Theories of fascism: a study of some interpretations of the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany

Jensen-Butler, Brigit

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THEORIES OF FASCISM:

A STUDY OF SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RISE OF THE NAZI PARTY IN GERMANY

Birgit Jensen-Butler B.A.

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts, in the University of Durham.

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Theories of fascism: A study of some interpretations of the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany.

ABSTRACT

A selection of texts analysing the structural sources of the success of the NSDAP in Weimar Germany is reviewed critically. A general approach to the selected texts is implicit, and an attempt is made to develop a framework, essentially Weberian, for analysis of the success of the Nazi Party in Germany.

Lipset's analysis of the relation between the middle class and fascism is found insufficient to explain the success of the NSDAP and is discussed in the light of his own voting data evidence. A Weberian analysis of the middle class relationships involved is tentatively developed. This is followed by a consideration of Kornhauser's claims for the explanatory capacity of mass society theory. It is found that pluralist values are taken for granted, and mass analysis is not found to supercede class analysis, though it may be of value on the level of individual motivation. Parsons' analysis, similar to Kornhauser's, of the consequences of fundamentalist reaction to social change, in conjunction with particular aspects of German social structure, is found to be conducted on the level of normative integration, basically not related to class conflict and capitalist development. Dahrendorf makes the contribution of Parsons historically more concrete in suggesting which classes were served by National Socialist ideology; he singles out the role and position of the state in German society, but fails to consider the general consequences of capitalist development. The force of Sweezy's contribution is placing class conflict between the working class, industrialists, and the middle class in exactly this context. However, it is suggested that this theory of the relationship between state and society gives his argument of a situation of class equilibrium leading to eventual fascist takeover of the state, a certain deterministic tenor. Weber's concept of Legitimacy, with respect to relationships of authority is introduced here. Thalheimer's model of a particular totality of class relationships, leading to the executive becoming independent of the bourgeoisie is found to need elaboration with respect to historical content, but points to the extra-capitalist sources of fascism.

Finally a consideration of the contribution of 'The Authoritarian Personality' is attempted, though no clear assessment of the contribution of psychology to sociology in understanding social action is reached.
Thanks are due to Peter Lassman and especially Philip Abrams for supervising my efforts and to Birthe Kremmer for typing the manuscript.

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INTRODUCTION

This study of theories of fascism is in the main an attempt to review critically a selection, if arbitrary, of texts that purport to analyse certain structural relationships in Weimar German society which the authors responsible find to be crucial for the understanding of the success of the Nazi party.

A general approach to the selected texts that might appear to be present if implicitly rather than explicitly is the result of attempting to develop my own framework for analyzing the success of the Nazi party in Germany. This framework is essentially Weberian, being based on Weber's essay on 'Class, Status and Party' (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.180-194) and also on his concept of Legitimacy (Weber, 1966).

The problem of accounting for the rise of the Nazi party consists, as it is traditionally presented in the literature of many different aspects and approaches. Before giving a short summary of the interpretation of the texts selected here, some of the main approaches which are not covered may be mentioned.

No consideration is made for example of the Nazi ideology or of the history of ideas lying behind it. The history of the party itself receives no attention, neither with respect to its leadership, to the recruitment and social composition of its membership nor to the strategy and tactics employed. Finally it may be mentioned that the history of the constitutional difficulties and final breakdown of par-
liamentary democracy in Weimar Germany is not considered as such.

It may be suggested that this study is based on the working assumption that fascism is a feature of traditional more or less democratic capitalist societies, an assumption which however certainly needs modification and elaboration. Taken as a starting point the theories considered here all employ concepts pertaining to the development of capitalist industrialized societies and parliamentary democracy.

The contribution on 'Fascism Right, Left and Center' by Lipset (1964) is considered first, and through its shortcomings is central to the attempt here to develop a Weberian framework for the understanding of the support and success of the Nazi party.

Lipset considers fascism a middle class phenomenon and analyses its rise and success in terms mainly of its voting strength in the middle class. His analysis is discussed and it is suggested that this is an insufficient approach to understanding the success of the NSDAP, that for example the relationship to the fascist party and parliamentary democracy of the landed aristocracy and the industrialists must also be considered in the light of the nature of class conflict between capital and labour in Weimar Germany.

Lipset suggests that the support by the middle class for the fascist party is a protest against big labour and big capital; here an attempt is made to develop a Weberian analysis of the class relationships of the middle class in Weimar Germany. It is suggested that not only were many sectors of the middle class not represented primarily in the
labour market corresponding to the dominant class relationships of the stage of capitalist development in Weimar Germany, but that with respect to the labour, commodity, and credit markets the class relationships of the middle class may often have been 'inconsistent' (Wiley, 1967). To the extent to which this makes for lack of "transparency of the cause and consequences of class relationships" (Gerth and Mills, 1964) this may provide some of the explanation of why the middle class did not support a party of the proletarian left.

Kornhauser's theory of mass society is considered next and his claim for its superior explanatory capacity as compared with class analysis, with respect to explaining extremist political action is discussed. If the theory of mass society and anomie builds on a moral commitment against an over-individualized society and for the necessity of social constraint on the individual, then this would appear to have developed into the assumption that so-called pluralist social relationships are necessary for the maintenance of democracy, that is, the integration of the individual through primary and secondary groups into society. In consequence, if people act in a manner deemed alienated or anomic - for example, supporting a totalitarian party - this must result from their not being integrated into society, from the breakdown of secondary and primary groups.

It is suggested 1) that this need not follow, because conflicting aims may exist among different groups and 2) that mass analysis does not really supercede class analysis. The contribution of mass society theory to the understanding of conflict at certain stages in capitalist industrial societies
is not considered with respect to the insights it may give concerning individual motivations for joining a political party but is discussed only in terms of a defence of the utility of class analyses of structural relationships as explaining the source of fascism. Thus, amongst others, there is no discussion of Mannheim's contribution on the subject, for example, of the problem of formal large scale bureaucratic organizations.

Parsons' discussion of fascism in Weimar Germany is based on concepts similar to Kornhauser's; he regards fascism as a consequence of the fundamentalist reaction to social change general to all industrialized societies expressing insufficient normative integration into society. That the fundamentalist reaction could develop so as to have such severe consequences for parliamentary democracy and western civilization generally, Parsons argues, must be understood on the basis of a heritage of Prussian feudal and romanticist values, which he relates to particular aspects of the German social structure. It is argued that Parsons fails to make the role of 'feudal' value patterns in the breakdown of parliamentary democracy comprehensible because he fails to relate them to classes and to status groups in conflict over power. However, Parsons points to important historical relationships between state and society in Germany which are essential to understanding the relationship between class conflict and the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy.

Dahrendorf develops the more constructive suggestions of Parsons in a discussion of the relationship between social structure and democracy. It is argued that whilst in contrast to the previous texts considered, Dahrendorf goes further toward making his value assumptions explicit
he fails to consider the general consequences of capitalist
development as the context in which the particular aspects
of German social structure may be said to have played an
important role in the breakdown of parliamentary democracy.

The two contributions by Sweezy and Thalheimer lead
to the introduction of Weber's concept of Legitimacy as it
may be applied to relationships of authority. It is suggested,
though not greatly elaborated upon, that this concept might
be of greater explanatory value in considering the histori-
cal relationship between state and society than Sweezy's
theory of the state as this theory of the role of the state
in capitalist society was found to be ambiguous at best and
is in danger of suggesting that the political outcome in
Weimar Germany was inevitable. However, Sweezy does not re-
duce fascist parties to being mere representatives of the
bourgeoisie, and he discusses the rise of fascism in the
general context of the development of monopoly capitalism,
considerations which were felt to be missing from the other
texts discussed.

Thalheimer presents a model of a particular totality
of class relationships which leads to the executive becoming
independent of the bourgeoisie. He thus does not reduce
fascism to a mere expression of capitalist development but
he leaves the class relationships involved empty of histori-
cal content, and it is suggested that by using an analogy in
history he is pointing to extra-capitalist sources of fascism
as were, in a way, both Parsons and Dahrendorf.

Finally a discussion of 'The Authoritarian Personality'
of Adorno et al. (1950) is undertaken. The consideration of
psychoanalytical analysis of political action was initially
taken up because of the fact that there is a large body of literature on the subject, which seemed to hold promise, and because there was a suggestion of personality types particular to the middle class, which superficially might seem to explain why Lipset's middle class protest against big capital and labour in Weimar Germany might be said to take the form which it did. However, partly as a result of the difficulties of relating the analytical levels of personality, social structure, and ideology to each other, and partly because discussion led away from the issue at hand, it has not been possible to make any real assessment of what contributions psychology might make to sociology in the understanding of the rise of fascism. Psychological analyses of the psychological characteristics of members of political parties might be able to reveal why a particular member joined a particular party, but would appear not to help in understanding the structural relationships and problems that are the source of the rise and success of a political party. The structural dimension in the analysis of Adorno et al., (1950) is in the last analysis, to be found in the belief that particular childhood family relationships are likely to lead to the development of a particular personality open to certain ideological appeal. However the evidence on the relationship is ambiguous as is the evidence on the relationship between personality and class differences in family authority structures. If the relationship between background and personality is difficult to establish, so too is the nature of the relationship between personality, or particular personality problems, and holding particular attitudes, let alone supporting or joining a political party.
CHAPTER 1

VOTING DATA AS EVIDENCE OF THE CLASS BASIS OF FASCISM

Around the first world war most European countries experienced political movements\(^1\) which professed ideologically to be nationalistic and anti-capitalistic, and which violently denounced parliamentary democracy, organized labour movements, and marxist ideology. It is, however, commonly held that the political and economic role of fascism in the end was not that of significantly modifying the capitalist economic system and the established position of private property.

In some countries these movements were victorious in the sense that they took over the state power, in other countries the movements remained sectarian nationalist movements.\(^2\)

As the second world war progressed, the allies\(^3\) increasingly represented the war as a battle against fascism on behalf of democracy and the attendant notions of civil rights.

In line with the emphasis on the values of parliamentary democracy as a popular justification for the war, many of the sociological theories concerned with the explanation of the nature of fascism and with the reasons for its successful takeover of institutions of the state, have concentrated on the functional requirements of parliamentary democracy as

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\(^1\) Not all of which may be described as fascist, e.g. Poland may be argued to have experienced a military dictatorship of Pilsudski rather than a fascist dictatorship.

\(^2\) as was the case in Great Britain.

\(^3\) At least the western allies.
expressed mainly in the relationship between individual voters and democratic institutions.

The contribution of S.M. Lipset (1964) on the class basis of the NSDAP could be argued to fall within this category of explanations of fascism. Lipset analyses the sources of the success of the NSDAP with the aid of concepts of general applicability to industrial capitalist societies, basing his argument on the evidence of voting statistics and other ecological data.

Lipset, in 'Political Man' (1964) puts forward the thesis of 'Fascism, left, right and centre'. He suggests that corresponding to the democratic positions of left, right and centre in parliamentary democracy one can classify extremist positions along the same continuum as they correspond to each other in terms of their 'social base'.

It has been suggested that:

"Seine These..., hat trotz ihrer Einfachheit eine gewisse Originalität; sie leidet aber an Kurzatmigkeit an den beiden Enden, denn es bleibt unklar, wo die Demokraten der Rechten zu suchen sind, wenn als 'Rechtsextremisten' die klassischen Konservativen erscheinen, und es ist schwerlich überzeugend, wenn der Extremismus der Linken ebensosehr vom Peronismus wie vom Kommunismus repräsentiert wird." (E. Nolte, 1967, p.70) 1,2.

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1 Whereever quotes are given in German an English edition has not been available, and my own translation into English will be provided in footnotes.

2 "His theory..., has despite its simplicity a certain originality; it is, however, not quite exhaustive at the extremes, because it remains unclear where we may seek the democratic right, when the classical conservatives are suggested as the right-extremists, and it is hardly convincing, that both Peronism as well as communism is represented as left-extremism."
Nolte goes on to suggest that perhaps it would be more obvious to differentiate between forms and phases of fascism that vary with respect to the dominating class influence, a position that would allow for the recognition of the classless character of fascism or rather its all-class character ('oder besser allklassenmässigen Character') (see Nolte, 1967, p. 70).

In the following a discussion will be attempted of Lipset's class analysis of fascism and of his contribution to the understanding of the breakdown of parliamentary democratic institutions and the taking possession of the state by fascist movements.

Lipset proposes that fascism may be seen as a middle class protest against the ongoing development of large scale capitalist organization and organized labour, because its position in society is declining; a society that no longer corresponds to the 19th century liberal ideology which included individual rights, private property and free competition, where the safeguarding of these values was argued to be the major internal role of the state.¹ Lipset continues:

"It is not surprising, therefore that under certain conditions small businessmen turn to extremist political movements, either fascism or anti-parliamentary populism, which in one way or another express contempt for parliamentary democracy. These movements answer some of the same needs as the more conventional liberal parties; they are an outlet for the stratification strains of the middle class in a mature industrial order." (Lipset, 1964, p. 137).

The key words here would appear to be 'under certain conditions' to be able to understand when the middle class will employ democratic means for gaining access to power and when

¹ it can be questioned whether or not the state was reduced to this night-watchman role.
It will use undemocratic means; it is questionable whether Lipset anywhere indicates clearly what these conditions are.

Furthermore, the analysis of the non-democratic implications of support for the NSDAP is ironically based on an analysis of voting data. Voting being the democratic act par excellence, whether for the NSDAP, the Wirtschaftspartei or say the SPD. Voting data is not sufficient alone to explain the success of the NSDAP. Hitler’s takeover was legalistic but was not on the basis of a straightforward parliamentary majority.

It is suggested by Lipset that “The real question to answer is: which strata are most ‘displaced’ by industrialization in each country” (Lipset, 1964, p.134). Whether displacement means for example, numerical decline, loss of livelihood, changed significance of class and status relationships, or lack of access to power is unspecified, and when speaking of changes in class relationships it may perhaps be more fruitful to understand them in terms of both capitalist as well as industrial developments.

When discussing Italian fascism, on the strength of the above argument, Lipset is in effect saying that all the three main strata in Italy were displaced and hence provided support for Mussolini. Not only would Lipset appear to be providing a limiting case for the theory of the middle class as the main source of the success of fascism, but it may perhaps be suggested that the Italian case is a prime example of the explanatory drawbacks of a theory of fascism resting mainly on the middle class¹, he is also making the concept of dis-

¹ Lipset does say that in Germany, for example, conservatives supported Hitler as a bulwark against the left, indicating that the support for fascism may not be understood as just electoral gains.
placement meaningless.

In Italy, the bourgeoisie, in particular the industrial upper class, was deeply involved in initiating and condoning extra-parliamentary activities by the fascists. The Italian industrialists were not the traditionalist elements of Lipset's right-wing fascism, nor does it make sense to argue that they were displaced or without access to power, though they may have thought themselves to be threatened by a possible proletarian revolution. Indeed Lipset finds the case of pre-World War II Italian fascism awkward to explain.

With respect to the nature of the middle class in Germany Lipset speaks of the middle class, small businessmen, salaried employees, etc., and symbolizes their class relationships by saying that they were opposed to both big business and big labour. However, it is important to stress that in industrialized capitalist societies, class relationships, in particular those of the middle class, are neither uni-dimensional nor uniform, though it must be emphasized that Lipset singles out certain sectors of the middle class as supplying the typical supporters of NSDAP, for example: "As the Nazis grew, the liberal bourgeois center parties, based on the less traditionalist elements of German society - primarily small business and white collar workers - completely collapsed," (Lipset, 1964, p.140), further: "The second part of the argument, that fascism appeals predominantly to the self-employed among the middle strata, has been supported by three separate ecological studies of German voting between 1928 and 1932." (p.146).

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1 See: Hoare (1963)
Such German liberal parties as the Wirtschaftspartei, the DDP and the DVP did collapse with respect to their support in the electorate during the course of the Weimar Republic and most analysts agree that the larger share of their previous votes went to the NSDAP, but does this relationship make it legitimate for us to conclude that the NSDAP was a middle class party, of the independent middle class, and if so in what sense? Is it in the sense that the NSDAP primarily represented the interests of the middle class over and against other classes? Certainly Rosenberg's taunt that:

"Die Dilettanten der Sociologie fanden meistens, dass die Kleinbürger jene geheimnisvolle Klasse wären, mit deren Hilfe Hitler und Mussolini ihre Siege erfochten haben. Der Gemüsehändler Fritz Schulze wuchs empor zu dämonischen Größe, Mit der einen Hand hält er das Proletariat nieder und mit der anderen den Kapitalismus. Er verkörpert die Nation und beherrscht das neue Jahrhundert". (Rosenberg, in Abendroth, 1972, pp.75-76) 1.

is an indication that concentrating on the middle class may limit the understanding of the rise to power of German and Italian fascism.

In Great Britain, too, the middle class was pressed between organized labour and capital and was experiencing economic depression, a situation, however, not reflected in substantial voting support for the resident national-socialist party. It is beyond the scope of this thesis even to attempt to put some of the questions arising out of this superficial comparison between England and Germany. However, by itself

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1 'On the whole amateur sociologists have tended to conclude that the petit-bourgeoisie was that mysterious class with the aid of which Hitler and Mussolini won their victory. The greengrocer Fritz Schulze grew to demoniacal size. With one hand he holds the proletariat under and with the other capitalism. He incorporates the nation and dominates the new century.'
it suggests that the voting preferences by the middle class in Germany do not, in isolation, give an adequate explanation of the NSDAP success and the relationship between class conflict and the particular workings of the institutions of parliamentary democracy. In England the middle class was threatened by concentration of power in labour and capital, and on the basis of that condition a middle class may or may not become a primary source for support for a fascist movement, and the consequences of it doing so may not be equally devastating in different historical contexts for parliamentary democracy.

Bendix (1952a) suggests that the use of class analysis for the understanding of the struggle for power is limited because we cannot be certain that a common class background will lead to collective action, nor can we know in advance what the nature of collective action will be; only retrospectively can we say anything more definite about the role of class relationship in the struggle for power.

With respect to analysis of the class support for fascist movements, Bendix suggests that such movements, when successful, were characterized by the receipt of support from a number of ordinarily antagonistic social groups, which Bendix sees as seriously limiting the scope of traditional class analysis. Consequently, Bendix would not agree that fascism is first and foremost a middle class movement, not even a middle class movement of Lipset's type:

"(the) ideal typical Nazi voter in 1932 (was) a middle class self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a centrist or regionalist political party strongly opposed to the power and influence of big
for two reasons: on the one hand because fascism received substantial electoral support from other than self-employed middle class people, and on the other hand, because Bendix finds the interpretation of the General Election statistics for the Weimar Republic in the years 1928-33, in support of the middle class-and-fascism hypothesis to be mistaken. Bendix argues that in the course of those five years the liberal centre parties collapsed, but attempts to demonstrate that they did so only as a secondary response to the first substantial success of the NSDAP on a national level in 1930. He argues on the basis of the election statistics that the most probable sources of NSDAP voters in 1930 are previous non-voters, with respect to whom he would argue, with Lipset, that they are unlikely to be primarily middle class.

Even if Bendix's interpretation of the voting statistics is the more correct numerically, it does not exclude the relevance of a class analysis of the NSDAP voters, even post facto, nor would it, by itself, invalidate Lipset's thesis of the class base of fascism. Interpreting changes in voting patterns first and foremost on the basis of voting data itself would in any case tend toward an individualistic

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1 it is not analysed by Lipset what the role of the state was in the economy, and the consequences for parliamentary democracy of this, nor does he analyse the relationship of big business and labour to parliamentary democracy and state bureaucracy.

2 See Bendix (1952a), p.361.


4 both Bendix and Lipset would appear to equate non-voting with apathy and ignorance, a position not necessarily valid for all instances of non-voters.
bias making understanding of such changes in their structural context (for example class relationships) more difficult to obtain.

Lipset pays special attention to the argument of the primary role of the previous non-voter, citing Bendix as the main proponent of this thesis and Geiger as an early supporter.¹ It would seem difficult to agree with Lipset that Geiger challenges the relevance of class for the analysis of fascism: Geiger writes:

"Die von der NSDAP zwischen 1930 und 1932 gewonnenen 4,6 Millionen Stimmen (11,6%) müssten abermals, wie bisher alle Zugänge dieser Partei, aus den rund 9 Millionen Wähler der bürgerlichen Mittelparteien mit Ausnahme des Zentrums herausgeschnitten sein, soweit sie nicht (2,7 Millionen) durch Mobilmachung bisher politisch Indifferenter aufgebracht wurden. Die bürgerlichen Parteien (ohne Zentrum und Deutschnationale) würden also für sich allein bei der ersten Hindenburgwahl von 1932 statt bisher 8,9 nur noch 6,7 Millionen Stimmen aufgebracht haben." (Geiger, 1932, p.112).

Lipset argues that Bendix's claims are based on total election statistics, but that a breakdown by districts reverses the picture, showing a small negative correlation between increase in NSDAP votes from 1928 to 1930 and increase in turnout. Lipset further cites the evidence from the study of Loomis and Beegle (1946) as being in support of this stati-

¹ Lipset refers to Geiger, (1932), p.112.

² 'Between 1930 and 1932 the NSDAP won 4,6 million votes (11,6%) as in the case of all previous gains of this party, these votes must, however, have come from the approximately 9 million voters of bourgeois centre parties with the exception of the Catholic Centre Party, to the extent that they did not consist of the mobilized political apathetic (2,7 mill.) Even in this case the bourgeois parties (except Zentrum and DNVP) would by the first Hindenburg election in 1932 have lost 6,7 million votes instead of 8,9.'
stical analysis.¹

As it is impossible here to attempt a more systematic investigation of the available election statistics, and as the most imaginative of methods remain based on aggregate data, permitting interminable speculation as to possible changes in voting behaviour, it is tempting to suggest that the NSDAP received votes from both previous non-voters, first time voters, as well as from previous liberal middle-class party voters, in addition to votes from the conservative nationalist party (DNVP), as well as some SPD voters.

O'Lessker (1968), using more advanced statistical methods than Lipset applied to the voting data from the German elections between 1928 and 1933 concludes: 1) that in the case of the 1930 election, the main increase in the support for the NSDAP came from former non-voters, and 2) in line with the argument here, that the second most important source of the increase in the vote for the NSDAP was from previous voters for right-wing parties rather than for non-catholic middle class parties, who were found to be the least important of the three sources mentioned.

Lipset is not suggesting that only previous liberal middle-class party voters supported the NSDAP, but he is using their collapse to support his thesis that 'classic fascism' appeals largely to the same elements as those who back liberalism, i.e. in Lipset's terms, the independent middle class.

¹ The Loomis and Beegle study is of the 1932 election, where the increase in voting participation was rather less than in 1930 and where the loss of votes for the middle-class parties in 1932 (with the exception of DVP, which was halved in 1930) was even more devastating than in 1930, - see for example Lipset, 1964, p.141.
Therefore it may cause surprise to read Lipset's statement to the effect that the DNVP during the years 1928 to 1933 lost only 40% of its votes (Lipset, 1964, p.142), thus minimising the importance of votes from previous German nationalist party voters, rather than using this evidence, for what it is worth, in support of his thesis of the relationship between the independent middle class and fascism.

In the Republic, the DNVP carried on the conservative tradition of the first Reich, becoming one organizational outlet for restorative forces, whilst at the same time it widened its social base so that it became a party both of large landholders and of large industrialists, under the uniting banner of restorative nationalism, as well as of members of the middle class. It is arguable that it was the middle class voters of the DNVP who changed allegiance in 1930, it is assumed to the NSDAP, because increasingly they felt that not their interests, but rather the interests of big business, were being represented by the DNVP.¹

In favour of this argument the evidence of one of Lipset's main sources may be introduced: Rudolf Heberle's study of political parties in Schleswig-Holstein (Heberle, 1945). Here the DNVP and to some extent the DVP² had probably received much of the liberal democratic vote from 1919; according to Heberle, the independent middle class had in the majority been genuinely liberal, hoping from a democratic parliamentary state to get the support they needed to maintain and develop their means of living and guarantee influ-

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² Deutsche Volks Party, Right Liberal, becoming increasingly conservative.
ence and access to power. When the Weimar Republic was found not to fulfill expectations, many members of the middle class voted nationalist for DNVP or DVP possibly in the hope that a more authoritarian state might be better able to solve their economic problems\(^1\) and safeguard their status with respect to other classes in society.

These two parties in Schleswig-Holstein lost a considerable part of their votes in 1930 as compared with 1928, the DNVP over three-quarters and the DVP slightly less than half, whereas the NSDAP here gained a third more than the national average.\(^2\) On the basis of Heberle's analysis, it would appear that a sizeable proportion of the NSDAP voters were small independent farmers and entrepreneurs, many of whom had lately been voting conservative or right liberal. The point to be made here is that former liberal supporters of democracy were open to appeal not just from the NSDAP but were also willing to support traditionalist more or less explicitly anti-democratic parties, as Heberle suggests, for substantially the same reasons as Lipset gives for the support of fascism: depressed economic conditions, opposition to the major consequences of industrialization and capitalist economic development. Thus it could be argued that the NSDAP was reaping some of the fruits of a long battle between democratic and anti-democratic forces in the Weimar Republic and the Kaiserreich, where the voting support of the self-employed middle class was by no means uniform and self-evident.

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\(^1\) arising both out of the particular economic problems and also out of the changes in the economic structure and in the economic policy of the state.

\(^2\) See Heberle, 1951, p.224.
In arguing in this vein, one may also recollect Bendix's warning that there is no self-evident relationship between class and class action as expressed through voting for a political party and that particular historical developments act to modify what one would expect on the basis, perhaps, of different national experiences.

Large sections of the German middle class in 1930 had long since ceased to vote liberal; the DDP, after its initial success in 1919 rapidly lost support both to the left and to the right. In 1928 the DVP had 8.7% of the vote, but gradually became less of an exponent of liberal middle class policy. The Wirtschaftspartei, of which Lipset says:

"An inspection of the shifts among the non-Marxist and non-Catholic parties suggests that the Nazis gained most heavily among the liberal middle class parties, the former bulwarks of the Weimar Republic. Among these parties, the one which lost most heavily was the Wirtschaftspartei, which represented primarily small businessmen and artisans" (Lipset, 1964, p.192),

and which could be said to have been more a narrow interest organization than a party with a liberal ideology with respect to the relation between the state and society, collapsed in 1932 under the pressure of the crisis of economy and state, confronted with the appeal of the NSDAP promising to take care of every acceptable individual and group interest as well as the nation's interest.

It holds true for both the DDP and the Wirtschaftspartei that the substantial loss of votes took place in 1932, where-

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1 Bracher 1955, p.86.

2 See Bracher, 1955, p.94.
as the DVP lost half of its 1928 votes in 1930\(^1\), and in 1932 parliamentary democracy had not even appeared to work for two years; sovereign power had been removed from parliament in effect and was placed with the President and Brüning's 'Präsidial Regierung\(^2\).

It can therefore be argued that Bendix does have a certain basis for claiming that the middle class parties' collapse was a secondary response to the initial fascist success in 1930 and to the breakdown of parliamentary government. However, this does not mean that the self-employed middle class voter was not substantially represented among the NSDAP voters in 1930, only that the evidence for this cannot be deduced from an analysis of the collapse of the liberal middle class parties alone, as Lipset would appear to be attempting, but must be corroborated by other evidence.\(^3,4\)

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\(^{1}\) the following table is taken from Bracher, 1955, pages 84 and 94:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDP</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVP</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirts.p.</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compared with:</td>
<td>DNVP</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

note that Lipset (1964), p.141, quotes a figure of 4.8% for the DDP in 1928, as compared with the figure of 3.8% in the above table.

\(^{2}\) See Conze in Morsey, 1960.

\(^{3}\) it may be suggested that a study of the voting patterns for the liberal middle class parties between 1928 and 1933 explains little about why parliamentary democracy lost support in the population and ceased to function.

\(^{4}\) for a detailed analysis of voting changes in the Weimar Republic 1928-33, see Morsey (1960), the final chapter: das Ende der Republik.
Finally, it may be suggested that it is not quite clear on the basis of Lipset's analysis, why the self-employed middle class should have supported a fascist party rather than the DVP, or in particular the DNVP.\(^1\)

Apart from the middle class vote that may have gone to the SPD (the German Social Democratic Party), it is probably true to say that between 1920 and 1928 the great majority of the self-employed and salaried\(^2\) middle class voters voted for the DNVP, the DVP and the Wirtschaftspartei, as well as for a number of small occupation-specific (Beruf) interest parties,\(^3\) rather than for the DDP, if they did not vote for the Catholic Zentrums Partei. Of these parties, the DNVP and the DVP were at no time unambiguous supporters of parliamentary democracy, both appealed to national 'völkisch' sentiments. At the same time they conducted their politics sufficiently inside the demands of the constitution not to endanger the Republic,\(^4\) for which explanation may lie: (a) in a traditional acceptance of and support of state authority, wherefore the outcome of the conflict inside the DNVP over acceptance of democratic parliamentary 'rules of the game' was crucial for both the fate of the Republic and the policies and goals of the party itself, resulting in a split in which the Hugenberg fraction finally came out clearly for a nationalist

\(^1\) it has been argued that increasingly the DNVP came to represent a legal and tradition-orientated form of fascism: see Rosenberg, in Abendroth, 1972, p.126-127.

\(^2\) Angestellten rather than Beamten.

\(^3\) these small interest parties increased their parliamentary vote between 1928 and 1930: see Lipset, 1964, p.141.

\(^4\) There were however notable exceptions, e.g. the Cuno government, 1923.
revolutionary party (see Bracher, 1955, p.83-93), and (b) in the demands of the international relationships of the state and the economy.

When the economic crisis set in in 1928, both the DNVP and the DVP were found by many middle class people to be no longer adequately willing to guarantee their livelihood and occupational status, but rather the interest and social position of the industrialist and the capitalist landowner.¹

Lipset too invokes the explanatory power of economic crisis, but does not introduce the nature of class conflict in the particular historical circumstances, beyond saying that the middle class was opposed to both organized labour and capital, in order to give some understanding of why none of the established parties seemed to suffice any longer for the middle class.² He makes insignificant the support of industrialist and traditionalist elements in German society for the NSDAP, or at least he does not consider the positive role that such elements must have played in the breakdown of parliamentary democracy to enable Hitler's legalistic takeover of the state.³,⁴

As Lipset is concerned with mass support for fascism as expressed through voting, it can be accepted as legitimate neither to consider the role of the breakdown of parliamentary democracy

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¹ see Rosenberg, in Abendroth, 1972.

² this being said with the reservation that not all the middle class voted for the NSDAP and that it received votes from other classes.

³ see Conze in Morsey, 1960.

⁴ (the working class and its organization has received little mention here, which reflects Lipset's own analysis)
democratic institutions in the success of the NSDAP, nor to consider how the crisis in the state was related to economic and social crisis and conflicts. An attempt at this kind of multi-dimensional analysis might provide not merely a historically more meaningful explanation of the relationships that were uniquely interacting in Weimar Germany, but also an explanation that might suggest the nature of a generalization, that may be fruitful both with respect to Italian fascism and with respect to fascism in Great Britain and the U.S.A., for example.

Lipset does generalize with respect to the non-democratic propensities of the middle class, thus drawing attention to movements such as populism in France and McCarthyism in the U.S.A. which in certain respects are comparable to fascism. This is an important contribution to the understanding of class conflict in advanced capitalist societies, as is the fact that Lipset clearly brings out the modifying influence of community, region and religion on the relationship between class and party. However, he clearly states that the 'extremist expression' (the undemocratic expression) of the middle class is fascism.

From the point of view of liberal democratic values, to support a nationalist and at least ideologically a revolutionary and restorative party, may be considered extreme and radical as it might mean accepting an authoritarian exercise of and an undemocratic control over state authority. If some of the pluralist values of parliamentary democracy, such as the regular competition for the votes of individual citizens, may be said to be implicit in Lipset's investigation into the nature of fascism, then it may follow that some of the
most important data to be sought is voting data expressing the relationship between the individual and the main institutions of parliamentary democracy, the political parties.

Lipset sought to show that fascism is the extremist parallel to democratic middle class parties, but the theoretical status of the claim to be able to show that the NSDAP received support from the middle class, and that this can provide the main explanation of the Nazi success is perhaps called in question by Heberle's comment "that parties may change while basic political attitudes tend to remain constant as long as the economic interests and other structural factors in society remain unchanged" (Heberle, 1951, p.225). ¹

Lipset sought to verify his view of fascism as a middle class movement by proving that the middle class was the first class to give substantial support to the NSDAP; Bendix's critique of this analysis was here cited and it was pointed out that the initial decline of the liberal middle class parties was perhaps not the best argument, but that at least the decline of the DNVP should be considered.

The middle class parties did collapse in 1932, though

¹ this would seem to make nonsense of Lipset's 'liberal man' under the pressure of circumstances becoming a Blut und Boden man, industrialization and centralization may have meant a greater emphasis on the romanticized version of rural local society, but this would not be restricted to members of the middle class. But perhaps one should consider whether people always relate themselves to politics on the basis of a clearly formulated ideological standpoint; on the basis of Lipset's own argument of the importance of cross pressures on the individual for the maintenance of a democratic form of government, this would not even be desireable.

² (Lipset does use other arguments).

³ with the exception of the Catholic centre party, which received a certain proportion of the working class vote and some of the upper class vote, though the votes of large industrialists may have declined during the 1920's.
it is impossible to say whether to the benefit of the NSDAP only, but as the emphasis in the literature on the middle class protest against big labour and capital is so consistent, it would be of relevance to consider what might be the nature of the class relationships expressed through such sentiments that supposedly make, for example, the self-employed middle class particularly receptive to fascist movements.
CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF MIDDLE CLASS RELATIONSHIPS AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR FASCIST MOVEMENTS.

Part of the emphasis of National Socialist ideology was that of nation, community and volk rather than class. In supporting such a party the middle class is often said to have acted against its class interests, because in a society where the dominant class relationship is that between owners and non-owners of property, as expressed in the labour market, the middle class (both the self-employed and the small employers), failed at least for the time being, to see that their interests lay with those of the non-owners, and resorted instead to reactionary and utopian politics in the hope of safeguarding their class and status position. Witness:

"The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay, more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are only so in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat." (Marx and Engels, 1963, p.24).

It is often argued that the middle class acted against its own interests by supporting the NSDAP, in a situation of severe economic distress, reinforcing the strains of structural changes in the economy on the middle class.

Whether this is meant to indicate that the middle class did not realize that its true interest lay with the proletariat, or alternatively that the interests of the middle class
consist of maintaining and advancing its position relative to other groups in society, the conclusion would be that they acted irrationally by supporting a party that heavily emphasized nationalist expansion, which would mean further industrialization, but that also in part of its ideology emphasized a restructuring of society not of the liberal variety; though the romantic emphasis on Blut und Boden, on the homestead, obviously was a point of possible attachment to the farmers.

The National Socialist ideology and propaganda as it developed was ambiguous, in particular with respect to what exactly the party would do when once in office, it offered something to every group to which it appealed and went to certain lengths not to alienate the middle class. In his discussion of the strategic and tactical policies of the NSDAP and of its opportunism Schoenbaum writes:

"Hung above each subappeal - fixed prices for the farmers, jobs for the unemployed, liberation from competition with big competitors for small business, and careers open to talent for the young - was the general appeal of 'Rescue Germany', an idealized form of 'sauve qui peut' as Geiger said, directed at a population that had lost the self-confidence of 1848 and 1870 and was now prepared to throw itself into the arms of its own desperation." (Schoenbaum, 1967, p.34-35) 1.

In a situation of severe distress, given certain assurances the NSDAP may easily have appeared to the middle class as a plausible promise of betterment of their position and of securing their position in relation both to labour and business. Nor was such a hope left totally unsupported by the NSDAP policies once in power.

1 in Schoenbaum, 1967, p.1-46 for a discussion of the accommodation to different interests in the proposals of the NSDAP.
Schoenbaum writes that the various goals of NSDAP policy were incompatible:

"Low man in the Nazi economy was small business, whose relative position deteriorated directly and irreversibly from appoint of initial strength. Small business was necessarily the Third Reich's first beneficiary. ... ...But the honeymoon was relatively short, as small business proved the most vulnerable to the advancing labour shortage, increased industrial goals, and the consumer needs of a population whose artificially low wages demanded some kind of consideration." (Schoenbaum, 1967, p.136-37)

National Socialism was ideologically committed to the development of homesteads, but made only half-hearted attempts in this direction, on the whole the advantage remained with the larger farms, who even in the third Reich were better able to great credit to finance rationalization of production and to compensate the loss of labour. Schoenbaum writes:

"Agriculture's position in the budget hierarchy bore no relation to its ideological status. What this meant for the individual farmer was a life little different than before. In return for some security of land tenure and the flattery of official rhetoric, the farmer was expected to work harder and longer for increasingly little return. The difficulties of his position were in inverse relationship to his size." (Schoenbaum, 1967, p.185).

Though the record for the middle class in the Third Reich would not seem to justify the hopes pinned on the NSDAP, there were attempts to meet them, and to this extent the middle class did not act completely against its interests, there was a certain amount of genuine wish to improve the position of the middle class, if it did not receive priority in implementation. Perhaps it was less overtly in the interest of the middle class to vote for a party that had specified so little in advance how it was going to improve the position of farmers and small shopkeepers in industrialized society vis-a-vis big business and labour.
Lipset does not dichotomise society into two classes, but considers the middle class as an independent category. However, with respect to explaining why the middle class supported a fascist movement, he defines its class relationships in terms only of a class opposed to the growing power and influence of large scale capitalist enterprises and organized labour. He describes the middle class in various places in the chapter on Germany (pp.140-152) as being small business, white collar workers (p.140), artisans,(p.142), and as "middle class self-employed Protestants who lived either on a farm or in a small community" (p.149).

Furthermore he shows that the NSDAP probably inherited the support of the Schleswig-Holsteinsche Landespartei which aimed at the preservation of political power at the local level, and mentions the often-cited study of Pratt (1948) showing a positive correlation between vote for NSDAP and rural and small town communities, which indicates that the political consequences of class relationships were being mediated through the social relationships of region and community as well as status expectations.

Despite the obvious importance of such modifications of a straight class analysis, one would venture to suggest that on the one hand the class relationships involved are not clearly specified and that on the other hand, the definition of the middle class in terms of its occupational categories is not sufficient to clarify the matter. Occupational position is one index of class and also of status, and whilst status position certainly influences class relationships they are not of the same order.¹

¹ see Dahrendorf, 1965, pp.72-117.
The intention is not to deny that for example concepts of status and prestige may supply helpful insights into political action such as the choice of party in a voting situation. In this instance the occupational groups mentioned above may have experienced the continuing rationalization of industrial capitalist society, as represented in the centralization and bureaucratization of power and conflict, as a threat to their traditional status and influence in society as well as future existence.

That other structural relationships than those of class influence the choice of party can be no surprise and emphasizes Bendix's warning that it would be a mistake to expect a one-to-one relationship between class and class action. However, this position does not invalidate the relevance of class for the understanding of action directed towards the distribution and acquisition of power in society.

Geiger's (1932) contribution on the social structure of Germany provides earlier and probably more fruitful suggestions for a more illuminating and suggestive analysis of the middle class in Weimar Germany than that put forward by Lipset.

Geiger, whilst arguing that objectively only two classes exist and that the interest of the old middle class lies in fact with the proletariat suggests, however:

"Insofern war die sozialistische Prognose bisher trügerisch, das Bürgertum werde durch seine fortschreitende Auspowerung in den Gesinnungsbereich des Sozialismus geraten." (Geiger, 1932, p.107), 1.

1 "To this extent the socialist prognosis was mistaken, that the bourgeoisie through her progressive impoverishment would turn to the socialist mode of thinking".
and argues that both the salaried and the propertied middle classes subjectively interpreted their economic position on the basis of a state nationalist mentality.\(^1\)

In the case of the propertied middle class, a particular form of the private ownership of the means of production separated it from the proletariat as expressed in the concept of "personal property for which one was personally responsible" \(^2\) and which also distinguished its class relationships from those of the capitalist bourgeoisie.

In order to understand why the middle class supposedly acted against its own interests Geiger's argument:

"Je heftiger das mittlere und kleine Eigentum bedroht ist - durch Wirtschaftskreise oder dadurch, dass die Expansion des Grosskapitals den Kleinbesitz an Produktionsmitteln in der Hand des Eigentürmers entwertet - desto eifersüchtiger und fanatischer wird der Eigentumsgedanke verteidigt" (Geiger, 1932, p.107). \(^3\)

would seem to be suggestive, especially as he indicates the nature of the class relationships involved.

Though Geiger here is developing his argument on a general level, it would, on that basis, be mistaken to posit a collective class action on behalf of the middle class in the form of support for the NSDAP; rather, the inference

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\(^1\) "staatslich-nationale Mentalität" (Geiger, 1932, p.106).

\(^2\) Im Bannbereich der altkapitalistischen Wirtschaftsromantik, bei den mittleren und kleineren Unternehmern, ist noch heute das Eigentumsdenken zuhause, das Hangen am bürgerlichen Begriff des persönlichen und persönlich zu verantwortenden Eigentums" (Geiger, 1932, p.106-7).

\(^3\) "that increasingly as the small private ownership of the means of production decline in value (lose importance and power in the development of the economy) due to either economic crisis or the continuing expansion of monopoly capital, the moreconcertedly and fanatically will the middle class defend the value and concept of private property"
would be that Geiger is pointing to certain aspects of the changing class relationships of the middle class that might be valueable in the attempt to gain some understanding of why some members of the middle class voted for the NSDAP.

If, according to Lipset, the substance in the motivation of the middle class was partly the consequences of a changing social and economic order as represented in the opposition to and resentment of big business and big labour then Weber's considerations would appear to be in order here:

"As to the general economic conditions making for the predominance of stratification by 'status', only very little can be said. When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favoured. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations" (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.193-194).

Both the Kaiserreich and Weimar Germany were periods of 'technological and economic transformations'. In the Kaiserreich e.g. protective tarrifs and other economic policies of the state were first and foremost to the benefit of the large industrialists and farmers economically and socially, rather than small independent middle class people.

In Weimar Germany the policy and actions of the state (parliament and bureaucracy) were further detrimental to the economic position of the middle class, apart from the policies arising out of severe economic problems such as inflation and depression.

Geiger was suggesting that subjectively members of the old middle class had not yet clearly recognized the consequences of the changes in their objective class position, and that this may account for their support of a nationalist
socialist party. Whilst not necessarily agreeing with Geiger that the class position of the middle class had become more or less identical with that of the proletariat, Geiger could be read to suggest that for the middle class its support of the NSDAP was "linked to the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the (its) 'class situation'". (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.184).

A tentative analysis of the class relations of the Weimar middle class based on Max Weber's contribution on the subject of class may now be introduced. Implicitly a critique of Lipset's discussion, explicitly it attempts, if fumblingly and inadequately, to suggest that in Weber's writings lies one of the best theoretical approaches to the subject of class relationships which when applied calls for a historical concreteness that could not be met merely through voting figures; regretfully no such claim could be made for the following analysis.

Weber summarizes the change in class relationships over time when saying:

"the struggle in which class situations are effective has progressively shifted from consumption credit toward, first, competitive struggles in the commodity market and then, toward price wars on the labour market" (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.185) ... "all categories are derived from the basic one of 'property' or 'lack of property'". (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.182).

It could be suggested that the class situation of the middle class was expressed in the relationships of the commodity market, whereas one might argue that the dominant class relationships in Weimar Germany were those experienced in the labour market. This is not to suggest that other class relationships were not effective for the middle class or in the economic structure as a whole.
A further elaboration of this perspective is made by Wiley, who suggests (with reference to Weber's three main dimensions of class relationships):

"Accordingly anyone who participates in all three markets is a member of three distinct economic classes and may participate in class conflict along three distinct axes. These three kinds of conflict are not equally important at any one time in the industrialization process or in the business cycle, nor do distinct interest groups always form around each issue" (Wiley, 1967, p.531-2).

On the basis of Weber's analysis of class, Wiley develops the concept of class inconsistency, with relevance for either the individual or the 'system' or both. (Wiley, 1967, p.532). He says:

"There are two consistent sets of class attributes, the propertied and the non-propertied. The propertied set is that of employer-creditor-seller, the non-propertied that of employee-debtor-buyer. All other sets entail a mixture of the propertied and the non-propertied, or non-membership in one or more markets, or membership on both the propertied and non-propertied sides in one or more markets, or some combination of these. It will be assumed that all sets other than the two consistent ones, are likely to involve a conflict of economic interest for the person, and it is in this sense that we refer to them as inconsistent. The extent of inconsistency reflects the degree to which the three axes of class conflict divide a population at different points, and to what extent a society will have a built-in source of cross-pressures" (Wiley, 1967, p.532).

The relevance of Wiley's categories of class for the analysis of the relationship between the middle class and fascism lies in his suggestion that: "the normal response of an inconsistent lower class, centered around several in-

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1 inspired by the many contributions in the literature on the subject of status consistency.

2 no attempt will be made to assess the claim of normality, as the intention here is not to make a definitive statement on the relationship between class and party, but an elaboration of what might possibly be of generalizable value in Lipset's claim of a relationship between the middle class and fascism.
consistent interests, is something more diffuse and less radical than socialism" (Wiley, 1967, p.535).

In his chapter on 'Fascism - Left, Right and Center', Lipset brings out, amongst others, the case of the support for McCarthy. He uses the evidence of the well-known study by Martin Trow (in Coser, 1967), which shows: 1) of four ideological categories, the respondents in the one termed '19th century liberalists' ('hostility towards both big business and trade unions') were much more likely than respondents of any of the three others to support McCarthy, 2) that the small businessman was more likely than any other occupational group to hold these views and 3) that the 19th century liberal small businessman supported McCarthy to a disproportionate extent. Trow concludes:

"...small businessmen react not so much to short-run crises in the economy as to its long-range tendencies and direction of development - against the society itself rather than merely to features of its economy" (Trow, in Coser, 1967, p.200).

Applying the concept of class inconsistency to the study by Trow, it is suggested by Wiley that

"small businessmen along with farmers are the classic mixed types, for while both make their living by selling, they also do capital buying from powerful sellers, and their incomes are often affected as much by buying as by selling. In addition, they are often heavily in debt and may be employers of labour, at least sporadically. Both groups consequently are afflicted with economic...

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1 the influence of small business on the economic policy and its position in the structure of the economy may be declining, but this does not necessarily mean that the number of small businesses is declining, rather, it may be the case that small business is economically vulnerable and has a high turnover, concurrent with a continuous change in the nature of the services provided by small business. See for example Mayer, 1947 and Geiger, 1932.
crosspressures\textsuperscript{1} and cannot identify their interests with either big business or labour unions" (Wiley, 1967, p.536).

Geiger pointed out that the middle class view of private property was not consistent with the major division of class conflict in Weimar German society. It would seem to bring light on Geiger's analysis if one were to attempt to use the categories of class analysis suggested above on some of the class relationships in Weimar Germany.

According to Weber, the major dimension of class relationships in developed capitalist society is that which is given expression in the labour market; other class relationships may be operating too, but will be subordinate in determining the direction of the development of the capitalist economy.

Applying the concepts of Weber and of Wiley to the middle class in Weimar Germany, it is clear that the major class dimension for at least the self-employed middle class was that of the commodity market of selling and buying, though they were also to different degrees represented in the credit and labour markets. Thus both small farmers and small businessmen (artisans, shopkeepers, etc.) had inconsistent class relationships, they were primarily represented in the commodity market as sellers but also as buyers, under difficult economic conditions; the inflation of the first years of the Weimar Republic was primarily a result of a severe shortage of goods, thus being of little benefit to the middle class, but wiping out their resources, though debt may have been

\textsuperscript{1} incidentally, this would seem at least to modify Lipset's claim of the functional importance of crosspressures on the individual, for democracy (Lipset, 1964, p.88)
alleviated, the depression of 1928 was obviously detrimental.

It is Weber's point that class position does not always lead to clearly recognizable class action, either communal or interest action; it would therefore be of relevance to consider the evidence concerning the usefulness of applying Wiley's analytical categories to the role of the middle class in the success of fascism.

Apart from the reservations arising out of the discussion above of the nature of the statistical evidence brought forward by Lipset concerning the relationship between the middle class and fascism, it should be stressed that one is not attempting to show that a disproportionate number of the middle class supported fascism, but that the middle class was involved in cross-cutting class relationships that might make it difficult for members of the middle class to distinguish clearly the causal relationships of their public and private problems and the consequences for social action. The hypothetical assumption being that "People with inconsistent class attributes are especially prone to support right-wing groups" (Wiley, 1967, p.536).

Heberle's study in Schleswig-Holstein would appear to be suitable material for indicating how the proposed analysis might be applied to Weimar Germany.

In Schleswig-Holstein the middle class predominantly supported so-called middle class parties prior to and immediately after World War I. But these parties were then succeeded by first the National Conservative party (DNVP) as well as by a number of interest-group parties and smaller politi-

\(^1\) see Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.184).
cal organizations such as the Landespartei, and finally by the NSDAP. Heberle explains that an analysis of the voting pattern for the July 1932 election shows that the NSDAP were strongest in the central area of Schleswig-Holstein, the Geest, where the NSDAP gained almost 80% of the vote, whereas to the east and west of this district the percentage was lower, and the vote for DNVP, SPD and KPD was correspondingly higher, though in the Land as a whole, the NSDAP received 51% of the vote, being the only sub-region in Germany where this occurred.

Heberle notes that this distribution of votes dismisses one initial hypothesis: that a primary relationship accounting for the large NSDAP vote was that of debtor protest, because the people in the Geest as a whole were not debtors, though debtors as a whole showed a propensity to vote NSDAP. That debtors were protesting over their conditions and voicing opposition to parliamentary government and the state was shown by clashes with the state over taxes, for example, the Landvolk riots, especially in the marshes over debts, as the traditional (both liberal and conservative) pressure groups, were seen to fail the small and medium-sized farmers.

To the extent that the rural and urban middle class was represented in the credit market as debtors and their demands on economic policy clashed with those of big business Wiley's concept of class inconsistency in the social system is clearly relevant and adds substance to the explanatory symbol of 'opposition to big business'.

Concerning the regional differences in the size of the NSDAP vote in Schleswig-Holstein, Heberle suggests that two
main factors were involved, differences in social structure and in economic relationships. (see Heberle, 1951, p.227). Heberle writes:

"The Geest farmers depended largely on the two extremely sensitive markets, for young beef cattle and for hogs .... The Geest was a zone of medium size and small family farms, operated almost entirely without hired help. Contrary to the two other zones, the Geest had no broad class of landless proletariat. Consequently the villages were distinguished from the rural communities in the other two zones by a much higher degree of social solidarity, which was reflected in a more unanimous vote" (Heberle, 1951, p.228).

The Geest farmer was represented on the commodity market almost entirely as a seller with few products, very sensitive to the business cycle, and furthermore lived in a community which gave little experience of the dominant class relationships between labour and capital and understanding of the dominant political issues if the time. In Wiley's terms their class relationships were highly inconsistent. In 1919 a large proportion of the votes in the Geest were given to the Landespartei, a party with pronounced romantic notions of the ideal role of the state with respect to the independent farmer. On the whole, the voting in the Geest, in the whole period of the Weimar Republic had been very fluctuating, a situation tending to support further Wiley's suggestion that inconsistent and untransparent class relationships may make for right-wing voting.

The Marshes (the area in the west) had great differences in class between wealthy farmers and labourers and a number of cottagers; in this area the vote for the DNVP and the marxist parties were much more stable and the vote for the NSDAP lower, though still fairly sizeable. The farming economy was more diversified and hence less vulnerable, which may
account for why fewer farmers voted NSDAP. Further, there was here a longer tradition of political activism in the established parties of both the DNVP and the marxist parties, which together with the daily experience of class difference might explain why a party proposing a society in which class relationships were ignored would have less appeal.

However, Wiley's categories would still be useful for suggesting some of the class relationships that may lie behind the considerable support for the NSDAP by farmers in this area. They were often in debt (see Heberle), were employers of labour and were represented in the commodity market as both buyers and sellers, for example, they bought cattle for grazing from the Geest farmers. In the area there were also a number of cottagers with obvious inconsistent class relationships, and to the extent that labourers interpreted the distribution of power in terms of more traditional values, they would experience their class relations less clearly.

In the East, support for the DNVP, the SPD and the KPD was fairly stable, consistent with greater differences in class, between landlord, tenants, large and small farmers, cottagers and labourers than in the Geest. Heberle shows that here too it was probably the small farmers and cottagers who gave the greatest support for the NSDAP and again Wiley's categories may be applied.

Finally Heberle suggests that small businessmen and entrepreneurs in towns and villages gave support to the NSDAP, again we find economically less secure occupational categories experiencing conflicting class relationships.

The study by Loomis and Beegle (1946), of the spread of Nazism in the rural areas of Hannover and Bavaria provides
further evidence for the relationship between small farmers and businessmen and voting for NSDAP.¹

Geiger² points to other occupational groups in German society which in his experience would be open to appeal from the NSDAP, amongst others Tagewerker für eigene Rechnung, (day labourers), and industrial workers with a small plot of land; according to Geiger, quite a few members of the proletariat acquired small businesses in the more prosperous years between 1924 and 1928. All can be seen to have conflicting class relationships.

The intention here has not been to make an exhaustive analysis of class relations in Weimar Germany, but rather to show that Wiley's analytical concepts may illuminate the nature of the connection posited by Lipset between the middle class and the NSDAP, namely that their vote should be seen as a protest against big labour and big business.

It is not here suggested that people with class relations along the dominant lines of economic relationships in Weimar Germany did not support the NSDAP or that for example, all small farmers did, but that Wiley may be right in suggesting that a comparative analysis would show that: "People with inconsistent class attributes are especially prone to support right-wing groups" (Wiley, 1967, p.536).

It may be suggested that exactly what will be the nature of the party in question is much less clear and it

¹ with the exception of the strongly catholic areas in Bavaria where the Zentrum party (Bavarian Catholic party) kept the majority of the independent farmers' and of the labourers' vote.

² see Geiger, 1932, p.107.
may also be difficult to agree on calling it right-wing.¹
At the very least one would have to suggest that the particu-
lar historical circumstances would have to be considered.

A note on the salaried employee.

The salaried employees in Trow's sample in the study
of McCarthyism were very low in their support for McCarthy,
in contrast to which he mentions the general agreement on
the disproportionate support given to the NSDAP by the sala-
ried middle class. Trow suggests:

"But, while accepting the general shape and direction of
modern society, the salaried employees in Europe respon-
ded violently to short-run crises in capitalist society -
to inflation, depression, mass unemployment, and their
component insecurities of livelihood and social status"

Unemployment and deteriorating economic conditions
were seen as a threat to the maintenance of the social pre-
stige which supposedly a large number of salaried employees
thought was legitimately due to them.² Speier suggests:

"It (class theory) can explain the social superiority
of the owner of the means of production over the pro-
ertyless proletariat. But the differences in rank with-
in a class and the prestige which is not primarily eco-
nomic (such as that of the officials in Germany) are
quite incomprehensible by means of this theory" (Speier,
1934, p.124).

Only a small proportion of the organized salaried em-
ployees were organized in the socialist Zentralverband der
Angestellten. The rest were mainly in the moderate Gewerk-
schaftsbund der Angestellten and the Deutschnationale Hand-

¹ see Wiley's own treatment of populism in the U.S.A. (1967)
and Lipset's (1964) discussion of Agrarian Socialism.

² a social prestige which was being threatened also by the
increasing routinization of work and the recruitment of
employees from 'lower' status groups.
lungsgehilfen-Verband, for a time closely associated with the DNVP, as well as a number of christian unions.

The support of a large number of salaried employees for the NSDAP may be explained not so much as a protest against big business and labour as their life-chances were bound up with the fate of bureaucratic organization, but as a reaction against parliamentary government which appeared to be unable to guarantee the economic basis for monopoly capitalism.

That the political outcome of this for only a few was support for the socialist parties must, Speier suggests, be analysed in terms of status ranking. Their status claims are based on (a) their share in the authority of those who rule the undertaking (b) their education, as co-bearers of the intelligence of scientific experience and (c) their share in official authority as a result of nationalistic sentiment. (Dahrendorf, 1965, on authority and class conflict in Industrial Society can be seen as a further elaboration).

On Speier's terms status relations are predominant with respect to political action or of equal importance to those of class which they modify. On Wiley's terms, the salaried employee is typically a debtor-buyer-employee but:

"... it is the salaried middle class that often becomes psychologically identified with the interests of big business ... (and) perceive themselves as employer-debtor-buyers" (Wiley, 1967, p.538), i.e. have inconsistent class relationships. Whether or not it is always justified to translate the status claims of salaried employees into psychological identification with another class is however questionable. For the traditional
'Beamten und Angestellten' the prestige of his position could be said to determine his economic life chance to a great extent; in Weimar Germany this was no longer so, he was vulnerable to unemployment and had to take his chance in the labour market against which support for both DNVP and the NSDAP may be seen as the political action.

The different sections of the middle class, peasants, artisans, investors, salaried employees, shopkeepers, had different and often divergent demands on economic policy. Salaried employees were interested in higher salaries and security of employment which was directly against the interest of the small employer. Peasants wanted high food prices and tariff protection, whereas shopkeepers would want low food prices, as would salaried employees. In consequence, the demands on the government were diverse and conflicting and also conflicted with the demands of big business and labour. A further consequence was the diversification of occupational and political organizations representing the middle class which largely failed to secure middle class interests and support parliamentary democracy.

Heberle has described how the peasants increasingly voted for the DNVP representing both pre-capitalist expectations of status and class with respect to the economic order, as well as opposition to the prevailing forces in society of big business and labour. Inflation probably prompted other sections of the middle class, people with savings and investments, for example, to transfer their vote to the conservative parties (DNVP and DVP) as well as to the many interest parties that shot up in the latter half of the 1920's. When the depression set in the support for parliamentary democracy among the middle class was already weakened,
however, this need not have led to fascism.

It may be correct to state that the middle class\(^1\) in Weimar was opposed to both big business and labour, but whether this is a necessary consequence of the development of capitalist industrial societies in general, or whether the particular social, economic and political relationships distinguishing this development in Germany must be taken into account is not considered by Lipset, except in saying that the economic crisis was severe. Whether it was more severe than in the U.S.A. for example is not considered and may be questioned. Finally the relationship of the middle class to fascism does not in isolation explain the takeover of the state.

\(^1\) with certain exceptions such as the salaried employees organized in socialist unions.
When considering Lipset's proposition that fascism must be seen first and foremost as a middle class movement, it was suggested that even in the case of Weimar Germany, where the institutions of parliamentary democracy were directly involved in the ascendancy of the NSDAP, the final takeover of the state cannot be explained alone through the voting support from the middle class, or from the additional voting support of other classes.

However, an attempt was made to show that class analysis of political action is relevant to the understanding of fascism, though the relationship between class and action was far from being self evident.

However, as the NSDAP received support from members of other classes than the middle class, and as the support of the middle class by itself cannot sufficiently explain the final success of the NSDAP, it may be legitimate to ask whether sociological concepts such as class and status are the primary concepts to be used in achieving an understanding of fascist movements.

Kornhauser suggests:

"What class analysis does not help to explain is the extremism of totalitarian movements": their appeal to

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1 It must be borne in mind that a simplistic explanation in terms of voting strength is of little value on its own.

2 Fascist parties are defined by Kornhauser as totalitarian movements.
the most extreme dispositions of individuals and their readiness to go to any extreme in the pursuit of their objectives. But it is precisely this quality of extremism which makes these movements so threatening to democratic politics and individual liberty. ... The present study is concerned with the fate of democracy insofar as it is affected by the opportunities provided for the growth of mass movements; and it seeks to analyse these opportunities with the aid of the concept of mass society" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.49-50).

The intention here is not to conduct an extensive discussion of the theory of mass society and mass behaviour, but is to assess whether with respect to fascism, in particular in Germany, Kornhauser is able to provide a fuller or an alternative explanation as compared with class analysis, and whether his explanation adds understanding to that of for example Lipset, which is based on class and class conflict.2

Following Kornhauser:

"The major set of circumstances associated with the emergence and development of mass movements must include those factors that weaken social arrangements intermediate between the individual and the state. This much is suggested by the structure of mass society. Such factors are those associated with major discontinuities in social process as measured by the rate, scope, and mode of social change. Thus it is not democratisation per se. which provides extremist mass movements, but the discontinuities in political authority that may accompany the introduction of popular rule" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.125).

According to Kornhauser: "pluralist society supports a liberal democracy, whereas a mass society supports a populist

1 totalitarian movements are typically mass movements, according to Kornhauser, 1968, p.48.

2 The theory of mass society in its different forms is generally well known and need not be expounded here. An adequate summary may be found in Gusfield, 1962, pp.14-30. This summary can be exemplified in the following quote: "Supporters of this view (of mass society) hold that structural characteristics of bureaucracy and equality undermine the function of secondary and primary associations in inculcating values and transmitting political norms" (Gusfield, 1962, p.21).
democracy" (p.131), and it is supposed that mass societies are open to extremist mass movements and hence to totalitarian takeovers of state and society.\(^1\) In a pluralist society the relationship of the individual to the state and the national political community is mediated by a great number of primary and secondary groups, which provide a set of social checks and balances, both on the power of the state and of social groups; this, in conjunction with the constitutional 'checks and balances' ensures equality in access to power and protection against arbitrary rule.

Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for the maintenance of democracy is a pluralist society. Underlying such an evaluation must be the assumption that there is a 'natural harmony of interests' amongst the different groups in society, as expressed through the balancing of interests in the political system.\(^2\) If there is a proliferation of primary and secondary groups present, toward which the individual is primarily orientated, democracy in the form of a pluralistic social and political system is more or less assured. The difference between liberal democracy and populist democracy in Kornhauser's terminology is the agreed rules of the game of gaining access to power.

Whatever else Weimar Germany may have lacked, it would be stretching the imagination to suggest that German society lacked to a great extent primary and secondary groups and that therefore the individual was variously disattached, socially alienated, self alienated and ready to partake in

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\(^1\) see Kornhauser, 1968, chapters 1-4 inclusive.

\(^2\) for a discussion and critique of the notion of 'balance of forces' see Mills, 1959, pp.242-264.
direct action.

It might be argued that to a great extent the secondary groups were large scale bureaucratic organizations with which the rank and file did not identify\(^1\), though in Weimar Germany it may be difficult to establish the extent to which such relationships played a major role in the growth of the support for the NSDAP; moreover the trades unions and the SPD did not lose substantially the support of their members. However, even if it can be shown that the members of the middle class disaffiliated from their interest organizations (for example as Heberle shows with regard to the peasants and the Bauernverein), mass society theory would appear to be logically unable to explain this. The question must also be raised of whether the existence of secondary groups equates with the acceptance of some nationally integrating values.

Wiley suggests:

"... there is a kind of alienation in not being clearly attached to any of the powerful bureaucracies, but this form of alienation comes, not from the growth of bureaucracy and mass society, but from the unevenness of this growth" (Wiley, 1967, p.538).

On the contrary, one might suggest that participation in a great number of informal primary group relationships is likely to lead to the spread of and acceptance of extremist political ideas; a case in point is Pratt's\(^2\) establishment of a negative correlation between degree of urbanisation and strength of support for the NSDAP on the assumption that

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\(^1\) Neumann, 1966, p.17-19 provides evidence in support of this thesis.

\(^2\) see Lipset, 1964, p.123.
rural society still portrayed Gemeinschaft qualities.

Pluralist theories of democracy say little about the possibility for developing general acceptance of pluralist norms for political conduct. In 1919

"(die) drei Parteien des parlamentarischen Kompromisses von 1917-1919 ... erhielten in % der abgegebenen Stimmen 76 (%), (und in) 1920 44 (%)" (Conze, in Morsey, 1960, p.17-18). 1.

We also know from Heberle that to a great extent, the people in Schleswig-Holstein who supported the NSDAP had, in 1919, voted liberal, being the ideology par excellence to favour pluralist democracy; but perhaps this holds good only for certain historical circumstances. A liberal vote by peasants and other middle class people in the Kaiserreich was probably as much opposition to the centralization of power in Berlin as it was to the consequences of industrialization and rationalization for their class and status. Industrialization and the development of monopoly capitalism led to the preferential treatment of large industrial and agricultural undertakings with respect to the policies of the state and in society in general. Weimar Germany was organized politically around the institution of parliamentary democracy - but much of the middle class vote soon went to conservative and even restorative parties. Supposedly mass society theory would interpret this to mean that such people were no longer integrated into society by secondary groups that adequately expressed and supported the validity of their economic interests and of their status claims and thus, being at least in part anomic they were free to relate themselves to the wider

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1 "the three parties involved in the parliamentary compromise in 1917-19 ... gained 75% of the votes cast (and in) 1920 44%."
society on the level of the integrating norms and values of nationalism.

Little consideration is given to economic relationships and conflicts that may lead even the best of primary and secondary groups to abandon the pluralist rules of the game, or to the possibility that in a society with a plurality of groups different and conflicting sets of values may be supported.

Kornhauser does stress certain differences in the social structure of England and Germany in the 19th century, such as "the failure of its (Germany's) middle class to develop fully a political style of their own" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.138).

Barrington Moore (1967, chapters 7 and 8) analyses important differences in the relationships of classes to each other and to the state, in Germany and in England in the process of industrialization, which were probably more or less favourable to the development of parliamentary democracy. In Germany the authority of the crown was not so effectively challenged as in England, where the landed upper classes and the bourgeoisie checked each other's power, whereas in Germany, though there was not identity of interest between aristocracy and bourgeoisie, especially the industrializing bourgeoisie, their interests in the course of industrialization both became subsumed under the interest of the Imperialist state.

As it is difficult to argue that Weimar Germany was lacking intermediary groups between the individual and the state, Kornhauser suggests a different reason for the breakdown of democracy in Weimar Germany:
"Furthermore, the genesis of liberal democracy depends not on the destruction of any class, nor on the abolition of conflict among classes, but on the progressive opening of the upper classes, and on the increased power and participation of the middle and lower classes. When the introduction of democratic rule is based on the continuous opening up of the class structure, then no major segment of the society will be alienated from it. When, on the other hand, democratic rule is introduced by means of the sudden destruction of the old regime, then the new ruling groups cannot lean on pre-existing principles of legitimacy or on institutional procedures to stabilize their authority" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.140-141).

Initially this argument sounds persuasive, but it lacks a specification of the tolerable degrees of discontinuity in authority for the maintenance of democracy. Weimar democracy could have survived despite the difficulties surrounding its birth, but it did not, and we are able to say that part of the explanation is probably to be found in the relationship and expectations of the upper class, landed and industrial, to and of the state. Based on the English model of a successful development of parliamentary democracy, the major class supporting the values of liberal democracy, the bourgeoisie, which Kornhauser calls the 19th century middle class, had in 20th century in Germany less need of such values. Whilst the middle class, the small property owners, could not back by sufficient economic power any support, if outdated, of liberal values.

If Weimar Germany cannot be adequately described as a mass society, but must be admitted to the ranks of pluralist societies, and yet experienced the failure of democracy, mass society theory must explain this by sudden rearrangements in the social structure of primary and secondary groups and their relationships to the state authority, in order to be able to explain the failure of the national harmony of
interests to come to the fore. That the different social groups may hold widely different values and goals, so as to make consensus on the rules of the game difficult or improbable seems, on the basis of the theories of mass and pluralist society, nearly impossible.

Consequently it follows that the support for an extremist movement such as the NSDAP is given by people who have become displaced, socially alienated, and normless through the sudden discontinuity in authority. It would appear to be of relevance to see whether or not the theory of mass society adds further dimensions to the theory of class relationships, in analysing the support that the NSDAP received from the middle class. Kornhauser writes:

"In part III, we shall adduce considerable evidence to show that the strongest response to the totalitarian appeal is not to be found among those who are involved in class organization and class struggle; on the contrary, the strongest response comes from people with the weakest attachment to class organizations, or any other kind of social group" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.49).

The consequent argument being that those members of the middle class and the working class who support fascist movements or communist movements are those members of their respective classes who according to both the structural and psychologi-

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1 Kornhauser uses these terms more or less synonymously; here it may be suggested that they may all be understood as anomie, as what Kornhauser mainly appears to be talking about is the lack of norms integrating the individual into the social order.

2 Kornhauser suggests that to account for the differences in class composition between the two totalitarian movements, it is necessary to utilize class analysis, but that this cannot account for the similarities between totalitarian mass movements, as: "When organizations have as their central purpose the advancement of class interests, they tend to be restrained and limited by the exigencies of social situations and class traditions" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.180)
cal assumptions of the theory of mass society are most dis-attached from the integrating primary and secondary groups in society.

Kornhauser's argument here shows a certain likeness to certain aspects of Marx's analysis of Bonapartism. The peasants, according to Marx, were one of the social groups who supported Bonaparte but they did not form a class, and therefore their support of Bonapartism cannot be considered an expression of class and political consciousness. That certain sections of the peasantry did not form a class can be adduced from the fact that they did not possess political and economic organizations to give expression to and defend their common interests; in Kornhauser's terms these people were mass men.

Marx writes: (as quoted by Thalheimer from the 18th Brumaire):

"Insofern ein nur lokaler Zusammenhang unter den Parzellenbauern besteht, die Dieselbigkeit ihrer Interessen keine Gemeinsamkeit, keine nationale Verbindung und keine politische Organisation unter ihnen erzeugt, bilden sie keine Klasse. Sie sind daher unfähig, ihre Klasseninteressen im eigenen Namen, sei es durch einen Konvent geltend zu machen. Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen vertreten werden. Ihr Vertreter muss zugleich als ein Herr, als eine Autorität über ihnen erscheinen, als eine uneingeschränkte Regierungsgewalt, die sie vor den anderen Klassen beschützt und ihnen von oben Regen und Sonnenschein schickt. Der politische Einfluss der Parzellenbauern findet also darin seinen letzten Ausdruck, dass die Exekutivgewalt sich das Parlament, der Staat sich die Gesellschaft unterordnet." (Marx in Abendroth, 1972, p.20-21) 1.

1 "To the extent that only a local association exists among the peasants with small holdings, and their identity of interests produces no communality of interests, no national association and no political organization, do they not form a class. They are consequently incapable of making their class interests effective in their own name, be it through a parliament or a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them against
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to enter into an investigation of the extent to which members of the middle class in Germany possessed a rational awareness of and identification with their common class interest as a minimum condition for saying in Marx's terms that in supporting the NSDAP they acted as representatives of their class. The argument being put forward here is that a number of social and political organizations of the middle class did exist.

The overriding argument on behalf of the relevance of the analysis of class relationships for understanding political action would in any case be, that analysis of the nature of a given class situation is essential for understanding political action even if a common class situation does not result in what may be termed class action (see Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.183-184).

What might be argued is that the structural causes and consequences of the class situation of some groups in society may be less transparent (see Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.184) reducing the ability to act overtly rational and in this sense one might for example accept defining the support of the NSDAP by small farmers as an irrational political act.

The aim of the following will be to consider whether Kornhauser can be said to have convincingly documented the claims made for the explanatory superiority in certain respects of the theory of mass society, over other kinds of the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of peasants with small holdings finds, therefore, its final expression in the executive powers subordinating parliament to itself, the state society to itself."
sociological analysis, as for example of class relationships.

The relationship of big business to fascism in Weimar and the third Reich is considered by Kornhauser in terms of direct support for the NSDAP.¹ He concludes, on the basis of the evidence considered:

"In general, it would appear that big businessmen were more opportunistic toward nazism than the other classes were, since they had the greater stake in preserving the existing economic order; at the same time, newer sections of big business, having less at stake than the old industrial families, rallied to Hitler's side once his ascendancy became apparent" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.201).

These 'newer' businesses mentioned turn out to be heavy industry, which was developed to a great extent under the aegis of the Prussian monarchy.

It would be difficult to argue that this sector of business lacked access to bureaucratic organization and power, they most obviously benefited from industrialization and bureaucratic organization. Nevertheless, they failed adequately to support the rules of the game of pluralist democracy. This was not, surely, because they were ruleless and normless, but because they had past experience of alternative forms of political and economic interaction that in particular in a situation of economic depression might appear to be more adequate for safeguarding their economic interests vis-à-vis both the state, the trades unions, the working class, and the middle class.

The role of small business in the rise of fascism, Kornhauser suggests, can best be understood with the aid of

¹ see Kornhauser, 1968, p.197-201. One might suggest that this relationship is more complex than may be seen from a consideration of 'who paid Hitler', a subject of considerable controversy.
the concepts of mass society analysis:

"Small business, on the other hand, increasingly is marginal in modern society and as a result has been more susceptible to mass movements. Small business is less and less assimilated into the world of rationalized enterprise, but it also cannot find security in a declining world of individual enterprise" (Kornhauser, 1968, p.202).

The old middle class of small businessmen and artisans may not have been closely connected with large scale organizations, however they were related through intermediary organizations such as parties and interest groups to national organizations and the state and in many instances also were organized in the peak - organizations of industry and trade, in which however, the large corporate enterprises were dominant (see Bendix, 1964, p.133).

Social and economic changes in Imperial and Weimar Germany can be said to have placed small businesses in disadvantageous class relationships both with respect to organized labour and monopoly capital. However, this does not amount to proving either that they were relatively normless or that their actions may not be understandable in terms of class conflict and status claims. A firm sense of one's class and status relationships does not ensure acceptance of pluralistic norms, on the contrary.

Political anti-semetism in 19th century Germany was to a large extent supported by people who found that their class and status relationships were being altered by capitalist industrialization (Pulzer, 1964, pp.41-50).

Gusfield suggests:

"To such 'doomed classes' (F. Neumann) the future looks far less inviting than the past. A radical reorganiza¬tion of society might be a solution to their problems but such a reorganization against political ascendant
forces is precisely what the moderating elements in the structure of political balance operate against" (Gusfield, 1962, p.25).

Kornhauser cites the study of Trow on small businessmen and support for McCarthyism (1958) as further evidence for his proposition that it is the more disattached from the dominant institutions in society who support mass movements. (Kornhauser, 1968, pp.205, 207).

In chapter 2 evidence was presented to the effect that the support of the small businessman for McCarthy may be meaningfully analysed in terms of class. In support of this position Gusfield may again be cited:

"Granting the rather dubious assumption that the small businessman has little place in the current constellation of political and ideological forces in the U.S.A., the picture of disaffection portrayed in Trow's study is a classic picture of a well-organized economic group losing out in the process of social and economic change. This type of disaffection is readily analysed in terms of class and status conflicts" (Gusfield, 1962, p.27).

Finally, data in a study on: 'Anomie, Comparisons between the Old and the New Middle Class' (Nelson, 1968) enables the author to conclude that:

"The data in effect suggests that the results in other research of pronounced alienation in the old middle class may be more a function of the ownership of capital than of marginal connections to the corporate economy. If anything the findings direct attention to a more economic interpretation than is usually emphasized by mass-society theorists" (Nelson, 1968, p.188).

The case of the small farmers in Weimar Germany has been analysed in terms of class relationships in chapter 2. Kornhauser (1968, p.208) suggests that it is as much their group isolation as their class position which makes them open to mass movements. Whilst the integrating and homogeneous nature of the local communities on the Geest in Schleswig-Holstein may account for the spread of support for the
NSDAP, it does not support a claim that small farmers were relatively more anomic than others, on the contrary, they were likely to possess well established norms with regard to the social order and their own place in it. It must be admitted that it has been difficult to apply the concepts of mass society, social disorganization and anomie. Whilst they may be useful in analysing individual experiences of social change, and may give a psychological explanation for why people join social movements, their usefulness would appear to be much more problematic with respect to the social and economic sources and origins of social movements.

In conclusion, it could be suggested that Kornhauser does not succeed in showing that middle class support for the NSDAP was given by the more anomic members of this class, in fact concepts of class, status, and community lie at the base of Kornhauser's own analysis; the proof of lack of social cohesion and integration consists only in saying that individuals are discontent with the perceived direction of changes in society and hence in certain instances support non-democratic movements. That this should amount to proof of the usefulness of the concept of mass society is a consequence of defining supporters of extremist movements as mass men (relatively), and of the assumption of a natural balance of interests, which does not allow for the fact that primary and secondary groups may not always have access to political influence or be willing to accept defeat that may

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1 Kornhauser analyses support by white collar people in terms of status, attention may be drawn to the previously cited discussion by Hans Speier on the relationship between the salaried employees, their status claims and National Socialism.
result from accepting the rules of the game. As witness:

"And yet, a mere ten years after the end of World War II, in one of the countries which suffered most from fascist repression - France - fascism re-emerged. What is more, many of those who used fascist symbols, expressed themselves in terms of fascist ideology, acknowledged Nazi Germany and fascist Italy as their spiritual forebears, in the years from 1956 to 1962, were the same men who had fought against fascist occupation during the World War. Bidault, hero of the anti-fascist Resistance in 1945, becomes leader of the OAS in 1962. It is quite impossible to explain such apparent paradoxes with a liberal perspective. The explanation can only lie in a concrete, conjunctural sociology of fascism" (Hoare, 1963, p.108-9).

The French-Algerians were represented in the French Parliament and society, but ... .

One is led to conclude with Gusfield:

"It is not true that attachment to intermediate structures ensures attachment to the larger national institutions and structures. As society undergoes change it is likely that specific groups will be adversely affected by economic or social change" (Gusfield, 1962, p.26). 1.

Heberle, in his study of Schleswig-Holstein had as one of his hypotheses that parties may change whilst economic interests of a class remain the same; that such a party might be a fascist party need not mean that groups supporting it are disintegrated socially. What ideological content alienation from the dominant political values may take would appear to be inexplicable on the basis of mass society theory and would necessitate an historical knowledge of the interrelationships between culture and social conflict.

1 one might mention Kornhauser's suggestion that in terms of discontinuities in society such as war and economic crisis, people may be particularly likely to engage in mass behaviour, i.e. support extremist movements; to this it could be suggested that the ascendancy of such movements may result from an inability of the balancing forces to deal adequately with the problems.
Essentially similar to Kornhauser's approach is that of Parsons, who regards fascism as an expression of a universal tendency in western industrialized societies, a fundamentalist reaction against the process of rationalization of society. For Parsons as for Kornhauser the problem lies in the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft type of social relationships, from mechanical to organic solidarity. This process has negative consequences for social cohesion and integration, for the equilibrium of society. Kornhauser's argument concerning the availability of the individual members of society for political mobilization is based on the relationship of the individual to primary and secondary groups representing him in society, whereas Parsons is directly concerned with the problem of normative integration, which is of course implicit in Kornhauser's analysis.

The rise of fascism is analysed by Parsons by considering the problems of normative integration that are general to the development of industrialized societies, in their interaction with the particular social structure of Weimar Germany and the consequences this particular constellation may be said to have had for parliamentary democracy.

Parsons discusses the particular way in which German social structure differs from the Anglo-Saxon "liberal-democratic type of societies" (Parsons, 1942, p.104). On the one hand he finds that Germany, with respect to its highly bureaucratized economy, its segregation of ownership from political authority and social status, is the country that most closely resembles the U.S.A. However, he suggests that it would be misleading on the basis of these similarities to draw the conclusion that societies with a capitalist economy
may become fascist in the right circumstances, as: "... a divergence of political orientation so fundamental as that at present developing between the fascist and liberal-democratic societies must go back to deeper structural sources than this view would indicate" (Parsons, 1942, p.106).

Parsons consequently describes more closely these structural sources of the failure of liberal democracy in the capitalist industrialized society of Weimar Germany.

The state, in Germany, Parsons suggests, may be distinguished by its "interdependent 'feudal', militaristic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian features" (p.106), as compared with the state in England and the U.S.A. Parsons describes the position of the Prussian junkers as a ruling class with respect to the local population. Its social status was emphasized by its claim, at least earlier, on the ranks of officers in the military in Prussia. The military in the monarchist state of Prussia was under the direct control of the monarch and continued to remain so after the unification of the German Reich.

As the particular relationship between the nobility and the state and monarchy was a development which took place prior to industrialization in Prussia, so Parsons finds that the civilian bureaucracy has developed independently of industrialization and "has constituted for Prussia in particular the highest prestige elements in the bourgeoisie" (p.108). Parsons writes:

"These two elements, which were most clearly involved in power and responsibility in the structure of the old German state were for the most part integrated together by the ideology which is perhaps best called 'Prussian conservatism'. It might be characterized as a combination of a particular type of authoritarianism with a highly developed formal legalism" (Parsons, 1942, p.109).
The nobility and the bureaucracy, along with the monarchy limited the development of parliamentary democracy in Germany and

"The fact that a modern industrial economy developed in Germany in a society already to a large extent structured about the Prussian state and in the context of the pervasive configurational patterns of Prussian conservatism, undoubtedly coloured the total development in many different respects" (Parsons, 1942, p.119).

This may have resulted in limitations on the development of economic individualism as Parsons suggests, and greater direct state participation in the economy and industrialization.

Prussian conservatism and the formalisation of social relationships as an expression of the relationship between status and power in the state led to a tendency to fundamentalism and romanticism in German thinking.

Parsons suggests that whilst for the understanding of National Socialism in Germany class conflict and the threat of communist takeover as well as the difficult economic circumstances and feelings of national humiliation must be taken into account, it must be considered that:

"... it (the National Socialist Movement) constitutes a mobilisation of the extremely deep-seated romantic tendencies of German society ..., incorporating a 'fundamentalist' revolt against the whole tendency of rationalization in the Western world, and at the same time against its deepest institutional foundations" (Parsons, 1942, p.123).

It would thus appear that a major key to the understanding of the breakdown of democratic institutions in Weimar Germany, according to Parsons, is to be found in the value patterns arising or inherent in the modernization of societies in the process of industrial capitalist development, that is, in what may be called the process of the rationalization of
social relationships.

However, it would also appear that to Parsons the process of rationalization pertains more to industrialization than to the development of the capitalist mode of economic exchange. This is a legitimate distinction, but it might be borne in mind that for Max Weber the process of rationalization characterized as much the growth of capitalism as of industrialism in Western societies, indeed the two were interrelated in their development.

Parsons' emphasis on the normative consequences of the process of industrialization, one might suggest, has direct consequences for his analysis of fascism in that he conducts his analysis on such a high level of generalization that it would appear to have little explanatory capacity when applied to the concrete instance of social structure and democracy in Weimar Germany.

On the one hand Parsons makes use of assumptions concerning the consequences of social change (as represented by the process of industrialization) for the normative integration of the social system in order to analyse the causes of fascism, whilst on the other hand he connects this analysis of the structural sources of value patterns with an analysis of particular aspects of the German social structure, as described above. Here he would seem to conduct his analysis on two conceptual levels, on the level of social integration and on the level of social change. He speaks of "the interdependent 'feudal', militaristic, bureaucratic and authoritarian features of the state" and the integrating and legitimating values of authority relationships, i.e. of the integrating ideology of Prussian conservatism, but Parsons also
relates these specific features of the German state to an analysis of social change where he utilizes the concepts of class, and it could be argued, assumptions also of class conflict and of the role of the state in the economy. In this context of a brief discussion of class relationships and the role of the state in the economy, and the consequences of these for the development of parliamentary democracy and its attendant values, Parsons' notion of Prussian conservatism acquires some meaning. However, the main purpose of Parsons' argument would appear to be the presentation of the value-pattern of Prussian conservatism rather than relating its changing role to class conflict and changes in the economic and social order.

In the Kaiserreich Parsons would have to argue that Prussian conservatism was not unsuccessful in integrating state and society; such a statement is, however, totally unsatisfactory, as it leaves out considerations of differences in power and assumes a consensus on values as the natural order of things. This situation was manifestly not present in the Kaiserreich, but it points to the weakness of concentration on value patterns and social integration, because if Prussian conservatism and the formalisation of social relationships supported in Germany the general tendency in industriaist-capitalist society to fundamentalism and romanticism, why then did fascism not occur during the Empire, but in Weimar Germany?

According to Parsons social change leads to social disorganization and feelings of insecurity, i.e. anomie, with the consequent availability of individuals for mobilization. However, rationalization has one other divisive effect on
it tends to divide elements of the population according to whether they tend toward what are, in rationalistic terms, the more 'progressive' or 'emancipated' values of patterns of conduct, or the more conservative 'backward', or traditional patterns" (Parsons, 1942, p.118).

Parsons describes in some detail the development of "the polar attitude patterns", that is, "patterns of wishes and idealized hopes which, in the majority of cases, the established institutional patterns and their attendant situations do not permit to be fully realized" (Parsons, 1942, p.120), and suggests that in Germany the formalized nature of social institutions emphasized the tendency to romanticism as the conservative value patterns also did; thus we must conclude that the impact of industrialization could have such severe and unsettling consequences in Germany. Parsons explains that this pattern of reaction to industrialization is common in the Western world but that National Socialism should be able to structure itself around this fundamentalist pattern of values must be understood in terms of (the) "factors distinctive to the social structure of Germany, in dynamic interrelation with the general processes of social development in Western civilization" (Parsons, 1942, p.123).

Consequently National Socialism is defined as a fundamentalist movement, which arises as a protest against rationalization common to all Western societies, and was successful in Germany due to her particular social structure. That is, for the understanding of fascism in Germany, Parsons suggests the one essential difference of 'Prussian conservative' values, and less clearly emphasizes their supporting social groups of junkers, state bureaucrats and officers, the consequences of this aspect of social structure for
democracy. More or less in parentheses he mentions the role of class conflict and international economic relationships, but does not attempt to connect this with the role of 'Prussian values'.

It would appear that although Parsons explains well the development of fundamentalist values, he does not indicate with respect to which social groups this development could be of particular relevance. To do so, it may be suggested, it would be necessary to take account of class and status relationships, as is done by Pulzer (1964) when he describes in detail the spread of anti-semetism in Imperial Germany among the middle class of small traders, artisans, etc., and the relationship of this 'normative development' to Prussian conservatism and the political and economic predominance of the state (see Pulzer, 1964).

Parsons stresses the importance of a formalized status order and the resultant emotional 'innerlichkeit'; but it is difficult to assess what relevance such values may have had on the psychological level of the private individual and even more so with respect to social structure and interaction. Parsons may point to the predominance of the state, Prussian conservative values and the formalization of status as the sources of the acceptance of relationships of authority in many different institutions in society, but the positive relevance of this for the success of fascism is far from self-evident; it may have been directly detrimental. The importance of status considerations by themselves explain little, but must be understood in the light of concrete changes in social and economic relations of status groups to understand the relevance of status for political action.
German society, Parsons postulates, was polarized in left and right romantic attitude patterns; one would venture to suggest that this is rather an overstatement, at any rate no satisfactory explanation is given of why it was not the left romanticist reaction to rationalization that carried the day, or why democracy did not persist, except for the feature of Prussian conservatism.

Parsons' analysis of industrialization is so general as to make the role of this value pattern with respect to the German social structure and its relationship to parliamentary democracy not easily understandable.

The carriers of National Socialist 'value patterns' were only to a limited extent the feudal elements in Weimar Germany, in fact, in this respect, the argument of anomie would appear to fall short, as the Prussian conservatives, if nothing else, had a clear set of nationalist authoritarian values through which to relate themselves to the Weimar Republic. It would appear that at least one must ask, as Dahrendorf does:


Economic interaction and conflict remain as extraneous factors in Parsons' explanation, though it is suggested that they 'tipped' (p.116) the balance of forces; yet it must have been through comparative analysis of the relationship

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1 "The question is rather: Which groups, strata, and classes were placed in such a way in German society, that the values in question met their interests?"
between social structure and the development of capitalism that Parsons is able to single out the importance of the monarchist state, both with respect to the relationship between status, and authority and with respect to the development of the capitalist industrial economy. Parsons points out that economic individualism was not so prominent in Imperial Germany as in Imperial Britain for example. It is commonly suggested that the German industrializing bourgeoisie did not become the most important class by successfully challenging the authority of the crown and the position of the nobility. Though parliamentary representation became fully developed in Imperial Germany, the powers of parliament were severely limited in particular with respect to the executive powers of the state. ¹

As Parsons is concerned with relating the social structure of Weimar Germany to democracy it may be acceptable with respect to Imperial Germany to describe the categories of social structure without considering even at a general level economic conflict and development. However, to analyse the particular development of industrial capitalism in Germany it would appear insufficient to argue that in Prussia authority was centered around the monarchist state and nobility, enabling the state to take an initiating role in industrialization, and that this had consequences for the development of economic individualism and Prussian conservatism and nationalism.

These developments must also be analysed in the light of the fact that Germany was a latecomer to industrialization

¹ see Conze, in Morsey, 1960, p.10.
(Veblen, 1939) and that economic policies and initiatives of the state were not merely expressions of dynastic interest but must be seen in relation to internal class conflicts and international competition. For example, the tariff policy was both a concession to the landed nobility as well as a protective measure for the development of industry and the home market.¹

It has been suggested that liberal economics "pervaded the entire economic policy in the era of the creation of the Reich" (Stolper, 1940, p.68). The return to more mercantilist economic policies by the state cannot be explained on the basis of the social structure alone. The important role of the German state in the economy can finally be argued to have been directly beneficial for the development of an industrialized economy.

When Parsons gets down to discussing the concrete relationships between social structure and value patterns, it is impressive to see how he utilizes concepts of status, class and class conflict. (See Parsons, 1942, p.116). With respect to political development in Weimar Germany Parsons states:

"Then the one important thing would seem to have been the removal from power of the 'feudal' elements of the old regime, and end for which for all practical purposes was achieved with the revolution of 1918. The question is why did this solution fail to stick, why did not Germany continue in what many have thought to be the main line of the evolution of Western society, the progressive approach to the realization of 'liberal-democratic' patterns and values?" (Parsons, 1942, p.116).

On the basis of Parsons' own analysis the answers to

¹ see Veblen, 1939, p.214.
this must nevertheless be found in the continued relevance of Prussian conservative values for the interpretation of conflict in society. But how are we to understand this? 
merely that in a situation where liberal democratic institutions and values were faced with disaffection in the form of a fundamentalist expression and in the form of a radical left-wing expression, arising out of rationalization, the presence of a conservative tradition favoured the former?

In the German Empire, a fundamentalist reaction to industrialization as symbolized in anti-liberalism and anti-capitalism could be argued to have gained expression for example in Stocker's Christian Social Movement, and in pressure groups such as Der Bund der Landwirte (the Agricultural League), which managed to secure a certain amount of support for tariff policy and 'Prussian conservatism' among the independent peasants of West Germany.

Pulzer describes how anti-semetism became dispersed into the conservative and liberal parties and was utilized in the interest of the policies of the state and upper class against social democracy.

However, National Socialism, according to Parsons is more than a nationalist anti-semetic movement centering around the monarchist state because it removes Germany from "the general sphere of Western civilization". It remains to be explained why nationalist conservatives in Weimar should join forces with an extremist nationalist movement and why the liberal and social democratic majority of the 1919 election did not last.

Parsons explains well how conservative anti-semitism can develop into national socialist anti-semitism, but the
suggestion might be made that the basis for its appeal must be sought in class and status relationships, that problems of economic class conflict must be integrated into the argument of social structure to make the role of a feudal conservative tradition in economic and political conflict understandable, as for example Parsons himself does when he suggests that the class basis of the bureaucracy was the bourgeoisie.

If the feudal claim to power was losing ground in Weimar German society and the analysis of fascism is still going to emphasize the role of feudal values and status groups in an advanced capitalist society it is necessary to connect status claims to authority and privilege with those of class and conflict over power. In a monopoly capitalist economic system though there might well be differences of interest between and among agrarian and industrial interests; it could well be to the advantage of both groups to structure the access to power in terms of the values of an authoritarian conservative state rather than those of a state based on parliamentary democracy. The agricultural crisis of 1928-29, which hit severely the large estates of north and northeastern Germany was an economic crisis for the junkers and their tenant peasants, but neither found the Republic to be serving and safeguarding their interests.

This kind of explanation may indicate some of the reasons why landed and industrial upper classes may not continue to accept or tolerate parliamentary democracy, but not, of course, why fascism is the outcome.
The discussion of Lipset's analysis of fascism and the middle class led to the suggestion that even if this relationship was established, it would not in itself explain the final rise to power of the NSDAP.

In the chapter which followed, it was found that Kornhauser's theory of mass society did not appear to complement substantially class and status analysis of the support for the NSDAP, though it must be emphasized that it was found difficult to evaluate Kornhauser's application of the concepts of social disintegration and political action.

Both Parsons and Dahrendorf attempt to analyse fascism in terms of social structure and its relationship to parliamentary democracy. Whilst Parsons regards fascism as an expression of a universal tendency in Western industrialized societies, a fundamentalist reaction against the process of rationalization in society resulting in anomie, he explains its success in Weimar Germany on the basis of the particular German social structure and its relationship to democracy. Dahrendorf specifically limits the consideration of fascism to the particular instance of German social structure and democracy, and in contrast to Parsons he regards the natural condition of society to be one of conflict and change and not one of equilibrium in the institutional structure.

In contrast to Parsons, Dahrendorf finds that to analyse why fascism occurred in Germany, it is necessary to con-
centrate on the particular relationship of democracy to social structure in Germany, i.e.:

"Das Problem der deutschen Demokratie ist eben nicht ein allgemeines Problem der Sozialstruktur industrial- ler Gesellschaften, sondern zunächst eines der beson- deren Bedingungen der deutschen Gesellschaft bis 1933 - und vielleicht bis heute." (Dahrendorf, 1960, p.88) 1.

He finds that Parsons' analysis of fascism in terms of the general concepts of the process of industrialization and anomie makes the mistake of over-generalization, (Irrtum der Verallgemeinerung). However, Lipset's analysis of fascism and the middle class also commits the mistake of over-generalization as this analysis too is undertaken on the basis of common characteristics of modern societies (allgemeinen merk- malen moderner Gesellschaften).

As Dahrendorf rightly observes, both approaches leave open the question of why fascism was successful only in Germany (and Italy) and not elsewhere.

On the other hand particularistic explanations are equally mistaken (Irrtum der Besonderung), as for example explanations based on the constitutional weaknesses of Weimar Germany, on inflation, on depression, etc. These factors have played a role, but they were also present to varying degrees in countries that did not become fascist.

In contradistinction to all these approaches Dahrendorf sets out to conduct his analysis in terms of the particular development of social and political relationships in Imperial

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1 "The problem of German democracy is not a general problem of the social structure of industrial societies, but rather the problem of the particular conditions of German society up to 1933 - and perhaps up to today."
With respect to the middle class Dahrendorf finds that it is a commonplace with which he agrees to suggest that the middle class in Weimar Germany became the carrier of National Socialism. However, he argues that it leaves the question of why the middle class in England did not become anti-democratic unanswered. To understand this, the particular relationship of the German middle class to the state in the process of industrialization must be analysed.

Germany did not fully experience the development of an industrializing middle class into the major class in society, the bourgeoisie, in conflict with the authoritarian state and the aristocracy, which in this process would have been the exponent of both political and economic liberalism. Rather the industrializing middle class stabilized its political position inside the old ruling class.

Dahrendorf accounts for the development of a new middle class partly of self-employed and partly of salaried employees (Angestellten und Beamten) below the bourgeoisie in all Western societies. In the 20th century this new middle class, according to Dahrendorf, in particular the independent sector, was no longer so much interested in economic expansion as in protecting its livelihood. Consequently Dahrendorf finds that the economic interests of the middle class were no longer served by a liberalistic economic and political system, as it needed state protection. (See Dahrendorf, p.93).

calling the middle class new overlooks the historical continuity of a class of small traders, industrialists, artisans, and peasants.
Rather in parentheses, one might suggest, Dahrendorf indicates the nature of the interrelationship between changes in the social and political spheres when he says:


Dahrendorf here touches on the development of monopoly capitalism and its consequences, for the social structure and the middle class in particular. He touches on the possibility of divergent economic and political interests between large companies and small independent businesses and on the differences in power between organized labour and the middle class, organized labour and large scale capital being both ideological and immediate economic threats.

However, the relationship between the dynamics of economic development and the social and political institutions remain on the fringes of the argument as Dahrendorf concentrates on social structure and democracy.

The main contribution of Dahrendorf's analysis lies in his suggestion that the ideological change of the 20th century middle class (vis-a-vis the state) need not have had antidemocratic consequences. That it was the case in Germany must be understood on the basis of the particular development of the German social structure. The predominant role of the state in industrialization and in the economy, limiting the

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1 "In this dual fight, in the economic and political fight against large scale capital and in the ideological fight against the working class (Geiger, 1949, p.14), the new middle class developed the dominant ideology of our time ..."
independent social and political position of the bourgeoisie resulted in their adoption of the values of the conservative and feudal upper class¹ (see Dahrendorf, 1960, p.94).

The fact that the ruling class (Oberschicht) was structured around the pre-industrial state and bureaucracy and the fact of the primacy of the state itself can be understood as the cause of:

"Die oft zitierte patriarchalisch-authoritäre Struktur der deutschen Familie, die paternalistisch-militärische Organisation deutscher Betriebe, die bürokratische Formalisierung der sozialen Statusheirarchie, die Staatsglaubigkeit insbesondere auch der deutschen Linksparteien, der fehlende Liberalismus sowohl im politischen und ökonomischen Denken als auch in der politischen Wirklichkeit ..." (Dahrendorf, 1960, p.94) ².

According to Dahrendorf, the values and to a certain extent the personnel of the feudal upper class persisted after World War I and the foundation of the Republic in dominating the leading groups in industry and finance as well as the state bureaucracy and the military.

Dahrendorf suggests that:

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¹ It could be suggested that the relationship between industrialists, junkers, and monarchist bureaucracy was not without conflicts, the solution of which influenced the particular political development of Prussian conservatism. It may also be questioned as to how wholesale was the adoption by business of the values of the authoritarian state to the exclusion of a state based on parliamentary democracy. For a discussion of this question see Neumann, 1966, p.3-8.

² "The often cited patriarchal authoritarian structure of the German family, the paternalistic militaristic organization of German business, the bureaucratic formalization of the social status hierarchy, the belief in the state also of the German parties of the left, the weakness of liberalism both in political and economic ideas as in political reality."
"Erst vor diesem Hintergrund konnte das Ressentiments des 'neuen Mittelstandes' zu dem Resultat führen, das es in Deutschland hatte." (Dahrendorf, 1960, p.95).

Essential for the success of National Socialism was the development of conservative Rechtsextremismus simultanenous with der Extremismus der Mitte, which in the situation of economic crisis co-operated. That is, in Parsons' terminology, the overdetermined fundamentalist values, in conjunction with Prussian conservatism had superceded the values of liberal democracy (and it might also be suggested of social democracy and communism).

Whilst Dahrendorf analyses the social structure in Germany with concepts familiar to those used by Parsons, indeed he specifically acknowledges his indebtedness to Parsons' analysis, his analysis has certain obvious advantages over that of Parsons in that Dahrendorf brings out the assumption on which his analysis is constructed, namely the independent middle class as the supporter in effect of liberal and democratic values, as an ideal type with which to analyse the singularities of the German social structure. This position enables him much more clearly than Parsons to relate the continued existence of Prussian conservative values to a concrete class, the interrelated Oberschicht of industrial, landed conservative, military and bureaucratic upper classes. Furthermore Dahrendorf does not leave National So-

1 "First on this background could the resentment of 'the new middle class' lead to the result it did in Germany."

2 "Right-wing extremism simultanenous with extremism of the center." Dahrendorf has adopted the concepts of extremism Right, Left, and Center from Lipset (1964).
cialism floating freely around, but singles out the new middle class as the most important group in the German population to have supported it. He also indicates the nature of the analysis one might adopt to understand why the middle class supported the NSDAP, though he makes little mention of the role of the peasantry and the more traditional middle class in the political conflicts of Weimar, it may also be suggested that the role of the Junkers as a class could be considered with advantage.

However, though it may be explained why the middle class in Weimar Germany would be interested in a strong state to protect its economic and social position in society, it would not seem to be explained why fascism became a solution. By analysing the social nature of the upper class and its political patterns it may be explained how fascism could occur but not why it did.

In particular, to understand why the upper class, or at least parts of it supported fascism, or rather failed to support parliamentary democracy, it would appear necessary to consider the nature of class conflict and the structure of the economy to be able to understand how an economic crisis of international dimensions could have such far-reaching political and social consequences.

Dahrendorf does, however, consider the relationship of the development of capitalism to democracy, in fact he appears to be developing a theory of social change with respect to the relationship between state and economy and the consequent chances for democracy.

One might venture to suggest that on the basis of historical knowledge of the concurrent development of democracy
and competitive capitalism he formulates his theory of the relationship between capitalism and democracy when he says:


The development of the economic system towards monopoly capitalism, Dahrendorf finds, constitutes a threat to the democratic system of political competition, but even the values of monopoly capitalism are closer to those of democracy than, for example, those of a state claiming to represent the interests of the whole community.

Both with respect to the development of competitive capitalism and to the dominant institutional values in society did Germany differ from Great Britain with adverse consequences for parliamentary democracy.

Dahrendorf finds that the industrial economy in Germany to a great extent began at the stage of monopoly capitalism, and that in this development the state took a direct part, a state that was still largely in the hands of the pre-capitalist upper-class and status group; furthermore the state in Germany, according to Dahrendorf, embodied the moral Idea

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1 "As with the relationship between the middle class and democracy so was also the relationship between capitalism and democracy subjected to historical change. In the beginnings of the capitalist system of production, as the ideology of competition, the independence of the small and medium-sized enterprises and employers, and the regulating force of the market still corresponded to reality, capitalism could advance the accomplishment of the democratic form of authority."
itself (die sittliche Idee) and represented ultimate justice, i.e. the state had metaphysical qualities or at least, Dahrendorf would seem to be suggesting that in Germany the dominant theory of the state was metaphysical. In the Weimar Republic the traditional upper class succeeded in keeping for itself the major institution of the state (it might be suggested with the exception of parliament), either personally or through the spread of their values.

The existence of this structural relationship Dahrendorf appears to be suggesting explains why parliamentary democracy was not established as a legitimate form of government among the upper class, he writes:


In contradistinction to Parsons the values on the basis of which Dahrendorf analyses the relationship between state and social structure in Germany are quite explicit, in particular when he discusses the relationship of the Left to the state and in his discussion of the utopian versus the rational approach to the relationship between the state and social conflict. (See Dahrendorf, 1960, p.102-3 in particular).

Whereas it would be going too far to interpret Dahrendorf as holding the theory that monopoly capitalism arises out of state interference in the economy of competitive cap-

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1 "The democratic method (form of government) with inbuilt possibilities of changes in positions of power must always appear as a threat for a strata, which has gained a monopoly of state."
talism, he is saying that Germany started off as an industrializing nation to some extent already at the stage of private and state monopoly capitalism. It follows from this argument that Dahrendorf in effect is postulating that had the German state been less directly involved in industrializing the German economy, German capitalism too would have gone through a period of liberal competitive capitalism with the well-known beneficial effect for the position of the bourgeoisie in relation to the aristocracy and crown, and on the mode of access to power.

It has been suggested that:

"The German captains of industry who came to take the discretionary management in the new era were fortunate enough not to have matriculated from the training school of a country town based on a retail business in speculative real estate and political jobbery managed under the rule of 'prehension, division and silence'" (Veblen, 1939, p.193).

Veblen is suggesting that there were certain advantages for the development of the economy in not being too encumbered by notions of liberalism either in economics or in politics.

On the other hand it is important not to overstress the lack of liberal norms either with respect to the economy or the state, especially prior to the unification of Germany.

Veblen points out the fact that Germany was a latecomer to industrialization, with the advantages for rapid expansion and the consequences for the structure of the economy as well as the social structure which this would entail, as is so well described by Dahrendorf himself.

However, the fact that Germany was a latecomer to industrialization suggests that with respect to international economic relationships, state action would be necessary to
protect and develop her own economy, and, developing this suggestion even further, even if viewed in isolation from international competition between national economies, the development of an industrialist capitalist economy requires a certain amount of state interference to provide the economic and legal calculability and stable expectation which appeared to be required by a capitalist mode of production.

Whilst Dahrendorf points out that the development of monopoly capitalism may be a threat to democracy, he, as already mentioned, appears to think that the consequences of monopoly capitalism in Germany were particularly severe due to the large measure of state initiative with development. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that perhaps competitive capitalism has inherent tendencies to develop into monopoly capitalism, if uneven with respect to different sectors of the economy, quite independent of state actions; on the other hand state action is important in this process such as providing legislation concerning limited liability, etc. Monopoly capitalism by itself is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of fascism: it existed in the 1930's in Great Britain and in the Kaiserreich, nor is Dahrendorf suggesting this, of course.

However, Dahrendorf's emphasis on the particularities of the social structure in Germany may be elaborated in connection with Veblen's suggestion that Germany was a latecomer to industrialization. It may be fruitful to turn to Barrington-Moore's discussion of what he calls 'Modernisation from Above and Fascism' (Barrington-Moore, 1967, p.433-53).

As Veblen suggests, Germany was a latecomer to indu-
trialization in the 19th century, Moore suggests that in
the 16th century important developments took place with re-
pect to the rural economy and social structure, in the east
a capitalist production of grain developed tying the peasants
economically and politically to the large estates and to their
owners, the Junker aristocracy. In west Germany a local market
production developed on the basis of small holding peasants.
These two main aspects of German economic and social struc-
ture proposed by Veblen and Barrington-Moore may be said
superficially speaking to contain the clue to the nature of
the relationship between state and society in the Empire and
some of the consequences this relationship may have had for
parliamentary democracy.

The relationship between the Junkers and the state-
crown, army and bureaucracy was touched upon in the chapter
on Parsons. The industrializing middle class was dependent on
the state in Germany for creating conditions of free trade,
etc. and this factor may have been one reason for not chal-
lenging seriously the authority of crown and nobility.
Following Veblen the fact that Germany was a latecomer to
industrialization had consequences both for the nature of
her industry, in the direction of heavy industry and large
plants for example, and for the involvement of the state in
the industrialization process. These benefits to the bour-
geoisie derived from the involvement of the state in industrila-
ization may obviously have facilitated the acceptance of the
aims of the monarchist state by the bourgeoisie or sections
of it.

Barrington-Moore writes:
"At a later stage in the course of modernization, a new and crucial factor is likely to appear in the form of a rough working coalition between influential sectors of the landed upper classes and the emerging commercial and manufacturing interests." (Barrington-Moore, 1967, p.436).

Heightened international competition and the depression of the 1870s led to demands for increased protective tariffs for industry, and coinciding with the influx of cheap American grain this led to the marriage between iron and rye of school test-book fame. For the large agriculturalists the price of grain was a question of their continued existence as a class. Barrington-Moore writes:

"In the context of a reactionary coalition, such competition intensifies authoritarian and reactionary trends among a landed upper class that finds its economic basis sinking and therefore turns to political levers to preserve its rule." (Barrington-Moore, 1967, p.437).

Barrington-Moore suggests that the interests of the parties to the coalition did not always coincide, amongst other things the process of industrialization removes manpower from agriculture; he suggests that militarism and the interests of the nation state "united the upper class" (p.442).

Protective tariffs on agricultural products were essential for the maintenance of the position of the junkers in society, in a situation where it might well have been more advantageous for the peasants to change to dairy farming as for example was the case with the Danish peasants faced with the same competition from American grain. The introduction of tariffs was self-reinforcing with respect to demands for more and more protection, gaining its final expression in the direct role of the junkers in the fall of the last Brüning cabinet.
The peasants in particular in west Germany would clearly have benefitted from a different development. Barrington-Moore writes:

"In Germany the effort to establish a massive conservative base in the countryside long antedates the Nazis. As Professor Alexander Gerschenkron points out, the basic elements of Nazi doctrine appear quite distinctly in the Junkers' generally successful efforts, by means of the Agrarian League established in 1894, to win the support of the peasants in non-junker areas of smaller farms." (Barrington-Moore, 1967, p. 448).

The appeal of the Stöcker movement as an instance of anti-capitalism may be cited as supportive of this statement. Furthermore Neumann describes the limited efforts of the political parties of the left to make an alliance between peasants and workers (see Neumann, 1966, p. 3-33) which may go some way towards explaining why the peasants would support nationalist and national socialist parties.¹

Dahrendorf's main points with respect to the relationship between the particular nature of German capitalism and democracy are however: 1) the presence of a pre-capitalistic upper class, or an upper class that has adopted certain pre-capitalistic political values, which regards itself as having a particular claim on the exercise of state authority and 2) a theory of state which renders the state certain metaphysical qualities.

The first point is clearly important because of the obvious consequences for parliamentary democracy. When Dahrendorf speaks of the particular status of the state in German

¹ For a discussion of the difficulties experienced by the farmers in Germany as a result of industrialization and capitalist expansion see e.g. Schoenbaum, 1967, chapters 1, 2, and 5.
society it is not quite clear whether he is speaking of certain institutions of the state such as the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the military, as well as parliament.

With respect to the executive branches of the state, the fact that at least the leading personnel had a common social, and educational background, (on the evidence of many writers on the state in Weimar and Imperial Germany) with those of the landed and industrial upper classes could be a safeguard on the abuse of power by parliamentary democracy as seen from the point of view of the interests of the upper classes. This factor, coupled with the expertise of modern government bureaucracies may also have led to the circumvention of the decisions of parliament.

Neumann writes:

"Efficient and incorruptible in the ordinary sense, the ministerial bureaucracy was the centre of every antidemocratic movement in the Weimar Republic". (Neumann, 1966, p.320).

Neumann details how the judiciary in Weimar Germany administered justice to the advantage of the enemies of the republic and parliamentary democracy (pp.20-24), and furthermore he argues that the decline in the power of parliament in Weimar Germany was particularly severe because of: "the monarchist nationalist tradition of the bureaucracy."

Political differences in Weimar were marked, making the formation of workable cabinets increasingly difficult, and this, in conjunction with the role of the state in the economy, according to Neumann, tended to favour bureaucracy over parliament.

It is in this connection that Dahrendorf's stress on both the acceptance of the state's executive institutions as
standing above political differences and the social and ideological background of the administrative personnel acquires relevance. Weimar Germany experienced: "... the decline of parliamentary democracy (bringing in) the practice of delegated legislation, and the virtual immunity of the budget and administration from parliamentary control." (Neumann, 1966, p.370. See also pp.24-28). However, the critical relevance for democracy of the decline in power of parliament to the advantage of the bureaucracy must be seen in the light of class conflict and class interests.¹

With this Dahrendorf would probably not disagree though he does not say so clearly. Instead he turns to the theory of state, and proposes the rational attitude (die rationale Haltung) for the solution of social conflict (Dahrendorf, 1960, p.102), as cited above.

Dahrendorf may find this approach to conflict solution to be rational because with respect to the solution of political conflict it is similar in many ways to the classical liberal definition of economic conflict. As Dahrendorf found that competitive capitalism was apparently necessary for the emergence of a middle class that could become the supporter of democracy, so would he appear to find that the relationship of the state to society in order to safeguard democracy must be of a kind similar to competitive capitalism. One may suggest that on Dahrendorf's own terms this necessitates the dominant position of the middle class in society, which in view of the relationship of the middle class to fascism sounds rather ironical.

¹ See Neumann, 1966, pp.27-33.
It may also be suggested that Dahrendorf's definition of the relationship between state and society shows a certain tendency to explain away the state, both the problem of sovereignty and of bureaucracy, through a notion of pluralistic competition for the votes of electors (Interessenkonkurrenz). Relationships of authority are perhaps not irrelevant to, or absent from democracy.

Even the acceptance of the state or Obrigkeit as administering some kind of impartial justice need not be detrimental for democracy. Such attitudes to authority have not been confined to Germany. In the Scandinavian countries similar attitudes have been, and are present in large measure. In Dahrendorf's terms of social structure and democracy there were, however, important differences compared with Germany. In Denmark for example, parliamentary democracy was established on the backs of a modernising peasantry.¹

Dahrendorf's approach to the solution of conflict would barely appear to consider the extent to which state intervention may be needed to solve conflict between the major interest groups under conditions of developed capitalism, between labour and business, for example. Dahrendorf mentions as one consequence of the role of the state in the economy that it acted as arbiter in industrial disputes, even to the extent of settling them by legislation, and of providing legislation for the conduct of industrial relations. This position in itself is, however, not unique for Weimar Germany.

¹ Barrington-Moore's analysis of the role of the peasantry in the development of parliamentary democracy may be brought to mind.
Whether or not this may lead to fascism is not certain. In Germany the trades unions and social democracy had a large stake in the state in the Weimar Republic, trades unions were recognized and achieved the establishment of collective bargaining, social democracy promoted social welfare legislation and both aspects strengthened the position of large enterprises as they were more able to carry the expenses connected with higher wages and social legislation than was small business. The inflation in the early twenties enabled further concentration of business which through various representative bodies aimed to influence the state. Social democracy was not clearly opposed to monopolisation, and again the independent middle class got squashed.

However, parliamentary democracy had enabled the trades unions and social democracy to gain certain rights and constituted a potential threat to the position of big business and security of profits. Under adverse conditions business may despair that the nature of state action possible under parliamentary democracy will be adequate for the safeguarding of their interests, as is described for the depression in Weimar Germany by Sweezy (1942, pp.84-96), and may then resort to the use of fascist movements; the extent to which this will happen may then possibly be related to the strength of undemocratic values in the upper class.
"Political sociologists now agree that the state is just one of many political institutions, and that political institutions are only one of many clusters of social institutions; that the relationships among these institutions and clusters of institutions is the subject of sociology in general, and that the relationship between political and other institutions is the special province of a sociology of politics" (Lipset, 1964, p.23).

Whilst one may agree with the definition of political sociology as being: "the relationship between political and other institutions" it does not follow that one need agree with the definition of the nature of political institutions and the state in particular.

Lipset can be interpreted as arguing that what in effect underlies the distinction of former times between state and society as two independent structures is a concern with "the proper balance between conflict and consensus" (Lipset, 1964, p.24).

Such a position would appear to rest on the assumption that the concept of balance between conflicting groups is meaningful. That is, whereas conflict will exist among the different groups in society, there is a natural tendency towards consensus, perhaps with respect to certain overriding integrating values or at least with respect to the mutual advantages of accepting certain rules for solving social conflict. The ultimate consequence of this argument is to regard political institutions as epiphenomena of social structure.

In contradistinction to this position, it has been
argued:

"Men may be guided not only by considerations of utility and affinity, but also by a belief in the existence of a legitimate order of authority. In this way Weber wishes to distinguish between social relations (such as the supply and demand relations on a market) that are maintained by the reciprocity of expectations, and others that are maintained through orientation toward an exercise of authority. The latter orientation typically involves a belief in the existence of a legitimate order. Identifiable persons maintain that order through the exercise of authority.... Certainly, such individuals are involved in social relations and affected by the affinities of interest that characterize these relations. But however pervasive, these involvements will not fully account for the actions constituting the exercise of authority. That exercise requires some element of neutrality, though admittedly such disengagement of the persons in authority is a matter of degree and may become quite nominal. My thesis is that from an analytical standpoint, authority and association constitute interdependent but autonomous spheres of thought and action which coexist in one form or another in all societies. These general considerations provide the basis for formulating the recurrent issues of legitimation involved in the exercise of private and public authority" (Bendix, 1964, p.16-17).

That is, the relationship between the state and society concerns also the acceptance and rejection of authority as legitimate both with respect to the willingness and ability of individuals and social groups to comply with, and the willingness and ability of the state to exercise, authority with respect to the public at large and any particular groups within the public.

Sweezy (1942, pp.239-252), in opposition to what he calls

"modern liberal theorists' (tendency) to interpret the state as an institution established in the interests of society as a whole for the purpose of mediating and reconciling the antagonisms to which social existence inevitably give rise" (p.240)

proposes that the primary function of the state is to defend the social domination of the dominant class or classes in society.
In so far as Sweezy would appear to consider the primary role of the state to be that of upholding a particular social order, it follows that the distinguishing relationships engaged in by the functionaries of the state are relationships of authority necessary not merely for mediating in social conflict but for maintaining that order. Hence within that overriding limitation the state may be said to act autonomously with respect to any particular group interests in society at the time, but ultimately, though Sweezy is not fully unambiguous, the state has no autonomy.

Consequently, the problem of the belief in and acceptance of a political order as legitimate can have no independent significance in the relationship between social groups and the state. Though of course, the state may be concerned with legitimating the existing class order.

Major political developments in this view are explainable on the basis of an interpretation and an analysis of the mode of economic reproduction and the relationship of different classes to the means of production; political ideas and decisions play an insignificant role in comparison in influencing political development.

Sweezy maintains: 1) that the state arose out of class conflicts, and 2) that throughout the subsequent history of class societies the nature of the relationship to society has been the exercise of authority over the population as a whole for the protection of private property in the interest of the property owning classes.

"Capitalist private property does not consist of things - things exist independently of their ownership - but in social relation between people. Property confers upon its owners freedom from labour and the disposal over the labour of others, and this is the essence of social domination whatever form it may assume. It follows that
the protection of property is fundamentally the assurance of social domination to owners over non-owners. And this in turn is precisely what is meant by class domination, which it is the primary function of the state to uphold" (Sweezy, 1942, p.244).

That this must be so, Sweezy argues, is because:

"If the disadvantaged classes were in possession of state power, they would attempt to use it to establish a social order more favourable to their own interests, while a sharing of state power among the various classes would merely shift the locality of the conflict to the state itself" (Sweezy, 1942, p.242).

There are certain problems connected with this view of the relationship between the state and society and between the state and class conflict. It may be suggested that though Sweezy does not hold the view that fascism is an inevitable outcome of the conflicts arising out of the contradictions of the capitalist system of production he would appear to be very close indeed to saying that the particular historical circumstances which led up to the taking possession of the state by a fascist movement in Germany and Italy after World War I would inevitably lead to such a result due to the existence of a particular type of relationship between the state and the conflicting classes.

Sweezy analyses the role of the state on the implicit basis of a theory of social change, a theory of history, that makes postulates of the following kind: That the dominant relationships in society arise out of the major mode of production at any one historical time, and that the major dimension of social relationships concerns the ownership of the means of production, this in turn leads to the dominance of the property owning classes over the non-property owning classes, whose dominance it is the primary role of the state to ensure. However, change arises because in class societies
a growing contradiction develops between the capacity of the forces of production and the ability of the dominant classes of property owners to utilize them fully. In capitalist society this leads to growing state intervention in society and economy to ameliorate problems of underconsumption and in order to protect property. Eventually these contradictions lead to the proletarian revolution, when ownership over the means of production will vanish and in logical consequence, also the state.

That is, apart from some intermediate problems of moving from the revolutionary situation to the classless society, the state "exercises authority" (p.267) in the interests of the property owning classes and exists only in class societies. Fascism is a particular case arising out of what Sweezy calls class equilibrium, where in order to preserve social dominance, the property owning classes are forced to relinquish political dominance.

Returning to the quotation from Bendix (1964), it may be suggested that the main issue on which Bendix differs from Sweezy concerns the problem of a legitimate order for the exercise of authority be it in the interest of the property owning class, and the conception of the nature of the relationship between state and authority. On the subject of power and authority Weber writes:

"But these factors, custom and personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal notions of solidarity, do not, even taken together, form a sufficiently reliable basis for a system of imperative coordination. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy. ... The 'legitimacy' of a system of authority has far more than a merely 'ideal' significance, if only because it has very definite relations to the legitimacy of property" (Weber, 1966, p.325).
Turning to his discussion of the economic function of the state, Sweezy's view regarding the relationship between state and society may become clearer. Discussing political action in the process of historical change in relation to legislation concerning the length of the working day, Sweezy suggests:

"In the first place the state comes into action in the economic sphere in order to solve problems which are posed by the development of capitalism. In the second place, where the interests of the capitalist class are concerned, there is a strong disposition to use the state power freely. And finally the state may be used to make concessions to the working class provided that the consequences of not doing so are sufficiently dangerous to the stability and functioning of the system as a whole." (Sweezy, 1942, p.249).

Sweezy regards limitation of the working day as a concession by the state favouring the working class: "since it could not possibly be maintained that the workers had a share in the state power in England at the time the main factory acts were passed" (Sweezy, 1942, p.248, footnote).

One may then ask, if the working class had no stake in state power, how are we to understand the nature of this legislation? The ruling class may very well regard it as a concession to preserve their privileges or to evade a revolutionary situation, but a certain autonomy of the state as a 'sphere of action' (Bendix) is suggested. Sweezy's viewpoint is that the institutions of the state serve the interests of property and the continuation of the system of social

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1 whether or not this is Marx's interpretation of the political significance of this legislation will not be considered here.

2 the historical conflicts between different classes surrounding the legislation concerning the working day in England were naturally more complex than this discussion indicates.
dominance of owners of the means of production over non-owners.

The ruling group may claim legitimacy both for the social order and for the authority exercised in the interest of its maintenance, though authority may be exercised successfully for reasons other than a belief in its legitimacy, for example, for reasons of fear, self interest, etc., but:

"It is an induction from experience that no system of authority voluntarily limits itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 'legitimacy"' (Weber, 1966, p.325).

In the light of this quotation resistance on behalf of the working class to exploitation as exemplified by the length of the working day could be regarded as an expression of the denial of the legitimacy of the economic system and of the institutions of authority backing it up. The enactment of legislation on the issue arising out of the conflict between the aims and power of the working class with those of the ruling class can be argued to constitute a modification of the aims of the ruling class and a limitation on the pursuit of their interests and of their power in relation both to the power of the state and the working class.

The exercise of state authority for the execution of such legislation arises out of the conflict of power between the ruling class and the subject class and may be recognized as legitimate by both. From the point of view of the working class such legislation may very well serve to increase the belief in legitimacy of the social order and the acceptance of state authority as representing legitimate authority.
Furthermore one would postulate that such action on the part of the state may alter or modify the social order, where Sweezy would maintain that the state acts contrary to "the immediate economic interests of some or even all of the capitalists provided only that the overriding aim of preserving the system intact is promoted" (p. 248), the system being the process of capitalist accumulation. Welfare legislation, such as the example discussed here, however, affects the process of accumulation, even if it does not seriously alter property relations. It is difficult to imagine how Sweezy would provide a measure for the intact state of the system. However, Sweezy finds that the state in capitalist society acts in the interest of the dominant property owning classes and that the sharing of power between different classes "would merely shift the locale of conflict to the state itself" (p. 247), that is, it would not alter the essential nature of the relationship between the state and society under capitalist modes of production, that of upholding the position of the property owning classes.

It may be suggested that relationships of authority are always indicative of the existence of conflict in society, and that it is less clear what constitutes a share in state power than Sweezy would appear to be suggesting. In Imperial Germany welfare legislation was enacted on the initiative of the state; there may have been many different reasons for this, for example, it was an attempt to buttress the belief in the legitimacy of the system of authority, as well as a measure to safeguard property relations in the process of capitalist industrialization. However, one would also like to advance the case of the role of the state in Imperial
German society as evidence for a view of the state as an autonomous structure with respect to the process of capitalist accumulation, if interdependent with it.

Whilst one is not arguing that Sweezy ignores the role of politics in historical change, nor that he is suggesting that the state is always acting in the immediate interest of the ruling class, or sectors of it, one is suggesting that perhaps Sweezy is underestimating the relative independence of the state as a social structure interacting with other structural relationships, such as class relationships. Furthermore this may be taken to be illuminated by Sweezy's stress on the coercive role of the state, under-emphasizing the problem of legitimacy (p.247).

Marx (1970) writing on the process of primitive accumulation suggests:

"The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In England at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten hothouse fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power" (Marx, 1970, p.751).

That is the state, the force of the state, would appear to be envisaged by Marx as being made use of in the process of capitalist accumulation, the state is a tool or an agent of the forces of production, possibly regarded by Marx as a necessary tool, as witness: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one", but this does not amount to a convincing argument that the state may be regarded
as a structure reducible to a mere expression of the forces of production, of the process of capitalist accumulation. Indeed Marx's writing: "But they (the different momenta of primitive accumulation) all employ the power of the State . . ." (p.751) suggests that the power of the state is a condition for the development of capitalism and for the development of the bourgeoisie, which would explain why the state, according to Sweezy does not always act in the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie. However ambiguity remains with respect to the status of the autonomy of the state, "National debts, i.e. the alienation of the state - whether despotic, constitutional or republican - marked with its stamp the capitalist era" (Marx, 1970, p.754) suggests that after all the state is an expression of the forces of production.

It is not being argued here that the state is a neutral institution with respect to the structural relationships and conflicts in society, but that the state has a certain independence both with respect to the ruling class and different sectors within it\(^1\), if this is not so the interaction between the state and social classes leading to the legislation concerning the length of the working day becomes difficult to explain. However, the consequence of this is to make it difficult to predict the outcome of class conflict, even the ultimate outcome, in capitalist societies.

Although advanced as support for Sweezy's postulate of the ultimate limitation on the autonomy of the state, in

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\(^1\) see Neumann, 1966, pp. 6, 204, and 209 on the role of the state in uniting the conflicting interests of sectors of the ruling class behind the naval program of 1900 in Imperial Germany.
capitalist societies, his discussion of "the question of the form of government" (p. 250-52) could be interpreted to be in support of the line of the argument attempted here. Sweezy writes:

"Democracy brings the conflicts of capitalist society into the open in the political sphere; it restricts the freedom of the capitalists to use the state power in their own interests; it reinforces the working class in demanding concessions; finally it even increases the possibility that the working class will present demands which threaten the system itself and so must be rejected by the capitalists and their state functionaries regardless of the consequences. ... There is, in other words, nothing in the nature of democracy to make us change our view of the fundamental functions and limits of state action in capitalist society" (Sweezy, 1942, p. 251).

If the working class can threaten 'the system' because of the nature of the form of government, this must mean that the state is relatively independent of the property owning classes, and that state action with respect to the major conflicts of capitalist society need not be the exact reproduction of the conditions of production favouring the capitalist classes and the capitalist system.

As far as Sweezy is concerned, the relationship between the state and the ruling class is an objective one, and the fact that the role of the state coincides with the interests of the capitalist class arises out of the system of production itself. He does not suggest that the state literally represents the interests of the capitalist ruling class, or sectors of it, such as monopoly capital. Any changes in the state, such as the development of parliamentary democracy and alterations with respect to which institutions of the state are the dominant ones, for example, the decline of parliament and the increasing importance of the executive,
arise from changes in the relationships of production and in class conflict.

Sweezy maintains that if parliamentary democracy enables the working class to threaten the economic system itself, then it will be "rejected by the capitalists and their state functionaries" (p.251). Though he is here talking of persons rather than structures, it would most certainly be a mistake to interpret Sweezy as discussing the interrelationships of the members of the ruling class and the personnel of the state.

Bendix suggested that such relationships were of relevance in considering the relationship of the state to society, and a major part of Dahrendorf's analysis of social structure and democracy in Weimar Germany considered such personal interrelationships of the state and upper classes.

Sweezy's discussion of the capitalists and their state functionaries is in keeping with his emphasis on the objective relations between the state and the ruling class. These functionaries act, even if contrary to the immediate interests of the ruling class, according to the overall demands of the system, which means that there is no ultimate independence of the state and political action from the objective structure of the economy.

This in fact means that one may begin to lose any sense of qualitative difference between a democratic and a fascist state, and why at certain times recourse must be made to fascism. It is recognized that Sweezy makes an analytical distinction between the state in capitalized societies and the form of government it may take.
However, this does not mean that one might not agree that the state in capitalist societies generally acts to protect the economic interests of the dominant classes. Sweezy points to the importance of parliamentary democracy for the working class, because the state, when political power is organized democratically, professes to be protecting certain rights. However, this has consequences for class conflict and for the acceptance of the legitimacy of state action and power.

In their respective discussions of fascism, this latter aspect of authority is hardly considered by Sweezy, whilst Dahrendorf discusses both the interrelationships between the members of state institutions as well as the legitimacy of the parliamentary democratic form of government.

If Sweezy does not consider questions of the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy, because he holds a specific view of the relationship between state and society, it may be suggested that on the strength of this premise he would appear to be arguing that in the particular historical circumstances of Weimar Germany the political outcome was inevitable.

Yet it may be suggested that Sweezy's general discussion of the disruptive effects of capitalism in its development with respect to the functioning of parliamentary democracy, and the particular characteristics of the state in a situation of what he calls class equilibrium, provides an analysis of the historical circumstances in Weimar Germany that may serve to bring out the context in which the relationships analysed by Dahrendorf became disruptive to parliamentary democracy.
If as a working interpretation of Sweezy we credit him with the view that the power of the state is essential for the development of capitalism his analysis of the rise of fascism becomes understandable. A parallel may be suggested between the relationship between the state and the direct political rule of the bourgeoisie in the Third Reich and in the Empire. Sweezy writes:

"Fascism arises only out of a situation in which the structure of capitalism has been severely injured and not yet overthrown. The approximate class equilibrium which ensues at once intensifies the underlying difficulties of capitalist production and emasculates the state power. Under these conditions fascist movement grows to formidable proportions, and when a new economic crisis breaks out, as it is bound to do, the capitalist class embraces fascism as the only way out of its otherwise insoluble problems". (Sweezy, 1942, p.346).

The following are some of the main elements in Sweezy's analysis: that the structure of society has been 'severely injured' and with respect to the state the different classes share in its power. He operates with a concept of class-equilibrium on the basis of the capitalist ownership of the means of production in certain closely defined historical circumstances.¹ From our point of view this would indicate a certain independence of the political structure from the economic structure as the capitalist class is not able to utilize the state fully for its own purposes.² The question arises, of whether a state that is based on a parliamentary form of government does not always represent the possibility of a limitation on the use of the state by the capitalists. Without the assumptions of the analytical structural conceptions

¹ see Sweezy, 1942, pp.324-332.

² defined by Sweezy according to the general laws of capitalist development.
of the development of capitalism it may, however, perhaps be difficult to determine what constitutes the overall interests of the capitalist system and a situation of class equilibrium. Thus the most reasonable type of analysis here would appear to be an inquiry which is based on general sociological principles rather than on a thorough discussion of the premises of marxian analysis into whether the notion of class equilibrium is at all useful and whether the idea of 'heightened class antagonism', which Sweezy suggests to be the reality behind the situation of class equilibrium, is the more serviceable concept with respect to understanding the relationship between the different classes and parliamentary democracy.

Sweezy bases his analysis of fascism on certain general assumptions concerning the development of capitalism and sees fascism historically to be an outcome of imperialist wars of redivision, fascism being one form the state may take in the period of imperialism.

Sweezy operates with the concept of class equilibrium with respect to the state power and heightened class antagonism with respect to the social and economic structure, a structural situation which heightens the contradiction of capitalist production and diminishes the ability of the state to manage the inevitable crises that arise; out of this constellation of forces fascism arises. (see Sweezy, 1942, pp.329-334). The utility of this kind of analysis must now be considered.

Sweezy analyses the rise of fascism by considering the interrelationships of the political, economic and social structures. As a result of imperialist wars certain countries
experience a severe disruption of their social structure, and revolutionary struggles. Sweezy writes:

"The fact that the revolution stops short of a socialist consummation is, in a very real sense, the key to subsequent developments. What emerges may best be described as a transitional condition of class equilibrium resting on a foundation of capitalist property relations." (Sweezy, 1942, p.330). 1.

This description would appear to correspond to the interpretation of the social structure in Germany immediately before and after World War I, as provided by Neumann, (1966, pp.8-13), by Bracher (1955, pp.15-28) and by Rosenberg (1972, pp. 114-120), and incidentally would appear to hold in the case of Italy, with minor modifications. 2

Of Weimar Germany Rosenberg writes:


However ..

"Yet Social Democracy (in Germany) was unable to orga-
nize either the whole of the working class or the middle classes. It lost sections of the former and never won a real foothold with the latter" (Neumann, 1966, p.13).

In Germany, the young democracy, for many middle class people soon appeared unable or unwilling to guarantee them a greater share in state power or to provide a government capable of dealing with post-war inflation which threatened their livelihood. Many middle class groups, such as rentiers lost their savings, whilst others were relieved of their debts, at least in part. The case of Italy may be mentioned: Rosenberg describes the brief period where a co-operation between workers, urban petit.bourgeoisie and peasantry and agricultural workers was possible, but in Italy too the middle classes soon turned against the socialists and the trades unions. (See Rosenberg, 1972, pp.101-103).

In Germany, the Weimar Republic was held responsible for continued suffering, for inflation, for the reparation conditions, and for civil war, failing to provide for the most elementary needs of the middle classes. It quickly lost in legitimacy and large sectors of the middle class ceased to support the parties of the Weimar Coalition.

The situation of stalemate or class equilibrium of which Sweezy speaks may be said to apply to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Weimar Republic. With respect to the social structure it could be argued to have gained expression in the Stinnes Legien agreement of 15th November 1918. (See Neumann, 1966, pp.11-12 and p.405 and Bracher, 1955, pp.203-204).

The Weimar Republic brought complete recognition of the trades unions, of collective bargaining, state arbitra-
tion and state powers of making labour agreements generally binding. (See Stolper, 1940, pp.212-215 and Neumann, 1966, pp.403-413). But even if the position of the trades unions was strengthened both with respect to employers' organizations and the state this was not tantamount to a relationship essentially of cooperation between employers and workers. (See Bracher, 1955, pp.203-204). On this Neumann writes:

"Other strata reacted to the complex post-war and post-revolution situation exactly as one would have expected. The big estate owners pursued a reactionary policy in every field. Monopolistic industries hated and fought trades unions and the political system that gave the unions their status. The army used every available means to strengthen chauvinistic nationalism in order to restore itself to its former greatness. The judiciary invariably sided with the right and the civil service supported counter-revolutionary movements" (Neumann, 1966, p.13).

This would seem to support Sweezy's claim of "the reality of the heightened class antagonism (behind the temporary balance of forces) is too often overlooked" (Sweezy, 1942, p.330), but not self-evidently his claim of the existence of a balance of forces; the working class had a share in state power, particularly important for the fields of labour and social policy, but the socialists led the government only until 1920, after which for two years the other main party in the Weimar coalition, the Zentrum party, attempted to cope with inflation and reparation payments. In 1923 parliamentary democracy handed over the government to a cabinet of experts who in reality were the representatives of large capital. All attempts by the democratic forces to cope with the enormous post-war economic problems had been countered by the unwillingness of big business and the foreign powers who were owed reparation payments. Neumann writes:
"The inflation of the early 20's permitted unscrupulous entrepreneurs to build up giant economic empires at the expense of the middle and working classes" (Neumann, 1966, p.15).

The transitional condition of class equilibrium resting on a foundation of capitalist property relations did not pertain to the situation in Weimar in 1923, the employers were by then organized to counter the trades unions and from the vantage point of capitalist property relations were able to exploit the inflation. (See Bracher, 1955, p.204).

The reaffirmation of parliamentary democracy in 1924 was not due to the strength of the democratic forces in society or the equilibrium of the working and capitalist classes but much more due to the intervention of foreign capitalists, represented by an influx of foreign capital and new arrangements for reparation payments.

The state in form of parliamentary democracy appeared not able to safeguard law and order and had not been able to protect the interests of large sectors of the middle classes under conditions of both cyclical and structural economic pressures on the position of the middle class. Democracy to many members of the middle class appeared only to be able to attain gains for the workers - to a limited extent the trades unions had managed to readjust wages to the rising prices under inflation. (See Stolper, 1940, pp.154-162). In consequence, large numbers ceased to support democratic parties and turned to nationalist parties; parliamentary democracy had not succeeded in establishing itself as a legitimate form of government nor did it represent a temporary class equilibrium.

Admittedly Sweezy uses this notion in the sense that
neither the working class nor the capitalist class is able
tfully to utilize the state power in their own interests,
that they both share in it, which means, however, that the
capitalist classes do not have monopoly of the state power
corresponding to the nature of the social order, (see Sweezy,
1942, pp.330-331 and pp.242-243). Furthermore, it is not easy
to see that this was a condition pertaining only to 'people's
republics' in the mid-war years and not to other parliamen-
tary democracies to a greater or lesser extent.

The background for Sweezy's analysis of the develop-
ment of fascism is his analysis of monopoly capitalism and
imperialism. He finds that the people's republics are not
only unable "to ameliorate the contradictions of capitalist
production, ... (but that they) are on the contrary intensi-
fied" (pp.330-31). These contradictions are the tendencies
to over-accumulation and underconsumption. The gains won in
people's republics by the trades unions are attempted offset
by even more monopolistic concentration and through ratio-
nalization. Assesment of whether or not the interplay between
trades unions and monopoly capital and the state had the
result of leading to greater economic concentration in Weimar
Germany than for example in U.S.A. is beyond the scope of
this present work.

According to Sweezy monopolization and the organization
of working class interests are features of economic relation-
ships in all capitalist societies in the period of imperia-
ism. With respect to Weimar Germany, the relationship of
labour to the state may have been significantly different
from that of the major capitalist nations at the time (again
see Stolper, 1940, p.210 and p.218), but large scale enter-
prises were not just a feature of post-World War I Germany, if we are to follow Sweezy, they were a feature of all capitalist countries. It is, however, possible, that due to the particular relationships between state and economy, and because of the fact that Germany was a latecomer to industrialization, that large scale enterprises were more dominant in the German economy and politics than elsewhere. Certainly there may have been fewer attempts to make and enforce anti-monopoly legislation. (See Neumann, 1966, p.15). In this situation monopoly capital was able to pass increase in cost on to the consumer whilst at the same time being able to squeeze the remaining independent sectors of production and retail.

Bracher (1955, pp.194-224) would with respect to the economic order appear in the main to argue for this description. He writes:


Both Neumann and Bracher would agree that through a wide network of organizations big business attempted to control the labour market and influence the policies of the state.

As described, Sweezy suggests that underneath the sur-

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1 "(1924-29 in Germany) Was first and foremost a period of the stabilization and extension of power of increasing monopolistic concentration, as it gained expression in the formation of extensive concerns as for example the United Steelworks or I.G.Farben."

face of class equilibrium is a situation of heightened class antagonism. Neumann writes: "

"Unwittingly, they (the Social Democrats) strengthened the monopolistic trends in German industry, and, placing complete reliance on formalistic legality, they were unable to root out the reactionary elements in the judiciary and civil service or limit the army to its proper constitutional role" (Neumann, 1966, p.13-14).

Social Democracy strengthened the tendency towards monopolisation as large scale organizations were better able to carry the cost of social legislation, higher wages etc., and neither were either the Communists or the Social Democrats really hostile to monopolisation (see Neumann, 1966, and Bracher, 1955). From a peak of influence and power, after World War I, the position of the trades unions vis-a-vis the state and employer organizations declined during the 20's for many reasons, two major ones being 1) the changes in the social structure resulting from rationalization and bureaucratization of the economy and 2) the many links with the state and the increased role of the state in the economy for example welfare legislation. (For detailed discussion of the see Neumann, 1966, pp. 17-20, pp.403-413, and Bracher, 1955, pp.199-208). The trades unions and Social Democracy had not succeeded substantially in gaining the support of or in organizing the white collar workers and other middle class elements. Admittedly the trades unions had a share in the state and parliamentary democracy, and together with the Social Democrats had carried through important social legislation.

According to Sweezy, in the period of imperialism the role of the state is extended externally and internally, with respect to the economy. The increased economic role of
the state is seen by Sweezy to be primarily the result of the
growth of monopoly capitalism in contradistinction to,
for example, Dahrendorf, who stresses the importance of the
fact that German capitalism developed in a close interaction
with and around the state. For Neumann, the particularly
relevant aspects of this for the understanding of fascism,
as well as for both Rosenberg and Dahrendorf, were the social
background and political values of the civil service, the
judiciary and the army and their links with the bourgeoisie.
(Neumann, 1966, p.14, Rosenberg, 1972, p.117). This aspect
receives little attention from Sweezy, except in so far as
he talks of a disrupted social and economic structure and
"lack of regard for established habits of thought and be­
haviour among wide sections of the population" (Sweezy, 1942,
p.329). However, there is, in this, no consideration of the
nature of the social structure before being disrupted.

In Weimar Germany, the state was involved both direct­
ly and as a regulating agency in the economy as it had been
in the Empire. (See Stolper, 1940, in particular pp.198-218).
From the extension of the scope of the activities of the
state, Sweezy finds that a general decline in the power and
ability of parliament to control the actions of the execu­
23-28) largely agrees with respect to Weimar Germany and also
suggests that 1) the particular political conditions in
Weimar made it difficult to find working parliamentary majo­
rities, leading to the use of cabinets composed of experts
and the delegation of legislative powers etc. to expert bodies
and the executive and 2) that:
"Democracy might have survived nonetheless - but only if the democratic value system had been firmly rooted in the society, if the delegation of power had not been utilized to deprive minorities of their rights and as a shield behind which anti-democratic forces carried on the work of establishing a bureaucratic dictatorship." (Neumann, 1966, p.25).

Of the economic and political structure in Weimar Germany Gerth and Mills write:

"during the 1920's the economic and political orders develop quite differently: within the economic order institutions are highly centralized, a few big units more or less control the operations and the results of the entire order; within the political order there is fragmentation, many parties competing to influence the state but no one of them powerful enough to control the results of economic concentration." (Gerth and Mills, 1965, p.363).

This description is largely based on Neumann.

One sector whose power was increased as a result of the extensive use of expert bodies was big business, (see Bracher, 1955, p.215) and the state sided increasingly with their interests.

In so far as Sweezy is suggesting that in Weimar Germany increasing antagonism is the basic condition, he is supported by both Neumann and Bracher. Already before the outbreak of the international economic crisis attempts were being made by certain sectors of big business to break the power of the trades unions and to decrease the role of the state in labour relations. (See Schweitzer, 1964, pp.89-90).

Bracher writes:

"Schwierigkeiten und Sturz des Kabinetts Müller, das auf die Unterstützung der Gewerkschaften und der Unternehmerschaft gleichermassen gegründet war, spiegelten die neue Vertiefung der Gegensätze zwischen den wirtschaftspolitischen Fronten selbst in kleineren sozial-politischen Fragen wider und drückten zugleich das politische Gewicht der Interessengruppen und die Rich-
tung der sich anbahnenden Machtverschiebung überhaupt aus." (Bracher, 1955, p.207).

Sweezy argues that monopoly capitalism intensifies the tendency of the capitalist mode of production to overaccumulation and under-consumption. With respect to Weimar Germany Neumann writes: "At no time in the Republic (not even in the boom year of 1929) were the productive capacities of German industry fully, or even adequately, utilized" (p.16). The reason for underconsumption Sweezy finds in the impoverishment of the middle class and the technological unemployment of the worker.

One 'remedy' would be to lower wages and reduce welfare payments made by enterprises, i.e. diminish the power of the trades unions. Bracher suggests that the sectors of business which first attempted this course were heavy industry combines which in particular had benefited from the leading role of the state in the economy in Empire Germany and were the sectors of industry least imbued with democratic values.

As the trades unions and Social Democrats had such a large share in the German state, big business first sought to break the unions and diminish the role of the state in collective bargaining but:

"The aims of the monopolistic powers could not be carried out in a system of political democracy, at least not in Germany. The Social Democratic party, though they had lost their aggressive militancy, was still powerful enough to defend their gains. Their defensive strength made it
impossible to place the whole machinery of the state at the service of one particular group in society." (Neumann, 1966, p.260).

From our point of view this would appear to suggest that the state in a parliamentary democracy has institutional areas that are not self-evidently in the service of the capitalist classes. Neumann writes:

"Who is to interfere, and on whose behalf becomes the most important question for modern society. The possession of the state machinery is thus the pivotal position around which everything else revolves. This is the only possible meaning of the primacy of politics over economics" (Neumann, 1966, p.260).

Sweezy argues that the usual way out of an economic crisis is expansion abroad, but that this is not possible as the workers share in the power of the state and the strength of the military is diminished as "(a) result of previous imperialist wars of redivision. In this situation, as the state is weak, the conditions are created for an alliance between capital and fascism in order to create a strong state.

Whether or not Sweezy's analysis of monopoly capitalism and inevitable crisis can be verified cannot be assessed here. It is possible that in Weimar Germany monopolization of industry was particularly heavy with the attendant consequences for the remaining independent or semi-independent sector; it is also possible that costs were increased by the struggle of the trades unions.

It could also be argued that with respect to dealing with crisis the state was weak, or successive governments were incapable of carrying through any substantial measures (see Neumann, 1966, p.261-263). This corresponds to Gerth and Mills description of a proliferation of parties, but the
explanation for this may perhaps be less problematic when based on Weberian analytical concepts relating the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy to class relationships than when based on a marxist-Sweezyian analysis of the relationship of the state to the forces of production and their notion of the force of the state as a condition of the flowering of the bourgeoisie in capitalist society. One ought to suggest that this latter approach would appear to require elaboration from other theoretical sources for explanation of why parliamentary democracy fell in Weimar Germany and not for example in the U.S.A.

The above discussion has attempted to show that it is doubtful whether the concept of class equilibrium can meaningfully be applied to Germany at any time after 1923, either to the economy or to the state, though with respect to parliament itself a position describable as stalemate may have developed, hence the governments of 1930-33 governed by emergency decree.

Other highly developed capitalist countries faced a similarly severe crisis but did not take recourse to fascism. It can be argued that in Germany the crisis might have been overcome by other means than expansion and fascism, under a democratic state, if big business and agriculture had been willing.

Parliamentary democracy was perhaps accepted by big business and by members of the middle class as one possible form of government as long as the economy expanded. Prosperity strengthened monopolization and was based to a considerable extent upon foreign loans in connection with the repara-
Sweezy's argument emphasizes the necessity of considering the consequences of monopoly capitalism in order to understand the rise of fascism. He points clearly to the international interrelatedness of capitalist production and to the possibility of cyclical economic movements, (see also Bracher, 1955, pp.208-213) as well as the close ties of monopoly capitalism to the state. Bracher writes on this point:


Parliamentary democracy was blamed for the inability of the state to cope with the crisis and was also argued to be a cause of the crisis itself. However the weakness of parliamentary democracy had its root not so much in the fact that the workers shared in the state power as in the fact that there was not a clear acceptance of its legitimacy, the form of government became the central issue in class conflict; the concern of Dahrendorf with Prussian authoritarian values is directly relevant here, if difficult to incorporate in a

1 "The outbreak and course of the economic crisis portrayed the close interrelatedness of economics and politics in a clearer light and finally showed the weakness of the political structure in relation to an economic system, that pushed its structural and cyclical difficulties onto the field of politics and which brought the democratic mechanism to totter (tumble) from below, that is, from distressed workers, white collar workers, small employers, from seemingly escapeless unemployment."
straight Sweezyian analysis.

To big business, parliamentary democracy represented social democracy or at least the possibility of it, as represented by the strengthened position of the trades unions. To large sectors of the middle class the Weimar Republic appeared to have been of benefit to mainly the trades unions and monopoly capital.

The attacks on the position of the trades unions and the role of the state in collective bargaining had started already before the crisis and led to efforts to reduce the role of the state by big business.

The depression widened the gap between production and productive capacity and various supportive measures were undertaken as well as attempts at modifying the effects of monopoly, such as for example, fixing prices. Neumann (1966, p.29-33) describes in detail the limited success and the difficulties facing Brüning's deflationary measures, but stresses that parliamentary democracy was still the basis of Brüning's government despite its practice of ruling by emergency decrees, and therefore big business was unwilling to acquiesce to any attacks on the structure of the economy.

In the end Brüning by-passed the results of collective bargaining, as did von Papen. On this Schweitzer comments:

"The success of the employers in their dealings with labour was more than a function of the depression and served to increase the power of the employers association relative to the trades unions. Also, as we should expect, the animosity of the employers toward trades unions and social legislation intensified itself into a fundamental opposition to the Weimar Republic" (Schweitzer, 1964, p.90).

The DNVP had long been clearly against parliamentary
democracy, the DVP though more and more nationalist had been less unambiguous in its relation to trades unions (see Bracher, 1955, p.206), but gradually changed its attitude and came out against trades unions, and in effect, parliamentary democracy, as the crisis developed. Neumann suggested that monopoly capitalism increasingly found democracy an obstacle to further expansion. The policy of trying to weaken labour and the government did not appear to be sufficient to overcome the depression, nor did it appear possible to gain complete control over the economic policy of the government under a system of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, working majorities in parliament became less and less possible and thus parliamentary democracy appeared unable to provide the strong government thought necessary to break the 'fetters of Versailles' and the trades unions.

According to Sweezy, the interests of the landed and industrial upper classes in the period of imperialism more or less coincide with respect to the economic policy of the state. Initially, however, with respect to the fall in demand and in prices on agricultural goods, the reaction of agricultural interests ran contrary to the demands made by big business on the state, in that it had the effect of increasing its role.

Stolper (1940, pp.182-86) describes how the agricultural crisis was first and foremost a crisis of the rye belt, from the time of the Empire protected by tariffs, and that therefore it became a crisis of the landed upper class, the junkers, as a class. However, at the same time it highlighted the antagonisms felt by the peasants towards both capita-
lism and parliamentary democracy. (See Neumann, 1966, p. 392-396, and Schweitzer, 1964, pp. 92-93). The relationship between small farmers, large agriculturalists and fascism is perhaps one area that Sweezy's analysis takes less into account.

The Junkers had not been effectively expropriated by the Weimar Republic though some resettlement had taken place, but this was in conjunction with extension of large estates. Single crop agriculturalists ran into debt after the bad harvest in 1926; indebtedness threatened both peasants and landowners. Schweitzer (1964, p. 92) describes the series of emergency measures undertaken to support agriculture, however, in the end even these measures were felt to threaten the large estate with expropriation and to threaten the class position of the junkers, and led finally to the deposition of the Brüning cabinet by President von Hindenburg, in the event the final blow to parliamentary democracy. Thus both the upper landed and industrial classes had come to find parliamentary democracy incompatible with their class interests.

Sweezy does not argue that fascism is a straightforward function of capitalistic development. Imperialism and monopoly capitalism are conditions common to all capitalist countries as are the changes in the nature of interaction between state and economy and the problems concerning the power of the legislature. "Every capitalist nation in the period of imperialism carries within it the seeds of fascism" (Sweezy, 1942, p. 348). This statement underlines that though Sweezy does not regard fascism as a final or inevitable stage of capitalism, he finds the conditions for fascism in the economic and political relationships of capitalist imperialist society. This is further emphasized by the singling out
of nationalist chauvinism and expansion as the relevant aspects of fascist ideology in establishing a working relationship between the capitalist and the fascist party.

Sweezy writes:

"It must not be supposed that the capitalists are altogether happy about the rise of fascism. Unquestionably they would prefer to solve their problems in their own way if that were possible. But their impotence forces them to strengthen fascism, and when at length conditions become generally intolerable and a new revolutionary situation looms on the horizon, the capitalists, from their position inside the citadel of state power throw open the gates and admit the fascist legions" (Sweezy, 1942, p.334).

Above an attempt has been made to show that it is not self-evident that one can describe class relations with respect to the state as being in a state of equilibrium between the capitalist and working class, for most of the period of the Weimar Republic, though heightened class antagonism may be said to have existed, but this is not necessarily tantamount to a revolutionary threat.

Sweezy finds that fascism is essentially the outcome of the growing contradictions of production and of class antagonisms arising from concentration in social, economic and political organization as a result of the development of monopoly capitalism. Countries with particular historical developments in the relationship between state and society experience an intensification of basic contradictions, which particularly hits the middle classes, about which Sweezy writes:

"Both the origins and the mass base of fascism are to be found in the middle classes, which form such a large section of the population of capitalist countries in the period of monopoly capitalism" (Sweezy, 1942, p.332).
The independent middle class, according to Sweezy, is declining numerically and in importance, in the period of monopoly capitalism. However, both for Italian and German fascism the independent middle class was perhaps more important than Sweezy seems to suggest. The new middle class on the other hand is expanding as a result of centralization and growth in the distribution sphere. Generally, Sweezy suggests that the middle classes lack an objective basis for class organization, though the new middle class, due to their particular relationship to surplus value tends, for both objective and subjective reasons, to support the capitalist class. On the other hand Sweezy suggests that:

"Hence it is the fate of the middle class in the period of ripening contradictions to be squeezed between the extortions of monopoly capital on the one hand and the demands of the working class for better conditions and greater security on the other hand; this much at any rate they all have in common, and it is this which determines the basic attitude characteristic of nearly all sectors of the middle classes. The attitude in question is hostility to both organized capital and organized labour which can manifest itself in seemingly contradictory ways" (Sweezy, 1942, p.314).

The size of the middle class and middle class attitudes to labour and to capital is a general feature of monopoly capitalism, according to Sweezy; its intensification into non-proletarian anticapitalism in the form of fascism takes place in the above discussed conditions of class equilibrium and economic crisis. So though fascism is seen in its origin to be middle class, Sweezy still places it firmly as a function of capitalist development, and its ideological content of anti-capitalism, of racism, and nationalism is explained through the parliamentary position of the middle

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1 for Sweezy's discussion of the middle class see Sweezy, 1942, pp. 284, 311-317, 332 and 339.
classes, its lack of a common class interest, and the development of imperialist monopoly capitalism.

The extent and severity of the depression does not, by itself, explain the spread of fascism among the middle classes, it has already been suggested that the Weimar Democracy had not succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the middle class, large numbers voted for conservative and for interest parties. Schweitzer (1964) suggests: "A deeply felt protest arose against private capitalism and democracy, which were held responsible for the depression and the deflation" (p.74-75), and argues further:

"The best available answer (to the success of fascism in Germany) hinges on some special economic events that accompanied the depression, on the particular political constellation of the Weimar Republic, and on the ideological preferences that existed and the transformations that took place in the depression years" (p.72).

In his analysis of the effects of class equilibrium with respect to the state on capitalist production and on the middle classes, Sweezy writes:

"...Big capital meets this situation in two ways. First, by tightening up its monopolistic organizations and squeezing the middle classes. The latter, already impoverished by the war and the subsequent derangement of economic life which, in the form of inflation, bears particularly heavily on those with small savings and no organizations to protect them, now find that their desperate position is but slightly improved by the return of 'law and order', that they are in effect the orphan children of the people's republic" (Sweezy, 1942,p.331).

This applies more to Germany than to Italy, but indicates the historical dimension introduced into Sweezy's general discussion of social and political consequences of monopoly capitalism. But it also suggests questions of the legitimacy

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1 Schweitzer, 1964, pp.71-81, provides a discussion of middle class opposition to trades unions and monopoly capital and their attitude to democracy.
of parliamentary democracy and of particular manifestations of class relationships that emphasized antagonism toward both labour and capital as the basic attitude to which the fascist party could appeal.

Sweezy holds the view that the primary role of the state is to uphold the capitalist system of production and we have postulated that he does so on the basis of at least the assumption that the process of capitalist accumulation is dependent on the power of the state, wherefore on Sweezy's own terms if the outcome of class conflict is the sharing of state power the state must be weak with respect to supporting the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeoisie must inevitably attempt to establish a strong state. In this way the question of the form of government is subordinated to the question of the overriding role of the state in capitalist society.

One may find it difficult to agree that there was a state of class equilibrium with respect to the state in Germany when the crisis broke out. Furthermore if it is suggested that there may then be several outcomes of class conflict and that some institution of the state may be regarded as not first and foremost an expression of the state being an agent of capitalism, and if parliamentary democracy is regarded in this light then the question may be put to Sweezy, as parliamentary democracy existed in some form both in Weimar Germany and for example the U.S.A., why on Sweezy's terms did it make the state weak in one case and not in the other.

It may be suggested that both the particular importance of the Junkers in the German social structure and the question
of the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy in particular from the point of view of the bourgeoisie may be taken into account with advantage, as well as Sweezy's major contribution of considering the nature of class conflict between labour and capital, this, however, would not provide an explanation of why fascism did not happen in the U.S.A.

**Fascism as a case of 'die Verselbständigung des Staatsapparats'.**

August Thalheimer, (1972, pp.19-39), does not, as Sweezy, use the concept of temporary class equilibrium on the basis of increasing class antagonism, rather his main concept consists of an analytical distinction between the political and the social class rule of the bourgeoisie, (politischer und sozialer Herrschaft).

The more or less official Communist\(^1\) theory of fascism as it developed during the twenties, as represented by the notion of "Sozial-fascismus" and the idea of fascism being the tool of 'the most reactionary and chauvenistic sections of finance capital' met with a certain number of notable opposing and differentiated analyses from the German and Italian Communist parties.

Among these was a contribution by Thalheimer, who attempted to utilize Marx's concepts and own analysis of Bonapartism for the analysis of fascism. Thalheimer's idea is that parliamentary democracy as a form of government no longer can be relied upon to carry through and safeguard interests of the bourgeoisie. Consequently he finds a tendency

\(^1\) for a discussion of Communist theories of fascism, 1920-1935, see Cammett, 1967.
going in the direction away from a democratically based state towards 'die Verselbständigung des Staatsapparats', a process whereby the state executive comes to stand above the social classes, in this manner better being able to safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e. the relationship between state and society would appear to be in line with the view of Sweezy on the matter.

One such form of 'de-democratisation' (Entdemokratisierung) is fascism, which is the political outcome of a particular totality of class relationships, and which is distinguished thereby that 'die Verselbständigung' in this instance entails the loss of political power on behalf of the bourgeoisie, in order to safeguard its (social and) economic power, (sozialer Herrschaft).

The historically distinct class constellation which gave rise to Bonapartism as analysed by Marx is 1) a bourgeoisie that is too weak to defend its economic class position (ihre soziale Existenz) against the attacks of the working class through their own direct exercise of political power under a parliamentary form of government, 2) die Parzellenbauern (small peasant farmers) wanting to protect their property as private, against the threat of a proletarian revolution, in a situation where they do not form a class in the Marxist sense, 3) the working class, by having attacked bourgeois society whilst not yet proving itself able (nicht fähig) to gain and keep possession of the state power (die Gewalt)

1 "the independence of the state apparatus" (from the bourgeoisie.

and 4) the bands of deklassé who take over the state executive. The position of 'Verselbständigung der Executivgewalt' is not identical with that at the given time existing state bureaucracy. Thalheimer quotes Marx:

"... Der Imperialismus ist die prostitutierste und zugleich die schliessliche Form jener Staatsmacht, die von der entstehenden bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ins Leben gerufen war als das Werkzeug ihrer eigenen Befreiung vom Feudalismus und die die vollentwickelte Bourgeoisiegesellschaft verwandelt hatte in eine Werkzeug zur Knechtung der Arbeit durch das Kapital." (Thalheimer, 1972, p.26). 1.

This does not mean that Thalheimer himself analyses and interprets Marx as analysing Bonapartism as the final and last form the state takes at the stage of fully developed capitalism in bourgeois society. Thalheimer does not deduce that Bonapartism or fascism is a necessary consequence of capitalist development, rather the nature of class relationships is decisive. Thalheimer writes:


Bonapartism is the last and final form of the bourgeois state when bourgeois society is threatened by revolution by the

1 "... Imperialism (that is Bonapartism) is at the same time the most prostitute and the final form of state power, which the rising middle-class society had started to develop as the means of its own emancipation from feudalism and which the mature bourgeois society had transformed into a tool for the enslavement of labour through capital"

2 Marx's own position would appear to be ambiguous if not directly being that Bonapartism is the final form of the state in capitalist society, the dictatorship of capital.

3 "The decisive relationship is the totality of class relationships in a given country, a given society."
proletariat and the bourgeoisie cannot defend itself. Bonapartism is the final form the state takes in capitalist society not in a time sense as an expression of a higher stage in capitalist development, but one form of the dictatorship of capital to save the position of bourgeoisie when it cannot rule in its own name; as Thalheimer writes: "(der Bonapartismus ist eine Form der offene Diktatur des Kapitals". (Thalheimer, 1972, p.28).

Thalheimer, using an analogy in history and based on his interpretation of Marx's analysis of Bonapartism, suggests:

"Der Bonapartismus ist die 'schliessliche' Form der bürgerliche Staatsmacht insofern er eine Form der offenen kapitalistischen Diktatur ist und insofern die offenen kapitalistischen Diktatur eintritt, wenn die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, eben am Rande des Grabes angelangt, tödlich bedroht war von der proletarischen Revolution. Dasselbe ist im Wesen der Faschismus: eine Form der offenen kapitalistischen Diktatur.

Hier ist die wichtigste anzubringende Korrektur. Sie besteht nur in einem kleinen Wörtschen. Statt zu sagen, der Faschismus ist die offene Diktatur der Bourgeoisie, ist zu setzen: er ist eine Form." (p.28). 1.

Thalheimer thus assumes an unchanged relationship between state and society even though he makes allowances for a relationship of contradiction between the fascist party and bourgeoisie both before and after 'die Verselbständigung der

1 "Bonapartism is the 'final' form of the bourgeois state insofar as it is one form of the open dictatorship of capital and insofar as the open capitalist dictatorship occurs, when bourgeois society, already at the edge of the grave, was threatened to death by the proletarian revolution. That is also the nature of fascism: one form of open capitalist dictatorship.

Here is the most important correction to be made. It consists only of one small word. Instead of saying that fascism is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, it is to substitute: it is one form."
Executivgewalt' (see Thalheimer, pp.25,31 and 33) Certain
difficulties are, however, apparent here, whilst Thalheimer
does not reduce fascism to a tool of the bourgeoisie and
brings out Marx's discussion of the declassé members of the
10th December Society and of the Bonapartist army, he never­
theless insists that fascism and Bonapartism are dictator­
ships of capital, that the relationship between state and
society is unchanged because:

"Ihr sozialer oder klassenmässiger Inhalt aber ist die
Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie und der Privateigentümer
überhaupt über die Arbeiterklasse und alle anderen kapi­
talistisch ausgebeuteten Schichten" (p.28). 1.

The reasoning which enables Thalheimer to maintain that
the relationship between state and society under forms of the
open capitalist dictatorship remains unaltered, lies in his
suggestion that possession of the state by declassé elements
represents a counter-revolutionary, not a revolutionary'Auf­
hebung' (elevation/dissolution) of bourgeois class society,
the declassé from all classes are children of the bourgeois
society and therefore are able to protect the social and
economic dominance of the bourgeoisie whilst denying them
political cominance. Hence Thalheimer's stress on the form of
the state as the difference which distinguished the open ca­
pitalist dictatorship from other forms of state power. There
is, however, a certain amount of tension in Thalheimer's view
of the relation between state and society, which is represen­
ted by his emphasis that the fascist party is not a simple
tool of the bourgeoisie, and of Bonaparte he writes:

1 "The social content (of the dictatorship of capital) is the
rule of the bourgeoisie and owners of private property al­
together over the working class and all other strata exploi­
ted by the capitalists."

Whilst thus indicating that the fascist state is autonomous, that there is a certain independence of executive authority, Thalheimer insist on analysing the fascist form of state as an instance of the dictatorship of capital. It has, however, been suggested:

"Die Gefahren, welche diese Parallelisierung für die orthodoxe kommunistische Interpretation in sich schliesst, springen freilich ins Auge: Wenn der Faschismus nicht die Form der Diktatur des Kapitals ist, sondern nur eine dieser Formen, dann muss er nicht notwendig die letzte Etappe vor der siegreichen proletarischen Revolution sein, die Erinnerung an Marx' Deskription der Rolle der 'Deklassierten' entwertet eines der wichtigen Elemente der gewohnten Ätiologie, eine verselbständigte Executive kann nicht die Diktatur des Kapitals sein." (Nolte, 1967, p.37).

By applying the otherwise seemingly fruitful distinc-

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1 "But Bonaparte is before everything the leader of the society of 10th of December the representative of the lumpenproletariat, to which he himself, his entourage, his government, and his army belong, and who it is the main aim to benefit and to provide with large shares of state possessions. And he confirms himself as leader of the 10th December society with decrees, without decrees, and despite decrees."

2 "The danger of this analogy (between Bonapartism and fascism) for orthodox communist interpretation (of fascism) stands out clearly: When fascism is not the dictatorship of capital but only one form, then it is not necessarily the last stage before the victorious proletarian revolution, the recollection of Marx's description of the role of the 'declassé' devalues one of the most important elements of the customary aetiologi, an independent executive cannot be the dictatorship of capital."
tion between the political and the economic power of the bourgeoisie and attack is made on the very basic assumption of Marxist analysis on the assumption of the relationship between state and capital.

The state in the form of fascism is independent of the bourgeoisie, that is the essential role of the state need no longer be that of safeguarding the capitalist system, and what is more, by using an analogy in history pre-capitalist analogies to fascism are brought to mind (see Nolte, 1967, p.38).

Thalheimer's emphasis lies on the main class relationship between bourgeoisie and proletariat, both Rosenberg (1972, pp.93-114) and Bauer (1972, pp.143-169) and Hoare (1963) analyse the class relationship and political organization of the bourgeoisie in a way which supports Thalheimer's interpretation.

Of Italy Hoare writes:

"The Northern bourgeoisie was threatened by an intense increase in working class strength and militancy after the first World War, while the landowning class was threatened by mounting peasant agitation for land, by the demand of unemployed agricultural labourers for work, and by the swiftly progressing organization of peasants and labourers into militant Catholic and socialist unions and co-operatives. The industrial bourgeoisie was not a national homogeneous class - it was not capable of containing popular strength by itself, nor even in alliance with the landowners and the traditional governing elites (a distinct group of lawyers, bankers, intellectuals, members of traditionally political families), who were driven closer to the industrial bourgeoisie by the spectre of social revolution. This threat was spuriously magnified by the unfortunate 'maximalism' of the Socialist Party, which by its extreme revolutionary language terrified the liberal bourgeoisie into condoning the fascist violence, but never, in fact, translated this language into any real and resolute political action. It was Mussolini's inspired opportunism which enabled him, by a series of changing and indeed contradictory positions, to create an alignment of the near-totality of potential anti-socialist forces, in which
the petit bourgeoisie, and in particular demobilized petit bourgeois officers, were enrolled under mystical nationalist and pseudo-revolutionary watchwords as the weapons with which the popular forces could be broken." (Hoare, 1963, p.107-108).

The other party to the main relationship, the proletariat, whilst threatening a revolution, is not yet able (nichtfähig) to take over and defend the possession of state power. It is however somewhat problematic as to how one should interpret the concept of fähig/nichtfähig, whether it is an objective condition or a question of political organization. Thalheimer refers to Lenin:


Hoare's writing of Italy describes the failure of the Italian Socialist Party to ally itself with the peasants, and suggests also that the Italian Socialist Party and the trades unions did not fully support the strikes and factory

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1 The actual content of the class relationships fitting into the model of a bourgeoisie too weak to rule and a proletariat not yet able would have to be specified with respect to its historical content; differences between and developments in the economic structures in Bonapartes France, Germany in the 20s, and Italy after World War I must have consequences for political conflicts. Sweezy's emphasis on the international relatedness of monopoly capital springs to mind, too.

2 "To the question, whether the crisis of capitalism after the end of the war inevitably must lead to the socialist revolution, Lenin, as is known, replied that the answer could not be given on the basis of theory. That is only word making, scholasticism. Only the real battle could give the answer. The task of the Communist parties consists of preparing the battle in the best way."
occupations after the war. (See Hoare , 1963, p.104). In a sense therefore, the working class may not have been 'fähig' to take over the state.

Hoare suggests, together with Paris (1963):

"Secondly, there was the failure of the occupation of the Turin factories in September 1920, and the subsequent demoralization and fragmentation of working class organizations. It was only after this date that militant fascist action became widespread. Fascism was initially a campaign of preventive counter-revolutionary terror, launched a month after the occupation of the factories, and financed by steady and increasing subventions from Northern industrialists." (Hoare, 1963, p.106).

This would indicate that fascism in Italy at least was not the last resort of capitalist society in the face of a threatening proletarian revolution, but rather is an expression of growing strength on the side of the bourgeoisie. In support of this interpretation Bauer (1972) may be cited:


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1 "Fascism is fond of justifying itself to the bourgeoisie by saying it has saved the bourgeoisie from the proletarian revolution, from bolschevism. In the event fascism has generally in its propaganda frightened intellectuals, petit bourgeois and peasants with the ghost of bolschevism. But in reality
This analysis could be used as evidence that parliamentary democracy as a form of the state can be viewed as partly autonomous of the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Thalheimer's analysis of fascism is made on the basis of the general assumption that parliamentary democracy increasingly cannot serve the needs of capitalism, he writes:

"Ziemlich allgemein ist heute in der Bourgeoisie vollentwickelter kapitalistischer Länder das Bestreben, das parlamentarische System abzubauen, einzuengen, stärkere politische Garantien für die Bourgeoisieherrschaft zu schaffen". (Thalheimer, 1972, p.38). 1.

This tendency may approach fascism, and may lead to forms of the open dictatorship of capital, which may take the form of fascism.

What Thalheimer here is talking of are stages through which parliamentary democracy changes into forms of dictatorship. Brüning's cabinets would be such stages of 'Entdemokratiesierung', and what is more, recollecting Sweezy's analysis of class equilibrium, Thalheimer is in effect saying that such 'Entdemokratiesierung' by stages is an expression of fascism was not victorious at the time when the bourgeoisie was threatened by the proletarian revolution. It was successful, when the proletariat was already weakened and on the defensive, when the revolutionary flood had already withdrawn. The bourgeoisie and the landowners had not handed over the state to the fascist bands in order to protect itself against a threatening proletarian revolution, but in order to press wages down to destroy the social achievements of the working class, to splinter the trades unions and the political positions of power of the working class; that is, not in order to suppress revolutionary socialism but to destroy the achievements of reformist socialism."

1"It is apparently general in the fully developed capitalist countries for the bourgeoisie to make efforts to demolish and limit the parliamentary system, to get stronger political guarantees for the dominance of the bourgeoisie."
the greater strength of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat and not of a threatening revolutionary situation.

However, this must not be misinterpreted to mean that the bourgeoisie deliberately hands over to the fascists, some of course support them directly. The actual business of 'Selbstverwaltung' is not in the hands of the bourgeoisie, hence Thalheimer's distinction between political and economic power. (See Thalheimer, 1972, p.38).

Concerning Italy, Hoare emphasizes the same two points concerning the question of the autonomy of the fascist movement and of the objective and subjective role of the bourgeoisie. (See Hoare, 1963, p.109).

However, if parliamentary democracy does no longer fully serve the interests of capitalist society, one may ask whether both Thalheimer and Sweezy's assumptions concerning the relationship between state and society must at least be modified. (For a discussion in support of this view see Bauer, 1972, p.154-55).
"The most crucial result of the present study, as it seems to the authors, is the demonstration of a close correspondence in the type of approach and outlook a subject is likely to have in a great variety of areas, ranging from the most intimate features of family and sex adjustment through relationships to other people in general, to religious and to social and political philosophy. Thus a basically hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitative parent-child relationship is apt to carry over into a power-orientated, exploitative-dependent attitude toward one's sex partner and one's God and may well culminate in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be a strong and a disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom. The inherent dramatisation likewise extends from the parent-child dichotomy to the dichotomous conception of sex roles and of moral values, as well as to a dichotomous handling of social relations as manifested especially in the formation of stereotypes and of in-group-out-group cleavages. Conventionality, rigidity, repressive denial, and the ensuing break-through of one's weakness, fear and dependency are but other aspects of the same fundamental personality pattern and they can be observed in personality as well as in attitudes towards religious and social issues" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.971.)

This dramatic statement of a personality syndrome with genetic roots in the child-parent relationship is the most important conclusion reached by Adorno et al. as is also indicated by much of the work and discussion that has followed the publication of 'The Authoritarian Personality'. Viewed in isolation, it is a simplification in the sense that it gives little indication of the circumscribed nature of this contribution to the understanding of social action.

There is a case for presenting the authors' own reservations, so that their own standards may be kept in mind when turning to a discussion of some of the criticisms and considerations arising from their study.
In their introduction, the authors state that their endeavour should be seen as a contribution to the understanding of fascism and prejudice, and formulate their major hypothesis as:

"the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad coherent pattern, as if bound together by a 'mentality' or 'spirit' and that this pattern is an expression of deep lying trends in his personality" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.1.).

With respect to the 'potentially fascistic individual', (i.e. one whose personality structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda (Adorno et al. 1950, p.1.)), they wish to investigate his nature, how he is organised, how common he might be in American society and what has determined his development. (Adorno et al. 1950, p.2.)

The study initially concentrated on anti-semitism on the basis of two assumptions:

1) anti-semitism is probably not a specific or isolated phenomenon, but is a part of a broader ideological framework, and 2) an individual's susceptibility to this ideology depends primarily upon his psychological needs. (Adorno et al. 1950, p.3.)

The authors go on to discuss briefly the relationship between action, ideology and personality stating on page 4 that:

"overt action, like open verbal expression, depends very largely upon the situation of the moment - something that is best described in socio-economic and political terms - but individuals differ very widely with respect to their readiness to be provoked into action. The study of this potential is a part of the study of the individual's overall ideology ..."
However, despite the implied difficulty of positing a one-to-one relation between belief and action the authors assume that all the levels of personality, the underlying motives and needs, attitudes, verbalized attitudes and action can be said to be organised into a whole "in the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful ways" (p.5.). The theory here being brought forward is a theory of the total personality, which is a more or less enduring organization of forms or needs in the individual (Adorno et al. 1950, p.8.)

However, personality is not to be seen as something static and fixed, rather: "personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the social totality within which it occurs" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.5.), with the major qualification that influences of the environment are profounder the earlier in life they take place.

The authors suggest that the family, responsible for the earliest socialization of the child, is greatly influenced by economic and social factors, with the implication that social changes will influence directly 'the kinds of personalities' that evolve at particular points of time in any society.

Thus, put in another way, the authors set out to

"...discover the correlations between ideology and sociological factors operating in the individual's past - whether or not they continue to operate in the present. ... The general approach being to consider personality as an agency through which sociological influences upon ideology are mediated" (p.6.)

However, personality is not to be regarded as a mere object of contemporary environment but as a structure capable
of initiating action and selecting from stimuli:

"personality is mainly apolitical; it is a readiness for behaviour rather than behaviour itself, although it consists in dispositions to behaviour in certain ways, the behaviour that actually occurs will always depend upon the objective situation" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.7.)

Given the above broad outline of the content of the concept of personality, an enduring structure of forces in the individual in continual development and change, under the influence of the social environment, the question arises of how can personality analysis be said to explain political attitudes and action?

This kind of analysis may contribute a great deal to the understanding of social action of individuals, but can it contribute toward a wider understanding of the causation of political movements and their success?

Given the conception of the personality as developing under the impact of the social environment, is anything specific being said about what kinds of social relationships are more likely to lead to the formation of certain personality structures (in this case potential fascist ones)? If so, is any guidance given about how to relate this knowledge to the understanding of social action, beyond merely applying the concepts and theory of personality analysis, to the analysis of social relationships and institutions?

A description of the authoritarian personality

An attempt is here made to consider briefly the arguments for the existence of an authoritarian personality type which
may be said to exist in our time. This will be followed by a consideration of the relationship of personality to social attitudes and action.

Nowhere in 'The Authoritarian Personality' is the theory upon which the research is based explicitly and fully stated, though on the basis of the conclusion and chapter XIX one might attempt to put forward a description of the authoritarian (the prejudiced) personality and also to indicate what psychoanalytical constructs were employed by the authors to account for the dynamics of the personality structure.

The justification for employing a typological analysis of personality structures, which might easily invite the accusation of being equally stereotypical in conception as the typological constructs which is purports to analyse, is to be found in the nature of society itself. 1

All societies yet known are repressive and restricting forces on the development of the individual: "People form psychological 'classes' in as much as they are stamped by variagated social processes" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.747.). Psychological types are a social fact, an objective fact taken to amount to a methodological demand for the use of typologies in psychoanalysis.

"Only by identifying stereotypical traits in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classifications and subsumption be challenged" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.747).

If psychological types are seen as being a social function, a product of social and economic conditions in

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1 See Adorno et al. pp. 744-752.
interaction with the ideological underpinnings of the given society, as witness: "People are continuously moulded from above because they must be moulded if the overall economic pattern is to be maintained ....." (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 976.), one is given the impression of a deterministic view of psychological development. Alternatively the psychological types as represented here are mere epiphenomena of social structure, and hence the understanding of social action on the level of the individual might be more easily facilitated if undertaken in terms of social relationships and their content.

Part of the problem here is the difficulty in meeting the commonly accepted demand of keeping the explanatory analyses of psychology and sociology distinct, in order to be as explicit as possible about what characteristics pertain to the individual as a result of his unique psychological development and what are aspects of social relationships and institutions, so that one may approach an understanding of the articulation between the two levels, that is: what are the psychological consequences of social relationships, in this instance power relationships in particular, and how do individual motivational structures affect social relations and institutions? The explanatory contribution as well as the meaningfulness of the construct of the authoritarian personality type will be dependent on how well the different analytical levels are kept separate whilst demonstrating their interdependence.

This is, of course, not to suggest that the authors at any point envisaged their concept of the prejudiced personality as a single explanatory factor of fascist movements, they explicitly recognise that social structural factors must be taken into account (see Adorno et al. 1950, introduction).
The general pattern of the authoritarian personality

Ross Stagner, reporting an investigation into fascistic attitudes, (Stagner, 1936) states that the results obtained from the use of an opinion scale, which is claimed to be both reliable and internally consistent, were such as to give a valid basis for inferring the existence of "a general attitude describeable as 'sympathy for fascism'", and that "common sense makes it obvious that something binds these isolated units (of the opinion scale) together into an effective integrated reactive system" (Stagner, 1936, p.444).

One of the objectives of 'The Authoritarian Personality' was to develop research instruments that could produce relevant data for testing the major hypotheses of the study: the existence of an organized pattern of attitudes in the individual with respect to the political, economic and social aspects of their environment, this pattern being an expression of underlying personality characteristics. The authors found by the conclusions of their study that they had been able to demonstrate the existence of general personality types, the prejudiced and the unprejudiced personality types. However, it is stressed that these personality types emerge as a result of statistical analysis and thus have to be considered as syndromes of correlating and dynamically related factors. They consist of accumulations of symptoms frequently found together but they leave plenty of room for variations in specific factors.

The ethnically prejudiced personalities were found to divide into a number of sub-types of which the more important were those of the conventional type, the authoritarian type,
and the psychopathological type; of the authoritarian type the authors state, "the syndrome comes closest to the overall picture of the high scorer as it stands out throughout our study" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.759.).

Briefly, the following traits may be said to be involved. The main descriptive category used for the authoritarian personality is a tendency towards dominance-submissiveness, e.g. "the denial of material gratifications, indicative of a restrictive superego, is no less characteristic than the two-fold pleasure in being obeyed and giving pleasure to the boss" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.760.), leading to awareness of power relationships and identification with those in positions of authority. Ambivalence is all pervasive, being evidenced mainly by the simultaneity of blind belief in authority and readiness to attack those who are socially acceptable as 'victims' (p.759). Clearly related to this is the development of a rigid, stereotypical outlook on the world; further characteristics are conformism to the social standards of the persons in the group, emphasis on toughness, strength, femininity in case of women though less clearly pronounced, and preoccupation with sex and sexual purity.

The Conventional subtype is characterized by a resolution of the oedipus complex different from that of the Authoritarian type; instead of identifying with parental authority, this type may submit to authority only unconsciously whilst overtly showing a destructive tendency towards all authority, together with a readiness to submit to propaganda.

To indicate some of the differences between the main subtypes distinguished by the authors, it has been necessary to touch upon explanation of the dynamics of the personality
structures, an aspect which will be dealt with later.

With respect to the evidence for the existence of such personality types, it is not my intention to enter into an exhaustive discussion of the methodological and conceptual problems involved when attempting to provide valid evidence for the existence of a causal relationship between personality structure and ideology, and for the existence of a generalized attitude structure as intervening between the deeper levels of personality and ideology.

In chapter 2 of 'The Authoritarian Personality' which is concerned with "the contrasting ideologies of two college men", the authors state on page 56:

"Even if factors of personality did not come explicitly to the fore at particular points in the interviews with these two men, the conception of personality would be forced upon us by observation of the consistency with which the same ideas and the same modes of thought recur as the discussion turns from one ideological area to another. Since no such consistency could conceivably exist as a matter of sociological fact, we are bound to conceive of central tendencies in the person which express themselves in various areas".

On page 288 the authors go on to suggest that sampling biases of a higher than average I.Q. and educational level "have (not) distorted to any appreciable degree the relationships among the variables of ideology, personality and group membership under investigation".

It may well be that Adorno et al. are correct in suggesting that sampling considerations are of less importance when attempting to establish whether a general attitudinal structure can be said to exist, and which furthermore for the individuals in a given sample may be said to articulate a given ideology, but it is quite a different matter to generalize from this to all other samples and suggest that
the acceptance of a particular set of ideological beliefs and attitudes indicate the existence of a similar underlying broad attitudinal structure articulating deeper personality needs. Indeed one might legitimately question the a priori exclusion of sociological explanation of ideology.

Further discussion of the methodological problems arising from 'The Authoritarian personality' is provided by Hyman, Sheatsley, and Christie (in Christie and Jahoda, 1954). A brief indication of the nature of their critique is perhaps in order.

Hyman & Sheatsley suggest that the interviewing and coding procedures are of suspect validity from the point of view of providing an independent criterion with which to correlate the measures of authoritarianism, and go on to suggest that it is commonly agreed upon "that one cannot generalize about the degree of attitude organization from one group to another - or even for the same group from one point in time to another" (Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.58.). Hence if attitude organization cannot be generalized from one sample to another or from one social group to another, then the relationship between personality characteristics and attitudes, should, by the same argument, be expected to vary between samples and social groups.

Christie indicates:

"that the generalizations made in 'The Authoritarian Personality' fail to do justice to either the influence of broad social factors or membership in face-to-face groups, upon ideology. What is illuminated, however, is the importance of individual personality characteristics in those instances in which selective identification with groups occurs" (Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.182.).

Hyman and Sheatsley on the other hand make an extensive review of the importance of formal education in determining
whether the acceptance of an authoritarian ideology is indicative of an authoritarian character (personality) structure, or whether the correlation of scores between the authoritarianism scale and the ethnocentrism scale may be spurious and thus not necessarily indicating a personality describeable in terms of dominance-submission.

The idea here is that even if it is agreed that prejudice is irrational, this irrationality need not stem from psychological conditions, but on the contrary, may be dependent on social relationships, e.g. be an expression of conformity with the beliefs and values of the significant social environment, or be an expression of the knowledge available to the individual. However, when the better educated person persists in holding prejudiced views, in the face of the availability of more sophisticated knowledge, this may indicate that this particular kind of irrationality is necessary for maintaining psychological balance.

Thus Hyman and Sheatsley are led to conclude:

"certainly, consistency must be explained not in terms of the specific objects of prejudice, but as a generalized disposition within the person - but the organizing factor behind this generalized disposition may very well be societal. We are far from being inevitably thrown back on deep personality factors" (Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.112.).

To develop some of the general problems raised here, I shall attempt a consideration of the value of using a psychoanalytically based theory of motivation in understanding why people hold certain values and beliefs and their relationship to social action.
The dynamic personality structure of the authoritarian personality.

Underlying the authoritarian personality type as described above, a fairly permanent structure was posited to exist, of which the more outward attributes were seen to play a dynamic functional role. The authors stress that only insofar as such a structure can be said to exist can one speak of a personality structure as opposed to an association of variables (attitudes) resulting from external relationships, i.e. the personality structure exists over time regardless of the changing social environmental circumstances.

Adorno et al. suggest that the authoritarian personality structure is the result of a particular kind of resolution of the oedipal conflict where the individual must learn to master the integration into his personality of his conscience or super-ego whilst at the same time allowing for gratification of his impulses, his libidinal drives. The ego is the self-expressing and self-controlling agency to which the function of relating the demands of conscience, inner impulses and the self into a moderately acceptable synthesis is attributed.

It is hypothesized that where the ego is weak and the super-ego is inadequately internalized to form a lasting structure of values in the self (with background in which the ego may relate the individual to reality), the ego must defend itself against the insufficiently managed demands of an outside agency in conflict with the libido with the aid of diffuse mechanisms leading to irrational compulsive interaction with reality (see Adorno et al. 1950, chapter 7).
With respect to the authoritarian personality the hypothesized internal dynamics of his character structure would be of the following nature: in the oedipal phase the child must integrate into his personality outside social control as represented by parental authority, and at the same time learn to cope with the aggressive impulses against any restriction or repression, be it in the shape of the super-ego or of an outside authority. The individual through the ego has to develop a mode of coping with and accepting the persistent conflict between the demands of the libido and the super-ego without submitting to either of the two so that the individual may develop the ability of making non-compulsive choices between alternative ways of acting.

In the case of the authoritarian personality the child has not been able to cope with his resistance against authority and has resolved the conflict in one particular way. On the one hand he has completely submitted himself to the outside authority suppressing all negative feelings towards this authority, which instead of becoming internalized, remains at least partly external, taking on an almost absolute and objectified nature for the individual. On the other hand the negative feelings toward authority which the individual was unable to acknowledge have to find an outlet, according to the theory, directly in the form of hostility and aggression towards those the individual perceives as weaker and less authoritarian than himself, but more importantly in certain characteristic ways of relating himself to the social environment. Not only does he vent his aggressions on those weaker than himself, but he tends to project onto out-groups the qualities of for example his father, against which he revolted; hence in this personality system stereotypical
attitudes play a supporting role in assisting the ego in satisfying the super-ego and in giving release for hostile feelings and thus reducing anxiety. As the ego only inadequately can make autonomous compromises between super-ego and id the individual becomes very dependent upon outside guidance and will therefore appear as very conventional in attitudes and values, this conventionality, the authors stress, must be distinguished from a true conservative in whom the conventional values are integrated into the personality, the essential point is the need for outside guidance, rather than the content of such guidance, rendering the individual open to manipulation.

Conventionalism and authoritarianism, the authors suggest, may

"be regarded as signs of ego weakness .... Ego weakness would, it seemed, be expressed fairly directly in such phenomena as opposition to introspection, in superstition and stereotypy, and in overemphasis upon the ego and its supposed strength" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.234.)

In 'The Authoritarian Personality' there is a certain ambiguity as to the nature of the theory advanced. To a great extent the theory is a development of Freudian psychology, but now and again a new element enters as when the authors write:

"According to Max Horkheimer's theory ...... external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of impulses. In order to achieve 'internalization' of social control which never gives as much to the individual as it takes, the latter's attitude towards authority and its psychological agency, the super-ego, assumes an irrational aspect. The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. This brings
into play the Sado-masochistic impulse structure both as a condition and as a result of social adjustment. In our form of society, sadistic, as well as masochistic tendencies actually find gratification. The pattern of translation of such gratifications into character traits is a specific resolution of the oedipus complex which defines the formation of the syndrome here in question (the authoritarian syndrome) - (see Adorno et al. 1950, p.759).

It can be argued that this is a Marxist oriented theory of the psychological repercussion of social repression (see, for example Greenstein, 1965, p.90), the point is that it makes a difference whether one is arguing that in a given repressive society, the individual, in order to adjust, must develop irrational aspects in his personality, or whether one is arguing that in coming to terms with social restrictions, some individuals will fail in developing an adequate ego, possibly indicating what kind of childhood relationships one would expect to find supportive of ego development.

One may try to strike a compromise by suggesting that the authoritarian solution to the oedipal conflict is more characteristic of certain social groups than of others, e.g. "Sociologically, this syndrome (the authoritarian syndrome) used to be, in Europe, highly characteristic of the lower middle classes" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.759). Given the context of the rest of the book, this is taken to indicate that one would expect the childhood environment to be particularly repressive in this class; why this should be so would then call for explanation, not merely from Freudian psychology, but also from sociology.

1 In the preceding presentation of the psychoanalytic theory underlying the notion of the authoritarian personality, reference to repressed sexuality was omitted. It is not quite clear what is the import of sexual repression in 'The Authoritarian Personality' - whether sexual repression is seen as only one aspect of submitting to the standards of outside authority, or whether it has a dynamic significance of its own, as indicated by the notion of the sado-masochistic character.
Yet difficulties remain. On the basis of psychoanalytical analysis of the dynamics of the authoritarian personality one cannot conclude that all children with a similar environment will develop the same personality structures.

Indeed what appears to be suggested in the quote concerning Horkheimer's theory, is a theoretical position allowing for a direct transference from psychological relationships to what must be seen to be analogous or even identical sociological relationships, and following on from this, the supposition of stereotypical interaction as indicated by a stereotypical attitude structure. When not circumscribed by modifications and the insightful reservations of the authors, a deterministic view of personality development and of the relationship between personality and social structure appears to be the result of such a theoretical position.1

Part of the difficulty in establishing whether an authoritarian personality can be said to exist lies in the status of psychoanalytical theory and the methodology employed to provide evidence for the theory: in this case not only the use of a modified method of psychoanalysis but also other methods, in particular the extensive use of questionnaire techniques, validated against results obtained from psychoanalysis.

It is by no means clear what evidence would provide adequate proof of the theory, as can be seen from the authors' own clear admission of the difficulties involved in developing

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1 Freudian psychology may be argued to be less deterministic: the insight afforded being the conflict between id and super-ego, but no deterministic outcome suggested. (See Wrong in Smelser & Smelser, 1963, p.72.).
an attitude scale that would indicate the existence of a particular underlying personality structure.

Farrell suggests that at the present point of time

"psychoanalytical theory is not sufficiently determinate, logically or empirically, to warrant us describing it without qualification as 'scientific' and that ... (the method of psychoanalysis) ... is a source of evidence that is scientifically very unsatisfactory" (Farrell, 1964, p.107.).

Farrell concludes his discussion of the status of psychoanalytical theory by suggesting that

"it is a premature empirical synthesis, which may or may not be more or less of an approximation to the truth. Yet in being such a pre-scientific system it provides the scientific world with a rich mine of concepts and hypotheses" (Farrell, 1964, p.121.);

he goes on to argue that its status will gradually be resolved by having 'incorporated' into science what is of value in it (p.122)\textsuperscript{1}.

Farrell's evaluation of the status of psychoanalytical theory would appear to be based upon the assumption that psychology and psychoanalysis in particular aim at establishing a body of knowledge which can meet the usual logical criteria for being a scientific theory as exemplified by the claims made for the natural sciences.

One may not agree that this is the aim of psychoanalytical psychology and sociology, or that it is even a possible aim. However, 'The Authoritarian Personality' appears to claim that some measure of the relationship between ideology and personality structure has been established, wherefore at

\textsuperscript{1} for example, a study of the way in which non-authoritarians may be said to be more insightful than authoritarians. (Schulberg, 1962)
least the methodological aspects must be judged against the usual standards of scientific enquiry.\(^1\)

The authors themselves indicate that other explanations of generalized attitude structures than underlying personality structures could be advanced. When speaking of subtypes of the prejudiced personality, they mention that of the 'Surface resentment type':

"We may say that there are a number of people who 'belong together' in terms of more or less rational motivations, whereas the remainder or our 'high' syndromes are characterized by the relative absence or spuriousness of rational motivation which, in their case (the surface resentment type), has to be recognized as a mere 'rationalization'," (Adorno et al. 1950, p.753.).

However, they do stress that whereas prejudice does not seem to be the outlet for suppressed desires this personality type as a whole would tend to exhibit a similar structure to other high scorers: "...(they) accept stereotypes of prejudice ... in order to rationalize and overcome overt difficulties of their own existence." (Adorno et al. 1950, p.754).

"It may be added that if there is any truth in the popular 'scapegoat theory' of anti-semetism it applies to people of her (this) kind" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.756.).

What the authors are suggesting is that prejudice can result from 'more or less rational' motivation and learning, and not just from a need to protect a weak ego.

In view of the difficulties in accepting the measure of authoritarianism as a valid indicator of underlying personality (see Hyman & Sheatsley in Christie & Jahoda, 1954), it

\(^1\) See Hyman & Sheatsley in Christie & Jahoda, 1954.
would appear that this personality type of surface resentment points to the importance of social structure for the acquisition of knowledge and development of attitudes. Adorno et al. themselves state:

"(the phenomenon of surface resentment) should not be entirely neglected in our discussion since it represents a sociological aspect of our problem which might be underestimated in its importance for the fascist potential if we concentrate entirely on psychological description and etiology" (p.754.).

The importance of sociological factors for a fascist potential is, however, not quite clear. Although the authors only admit to a modification of their general theory by saying that prejudice still fulfils the function of relieving anxiety for the person by offering a reason for some failure that might otherwise be attributed to the individual in question, it would appear that interaction with the social environment is of more direct importance to the development of a specific set of attitudes or an attitude structure.

Using different terminology, a given individual's particular set of attitudes may not be sufficiently explained by reference to underlying personality needs as the most important factor.

The above mentioned problem of interpreting the effect of the amount of education on the relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice may serve as an illustration. Hyman & Sheatsley (in Christie & Jahoda, 1954, p.91) state that there were no controls made for the possible influence of the factor of education on prejudice, though an investigation of the distribution of prejudiced and non-prejudiced personalities in terms of years of formal education would indicate that there might be such a relationship, and that therefore indicators of ethnocentrism such as conventionality
in outlook might be interpreted as expressing not so much personality dynamics, as a lack of sophistication in the use of concepts and inadequate knowledge. Hyman and Sheatsley further suggest that in the case of better educated people, when the relationship between anti-semetism and prejudice was found to hold, prejudice may be a 'derived irrationality' (see Hyman & Sheatsley in Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.109).

Janowitz and Marwick (in Smelser & Smelser, 1963) found that education was inversely related to authoritarianism, but that the significance of education differed with respect to social class. Higher education was related to a fall in authoritarianism for middle class people whereas no significant relationship was found to hold for lower class people. This finding is at variance with other investigations into the working class and authoritarianism, such as the widely cited study of Miller & Riessmann (1961). On the face of it, either one of the studies is in error, or both are. However, perhaps a part of the explanation of the discrepancy in findings lies in the difficulty in knowing exactly what it is that is measured by the administration of various F scales.¹

Christie (Christie & Jahoda, 1954, p.146) reports a study of the discriminatory value of the F scale between apathetic and non-apathetic college students. No relationship was found, however an administration of the projective questions, touching on similar dimensions of personality to those supposed by the F scale, was found to be highly discriminatory. As Janowitz and Marwick administered a scale of

projective questions and as they found that authoritarianism was significantly related to feeling of political ineffectiveness and to non-voting, perhaps part of the explanation of why education was found not to be significantly related to lower class authoritarianism may be found here. As on the one hand they were using a measure of authoritarianism which they themselves postulate to be an expression of thwarted self interest and lack of self confidence (Smelser & Smelser, 1963, p.464) and on the other hand the level of education in the lower class may not affect the response to this particular measure.

It is not suggested here that a high score on the measures of authoritarianism developed by Adorno et al. is merely an artifact of education and that in fact the measure used by Janowitz & Marwick (in Smelser & Smelser, 1963) is a more valid measure of authoritarianism. It is, however, suggested that with respect to the underlying personality nothing definite can necessarily be said. For example, the better educated lower class individual portraying authoritarian attitudes may not hold these primarily as an expression of personality dynamics but because he experiences the world as being divided into strong and weak, and because the expectations he may have acquired through a higher education may not have been fulfilled. Therefore, it could be argued that his is not an irrational interpretation of his situation and environment. Consequently, it can be argued that social factors may operate in the development of attitudes regardless of personality, that on the one hand one may have adopted authoritarian attitudes because they dominate among the people with whom one interacts and on the other hand they may be fairly rational interpretations of the social conditions with which one is faced, as was the case of the surface resentment authoritarian.
From the point of view of motivational theory of attitude formation, Sarnoff and Katz (1954) suggest that "similar attitudes may function in the service of different motivational patterns" (p.124). They hypothesize three main contexts of motivation in relation to which attitudes may be formed (a) realitytesting, i.e. the individual is motivated to acquire knowledge about the world, (b) reward and punishment, that is, the individual is motivated to adapt to the social environment and (c) Ego defence, the motive here being to defend a weak ego, through projection and other forms of symptom formation to achieve some gratification of suppressed impulses.¹

On Sarnoff and Katz' own suggestion, all three motivational contexts may be relevant in explaining why people hold authoritarian views, e.g. the lower class educated authoritarian may find that as an aid in cognition 'authoritarian' concepts correspond more to reality than others, that other people with whom he interacts hold similar views, and that authoritarian attitudes may serve to protect him against seeing himself as a personal failure in comparison with the expectations he may have acquired through education.

The childhood origins of authoritarianism.

The central problem with which this discussion attempts to deal is that of the relationship between personality and social action.

Though 'The Authoritarian Personality' is careful to state that personality is not the only important factor determining social action and is probably not the most important one, the whole emphasis of the book is on personality and personality development, i.e. suggesting perhaps tacitly that the authors view personality as the more important variable in action: "The present research seeks to discover correlations between ideology and sociological factors operating in the individual's past - whether or not they continue to operate in his present" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.6).

Consequently the childhood conditions for personality development are of direct importance for understanding social action, as the authors state: "The major influence upon personality development arises in the course of family training as carried forward in a setting of family life" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.6).

If the theory is found to hold, it would be of importance to see whether childhood environment differs significantly with respect to personality development for different social classes.

Research on the relationship between class-related child-rearing practices and authoritarianism seems to be inconclusive. On the one hand, writers such as Lipset (1964) find that a working class upbringing is likely to lead to the development of an authoritarian personality and on the other hand Kecskemeti & Leites (1947) suggest that a middle class childhood environment is conducive to the same; 'The Authoritarian Personality' itself would appear to be suggesting as much.¹

¹ See 'The Authoritarian Personality' pp.759-60.
Though on the face of things it would appear plausible to assume that class differences also articulate significantly in childhood environments the empirical evidence for the relationship between class membership and participation in or support of fascist or right-wing movements is contradictory on a cross-national basis; the relationship of the working class to the German Nazi party is not entirely supportive of Lipset's thesis, for example.

With respect to the evidence advanced in 'The Authoritarian Personality' for the childhood preconditions for later authoritarianism, it would appear that the people interviewed concerning their childhood differ systematically in terms of the experiences recalled, according to whether they are low or high on prejudice. However, their reports are of course retrospective and may therefore have been distorted by later experiences and personality development and may not agree with other reports of the same event by other people.

Christie (Christie and Jahoda, 1954) points to the fact that part of the sample used for investigating childhood experiences is suspect with respect to representativeness and the individual ratings on prejudice are suspect to the independence of the rating procedure.

It is therefore doubtful whether 'The Authoritarian Personality' advances sufficient evidence for the childhood origin of certain personality types. Part of the data is based on a study of psychiatric clinic patients, where a relationship in the expected direction was found between reported childhood experience and prejudiced attitudes. Christie suggests (Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.189) that the rating procedure in this part of the sample is fairly
unbiased and that therefore this strengthens the evidence of
the other data, that prejudiced people recall different
childhood experiences than do unprejudiced people, and that
there is some basis for relying on recollection.

However, Bendix's point that psychiatric patients are
a self selected sample (Bendix, 1952b) would be of relevance
here. Frenkel-Brunswick writes:

"A preliminary inspection of the data supports the
assumption made in 'The Authoritarian Personality'
that warmer, closer and more affectionate inter-personal
relationships prevail in the homes of the unprejudiced
children" (In Christie and Jahoda, 1954, p.236).

'Prevail' would seem to be the significant word in this
case, indicating that Freudian theory does not posit a
direct one-to-one relationship between childhood experience
and personality development. People brought up in a home with
"orientation toward rigid conformity" (Frenkel-Brunswick) can
be posited to be more likely to develop authoritarian persona-
lities, but may not do so. It would be as important to explain
why people do not develop a certain personality type as why
they do. However, much greater knowledge of which variables
are relevant is needed; what would appear to be of relevance
here would be an understanding of the importance of adult
experiences for the development of personality, as compared
with childhood ones. It would appear not unreasonable to
suggest that experiences in adult life are likely to affect
personality development, or at least attitude structure.

1 the data mentioned is from a study on social discrimination
in children and adolescents carried out at the Institute of
Child Welfare at the University of California at Berkley.
CHAPTER 7

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDES.

It was suggested above that 'The Authoritarian Personality' viewed personality as the most important factor in determining action and in the formation of attitudes, despite reservations that other factors are related to social action and to ideology. In reaching the conclusion that a personality type with certain fairly fixed traits, labelled as 'prefascist', can be said to exist, the authors also suggest how a person with such traits is most likely to act in a given situation. What is being said is that these are the people who par excellence are likely to support fascist movements, implicitly suggesting that the same personality traits are the major causes of such movements.

In order to facilitate an attempt to assess what kind of contribution psychoanalytical theory could be said to make to the understanding of social action, in this case fascist movements, it would appear relevant to consider some of the problems involved in relating personality to attitudes, opinions and social action.

What kind of evidence is used to demonstrate that a given personality type is likely to hold certain attitudes and how are we to understand such a correspondence if it may be said to exist?

Sarnoff and Katz (1954) suggest that perhaps the F scale developed in 'The Authoritarian Personality' measures not so much an underlying personality structure as a set of beliefs and values. This bears directly upon the relationship
between personality and attitudes. 'The Authoritarian Personality' at times gives the impression that its authors view prejudiced attitudes etc. as part of the personality structure itself, and indeed it is argued that: "(their) general approach (is) to consider personality as an agency through which sociological influences upon ideology are mediated" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.6). Cautiously interpreted, this suggests that ideology, beliefs, and values are an integrated part of personality, and have a function of satisfying certain needs. However, the whole tenor of the book indicates something more, namely that a particular personality type, the authoritarian, will hold particular beliefs, because only such beliefs are functional for the maintenance of that personality structure. This interpretation seems to be supported by a later statement of one of the authors: "...many of the personality characteristics that influence the individual's political participation are directly reflected (immanent) with it" (Levinson, 1958, p.7).

However as one is not able to say definitively that a given childhood environment will lead to the development of a particular personality type\(^1\), at least one has to accept that it is difficult to specify adequately what that given must be, so that it is legitimate to suggest that people with similar personality structures may hold different beliefs and attitudes, and conversely that people who hold similar beliefs are different in personality.

A corrolary to this is to suggest that beliefs about power relationships, such as those measured by the F-scale, may

\(^1\) See chapter 6.
serve different aspects of personality for different people and for the same people at different times.¹

Finally one might suggest that the personality does not necessarily become fixed at a certain stage in development but may be open to continuous change and modification, through the effect of more or less rational choice and through interaction with the social and ideological environment of the present. Thus personality is not merely a result of "sociological factors operating in the person's past"; on the contrary, a change in ideological alternatives available may lead to development and change in personality.

The left and right authoritarian personality and the dogmatic personality.

An early critique of 'The Authoritarian Personality' was that of Shils (in Christie & Jahoda, 1954) positing that the F scale measures not so much authoritarianism in general, but right-wing authoritarianism in particular. Shils suggests that there are people with authoritarian personality traits who exhibit what are conventionally thought of as left-wing political views and attitudes. Therefore, he argues, the measure of authoritarianism as developed by Adorno et al. only captures those who accept conventional expressions of authoritarianism.²

One might expect that an authoritarian personality


² which may not be indicative of authoritarian personality traits. See chapter 6.
syndrome would be expressed in authoritarian attitudes and that this again would be connected with right-wing political beliefs. The theoretical assumptions of 'The Authoritarian Personality', both the psychoanalytical ones concerning the development of the authoritarian personality and the Marxist orientated sociological ones, as exemplified in the theory that people are continuously moulded from above (Adorno et al. 1950, conclusion) could be said to mutually reinforce the hypothesis that such would be the relationship between personality and attitudes. However, psychoanalytical theory may account for the development of a personality type which may be called authoritarian, but it does not account for the presence of authoritarian beliefs and right-wing political ideology. Perhaps the point of Adorno et al. would be that one is not possible without the other; for example:

"Today the growing child, who instead of the image of a father, has received only the abstract idea of arbitrary power, looks for a stronger more powerful father, for a superfather, as it is furnished by fascist imagery" (Horkheimer, in Anshen, 1949, p.365),

i.e. the family is seen as essential for instilling respect for authority into the next generation through the respect for parental authority.

When the internalisation of parental authority fails the individual in adult life will be concerned with the conventional aspects and the externalities of authority and will therefore be open to fascist propaganda. The quote from Horkheimer represents a Marxist sociological analysis of the psychological and sociological implications of the changing and declining role of the bourgeois family in industrialized capitalist society, an analysis which the authors of 'The Authoritarian Personality' acknowledge as having been influential on their assumptions and hypotheses. Whilst this is an
oversimplification of the sociological positions of Horkheimer and Adorno et al., it is not entirely an unjust one, because both contributions on the relationship between family, personality and beliefs do suggest a direct relationship, and a tendency to equate the psychological and ideological meaning of authoritarianism, and for that matter the sociological meaning. Wrong argues: "that the relations between social norms, the individual's selection from these, his conduct, and his feelings about his conduct are far from self evident" (Wrong, 1961, p.73). That 'The Authoritarian Personality' presents partly a more deterministic viewpoint could be argued to be the result of attempting to integrate a marxist analysis with a psychoanalytical analysis, the theorems of which, Bendix argues, are based on biographical data and tends to be deterministic when generalized. (Bendix, 1952b).

In 'The Authoritarian Personality' itself there are examples of personality types similar to the authoritarian personality type which scores low on the F scale, in the work entitled "The 'rigid' low scores" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.771) and "The 'protesting' low scores" (p.774). This suggests that different sets of belief may go with the same underlying personality structure. When discussing the 'rigid' low scores, the authors write:

"the latter kind of low scores are definitely disposed towards totalitarianism in their thinking; what is accidental up to a certain degree is the particular brand of ideological world formula that they chance to come into contact with" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.772).

With respect to the surface resentment type (high scores) prejudice was suggested not to be significant for the underlying personality structure.
For all the high scoring types, and to a certain extent with respect to the two low scoring types, it is stressed that they all possess the 'generality of prejudicial outlook' (Adorno et al. 1950, p.754). This presumably is the more important aspect of the personalities for the authors, seemingly pointing to a very strong relationship indeed between personality and attitudes towards out-groups. But at the same time evidence is provided that attitudes may have more rational functions as witness the 'surface resentment type', or be acquired by chance, i.e. be related to the attitudinal environment. However, 'The Authoritarian Personality' is taken to argue that authoritarian personalities are more likely to hold political views and attitudes that also, logically, would appear to make for the best fit with their personality; that is, logically, a personality described in terms of authoritarian dominance-submissiveness is expected to hold attitudes that may be described in the same terms, or at least to be open holding such attitudes.

Against the argument that the authoritarian personality is likely to hold authoritarian beliefs Rokeach (1960) argues as did Shils, that the measurement instrument and the conception of 'The Authoritarian Personality' is politically slanted. Rokeach's position would appear to be similar to that of Adorno et al., in regarding personality as a fairly stable structure of traits that influence behaviour, but he suggests:

"... that authoritarianism is also manifest among radicals, liberals, and middle-of-the-roaders as well as among conservatives and reactionaries. Furthermore, authoritarianism can be recognised as a problem in such areas as science, art, literature and philosophy, where fascism and ethnocentrism are not necessarily the main issues or may even be totally absent as issues. As pointed out in this paper, dogmatism, which is assumed to involve both authoritarianism and intolerance, need
not necessarily take the form of fascist authoritarianism or ethnic intolerance" (Rokeach, in Hollander and Hunt, 1963, pp. 170-171).

Instead Rokeach argues that authoritarianism as investigated in 'The Authoritarian Personality' and its relationship to prejudice is only one aspect of the manifestations of authoritarianism and intolerance, or dogmatism as he prefers to call what he declares as one end of a continuum of predominant modes of organizing cognition about reality into more or less closed systems of beliefs and disbeliefs.

The postulated content of dogmatism is in many ways similar to the content of authoritarianism as described in 'The Authoritarian Personality', with the major difference that where Adorno et al. make a description based upon psychoanalytical analysis of the dynamics and genesis of authoritarianism, e.g.:

"Thus a basically hierarchical authoritarian, exploitative parent-child relationship is apt to carry over into a power-oriented, exploitively dependent attitude towards one's sex partner and one's God and may well culminate in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be a strong and disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.971).

Rokeach's description of the dogmatic personality is not reduceable to a basic dichotomy of weakness and strength but to a continuum of positive and negative authority:

"At the center of the belief-disbelief system, to the extent it is closed, is assumed a set of absolute beliefs about positive and negative authority and other closely related beliefs representing attempts by such authority to reinforce and perpetuate itself" (Rokeach, in Hollander and Hunt, 1963, p.169).

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1 See Rokeach, in Hollander and Hunt, 1963, p.163 ff.
One might say that Rokeach offers an analytical description of how a person with an authoritarian personality on the cognitive level maintains and changes his attitudes, but not of how and why he may hold given beliefs, and that dogmatism may be regarded in this sense as an aspect of authoritarianism. However, a dogmatic way of organizing beliefs about any particular field may not indicate an authoritarian personality.

Though Rokeach, in defence of having formulated a general theory of authoritarianism, in contrast to what he finds Adorno et al. to have done, may argue that the psychological effects of a dogmatic way of thinking, e.g. feelings of hatred and fear towards those in opposition to the positive authority, intolerance toward people in disagreement, etc., are characteristic of the authoritarian's feeling toward outgroups. Indeed Rokeach would postulate that his concept of dogmatism contains more than ideas concerning belief about authority and is a conceptualization of the general structure of belief systems viz: "As has already been said earlier in this work, we consider it to be first and foremost a measure of the extent to which the total mind is an open mind or a closed one" (Rokeach, 1960, p.397).

In attempting to develop a politically neutral measure of authoritarianism Rokeach has concentrated his analysis on the structure of cognitive belief systems in contra-distinction to Adorno et al. who emphasized personality dynamics as determining beliefs and prejudice. Rokeach suggests that there are certain properties common to all belief systems regardless of their nature and independent of personality, in that ideas, people and authority are ordered along lines of 'belief congruence' (Rokeach, 1960, p.369), but that with
respect to differences between belief systems, these may be categorized along a continuum in terms of open and closed minds or systems, i.e.: "the capacity to distinguish information from source of information and to evaluate each on its own merits" (Rokeach, 1960, p.369). Rokeach does not purport to develop the dynamics and motivational aspects of dogmatism.

Having charged that the F scale and the concept behind it is politically biased, Rokeach purports, on the basis of his analysis of the structure of belief systems, to have developed a value neutral scale for the measurement of dogmatism. A priori one would expect that many of the problems of validity that beset the F scale would be at present here, in particular, differences in sophistication and education might influence scores.

In support of his claim, Rokeach stresses the scores of English communists who were low on 'The Authoritarian Personality's' F scale and ethnocentrism scale but high on the Dogmatism scale and on the Left and Right Opinionation scale.\(^1\) However, he also points out that the Dogmatism and the Opinionation scales show a weak but positive relation to conservatism, and that Dogmatism shows a higher correlation with Right than with Left opinionation (see Rokeach, 1960, p.125-6). This might indicate that the Dogmatism scale is less neutral than Rokeach claimed. Rokeach favours a more 'fascinating' explanation. He suggests that whereas in terms of structure (e.g. repression, discipline) communism and

\(^1\) (cross validating measures for the Dogmatism scale developed by Rokeach, in particular thought to measure vehemence of attitudes held, supposedly an aspect of dogmatism)
fascism may be regarded as equally authoritarian, in terms of ideological content they may not, communism being humanitarian and anti-authoritarian and the opposite being true for fascism, here structure and content support each other, a position which may account for the affinity found between Dogmatism and Right wing ideologies, whereas adherents of communism may experience conflict between structure and content.

Rokeach cites Lindner's (1953) argument: "(that) ... there is a neurotic component (of anxiety, guilt, and conflict) to communism, but a psychopathic component to fascism" (Rokeach, 1960, p.127-128).

One might very tentatively suggest that this conclusion does not completely fail to support the position of 'The Authoritarian Personality'; looking at the relationship of the specific kinds of psychological disturbances to high and low scoring, the authors conclude that there was a relationship between high scores on the ethnocentrism scale and the classification 'anxiety state' and a relationship between low scores and what was labelled 'mixed neurosis'. (See Adorno et al. 1950, p.964). The 'mixed neurosis' cases were characterised by being more aware of themselves and their problems, and

"the complaints of low scoring patients very rarely consisted of vague anxiety or of physical symptoms alone. If anxiety without content appeared at all, the patient also reported being concerned about other problems" (Adorno et al., p.964).

It could be argued that experiencing conflict and guilt is consonant with being aware of oneself and one's problems rather than with severe anxiety.
Rokeach brings other seemingly ambiguous evidence in support of his main hypothesis of a strong positive correlation between measures of anxiety and dogmatism. Whilst this relation is found to hold generally it holds less so for communism. (Rokeach, 1960, Chapter 19). The hypothetical explanation presented is that the dogmatic content of communism, together with activism, reduces anxiety, rather than that communists are less anxiety troubled initially. Putting aside the question of to what extent this may be so, it seems equally plausible to suggest that in this case anxiety is not the only motivation for accepting a so-called dogmatic belief system, the awareness of other kinds of problems and a desire for their solution may also be involved.1

It may be suggested that by concentrating on the structure of belief systems rather than on their dynamic and motivational aspects (Rokeach suggests this to be the next step), Rokeach appears to be suggesting that the same underlying 'affective personality state' 2 is involved whenever a person is classified at the closed end of the belief system continuum. Rokeach argues that he has developed a measure of general authoritarianism where the size of the score is not related to the particular beliefs a person holds, that e.g. dogmatists of the left, right, and centre score equally high on the authoritarian criteria. He cites a study by Barker (1958) in support of this position (Rokeach, 1960, p.397).

However, the same Barker in a later study rather modifies this position (Barker, 1963). Using a supposedly more

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1 (See 'The protesting low scorer' was guilt ridden and possessed an autonomous conscience, in 'The Authoritarian Personality')

2 See Rokeach, 1960, p.400, for his view of the affective personality being represented in his cognitive personality.
representative sample he found that rightists score higher on the dogmatism scale than leftists and that there are more dogmatic rightists than leftists and moderates. With respect to opinionation, rightists score higher than leftists because they censure both rightists and leftists. Barker concludes that general authoritarianism is more associated with rightist ideology than leftist. Finally he found that the F scale discriminates right-wing dogmatists quite well, but left-wing dogmatists not at all, and that dogmatic rightists score higher on the F scale than the non-dogmatic rightists, in particular on ideas indicating authoritarian aggression, tending towards projection, and emphasis on power and toughness. Barker concludes from this that the notion of general authoritarianism, or dogmatism, has turned out to be viable, but that it appears somewhat more related to right-wing ideology than to leftist ideology than was posited by Rokeach, and finally that the direction of the opinionation (intolerance) and authoritarian aggression is different between right and left dogmatists. The right-wing dogmatists are more submissive to authority, at least the usual authority in our society (Barker, 1963).

Christie. (Christie and Jahoda, 1954) points out that the results obtained on the F scale vary according to the nature of the sample, as do results from attempts to validate the meaning of its items. Barker explains similarly the varying results he has obtained on tests of the generality of the Dogmatism scale, by differences in samples, where the differences between left and right wing dogmatism only come out when the sample includes people on the more extreme left and right. However, this leaves unanswered the question of to
what extent degree of dogmatism and content of belief are related causally.

Further light is perhaps thrown on the problem by Bay (1967), who cites some findings of McClosky on the relationship between conservatism and personality:

"By every measure available to us, conservative beliefs are found most frequently among the misinformed, the poorly educated, and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent; conservatism, in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social status, of people who think poorly of themselves ... who are submissive, timid and wanting in confidence; in four liberal-conservative classifications, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for their imperfections and weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgements. Although aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others, they are unusually defensive and armoured in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike in themselves" (Bay, 1967, pp.80-81).

The conclusion Bay draws from this evidence is that

"if the findings recorded in 'The Authoritarian Personality' of affinity between conservatism and neurotic authoritarianism can be questioned on methodological grounds, and if Rokeach's data only mildly suggested a similar affinity, McClosky's tables appear methodologically solid and of great theoretical import" (Bay, 1967, p.81-82).

Leaving aside problems of validity and comparability between the different studies, it would appear that there is a certain amount of evidence that the relationship between authoritarianism and right-wing political beliefs, which was conceived by Adorno et al. on the level of meaning also can be demonstrated empirically. On the other hand Rokeach has demonstrated that the relationship is not a necessary one.

Though the concept of general authoritarianism supposedly free from ideological content is probably not completely
equivalent to the concept of the authoritarian personality as developed by Adorno et al. The concept does serve to emphasize that different kinds of beliefs may serve similar personalities, further that certain cognitive habits, in this case a dogmatic way of organizing belief systems, may have certain psychological consequences, which again may have consequences for social interaction.

Finally, as Rokeach himself suggests, dogmatism is slightly more related to conservative beliefs, (Barker emphasizes this relationship even more), which would have to be explained. It would appear that a standard concept of dogmatism would be of less help than an explanation attempting to relate the development and content of individual motivation to the social and cultural environment, however, imperfectly. In support of this position one can refer to Bay, who considers that to the extent to which people are motivated by ego defensive and more neurotic social acceptance needs they are likely to manifest fear of equality and to hold conservative or mildly liberal views "firmly within the established framework of constitutional objective processes" (Bay, 1967, p.88).

What Bay is saying from the perspective of social-acceptance motivation may be taken to support the position of Adorno et al. when they say:

"This should not make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological 'subjective' phenomenon. It has to be remembered ....... that 'high' ideology and mentality are largely fomented by the objective spirit of our society".

A little further on they state:

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1 (stress on psychological determinants in explanation of ideology)
"The former (the cultural climate of prejudice) consists not only of crude outside factors, such as economic and social conditions, but of opinions, ideas, attitudes, and behaviour which appears to be the individual's but which have originated neither in his autonomous thinking nor in his self-sufficient psychological development but are due to his belonging to our culture" (Adorno et al. 1950, p.752).

They go on to point out that it is of equal importance to understand why people do not hold these attitudes and why others do. But 'our culture' does not merely provide a 'climate of prejudice' but also the opposite; it is Rokeach's point that different beliefs may be held with equal closed-mindedness, and this does seem to suggest the possibility that the same underlying personality structure may be associated with different attitudes.

Different motivational needs may account for similar attitudes on the strictly psychological level. A functional distinction of attitudes according to the personality needs served has been touched upon in chapter 6 here. Sarnoff & Katz (1954) and Katz in Hollander & Hunt (1963) suggest in all four analytical categories of personality needs that political and other social attitudes may serve, the four major attitude functions being: 1) the instrumental adjustive, or utilitarian function, 2) the ego-defensive function, 3) the value-expressive function and 4) the knowledge function (Katz, in Hollander & Hunt, 1963). An attitude may have one or several of these functions, different for different people. Its major function may change over time, as the attitude itself may have to change if it becomes less functional both for the single motive and for the total motivational structure of the personality; the predominance of any one motivational need may alter over time.
The important point to bear in mind is that these categories are analytical, that all individuals are posited to be motivated by all four, but that any one attitude may be understood to serve one of the needs more than any of the others and that individuals may be motivated more by some of the needs than others. In short, from the point of view of the psychological and motivational basis for attitudes (and action) the analytical scheme worked out by Katz and others is an acknowledgement of the motivational complexity behind attitudes and action and an attempt to analyse this complexity, where concentration on what may be conceived of as a single motivational basis for a given attitude may lead to oversimplification in the understanding of attitudes and action.

Within the framework of the above analytical categories Adorno et al. can be seen to have conducted their investigation into the relationship between personality and attitude mainly in terms of what both Katz and Bay call the ego-defensive function of attitudes, where Katz and others, by utilizing contributions from behaviouristic learning theory, ego psychology, and Gestalt psychology as well as contributions from Freudian psychology attempt to provide a more subtle approach to the understanding of why people hold certain attitudes.

An attitude such as prejudice toward out-groups may not just serve to relieve internal conflicts, feelings of inferiority etc., but may be adopted because it is part of the normative system of some groups by which one wants to be accepted. Attitudes which can be seen to have an instrumental function, partly what Bay calls serving social-acceptance notions, are much more directly oriented toward some goal; a person wanting
to further his career may hold only such political attitudes as will facilitate him or her in this or a person may favour a political party which he or she thinks will improve his or her economic position. The attitudes held for instrumental purposes may conflict with the attitudes held on ego-defensive grounds, the standard example here being a person who does have feelings of hostility toward certain groups of people but when with more tolerant people does not express his or her prejudice, on the contrary, submits to their authority on the subject. The outcome may be that the individual projects his or her feelings of aggression onto something else more in keeping with the tolerant attitudes of his or her 'reference group'.

Attitudes that have a value expressive function give "positive expression to (an individual's) central values and to the type of person he conceives himself to be" (Katz, in Hollander and Hunt, 1963, p.357). The satisfaction of this need may also conflict with that of other needs. A person may have as some of his most precious values notions of equality of men and ideals of a democratic organization of power - yet he or she may not stand up for such values, perhaps because of fear and coercion for example, or fear of losing one's job, or he or she may have a strong wish to gain social recognition in terms of the more or less established standards of society, to which end the voicing of other attitudes may be more instrumental. A perceived discrepancy between the values a person attributes to him or her self and what others do may lead to a change in political attitudes etc.

Finally, attitudes with a knowledge function may be understood to supply organizational standards for understanding and interpreting the world. Here stereotypes may be ac-
cepted as a tool for sorting out the environment of social institutions and relationships.

It would appear to follow on from this that attitudes serving different needs may reinforce or conflict with each other;¹ one general theory hypothesizes that such conflicts will lead to changes in the system of attitudes and behaviour to achieve a better balance,² it is less clear what the direction of such changes will be and with what overall effects on the personality.

There is however, some difficulty with this hypothesis of moving towards balance; for a person to achieve balance between discrepant attitudes and attitudes and action he will have to be conscious in some way that the attitudes are conflicting and to find that they are of relevance for each other, but even then, he may make up for the discrepancy through rationalizations or other ego-defensive measures, suggesting a deeper conflict than the mere cognitive discrepancy between attitudes.

Indeed an individual does not compartmentalize his attitudes according to the functional categories here described, nor was this suggested to be the case by Katz and others. It could be argued in support of the thesis of 'The Authoritarian Personality' that attitudes which have, for example, a knowledge function and a value expressive function may be invested with ego-defensive energy and defended with ego-defensive measures when challenged; maybe this is implicit when Katz argues that all attitudes may have more than

¹ Festinger's theory of dissonance.
² (in part accepted by Katz).
one function, (see Katz, in Hollander and Hunt, 1963, p.345).

If we accept that from the position of psychoanalytical theory attitudes with value expressive and knowledge functions may be regarded as external functions of the ego, the theory would be that the ego's mode of carrying out its external function would reflect how it solves the internal conflict between ego, id and super-ego, and that the individual will tend to hold such attitudes as are consonant with the internal dynamics.

It may be that the attitudes most consistent with a heavily ego-defensive personality are authoritarian and right-wing political attitudes, but one would still postulate that other attitudes can be supported with ego-defensive emotional energy and defensive measures, if not, it amounts to saying that political ideas are mere epiphenomena, and that personality accounts for the availability of ideologies.

Katz's analytical categories would also seem to suggest that people are rarely totally and all the time exclusively ego-defensively motivated, even authoritarian personalities, which supports the argument, a) that there is not a one-to-one relationship between strongly ego-defensive personalities and certain political attitudes, b) that the ego-defensive personality has several attitudinal possibilities and c) is capable of changing the attitude which he or she holds, for example, as a result of new knowledge, changes in social relationships, perceived alterations in social circumstances, coercion, etc. and d) that with respect to his personality structure, a person become more or less ego-defensive over time, and be more ego-defensively motivated in some social relationships than in others. Changes in attitude that serve
for example the knowledge function may lead to changes in the
degree of ego-defensiveness; in psychological terms changes
in the external ego function in the shape of a new ideology
may lead to a restructuring of internal dynamics.

It would appear to be almost self evident that we can­
not expect a one-to-one correspondence or causal relationship
between personality and attitudes.

The arguments of Adorno et al. and also of Bay have
been presented in terms of the meaningful attitudinal context
one would expect to be related to a given personality type,
partly on the assumption that the attitudinal context is the
ideological manifestation of the sociological relationships
that are argued to have been causal with respect to the develop­
ment of relevant aspects of personality.

In the previous section it has been suggested that
perhaps psychoanalytical theory and analysis is not able to
show that a given sociological environment will lead to the
development of only one personality type, which means that
the social and individual levels do not inter-relate in a
completely deterministic way.

For the purpose of analysis the two levels may be seen
to be independent as well as interdependent. This is obvious­ly a platitude, whereas the efforts of Adorno et al. have been
directed towards saying something meaningful and concrete
about the nature of the inter-relationships and their expres­sion on the ideological level.

The investigations of Adorno et al. have been concen­
trated on the relationship between personality and ideology.
The difficulties involved in investigating the nature of this
relationship empirically are immense, particularly if the
attempt were to be made to validate hypotheses concerning this relationship cross-nationally. However, existing empirical investigations would appear to provide strong evidence for the position that a given personality type may be related to widely differing attitudes, if for no other reason than that attitudes and ideology have an existence apart from individual adherents. Katz's motivational categories, though they may be subsumed by psychoanalytical theory, were suggestive in indicating that the motivational structure of an individual has many facets, and that even if one agrees with the authors in their position that a personality is a system of fairly fixed traits, not only would one argue that a personality is generally open to change, but importantly that the content of motivations is socially based as well as open to individual modifications, and that therefore answers to the question of why people hold certain attitudes may have to be found on the level of social relationships and institutions, as is also indicated by some of the sub-types in 'The Authoritarian Personality'.

As a side issue, it could be suggested that to hypothesize that the authoritarian person always expresses his internal conflicts in his attitudes assumes a one-sided view of man. Surely even an authoritarian personality, which is presented as being normal and not as a psychiatric case, has other feelings than those emanating from repressed aggression, which get expressed in attitudes concerning power relationships also.

It has been tentatively argued here that one cannot expect a direct one-to-one relationship between personality and beliefs, whilst not suggesting that the hypotheses of
Adorno et al. are unuseable and devoid of meaning. Katz analytical categories were "at the level of psychological motivations and not of the accidents of external events and circumstances" (Katz in Hollander & Hunt, 1963, p.345), and were an attempt to gain subtle understanding of the motivational basis for attitudes and to avoid single cause explanations of the relationship between personality, attitudes and behaviour. However, much as understanding is facilitated, the important point remains that any one of these four motivational categories may account equally well for any one attitude.

If then one seeks explanation of attitudes through analysis of the relationship between these and social institutions and interaction, as Adorno et al. appear to be doing when they suggest that Weimar German middle class people in particular were likely to have authoritarian personalities, hold the relevant attitudes and support the NSDAP, one is conducting the investigation of why people hold certain attitudes, not at the level of personality and its dynamics but at the level of social relationships and institutions. The social environment has psychological consequences, as Adorno et al. pointed out, but by conducting the investigation on the level of social interaction one is also suggesting that sociological factors influence the attitudes an individual holds regardless of any specific resolution of the oedipus complex.

It was mentioned earlier that Katz and Sarnoff (1954) suggest that perhaps the F scale was more a measure of value systems than of underlying personality, and certainly it would appear from the above discussion that one cannot assume
that a given personality type will correspond to a given value system.

Adorno et al. have attempted to illuminate how sociological, psychological, and ideological factors interrelate in the individual, though it is not always clear whether sociological factors operating in the past are thought to be the primary relationships in the family or include those with the wider society. It would appear to be clear that the relationships of the different levels with each other are not definite and completely interdependent, an assumption that would make it difficult to explain change. This does not however exempt one from trying to understand what is the nature of the relationship, but also suggests that choice, coercion, indifference, and chance play a part in what attitudes a person holds.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION.

Parsons suggested that the importance of the feudal value system in Imperial and Weimar Germany in the formalized Prussian social status system. This perhaps is the key to relating the contribution of Adorno et al. on fascism to sociological theories of fascism.

Parsons is in fact saying that status is especially important for understanding access to and claims on access to power. 'The Authoritarian Personality' can be understood as formulating the following theory: people who suffer from status anxiety will exercise authoritarian discipline over their children which has certain consequences for personality development, e.g. of repression of aggression against authority and consequent projection onto minorities. Prejudice therefore plays a functional role in the psychology of the individual; he is thus open to appeal from political parties with a specific ideological content.

It has been argued in the text that the causal connection between the different elements in this theory is far from unambiguously established. In any case obvious anomalies would have to be explained, as for example the fact that the NSDAP received most support under conditions of economic crisis and not before, or if assuming that in particular the middle class was status conscious, middle class people of working class background also create a problem.

Psychology may give insights into some of the motivations of an individual for joining a political party but
there probably still remains the problem of explaining why a particular party and why a political party.

However, Fromm (1941, pp.216-218) suggests that increased social frustration leads to projection and that this psychological mechanism may be understood as an important basis for the development of fascism. Furthermore it has been suggested that:

"Individuals who are prevented - by conditions which may be beyond their control - from attaining their goals may react to this situation in two different ways: they may face the facts squarely and adjust themselves in rational ways to their misfortune and, perhaps, try to find practicable remedies for goal blocking conditions, or they may become frustrated, that is, develop attitudes of aggression, without having opportunity to commit aggressive actions. In the latter case, ensuing tensions may find release by participation in a social movement which may direct aggressive tendencies at conditions or groups which are not responsible for the initial courses of frustration." (Heberle, 1951, p.107).

Reading, or perhaps misreading, Fromm and Heberle together it springs to mind that psychoanalytically based notions such as projection and frustration may provide a psychological elaboration and dimension to sociological theories relating the transparancty of class and status relationships to political action.

In view of the fact of having used a concept of class consisting for the analysis of the nature of the class relationships of the middle class in Weimar Germany it may be asked why the application of the concept of status consistency to mainly American material has not been considered, not because these are twin concepts of class and status which in theory at least they are not, but because the concept of status consistency, status crystallisation or status equilibrium is a general concept based on Weber's three distinct

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1 see for example Lenski, 1954, and Benoit-Smullyan, 1944.
concepts of class, status and party. This leads to theories concerning the relationship between status inconsistency and radical political action. However the evidence concerning the direction of the relationship is contradictory.\(^1\) What is more an orientation in the literature toward conducting explanation on the level of individual psychology is apparent, i.e. given political act tends to be viewed as an outcome of a given psychological state e.g. stress, frustration etc., which is caused by status inconsistency, a set of postulated relationships as awkward to verify as those between childhood upbringing, personality and attitude.

Lipset speaks of the middle class in Weimar as an occupational group and it is often said that the support of the middle class for fascism was an expression of status anxiety. It may consequently surprise why nothing has here been made of, for example, the notion of status conflict arising from "... the changed pattern in the distribution of deference power" (Hofstadter, 1955, p.135)\(^2\).

It may be argued that Hofstadter does not succeed in keeping the concept of status conflict distinct from the concept of class conflict and that changes in class relationships underline or at least reinforce those of status.\(^3\)

This does not mean to say that relationships of status are not relevant for the understanding of the rise of the

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2 This concept is applied by Hofstadter to political parties or movements in prosperous economic periods.

NSDAP, on the contrary, they are essential.

Much more work is obviously necessary to gain an understanding of the interaction between class, status and party and the particular ideological content in which this interaction gained expression.

A Weberian analysis of class, status, and party in capitalist industrialized German society should make a particular point of also considering the role of the state in social changes. The consequences of the development of large-scale bureaucratic organization on class relationships should be taken into account as aspects of capitalist society, for example with a view to the consequences of particular policies of the state for the life chances of any one class compared with others.

A Weberian and a Sweezyian approach might complement each other for the purpose of analysing the relationships of class, status, and party in German society in the context of the development of capitalist society. It may well be asked why this kind of analysis has not to any great extent been attempted here. One reason for this is the initial structure of the thesis.

An example of the kind of material which a more thorough-going analysis would draw upon is Weber's own discussion of the relationship between junkers and agricultural workers in east Germany (Weber, 1924), which is of direct relevance for understanding the relationship between the junkers' class, status, and set of values and their political action in Weimar Germany.

In fact not merely the possible connections between so-
called inconsistent class relationships and political action call for an investigation, but also the relationship between political action and different groups of holders of so-called consistent class relationships should be investigated, as for example differences between consumer industry and heavy industry, or the consequences for political action and demands made on the state of being a more old fashioned entrepreneur regarding himself personally responsible for his enterprise (Geiger) in a society where both the economy and the policies of the state increasingly seemed to be dominated by monopoly capital.

The continued importance of the junker aristocracy as a 'feudal' status group in Weimar German society, in the development of parliamentary democracy has often been pointed out. In the context of proposing a Weberian analysis of the social structure in Germany, in order to arrive at an understanding of the success of fascism, it may be mentioned that there are other marxist approaches that may well provide insights, as for example the work of Bloch (1962). Bloch discusses fascism using the concept of non-simultaneous contradictions of class and of values in society, for instance the class relationships of farmers are not examples of the dominant class relationships of the time, these being between capital and labour, but they nevertheless persist in capitalist society. Such a multi-dimensional view of class in historical time may well provide elaboration to a Weberian approach.
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