it is never possible to deduce from Christian principles of belief and morality any one single pattern of the world as it ought to be. It is only possible, rather, to reject certain things as contradicting the law of Christian faith and morality. Christians today are in a similar position to those in the early Church—a minority group amidst a secular world; a "diaspora" in the scientific age. In the "diaspora situation" the Church will not clash with the State except on an individual level—the level of conscience. However, the consciences of Christians will be developed not by set rules, but by judging, as Maurice puts it, each situation in the light of the Gospel's main doctrines.

Not only did Maurice not expect to find the principles of the universal society (the Church) in the Old Testament, he also did not expect to discover the principles of national society in the New, but both must be taken together as illustrating and sustaining the other. They must be distinct but inseparable. The germs of the universal society were planted in the heart of the Jewish commonwealth—the existence of priest, sacrifices, tabernacle, testified as much to the human and the general, as the king, judges, law did to the peculiar and exclusive. From its beginning, Jewish society carefully separated the offices of priest and lawgiver; they were separate in function but equally divine. The priestly part of the commonwealth governed the internal life of man, while the outward regulation of society was maintained by the legal part. However, by internal life is not meant merely religious services, but anything to do with dietary laws, health, moral health, and
presumably education, although he does not mention it specifically here, but which he sees as important in nineteenth century society as a function of the Church.

At the same time, as there is no division between the internal and the external life of man, no division in the character of God as the Lord of the outward and the Lord of the inward world, so neither is there in the Jewish economy between the offices which represent Him in these characters. The sacrifice of the priest is necessary to hallow the troops the king is leading out to battle; the king takes part in every ecclesiastical reformation. 55.

And so Maurice sees the Old Testament Kingdom of God as the perfect state— not sinless, but the best blend of the Church-State relation—a society which is not national plus ecclesiastical, but one which could not be national were it not ecclesiastical, or ecclesiastical were it not national.

A counterpart of the Jewish commonwealth can be seen in pagan Rome. The sacerdotal influence existed in every office of government; in effect, state religion was the practice. This led to the solidity of Roman society even after all the principles upon which it had been founded were set at naught. Mauricé saw Rome as the direct opposite of the Kingdom of Christ (pagan Rome, in this case, although it might also be said of the Roman Catholic Church!) He condemns the empire for effacing all national distinctions (so too does he condemn the Roman Church) even while praising the solidity of the society based on state religion.

Maurice asks whether by being its formal opposite the Kingdom of Christ opposed the principles of national life. The early Church was "at war with" the Roman government as well as the Jewish authorities; Jesus had acted as a prophet to his own people

55. KC II, p.183.
56. ibid. p.183.
57. ibid. p.184.
as well as witness to Rome in revitalizing and energizing, as Maurice sees it, the nation of the Jews. In effect, the early Church had to be opposed to "governments" in order to strengthen and reaffirm the principles of national society which the Jews and Romans were negating, in the one case, by sectarianism, and in the other, by building the empire.

As the Christian society was "an anomaly incompatible with the safety of the government" Maurice sees Constantine's Establishment of the Church as a necessary event—"the new kingdom could not be put down" by the opposing forces of persecution. Under Constantine "the organization of the Church became connected with that of the empire..." This alliance had not been sought by the Church, and Maurice sees the influence of the ecclesiastical society on the tribes within the empire directly contributing to the distinct national organizations which grew within it, thus contradicting the imperial principle itself. And the Church itself began to take on the characteristics of a developing nation, establishing itself in one great city and sending out missionaries to different districts. Maurice says:

The form of national society which the Old Testament invests with so much sacredness, is reproduced by that other New Testament society which seemed to have displaced it. As before, a spiritual element was proved to be necessary to uphold a legal society; so now, a legal element, a body expressing the sacredness and majesty of law, is shown to be necessary in order to fulfil the objects for which the spiritual and universal society exists.

The relationship of these two bodies has never occupied men's thoughts more than in his day. "The legal power can no longer

58. ibid. p.185.
59. ibid. p.185.
60. ibid. p.185.
61. ibid. p.189.
help the spiritual power by persecuting and putting down its enemies; the spiritual power can no longer help the legal power, by throwing a fictitious sacredness around it." He continues:

The Church wishes to make men feel that they are subjects, but its own influence is one which especially aims at setting them free; the State wishes to have a free intelligent people but it has itself only the power of keeping men servants. 63.

* * * *

In his review of the Quaker position (which rejects certain institutions of national life based on the principles contained within the Sermon on the Mount, e.g. war, and oath-taking) he demonstrates the inward character of Jesus' message—the purely religious nature of the Kingdom of which he speaks:

...it is my object to show how carefully our Lord preserves the characteristics of His kingdom, and its rewards, from all secular mixtures; how He transports men into a region entirely unlike that with which they are ordinarily conversant, and yet their own native region, the region of their own true and proper being. 64.

Everything in the Sermon seems to show, according to Maurice, that Christ came not to repeal one set of rules and establish another, but to confirm the existing rules and show their "inward righteousness." To follow the Sermon to the letter would be to deny its very spirit; Jesus came not to destroy but to fulfil the Old Testament law. It cannot be assumed that a man who says, "Thou fool" to his brother is liable to the same punishment as one who murders. Jesus was not giving us the same list of legal commands merely updated. Maurice criticizes the Quakers for taking the literal meaning of "Swear not at all" and denying oaths in court.

62. ibid. p.189.
63. ibid. p.189.
64. ibid. p.192.
65. ibid. p.193.
He says that Jesus did not mean judicial oaths, but rather oaths carelessly used in conversation; in this way Maurice is giving the Sermon a purely personal import in that it instructs Christians how to conduct their personal affairs but is not a blueprint for legal and national institutions. Here he is making an important point not seen by many in the nineteenth century— he wishes to get away from a purely legalistic notion of Christianity. However, he goes too far in this attempt. It is true he has said that the principles of national society are not to be found in the New Testament but in the Old, and with this he is consistent. But whether the Old Testament should be used for national society in the same way that the Sermon is used by Maurice to define personal conduct is open to question.

"An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" is the foundation of all law, says Maurice. This principle should not be abolished as it would cause disrespect for law and perhaps a taking of the law into one's own hands:

It is the business of the lawgiver to say, "You are all members of one body; the law cares for each of you distinctly... it will require from every man who injures another man, that he shall make compensation and satisfaction for that evil which he has done... in that kind, and to that degree, in which he has offended." 66.

So the "eye for an eye" concept is "a principle which lies at the foundation of a State, and perhaps more than any other, explains to us what a State is." 67. It is a righteous principle which "presents to us the most complete image of the order and moral government of the world; it most exhibits the rights of each distinct person, in connexion with that order and government." He continues:

66. ibid. p.208.
67. ibid. p.208.
68. ibid. p.208.
Vengeance must be somewhere—"It is mine, said the Lord"; and the State is that which teaches each man that there is a Lord, an invisible ruler, and judge, and governor over him, whose authority he is bound to acknowledge, and upon whose authority every act of private vengeance is an infringement. 69.

This is the function of law, then, "to bring men into an apprehension of the system of retribution which is established in the universe." The State is the instrument of the vengeance of the Lord in this matter. The law itself cannot take the desire for vengeance out of a man, but only regulate it; a spiritual and educative influence is necessary for the removal of vengeance. However, problems arise with this type of language. Maurice hints that vengeance should and can be erased from men's hearts by the power of the Gospel. This statement equates vengeance with revenge and assigns to it an immoral character. The same word should not be used for different reactions to wrongdoing on the part of God and of man. More pointedly, how can he give over to the State this power when he desires its obliteration in the individuals who make it up? If he means "justice" in the case of the State, then his defence of capital punishment must be qualified to some extent. (He had said, page 103, that the law shall obtain satisfaction for an offense "in that kind, and to that degree, in which he has offended." Presumably this would include capital punishment for capital offenses.) The concept of justice is more fluid than he seems to admit here, as in the phrase "the system of retribution which is established in the universe." In his desire to adhere to the belief that everything to do with law and national society

69. ibid. p.208.
70. ibid. p.208.
71. ibid. p.208.
72. ibid. p.208.
must be found in the Old Testament, he fails to do justice to the argument of the Quaker who sees the New Testament as the source of law as well. The Quaker looks to the New Testament as Maurice looks to the Old to obtain principles of national as well as personal morality. Maurice certainly realizes the limitations of the law— it cannot change men's hearts. But this fact should not prevent men from changing the law into something more compatible with the principles in the New Testament.

The law, Maurice says, protests against the selfish, individual principle (private vengeance) by raising a standard against it, but it can do no more. (What prevents the State from being selfish and individual, in terms of its own goals, in the enactment of vengeance? Every act of the private vengeance is an infringement on the Lord's authority; why not every act of vengeance, public or private? Cannot acts of the State be judged by individual moral standards, that is to say, that what is wrong for a man is wrong for the State, generally speaking? The secularization of the State has done much perhaps to alter views in this area.) The maxim "turn the other cheek" is of the highest order and value, but to apply it literally to anything besides our personal morality would perhaps lead us into the danger of "carrying out our Lord's commands too far, and thus sacrificing (our) civil duties to (our) Christian." This also applies to war: "After what I have just said, it is obvious that no attempt to extract a condemnation of war, or any allusion to it, from the words, 'Resist not evil,' 'He that smiteth you on one cheek,' etc., can be successful." It would seem, then, that Maurice sees the New Testament as describing a

74. ibid. p.211.
personal morality for dealing with our fellow men on an I-Thou basis. He cannot seem to extend this to the institutional or National level, especially in his concept of law and civil duties. The problem is great indeed. It is true institutions do not "love" as individuals do. However, one can say that Christ's personal law of love is translated into justice on the institutional level. Institutions embody the attitudes of individuals, historical attitudes, cultural values. The question is essential—what happens when State duties, legal duties, conflict with Christian duties? Conscience would have to be the decisive factor when such a conflict occurred, and Maurice admits that a man can resist the law should it be contrary to Christ's revelation, or if the law does not uphold the dignity of Law. But does this not contradict what Maurice has said previously? He is basically saying that love is the law of personal morality, and vengeance that of the State. The vengeance, or even justice, of the State, however, is that of the ancient Jews, not that of the Sermon on the Mount. If Maurice is talking about a Christian State, why are the principles of law not Christian ones, but those found in the Old Testament? It is true that Jesus did not wish to destroy the Old Law in the Sermon on the Mount. On the other hand, to take the principles in Matthew, chapter 5, as solely individual maxims would seem to be too stringent an interpretation, even if it is in accord with Maurice's belief about National morality being contained in the Old Testament and Universal morality being contained in the New. Since Maurice believes that every precept or command to man reveals something in the character of God, the two revelations of Him in the Old and New Testaments must be compatible since they cannot contradict each other:
Unless one of these revelations of God can be shown to merge in the other, so that all the qualities attributed to him in the first shall be actually, if not apparently, contained in the second, the duties founded upon these separate revelations cannot be merged in each other, but must continue distinct obligations. 75.

Christ came to establish a universal dispensation which did not exist previously in the same fullness, which was grounded on the manifestation of God as absolute universal love. He gives His Spirit to those united to His Son, that they may be endowed with the same universal love which is His essential nature. This is the foundation of the Christian Church, whose members are bound to love "even the enemies of God because they regard them as creatures still bearing the flesh which Christ bore, not yet finally separated from Him, not deserted by His Spirit." At the same time Maurice sees God manifested to the Jews as an avenger of evil; as a maintainer of law and order, to the extent of not shrinking from "the sacrifice of individual life, sacred and awful as it is, for the sake of maintaining that without which life is a mere miserable lie." The nation, he says, was established for this very end. It had at times to go to war "to maintain its own God-given position". Maurice wants to maintain that since Jesus did not come to repeal the laws of old, one must be able to reconcile the duty of loving our enemies with that of hating them.

...the revelation of God as universal love is not inconsistent with that prior revelation of Him, as the Being who is carrying on continual strife with whatever in our world resists and opposes law and order; and that, consequently, the duty of loving our enemies, which is grounded upon the one revelation, must be in some way or other compatible with that duty of hating our enemies which is grounded upon the other. 80.

75. *ibid.* p.213.
76. *ibid.* p.213.
77. *ibid.* p.214.
78. *ibid.* p.214.
This conception is not completely acceptable. It stems from Mauric­
iece's notion that the revelation of God as a God of love in the 
New Testament and a God of vengeance in the Old are equally true 
or are both revelations of God's true nature. Both have equal 
weight in argument and must therefore not really contradict each 
other. It would be possible to say, "God is loving," and "God is 
just and punishes" and somehow the two statements can be reconciled, 
just as Jesus' command of loving one's enemies can, as Maurice sees 
it, be reconciled with hating them. But although this attempted 
solution contains some truth, it denies a dynamic conception of 
revelation. Maurice's idea of permanence always relates to "un-
changeability" and so his idea of Scripture is static in this in­
stance. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ is more complete, 
fuller, deeper, than the Old Testament one, or so Christians be­
lieve. Maurice seems to neglect the historical context of Jewish 
Scripture. Neither does he distinguish here between resisting evil 
and hating one's enemies, although he had said the Christian duty 
was to love even the enemies of God. (See page 106 above.) This 
again is on a personal level - the State has the right to punish 
it's enemies (lawbreakers) even unto death.

Since God does not cease to judge and to punish because He ad­
mits everyone into His kingdom of love, neither is it meant that 
men should cease to judge and to punish under Him, "because He has 
appointed them under Him to publish His Gospel, and open the doors 
of His kingdom." The remaining question is:

How can both these forms of character be at once preserved? 
How can these two sets of duties, apparently so opposite, 
be fulfilled? Clearly, there is the greatest danger in o­
mitting either; there is the greatest danger in confusing 
them. 82.

81. ibid. p.217.
82. ibid. p.217.
Love is weakened when it is separated from law; law become monstrous when separated from love. There must, then, be some Divine scheme for asserting the dignity of each:

By acting in concert with each of them, a man shall find that the feeling of God's universal love in himself does not clash with the feeling of God's eternal and unchangeable law;...and, by refusing to act in concert with these schemes, he shall find one set of duties continually interfering with another, the peculiar temper of his mind determining which he shall prefer, which neglect. 83.

Certainly the principles of law and love must be compatible. As Maurice rightly says the question is how? Maurice argues for a "Divine Scheme" which separates the two, retaining a "justice" with no love mixed in, rather than arguing for a justice which incorporates the New Testament notion of love. Twentieth century philosophy has done much to clarify statements of this sort (above quotation). By "God's eternal and unchangeable law", he means a blind justice which exacts precisely retribution for an offense. This is not justice in the twentieth century (although perhaps in the nineteenth) but ancient Hebrew law. He tries to relegate the two opposites, law and love, to different aspects of the life of man, love to his internal, and law to his external life. These concepts are fluid... the law is not eternal and therefore unchangeable... The problem cannot be resolved into an opposition between the respective moralities of the State and the individual. Philosophy has shown us the relativity of all these concepts, especially the subjectivity of morality. Maurice's morality is Judeo-Christian, but like all other interpretations of the biblical ethic, it is bound up with his place in history. I disagree with his conclusion that legal duties and Christian duties would continually...

interfere with each other unless there is some Divine Scheme for their separation. I take the opposite view that legal or national duties must constantly be challenged by and possibly made to conform to Christian obligations. Love is not a simple opposite to justice, justice should include love. The institutions of society must exhibit this justice as much as personal dealings should.

God's method of establishing peace in the world, by the revelation of a Kingdom of love as well as of law, is to Maurice more effective than the Quaker method of refusing to fight one's fellows and loving one's enemies. The Quaker way will entail a loss of national spirit; God's way is to show the world the true order of its fellowship (in the Church) and to place in the hands of the national ruler a sword to chastise those who love war rather than peace. The logic of this argument is not obvious, but many people today would support Maurice in this view.

Maurice concludes that:

There are two societies, both organic, both forming part of the same constitution; both related to man under different aspects of his life; both bearing witness for God according to different aspects of His character: the one expressed in such institutions as the Sacraments, which directly concern man as a spiritual being; the other in such institutions as Property, which directly concern him as a creature of the earth. 85.

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Maurice next deals with the pure theocratist position, which for him includes Scotch Covenanters, Fifth-Monarchy men, and Non-Jurors. The position is represented by a belief in the Old Testament as the key to national society, in the Lord as King of every nation as He was of the Jewish, and a belief that the nation should undertake wars, administer oaths, inflict punishments, in the name of its unseen ruler. With all these Maurice agrees, but he says

84. ibid. p.220.
85. ibid. p.220.
they proceed to inferences with which he does not. The Covenanter wishes to oppose idolatry by treating offenses against God as offenses against the law; Maurice sees this as denying the function of the Church which deals with the spiritual matters beyond the reach of law. In this way, the Covenanter is "seeking to establish a Jewish and not a Christian nation; that is to say, a Nation professing Religion, and Not a Nation which recognizes the Church as the ground and vital principle of its own existence." But in his very description of their position he mentions those principles of national society which the Quaker would regard as being Jewish and not Christian; presumably Maurice must draw a distinction between law and love, calling a nation Christian which models itself legally on the Old Testament and spiritually on the New (by having a Church). His position lies somewhere in between the Quakers' and the theocratists'.

* * * *

Maurice next treats of the separatists who wish to see the Church separate from the State. He neatly sums up their arguments:

The State is secular; the Church, if it be a true Church is anti-secular; to unite a secular and anti-secular body is monstrous. The effects of it are an invasion of the rights of conscience, continual disputes between the two societies, an impossibility of reformation. 87.

This analysis opposes the Church and State in deadly conflict. "If the State be secular, the Church must desire the extinction of the State, for she lives that she may destroy that which is secular." The use of the word "secular" in this context must be investigated. Maurice says that the separatist is using it in an

86. ibid. p.225.
87. ibid. p.227.
88. ibid. p.227.
evil sense, otherwise there is no point in the antithesis. The Church is only opposed to something wrong, something ungodly.

If by the word anti-secular is understood merely 'spiritual' as opposed to legal', then the whole phrase is a cheating one. For we deny that there is any contradiction between that which is legal and that which is spiritual; and those who use this language will join us in the denial. They say continually, that the Law and the Gospel are not contrary to each other, though the Gospel is able to do that which the Law, being weak through the flesh, cannot do. 89.

Both the Church and the nation are anti-secular, says Maurice, in that both oppose evil and disorder—those principles which make up the Scriptural notion of 'this world'. He goes on:

The Church has become secular when she has attempted to realise herself as a separate body; the Nation has become secular when it has tried to realise itself as a separate body. But each does so by violating the law of its existence, by refusing to be that which the Scriptures affirm and history prove that it was meant to be. 90.

The conflict between the Nation and the Church arises when each tries to usurp the prerogatives of the other. Presumably if each attended to its own jurisdiction, the Church to man's spirit, and the State to man's bodily welfare and social needs, no conflict need arise. But the separatist asks if the union of the Church with the State is not a hindrance to the reformation of the Church when it becomes corrupt. Maurice considers the historical justification for this position to be weak and maintains that each was in a better position to admonish each other when in union:

To me it seems clear, from experience as well as reason, that the State is an excellent admonisher to the Church respecting her inward corruptions because it comes in contact with those outward evils which are the fruits of them, even as the Church is a most excellent admonisher to the State respecting its sins, because their effects in destroying the Nation's heart are most evident to the spiritual man; but that each will do mischief if it attempts, according to its own maxims, to set the other right. 91.
At first the arguments set forth here sounded much like the position I have been taking in criticism of Maurice, but there are certain important qualifications to be made. First, I would subscribe to Charles Davis's definition of secular: "the sphere of immediate reality", "intrinsically intelligible to man". In the separatist's argument, as Maurice sets it out, we have applications of this word to Church and State. First, "the State is secular." This means, according to Davis, that the power of the State does not extend into the higher, sacred order of human life, and that the State is not the judge or representative of ultimate truth concerning man and the world. Its functions are limited to temporal affairs, and its powers should not be used for the furtherance of any sacred mission, whether that of the Christian Church or any other ideology which claims to possess ultimate truth. (His example is Marxism.) Maurice has already argued with the theocratists that the State has no right to punish offenses against God but only offenses against the law, and therefore would agree that the powers of the State should not (and in any case cannot effectively) be used, in the spiritual area over which the Church alone can have jurisdiction. However, I would maintain that the State is not really neutral, but derives its values from economic, social, cultural and religious belief and practice. In modern society, these appear to claim possession of absolute truth, even if there is not a mission specifically designed for the propagation of the capitalist faith (although some might classify advertising as just this mission!) And so to some degree, the State is not in fact secular, but assumes a "moral" position with which one can agree or disagree from a Christian standpoint. From this I would argue that the

93. ibid. p.29.
State should in fact use the means at its command, with the exception of physical force or violence, to further values more compatible with the Christian faith, while being careful to respect other points of view insofar as it is possible. I am therefore closer to Maurice than to Davis on this point.

Second, "the Church is anti-secular". Davis had pointed out the dangers of identifying that which the Church opposes with the secular realm. Maurice rightly sees this, although he uses "secular" to mean the evil "World" of Scripture. His implication is sound even if his language differs. The Church opposes evil, and as Maurice continued, so does the State: the State is not identical with the World or Kingdom of Darkness, and the Church is not opposed to the secular or human realm and therefore not opposed to the State.

Third, "we deny that there is any contradiction between that which is legal and that which is spiritual." Perhaps there is no contradiction, but Maurice himself has argued for their separation in terms of function. The State rules external actions and social life; the Church rules internal and spiritual life.

Fourth, "the effects of (union of Church and State) are an invasion of the rights of conscience, continual disputes between the two societies, an impossibility of reformation." The fact that there is no contradiction between that which is legal and that which is spiritual does not immediately suggest an official union of Church and State. This union must be seen in the light of modern developments if it is to be criticized at all. Maurice does not adequately deal with the charge of an invasion of the rights of conscience—dissenters had to support by taxes a Church with which they did not agree. The existence of disputes between the
two societies is not a particularly good argument either for or against their union. And the final charge, that of an impossibility of reformation must be tried in the court of historical experience. I would see union as a hindrance much more to the reformation of the State than the reformation of the Church, although Maurice regards the separatist as reversing the argument. In the pluralist context, a State which must appear to be agnostic, as Clark had put it, might appear to be amoral as well. But this does not exclude a two-sided critical dialogue between Church and State; indeed this should be the case. The burden of proof is on Maurice to say whether establishment fosters the critical aspect of religion or hinders it. I do not think that he discusses it adequately here. Whether the advance of pluralism, the formal union of Church and State in modern times is not anachronistic, is yet another question.

* * * *

The next viewpoint which Maurice mentions is that of the "patrician". Its advocates see the early Church as the ideal model, and Maurice sums up their argument in this way:

The age of the Fathers is the pattern on the Mount— the true model of a Catholic Church; in which there was fellowship in faith and worship, discipline for moral offenders, separation from wilful heretics. Since that time the Eastern Church has been separated from the Western, Protestants have divided themselves from Romanists; heresies made light of, the idea of national Churches substituted for the idea of a universal Church, in each particular nation the Church is regarded as part of the civil establishment. 95.

Maurice sees the age of the Fathers as no ideal period but as one in which there was more conflict with evil within and without the Church than in any other age. The apostolic age was:

95. KC II, pp.231-2.
not one which was holding itself up as a model to the
world, but which was bringing out the idea of the Church
as a body belonging to no age; as the permanent witness
against that secular spirit which would always make some
period of time, and not the principles exhibited in that
time, the object of its admiration. 96.

In this way it exhibited its universal quality. What bears in-
vestigation is how the Church can belong to no age and at the
same time be part of the civil establishment. Maurice defends
the existence of national Churches. "The Church had been brought
out as one body existing in different places, to try its strength
against the Roman world, and it had prevailed." And so as the
Roman empire had swallowed up nations, the Church by its opposition
to that empire brought nations forth and in the Western world be-
came identified with those nations. Must we not, he asks, believe
this was a mighty step in the establishment of the Divine kingdom
upon earth? The merely universal constitution of the Church in
the first centuries was imperfect since it did not affirm nation-
hood—"it left all the relations of men as held together by the
bonds of neighbourhood, as distinguished by race and language,
unaccounted for; it did not bring these relations under Church
influence." Also the early Church tried to conduct itself as
if it were a spiritual police. With the development of nations
and law, an external body has taken over the role of punishing
offenders, leaving the Church free to discover its own more spiri-
tual role. Spiritual discipline cannot be everything, and since
that time, law has tried to be everything; but the time is come,
"when the spiritual side of Christ's kingdom must come forth into
a prominence which it has not yet assumed; when the education and
discipline which the Church exercises will be demanded by each

96. ibid. p.233.
97. ibid. p.235.
98. ibid. pp.234-5.
nation" for its own preservation. There must be a balance.

He goes on to conclude:

But the Church, I believe, can only profit by this great crisis in the history of mankind, if she be ready to acknowledge that according to the will of her Author and her Lord she is not meant to have an independent existence; that she is not meant to be extranational; that she has no commission or powers which dispense with the necessity of positive, formal law, and with outward government; that her highest honour is to be the life-giving energy to every body in the midst of which she dwells. 101.

In other words, God intends the union of Church and Nation and does not intend the Church to be a body existing outside it. This warrants careful consideration. Obviously on one level the Church cannot exist outside the Nation or apart from it in the sense that the People of God cannot be taken outside their human condition of existing in nations. But Maurice pointed out earlier a distinction between governments and national society in his discussion of the early Church (see page 100). Then he said the Church had to oppose governments in order to affirm the principles of national society which God intended it to affirm. This would harmonize with his statement above that "her highest honour is to be the life-giving energy to every body in the midst of which she dwells." 102. But does the Church have to be formally united to the State, that is, to the Nation and its Government? Maurice certainly thinks it should in England, and so when he says that the Church should not have an independent existence, he means that the separation of Church from State is not intended by God. Again I ask, how then can the Church exercise its radical religious function?

To the patrician's argument about the suppression of heresies, Maurice states that although the Church in this way asserted her

100. ibid. p.240.
101. ibid. p.240.
102. ibid. p.240.
own integrity, the impression was often given that arguments were over dogmas and opinions which Christians themselves could not settle. The Greek age of controversy passed into the Roman one of business and enterprise where the practical work was going on: "societies are growing; the Church is felt to be herself a society governed by certain laws, informed by a certain principle."

Maurice claims in effect that the connection of Church polity with national polity was the means of keeping the feeling of being a Kingdom alive. The feeling of national life made it possible for the Pope to assume his position, oddly enough. The national feeling made it impossible to think of the Church as a mere school of dogmas. Rather, "men were obliged to look upon it as a kingdom, for it was exercising the powers of one, and in no other character could they have paid it homage." As a result, the Bishop of Rome was able to give this character an outward, formal appearance, to become the Head of a political State, thereby affirming a principle he was in fact denying! Maurice realizes the anomaly of this statement, but defends it as explaining "how truly it was the will of God that Nations should come into being, and how necessary this was, not for the chastisement of the Church, but for its development." The problem of heretics could now be dealt with in a different way. In the first age, he says, they were declared anathema; in the second age, they were regarded as invaders of the unity of the state in which they were found; finally, in the third age, they are left alone by the state and treated as the rest of its subjects. This will continue only so long as the State "maintains its relation with a spiritual society... the mo-

103. Ibid. p.242.
104. Ibid. p.243.
105. Ibid. p.243.
ment it becomes a mere civil body, it will of necessity resort to force again for the putting down of opinion." Yet, the States, he says, are inclined to forbear from physical violence to repress heresies because they have found them ineffectual: they now look upon these disputes as having nothing to do with them unless civil law is abrogated in the process. Now the Church's great duty is to show its power of reconciliation of these differences, and the fact that the distinctions of Fathers and councils of old were not meant to divide but to preserve truth and unity.

He concludes this head with a few remarks on "the alleged impossibility of recognising a one Catholic Church under the distinctions and limitations of national bodies." This argument is summed up by saying, how can the unity of the Church be preserved when there are no visible tokens of unity, no general councils; everything is subject to individual princes; will not the Church in each country become more and more proud of that which separates it from other communities than of that which it has in common with them? To this Maurice replies:

...there are certain permanent ordinances in which the character and universality of the Church are expressed; she does not, therefore, depend for her unity on the faith and feeling of her particular members, but bears a constant and abiding testimony against the want of faith or feeling in any or all of them.

The forms of these ordinances vary slightly with national distinctions but in essence they link Christians of every nationality by showing Christ to be the real principle of unity. One must distinguish between the ordinance and the form of it. After the Re-

106. ibid. p.243.
107. ibid. pp.244-5.
108. ibid. p.245.
109. ibid. p.245.
formation when the Churches in each Nation claimed for themselves the power to decree forms and ceremonies, they did homage to this distinction, asserting that ordinances were the gifts of the Church universal, and forms expressive of National character. This affirmation shows "wherein the substance and essence of a national Church consist..." The ordinances give it substance as they unite it to Christians elsewhere; the essence consists in those powers which belong to it in common with other national Churches and which are to be exercised first for the benefit of its own Nation.

But when the national Churches begin to recognize their own positions, Maurice looks forward to their sending representatives once again to a general synod, and so concedes to that part of the argument respecting communication between national Churches. He rejoices that he might be living in the age when the two principles which have been struggling in Europe for centuries may come together in some unity, that of Protestantism which resists the claim of spiritual power to extranational domination, and resists spiritual authority altogether; and that of Romanism, which resists attempts of States to divide their subjects from the rest of Christendom, holds the Church a separate power to the State, and sets at naught the existence of each particular Nation. His dream of unity is still to be fulfilled.

Maurice is right to deny that the early Church is a perfect model on which to structure the Church today. It may have many important characteristics from which the modern Church could learn, for example, its relative indifference to the Roman State until its very existence was considered subversive; the fact that it received no official favours or finances from the State (in fact, was

110. ibid. p.248.
111. ibid. p.249.
actively persecuted) and was not therefore tempted to overlook the evils perpetrated by the State; its minority position amidst a pagan society (the diaspora situation of which Rahner speaks); its community structure; all these are attractive propositions in an alienated industrial society, but the early Church is not the blueprint for the Church throughout the ages, as Maurice calls it, "a body belonging to no age."

However, to bring nations into existence (whether the Church was solely responsible for this development as Maurice seems to suggest or not) and to become identified with them does not conclusively indicate "a mighty step in the establishment of the Divine Kingdom upon earth," rather indicates a historical development neither good nor bad. The question for us is the position the Church should take in the era of super-nations, and in the face of world communication and the threat of atomic annihilation.

Further, in dealing with the last two criticisms of the patrician, (that the idea of national Churches has been substituted for that of the universal Church, and that the Church is regarded as part of the civil establishment) he tries to provide first for the universality of the national Church in its ordinances, but he must admit the danger of a Church "nationalism" creeping into the forms. His conclusion that, once the principle of universality was again grasped by national Churches without submitting to Popery it would be beneficial to have general councils to promote fellowship, perhaps can be seen as compatible with the position of the patrician here. They do not seem at odds in asserting practical points for unity and universality of the Church. With regard to the second charge, he feels the State would resort to violence to put down opinion if it had not a link with the Church. This is unlikely
to apply to legal establishments since the Church would protest against any such display of force whether or not it was formally tied to the State. But he considers that he has handled the point sufficiently earlier in *The Kingdom of Christ*.

In spite of these criticisms, Maurice is prophetic here. His statement that the time is coming "when the spiritual side of Christ's kingdom must come forth into a prominence which it has not yet assumed..." could be very accurately applied to the present diaspora situation in which Christians find themselves.

And when Maurice says the Church's highest honour is to be the life-giving energy to every body in the midst of which she dwells, he is affirming what Paupert calls the Christian political orthodoxy of the Gospel. We must be as leaven in the dough, an active Christianizing influence in the wider community of men.

* * * *

The next position to be discussed is that of the "modern" or nineteenth century statesman who fears the power of educating the nation which the Church claims as its rightful influence, in keeping with its internal, spiritual mission. He would claim that it is the State's function to educate its citizens; if an ecclesiastical body does so, that body becomes as dangerous as the Jesuits have ever been. But Maurice sees a contradiction in the statesman's claims. Education is a power which acts on men's spirits; but the State, by its own admission, has nothing to do with this internal spiritual life, but only with outward legal matters—this the statesman would assert. By claiming an educational function


for the State, the statesman involves himself in a contradiction.
Maurice had said in volume I of The Kingdom of Christ, that the
problem is not solved by relegating to the State the charge of secu-
lar education and leaving religious truths to be taught by the
different sects, because education means an influence over the
hearts of men, and acts "directly on the human spirit." He found
it ironic that the State in his day was anxious to take on the duty
of educating when it repudiated the idea of having any influence
on the internal life of its citizens. But Maurice believes that
there is in the Nation a body which is as organic as the civil
body and able to perform the function which the State by its own
admission is incapable of performing; that body is the Church.

The problem of secular education is a great one. On the one
hand, the Church could no longer provide for the education of all
the citizens from a practical point of view. On the other hand,
Maurice wishes to see it do so because he recognizes the limitations
of the legal power which cannot influence men's spirits and appeals
to the self-interest of its citizens to maintain law and order.
Maurice rightly sees the importance of the question, "What values
will the State transmit if it takes over the education of the Na-
ton?"

He next compares the effects of an education "by a national
Church which understands its own powers and responsibilities,"
with other alternatives, by different sects, and by "an ecclesiasti-
cal extra-national order like that of the Jesuits." He treats
each with respect to family life, science, art and literature,
popular ethics and philosophy.

117. KC II, p.252.
A. To sum up his statements about the inadequacy of sectarian education with regard to the above topics (with the exception of philosophy which he seems to have omitted):

1. Since the sect is not based on the family principle, but on the individual choosing a new way of life, and since the religious body is looked upon as something different in kind from a family, and finally, since the sect does not bring the spiritual life into direct relation to "natural kinship", sectarian education will cause the disappearance of the family principle entirely from the country.

2. Sects have looked upon science with suspicion, but now persons arise from the sects who show a genius for physical speculation. To Maurice, the old way of suspicion was better because at least the principle was being affirmed that man's job was to find out about his Creator and do His will. The older sectarianists did not see what science had to do with that task; whereas their descendants merely abandon religion or make science conform to the religious opinions of the day, thus abrogating both science and honesty.

3. Again, in their infancy sects rejected art and literature as worldly, but now either tolerate them as necessary indulgences or make them conform to religion by coating them with Christian phraseology.

4. With regard to ethics, strictly speaking the sectarian does not admit of ethical study because he denies a morality for man as man. He is bound by Christian ethics, but regards worldly men as bound by a different set of rules.

B. State education:

1. As Maurice has already maintained, the State cannot do anything to protect family relations; it must teach men only to be
citizens. This is connected with his first premise that the State cannot educate in the first place because its activity is restricted to the outward and legal area of men's lives.

2. The civil power must teach science in an unbiased way because it needs technologists for its being. Maurice finds this self-defeating; the purpose of education, he says, is not to make shoes but to seek for principles.

3. The State would also have a utilitarian attitude toward art and literature, teaching only what is immediately useful.

4. Finally, the State would teach the morality which belongs to its position— a method of self-government based on the principle of self-interest.

C. Jesuit education:

1. All to whom Maurice is addressing his remarks would agree that the Jesuit is not the person to guard the family principle or family life, but this is not because of the opinions which he inculcates. A Protestant order of the same kind would be equally mischievous. Rather celibacy is looked upon by Maurice as the evil of the Jesuits. A universal Church which grew out of a family can only be preserved if connection is kept between its highest form and its lowest: the true Fatherhood of God expressed in the true fatherhood of men.

2. The Jesuits have given scientific study a high place and have even published books with which the Pope is not in agreement because they have assumed that nothing can be proved. This attitude that we cannot arrive at truth and so must submit to an infallible authority led to scepticism in religion and philosophy, and hopelessness of progression in science.

3. The Jesuit favours "literary diligence which exhibits itself in laborious compilations, annals, chronologies... all...
which may help to connect devotion more closely with the senses."

This (as well as the attitudes of the sectarian and the statesman) tends to give art and literature an "artificial, outward, fictitious character; to make them insincere expressions of that which is actually in the hearts of men."

4. The evil in Jesuit ethics has flowed from their establishment of a universal order on a human calculation of expediency for preserving the Church and religion. "The Jesuits feel about morality, as about science, not that it is but that it has been made, and, therefore, that it may be remade for a higher object."

In other words, the Jesuit frames his maxims to keep the order alive.

D. Education by a National Church:

1. Maurice has already demonstrated the connection of the Church with family life. It can best accomplish its object of "building up and sanctifying the domestic society of every nation."

2. A National Church, he says, which believes that it exists for the purpose of cultivating the inward man, just as the civil power exists for the sake of the outward man, which believes that it has a commission and vocation for this end must be a continual witness against all these notions of education. The National Church cannot tolerate the notions of the sectarians that science is not a proper study, or that science must conform to the maxims of theology, nor can it tolerate civil education which merely teaches facts and opinions rather than the knowledge of laws; nor can it look upon authority as a substitute for truth as the Jesuits do,

118. ibid. p. 260.
119. ibid. p. 260.
120. ibid. p. 262.
121. ibid. p. 254.
122. ibid. p. 258.
but "as that which is to put us in the right way of searching after it." 

3. With regard to art and literature:

But if there be any body which really believes that it has a commission to cultivate the mind and spirit of a nation... such a body will feel that the men to whom God has given the power of expressing their own minds and the minds of their age (in art and literature)... have a high vocation and mighty responsibility; that the influences of the world are likely to choke their powers and prevent them from freely and happily expanding; that the spiritual mother is to brood over them with tender and affectionate care... to teach them how they may discover the invisible in the visible, instead of confounding them and bringing the higher under the conditions of the lower. 124.

4. Morality is universal, so the National Church affirms, "in its highest form to be meant for all men and to be attainable by all men, seeing that the covenant of Baptism takes all who will receive it into the highest state which a man on earth can enjoy..." The morality of the National Church is in direct opposition to selfishness; it is "grounded upon the character and will of God; subjection to that will being the lesson inculcated by the law, conformity to that character being the effect produced by the power of the Gospel." Therefore this morality must hate Jesuit schemes which pervert the truth that individual cases must be judged each on its own merits and peculiarities, into a doctrine that "there is no common law of right and wrong, or that no conscience for perceiving that law exists in the creatures to whom it is addressed."

As we saw previously (page 92 ff.) Maurice's view of the

123. ibid. p.259.
125. ibid. p.262.
126. ibid. pp.262-3.
127. ibid. p.263.
National Church's function of education is similar to Coleridge's. Although he does not go so far as to speak of a "permanent learned class", he does not really meet the problem of "toleration" with regard to the educational system of his day. Unfortunately Coleridge's ideas on this subject are not well-developed, as Maurice himself indicated in the Dedication to _Kingdom of Christ_ when he said, "...it is also true that the main subject of my book is one which (so far as I know) he has not distinctly treated of, that the thoughts which he has scattered respecting it, though deeply interesting, are not always satisfactory to me..." I do not believe Maurice would have agreed with Coleridge's conclusion that the National Church (not the Church of Christ) will fall when the divorce of scientific from religious education shall have had its full work in England.

I have argued against the family as a model for either the Church or for society because of the ambiguities in the term as Maurice uses it. Also, inherent in the Victorian family structure was an inequality of status for women and children, thus by "family" we of the twentieth century would mean something much more democratic in structure. If the sect is based on individuals who choose a new way of life for themselves, Maurice fears that the family principle will be set at naught. But just because the sect is a group of dedicated individuals does not preclude "brotherliness" in the sense of good relationships of which Maurice would no doubt approve. However, sectarian education can be seen as a bad thing both in terms of the needs of nineteenth century children and in terms of a narrow and dogmatic education. Maurice rightly saw education as a broadening experience, and if the sects of his day were to take over that function, minds might be closed to the

truth rather than freely opened into it. In addition, the practical problem of educating the expanding population would be aggravated by putting it into the hands of sectarian groups.

For Maurice, the question of state education presented a very grave problem indeed. The State has to take over the Church's role out of sheer necessity, and yet what values will it inculcate in its citizens when it appeals to self-interest to maintain itself? Maurice has in the past made claims that statesmen by their own admission realize the legal power cannot influence the spirits of men. I have argued against this view in the discussion of the opposition of law to love. And Maurice himself has admitted "there is no division between the internal and external life of men" and elsewhere, "we deny that there is any contradiction between that which is legal and that which is spiritual," no contradiction, merely separation of a predominantly spiritual body from a predominantly legal body. He also says that subjection to the will of God is inculcated by the law of a Nation, and elsewhere that legislators must appeal to men's faith in a Divine Being (see page 96 above). He finds the principles of national life in the Old Testament, a religious document. He is speaking of a State which believes in God, whose policies were supposedly formed from that belief. Yet he believes what the statesmen have claimed, that the State cannot in principle exert any influence over men's spirits; it is the "eye for an eye" principle which lies at its foundation. Surely there is a contradiction here. A State which inculcates by its laws subjection to the will of God has some bearing on the spirits of men. The need for an educating body and a governing

129. KC II, p.183.
130. Ibid. p.227.
131. Ibid. p.262.
body does not imply that a government cannot provide education.

Maurice's treatment of the Jesuits must be seen in its context of a fairly widespread fear of the order as well as his own repudiation of the legalistic moral theology which was characteristic of that order. And so his remarks about celibacy can be put down to the first of these causes and his condemnation of their attitude to art and literature to the second.

Finally, his reassertion that the National Church can best keep the family principle alive is questionable. Just because the State addresses each man as an individual under law, it does not exclude family life from consideration, and is not opposed to domestic society. Neither would family life in England be destroyed nor would "brotherhood" be discouraged by State education.

Maurice's depreciation of "utility" as the end of education does not allow for the complexity and demands of modern industrial society. There is an immense need for trained technologists which Maurice does not sufficiently recognize as important. Society cannot exist without an educated working class; and although it is good to teach "laws" and "principles" they must be seen in connection with "making shoes" if industrial society is to go about its business in an efficient manner, and if the great potential of industry to grant more leisure time and a better standard of living is to be realized. From a twentieth century standpoint we can see that State education does not merely teach facts, but has taken over the role of imparting "knowledge of laws" as well. However, Maurice's fears are justified in many ways. To his credit, he saw that the State would teach those values on which it is based and on which its economy runs, and in this history has proved Maurice
right. Certainly State education must impart that morality which corresponds to its own laws. If its laws are based on self-interest, as all law is by Maurice's definition, then the morality will indeed be one based on that selfish principle. Presumably if Christian principles are inculcated by law, the State could quite happily teach a morality compatible with Christian values. This would occur in a Christian state which Maurice paradoxically presupposes yet will not admit. He at times seems to want a Jewish state (with a Christian Church), but he has accused the theocratist of that mistake. Why does Maurice lament a State education which merely teaches the principles on which its laws are based? If he deplores this situation, he should want to change laws to be more compatible with his educational ideals. The institutions and laws of the State will militate against the Christian ideals taught in school. A schizophrenic attitude will result in the citizens. A marked division will occur between personal and social morality; the laws will impart a principle which contradicts the Christian morality taught in the educational system. Either Maurice thinks that the values of the State in his time are Christian ones or he thinks they are not. If he is a Christian he will want them to be. If he thinks that the State would teach a morality based on self-interest if it controlled education, he cannot approve of its being based on a value so alien to the Gospel. I agree with Maurice in that I do not want an education system to impart a self-interested morality, as in fact the present one does, but neither do I want law and the State to support the value of self-interest in a society.

When Maurice argues for preserving the study of ethics he is presuming a Christian rather than a pluralist society. The sectarian will teach Christian ethics because he sees that not all men ad-
here to the same moral code. Maurice believes there is a morality for man as man, but this morality is grounded on God's will and the power of the Gospel, so in fact is Christian. The sectarian's idea is more pertinent to the modern age in which morality is not regarded as specifically a universal and Christian one solely, but as a matter of individual conscience and perspective within a culture. Should the educational system inculcate Christian morality in citizens who are not members of the Church? Here again we have the problem of the rights of conscience, both within Christian groups themselves and within the wider spectrum of other religions and agnosticism. The confrontation between radically differing ideas concerning ultimate truth was embryonic in Maurice's day, so it is understandable that his view was more specifically in the terms of a Christian societal outlook.

In his last section on the Church and the Nation, he discusses the position of the "Modern Interpreters of Prophecy." He feels that they will criticize his position from three aspects: first, that he has overlooked God's promise of permanence and restoration to the Jewish nation; second, that his "notion of a Divine constitution already established, which is not merely spiritual and universal but national, practically sets aside the doctrine of the second coming;" third, that he has overlooked Scriptural declarations of judgment upon the apostasy of the Romish Church.

Maurice agrees with those who look forward to a national restoration of the Jews in a commonwealth in Palestine, but argues that this notion should not take the place of that of the universal Church, Jerusalem is not to be the centre of a Church as Rome was, nor would

132. ibid. p.265.
modern Israel provide the only model of a godly nation. If we re­lapse into a national dispensation, the idea of the universal Church would be reabsorbed into that of an exclusive society; and if the principle that there is a visible capital of the Church in one land be admitted, Romanism will be affirmed. Thus if these notions of Jewish restoration were abandoned, he says, then "the way in which I have spoken of the state in this chapter may possibly strike earnest and thoughtful men as the true explanation and justification of an idea which they cherish..." He goes on to say:

I look upon the Jewish nation as an abiding sign to the Christian Church of the honour which God has put upon national life, and of His will that the Church should never strive to set itself up as something separate from the nations. 134.

Next he treats of the second coming of Christ in relation to the Divine Order which he envisages. This is the only instance of Maurice's connection of this idea to that of the "Kingdom". He says that the revival of the idea of Christ's second coming in his day has been one great influence for "looking at Christ's Church as a Kingdom." This has also driven out the notion of a private heaven with a system of rewards for duties performed and compensation for troubles incurred, a mercantile rather than a theological notion. But Maurice regrets as a confusion the idea that the second coming will be the beginning of a new order and constitution of things, in fact a millennial perfection. Rather, Scripture tells us that the second coming will be a revelation of things as they truly are now, "the dispersion of all the shadows and appearances which have counterfeited it or have hidden it from view." 136.

133. ibid. p.267.
135. ibid. p.269.
136. ibid. p.270.
words of Scripture imply the existence of a kingdom or order which men try to set at naught but under which they are living now.

Is there any shelter from this conclusion in the distinction between the spiritual dispensation or spiritual kingdom which has existed since our Lord's first Advent, and the outward visible kingdom which shall be established after His second? If by the words outward and visible it be meant that something less spiritual is in reserve for the time to come than for the time which is; that now we are living by faith, that then we shall live by sense;... I cannot conceive a darker or more dreadful vision than this of a millennial perfection. 137.

But he goes on to say, if by outward and visible is meant that Christ's rule is not merely to be over the spirit of man, that which directly connects him to the unseen world, but also over all human relations, earthly associations, policy of rulers, nature, art...then this is as true now as it will be in any future age. The Incarnation has made it so: "The Son of Man claimed it for Himself when He did not abhor the Virgin's womb..." And so Maurice believes that the principle he has elaborated in this book is not one which interferes with a sound theology of the second coming of Christ but only with corruptions of it.

Finally, although the Church of Rome has denied the national Church principle and therefore the universal principle, perverting the idea of a spiritual power and therefore the idea of civil power, still "it does bear a very striking witness on behalf of the truth that Christ's Church is a kingdom, and not merely a collection of sects bound together in the profession of particular dogmas." In any case, Maurice believes, only God can determine the punishments of these apostates. He says:

137. ibid. pp. 270-1.
138. ibid. p. 271.
139. ibid. p. 272.
140. ibid. p. 272.
But the end of these judgments, I conceive, be they more or less tremendous, will be the destruction of a false apostate system. You say that system is part and parcel of the Church; that if one perishes, the other must perish. That is precisely the point about which I know nothing, and about which you know nothing. But this I do know, that as long as a man is alive and struggling, I have no business to say that his disease and he are identical, that the cure of the disease must be the death of the patient...

This admission by Maurice which shows some of his greatness of character could be used to qualify some of his other statements in The Kingdom of Christ. His discussion of the State's duty of vengeance might have been less troublesome if he had added this clause about the disease being distinguished from the man; perhaps it would have changed his meaning completely.

When Maurice says the Church should never strive to set itself up as something separate from the nations, he is saying something positive about national life, not just stating the obvious. Secularization has changed this attribution of sacred qualities to nations as nations. Obviously the Church has to remain within whatever political groupings men form because its members are living within certain geographical and political boundaries. But perhaps today we would not emphasize nation-ality so strongly as it leads to the type of "individuality" which Maurice criticizes and which has contributed to world war, cold war, guerrilla war, and possibly into nuclear war should it become extreme enough.

I would not accept his idea that a revival of the concept of Christ's second coming has fortunately contributed to looking upon the Church as a kingdom. As we saw in the discussion of Maurice's use of "kingdom", there is some confusion in his language which indicates an identification of "kingdom" with an awareness of God's sovereignty (Divine Order), with the Church universal, with the

141. ibid. p.273.
special kingship of God over the Hebrew nation (with a parallel in England) and not at all with the future kingdom or eschaton. There is little indication in The Kingdom of Christ that he was thinking of this meaning of "kingdom" at all until he brings up the topic here. Even in his idea of the Church being a sign of the kingdom, a concept which has great appeal today, we cannot assume he was talking about a fully transformed cosmos or the final eschatological event. Rather the kingdom which the Church reveals is the Divine Order or constitution. There is no reason to doubt his claim that the second coming will fully reveal what is already here by virtue of Christ's first coming but which is obscured to man by ignorance and sin. And we would rejoice with Maurice at the obliterition of the notion of a private heaven, so future in emphasis that it becomes impossible and unmeaningful to reform or renew the earth itself. But since he sees the kingdom which Jesus proclaimed only as the Divine Order and the Church, he cannot do justice to a final eschatological event or fully realized kingdom of God of which Schnackenburg has spoken in earlier chapters. If, as he claims, the second coming is to be the "outward and visible" manifestation of what is "spiritual" now, and Christ's rule will be over all earthly things as well as man's heart, it does not follow either that this is already a reality or that it will not result in a "new constitution" for man. He does not allow sufficiently for the perfection of the end time, and the imperfection of the present. His views on modern Biblical scholarship were generally quite liberal, although he suffers on more than one occasion from underdevelopment in this area. It is a pity he did not expand his views here a bit more.

At this point Maurice recapitulates his arguments so far.
He asks the question whether these principles he has set out about the relationship of the Church to the Nation or State has bearing upon the English situation, and of course he finds that it does.

He sums up in this way:

We have maintained that there is a spiritual and universal society in the world; that there are also national societies in the world; that the Universal Society and the National Society cannot, according to the scheme of Providence, be separated from each other, that when they are brought into conjunction, that form of character which is intended for each nation is gradually developed in it by means of the spiritual body. 142.

I have maintained that there is a Church which is potentially universal, although it is in a minority position in the present day. There are states or nations in which the Church exists. In a limited sense the two cannot be separated, but may be legally unbound to each other in a formal way. When the two are legally bound there arises a danger of the Church losing its radical influence and critical capacity (although I recognize that the same can and does happen where there is no legal bond). No longer does the Church form the character of the Nation in terms of controlling the education system, nor in terms of a mammoth industrial economy which controls more than is controlled by the citizens of the Nation. But in a limited sense the Church could develop character in each Nation if it truly used its potential for prophetic utterances and radical reform. However, let us continue with Maurice's discussion of the Church of England's relation to all he has described.

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Maurice now asks the following: whether the Church of England recognizes the constitution which belongs to all mankind; whether this constitution be or be not so recognized as to be compatible with the distinct National Constitution; what is particularly Eng-

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142. ibid. p.277.
lish; how the character of universality can be realized in its perfection, or depraved.

Do the signs of a universal and spiritual constitution exist in England? The answer is yes if they are taken to be the ordinances and sacraments of the Church acknowledged from all time as they are still. But in the case of two bodies existing which both acknowledge these signs, which is the true representative of the universal society? That body which has the 'prima facie' marks of Catholicity—of true Catholicity and not Popery. The Romish system is incompatible with the acknowledgement of Christ's spiritual and universal Kingdom. In addition, the Protestant sects have made sin and the Fall the centre of Christianity; whereas in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, the first two deal with belief in the Trinity and in the Incarnation, and the fall of man is not dealt with until the ninth article. In this way the Thirty-Nine Articles best express Christian principles since it joins true Catholicity with the principles expressed by the Reformers. In fact all the principles of Protestant sects are contained within the Church of England. What she has rejected are the systems into which they have been turned.

Does the universal society exist in England apart from its civil institutions, or in union with them? All parties agree that the Church exists in union with the civil body:

The English dissenter affirms that the Church is embodied in the State; it is an Act of Parliament Church. The modern civil Ruler says, that the State is impeded in all its operations by the Church; the Sovereign is crowned by the Archbishop, the Bishops as a body take part in the deliberations of Parliament; above all, the greater part of the education of the land is ecclesiastical. The Romanist affirms that the Church has no pretensions to be called a Catholic body;

143. {Ibid.} p. 278.
144. {Ibid.} p. 287.
it is a national body. There can be no doubt, then, that the ecclesiastical and civil institutions are united, and this by bonds which it must require some violence to break. 145.

There is no fixed date recorded in history which tells at what point this union came about:

So soon as we find the Church in the land, we find her doing homage to the civil powers, such as they were, which ruled the land. So soon as the Church begins to exercise its own peculiar influence, the civil power begins to feel that influence, and to be moulded by it. 146.

Each body we find has its own representative and own object but are not set apart by any formal line of separation. Maurice claims that the transactions between the two bodies throughout history have not necessitated a covenant by the State for the protection of the Church, nor by the Church for the rendering of services to the State. They have only been attempts by each to regain a portion of its own province which it thinks the other is usurping, or to usurp part of the other's province. These transactions presupposed a relation, although an imperfectly understood one, and not one produced by a compact.

The Church affirms that it has a right to assign the powers and jurisdiction of its own Bishops; the State maintains that Bishops as well as the rest of its subjects must acknowledge its paramount authority. The Church affirms that it has a spiritual government altogether distinct from the civil government. The State says that the minister of the Church must submit like other men to its laws and its tribunals. 147.

This applies to the period before the Reformation; what of the Reformation itself, he asks? Opponents say of it that it was merely a national movement, concerned with politics rather than religion. Maurice refuses to admit this distinction: "I do not understand their distinction between politics and religion." But he acknow-

146. ibid. p.292.
ledges their meaning and affirms that the peculiarity of the English Reformation was that it was started not by the theologians but by the Sovereign, and was, therefore, not a movement, but a series of movements. In Henry VIII's reign:

a large body of the Bishops and Clergy had been led by their religious feelings to desire that this correspondence should be broken off (with Rome); to feel that the English Church could not maintain its own position unless it became strictly national; unless it abandoned that subjection to a foreign bishop, which the State had always wished it to abandon. 149.

And what of the period since the Reformation? A number of sects have grown up which feel that the principles of Protestantism were not stated boldly enough by the English Church; the Romanists feel that a Church which has affirmed the principle of nationality and come to terms with the sovereign of its country was incorrigible, especially as it had retained so many of the principles of Catholicism. Maurice laments the change which began to occur around the time of James I, "from the notion of government as grounded upon deep mysterious principles, to the notion of it as the result of mere commercial arrangement—of some imaginary artificial compact." 150. This change has produced some mischievous effects both in Church and in Nation of England. But this change has not destroyed the relationship which the Church and State have always held to each other, nor do acts of toleration, emancipation of Romanists, repeal of test laws, destroy the principle asserted. "... it requires something far deeper and more subtle than any such measures, to destroy a union which has cemented itself by no human contrivances, and which exists in the very nature of things." 151.

What is particularly English and to what depravation is it liable? The characteristic of Englishmen is their devotion to

149. *ibid.* p.294.
150. *ibid.* p.298.
"mere politics" (so foreigners say); how concerned the English are with the organization of society and with practical political action. Maurice multiplies examples of this characteristic which has its good and bad points. The political bias of the Reformers in the sixteenth century enhanced their religious faith, he says, and its main effect was to lead them to think of Christ's Church as a kingdom rather than as a system: in the dust and bustle of affairs their strong conviction that this kingdom was a reality and not a metaphor may have led them to forget that it is the type of all kingdoms, and is not moulded after the maxims of any, even of those which confess it, and do homage to it. 152.

The danger, however, lies in a State Churchmanship which was more concerned about affairs of State than about the new working classes who were living in poverty-stricken conditions in the newly-developed cities. This "political Anglicanism" had many other unfortunate characteristics: a tendency to maintain customs and practices merely because they existed; an acquiescence with social maxims, even those which abrogate higher principles of morality; a feeling that the Church is bound to sympathize with the aristocracy and overlook its aims for the sake of preserving order; more of a sense of the service which subjects owe their rulers than of service which is owed them by rulers; an inclination to assert the privileges of clergymen; great anxiety for State encouragement of religion for fear that it would not flourish otherwise. And yet the spirit of State Churchmanship was a passing spirit in the history of the National Church and not the spirit of the Church itself. That true spirit continued to express itself, says Maurice, in the liturgy.

A relief was sought from this in systems: liberal, evangelical, high church. But each of these systems, although it bears some witness for the Divine Order, is still a "miserable, partial, 152. ibid. p.301.
human substitute for it. The systems have limited the very principles they have set out to assert. Defenders of party maintain that, once men decide upon action, they must associate for it, and this will take on a party character. Yet Maurice claims that there are other ways of acting without falling into the dangerous situation of forming parties which so easily divide and contribute to the problem rather than the solution. The true minister of God's kingdom, if he finds himself among sects, must recognize the truth of each sect and the principle on which it was founded, but should not support all schemes of union just for the sake of covering over differences. He must attempt to preserve and unite the faith of those who are separated without forcing on them any notions of his own. Should he find himself in a manufacturing district, among the workers, he might at first despair of his ability to do anything for the people he finds there. The Church had fallen into discredit with these people:

A Church which was looked upon, and almost looked upon itself, as a tool of the aristocracy, which compared its own orders with the ranks in civil society, and forgot that it existed to testify that man as man is the object of his Creator's sympathy; such a Church had no voice which could reach the hearts of these multitudes. 154.

If religion gives these people no explanation of their cravings for fellowship, if it can only tell of the fall of the race and the redemption for a few individuals, then they will try to satisfy their wants without it. "Then begin Chartism and Socialism, and whatever schemes make rich men tremble." And so the minister of God's kingdom must tell the people the old and true doctrines of Christ's Church which translate into life all the schemes and

153. ibid. p.314.
notions of liberals and urge on the other ministers of the Church the duty of making religion meaningful to these working folk. These
principles can be translated into action by the minister "enlisting
all the wealthier inhabitants of his parish in different services
and occupations for the benefit of their inferiors." Maurice ex-
cuses himself from remarking further upon this because he does not
know exactly what practical schemes would be most effective. He
mentions it merely to assert the principle that working through the
existing parishes rather than forming parties is the true manner
of helping the working people. He says:

... we find how infinitely freer from fiction a society is which is held together by sacramental bonds, and is moving under the direction of an appointed pastor, than all societies constructed upon a party model, or acknowledging a party motive... For the one seeks to preserve all existing ranks and relations, the other sets them all aside. The one is continually endeavouring to understand how the middle classes may be brought most to act upon the lower, so as to be their guides and not their tyrants; how the upper classes may be brought to act upon the middle, so as not to be their fawning slaves and at the same time the betrayers of their consciences at elections... how each portion of the community may preserve its proper position to the rest, and may be fused together by the spiritual power which exists for each... The (party) confounds all orders, and yet does not the least diminish their mutual repulsion, or make them feel that they have a common object. 157.

In spite of its failures, the English Church is a Church and not a sect, by its faith and in its liturgy. By seeking to unite with other Churches in foreign lands on the basis of the universal Church rather than on the basis of one of its systems, we teach them their strengths and their weaknesses; by maintaining national character-
istics, we urge them to do the same. The English Church has this duty- to proclaim the doctrine of the living Kingdom of Christ realized now on earth in that Church universal of which the English Church is a part.

156. ibid. p.322.
157. ibid. p.323.
If I had accepted Maurice's premises about the Church united to the State, I could agree with his remarks in this chapter about its proper development with it. But since I do not, I am able to find much to criticize in this section. His resistance to democratic developments can be seen throughout, especially in his complaint that the secularization of the State results in it being no longer considered founded upon mysterious principles. His affirmation that the Church should be united to the State because it is part of the "very nature of things" betrays an attitude which cannot be held in modern times. It is a mystification of the societal structure and of history. When he says that the Church is the "type of all kingdoms", he admits to a belief in the "Christian State" (or the religious State or theocracy- at times his State appears to be based on Old Testament rather than New Testament principles). His qualification that the Church is not moulded upon the maxims of the States which confess it could be contested by those who hold that the Church is organized on the basis of a monarchical social structure, but his principle here is in the main a good one. His arguments against sects and parties are consistent with his tendency (discussed earlier) to seek to unite through existing institutions rather than to divide by forming new ones. Yet his solution for the problems of the workers was also an acceptance of class structures mingled with a personal benevolence and a wish to alleviate suffering. The question is whether such a Church as he describes as a tool of the aristocracy would have a voice which could reach these multitudes if it stopped short of radical changes in existing society. Maurice wished to see the under classes guiding the lower and middle, not to see the distinction of class as he knew it and we know it abolished because of the Christian message. It is in this that we part company.

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Elsewhere in Maurice's correspondence and writings we find statements which support the view expressed in *The Kingdom of Christ* and *Social Morality* and which serve to illustrate some of his main points.

Maurice is speaking of a Christian State. We find a definition of State (which he interchanges with "Nation") in the first (1838) edition of *The Kingdom of Christ*:

> A body connected together in a particular locality, united in the acknowledgement of a certain law, which each member of this body must obey, or suffer for its violation; a body recognizing a supreme and invisible Being as the author and sanction of this law; a body recognizing a relationship between its members, grounded originally upon actual kinsmanship, but now expressed solely in the term neighbourhood—this is what I call a State, and in such a State, I say every man must dwell, not only for purposes of safety and protection, but in order that his moral and spiritual being may be properly developed. Such a State, I say, is as much implied in the constitution of man as a Church is implied in that constitution; such a State is as much a witness for God in one way as a Church is witness for Him in another way. 158.

Davies says of Maurice's thought on this topic, "Maurice's aim throughout has been to claim that national life is not secular," and, "Maurice at all events believes the theocratic foundation of government to be the only solid one." I think this is borne out in his writings. He says in *Hope For Mankind*:

> There are many Christians who would persuade us that the life of a Nation is what they call a secular thing; that it may be very well on mere earthly grounds to care for the land in which we have been born and nurtured... I solemnly deny that a Nation is a secular thing... if by 'secular' is meant that which belongs to the fashion of a particular age— that which shuts out the acknowledgement of the permanent and eternal— that, I grant, is the 'evil world' against which we are to fight. 161.

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159. Davies, *op.cit.* p.120.
160. *ibid.* p.120.
In *Sermons on the Sabbath-Day* he writes:

I believe that we have as much right to call England a holy nation as the prophets had to call Judea a holy nation.
I believe that it is holy in virtue of God's calling...162.

He develops this notion further in *The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament*. He defends his language that God is in covenant with England, just as He was in Hebraic times. To those who "scoff at the notion that there is a covenant with our Sovereign and people as real as there was with the Sovereign and people of the Jews," he answers by appealing to the "homes and hearths" of England, and to those who do not wish to set relationships at naught. He says relationships are perishing through devotion to material goods, acquisition of wealth, modern industry; among the rich because of greed and self-seeking, and among the poor because of being regarded and regarding themselves as mere instruments for production of goods and capital. This inhuman situation will only be stopped by the belief that human relationships have a deeper ground than themselves, that "there is an actual relationship between us, our kings, our priests, and God."

We must speak again the ancient language that God has made a covenant with the nation, and that all citizens are subjects of an unseen and righteous King, if we would have a hearty, inward repentance, which will really bring us back to God... to what we shall no more dare to call our secular existence. 165.

In *Letters on Church and State to the Daily News*, September 1868, Maurice said:


The State is not... a vulgar earthly institution, which might do the dirty work of the Church, paying its ministers, persecuting its foes, or determining its teachings, but a sacred and divine institution bearing a witness for law and justice, which the Church under no condition has borne or can bear. 166.

The fact that the State is not secular but holy (like the Church) contributes to Maurice's reasoning that their union is also intended by God. He makes the point in the first edition of The Kingdom of Christ, quoted in Davies:

If we once settle it in our minds that the State is as much God's creation as the Church, even as the body is just as much His creation as the spirit, we shall be saved from a world of difficulties... That connexion (between Church and State) as much exists in the nature of things- is as much based in an eternal law, as that which binds father to child, or brother to sister... 167.

He also writes:

The State, though it deals with the outward life of man, is not...a secular body, but appeals to, and acts upon the conscience of man in a way in which the Church cannot appeal to that conscience... The Church is necessarily a maimed and imperfect thing without the State, not because it wants its revenues or its sword, but because God hath ordained an eternal connexion between the law, which is embodied in the State, and the religious, life-giving principles which is embodied in the Church, so that one shall always sigh and cry till it has found the other to be its mate. 168.

He claims that this union between Church and State "stands upon no decrees or acts of Parliament, but exists in the laws of society, in the nature of things." But his doctrine of their union did not entirely prevent him from seeing a danger. Maurice wrote that

...Believing a union of Church and State to be implied in the existence of each, and to be necessary for the protection of moral freedom, I see equal dangers in the disposition of Churchmen to make the Church into a powerful and domineering State, and of Statesmen to make themselves dictators in the Church. 170.

166. Life II, p.586.
167. KC III (1838), p.76. Quoted in Davies, op.cit. p.120.
And:

... the relations with the State which the Romanists and Protestant Dissenters taunt her (the Church) with, are relations of infinite peril, of infinite responsibility. She has abused them to immoral purposes. She is bound to use them for the most glorious and holy purposes. 171.

Church and State must have distinct roles although they live to promote the same end. Maurice states:

... we believe that God has appointed one body, the State, as His minister for dealing with the outward, formal, visible conduct of men, and another minister, the Church, for dealing with the inward spiritual invisible origin of that conduct. Abolish the distinction, confound acts with principles, and of necessity you merge the one in the other. 172.

And in Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament, Maurice said,

"... while men have been trying to identify the Nation with the Church, or to sever them utterly, God has been using each for His purposes,- has been claiming each for a distinct part of His Kingdom." His son, F. Maurice, Jr., summarizes his letters to the Daily News as tracing the history of the Church and State in order to maintain that the notion of their separate existence and of their entering into a bargain with one another is an idle fable. 174.

Maurice continues; "What I mean by the union of Church and State is the cooperation of spirit with law; the abandonment of the attempt to put one for the other, to dispense with either." This distinction results in the somewhat paradoxical situation of the Church being Communist in principle, while the State cannot ever be so because it is the guardian of law which is based on a sense of property. 176.

175. ibid. p.585.
176. See page 95 of this dissertation.
Since this is Maurice’s belief, we find his Church accepting of the political organization of the country in which it finds itself:

What follows as to the duty of the priest? He comes into a nation. He says he is a witness for something else than mere civil or local or secular government... And as proof that he is, let him do homage to the order which the Eternal Lord has established in a land. 177.

Vidler says, "It is the office of a National Church to witness to the monarch, to the aristocracy, and to the democracy that they are all under the Law of God and responsible to Him." Maurice himself said:

The greatest and deepest desire that I am conscious of is that of bringing all men to the feeling that there can be but one Church—though that Church may exist in a number of different nations—though it may be quite right that in some subordinate particulars it should be modified by the character of those nations—though it is, I believe, actually demanded by its constitution that it should recognize and sustain the distinct government of each of those nations. 179.

Maurice was a supporter of monarchy and aristocracy in Britain partly because of his aversion to the ideas of popular sovereignty prevalent at the time, by which he understood "democracy", and which he saw as limiting individual freedom and tending toward a popular dictatorship or military despotism; and partly because of his vision of England as similar to the Israelite monarchy—a holy nation whose kings reigned by the grace of God and were responsible to Him alone. In Patriarchs and Lawgivers, his study of the Hebrew monarchy revealed that:

Such true kings, kings after His own heart, God would in due time bring forth. Such kings...would impart to (their subjects) a sense of divine government which they had never possessed before; would make them understand that a true divine government must also be a true human government;

that man is made in the image of God; that the heavenly offices are represented in the earthly. 180.

And in the first edition of *The Kingdom of Christ* he says that a Church is essentially Catholic, "But a nation is essentially Protestant. It denounces the very idea of a universal visible sovereignty, of every sovereignty which interferes with the direct subordination of kings to God." And elsewhere he says, "If this doctrine of rulers reigning by the Grace of God is cast aside as an obsolete doctrine... then I can see no hope of growth... but a continual return to the point from which we started." Christensen summarizes the position in this way: Christianity did not first proclaim a universal brotherhood, but an invisible and righteous king, breaking thereby the absolutism of the Roman Empire to pieces. Kings from then on, says Christensen, reigned by God's grace and were anointed in His name, being given righteousness, wisdom, counsel and courage from God. In spite of contradictions, this was the principle on which the monarchy of every European nation had rested. Monarchy had been instituted by God, and because of its hereditary succession, it bore witness to the perpetuity of God's reign.

Maurice was particularly averse to democracy as a political concept, although he recognized a certain amount of public involvement in politics and government as necessary, provided it was linked with monarchy and aristocracy. He says:

A king given, an aristocracy given, and I can see my way clearly to call upon them (the English people) to do the work which God has laid upon them; to repent of their sins,


to labour that the whole manhood of the country may have a voice, and that every member of Christ’s body may be indeed a free man. 184.

(This is a good example of his “personal reform” coupled with limited social reforms— for example, universal manhood suffrage which excluded women.) He continues:

But reconstitute society upon the democratic basis treat the sovereign and aristocracy as not intended to rule and guide the land, as only holding their commissions from us and I anticipate nothing but a most accursed sacerdotal rule or a military despotism, with the great body of the population in either case, morally, politically, physically serfs, more than they are at present or ever have been. 185.

He writes to Ludlow:

... I am naturally by birth, education, everything, a democrat. I have arrived at my convictions about monarchy and aristocracy by sheer force of evidence, reflection on history, belief in God’s revelation... 186.

And in the same letter: "I must have Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Socialism, or rather Humanity, recognized as necessary elements and conditions of an organic Christian society..." 187.

Connected with his acceptance at least in theory of the political organization of England at the time, and in the context of the Christian State of which he was speaking, is his acceptance of inequality as a natural phenomenon of any social order. As Christiansen summed up the matter: man shares a common humanity in the "Human Order", but although he is on equal footing with his fellow-men, an inequality of offices exists. In 'Liberty: A Dialogue', Maurice attempted to show that the Bible’s concept of liberty meant that:

God set men free from their animal tendencies and thereby gave them the power to live as men and citizens of a nation. True liberty consisted in living in a human fellowship. 184. Life II, p.129.

185. ibid. p.129.

186. ibid. p.130.

wherein all acknowledged one another as brothers and fellow-workers. Therefore it had nothing to do with political enfranchisement and was not to be obtained by sweeping away the ancient institutions of the country. 188.

Equality to Maurice meant that men shared a common humanity— not equality of property, rank, or education. The model for the Human Order of which we have spoken is that of the Trinity. "When we assert the doctrine of the Trinity, we do so because we believe it to be the grand foundation of all society, the only ground of a universal fellowship, the only idea of a God of love." Although Maurice bases much of his liberal notions of human equality on the doctrine of the Trinity in unity, yet he viewed the three distinct persons as equal but of unequal office, although united in love. The Trinity of Maurice’s theology was "hierarchically structured" (if the phrase may be accepted) in the sense that the Son was obedient to the Father unto death (the Son can do nothing of Himself, the Father is greater than He, and so forth.) Ramsey supports this assessment of his doctrine when he says:

As Maurice was one of those theologians whose doctrine of the Trinity includes a principle of subordination among the Persons of the Triune God, so he affirms a principle of subordination in the law of brotherhood upon earth. Politically this law involved not egalitarianism, still less democracy... but theocracy expressed through a monarchy with divine right... 190.

But what is meant by "equal" in the phrase, "equal but of unequal office" (Christensen’s description)? How does the notion of equality include an inequality of office, whether it is applied to the Trinity or the Human Order? Equality of all human beings is a moral position. To say "All men are equal" is not to say "All men are the same, look alike, have the same capacity to do a job." Rather, it implies that man as man has a right to develop to his

188. Christensen, op.cit. p.75.
189. KC I (1838), p.58ff. Quoted in Davies, op.cit. p.27.
full potential; it is to say that no man should be more privileged or powerful by the mere fact of his birth than another man. Now to say two or more men are of "unequal office" is to say they have different functions or jobs. Unlike the statement "all men are equal," the phrase "unequal office" cannot have a moral connotation without contradicting the notion of human equality just set forth. The use of "unequal" in this phrase is not merely the negation of "equal" but a different use: that is, "not the same, or different." To my mind, the notion of persons being "equal but of unequal office" is either self-contradictory or it is merely saying that persons have the same rights but have different functions in society.

To apply the above discussion to the doctrine of the Triune God is perhaps ridiculous, but it will help to clarify the positions. Obviously the three Persons in the Trinity are "equal" because they are One God. If they are of "unequal office" we have seen that this must mean they have different functions. The problem arises in the translation of this concept into a theory of social structure. Maurice believed that whatever was revealed to man as an attribute or quality of God is truth, and is something which man should strive to be or do in order to become God-like, to become perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect. Since he saw God as triune, three distinct persons in unity, but the Father commanding, the Son obeying (subordination) and both acting in the Spirit of love, his translation of this into the nation is one which involves monarchy—the Father-king commanding, subjects-sons obeying, all in a spirit of good will and charity. Unfortunately the mystery of the Trinity in unity cannot be so easily applied in this way. Maurice was anxious not to overthrow the existing order of society. This order was class-divided. Maurice's notion of the Trinity does not necessarily lead to a view which preserves a class-structured society, because the equality of the Persons is not negated by
their difference in function. But because Maurice thinks that the principle of subordination applies to both the divine and the human, and has expounded views about the human realm which preserve what I see to be an inequitable society, one suspects that somehow Maurice sees the "unequal offices" of the Human Order (and thus the principle of subordination in the Trinity) to be not just "different", but "not equal". Because he justifies a particular system of government by appealing to the relationships found in the Trinity, and because a case could be made for that form of government's inherent injustice in its structure and philosophy, I find his Trinitarian doctrine suspect. It leads precisely to that view which I have criticized previously as one which rejects the kind of revolutionary change of structures necessary to bring our society closer to the justice of the Gospel message.

Along these lines an interesting comparison can be made with Maurice's friend and disciple, J.M.F. Ludlow, whom we have mentioned in Chapter One. Ludlow's views are much closer to my own, and his importance lies in the fact that he took Maurice's theological and political theories to their logical and practical conclusions... a political activism which saw the need to overcome alienation both by education and by changing the social and economic structures. Raven characterizes it this way:

Ludlow sees that there are two things to do and that they must be done together. A change in the social order will not of itself make men righteous or free. A change of heart cannot be universally accomplished so long as men are living under circumstances which degrade and defile them. 192.

In Theological Essays, however, we see Maurice asserting the same

point of view when he says that Christ is the reformer of both the individual and the society, and the two must work together, not apart from one another. Just as you cannot wait for all individuals to be reformed before you take on the duty of reforming society, so too, you must not think to reform society by the alteration of its circumstances without the assertion of a spiritual root and ground of it. Yet the difference was perhaps most accentuated in their view of monarchy, which to Maurice was a divinely sanctioned guarantee of order and discipline, but was to Ludlow "government based wholly on the selfish interests of a family, or rather of one old man." Christensen remarks that Ludlow felt it was a Christian's duty to test all political and social institutions to see whether they were impediments or aids to fulfilling God's will on earth. Although only tools, it was a matter of great importance to Ludlow to have the right tools. He did not doubt that a great deal in the State of England needed to be radically changed, even abolished. Likewise, it was necessary always to be willing to examine all new political and social systems to see whether they could promote truth and justice better than the present ones.

From Maurice Ludlow developed the idea that love was the foundation of the universe, that the human order was so constituted as to reflect this love, and that all social progress was possible only if people acted in fellowship. But Ludlow could not agree with Maurice that the established institutions in a country embodied the Divine Order. Christensen goes on to say:

Political and social institutions were not at all sacrosanct by themselves; their right of existence depended entirely on whether or not they expressed the true principles of God's universe, and his keen sense of the existing evils of a society and of the sufferings inflicted on the people by a society in which a monarchy, an aristocracy, and an established church, blocked the way to progress and reforms.

194. Raven, op. cit. p. 58.
195. Christensen, op. cit. p. 79.
made Ludlow sure that they seldom expressed them. Therefore, he concluded, these institutions had to be done away with. 196.

Ludlow himself wrote in "Politics for the People":

Certain I am that the term Radical is one which corresponds to a deep and true feeling, the latest outgrowth, the last realized development of Christianity in the field of worldly politics. The feeling that evil, political as well as moral, is not to be hidden, or blinked at, or passed over, or dressed up, or palliated but rooted out, even though its extirpation should need that of institutions and practices otherwise most dear to us... No man can be a Christian who is not... a Radical. No man can be a Christian who, if he be once convinced of the existence of moral evil anywhere, wherever it may be, dares to blind himself to it... God's truth cannot be satisfied with anything less than its utter extirpation. No man can be a true Radical who is not a Christian. Christianity is the only power on earth which has ever imposed as a law this total extinction of evil, which has inexorably divided all nations and things into two classes only, such as are for the glory of God, and such as are not; such as serve God and such as serve Mammon. 197.

For Maurice this kind of statement was not possible. But ironically it is a tribute to his theology that Ludlow came to these noble conclusions; and it is a tribute to his character that Ludlow followed him into the work of education in spite of his belief in political and economic action, a belief which had been the core of the divergence of thought which split the Christian Socialists as a group.

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196. ibid. p.95.

197. "Politics for the People", p.221; quoted in Christensen, op.cit. pp.78-9/
CONCLUSION

Having investigated Maurice's social concept of the Divine Order, his theory of the Kingdom/Church, State or Nation, and their relationship to each other, we return to the question posited in the introduction to this study: what of value remains in Maurice's thought if the Christian State has disappeared?

His positive contributions to the solution of the problem of the position of Christians in the modern State are many and worthy of attention here. I have not gone into great detail about his educational contributions and practical experiments in the field of social welfare which were quite considerable. Nor have I delved into his thought from the precise point of view of the ecumenist, although I recognize his willingness to seek the kernel of truth in sectarian positions. His theological achievements include an openness to the development of Biblical criticism coupled with a conviction that religious certainty is possible both through Reason and Revelation. His stress on the Old Testament and insistence that it should be seen together with and in the light of the New anticipates much modern scholarship, especially in his selection of the covenant as the key principle of the Old Testament. His doctrine of the Kingdom has great potential, although it was not without its own difficulties, but it broke ground for many modern interpreters of eschatological faith. Certainly his awareness of man as being in society, of the humanness of forming community, of the worth of every man regardless of rank, education or class, of salvation brought by Christ for all men, not just for a particular set of chosen men, all point to a broadness of mind absent in so many of his contemporaries both inside and outside the Church.

However, primarily three points stand out in my mind as his greatest contributions. One was his attempt to argue for the re-
ligious nature of man's existence, or his spiritual dimension, from outside Christian theology. He tries to base his arguments on Reason and Experience, and this method has much appeal. Although the attempt may be said to have failed, it nevertheless raised some important issues. His accounts of the nature of man and his Reason cross over time and again into the area of Christian faith, and his historical study is of a sacred rather than a profane history. These two issues: the nature of religious knowledge, and the distinction between the secular and the sacred are intimately related.

We mentioned in Chapter One that in the controversy with Mansel Maurice argued for the adequacy and finality of our present knowledge of God. Without going into a full exposition of that controversy, it may be said that he also argued that we must take the traditional language about knowing God "literally" and in the "most exact" sense. "Religion is subverted if while we are praying to God as Father we know that he is not so really." Whereas to Mansel, analogical language about God is always an act of faith.

Clayton sees Maurice's theology (so presumably his existenology) as a reaction both against laissez-faire capitalism and the accompanying "all-pervasive philosophical empiricism which equated knowledge with that which can be traced to sense experience and, more specifically, conceived of reality as a multitude of separate objects." His work was dominated by two affirmations: first, that religious certainty is possible, and second, that it is grounded in the awareness of a social bond which unites men as men. Universality is thus guaranteed by his premise that knowledge of religious truths is accessible to all men as men by virtue of reason—"the power shared by all men to know that which is indubitably the truth."  

3. Ibid. p. 308.
Reason is not just intellect or the logical aspect of human thinking—(Maurice and Coleridge describe that aspect as "understanding"). Reason is the mind's power to grasp eternal truths, and also to apprehend the Christian revelation. Man can know the truths of his existence, one of the most important of which is his bond of fellowship with others in society. It is by reason that man knows his righteousness and unity in Christ. Man's certainty, which Maurice demands, "resides in his capacity to apprehend an absolute moral good through the apprehension of his status as man." Maurice identifies the ultimate principle of human life which man can know and which is inseparable from his being, with Christ, the Eternal Logos. This, I think, is a transition from purely philosophical speculations to Christian faith, although it is difficult to separate the two in Maurice. Further, he sees the whole epistemological process as one of revelation: "The only way the mind can know a reality beyond its concepts is for this reality actively to present itself, aggressively to assert itself, upon the individual." In addition, we have seen that the structure of ultimate reality perceived by reason is the Trinity. And so Clayton rightly points out that one cannot siphon off Platonic elements or biblical elements from Maurice's thought as it is a unity. But I think this union of faith and reason is difficult for modern men to appreciate in the light of more recent developments in epistemology. Linguistic philosophy and positivism have imported lessons in the area of definitions of "knowledge" which should not be ignored. Terms such as "certainty" and "reason" when applied to religious "knowledge" need more careful definition than Maurice provides. I think for modern

4. ibid. p.311.
5. ibid. p.319.
theology a distinction between the process of reason and the process of faith is a necessary one, and I do not think Maurice gives us one. He would lack a modern philosophical audience, yet when he speaks more strictly as a theologian, his value is great indeed.

I think it would be true to say that for Maurice, God is essentially knowable, and man can know God now. Although he recognizes the ineffability of God when he praises Judaism, for example: "God they knew must be forever the Unsearchable, the Mysterious," his main stress was the certainty of religious knowledge. Cupitt suggests that this had to do with his realized eschatology, as we discussed in Chapter One. Had Maurice put more stress on the eschatological kingdom, he would no doubt have to admit that God will only become fully knowable at the end of time, or Day of the Lord, or Parousia. This brings us to the other aspect of this discussion, the problem of the relation between the secular and the sacred in Maurice's writings on Church and State. It has to do with a definition of God, if that phrase is permissible, as the sacred, holy, other, and so forth. That is, a God who is not a secular reality, or potentially within man's grasp, but is mystery.

As we saw, the unique fusion of the human and the divine in Jesus, and its continuing manifestation in the Trinity, resulted in Maurice's denial of secularity. By using the word "secular" to mean the "World" (in the Biblical sense of moral evil) and not to mean, as Davis does, "that which is within the sphere of man's investigation," and by using the word "world" in some instances to refer not to the Biblical "World" but to creation and human society (secular realm of Davis) which he says are sacred, Maurice eliminates the concept of the secular realm (morally neutral, within the sphere of man's investigation). And as we noted, this has immediate applica-

tion to his notion of the State and society. He is speaking of a theocracy, of the Christian Nation of England in the nineteenth century. However, we have seen that to talk of the secular State and to mean a morally neutral area is somewhat of a contradiction since society's institutions reflect a moral standpoint. Perhaps, then, a new concept is needed here— that of the "sancification" rather than the "sacralization" of the created world. Maurice has much to offer us on this tack. Although he falls prey to a "sacralized" view, his notion of the Church as sacrament and sign of the Kingdom of God shows a notion of "sancification" which Davis and Rahner, among others, have developed. The notion of the "engracement" (Rahner) of the secular area of man's life is one which allows us to keep the distinction between the secular and the sacred without distorting either. Davis develops the concept in the following way:

God is not a secular reality. Although to a limited extent He comes into the range of human understanding, God as He is in Himself is mystery, the fulness of which we will know only at the final coming of the Kingdom. Yet, God has communicated Himself to man in Christ, and has communicated Himself to mankind as a unity. The Incarnation binds men together in a new community of love. Further, in Christ, and His Body, the Church,"mystery became sacrament"—God's self-gift, or grace, became effectual sign and symbol. However, in spite of this revelation and communication, the sacred keeps its mystery and escapes man's full understanding which only the "beatific vision" will allow. This sacred area remains so, and can never become secular, demanding faith, and not interpretations by reason alone. The grace which God gives, His self-gift, is sacred

8. Ibid. p.42.
and must not be confused with nature. "Nature is indeed open to grace, but to identify them is to deny that God out of a free, personal love can offer man the unexpected and unexacted gift of Himself." 

The grace of sanctification brings human life and history into the sphere of the sacred, that is, it integrates the secular and the sacred without confusing them. "The order of grace has considerable repercussions upon the secular areas of man's life, perfecting them not destroying them." Davis continues: "In emphasizing this influence of grace, there is a constant temptation for Christians to swamp the secular in the sacred and not allow the secular its proper place and function." In order to avoid this, he makes a distinction between "sacred" and "holy", or generally between "sacralization" and "sanctification". Things which are consecrated, or removed from the secular sphere for devotion to God, make possible an express symbol of the sacred. This consecrated area is the institutional Church. The sanctified, as distinct from the consecrated, is the whole world and human life which has been brought under the higher order of grace. The Church, therefore, is witness to the world of its own condition of sanctification or engracement. In addition, the Church is not the community of the exclusively saved. The order of grace is not confined to the empirical Church, as Davis puts it. Salvation is potentially all men's. This was Maurice's belief (although he did not use the word "potentially" which Ramsey uses) and it is this which I feel is one of his greatest theological contribu-

9. ibid. p.44.
10. ibid. p.53.
11. ibid. p.53.
12. "The Church exists to tell the world the truth about its own existence." Christensen on Maurice, op.cit. op.25-6.
tions to the position of Christians in the modern world.

However, there remains in Maurice an unresolved tension in this respect. His belief that the Church existed to tell the world the truth about its own existence "led Maurice into an unrelenting conflict with those who distinguish between a profane and a sacred history." On the one hand, he had the doctrine of sanctification within his grasp which would have liberated his thought from a confusion of the sacred and the profane, and to which his involvement with the Christian Socialist group was intimately related. On the other hand, he speaks of society as a "Divine Order", and sees the State, monarchy, and so forth, as a theocracy modelled on that of the Israelites. We saw that his "sacralization" of society and the secular realm inhibited his own action for social change and was one of the important conservative elements in an otherwise radical interpretation of the Christian's place in society.

A second major contribution of Maurice was his attempt toward a political theology, by which I mean a theology which, if followed to its logical conclusion, will result in changes in the political and social structure of modern industrial nations. Maurice was particularly concerned to combat the doctrines of laissez-faire capitalism with its notion of free competition and individualism. He sees that the disease rampant in England is the notion that "Money is the measure of worth; that professions exist for the sake of the money which they bring it; that the acquisition of it is the purpose for which men are to live and die." Elsewhere he writes, "The Church is to teach men that society exists for the sake of the human beings who compose it, not to further the accumulation of capi-

tal, which is only one of its instruments." His aversion to a notion of a private Heaven which bestowed its rewards on a select few and was not a kingdom for mankind, was already noted.

Maurice can be criticized from the point of view that he did not go far enough with his perceptions about the evils of cannibalism. His idea that if one Christianized society first, socialism would follow was naive. Ludlow had seen that the two must go hand in hand, and later writers have judged that the stress should be rather to create a social order in which Christian life will be a real possibility. The Slant group of Christian socialists are particularly strong on this point as we have mentioned earlier. Maurice can be accused of "liberalism" which "exhibits an active and sometimes agonized concern with humane value, community, personal fulfillment, yet stops short at the precarious frontier where such a critique of value and relationship passes over into a critique of the concrete socio-economic structures in which the values are rooted." Maurice had been vitally concerned with "relationship". His great affirmation that men can know, and therefore must act upon, their situation of being in a bond of fellowship with one another, of being brothers because God was Father, tended to remain within the realm of personal relationships. This was perhaps typical of Victorian stress on personal charity, as Mitson Clark pointed out. However, we must today expand our definition of "relationship" as the Slant group rightly affirms. The wider relationships in an industrial society are created through institutions; we need not personal charity but a charitable society.


Yet we must not fall prey here to a notion that the New Testament specifically urges modern Christians to be socialists by its description of the communism of the early Church and its attitude toward the poor. One has to ask which political system today embodies Christian principles. Maurice had seen that there was no blueprint set down by Christ for social and political structures in the nineteenth century, although he sometimes spoke as though the Old Testament provided this blueprint. The Slant group emphasizes that the brotherhood of all men will be achieved by the visible witness of the Church—the closed society of the Church is the sacramental sign of the open community of all men. This is where Maurice’s doctrine is astoundingly prophetic. Had he concentrated on this aspect of his notion of the Church and not fallen into traps of identifying Kingdom and Church, secular and sacred; too much stress on the realized Kingdom with its resulting conservative elements; application of the Old Testament rather than the New to political structures; acceptance of the subordination principle in the Trinity;... he would have been providing the firm basis for Christian political radicalism today. Besides his personal conservatism which accounts for various idiosyncrasies in his dealings in the Christian Socialist movement, there is very little else standing in his way to being hailed as a mentor of the Christian left. The individualist concept that society is a neutral area in which every man pursues his own development and interest by "natural right" is a concept which both Maurice and Marxists today would oppose. Maurice would agree, I think, that society is a positive means of growth and development including that of the individual, and that the access to being human, to self-realization, is common

to all men and should be assisted by the institutions of that soci­
ety. To me this indicates a more radical approach as a Christian
than Maurice was able to describe. But it certainly rests on the
great principles which he affirmed, that theology has vital things
to say in the area of politics which will secure for man conditions
of life in which Christian faith is a real possibility and which
will reflect the truth of man's condition as in a bond of fellowship
under God.

The third great contribution of Maurice to the modern Chris­
tian is his feeling that the Church must retain its transcendent
character or be good for nothing. It is in this that the Church
is universal- its ability to stand over and criticize by its very
existence the (Biblical) World. When human society is out of joint
with itself and has become the World, then is the Church needed to
witness to the truth of Christ's saving message. Maurice manages
to reconcile this view with the maintenance of an established Church
which I find difficult to do. But on the other hand, I have al­
ready admitted that even in countries like America in which there
is no established Church, religion tends to serve social integration
and support the norms of society, thereby compromising its distinct­
ly transcendent character. In addition, this view would seem to
contradict a notion which does not allow for a distinction between
sacred and secular. Yet Maurice's contention about the Church as
witness and opposition to the World is a sound one.

Paul Tillich brings up this point in his collection of essays
entitled, Political Expectation. He is describing the many-facted
concept of "religious socialism":

(religious socialism) calls itself 'socialism' because it
has adopted the anti-demonic socialist criticism histori­
cally and substantially and because it supports the poli-
tical struggle of socialism as far as it intends to break
the domination of political and social demonries. But re-
ligious socialism does not overlook the extent to which
political socialism is possessed by these demonries, and,
above all, it knows that the socialist idea should not be
equated with the goal of political strategy. It must
therefore repudiate giving religious consecration to a par-
ty as such or to an economic program as such... But it
certainly calls for the recognition of the socialist criti-
cism of culture and of the socialist struggle against sac-
ramental and naturalistic demonries. 20.

It is the distinctly religious feature of this type of socialism
that saves it from what Tillich describes as "demonries", that is,
from profanization and objectification, and from an identification
of the socialist goal with the Kingdom of God. Religious socialism
knows that the secular socialist goal takes the form of a histori-
cally realizable utopia, but Christianity maintains the transcen-
dent character of the Kingdom of God:

Marx perceives a 'historically repairable' alienation
where Christianity sees a 'transhistorical' fail that
can be healed only transhistorically through the appear-
ance of the Messiah, who may be identified with neither
the proletariat nor any other human group. 21.

Yet it also rejects religious indifference towards constructive tasks
within the world, tasks which are a matter of unconditioned ser-
iousness. This religious socialism because of its dialectical or
dynamic character is critical of both religion and socialism: it
cannot assign absolute claims to any one religious or political
group or even to itself. It has the Biblical characteristic of
prophetism in its ability radically to criticize and transcend all
demonized forms and all conditioned forms.

It would be wrong to say that Maurice and Tillich were identical
in their ideas on this topic- far from it. But I believe Maurice
had hit upon an extremely exciting and important point in his notion
that the Church, as sacrament of the Kingdom to the world, stood

over against the world (society out of joint with itself) and yet engaged in an active and unconditionally serious concern, to use Tillich's language, for its well-being, in terms of justice, meaningfulness, and love.


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