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**U.S. - Saudi Relations**  
**Interdependence Revisited**

**by**

**Abdulaziz Al-Eisa**

**U.S. - Saudi Relations**  
**Interdependence Revisited**

**by**

**Abdulaziz Al-Eisa**

A Thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Durham

The faculty of Social Sciences

University of Durham

March, 1997

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### List of Abbreviations

ACC	Arab Cooperation Council
Acre	a measure of land, 4,840 square yards or about 4,047 square meters
Aramco	Arabian American Oil Company
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COE	The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DIA	U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
EU	European Union
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JTFME	Joint Task Force Middle East
KM	Kilometre
LOA	Letter of Acceptance
M.B.C.	Middle East Broadcast Centre
Mbd	Million barrels per day
MEDO	Middle East Defence Organization
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty



OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDRY	The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RFIS	Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
Tapline	The Trans-Arabian Pipeline
TWA	Trans World Airlines
SABIC	Saudi Basic Industries Corporation
SAMA	Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
SAS	Strategic Air Command
Socal	Standard Oil Company of California
SPR	Strategic Petroleum Reserve
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USMTM	United States Military Training Mission

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Abdulaziz Al-Eisa

## **Abstract**

Countries live in an age of interdependence. Although there are some studies concerned with the U.S.-Saudi relationship, to my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that analyses the U.S.-Saudi relationship as it relates to the concepts of interdependence to be written since the Gulf war of 1991. This study particularly examines the level of interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as it affects their relationship.

The oil embargo of 1973 marked a turning point in Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as the most important foreign source of American petroleum requirements. The U.S. for its part has supported Saudi Arabia with security assistance and arms while seeking in return to affect Saudi Arabia's oil production and price decisions. For both countries maintenance of the supply of oil and arms are of vital importance, but each country has different priorities. The different positions taken by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is affected by the fact that Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of oil and that the U.S. is the world's largest oil consumer. The connection gave way to a more complex relationship of interdependence, involving shared as well as divergent interest and therefore, increased the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism as well as cooperation.

The plan of this study is to explore whether the cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the fields of oil, politics, economics and military developments has increased their interdependence. In addition, this study explores why the relationships between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has moved over time from simple cooperation to complexity and how the two countries have changed in their relative importance to each other and what has been the impact of changes in the international system, the Middle East, or within the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on U.S. - Saudi relations.

## Introduction

The protection of oil reserves and other strategic considerations have been constituent elements of the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia since World War II. The United States and Saudi Arabia have been engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as the most important foreign source of American petroleum requirements. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, needs America for arms supplies and training, technology and many other items necessary for a developing country, including vital supplies of foodstuffs. For both countries, maintenance of the supply of arms and oil are of vital importance, but each country has different priorities.

The scale of the United States military deployment in the Gulf during the Gulf war in 1990 - half of all U.S. combat forces world-wide - was a shock to the American people. Washington's decision to send those forces, though, should come as no surprise. Tracing U.S. -Saudi relations to their origins has shown the singular degree of certainty which has characterised the relationship.<sup>1</sup> Common interests were first explored and defined when President Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz in 1945. It is well known that many of the failures of American and Saudi foreign policy had their sources in the limitations of realistic assumptions, particularly about the analysis of economic issues and of the roles played by formal and informal international institutions.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the world community lives in an age of interdependence, which led Henry Kissinger to state that "The traditional agenda of international affairs - the balance among major powers, the security of nations - no longer defines our perils or possibilities. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations".<sup>3</sup>

The plan of this thesis is to demonstrate if the political, economic and military concept of interdependence can illustrate the results of increasing interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The thesis examines how interdependence affects the U.S. - Saudi Arabia relationship. United States - Saudi interdependence includes the supply of oil and the recycling of petrodollars, the continuing American

support for Saudi security. However, the Saudis can take advantage of their superior position on economic issues, such as oil. The special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States, after the 1973 embargo, represents the highest stage of mutual co-operation. Military and technical co-operation strengthened the interdependence even more. Saudi Arabia is not dependent on U.S. foreign aid, but it is buying American technology, arms and expertise. The United States is buying Saudi oil. Both are able to diversify their sources of supply. The translation of this interdependence into specific trade-offs, however, in a natural way involves manoeuvring and bargaining by each side to obtain the most advantageous terms.

The Saudi - American relationship has undergone a deep transformation in the character and scope of their relationship, the connection gave way to a more complex relationship of interdependence, involving shared as well as divergent interest between them and, therefore, the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism as well as co-operation. This study explores why the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has moved at times from simple co-operation to complexity. How have the two countries changed in their relative importance to each other and what have been the impact of changes in the international system, the Middle East, or within the United States, and Saudi Arabia on U.S. - Saudi relations. The stable community of interests has further been characterised by the relatively independent set of dynamics that have guided each of its four major components - oil, economic, military, and political components. The study seeks to focus on the history, nature and objectives of each component. There is also a case study exploring U.S. - Saudi relations throughout the Gulf crisis, which divides the analysis of the thesis into focus of their relations before the Gulf war of 1991 and after the Gulf war. The conclusion presents the U.S. - Saudi bilateral interdependence and its consequences as well as the findings of the research.

The thesis comes through the study of one of the most significant facts of the international system and its effects on the relationship. This thesis searches through U.S. - Saudi interdependence and its results in terms of co-operation and conflict. The outcomes of interdependence dimensions on co-operation and conflict can be

determined as well as the amount of alteration in the dependant variables which can be illustrated by the independent variables operating together.

Since most studies of interdependence have concentrated mainly on relations among developed states and seldom on developing countries, this thesis seeks to evaluate the consequences and impact of the changing levels of interdependence on U.S. - Saudi relations. Therefore, the beginning of the Chapter One will discuss the definitions of the concepts of interdependence.

## **Chapter one**

### **Conceptual and Historical Background**

#### **1. The Concept of interdependence**

Modern writings on interdependence point out that much of the contemporary actuality of world politics demands radical change in the way traditional nations implement their strategies for international relations.<sup>1</sup> Some analysts argue that increased interdependence and the development of non-state actors essentially change the nature of contemporary international relations.<sup>2</sup> Military force is no longer a decisive policy tool in the mutual influence of international politics.<sup>3</sup> The dominant approach to the study of international relations has refused this demand.<sup>4</sup> Realists persist that the state is the main actor in international relations; that military force and security issues are the most important issues in contemporary international relations and that interdependence is a legend.<sup>5</sup> Realists including Hans J. Morgenthau, have described a world in which states, acting from self - interest, struggle for "power and Peace".<sup>6</sup> Security issues are dominant; war threatens.<sup>7</sup>

However, the contrary view is that the fast expansion of trade, foreign investment and manufacturing activities which came between the 1950s and 1970s, made an interdependent world.<sup>8</sup> Even those countries which had before been mainly self-sufficient in primary goods became more dependent on trade, foreign investment and exports.<sup>9</sup> Thus, in contrast to the dominant realist stance, theorists of transnationalism argue that the role of the state has declined. A diversity of non state actors are now very important in key areas. The use of force is restricted and national societies are more interdependent in the sense that domestic occurrences are crucially influenced by external variables. Issues significant to national governments (especially economic ones) have become more differentiated.<sup>10</sup>

Transnationalists do not argue that the realist stance is totally irrelevant but that it fails to present significant issues of contemporary international politics.<sup>11</sup> S. Hoffmann

stated "We are moving to an era dominated by economic power - an era which war between major states may virtually disappear."<sup>12</sup> National economies are more closely connected than at any time in history.<sup>13</sup> The number of actors in international economic relations has also increase with the diffusion of transnational corporations and the increase in international banking.<sup>14</sup> Lars Anell defines the international economic order as "The rules and norms applying to international economic co-operation".<sup>15</sup> Werner Levi asserted in his book, The Coming End of War, that war is outmoded because of the internationalisation of national interests, its gains are unlike those of the past, nuclear power makes war more dangerous and the overall changes that have taken place in the international system make it unlikely.<sup>16</sup> It was evaluating the transnationalist proposal that war is an anachronism which led Michael Sullivan to make three critical points: (1) the signs that war is declining in the international system are mixed; (2) it is possible that war itself might be subject to cyclical changes; and (3) that war remains a possibly in the contemporary intentional system.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1960's and early 1970's many people thought that it was possible that there would be no more wars.<sup>18</sup> However, in the wake of the events of the 1970's e.g. the American hostage crisis in Iran and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, this optimism became untenable. Jeffrey Hart examined the background in which developing countries introduced their demands for the reform of the international economic order in this era.<sup>19</sup> He provided a structure within which the negotiations within the new international economic order could be analysed.<sup>20</sup> The increased agitation within the international economic system during the 1970s was the consequence of three changes.

Firstly, there was an increase in the numbers of effective actors. The success of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in raising oil prices in 1973/74 increased the capability of these countries to effect international decision making. The fast growth of the newly industrialised countries and their increase portion of world manufacturing output improved their capability to influence global conditions. Secondly, doubt about trade-offs increased during the 1970s. This was the consequence of (a) the failure of demand management policies in the industrialised countries and confusion regarding the appropriate policies to be pursued; (b) uncertainty in developing countries in respect to the correct model of development; and (c) uncertainty about how to deal



with the OPEC threat . Thirdly, increased interdependence and complexity contributed to turbulence. <sup>21</sup>

Non state actors and interdependencies have always played a part in international relations, issues are continuously in flux, and war is periodically viewed as no longer an option.<sup>22</sup> Kenneth Waltz made the following conclusion about interdependence:

It is surprising then, that so much recent writing about interdependence reads as though it were written at the turn of the century, Economist and political scientists, like others, make free use of the clichés of our day: spaceship Earth, the shrinking planet, our global village, international interdependence.<sup>23</sup>

### Definitions of interdependence

Interdependence has been defined in a diversity of ways. As Edward L. Morse states: "Interdependence is a state of affairs where what one nation does impinges directly upon other nations."<sup>24</sup> He has also stated that "Interdependent behaviour may be understood in terms of the outcome of specified actions taken by two or more parties (individuals, governments, corporations). When such actions are mutually contingent, these parties then, are interdependent with respect to specific issues area and not with respect to the whole spectrum of their activities".<sup>25</sup> Richard A. Rosencrance states that interdependence suggest a relationship of interests such that if on nation's position changes, other states will be affected by that change. <sup>26</sup>

Interdependence, as defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, means mutual dependence. They argue that interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.<sup>27</sup> Dependence is "A state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces".<sup>28</sup>

Another definition suggest that interdependence can be present when there is growing national sensitivity to external economic developments. Interdependence refers to the "sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations".<sup>29</sup> This indicates that two states with extensive mutual trade would experience a low degree of interdependence if the value of the trade was not sensitive to price and income growth in both states.<sup>30</sup> Thus, two states would be

highly interdependent if their transactions were highly sensitive to economic growth, even if their mutual trade was primarily at a low level.<sup>31</sup>

Another way of defining interdependence is outlined by Klaus Knorr who asserted that "States are mutually dependent on one another for things valued by their population .....Interdependence encompasses both conflictive and cooperative interactions among states".<sup>32</sup> To Knorr dependence points to potential vulnerability to foreign events that can endanger the receipt of values or worsen the terms on which their receipt is conditional.<sup>33</sup>

### **Sensitivity and vulnerability**

An understanding of sensitivity and vulnerability involves understanding the difference between mutual dependence and interconnection.<sup>34</sup> Keohane and Nye state that "Sensitivity is an important concept not only because of its central role in many discussions on interdependence, but also because it is related to the considerations of the immediate economic and political significance of any pattern of economic interrelationship."<sup>35</sup> They go on to explain that sensitivity interdependence involves degrees of responsiveness with a policy framework: e.g. how quickly does change in one country bring change in another and how costly are the effects?<sup>36</sup>

The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face. It has been defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye as "An actor's ability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered".<sup>37</sup>

### **Increased interdependence**

Relations between actors which are characterised by increased interdependence become more complex and to some degree more vulnerable to disruption, because of the expansion of the network of dependency relationships which is concomitant with

increased interdependence.<sup>38</sup> An event within one member of the network is more likely to effect other members of the network.<sup>39</sup> Thus mutual dependence between states in a relationship of interdependence is not necessarily one of equality and there is the potential for asymmetrical interdependence.<sup>40</sup>

Keohane and Nye argued against defining interdependence in terms of situations of “evenly balanced mutual dependence”.<sup>41</sup> They state that asymmetric interdependence often provides influence for those dealing with others.<sup>42</sup> Those who are less dependent are often able to use the interdependent relationship to gain bargaining power and influence other issues.<sup>43</sup> Influence is perhaps most simply defined by Peter J. Anderson as, “The ability to get someone to do something you want via simple persuasion rather than the implicit or explicit threat of or use of sanctions.”<sup>44</sup>

Major shifts in the 1970s, in the OPEC pricing revolution, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet Union’s invasions of Afghanistan, all effected the environment of increased interdependence.<sup>45</sup> Theoretical arguments could be made that increased interdependence is usually a destabilising fact in international relations.<sup>46</sup> Its impact on peace and order will depend on how actors respond to it and how they try to operate within it.<sup>47</sup> This implies that a key question for systems undergoing an increased amount of interdependence, particularly if accompanied by the other attributes of turbulence (e.g. an increase the number of effective actors and greater uncertainty about policy trade-offs), is how to evolve a set of rules, procedures and averages which not only assist in the maintenance of order but do so in a way which most members of the system realise to be just and fair.<sup>48</sup> It is not necessary to add that increased interdependence does not essentially promote peace, order or stability.<sup>49</sup> For the reasons that have already been discussed, less vulnerable countries will attempt to use asymmetrical interdependence in individual groups of issues as a source of power.<sup>50</sup>

### **Asymmetrical interdependence and power**

Power is the tool for resolving any competing demands within and between different groups and countries.<sup>51</sup> For John Stoessinger power in international relations is “The

capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to effect the behaviour of other nations".<sup>52</sup>

Military force has been a conventional need.<sup>53</sup> Military force can persuade a state to do something or not, either by the credible threat of military force or by the use of the same.<sup>54</sup> States can also use their economic or political strength for the same purpose.<sup>55</sup> Keohane and Nye see power as the "ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor)."<sup>56</sup> Power can also be thought as control over outcomes.<sup>57</sup> Keohane and Nye pointed out that military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force.<sup>58</sup> They asserted that asymmetrical interdependencies can be a source of power among actors, and that different types of interdependence lead to potential political influence under different restrictions.<sup>59</sup> Sensitivity interdependence can provide significant political influence only when the rules and norms in effect can be taken for granted or when it would be costly for dissatisfied states to change policies quickly.<sup>60</sup> Manipulation of interdependence can be used as a tool of power.<sup>61</sup> Realists assume that military force is dominant, but Keohane and Nye pointed out that military force is costly and may be irrelevant in a wide range of issues and its threat so difficult to make credible, that a military strategy is an act of desperation and which might disrupt other relationships.<sup>62</sup> However, if the issue becomes a matter of life and death - as oil might become - the use or threat of force will become an important tool again.<sup>63</sup>

Although force remains a potential tool for state policy in other situations its use has become less frequent especially amongst the most powerful states.<sup>64</sup> Third world countries in particular (unlike the most powerful states) continue to link issues to secure satisfactory overall bargains.<sup>65</sup> For Knorr, power, influence and interdependence are inextricably related.<sup>66</sup> Two countries can be in conflict over some issues while co-operating on others, "When they co-operate they benefit from the creation of new values, material or non-material. When they are in conflict, they are interdependent."<sup>67</sup>

## **Conflict and co-operation as the consequences of interdependence**

Some researchers see interdependence as almost automatically producing co-operation, "Whenever the intermeshing of societies across nation - state lines occur without coercion, it is likely that disputes between the involved nations will be inhibited from escalating to war."<sup>68</sup> In some contemporary literature other writers hope for a changed international system. Robert Hunter, for instance, argued that "the old symbiotic relationship between power and peace is changing" and that it might be possible to separate the demands of peace from "their dependence on a particular distribution of power among nations".<sup>69</sup> However he did admit that such an outcome could only happen "provided that armed conflict between major countries is avoided."<sup>70</sup>

Global concerns over food, ecology and energy needs demand increased co-operation among the world community. Thus, Keohane and Nye asserted that an increasingly interdependent world is characterised by greater co-operation and less conflict.<sup>71</sup> They believe that there are multiple interstate issues in today's complex environment which are not dominated by concern for military security.<sup>72</sup> States with high levels of trade are motivated to maintain good relations with their trading partners.<sup>73</sup> The impact of the increase of East-West trade for conflict reduction between the U.S. and the Warsaw Pact states.<sup>74</sup> E.g. The trade generated by a degree of interdependence between the U.S. and the Warsaw pact states provided the motivation to reduce their hostility towards each other.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, the party who benefits the most has the greatest motivation to reduce hostilities.<sup>76</sup>

But these theories have not received firm empirical confirmation and alternatives have been made: increasing interdependence may produce negative outcomes. Kenneth Waltz argued that the closer contact associated with growing interdependence increases the chances for, at least, occasional conflict.<sup>77</sup> In another study, Keohane and Nye stated that asymmetrical economic interdependence provides a new form of power that can be used by less interdependent countries to gain concessions from others that are more interdependent.<sup>78</sup> It warns of a crisis of interdependence involving increased international tension because of the difficulties interdependence creates for policy

making.<sup>79</sup> Keohane and Nye assert that economic ties provide an opportunity to conduct war by other means.<sup>80</sup>

Vulnerability can be used as an economic weapon, allowing states that lack military force, or prefer not to use it, to compel their interacting partners.<sup>81</sup> Besides the potential for states to exercise such force, vulnerability can be a source of increase international conflict.<sup>82</sup> Klaus Knorr, argues that vulnerability can lead to unanticipated crises which could threaten national security.<sup>83</sup>

While interdependence can lead to increased conflict, it can also bring co-operation. Interdependence can therefore have mixed consequences.<sup>84</sup> The history of interstate relations demonstrate the presence of both conflict and co-operation.<sup>85</sup> The peace that the superpowers have preserved may have tensions and is frequently precarious, but competitors often experience periods of relative peace during which their implicit co-operation, although less visible, may be more important than their public disagreements.<sup>86</sup>

The paucity of studies on international co-operation compared to the numerous studies dealing with international conflict comes from the belief that the level of conflict between two nations defines the co-operation that exists between them.<sup>87</sup> Thus, co-operation is viewed only as the absence of high levels of conflict.<sup>88</sup> Most researchers would agree that co-operation and conflict are both present in mixed - interest situations and pay offs of international relations.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, conflict is defined as "the aggregate level of hostility directed by one country towards another in all foreign policy issue areas. This term does not refer only to actions involving military power .... rather, actions such as diplomatic protests, hostile propaganda statements and the breaking of bilateral agreements can also embody conflict."<sup>90</sup> Co-operation is defined as the aggregate level of friendly behaviour and actions directed by one country toward another in all foreign policy issue areas.<sup>91</sup> This term refers to action such as, establishing international alliances, economic markets, joint military exercises as well as military assistance.<sup>92</sup>

## **2. The history of Saudi Arabia**

Although the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not established until the early 1930s, the land has a long history. In ancient times, Arab tribesmen roamed the deserts or lived in trading centres such as Mecca and Medina, which were settlements established along well-established caravan routes. In the 7th and 8th centuries, the prophet Mohammed and his followers united the Arabs and founded a great empire.

Before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the peninsula had suffered for many years as tribes struggled for political power. The Bedouin of the peninsula were always contending with one another for control of the country, and the country was devastated by their fighting. No one tribe in Central Arabia had been able to prove its leadership, but tribes would alternately demand the support of other tribes when their leader was able to assert his authority over a larger area. The modern state of Saudi Arabia began to develop in Central Arabia (known as the Najd region) some two hundred years ago. From the start of the Islamic era to the middle of the eighteenth century, Arabian history is made up of the separate stories of a number of individual regions. The Hijaz (the Western province) - where Islam's holiest cities, Mecca and Medina are located - was the area of most importance to the outside world. In the 10th century, a descendant of the prophet Mohammed's family announced himself Sharif of Mecca. Sometimes the Sharif ruled independently and sometimes he was under outside control. Most frequently it was the ruler of Egypt who controlled the Sharifate, and when Egypt came under control of the Ottoman Empire, in 1517, the governor of Egypt held authority over the Hijaz on behalf of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>93</sup>

The region of Al-Hasa (the Eastern province) came, at times under the powerful rulers of Iraq, and sometimes existed as an independent entity. From the late 9th to the late 11th century, Al-Hasa was centre of an Ismaili state which arose in Yemen from Shi'ite Islam, and became involved in Iraq and Syria. In the late 15th century, the Ottomans took Al-Hasa under their control, and between 1694 and 1709, they took over the emirate of Diriyah from the Al-Saud family. By the end of the 18th century, the Saudi rulers of Diriyah defeated the Banu Khalid (a local family) and installed their own nominee in Al-Hasa as the first step to taking control of the overall region.<sup>94</sup>

The region of Najd (the Central province) was important to Hajis (the pilgrims) because of the route which crossed it from the Gulf to Mecca, but the area remained generally independent. Its people were mostly nomadic. A number of independent emirates or principalities came into existence during the 15th century. Here the Saudi state has its origins.<sup>95</sup>

The Saudi family tracks its descent from Mani Ibn Rabia Al-Muraydi, who came from Al-Hasa to settle in Wadi Hanifah in the middle of the 15th century. By the early 17th century, his descendants had become rulers of a small town in Diriyah (a town in central Najd). Before 1720, Saud Ibn Mohammed, the father of the Saudi Royal family, became ruler. He died in 1725, and his son, Mohammed, succeeded him in 1725.<sup>96</sup>

After this period, the history of Saudi Arabia can be divided into four time periods: from about 1745 to 1818, from 1819 to 1902, from 1903 to 1953 and from 1954 to the present. (See Table 1).

### **The uprising of the House of Ibn Saud, 1745-1818**

The first period started when Mohammed Ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah, offered safeguards to the religious reformer of Islam, Mohammed Abdulwahab and argued for his religious reforms. In an effort to diffuse the unitarian doctrine of Abdulwahab, Mohammed Ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah, subdued the tribes around Diriyah. About 1810, the Unitarian doctrine retained sway in some form or other from Syria and Iraq to Yemen and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. In 1806, Ibn Saud troops seized Mecca and Medina and kicked out the Ottoman Turks and their representatives.<sup>97</sup>

The occupation of Mecca and Medina urged the Ottoman military into action. Sultan Mahmud II ordered Mohammed Ali, his Egyptian Viceroy, to take the Holy Cities and to break Ibn Saud's authority. In 1816, an army from Egypt, directed by Mohammed Ali's son, invaded Najd and in 1818, Diriyah was taken, catching Abdullah Ibn Saud, the fourth Saudi ruler after Mohammed Ibn Saud.<sup>98</sup>



**Table 1**

Rulers of the House of Saud	
Ruler	Period
<i>First Saudi State</i>	
Muhammad ibn Sa'ud	1745-1765
`Abd al-' Aziz ibn Muhammad	1765-1803
Sa'ud ibn `Abd al-'Aziz	1803-1814
`Abdallah ibn Sa'ud	1814-1818
<i>Second Saudi State</i>	
Turki ibn `Abdallah ibn Muhammad	1824-1834
Faisal ibn Turki	1834-1838
Khalid ibn Sa'ud	1838-1842
`Abdallah ibn Thunain	1842-1843
Faisal ibn Turki	1843-1865
`Abdallah ibn Faisal	1866-1870
Sa'ud ibn Faisal	1870-1875
`Abdallah ibn Faisal	1875-1889
`Abd al-Rahman ibn Faisal	1889-1891
<i>Third Saudi State</i>	
`Abd al-'Aziz ibn `Abd al-Rahman	1902-1953

Source: Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign policy of Saudi Arabia,  
1986, Harvard University Press, p. 8.

**The struggle for domination in the Najd,**  
**1819-1902**

The second stage of Saudi Arabia's history started with the capture of Abdullah Ibn Saud. He was sent to Istanbul, where he was executed. It ends with the exile of the family of Saud to Kuwait. The Egyptians stayed in the Najd on and off for a further 20 years. The struggle for freedom from Egyptian rule began in 1823, when Turki, the son of the executed Abdullah, seized Riyadh from Mohammed Ali. To avoid rebuilding Diriyah, Turki based himself in Riyadh making it the new capital of the Saudi state.<sup>99</sup>

Turki was assassinated on May 19, 1834. The new ruler was Faisal Ibn Turki. Faisal's rule in Riyadh was interrupted when Mohammed Ali again sent a military force to seize Najd and nominated another member of the Saud family as ruler under the charge of

Mohammed Ali's representative in Riyadh. Faisal was taken as a prisoner to Cairo, but escaped from jail and re-established his rule in 1845, and maintained the Saudi family's authority until his death in 1865.<sup>100</sup>

Faisal's death in 1865, was followed by a struggle for command between two of his sons, Abdullah and Saud. This fight empowered the Ottomans to take back Al-Hasa and overcome Mohammed Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Hail (North Najd), which prevented him from expanding his power over the Saudi state. Abdullah died in 1889, and the Saudi state was no more than a province of an area which was ruled by the Rashids. The Rashids integrated their hold over the north-central part of Najd and ruled from town of Hail. In 1891, Abdullah's son and successor, Abdulrahman, was expelled from Riyadh to Kuwait with his family, including his young son Abdulaziz, who had been born in 1880. Rashidi control of the Najd lasted for only a decade, before it was again demanded by the Saud family.<sup>101</sup>

### **Creating The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,**

**1902-1953**

A twenty two-year-old son of Abdulrahman named Abdulaziz, known as Ibn Saud, captured Riyadh on January 1, 1902, with the help of only 60 men. The Rashidi power had been weakened following the death of Mohammed Ibn Rashid in 1897. The ten years after the capture of Riyadh were spent in indecisive fighting against Ibn Rashid because the rest of the Najd was still in Ibn Rashid's control, who received support from the Ottomans. To seize the entire Najd, Abdulaziz had to get the support of the Bedouin tribes of the southern Najd.<sup>102</sup>

The most difficult challenge to Abdulaziz's strategy came in 1904, when the sultan of the Turks sent eight battalions in support of Ibn Rashid. Abdulaziz, for the first time, was faced with a modern army. Abdulaziz could not subdue the Turks' modern army, however, he knew that Turks could not stand hot weather. Unprepared for survival in the desert, the Turkish troops suffered in the heat (temperatures of up to 45°C or 50°C are common in July and the beginning of August). Many of the fighting men died and the rest of the soldiers could not use their artillery, the Turks broke and ran. The battle for control between Abdulaziz and Ibn Rashid came in April 1906, when Abdulaziz's

troops surprised the army of Ibn Rashid. In a short battle the Rashid army was defeated, and their leader killed. Abdulaziz had regained control of his family's domain.<sup>103</sup>

The defeat and death of Ibn Rashid did not end Abdulaziz's problems. Abdulaziz's problem during this period was to maintain the loyalty of the various tribes in the central Najd. Therefore, he had to unite all the tribes in support of his goals and keep their loyalty after the fighting had ended.

Between 1906 and 1912, Abdulaziz faced several challenges. In the north, the House of Rashid still controlled the country. In the east, in Al-Hasa, the Turks still had control, and in the Hijaz the Turks had installed Hussain Ibn Ali. After Abdulaziz got the upper hand, he seized Al-Hofuf in April 1913, and eliminated Turkish authority in the Al-Hasa province.<sup>104</sup>

Abdulaziz arranged a settlement with the Turks. While conceding the eastern province to Abdulaziz, the Turks made an accord with the House of Rashid in Hail. They proposed to provide rifles to the Rashids to attack the Najd again. To oppose the Turkish initiative, Abdulaziz began negotiations with the British, which culminated in the Anglo-Saudi treaty of 1915.<sup>105</sup> To disable the Turks, the British convinced Abdulaziz to attack the Rashids. Saudi and Rashidi troops met in a battle in January 1915. Neither side won, as usual in desert warfare the fight settled nothing. The House of Saud was still threatened by the Rashids.<sup>106</sup>

While the British dealt with Abdulaziz inside Arabia, they also negotiated with the Sharif of Mecca and the ruler of the Hijaz, Hussain Ibn Ali, a member of the Hashimite family (the family of the prophet Mohammed). He had been born in Mecca but had spent most of his life at the Turkish Sultan's court. He was appointed Sharif of Mecca by the Turks to consolidate Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. The British found a good chance to weaken Turkish authority by persuading Hussain to withdraw from the Ottoman Empire. In July 1916, Hussain declared his independence, demanding the title of King of Arabia, but the British recognise him only as the King of Hijaz.<sup>107</sup>

Arabia did not play any great part in the events of World War I. At the end of World War I, the British faced an option between their two Arabian allies as to who to support. They chose Hussain in the belief that his better-trained and better armed army was more formidable than Abdulaziz's warrior force. With British support, Hussain launched an attack on the western edge of Abdulaziz' domain in May 1919. Hussain's force was met by Saudi soldiers of the Al-Khurma region. The soldiers of Abdulaziz killed most of the invading force. By the time, Abdulaziz came on the scene, the way to Mecca and the Hijaz lay open before him. However, he did not take the chance. He first turned to his northern enemy, the Rashids. In 1921 Abdulaziz seized Hail, ending the Rashid threat.<sup>108</sup>

In October 1924, Mecca was occupied fully by Abdulaziz's warriors and in December 1925, Medina surrendered. Two weeks later, the port city of Jeddah fell and Hussain's eldest son, Ali, who had succeeded his father, left for Iraq. Saudi supremacy had been established from Al-Hasa in the east to the Hijaz in the west and from the Rub-al-khali in the south to the Nafud in the north. Abdulaziz became King of Hijaz and Najd. In 1927, Great Britain recognised his state as an independent, sovereign state, and on September 22, 1932, the country was renamed the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia".<sup>109</sup>

Abdulaziz was in constant financial difficulties, but with the seizure of Hijaz some financial relief was obtained from the taxation of the pilgrims. However, when the Great Depression of the early 1930s spread from the United States and Europe, the number of pilgrims decreased, and the King faced a financial crisis. Oil was discovered in the Dammam region of Al-Hasa in March 1938, and came to Abdulaziz's financial rescue. A year later, the first oil shipment left Saudi Arabia. The King's financial crisis had been solved temporarily but when World War II broke out, work in the oil field came almost to a total halt. The problem was compounded as the winter of 1939-40 was a very dry season, and animals and agriculture suffered badly. Saudi Arabia faced bankruptcy, and the King asked the British for aid. The British supplied Saudi Arabia with some food and cash loans. When Saudi Arabia needed more supplies, the parent oil companies convinced the U.S. government to become involved in Saudi Arabia through the Lend-Lease programme. In 1942, President Roosevelt arranged aid to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the war, Saudi Arabia was neutral, but the King's sympathies were on the Allied side.<sup>110</sup>

King Abdulaziz is not widely known in the Western world, yet he was one of the most important rulers in the modern Middle East. He unified the Arabian tribes and created the Saudi state. He established his family as rulers, and that tradition carries on today. He fathered 37 sons and passed the reins of power to them.<sup>111</sup> On November 13, 1953, Abdulaziz Al-Saud died. His eldest son, Saud Ibn Abdulaziz Al-Saud, succeeded to the throne.

King Saud Ibn Abdulaziz was forced to resign by his brother Faisal in 1964. From 1964 to 1975, Saudi Arabia was ruled by King Faisal. He reorganized the government and subdued the different factions within the royal family. He was assassinated by a nephew in March 1975.


**Table 2**

Provinces, provincial capitals and principal localities in Saudi Arabia		
Province	Provincial Capital	Principal Towns, Villages, Oases
Easter Province (al-Hasa)	Dammam	Al-Hasa, Qatif, Hufuf, Khubar, Dhahran, Ras Tanura, 'Abqayq
Central Province (Najd)	Riyadh (Royal Capital)	'Unayza, Burayda, al-Majma'a, al-Kharj, al-Huta, al-Hariq, al-Dirayya, Sadus, Haradh
Western Province (Hijaz)	Mecca	Medina, Khaybar, al-Musayijd, Tabuk, al-Hanakiya, Badr Hunayn, Ta'if, Khulays, Jidda, Bisha, Ranya
Southwestern Province ('Asir)	Abha	Jizan, Najran, al-Shuqayq, Mukayla, Khamis Mushayt

Source: Emile A. Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia: A political Analysis.

1975, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, p.4.

## **Map 1**



Source: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1978,  
Setacy International, London, U.K., p.242.

Faisal's younger brother Khalid succeeded him, but owing to his poor health he allowed his younger brother, Prince Fahd, to exercise much authority. Khalid died on June 13, 1982. The present ruler is King Fahd. He is a strong supporter of modernisation, and he has shaped Saudi Arabia's 'middle of the road' policies.

Saudi Arabia is a vast country occupying the greater part of the Arabian peninsula and is largely desert. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has four administrative regions, the central province, the Eastern province, the Western province and the South-Western province. Table 2 summarizes the provincial capitals and principal localities in Saudi Arabia. The Eastern province is economically the most important for its oil, the Central is the capital of Saudi Arabia, the Western region holds the most important Muslim holy places of Mecca and Medina. (See map 1).

### **3. U.S. policy in the Gulf**

U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia has been based on a combination of interests, including economic and commercial objectives, as well as political and military goals. Therefore, the U.S. has looked to Saudi Arabia as a leader of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and the policy has tended to be one of encouraging intra-Arab stability in the region under Saudi leadership. U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf have been laid down as: (1) continued access to Saudi petroleum for the U.S. and its allies; (2) reinvestment

of oil-generated Saudi foreign exchange surpluses; and (3) American participation in Saudi modernisation activities.<sup>112</sup>

Expanding U.S. oil interests and concern about German and Japanese intentions in the Middle East before World War II contributed to the U.S. decision in 1939 to establish a full diplomatic presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>113</sup> The Kingdom and its oil became increasingly important to the U.S. The U.S.'s political and strategic objectives in the region were :

- supporting stability and security in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas;
- co-operating with Saudi Arabia in moderating regional behaviour;
- encouraging Saudi initiatives in maintaining oil production and moderating oil prices;
- encouraging Saudi efforts toward an Arab-Israeli settlement;
- maintenance of the territorial and political integrity of Saudi Arabia.<sup>114</sup>

Containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East also occupied the U.S. from the late 1940s until 1989. - This was part of a world-wide policy of containment against the expansion of international communism. Washington's policy of containment in the 1950s was to maintain a pro-Western Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which was pursued by the U.S. in the context of regional collective security agreements, such as the Baghdad pact and through bilateral agreements with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.<sup>115</sup>

With the 1958 revolution and the fall of the pro-Western monarchy, Iraq pulled out of the Baghdad pact and moved rapidly from a pro-Western stance to close friendship with the Soviet Union. Iran and Saudi Arabia became the only two pillars of stability in the Gulf in the opinion of U.S. and its Western allies.<sup>116</sup> It was a signal for the Americans that what had happened in Egypt in 1952, and in Iraq in 1958, could also happen in Saudi Arabia.<sup>117</sup> Because of these factors, the U.S. increased the importance it placed on being able to reinforce the internal security of Saudi Arabia and providing Riyadh with military hardware.

In 1972, Washington concluded a major review of its interests and policy options in the Persian Gulf. The review was influenced by particular factors: the British withdrawal from the region in 1971; the increasing dependence of the industrial world on Gulf oil; and the composition of newly independent small states in the lower Gulf. Another factor influencing the review was the Nixon doctrine, which declared the post-Vietnam desire on the part of the U.S. to have local governments participate in the defence of their security with U.S. support but without U.S. troops.<sup>118</sup>

Developments such as the 1973 October war, and the rise in the price of oil often frustrated implementation of some of the principles. However, the principles remained; these principles have forced the U.S. to become more directly involved in the Gulf region - politically, economically and strategically.<sup>119</sup> For the U.S., the case of France and Algeria was an outstanding example of how other consumer governments had tried to secure access to raw materials by establishing strong ties with a particular producing country. The U.S. government's response was a "special relationship" with Iran and Saudi Arabia. "Access" meant an adequate and long term source of supply of oil, at moderate prices not only for the United States but for a wider grouping of countries whose future would affect that of the U.S.<sup>120</sup> In 1974-75, joint commissions on the economic and security between the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as well as closer Iranian-Saudi co-operation in the fields of economic development and security were established. The U.S. began to view the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area separately from the rest of the Middle East. This, indeed emphasised the importance of the Peninsula and the Gulf in Washington's long-term policy planning to establish peace and security in the region.<sup>121</sup>

By the 1980s, the policy principles of the previous decade became obviously deficient. The fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979; and the Iran-Iraq war which broke out in 1980, all presented problems for the U.S. With these events, the new decade began. With President Carter's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, opposing Soviet expansionism had become a main policy goal of the United States. In an address before the Council on Foreign Relations in March 1980, Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, identified the United States' interests in the Persian Gulf and the Levant as follows: to insure access to adequate oil



supplies; to resist Soviet expansion; to promote stability in the region; and to advance the Middle East peace process; whilst ensuring the continued security of Israel.<sup>122</sup>

National Security Adviser, Brezinski, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was reported to have outlined U.S. policy toward the region during discussion in Saudi Arabia with Crown Prince Fahd in February 1980. The main points of which were:

- U.S. policy rested upon the President's determination to take concrete steps toward increasing security in the region,
- The U.S. would remain committed to obtaining a peaceful accommodation between the Arabs and Israel, with particular recognition of the importance of making progress on the Palestinian issue;
- The U.S. would undertake to establish a military presence in the region by acquiring regular access to military facilities and upgrading its military capabilities, and it was prepared to co-operate in military exercises in order to be ready for various contingencies;
- The U.S. desired to co-operate militarily with Saudi Arabia, and wanted to discuss in detail what was required to make such co-operation possible; and
- The U.S. was interested in maintaining a viable and united Iran where the Soviet Union would not be tempted to intervene, and once Iran had released its American hostages, the U.S. was willing to assist that nation with its economic and military problems.<sup>123</sup>

The issues concerning Western strategic relations with Gulf states acquired a far more pressing importance during the Iran-Iraq war in 1986, and 1987. The fighting in the war shifted to the point where an Iranian victory was likely and, thus, there was an Iranian threat to Gulf shipping. These pressures gradually drove the U.S. and several of its principal European allies, into more overt military interventions in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states found that a strong U.S. presence in the Gulf was necessary to prevent the growing threat from Iran and that the U.S. had to depend on its military relations with Saudi Arabia.<sup>124</sup>

Therefore, the U.S. has had an interest in the Persian Gulf region since World War II and the U.S. has been involved in the GCC mainly through Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played a significant role in regional and world affairs by virtue of its geographical location and its deposits of oil, as well as the instability elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region.

## **Chapter Two**

### **U.S. - Saudi Economic Relations until the 1990 Gulf Crisis**

From the very beginning, oil has been a driving force behind U.S. - Saudi relations. William Quandt, has stated, "Because Saudi Arabia sits atop the largest and most easily exploited reserves of petroleum in the world, it inevitably is being drawn into the centre of international politics". Quandt continues, "For Americans the stakes involved in the U.S. - Saudi relationship are particularly great. No country has benefited more from relations with Saudi Arabia than the United States. American oil companies have made enormous profits. American businessmen have had a disproportionate share of the Saudi market".<sup>1</sup> Before going into detail about the U.S. - Saudi economic relations, it is useful to give an overview of the Saudi economy.

#### **The Saudi Arabian economy**

##### **1. The oil sector**

The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inherited a simple, tribal economy until the discovery of oil in the 1930s. Saudi Arabia's economy had been small prior to this date. It was based on the Oasis, agriculture, pilgrimage traffic, and the tribe - each small unit functioning almost independently.

Since oil has become the main source of revenue for Saudi Arabia, providing the vast majority of the Saudi national income, Saudi Arabia has been moving rapidly along the road to modernity. The effect of the oil revenue and modern Western technology has been to change Saudi Arabia from a predominantly pastoral nation to one depending largely upon agriculture and related industries. Table 3 shows world oil production for 1989, with the Soviet Union as the largest producer, followed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Table 4 shows world oil reserves for early 1990, with the largest oil reserve held by Saudi Arabia.<sup>2</sup> Figure 1 shows the total world oil reserves in early 1994, with Saudi Arabia holding more than 25 per cent,

the world's largest national oil reserve. Figure 2 shows oil production in 1993, when Saudi Arabia's oil production averaged 8 million barrels/day, and how it compared to the OPEC and Gulf states oil production. Figure 3 shows that Saudi Arabia was the largest oil exporter in OPEC and the Gulf states during 1993. Map 2 illustrates the Saudi core area.

**Table 3**

**World oil production - top 10 countries  
1989 - million barrels per day.**

1. Soviet Union	12.475
2. United States	9.175
3. Saudi Arabia	5.260
4. Mexico	2.875
5. Iran	2.865
6. Iraq	2.825
7. China	2.790
8. Venezuela	1.980
9. United Kingdom	1 905
10. Canada	1.725

Source: Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, A Violent Peace, Global Security After the Cold War, 1992, Brassey's, U.K., p. 92.

**Table 4**


**World oil reserves - top 10 countries  
January 1, 1990 - billion barrels**

1. Saudi Arabia	( 255.0
2. Iraq	449.5 ( 100.0
3. Kuwait	( 94.5
4. Iran	92.9
5. UAE - Abu Dhabi	92.2
6. Venezuela	58.5
7. Soviet Union	58.4
8. Mexico	56.4
9. United States	34.1
10. China	24.0

Source: As table 3, p. 93.

## Map 2

### The Saudi core area




Source: Richard F. Nyrop, *Saudi Arabia, a country study*, 1984,  
U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 144.



**Figure 1**


**Proven crude oil reserves**  
**Share of world total (per cent); estimated at January 1, 1994**



Source: Saudi Arabia, Country Report, 1st quarter 1994,  
The Economist Intelligence Unit, P. 13.


**Figure 2**

**Estimated crude oil production, 1993**  
**000 barrels/day**



Source: As figure 1

**Figure 3**  
**Crude oil exports, 1993**  
 000 b/d - bottom scale; per cent share of world total -  
 top scale



Source: As Figure 1

## 2. Saudi oil policy

Economic resources are a significant factor in a state's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. Thus, Saudi Arabia's oil is the main economic instrument of its foreign policy. Oil for Saudi Arabia was not just a strategic economic commodity, but also a political instrument to be used to obtain political influence and security.<sup>3</sup>

Saudi Arabia used an oil embargo during the 1973 war with Israel as a political weapon to pressure the U.S. to gain a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement.<sup>4</sup> The oil embargo was carried out in such a way as to maximise both political interest and financial gains. The political purpose was accomplished through the concerted efforts of OPEC and the economic objective was geared more closely with the interests of Arabs and non-Arab oil exporters.

The Saudi oil policy, which was to maximize political and economic profit through oil, started in 1959, when an Arab oil congress was formed. The aims of the congress, clarified in its second meeting in 1960, was in sharp conflict with the oil companies. The oil companies decided, without prior consultation with the host governments, to reduce the prices of Middle East oil by about 18 per cent a barrel.<sup>5</sup>

The governments of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, issued a statement on May 13, 1960, recommending that petroleum exporting countries should seek a common policy to protect their rightful interests. Therefore, the main petroleum producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela and Kuwait) announced their intention to establish the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As a result, OPEC was founded in September 1960.<sup>6</sup>

OPEC has worked to gain control of oil resources since it has emerged as a power centre. OPEC has had a universal outlook and its formation had the effect of disconnecting Arab oil policy from large Arab political and economic interests. Since an Arab oil organisation could not be constructed, Saudi Arabia began to work within OPEC to work for the cause of the universal interests of all oil exporters, without regard to particular Arab interests.

In the mid-1960s, Saudi's policy was to prevent such control and to act jointly with the oil companies. As an alternative to nationalisation, Saudi Arabia demanded participation agreements with oil companies.

In 1967, after the Six-Day Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil producing countries formed a group, The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia submitted a proposal to both Kuwait and Libya for establishing the organisation which without competing with OPEC, would be in a position to protect Arab interests. This offered a regional political forum on a scale not found in OPEC.<sup>7</sup> Its objective is to promote greater co-operation between all Arab states. Arab petroleum exporting countries, in which petroleum represents an important source of income, have joined OAPEC.<sup>8</sup> The OAPEC objectives are to carry out common projects that would achieve a diversified economic investment for the members and to develop and promote the



international petroleum industry by means of providing suitable circumstances for capital and experience to be invested in the member countries.<sup>9</sup>

American support of the Israeli military efforts increased dramatically. This forced Saudi Arabia to take control of the oil companies and implement production cutbacks and use them to place an embargo on oil supplies to the U.S. Up to this point, OPEC had existed and functioned without much interest from the rest of the world, but the oil embargo of 1973, exposed the actual and potential influence of OPEC on the world economy.

Saudi Arabia believes that oil consumers and oil producers are linked by common interests and the oil producers can supply the industrialized nations with oil in return for the purchase of arms and goods available in the industrialized world. Saudi Arabia also looks to the United States for safe and productive uses of its supply of oil money. Therefore, the Saudis are adopting the concept of linkage in their dealing with the United States.

Saudi Arabia knows that it can not get advantage from economic confusion as a result of the energy crisis in the world. As Ahmed Zaki Yamani, former Saudi Oil Minister, stated, "If there is a depression, we will never be safe - no matter how rich we are .... we can not industrialize if there is a sick economy in the world".<sup>10</sup> Again he stated at a special 1974 energy seminar in Washington D.C. that Saudi policy planners recognise the need for international economic co-operation. He suggested that the United States and other industrial nations should: 1 - "adjust themselves to the new economic reality that there is a transfer of wealth from the industrial world to a group of developing nations, the oil producing nations"; 2 - "sit down with the newly wealthy group of states in order to see how you can meet their requirements and how you can solve your problems"; and 3 - "establish a committee representing the oil producers, the industrial countries, and the developing countries to jointly discuss the world's energy needs in a spirit of co-operation".<sup>11</sup>

Oil policies influence the economies of the industrialized countries. If oil production is cut back, the price of oil may double, and development plans may be affected.<sup>12</sup>

Saudi Arabia needs to produce oil revenues at a level appropriate to its total economic development goals while maintaining its international political and economic stability.<sup>13</sup> An increase in the OPEC prices directly affects the U.S. balance of payments, often leading to a devaluation of the dollar, which in turn, affects the value of Saudi holdings in the United States.<sup>14</sup>

Oil has assisted in the integration of the Saudi economy into the Western economy. Oil revenues have assisted the Saudis to import large numbers of consumer products from the industrialized countries, while Saudi investments of surplus oil income in Western countries and Saudi oil exports to industrialized countries have raised Saudi Arabia's position to an important international one.<sup>15</sup> Saudi Arabia was able to participate in international aid and development programmes.<sup>16</sup> Saudi Arabia was invited to be a member of the board of directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with voting power along with other industrialized powers.<sup>17</sup>

International and regional economic stability and Islam are the major motives behind the Saudi aid programmes.<sup>18</sup> Saudi aid has also encouraged some Arab states like Egypt and North Yemen to move away from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.<sup>19</sup> Saudi Arabia uses its aid programme in the same manner as the U.S. - to further its foreign policy.


Saudi Arabia has established a development fund of \$2.8 billion to lend to developing nations. Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, has pledged more than \$400 million to the Islamic Development Bank which was founded in 1974, in Saudi Arabia. They also declared non-Arab developing countries eligible for low interest loans. Saudi aid to developing countries grew from \$335 million in 1974, to more than \$3,000 million in 1978.<sup>20</sup> As David Long has stated, Saudi Arabia fully intended to become one of the world's leading foreign-aid donors.<sup>21</sup> Figure 4 shows foreign aid from the top ten donors in the world for 1983, with Saudi Arabia ranked second after the United States.

The Kingdom's oil revenues and its desire for development programmes have received large amounts of international publicity. But, Saudi Arabia has readily

accepted the obligation to share its wealth with developing countries. The U.N. recommends that 0.7 per cent of gross national income be given as aid. However, Saudi Arabia has given more than \$70,600 billion between 1973 and 1993, which is 5.5 per cent of its national production.<sup>22</sup> David Long stated that Saudi Arabia sought to use its new economic status to increase co-operation, not confrontation, with the United States.<sup>23</sup> Table 5 illustrates Saudi Arabia's contributions to Arab regional and international development institutions for 1988.

**Figure 4**

Foreign aid from top ten donors  
in the world for 1983



Sources: King Fahd and Saudi Arabia's Great Evolution.

1987, Nasser Ibrahim Rashid and Esber Ibrahim Shaheen, International Institute of Technology, Inc., p. 147.

**Table 5**

**The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's contributions to  
Arab regional and international development  
institutions for 1988.**

Institution	Capital (U.S. Dollars)	The Kingdom's contribution	Contribution as a percentage of the total capital
Islamic Bank for Development	2,118,800,000	536,440,000	25.3
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	2,415,900,000	553,100,000	22.9
Arab Monetary Fund	1,294,000,000	187,300,000	14.5
OPEC Fund for International Development	3,435,008,438	1,033,279,607	30.1
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	1,048,825,000	255,584,153	24.2
African Development Bank	5,931,468,000	14,279,460	0.25
World Bank	96,600,000,000	3,032,764,000	3.32
International Development Agency	40,927,000,000	1,665,700,000	3.5
International Finance Corporation	1,300,000,000	17,911,000	1.37
Mutual Investment Guarantee Agency	1,000,000,000	31,370,000	3.14
IMF	116,983,815,000	4,163,120,000	3.6
African Development Fund	3,499,930,000	116,524,973	3.4
International Fund for Agricultural Development	2,340,924,675	333,778,000	14.25
Arab Corporation for Investment Guarantee	25,025,000	3,750,000	15
Arab Gulf Programme for Support of the UN Development Organisation	197,000,000	150,000,000	76
Arab Fund for Technical Aid to Arab and African Countries	60,080,000	13,563,000	22.6
The Funds and Institutions Established in the Frame of the Organisations of the Islamic Conference		214,662,000	
Programme for Curing River Blindness	299,000,000	25,000,000	8.36
Programme for Combating Drought in the Sahel Countries	240,000,000	130,000,000	54

Sources: Fouad Al-Farsy, Modernity and Tradition, The Saudi Equation.  
1990. Kegan Paul International, London, & New York. P. 297-298.

### **3. Saudi infrastructures**

During the period 1974 to 1981, Saudi Arabia produced an annual average of 15.2 per cent of the total world production of oil with a peak contribution of 17.5 per cent in 1981 (an average of 9.8 million barrels a day). As a proportion of total OPEC production it had an annual average contribution of 31% over the same period.<sup>24</sup> Oil revenues (approximately 97.3 per cent of total national revenues in 1973) have fuelled Saudi Arabia's economic development programmes and have impelled the present transition from a traditional tribal and feudal economy into a modern industrial country. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dr Ghazi A. Algosaihi, has stated, "In the early 1970s the very substantial increase in oil revenues allowed us to raise our sights and accelerate the programme. But it was clearly not going to be easy. In 1977, I told a visiting American journalist: 'I know many economists tell us we can not compress the century long process of development industrialisation, infrastructure creation and manpower training - into a few decades. But since no nation with our resources has ever tried to do so, no one really knows if it can be done. We shall try'. The first problem that was to be confronted was the creation of a full economic infrastructure for the developed industrial state we were aspiring to. I would argue that we have already come a long way towards achieving our ambitions".<sup>25</sup>

With the help of oil revenues, the government has built seaports, airports, refineries, hospitals, clinics, industries and schools. Education is the first priority - it is free at all levels, even healthcare, including surgical treatment and medicines in Saudi Arabia are free, not only for citizens, but also for all resident foreigners and visitors.

Over the last few years, the greening of Saudi Arabia has meant the Kingdom has become almost self-sufficient in its agricultural needs. In 1975, there was only about 150,000 acres of cultivated land; by 1985, it had reached more than 2,300,000 acres.<sup>26</sup>

The largest industrial complex is SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation) which is a joint venture owned by the government and the private sector. This has

been described as the biggest single industrial programme in history. It is a huge project building two completely industrial cities, one at Yanbu on the Red Sea and the other at Jubail on the Gulf. The cities have been built, the heavy industrial projects - oil refineries, petro-chemical plants and steel works have been set up. SABIC costs 70 billion dollars and now naturally controls the heavy industrial and petrochemical sector and made profits of \$523 million in 1992.<sup>27</sup>

Transport and telecommunication in Saudi Arabia have taken massive steps forward. The Saudis began with two DC3 aircrafts in 1945 and now the Saudi national airline, has increased its fleet to over 100 jet aircraft. The fleet includes 747s, Tristars and Airbuses. Within Saudi Arabia, there are three international airports, (Riyadh, Jeddah and Dhahran) and 20 domestic airports covering all parts of Saudi Arabia. They now carry some 21 million passengers a year through out Saudi Arabia.<sup>28</sup>

In shipping important progress has been made. The government - owned National Shipping Company has more than 300 merchant ships. In the 1970s the harbours were so crowded that ships were queuing for up to six months outside Jeddah and Dammam. Today Saudi Arabia has seven major seaports and 14 minor ports.<sup>29</sup>

In 1951, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had no asphalt roads. In 1970, Saudi Arabia had 8,600 kilometres (km) of roads. By 1990, this had increased to 33,000 km including 6,000 km of freeways which had been built to connect all regions. Plans are under way to build 80,000 km of agricultural roads and by the end of 1995, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should have 150,000 km of asphalt roads. Saudi Arabia has the only railway system in the Arabian peninsula, connecting Riyadh and the port of Dammam in the Gulf. The 562 km single line track carries about 2 million tonnes of cargo and 25,000 passengers a year.<sup>30</sup>

In 1970, Saudi Arabia had just 57,000 telephone lines, in 1994, these had increased to 1.5 million telephone lines. They will have increased to 2 million by 1995. The Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones invested more than \$15 billion during the four, five year development plans covered in the period 1985 to 1990. The telephone service operates in 450 cities, towns and hamlets.

Telecommunications services are available throughout the country. It has more than 700 post offices.<sup>31</sup>

Saudi Arabia has now entered a new era for using satellite communications. It is the world's fifth largest user of satellite communications. The first two Arabsat satellites came into use about 10 years ago.

Healthcare in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is free for all citizens. Throughout the country, Saudi Arabia has 257 hospitals and more than 3,000 health care centres. In 1993, the government has been built more than 500 clinics. The number of doctors has been increased from one doctor per 6,000 people in 1970, to one doctor per 544 people in 1993. Medical universities are running basic health research programmes. For instance, the research centre at King Saud University's School of Pharmacology has developed a new drug that effectively steadies the blood sugar levels of diabetics.<sup>32</sup>

King Saud University in Riyadh, the first university in the country, was founded in 1957. There are now seven universities and the number of students has risen from 14,000 in 1970, to more than 160,000 in 1994. One of the universities is the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran founded in 1963, and one of the very few of its kind in the world. Its standards and achievements are internationally recognised.<sup>33</sup> The number of primary and secondary schools has increased from 3,600 in 1972, to more than 17,000 in 1994. During the same period the number of students has increased from 670,000 to more than 3 million in 1994.<sup>34</sup>

#### **4. The diversifying Saudi economy**

Since the Saudi economy is still sensitive to the volume and price of the Kingdom's oil exports, Riyadh is determined to diversify the Saudi Arabian economy, making it less dependent on oil. Saudi officials have said about the diversification of the economy, "We have already made considerable progress towards this goal. Twenty years ago, petroleum provided more than 55 per cent of our gross domestic product;



today it is responsible for only about 30 per cent".<sup>35</sup> Dr Algosaihi stated, "But perhaps the most remarkable growth has been in the more traditional private manufacturing industry which accounted for over 11 per cent of GDP in 1992. There are industrial estates outside all the major cities. The number of companies has increased from 1,000 in 1978 to over 2,300 today. There are some 2,000 working factories with up to 50 new units opening each year, producing paper and building products, detergents, furniture, plastics, metals, textiles, and many other items".<sup>36</sup> Figure 5 compares the gross domestic product of the Middle Eastern countries in 1993, and clearly shows Saudi Arabia as the wealthiest country.

In addition, Saudi Arabia is no longer as reliant on direct oil revenues as it was. For instance, agriculture's share of the gross national product (GNP) increased from 3 per cent in 1976, to 13 per cent in 1986. The success of these policies is reflected also in the manufacturing sector's contribution of a steadily growing share to the GNP in items such as textiles, cement, chemicals, plastics and building material, with increasing numbers of Saudi workers joining the industrial sector.<sup>37</sup> The objective of industrial development is to expand and diversify the production base, develop non-oil income sources and give Saudi Arabia a degree of self-sufficiency.<sup>38</sup> Table 6 illustrates the declining share of government revenues provided by oil. Oil revenues have been invested in developing Saudi agriculture, to make the Kingdom as self-reliant as possible, as well as turning it into a food exporter. Since a great drive for self-sufficiency and food security was launched in the 1970s, the Kingdom has reduced its dependence on food imports from 87 per cent to about 50 per cent. Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has become a major economy in the world. Saudi Arabia is firmly established among the world's 25 largest economies.<sup>39</sup>

It is probably rather less well known that, Saudi Arabia became a major flower grower, and exports some of its produce. The fishing industry is making rapid progress and now exports shrimps to Japan. Food imports into the Kingdom were reduced from 8.7 million tonnes in 1987, to 4 million tonnes in 1991.<sup>40</sup>



The amount of wheat grown rose from 26,000 tonnes in 1970, to 4,000,000 tonnes in 1993. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the world's sixth largest exporter of wheat. Saudi Arabia is also one of the world's leading growers of dates producing about 600,000 tonnes a year. Fruit and vegetable production reached a total of 2.6 million tonnes.<sup>41</sup> In 1985, Saudi Arabia achieved its self-sufficiency in the production of chickens for slaughter, eggs, milk and dairy products, as well as exporting part of its production to its neighbouring states.<sup>42</sup> Table 7 shows the increased production of grains, vegetables and fruit from 1985 to 1990.

Saudi Arabia has instituted an ambitious programme of agriculture developments. It offers grants of both land and money to farmers and companies as well as interest free loans to aid the agricultural development programme. The government offers grants to the value of 50 per cent of the cost of agricultural machinery, as well as for seeds.<sup>43</sup>

The continuous development of Saudi Arabia since it was declared a unified Kingdom has been one of the great national success stories of the history of the area. Saudi Arabia's ever-developing economy, established on oil, industry and agriculture, is founded on the investment of revenues; a free market economy; government adoption of many major products, diversification of the production base by encouraging the industrial and agricultural sectors; development of local manpower and of economic co-operation at all the required levels.<sup>44</sup> Since the price of oil has fallen, Saudi Arabia has channelled the wealth generated into national developments and initiated a programme to speed up the growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors.

The policies pursued in this regard control the expansion of crude oil refining in accordance with world and domestic demand and support industrial development. As part of this strategy, Saudi Arabia has been actively seeking to ensure that it has access to markets for its crude. In November 1988, Saudi Arabia obtained a 50:50 joint venture with Texaco's refineries and gasoline stations in 26 states in the eastern and southern United States, it cost Saudi Arabia about \$800 million. The company had revenue of \$6,823 million in 1992. The Company uses about 600,000 b/d of Saudi crude oil.<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, in 1991, Saudi Aramco bought 35 per cent of Sangyong Oil Refining Company of South Korea, which focused attention on one of the highest economic growth areas in the world. The company has two refineries: one with capacity of 175,000 b/d and one with capacity of 90,000 b/d.<sup>46</sup>

**Table 6**


Source of government revenue

Year	Oil %	Others %
1389/90	89.2	10.8
1390/91	89.5	10.5
1391/92	87.1	12.9
1392/93	88.0	12.0
1393/94	97.3	2.7
1394/95	94.1	5.9
1395/96	90.4	9.6
1396/97	89.1	10.9
1397/98	86.2	13.8
1398/99	87.5	12.5
1399/00	89.6	10.4
1400/01	91.7	8.3
1401/02	89.3	10.7
1402/03	75.6	24.4
1403/04	70.3	29.7
1404/05	70.8	29.2
1405/06	67.1	32.9
1406/07	55.5	44.5

Source: Fouad Al-Farsy, Modernity and Tradition, The Saudi Equation, 1990, Kegan Paul International, p. 134

**Figure 5**

**Gross domestic product in the Middle East in 1993.**  
**Gross domestic product**



Source: Saudi Arabia Country Report, 1<sup>st</sup> quarter, 1994, The Economist Intelligence Unit, p.12

**Table 7**

**Agricultural Production**  
**('000 tonnes)**

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Grains</b>	<b>2,194</b>	<b>2,606</b>	<b>2,767</b>	<b>3,081</b>	<b>3,633</b>	<b>4,118</b>
of which:						
wheat	2,135	2,544	2,467	2,800	3,192	3,570
sorghum	43	31	44	60	75	95
millet	4	5	10	11	12	13
corn	5	9	15	20	35	36
barley	3	13	136	186	315	400
<b>Vegetables</b>	<b>1,666</b>	<b>1,682</b>	<b>1,941</b>	<b>2,050</b>	<b>2,225</b>	<b>2,230</b>
of which:						
tomatoes	331	370	435	465	480	500
watermelons	667	534	633	625	700	730
<b>Fruit</b>						
of which:						
grapes	80	72	109	112	123	135
dates	456	460	515	517	528	542
Eggs	134	138	149	155	159	163
Red meat	130	139	154	159	164	171
Poultry meat	186	196	236	248	241	265
Milk <sup>b</sup>	403	428	487	508	555	625

<sup>a</sup> Estimates <sup>b</sup> Including reconstituted products

Source: As figure 5 for 1991-92, p. 14,15.

In early 1994, Saudi Aramco has purchased 40 per cent of the Petron Corporation, the state owned oil company in the Philippines. Petron operates a 155,000 b/d refinery along with 860 service stations which hold a 40 per cent share of the Philippine oil market. Mr Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources, stated that Saudi Aramco would supply 90 of the refinery's crude oil requirements. That was third Saudi Aramco's overseas joint venture in refining.<sup>47</sup>

The Minister of Industry and Electricity, Abdulaziz al-Zamil, remarked that "While trade and investment are significant. There is a shift in the Saudi Arabian market. Having completed a large part of its physical infrastructure, Saudi Arabia is now concentrating on economic diversification with the emphasis on industry, agriculture, financial and business services. The main opportunities for foreign companies have, therefore, shifted from contracting and services toward investment".<sup>48</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi oil relations**

Oil has been an essential element in U.S. - Saudi relations from the early stages in the development of their relations. The enormous oil reserve in Saudi Arabia alone make that country more important to American diplomacy than almost any other developing country.

The Americans were not the first country to be interested in Saudi oil. In 1923, a New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, a representative of a British group of investors, had obtained the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia from King Abdulaziz, a concession covering more than 30,000 square miles in the Al-Hasa, the north-eastern part of the peninsula along the Persian Gulf region of eastern Saudi Arabia.

Holmes failed to interest any British company in the exploitation of oil in the Al-Hasa region and ceased exploration in 1925. The concession was formally announced void in 1928.<sup>49</sup> That was one of the world's greatest lost opportunities for British companies.

John Philby, an Englishman who became a close advisor to King Abdulaziz, suggested that Charles R. Crane, an American with a deep interest in Arabia and who was sponsoring development projects in Yemen, might be interested in developing the oil fields. In 1930, King Abdulaziz invited Crane to visit the Kingdom. In 1931, he arrived in Riyadh and finally he promised to send, at his own expense, an American mining engineer to make a survey of Saudi Arabia to evaluate the Kingdom's water, mineral and oil resources.<sup>50</sup>

In 1931, Karl Twitchell, the mining engineer, arrived in Jeddah. Having made a more than 1,500 mile-long journey through the country, Twitchell found what he was looking for. He went home to the United States to find a company that was interested to win a comprehensive concession from Abdulaziz. In 1933, Twitchell arrived in Jeddah with a representative of the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), Lloyd Hamilton. In May 1933, Hamilton succeeded in negotiating a concession for exclusive rights to oil in the Eastern province. The initial agreement established a concession for sixty six years, from 1933 to 1999. The original concession covered 360,000 square miles along the east coast of Saudi Arabia. The rest of Saudi Arabia remained unleased until 1939, when concessions were granted, which added 80,000 square miles to the original concession, thus, bringing the total to 440,000 square miles. At that time, the United States had no diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. These were soon established, however, in 1940.<sup>51</sup>

The original concession called for an annual rental fee of 5,000 British pounds in gold until oil was discovered; a 50,000 pound loan in gold to the Saudi government; a royalty payment of four shillings (former British coin, equal to 1/20 of a pound) in gold per net tonne of crude oil produced after the discovery of oil; and the free supply to the government, of specific quantities of products from the refinery the company was to build after oil has been discovered, that was equal to the amount extracted in one day in 1970.<sup>52</sup> (In 1933, the British pound was worth about U.S. \$4.87). The company received exclusive rights to explore, produce, and export oil, free of all Saudi taxes and duties. This generous lease agreement reflected the King's need for funds at that time.<sup>53</sup>

The company was officially known as California Arabia Standard Oil (CASOC). On January 31, 1944, the name was changed to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Aramco is a consortium of four major American oil companies: Social 30 per cent, Texaco 30 per cent, Exxon 30 per cent and Mobil 10 per cent. These four companies were the owners of Aramco until the 1970s.<sup>54</sup>

Oil was first produced commercially in 1938, but World War II kept production at a relatively low level. Large scale production began in 1945, with over 58,000 barrels a day. Oil production had increased by almost 1,000 per cent in 1950, to over half a million barrels a day. Table 8 illustrates the steady increase in oil production.

The nature of Aramco was changing even as its activities were expanding. In 1950, an agreement was signed, between Aramco and the Saudi government whereby the government taxed profits at 50 per cent. In December 1972, long negotiations were completed for the Saudi government to buy a 25 per cent stake in Aramco, effective from 1973. The negotiations of 1973, resulted in the Saudi stake increasing to 60 per cent. In 1980, arrangements for 100 per cent Saudi ownership of Aramco were reached and the payments to the four American companies were completed. American staff remained at work for Aramco. There were more than 3,400 Americans in 1980. By 1983, Aramco employed more than 61,000 individuals, of which more than 33,000 were Saudi nationals.<sup>55</sup>

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Aramco have been marked by much stress and strain. Economic growth has primarily involved the American private sector more than the government. For many years, Aramco played a more important role in U.S. - Saudi relations than the United States government did. Socal and Texaco, the two partners in Casoc, were the only two private companies involved in Saudi oil.<sup>56</sup>

The direct U.S. government involvement to aid the Saudi government was protecting the Saudi's most valuable asset (oil) against the political risks in Saudi Arabia and concern about German and Japanese intentions in the Middle East and

**Table 8**

Annual crude oil production and oil revenues  
in Saudi Arabia from 1938 until 1993.

Year	Million Barrels per day	Million U.S. Dollars
1938	1,357	
1939	10,000	3.2
1940	13,000	
1941	11,000	
1942	12,000	
1943	13,000	
1944	21,000	
1945	58,386	
1946	164,000	10.4
1947	246,169	
1948	390,309	
1949	476,736	
1950	546,703	56.7
1951	761,000	
1952	827,000	
1953	844,000	
1954	961,000	
1955	976,000	340.8
1956	1,000,000	
1957	1,020,000	
1958	1,060,000	
1959	1,150,000	315.0
1960	1,320,000	333.7
1961	1,480,000	377.6
1962	1,640,000	409.7
1963	1,790,000	607.7
1964	1,900,000	523.2
1965	2,024,000	664.1
1966	2,392,000	789.0
1967	2,597,000	903.6
1968	2,829,000	926.4
1969	2,992,000	949.2
1970	3,548,000	1,214.0
1971	4,497,000	1,884.9
1972	5,733,000	2,744.6
1973	7,334,000	4,340.0
1974	8,048,000	22,573.5
1975	7,080,000	25,676.2
1976	8,580,000	30,754.9
1977	9,200,000	36,540.1
1978	8,315,000	32,000.0
1979	9,555,000	48,443.1
1980	9,990,000	104,200.0
1981	9,985,000	113,300.0
1982	6,695,000	76,000.0
1983	5,225,000	46,000.0
1984	4,760,000	43,700.0
1985	3,565,000	24,180.0
1986	4,784,000	16,975.0
1987	3,975,000	19,271.0
1988	5,086,000	20,500.0
1989	5,160,000	23,000.0
1990	5,160,000	43,000.0
1991	8,230,000	43,700.0
1992	8,410,000	40,000.0
1993	8,210,000	35,800.0

Sources: Saudi Arabia Rush to Development, 1982. Ragaei El Mallak, P. 55, p. 62 from year 1938 until 1977. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Statistical Abstract (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, December 1972, pp. 52-53, from year 1965 until 1972 (Revenue). Modernity and Tradition, The Saudi Equation, Fouad Al-Farsay, 1990 from year 1978 until 1987 (the revenues from 1978 until 1984) p. 140, p. 120. The Middle East Review 1991-1992, revenues from year 1985 until 1988, p. 120. Saudi Arabia, 1993, Mardechai Abir. Revenues from 1988 until 1991. Saudi Arabia, Country report, 1st quarter 1994, the years of 1992 and 1993.

the intentions of the British with regard to Saudi oil contributed to the U.S. decision in 1939 to establish a full diplomatic presence in Saudi Arabia.<sup>57</sup> By that , there were more than 325 Americans in Saudi Arabia. <sup>58</sup> Direct involvement by the American government in Saudi Arabia was known to some as the policy of “solidification”.<sup>59</sup> The U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia was securing the continuation of a totally American enterprises there after World War II.<sup>60</sup> In addition, the Army Navy Petroleum Board introduced it report to President Roosevelt that serious shortage of oil was imminent, which would threaten military operations.<sup>61</sup> The concerns of the military men gave a further push to the U.S. government in the direction of Saudi Arabia.<sup>62</sup>

Supplying the U.S. with oil from Saudi Arabia has continued over the decades. According to the Department of Energy figures, during the first quarter of 1990, the United States imported 1.3 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude and related products from Saudi Arabia. Imports into the U.S. of crude oil alone were 1.16 mbd. This represented 17 per cent of total U.S. imports of crude and related products. Broken down, it represented 19.4 per cent of crude imports and 8.5 per cent of related product imports. It is 15 per cent of total American imports and some 20 per cent of Saudi exports.

### **U.S. - Saudi commercial relations**

Commercial relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s, were carried out almost entirely between the Saudi government and private U.S. firms, represented by Aramco. When oil was produced in commercial quantities in 1938, a new period of Saudi-American relations began. Following World War II, America had an insufficient supply of domestic crude oil production. Immediately, other U.S. companies established a presence in Saudi Arabia in association with Aramco. For instance, in the late 1940s, the engineering firm Bechtel participated in the construction of the Trans-Arabia Pipeline (Tapline)



from Saudi Arabia's Eastern province to Lebanon and also built the Jeddah and Riyadh airports.

On January 17, 1951, a four point technical assistance agreement was signed in response to Saudi desires, and an American initiative was launched. Under the four point agreement, the United States sent a financial mission (in 1952) to reform the budgetary and administrative system of the Ministry of Finance. On the recommendations of the report of the mission, Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) to act as the Kingdom's central bank.<sup>63</sup> In fact, from the late 1930s to 1960, oil revenues and fiscal systems remained inadequate to permit major advances in development.<sup>64</sup> However, basic steps were taken to make Saudi Arabia a modern country.<sup>65</sup>

The years preceding the oil boom (1960-1973) were a period of steady growth. Thus, commercial relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia improved.<sup>66</sup> But, U.S. government technical assistance to Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, was generally focused in military areas (see Chapter 3) and in mineral exploration. In spite of the problems in the Middle East in the 1960s, U.S. - Saudi economic and commercial relations remained close until the world energy crisis in 1973.

After the oil price boom of 1973, there was a period of great infrastructure building and the development of the Saudi welfare services. Following the energy crisis, the United States began to deal more seriously with Saudi Arabia as a crucial player in the Middle East as well as recognising its reliance on Saudi oil.<sup>67</sup> As a result, in January 1974, the American embassy in Jeddah gave the government of Saudi Arabia a proposal to make a joint commission to further economic co-operation between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It was soon seen that the U.S. was trying to secure oil supplies from Saudi Arabia as well as trying to compensate the balance-of-payment deficit of growing U.S. oil imports by recycling Saudi petrodollars. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia wanted to ease the tension in U.S. - Saudi relations created by the energy crisis 1973, and so it has consistently

demonstrated its preference for American technology and expertise over the years, as both the quantity of its oil resources has become apparent and its strategic importance has increased.<sup>68</sup>

From this starting point, the American and Saudis began discussions that resulted in the formation of a 'U.S. - Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation'. During a visit of Prince Fahd to Washington, he and Secretary of State, Kissinger, issued a joint statement on Saudi Arabian - U.S. Co-operation. On June 8, 1974, a joint commission was to be established and would be headed by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy.<sup>69</sup> This sign-posted the new concept of U.S. Saudi "special relationship".

The term 'Joint Commission' implies co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in pursuing aims that are of interest to both countries rather than the more traditional arrangement of earlier years when the U.S. had looked upon those who received its technology as clients.<sup>70</sup>

It was in this context that consideration was given to the idea of establishing a more formal representation of the long-standing friendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.<sup>71</sup> The Joint Commission agreed to promote programmes of co-operation between the two countries in the field of industrialisation, trade, manpower training, agriculture, science and technology, and a variety of the other government services.<sup>72</sup> These projects were designed to perform the following objectives: (1) help Saudi Arabia achieve its national development goals by providing technical expertise in key areas; (2) strengthen economic and political ties between the two countries; and (3) encourage closer relationships between the American and Saudi Arabian people.<sup>73</sup>

Since then ministerial-level Joint Commission meetings have been held in Washington and Riyadh alternately and are attended by senior officials of both governments.<sup>74</sup> The most recent meeting was the Eleventh Session, which

occurred in 1994, in Washington.<sup>75</sup> In the early 1980s, the Joint Commission had almost 400 U.S. government and contract personnel on assignment in Saudi Arabia. More recently there were more than 60 full-time advisors.<sup>76</sup>

Under the Joint Commission, U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Technical Co-operation agreement on February 13, 1975, valid for five years and renewed four times since November 1979. The agreement called for:

- The United States to provide professional and technical advisors for Saudi economic and human resources development;
- Both countries to adopt mutually acceptable organizational arrangements;
- The United States, on Saudi request, to prepare studies for specific development projects and to provide advisors for them in accordance with agreed-upon cost estimates; the Saudi government to establish a dollar trust account in the U.S. Treasury and to provide in advance the full amount of funds necessary to cover the costs of studies and services; and,
- The United States to assign administrative support and staff to Saudi Arabia to carry out the purposes of the agreement; and Saudi Arabia to defray all costs.<sup>77</sup>

After this commission, a further six Joint Commissions were established at about the same time on November 1982, eleven U.S. departments and agencies were being involved in twenty-four projects, at a total estimated cost of \$716.17 million. At the same time, over 650 U.S. firms were represented in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>78</sup>

The new concept of a U.S. - Saudi "special relationship" was coined by John Sawhill then head of the Federal Energy Administration, in hearings before the Senate Sub-committee on multinational corporations. "The U.S. aim of recycling petrodollars could better be served, commercial opportunities for U.S. business could be enhanced, and expanded Saudi reliance on U.S. technical assistance in economic development could encourage closer co-operation on broader political issues of mutual interest".<sup>79</sup> Walter H. Donaldson, Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs, expressed his view in March 1974, "It is evident that the

international environment has dramatically changed... and that we must recognise that interdependence is a fact, not a choice".<sup>80</sup> Indeed after the 1973 October war and oil embargo defined Saudi Arabia's position as well as its relations with the U.S.

Since 1974, the U.S. government through the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Co-operation, has supplied assistance with a broad range of development projects involving industrialisation, training, agriculture, manpower and trade. Thousands of Saudis have received training in the U.S. since the Joint Commissions started.<sup>81</sup> The U.S. - Saudi special relationship continues today in the technical assistance and economic co-operation. Development of Saudi Arabian institutions and the skills of their employees will continue to be the predominant concern of the Joint Commission in the coming years.<sup>82</sup>

For many years until now, the United States has been the first country in the list of countries supplying Saudi Arabia with goods and services. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is among America's top ten trading partners. Saudi Arabia is sixth among the top exporters to the United States. Table 9 shows U.S.-Saudi trade from 1975 to 1994. There was a decrease in U.S.-Saudi trade from 1982 to 1990. As the world oil prices dropped, this was a period of economic slow down. However, between 1990 and 1994 there was an increase in the U.S.-Saudi trade again.

In 1988, there were 224 American-Saudi licensed joint business ventures. These ventures involved a total licensed capital of \$3.3 billion. Saudi investors maintained 53 per cent of the capital, while Americans reserved 45.5 per cent and other nationals held 1.5 per cent.

All U.S. capital involved in joint ventures is committed to the industrial sectors. Of the 224 joint ventures started in 1988, 68 were investments in industrial projects. Investments reached a total of \$3.1 billion. The remaining 156 licensed joint ventures were in non-industrial fields, amounting to \$ 233 million.<sup>83</sup>

**Table 9**

**U.S. - Saudi trade 1975-1994  
(in billion of dollars).**

Year	Saudi exports to U.S.	Saudi imports from U.S.
1975	2,642.6	1,501.8
1976	5,212.9	2,774.1
1977	6,358.5	3,575.0
1978	5,307.1	4,370.0
1979	7,983.4	4,875.0
1980	12,598.8	5,768.5
1981	14,391.3	7,327.4
1982	7,860.2	9,026.0
1983	3,840.3	7,903.3
1984	4,008.9	5,564.4
1985	2,026.8	4,474.2
1986	4,054.3	3,448.8
1987	4,886.5	3,057.4
1988	5,288.8	3,529.9
1989	7,326.4	3,842.9
1990	9,757.6	4,438.3
1991	10,925.1	5,867.6
1992	10,290.0	7,020.0
1993	7,810.0	6,520.0
1994	7,690.0	6,010.0

Source: as Table 10, p. 291. From year 1988 to 1991, see Economic Bulletin, GCC, Vol. X, 1995, p. 195-196. From year 1992 to 1994, see Middle East Insight, Vol. XI, No. 6, 1995, p. 121.

**Summary**

The Americans and Saudis can not avoid a close connection with each other. For most of the past, the United States and Saudi Arabia have worked in a mutually beneficial relationship. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may want to co-operate with the United States by turning the rapid developments in alternative energy to diversifying its economy from the increasingly vulnerable oil resource to other sources of revenue. For the United States, the higher prices of oil and the events that followed the 1973 oil embargo have substantially modified previous trends in energy consumption. The increase in oil prices in 1971, 1973 and 1975, showed that the sensitivity of these economies was determined by the greater costs of imported oil and the amount the oil that the countries had to import. Thus, the United States was sensitive to the oil price rises.<sup>84</sup> In 1976, Saudi Arabia overtook Canada and Venezuela as the largest supplier of oil to the United States. About 20 per cent of Saudi Arabia's exports went to the United States which was about 8 per cent of the U.S.'s total oil requirements.<sup>85</sup>

The United States found in the Arab oil embargo an increasing danger to its economic growth and standard of living. For reasons of national security, the United States is alarmed by its growing dependence on imported oil which may again be subject to the manipulation of supply for the political purpose to exploit American vulnerability. A consensus is growing that the United States should launch a unified, strict research and development effort into alternative energy sources to remove the dangerous degree of dependency on imported oil. The United States is developing nucosolar (Nuclear and solar) energy.

According to the Atomic Energy Commission, more American electricity will be generated from nuclear fission in future. The large-scale use of nuclear power will release much needed oil and natural gas for other pressing uses particularly for automobiles, but still nuclear power is dangerous unlike oil. Solar power has been used in California and Florida. Because of the cost and difficulties of installing solar energy in existing homes and because of the slow rate of replacing housing, the technology of solar heating and cooling will take several decades before it could have any significant impact on energy use.<sup>86</sup>

Despite the development of alternative sources of energy, however, oil will surely maintain its favoured position as a source of primary energy during this decade and the decade after. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises that they can not depend on oil because it is a non-renewable resource. The Saudis are now making a concerted effort to channel oil revenues into other productive enterprises that will provide income after the oil is depleted.

Having relied on the United States to produce oil revenue, the Saudis have also turned to the same source for advice and assistance on how best to invest their assets, spend their money, and develop their country. Private American consultants have worked with Saudis on their successive five-year plans, including the 1981-85 plan to spend nearly \$250 billion. American financial experts have advised the Saudis on how to invest their surplus revenues. The Americans want to ease the effect of their negative balance of payments by attracting surplus petro-dollars back to the U.S. economy. For example, in 1981, Saudi surpluses

stood at more than \$100 billion. However, most of it was held in dollars and much of it was invested in the United States.

The economic relationship is recognised as beneficial to both countries. Over the past few years, Saudi Arabia has become the seventh largest foreign market for U.S. goods, services and technology. It is the most rapidly expanding market for U.S. exports. At the same time, the United States has become the largest consuming country of Saudi oil.<sup>87</sup> This level of co-operation is generated from the increased interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as indicated by their total trade.<sup>88</sup> The signing of the Joint Economic Commission in 1974, was to harmonise and ease bilateral trade relations.

As interdependence increased the co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, conflict also appeared to increase. During the oil embargo of 1973, Saudi Arabia sought to use its leverage to press the United States on its policy towards Israel and its Arab neighbours. The United States, for its part, supplied Saudi Arabia with the assistance it sought and, at the same time, directed threats to affect its production and price decisions.

The realist school of thought recognised that, linkages were made between issues by strong countries, to use their power (especially their military force) to compel other countries into taking a stance on the issue. This is a most effective instrument of state policy.<sup>89</sup> Under conditions of complex interdependence, it is more difficult for strong countries to make such linkages because military force will, in these conditions, be ineffective.<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, linkages are frequently made by countries that lack substantial military power to secure satisfactory overall bargains.<sup>91</sup>

In conditions of complex interdependence, the manipulation of the economic factors of interdependence in the issue area and of international organisations and transnational actors are very important in achieving the state's objectives.<sup>92</sup> The U.S. could manipulate the oil crisis in order to promote a balance of interests. The U.S.' policies take account of these areas of mutual interests and its need to

encourage Saudi Arabia to recycle its petrodollars in the U.S. Indeed, Saudi Arabia places a substantial portion of its revenues in private banks (mainly in New York).<sup>93</sup> These deposits became the base for the expansion of the international lending activities of private banks.<sup>94</sup> The U.S. itself would suffer severely if Saudi's trade flow were disrupted.

Trade can be used as an instrument of power.<sup>95</sup> Vulnerability can be used as an economic weapon, allowing states that lack military force to compel their competitor.<sup>96</sup> The oil embargo was lifted after the U.S. played its part as mediator in brokering the troop disengagement accord between Egypt and Israel. Changing power dimensions are viewed as affecting behaviour in the system, vulnerability can be a source of increased international conflict.<sup>97</sup>



## **Chapter Three**

### **U.S.-Saudi Security and Military Relations until the 1990 Gulf Crisis**

#### **U.S.-Saudi security relations**

U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia has been based on a combination of interests. Containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East also occupied U.S. foreign policy for the late 1940s until 1989. Washington's policy of containment in the 1950s was to maintain a pro-Western Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This policy was pursued by the U.S. within the context of regional collective security agreements.<sup>1</sup> With the 1958 revolution and the fall of the pro-Western monarchy, Iraq moved rapidly from a pro-Western stance to establishing a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Iran and Saudi Arabia became the only two pillars of stability in the Gulf in the opinion of the U.S. and its Western allies.<sup>2</sup>

For that reason, developments in 1969, led the U.S. to give increased importance to strengthening the internal security of the Saudi monarchy. In June 1969, the Saudi government interrupted a group of people plotting to overthrow the King and establish a republic. Some two thousand individuals were arrested, including many key officials in the Saudi air force. Because of this event, the U.S. increased the importance it placed on being able to reinforce the internal security of Saudi Arabia and providing Riyadh with military hardware. It is true, that American military sales to Saudi Arabia increased under the Nixon administration.<sup>3</sup>

In 1972, Washington concluded a major review of its interests and policy options in the Persian Gulf. The review resulted in the British withdrawal from the region in 1971; the increasing dependence of the industrial world on Gulf oil; and the Nixon doctrine, which declared the post-Vietnam desire on the part of the U.S. to have local governments participate in the defence of their security with U.S. support but without U.S. troops.<sup>4</sup>

Developments such as the 1973 October war, and the rise in the price of oil often frustrated implementation of some of the principles. However, the principles remained; these principles have forced the U.S. to become more directly involved in the Gulf region - politically, economically and strategically.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. government's response was a "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia. "Access" meant an adequate and long term source of supply of oil, at moderate prices.<sup>6</sup> In 1974-75, joint commissions on the economic and security between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, were as the consequences of oil embargo of 1973. This, indeed emphasised the importance of Saudi Arabia in Washington's long-term policy planning to establish peace and security in the Gulf region.<sup>7</sup>

The changes in the Persian Gulf in 1974, urgently pointed to the need for a clearer policy. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, diagnosed four examples of the changes that were quickly developing in the Gulf and raised some questions relating to the region:

First, it is amply clear that increased Iranian Saudi Arabian co-operation in strategic, political and economic spheres is vital to maintaining our interests in this region in the future. Do our military supplies and other policies promote trust and confidence in regional co-operation? How are we encouraging Iran to co-operate with Saudi Arabia?

Second, it is clear that U.S. oil companies in the region are being forced toward a new type of relationship with the producing states... what role does the United States Government plan on playing in the future negotiations with producing states? What is the U.S. doing to try to bring the oil prices down?

Third, an enormous amount of money is accumulating in the Persian Gulf... what policies is our Government developing to deal with this new financial world? How are we trying to recycle petrodollars? What advice are we giving U.S. companies?

Fourth, it is also clear that, while the challenge of evolving effective policies toward the large states of the region... will be a major policy dilemma for the coming years, the U.S. faces another type of challenge in developing policy strategies toward the smaller states of the area.<sup>8</sup>

The five policy objectives of the U.S. in the Arabian peninsula/Persian Gulf area that were listed by Assistant Secretary of State, Atherton, in August 1974, were rephrased by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, in a Congressional hearing on June 10, 1975. Sisco stated that in view of these objectives, United States' policy toward the Gulf had

been designed to link arms sales to these countries with the overall policy objectives of the United States. According to Sisco, these states had expressed concerns in political, economic, cultural and defence fields, and they had sought co-operation with the United States. Sisco argued that "Given our mutuality of interests, it is reasonable and sensible for us to support the policy goals of these friendly countries, where such goals parallel our own". This approach controlled U.S. policy towards the Persian Gulf for the rest of the 1970s.<sup>9</sup>

In September 1980, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold H. Saunders, stated in a Congressional hearing that U.S. interests in the Gulf since the early 1970s "Have changed little in nature but have grown in importance". He also stated that the United States takes notice of the following factors:

- the area's strategic location and its significance to maintaining a global strategic balance;
- the significance we place on the sovereignty and independence of these countries as part of a more stable world;
- the world's vital need for the region's oil; and
- the importance of these states in international finance and development and as markets for our goods and technology.<sup>10</sup>

Before this period, Saudi Arabia had continued to stress its desire to preserve the Gulf region free from the presence of any superpower. In November 1979, Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in an interview that Saudi Arabia's concern was "To prevent the Gulf region from becoming an area for rivalry among the foreign powers".<sup>11</sup> In addition, Saudi Interior Minister, Nayif Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in an interview in October 1979, that Gulf security was the joint responsibility of all the region's countries; the existing and continuing co-ordination between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states gave proof to the extent of the importance attached to security.<sup>12</sup> While the Saudis reportedly continued being supportive of, though not in public, a U.S. "over-the-horizon" naval presence, as an exercise of the U.S. world-wide strategic role, Saudis continued to be sensitive of any proposal of joint military co-operation or the basing of U.S. military forces on Saudi soil.<sup>13</sup>

The events during 1979, beginning with the fall of the Shah of Iran to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has been explained by some Saudi officials as being a clear evidence of incoherence, doubts and weakness in U.S. policy.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, on January 4, 1980, the Saudi

Foreign Minister discussed with representatives of Arab and Islamic countries to obtain a clear-cut, united Muslim stand demanding for military and principled action and emphasising that the Soviet invasion represented a new strategy on the part of Moscow that had resulted from the incoherent and weak American policy.<sup>15</sup>

For the U.S., the Soviet invasion raised a number of serious questions and choices relating to the Gulf region. In particular, it cast doubt on the stability and the security of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. For the U.S., the situation demanded a reassessment of its role in international affairs. Instability in the Gulf region had exposed the vulnerability of Middle East oil resources vital to the Western world, and had underlined the geopolitical deficiencies of U.S. retrenchment policy that had begun with the Nixon doctrine and had been continued under the Ford and Carter administrations. To Americans, the invasion created a new national consensus that whatever world-wide role the U.S. might determine to play it could be supported by force. The first step toward signalling this change was taken in President Carter's State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, in which he said: "Any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".<sup>16</sup>

Reaction among Gulf Arab countries to President Carter's State of the Union address was critical as his commitment to safeguard Western interests in the region was interpreted as an excuse for U.S. interference in their domestic affairs, and justifying future U.S. military intervention in their countries.<sup>17</sup>

On January 29, 1980, President Carter, speaking to a group of newspaper editors, explained that U.S. deterrence was conditional on both regional and allied co-operation: "I don't think it would be accurate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there to defend the region unilaterally".<sup>18</sup> In order to safeguard oil supplies, the U.S. was looking for military ties with Gulf states and also was co-ordinating its "efforts with nations who are not located in the region but are heavily dependent even more than we, on oil from that region".<sup>19</sup>

It should be noted that since 1977, the idea of appointing special military units for emergency operations in a non-NATO situation had been discussed with the Department of Defense. While planning for such emergencies was well underway by the time of the Iranian revolution of 1979, it had become clear that events in the Persian Gulf had added new impetus to this planning effort. Thus, by October 1, 1979, President Carter had announced he had requested the design of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and, by late October, specific guidance had been given to the services for the establishment of a command structure.<sup>20</sup>

President Carter in a news conference on February 13, 1980, asserted that the U.S. retained its freedom of military action to oppose external expansion in the Gulf, when he stated: "We can't afford to let the Soviets choose either the terrain or the tactics to be used by any other country - a nation that might be invaded, their neighbours, our allies, or ourselves".<sup>21</sup> On February 14, 1980, Defense Secretary, Brown, said in an interview that Soviet seizure of political control in the region would be equivalent to seizing territory in Western Europe or Japan because of their dependence upon Persian Gulf oil.<sup>22</sup>

Crown Prince Fahd, in March 1980, urged friendly countries to continue to provide Arab states of the Gulf with arms for self-defence. Fahd stressed that the definition of self-reliance supported the stability of the region as it would remove the area from superpower conflicts and would make it independent of foreign protection.<sup>23</sup> They recognised this act as being confrontational and causing tension throughout the region. The Saudis condemned the Iranian regime for the taking of American diplomatic personnel as hostages in November 1979. The Saudi concern over the use of military force in the area, however, grew after the U.S. failed to rescue the hostages in Tehran in April 1980. The Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing the extreme concern of the Saudi government over the action by the U.S. against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and expressed that the use of military force went beyond accepted limits of international conduct. Crown Prince Fahd reported that foreign intervention in the Gulf could spark a global war, and that the Saudi government's policy was to prevent foreign intervention in the Gulf region.<sup>24</sup>

Border clashes between Iran and Iraq escalated to open conflict on September 22, 1980, when Iraq launched air raids on a number of military airfields in Iran. Both sides attacked each others' economic and population centres, and fighting included air, ground, and naval confrontations. The Gulf Arab states were concerned that there would be a widening of the conflict. The Iranian General Staff issued a warning, at the start of open warfare, that any Gulf state allowing its airfields or ports to be used for attacks against Iranian territory would be liable to Iranian counterattacks.<sup>25</sup>

The United States was reported to have given immediate attention to Saudi protection and deployed USAF AWACS aircraft to increase Saudi defences in the Gulf, especially near the oil fields and the oil terminals. In addition, there was a temporary deployment of 300 U.S. personnel including air crews and ground support technicians. On October 5, 1981, the Defense Department announced that ground radar and communications equipment, accompanied by 100 support personnel, were being sent to Saudi Arabia.<sup>26</sup>

The Reagan administration's attitude toward the Persian Gulf during its first year in office was massively influenced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and by the realisation of the Soviet threat throughout the region.<sup>27</sup> Subsequently, on April 21, 1981, the White House announced that President Reagan had decided to sell five AWACS and seven KC-135 refuelling tanker aircraft, in addition to fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia.<sup>28</sup> On October, 1, 1981, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Alexander Haig, defended the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia by pointing out that the deal would serve U.S. interests. He explained the four principles of U.S. strategy in the Gulf region:

- to improve the military position in and near the region;
- to strengthen the defence capabilities of the U.S.' friends;
- to restore confidence in the United States as a reliable partner; and,
- to pursue a permanent peace in the region.<sup>29</sup>

In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 17, 1981, Secretary of State, Haig, pointed out that the U.S. strategy in the Middle East must be to "Protect our vital interests in an unstable area exposed not only to historic Arab-Israeli rivalries but increasingly to threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies".<sup>30</sup> In Haig's view, regional security could be preserved through a system of security agreements between the U.S. and the major states of the Middle East region (Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). Such an "arc of strategic consensus" is based on the premise that "intimate connections" exist between the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and neighbouring areas in the region.<sup>31</sup>

The concept of an American presence in the Gulf was rejected in that such a presence might well provoke the Soviet Union to enter the region. Statements by Saudi leaders asserted that Secretary Haig's principal task should be to reassert U.S. reliability as a partner, in the wake of developments in Iran and Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> The question of an increased American presence in or near the Gulf region remained a sensitive issue to the government of Saudi Arabia. The interventionist threats of former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, after the oil embargo of 1973 in the mid 1970s, caused a strong reaction throughout the Gulf states. In 1979, the Gulf Arab states rejected an Omani plan to invite American participation in the administration of security of the maritime transit routes, including the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>33</sup>

The statements by Saudi spokesmen reflect an ambivalence toward the nature of the U.S. commitments to the security of Saudi Arabia. The American statements have revealed the appearance of two schools of thought. Firstly, there is the "activist" school, favouring military intervention either to support friendly governments or to secure access to oil supplies. This school emerged to call for the development of an inclusive strategy that would deal with Soviet interference with oil supplies, as well as more limited contingencies which might lead to the disruption to oil production and deliveries. Secondly, the "cautious" school, favouring an "over-the-horizon" U.S. presence that would be capable of responding quickly to requests for help from friendly governments. This school was concerned about the risks of superpower confrontation and the possible harm to long-term U.S. diplomatic and economic interests if a

provocative military stance was adopted, except at the considered request of the concerned regional government.<sup>34</sup>

Saudi and the Gulf Arab states had publicly stated their unwillingness to allow the establishment of a presence by any external power in the Gulf. U.S. ground and tactical forces would be unwelcome except, presumably, in the event of a major threat, which probably would include Soviet direct or indirect involvement. Saudi officials observed the U.S. as being unable or unwilling to respond to Soviet moves in Africa or the Middle East. They quoted as proof the U.S. refusal to support its regional allies, as demonstrated by arms embargoes against Turkey and Pakistan, and the refusal to give support to the Shah of Iran which Saudi Arabia saw as making his defeat inevitable.<sup>35</sup>

The build up of Soviet, East German, and Cuban strength in weapons, communications, facilities and advisers in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia, had been a source of concern for American defence planners for several years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased public awareness of the inadequacy of available U.S. forces to respond to a possible confrontation in the Gulf region, and demonstrated a general absence of support from the U.S.' Western allies.<sup>36</sup>

The Americans saw that the fall of the Shah of Iran and the collapse of the Iranian military establishment had removed Iran from its role as the Gulf policeman. Throughout Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Gulf, the gap between defence supplies and force levels, on the one hand, and effective military abilities, on the other hand, remained as big as ever despite massive defence expenditures and huge transfers of weapons.<sup>37</sup>

The maintenance and enhancement of the U.S. - Saudi Arabian relationship was considered by both governments as supplying a base for resolving political, security, economic, and energy issues. After 1978, the relationship experienced significant change in light of regional developments and policy responses on the part of the countries. With the continued importance of Saudi Arabia to the U.S., a report prepared for the sub-committee on Europe



and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 1981, made some number of mutual interests which would tend to enhance the relationship:

- preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia;
- maintenance of stability and security in the Persian Gulf/Red Sea region;
- prevention of the establishment by an external power, in particular the Soviet Union, of a predominant political and military presence in the region;
- the achievement by Saudi Arabia of a credible defence and a deterrence capability against political threats from regional states;
- maintenance and strengthening of economic and technological ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and continued mutual access to their respective markets for trade and investment;
- Saudi success in moderating OPEC oil-price deliberations and in the maintenance of current Saudi oil-production levels in order to sustain the economic and political health of the industrialized world;
- progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, including a resolution of the Palestinian and East Jerusalem issues, in order to remove the principal obstruction in U.S.-Arab relations, and to reduce potential revolutionary activity in the Gulf region.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to that, the report mentioned that there did exist differences with respect to U.S. and Saudi interests that could affect the relationship. These included the following:

- the desire by some elements in Saudi Arabia to reduce oil production to a level not exceeding that necessary to meet Saudis' reserve needs, on the premise that oil in the ground is a better long-term investment for a single-resource country than selling oil for inflated dollars;
- the desire to diversify Saudi diplomatic and economic ties with external powers, including the Soviet bloc, in light of current perceptions that too close a relationship with the U.S. is a liability, both politically and militarily;
- the disagreement with U.S. initiatives, under the Carter administration's Camp David guidelines, towards achieving an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and subsequent Saudi

support for the isolation of the regime of Egyptian President Al-Sadat; by the majority of Arab states.

- differences with respect to basing or the use of military facilities by U.S. forces on Saudi territory.<sup>39</sup>

In evaluating the importance of Saudi Arabia to U.S. interests in the Gulf region, the report made certain judgements relating to the U.S.-Saudi relationship stand out as a consequence of developments in the late 1970s. These include the following:

- domestic pressures in Saudi Arabia for a more restrictive policy on oil production may complicate the U.S.-Saudi economic relationships over the medium or long term;
- Saudi concern over the Palestinian question and the issue of Arab Jerusalem will complicate the U.S.-Saudi relationship if the U.S. is not seen to be placing reasonable pressure on Israel to moderate its position;
- close relations would benefit from greater sensitivity on the part of the U.S. and other Western powers to Saudi Arabia's delicate political situation in the Middle East region;
- the Saudis perceive the military relationship with the United States to be the principle test of U.S. reliability and political commitment to Saudi Arabia;
- there is no guarantee that the government of Saudi Arabia can control the hazardous process of modernisation and maintain political and economic stability in Saudi Arabia;
- co-ordination and integration of competing priorities and persistent problems in U.S.-Middle East policy threatens to complicate U.S.-Saudi relations, and;
- existing divisions within the Saudi government would seem to indicate that the U.S.-Saudi "special relationship" will likely be reassessed whenever a succession in the national leadership occurs.<sup>40</sup>

With the end of the "twin pillar" policy of the Nixon doctrine, the report indicated that planning for formulation of a new security arrangement in the Gulf raises a number of questions:

- the security problems of protecting oilfields, loading terminals, and the oil transit routes;
- increasing opportunities for the Soviet Union to influence events in the Gulf region;
- problems of the prevention of readiness to respond effectively to sabotage and terrorism;
- regional and internal upheavals, including the disruption of oil supplies through strike actions by religious or nationalist movements;
- the possibility that U.S. military intervention might generate violent anti-U.S. activities in regional states and give rise to internal instability;
- tensions or overt conflict between oil-producing Gulf states;
- the problems of maintaining strong and visible security support for Western Europe and Japan in the face of differences over energy problems;
- the use of oil pricing or an oil embargo as a political weapon;
- the reluctance by Saudi Arabia to be identified as the remaining pillar of the U.S. "twin pillar" policy;
- the fear of Saudi officials that their strategic and diplomatic position may be eroded by events over which they have no control; and
- the distinct limits on American's ability to influence events in desired directions.<sup>41</sup>

Since Saudi Arabia was reluctant to allow America a military presence in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. expanded its military facilities in Oman's Masirah island and on Diego Garcia. America also increased its military assistance to Oman, Somalia, and Kenya. In addition to that, the U.S. raised the level of its support of Saudi Arabia's military capability through the sale of AWACS (in October 1981) and other elements of the military sale package.<sup>42</sup>

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was the centrepiece of the United States' strategy to oppose the Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf. The RDJTF was transformed from the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1979.<sup>43</sup> President Carter and his assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, developed the national security policy in light of changes that were appearing in Soviet strategy.<sup>44</sup> To deter direct Soviet moves, the U.S. sought to create a formal military force in 1977 (RDF). This policy recommended the strategy

of employing U.S. general purpose forces to confront any Soviet aggression in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Later, Soviet military threats to the Gulf region came from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. After the Shah's fall in 1979, the U.S. transformed the RDF into a separate command area for a RDJTF.<sup>45</sup> It removed the new RDF from the dual command, which meant that no single service or even a combination of two services could take sole responsibility for Southwest Asia.<sup>46</sup> This was clearly evident when the U.S. created the RDJTF.

In the early 1980s, due to regional conditions and changes in the Reagan administration's strategy the regional policy focused more on the use of sea power and permanent bases in the Gulf region. Thus, in 1983, the commander of the RDJTF became the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. General Command (USCENTCOM) and was responsible for all planning, exercises, and operations in Southwest Asia. The new command is based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, with a 20-man forward headquarters on a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf.<sup>47</sup> Secretary Weinberger stated that developments since 1979, "Have dramatically increased the Soviet Union's access to the Persian Gulf region". Secretary Weinberger conceived the U.S. strategy for Southwest Asia in the 1980s, to contain two principal goals: "to improve our mobile forces and pre-position adequate equipment and supplies to deploy in support of an RDJTF of sufficient size to deter Soviet aggression; and to provide long-term support to sustain these forces".<sup>48</sup>

After several new developments in the Persian Gulf, particularly, the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia officially announced the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in January 1981. The GCC included six states of the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman.<sup>49</sup> The creation of the GCC gradually lead the states toward a more effective form of military co-operation. The GCC was made in large part as a reaction to the principal threat to Gulf security by the Iran-Iraq war.<sup>50</sup>

At the meeting of the GCC Supreme Council in Bahrain in November, 1982, the GCC did make a start towards collective defence, and agreed to support a \$1 billion aid programme for

Bahrain, which was to pay for a modern air base and fighter aircraft. In July, 1983, the Supreme Council agreed to a \$1.8 billion twelve-year aid programme for Oman, to improve its capability to defend the Straits of Hormuz. In the same year, at the meeting of the Defence Ministers in Qatar in March 1983, agreement was reached in principle in response to, Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan's call for a GCC defence industry to decrease the Gulf's dependence on arms imports.<sup>51</sup>

The GCC Supreme Council meeting in November, 1982, also led to the decision to hold the southern Gulf's first joint military exercise, Peninsula Shield I, during October 7-16, 1983. Peninsula Shield II exercises were held in the north of Saudi Arabia during October 10-13, 1984. These exercises brought fairly large forces together for the first time (10,000 men, 3,200 armoured and other vehicles, mobile artillery and tanks, and air units using F-5 and F-15 fighters and C-130 transport planes). The GCC carried out further exercise in 1985, 1986 and 1987, although the expansion of the Iran-Iraq war into the Gulf in 1987, shifted the focus of the key GCC states from exercises to actual operations.<sup>52</sup>

Despite all of these preparations, the GCC could not handle any major defence of the Gulf against a threat from Iran, Iraq or the USSR.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, in 1985, Saudi Arabia agreed that it would allow American military forces to use its bases in case of Soviet aggression or if it was unable to handle a Persian Gulf crisis on its own. The Saudis showed their willingness to defend themselves when they shot down two Iranian aircraft, on June 5, 1984, which threatened to attack Saudi oil fields. But the Saudis still refused to allow the U.S. to engage in joint planning for these contingencies.<sup>54</sup> Saudi Arabia consulted U.S. defence planners and senior USCENTCOM officers regarding U.S. use of facilities in an emergency, and it made USCENTCOM, which is based on the British island of Diego Garcia, reinforcement abilities one of the backbones of its defence planning.<sup>55</sup>

In fact, after the Iran-Iraq war accelerated in 1985, USCENTCOM could not function in its crisis contingency role without Saudi co-operation and wartime access to Saudi bases and facilities. While Diego Garcia, Turkey and Egypt provided useful contingency facilities on

outer boundary of the Gulf, they could not make up for the extent and reinforcement crisis the Americans would face in defending the critical oil facilities in the upper and central Gulf.<sup>56</sup>

The U.S. has contingency bases in Oman on the island of Masirah. Oman, however, is too far away to allow U.S. forces to efficiently defend most of the GCC oil fields. Both Bahrain and Kuwait, which are small states, can not support large air or land forces because their facilities are acutely limited. They can not supply suitable bases if the U.S. should have to deploy for a low-level war.<sup>57</sup>

All of these factors made American access to Saudi Arabia critical in any major defence of the Gulf, as was shown in 1991, when Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi troops. Saudi Arabia's modern air facilities could provide bases for up to two wings of USAF fighters, and give them full armament and service support. In addition, the U.S. has large numbers of contract personnel servicing Saudi equipment in the air force, army, national guard and navy. Large numbers of Saudi military and civilian personnel have had U.S. training and can operate with, or support and service, U.S. military equipment.<sup>58</sup>

Saudi Arabia has equally modern naval facilities and ground bases. These bases have extensive stocks of parts and armaments, and service and support equipment, which can be used by USCENTCOM forces.<sup>59</sup> Saudi army and naval bases, have been described by Anthony H. Cordesman, as the most sophisticated infrastructure and service facilities in the world, and can both speed the deployment of U.S. forces and make them more effective once they arrive.<sup>60</sup>

In order to understand the events involved, it is necessary to know two key developments that happened during 1985, and early 1986. The secret U.S. arms sales to Iran, and the impact of Iran invasion of Iraq's Faw Peninsula.<sup>61</sup>

The secret U.S. arms sales to Iran created a crisis in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. The arms deals, began in 1985, when the Reagan administration made a decision to trade arms for American hostages, eventually led to a massive scandal in 1987.

After the arms scandal and in an effort to restore U.S. credibility in the Gulf and to prevent the Soviet's from helping Kuwait to protect their tankers from Iranian attack as the Iran-Iraq war escalated, the U.S. moved quickly into an arrangement to re-flag and convoy Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf.<sup>62</sup> The Reagan administration initiated some of contacts with Iran at a time when it was unable to carry out arms deals with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.<sup>63</sup>

There are still a number of issues which have still not been fully explained concerning the U.S. arms sales to Iran. Several Israeli officials and U.S. consultants working outside the government persuaded senior officials of the U.S. and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that it might be possible to rebuild U.S. political ties with "moderates" in the Iranian government, and to release Americans held hostage by pro-Iranians in Lebanon.<sup>64</sup>

However, Eric Hooglund has a further perspective about U.S. arms sales to Iran. He has asserted, that the main interest of the Reagan staff regarding the Persian Gulf was not Iran or the war, but landlocked Afghanistan, which Soviet troops had entered in December 1979. That invasion confirmed the Reagan viewpoint of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expansionist threat to America's "vital" interests. The revolution against the Shah was a strategic disaster that served only the Soviet Union. The problem for the Americans was how to restore Iran to American influence.<sup>65</sup>

Within U.S. intelligence agencies a view developed that Washington needed to reach an accommodation with Iran in order to forestall possible Soviet political gains there. This thinking eventually created a secret policy of selling arms to Iran in return for Iran's promised use of its influence to release American hostages held in Lebanon.<sup>66</sup>

The second key development during the Iran-Iraq war was Iran's seizure of Iraq's Faw Peninsula. Iran's conquest posed a real threat to both Iraq and Kuwait, and threatened a major spread of the tanker war that increasingly involved Iranian strikes against international shipping through the Gulf, and particularly shipping to and from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - the countries that were giving Iraq the most financial aid.<sup>67</sup>

The U.S. increased its force in the Indian Ocean to a full carrier group including eleven escort ships. The U.S. also deployed the carrier task force just east of Masirah, off the east of Oman. Further, the U.S. sent F-111s to exercise in Turkey. Britain and France increased their ship activity, and the British Squadron in the Indian Ocean began to spend half of their time in the Gulf.<sup>68</sup>

The U.S. became increasingly responsive to series of Kuwaiti requests to provide U.S. protection and re-flagging for the tankers Kuwait was using to shuttle oil to loading points outside the Gulf.<sup>69</sup> Although, Kuwait had hosted a small U.S. military aircraft to operate out of Kuwait, it remained unwilling to offer any formal base for a U.S. combat unit because of pressure from its neighbours.<sup>70</sup>

Saudi Arabia and Bahrain did not agree to the kind of formal basing arrangements some U.S. officials wanted, but were willing to provide virtually all the other support the U.S. wanted. In 1987, Saudi Arabia agreed to expand the use of its four minesweepers, and these helped to find the presence of mines. Saudi Arabia quietly agreed to provide ship and aircraft fuel, and to provide emergency landing and fuelling support for U.S. carrier aircraft.<sup>71</sup>

Saudi Arabia's co-operation was guaranteed by Iranian attacks on Saudi shipping e.g. On August 13, 1987, a Saudi Coast Guard vessel was struck by a mine, and then a small supply boat blew up off one of the U.A.E. ports on August 15, 1987. That same day, two massive explosions rocked an ARAMCO facility in Saudi Arabia.<sup>72</sup> The cumulative total of Iranian attacks on shipping to Saudi Arabia was 100 ships from February 1987 through December 1987.<sup>73</sup>

April 1988, saw the opening of the final stage in the Iran-Iraq war when Iraq recaptured the Faw Peninsula. Following the total collapse of Iran's military, Iran was forced to accept a cease-fire unconditionally. Saudi Arabia maintained friendly relations with Iraq and improved its relations with Iran. Since then apart from an occasional disagreement with the



U.S. over arm sales, Saudi Arabia has continued to nurture its relationship with Washington and to get additional sophisticated weapons.<sup>74</sup>

Since the early 1980s, the U.S. involvement in the Gulf has become more visible and increased in size. The U.S. identified two primary objectives: assuring access to oil and keeping the Soviets out of the area. In the process, the U.S. adopted specific policies, such as the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force which later became the U.S. Central Command, to reflect U.S. readiness to deal with any threat that might actively interfere with these two objectives.<sup>75</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi military relations**

During the past few years, Saudi Arabia has shown increasing concern for its security, especially in the light of the Gulf war. Saudi Arabia has continued to sustain an extraordinary degree of dependence on the United States for the development of its modern armed forces.

David Long has argued, that for many Americans the U.S. Congressional debate over the sale of F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1981, was the first occasion on which they realised that there were U.S. - Saudi military relations.<sup>76</sup> In fact, the United States has been the natural associate in Saudi Arabia's military development since the midst of World War II.<sup>77</sup>

### **The establishment of U.S.-Saudi military relations,**

#### **1943-1953**

In 1943, Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a memorandum to President Roosevelt warning that America had an insufficient supply of domestic crude oil production<sup>78</sup>, which would become a problem in the U.S. in the next 25 years.<sup>79</sup> On February 18, 1943, Saudi Arabia was declared eligible for U.S. Lend-Lease

assistance.<sup>80</sup> This meant that the existing American stake in Saudi oil represented by the exclusively U.S.-owned ARAMCO Company was secured.<sup>81</sup>

Military relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States were formally initiated on February 18, 1943, as part of the Lend-Lease programme. In the same year, a U.S. mission led by General Ralph Royce was sent to Saudi Arabia to determine Saudi military needs. This was followed by a few advisory missions led by Colonel Garret Shomber, who arrived in April 1944.<sup>82</sup>

Beginning in 1945, Saudi Arabia and the United States reached an agreement to build an air base at Dhahran and an emergency air field at Lauqa and Hafr al-batin. The U.S. agreed to turn over the Dhahran air base to Saudi Arabia after three years.<sup>83</sup> The Dhahran base later became an important link in the U.S. global network of strategic bases directed against the Soviet bloc.<sup>84</sup> Thus, the Secretary of State for Defence, James Forrestal, notified Secretary of State, Marshall, in 1948, that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently agreed on a series of steps concerning Saudi Arabia which should be taken to improve the strategic position of the United States.<sup>85</sup> He concluded that America's defence capabilities would be greatly improved in the event of war against the Soviet Union if Dhahran air base could be used to conduct supported air operations.<sup>86</sup> The Joint Chiefs recommended that the U.S. try and achieve this by significantly increasing the number of American military personnel on the base.<sup>87</sup> With the beginning of the Cold War in 1949, the Dhahran base kept its strategic importance. Oil security and containing the Soviet threat, became the basic elements of U.S. military relations with Saudi Arabia. In 1949, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. agreed the lease of Dhahran airfield for a five-year period.<sup>88</sup>

The discussion took long hard bargaining between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. However, King Abdullaziz stressed that he did not feel that the United States had satisfied Saudi Arabia's necessary requirements.<sup>89</sup> At the same time as these discussions, a U.S. military survey team was established at Saudi's request to make recommendations to the Kingdom for the design of a Saudi armed force.<sup>90</sup>

Major General Richard O'Keefe headed the military survey team and arrived in Saudi Arabia on September 1, 1949. Prior to his departure on October 22, he travelled forty-four thousand miles in Saudi Arabia.<sup>91</sup> O'Keefe recommended training and equipping, over a five-year period, a modern defensive force of some 43,000 men, composed of 28,000 combat troops and 15,000 air force personnel, and recommended that 490 American officers and enlisted men to be sent to assist training the Saudi Army, Navy and Air Force, at a cost of \$107 million.<sup>92</sup> O'Keefe's recommendations became the first inclusive U.S. design to structure a modern Saudi armed force.<sup>93</sup>

Following the O'Keefe recommendations for U.S. military assistance to the Kingdom, both countries had some major differences including levels of assistance, the total of U.S. grants compared to the amount that had to be repaid and issues of extraterritoriality and Saudi sovereignty.<sup>94</sup> But the start of the Korean war in June 1950, increased Washington's receptivity to requests from anti-Communist nations such as Saudi Arabia. On July 26, 1950, the President of the U.S., Truman, signed an amendment to the mutual Defence Act of 1950, which now gave him authority to transfer military equipment to countries not linked in a defence agreement with the U.S. but whose self-defence was considered important to American security.<sup>95</sup> Thus, the U.S. included Saudi Arabia in the U.S. Point Four Programme of Technical Assistance. On June 18, 1951, the two countries finally concluded the new agreement providing for U.S. use of Dhahran airfield for five years and a mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed at the same time, making Saudi Arabia the first Arab country to receive such American assistance. The United States transferred M-41 light tanks, a number of B-26s bombers in 1951, and six Douglas C-47 transports in 1953.<sup>96</sup>

The establishment of the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) was the major military component of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. A U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance programme survey team arrived for duty in the Kingdom on July 17, 1951, and this led to the formal creation of USMTM in Saudi Arabia on June 27, 1953, by means of and exchange of notes between the U.S. Ambassador and Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, the Saudi Minister of Defence and Aviation, thus implementing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1951. The military training mission continues to operate and remains the major instrument of U.S.

military relations with Saudi Arabia. The U.S.-Saudi military relations from 1943 to 1953, involved a trade-off between the U.S. desire for access to forward strategic military bases and the Saudi desire for reassurance of a U.S. commitment to protect the country from foreign threats.<sup>97</sup>

### **U.S.-Saudi military relations during the reign of King Saud, 1954-1964**

Within four months of the formal establishment of the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz died on November 9, 1953. His son Saud was immediately proclaimed King. The reign of King Saud demonstrated a rough period for U.S.-Saudi military relations and for U.S.-Saudi relations in general as well. His reign came at the time of growing radicalism in the Arab world, spearheaded by Nasser's Egypt.

When Egypt's President Nasser's Arab nationalist wave began sweeping across the whole of the Middle East, King Saud visited Cairo and agreed on June 11, 1954, a "unified command" with Egypt. In January 1955, an Egyptian military training mission arrived in Saudi Arabia, which temporarily overshadowed USMTM in its influence on the Saudi military.<sup>98</sup> In the summer of 1954, King Saud asked the U.S. to close its technical assistance mission in Saudi Arabia and to withdraw its personnel. The need to prevent a further cooling in relations with Saudi Arabia was not lost in Washington. Not only was Saudi oil becoming increasingly important, but the agreement for the American use of the Dhahran base was up for renewal in June 1955.<sup>99</sup>

Increased Arab-Israeli tensions had forced Saudi Arabia to become involved with an Arab "defensive alliance" in October 1955, leading to increased Jewish American protests about the sale of U.S. tanks to Saudi Arabia. However, the potential damage to U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations, if the sale had been stopped, meant that Washington agreed to send the tanks in 1956.<sup>100</sup>

Negotiations for an extension to the Dhahran airfield agreement remained bogged down, but Saudi Arabia was continuing to receive arms from the U.S. Saudi Arabia requested a five-year military development plan with the help of USMTM, and the United States agreed in May 1956, to the sale of all items in the plan except M-47 medium tanks and F-86 fighter aircraft. In fact, the U.S. was willing to supply a financial assistance package to Saudi Arabia, but it did not desire (for bargaining reasons) to publicly link such assistance with a military access agreement.<sup>101</sup>

The radical and nationalist forces in the region in the mid-1950s might have pushed Saudi Arabia into Nasser's camp and damaged the government of Saudi Arabia if the United States had not persisted in trying to strengthen U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia.<sup>102</sup> Relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. began to improve by late 1956, as the U.S. showed its opposition to the Israeli-British-French military action against Egypt in the Suez crisis. Relations were further strengthened by the announcement of Eisenhower doctrine on January 1, 1957, and by the President's speech on January 5, that signalled that Saudi Arabia would be able to get arms from the United States without turning to the Soviet bloc.<sup>103</sup> In fact, the U.S.' new Middle East policy (the Eisenhower doctrine) was meant to check the Soviet's support of Nasser's nationalist forces. The U.S., therefore, invited King Saud to Washington, with the direct aim of building him up to counterbalance Nasser in the Arab world.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, in February 1957, King Saud visited the U.S. and expressed his support for the Eisenhower doctrine which produced a hostile response from Nasser.<sup>105</sup> It can be seen that King Saud only renewed the Saudi connection with the U.S. in response to the threats to his nation's security from Nasser.<sup>106</sup>

The new Dhahran airfield was finally completed on April 22, 1957, and it was agreed that the U.S. should have access to Dhahran for a further period of five years in which the two countries were to strengthen their military relations.<sup>107</sup> The U.S. agreed to sell Saudi Arabia the military equipment it required at a cost of \$110 million and to provide \$50 million in credit to authorise Saudi Arabia to start such purchases. The arms sales included a commitment to deliver to the Saudis 166 tanks, ten propeller-driven training aircraft, eight

T-33 aircraft, twelve F-86 aircraft, and two naval vessels. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to train Saudi forces including the army, navy and air force.<sup>108</sup>

U.S.-Saudi military relations steadied after the agreement of 1957, but their relations came under increasing criticism from radical Arab states, making the airfield agreement a liability to the Saudis. Since King Saud distanced himself from President Nasser, the Egyptians had become increasingly opposed to the Dhahran agreement, as did Syria, who joined with the Egyptians to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Although Iraq became a competitor of Nasser in inter-Arab politics, Iraq agreed with the Egyptian president to oppose the U.S. military presence at Dhahran, which also indicated a growing U.S. role in the Persian Gulf region as a whole.<sup>109</sup> The value of the Dhahran airfield was also diminishing during the beginning of Kennedy administration. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, argued that with the arrival of intercontinental ballistic missiles, overseas Strategic Air Command (SAS) bases were no longer cost effective.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement, in early 1961, to end the U.S. use of the base at Dhahran without damaging Saudi-U.S. relations.<sup>111</sup>

The U.S. withdrawal left Saudi Arabia without an important military force of its own to protect its borders, and in less than six months, in 1962, Saudi Arabia faced a major external threat from the Egyptian presence in Yemen during the Yemeni civil war. This crisis was accompanied by the collapse of King Saud's health and his forced resignation by his brother Faisal in 1964.

In 1962, Abdullah Sallal staged his anti-monarchist coup in Yemen and declared the country a republic.<sup>112</sup> Nasser then decided to intervene in support of the new republican regime. He sent in troops in October 1962, by which time a major civil war had started on Saudi Arabia's south eastern border.<sup>113</sup> At that time, Faisal was in New York attending the U.S. General Assembly. He rapidly arranged a meeting with Kennedy, and visited the White House on October 5, in order to secure for Saudi Arabia continuing U.S. assistance.<sup>114</sup> This was especially important as the U.S. had recognised the Salla regime in an effort to reduce the Soviet military presence in Yemen.<sup>115</sup>

Faisal supported the royalists in Yemen and provided them with light arms. Egyptian air raids attempted to suppress Saudi support for the rebels by bombing Saudi villages near the staging bases the Yemeni royalists were using in the surrounding area of Najran (close to the Saudi-Yemeni border). Repeated Egyptian air raids continued into 1963, which compelled Faisal to ask for U.S. military assistance. In addition, Saudi Arabia agreed to permit the U.S. to use the Dhahran airfield.

The U.S. then implemented an operation called "Hard Surface". In March 1963, the U.S. sent to Saudi Arabia eight F-100s and small number of paratroopers. It was only after the Egyptian build-up and bombings, that Kennedy agreed to highly visible U.S. fighter flight over Riyadh and Jeddah, thus, warning Nasser against further raids. It was followed up by sending Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to try to secure a cease-fire between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Faisal had made considerable progress in reaching agreement with Nasser at the Arab summit meeting in 1964, to end the Yemeni civil war. This led Faisal to request that the U.S. call off Operation Hard Surface.<sup>116</sup>

Faisal gave a high priority to the reform and modernisation of the Saudi armed forces. He raised defence expenditures from 1961 to 1963 by about 58 per cent. In early 1963, the Saudi Defence Ministry, working closely with USMTM, developed a comprehensive military reorganization plan known as the Armed Forces Defence Plan No.1.<sup>117</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi military relations, 1965-1973**

The growing contacts between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia led to formalising the long-standing arrangements between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) and Saudi Arabia. An Engineering Assistance Agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and the Corps on June 1965. This arrangement put the Corps in charge of planning and supervising the construction of major base facilities and installations that Saudi Arabia required to support military forces that could contest with those being built in Iraq and Iran.<sup>118</sup>

The agreement led to the building of three major military bases. The first, at Khamis Mushayt, was completed in 1971, at a cost of \$81.4 million. The second, at Tabak, was completed in 1973, at a cost of \$81 million. The third at Qaysumah, called Khalid Military City, is so large that it houses three brigades and has a population of over 70,000. It cost \$7.8 billion to build and was completed in 1985.<sup>119</sup> (see Map 3).

Two other COE-supervised projects involved the Saudi army. The Defence Ministry of Saudi Arabia was interested in COE assistance in upgrading the Army's mobility and this resulted in an agreement on September 7, 1966. The agreement provided for COE to supervise a five-year, \$120 million programme. It included the purchase of 4,276 general and special purpose vehicles, the provision of maintenance services, (including spare parts), an automated supply system, and the training of Saudi personnel in maintenance, and supply skills.<sup>120</sup>

The strength of the army had been kept constant since the defeat of the Arabs by Israel in the June war of 1967, even though the Saudis did not participate as a belligerent in that war.<sup>121</sup> The 1967 war was too short to have serious effects on U.S. - Saudi relations. On October 17, 1967, a \$9.9 million programme called the Armaments Repair and Maintenance Programme was concluded between the Secretary of State, McNamara, and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz. It called for the development of a plan to supply, maintain and manage vehicles, small arms, tanks, and artillery.<sup>122</sup>

Other Corps projects under the Engineering Assistance Agreement included the construction of the \$298 million Ministry of Defence and Aviation headquarters complex and the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters in Riyadh, and the \$1.7 billion King Abdullaziz Military Academy near Riyadh and the Airborne and Physical Training School at Tabuk. Also, other projects, like the Army Engineer Centre and School, the Signal Centre and School, and the Field Artillery Centre and School were initiated.<sup>123</sup>


The importance of Saudi Arabia to the U.S. for assuring the security of the Gulf after the British withdrawal made the military relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia even



more important. This followed the British announcement in January 1968, to withdraw troops from the Far East and the lower Gulf states by the end of 1971, involved America in taking up the British position to prevent Communist filling the gap.<sup>124</sup>

The large scale nature of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam prevented U.S. troops from replacing the British presence. As a result, a Gulf policy was developed, which was founded on the Nixon doctrine, which President Nixon announced in 1969. The Nixon doctrine called for the U.S. to assist in the build-up of strong regional allies that would eliminate the requirement for the deployment of U.S. forces abroad.<sup>125</sup> The Nixon doctrine, called the Two Pillar Policy, looked to Iran and Saudi Arabia as the regional powers that could fill the so-called power vacuum left by the departure of British forces.<sup>126</sup>

**Map 3**  
**Saudi Arabia force deployments**



Source: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and Search for Strategic Stability, 1984, Mansell Publishing Limited, p. 282.

In fact, Iran, with about seven times the population of Saudi Arabia, logically came to be seen as the stronger pillar.<sup>127</sup> Iran thought that its military power could secure the Gulf and check any spread of Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia shared with the U.S. strongly anti-Communist views and was the leading moderate on the Arab side on the Palestine question. Saudi Arabia, therefore, was capable of exercising authority and was strategically located in relation to the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>128</sup>

Although the U.S. announced that it would rely on a "two-pillar" (or twin-pillar) policy in the Gulf and build up both Iran and Saudi Arabia into centres of strategic stability, it actually pursued a "one-pillar" strategy, as it relied more on Iran for military security and treated Saudi Arabia as a source of oil and for its influence in Arab countries.<sup>129</sup>

Washington in this period, however, remained enthusiastic to assist in strengthening Saudi Arabia and to advance close political and economic ties. A request for assistance in modernising the Saudi National Guard led to an initial survey by mid-1972, which was completed by the fall of 1973. A general defence study requested in December 1973, was completed by September 1974. A study of a Naval expansion programme was agreed in 1972.<sup>130</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi military relations, 1974-1978**

The energy crisis of 1973 promoted a further dimension to U.S. strategic concerns in the Gulf, particularly Saudi security. On the other hand, Saudi military development programmes expanded rapidly during this period. For many years, Saudi Arabia was looking to enhance its military might and money was no longer limited! Therefore, the U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia had to face the fact that Saudi Arabia had a new financial position and was a major importer of American arms, military equipment, and technology.<sup>131</sup> On that basis, U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia were centred around four main points: 1) support for indigenous regional co-operation efforts and collective security and the orderly economic progress of the area, 2) the encouragement of the peaceful resolution of territorial and other disputes among states and the widening of channels of communication and consultation between them, 3) the

expansion of the U.S. diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial and financial presence and activities, and 4) maintaining access to the area's oil supplies at reasonable prices. The implication of these statements is that the U.S.'s primary objective was that of keeping the area free of extensive Soviet influence.<sup>132</sup>

In order to realise its long-term goals, the U.S. chose the following policies: 1) numerous bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia in which the U.S. provided Saudi Arabia with services, technology and equipment under the Saudi - U.S. Joint Commissions on Economic and Security Co-operation and 2) becoming a major source of arms for Saudi Arabia and supporting the moderate Saudi policy in the area.<sup>133</sup>

The Joint Commission on Security Co-operation was initially headed by Prince Sultan and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Robert Ellsworth. The Commission helped to expand the Saudi military. The U.S. foreign military sales agreements rose from \$459 million in 1973, to \$1,993 million in 1974, and Saudi Arabia ranked second to Iran in buying U.S. arms.<sup>134</sup> Equally important, President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia on 14-15 June 1974. It was the first visit of its kind undertaken by a U.S. President and he discussed with King Faisal the co-operation between the two countries.<sup>135</sup>

Saudi military development programmes expanded very fast after the energy crisis of 1973. One of the most notable fields of increased U.S. - Saudi military co-operation was in air defence. USMTM's planning efforts had been upgraded to an inclusive air defence development plan called Peace Hawk. At the same time, Saudi Arabia ordered thirty F-5Es and had one hundred more on order in 1975. In March 1976, the prime contractor, Northrop, had also received a maintenance and service contract for the Peace Hawk programme worth \$1.5 billion. Northrop's sales to Saudi Arabia averaged over \$1.2 billion annually during 1976-1980 and were 22-44 per cent of its total sales.<sup>136</sup>

The National Guard programme also came into full operation during the mid 1970s. The Saudi government contracted with the Vinnell Corporation of California to assist in the modernisation of the National Guard. The original Vinnell contract, signed in 1975, at a cost

of \$77 million, placed about 200 advisors in the country. In 1976, the U.S. supported the effort to expand the National Guard which included a National Guard Academy and to include the further training necessary to make the Guard more equal in rank to the army. The cost of Vinnell's part of the support programme had reached \$215 million. Others came to include \$12.4 million for 12 Vulcan AA guns, as well as funds for the Commando armoured cars, and the National Guard Headquarters, which eventually had a price tag of \$158 million.<sup>137</sup>

The Saudi Navy programme, which was to modernise the navy, was originally to cost \$150 million. The cost had risen to over \$2 billion by 1977. In fact, the expansion was scaled down to a less ambitious level. On the Saudi side, the problem was generally a shortage of manpower. On the U.S. side, the U.S. Navy had less experience in managing foreign military programmes than the other service branches and so implementation took somewhat longer. In May 1979, a U.S. firm HUH (a creation of Hughes Aircraft, Bendix Corporation, and Holmes and Nower) won a \$671 million operation and management contract for the programme. At the same time, the Corps of Engineers supervised construction of the naval bases at Jeddah and Jubayl, the headquarters at Riyadh, and the repair facility at Dammam.<sup>138</sup> In short, the U.S. Navy did not prove as successful as the other services in assisting the Saudi programme and managing their force expansion. As a result, this led to a shift in the Saudi Navy modernisation programme to the European countries like France.<sup>139</sup>

Over a period of time during the mid 1970s, Saudi Arabia decided to organise its military into two major groups of combat units. This was due to the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Saudi Arabia was concerned by the possible Israeli threat to its security. The first group was to be equipped with French equipment, including MAX-30 tanks, and the second group with U.S. equipment, including M-60 tanks. These units were to be organised initially into one modern armoured brigade. U.S. assistance to the Saudi Army took a lower profile during the 1970s. This was in part because the air force became the prestige service, and because of the original Saudi decision to rely on two different countries.<sup>140</sup> The Saudis, however, turned to Britain as well and in 1975, purchased Fox armoured fighting vehicles, optically tracked versions of Rapier surface-to-air missiles, and some additional British armoured cars. These

purchases met the needs of the Saudi Army in the sense that they were high quality, but they added a third line of logistic, service, and combat support requirements for the Saudi Army.<sup>141</sup>

In spite of the problems in Saudi defence structures, Saudi Arabia appeared reasonably well positioned to deal with its national security problems by the mid-1970s. Saudi Arabia had acquired the foreign support it required to continue its defence modernisation, and its diplomatic and economic initiatives had contributed to a rapprochement between Iran and Iraq.

### U.S. - Saudi military relations, 1979-1981

Once again, as the security situation in the area worsened in the late 1970s, so U.S. - Saudi military relations entered a new phase. This was due to some major crises: the fall of the Shah and the explosion of antagonism between Marxist South Yemen and North Yemen in early 1979; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979; and the Iran-Iraq war, which began in 1980.<sup>142</sup>

During this period, two arms requests came to be considered by the Saudis as tests of American friendship. They were the F-15 request in 1978, and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in 1981. Both sales requests were granted to Saudi Arabia, but not without stiff Congressional opposition which itself had a negative effect on U.S. - Saudi military relations.

In the Saudi programme of air force modernisation, the Saudi government sought to replace its ageing Lightning aircraft (sold by Britain in the mid-1960s) with sixty F-15s. The Ford administration had approved the request, but in the face of strong Congressional opposition the number was cut below that which the Saudis had sought. That was the first round of Congressional concern over Saudi arms purchases.<sup>143</sup>

After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, the Saudis were tense about the direction of American policy. Thus, when President Carter paid a visit to Saudi Arabia between visits to Iran and Egypt in early January 1978, the Saudis insisted on an early decision about sale of the advanced aircraft they felt they had been promised. Carter responded that he would remain bound by President Ford's commitments but that the particulars - number, delivery schedules, price - remained to be worked out.<sup>144</sup>

In submitting the Saudi request to Congress, Carter asked for sixty F-15s, with delivery in 1981.<sup>145</sup> He sought to placate opponents by promising fifteen F-15s to Israel to compensate for the Saudi sale. President Carter assured that the sale would not alter the strategic balance in the Middle East and the sale would not prevent him from achieving his goal of reducing the number of arms sales each year. He insured superiority of the Israeli F-15s over the Saudi designs by omitting critical avionics in the Saudi F-15s and by also eliminating "hard spots" in the air frame, making future use for offensive missions practically impossible.<sup>146</sup>

In spite of all these efforts, the administration could not be sure of Congressional support for the request unless some restrictions were placed on the F-15s. The Saudis found this extremely distasteful as long as their requests were legal and they paid for the planes with their own resources. The specific restriction governing the sale included: the aircraft would not be based at Tabuk (125 miles from Israel), nor could the Saudis buy bomb racks that would improve the offensive capabilities of the F-15s or special auxiliary fuel tanks which would increase the range of the aircraft.<sup>147</sup> They could not transfer their F-15s or use them to train in other countries, and they could not buy other combat aircraft pending delivery of the F-15s.<sup>148</sup>

To counter Congressional criticism and the opposition of the pro-Israel lobby factions, Saudi Arabia used the readiness of France to sell the F-1 Mirage aircraft, with a faster delivery date and with no restrictions governing their deployment or transfer, as a bargaining card to pressure Washington. The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, warned Congress that if the F-15 sale was not approved, Saudi Arabia would acquire its needs from France without the

controls guaranteeing Israel's safety. Thus, on May 15, 1978, under considerable pressure the Senate approved the sale of the sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia by a vote of 54 to 44.<sup>149</sup>

For the Saudis, the sale gave them what they had been promised, but after a rather humiliating ordeal.<sup>150</sup> The Saudis saw in the request a test of the Saudi-U.S. relationship and a symbol of U.S. - Saudi ties. The postponement and the reduction of the request would indicate that Saudi Arabia was taken less seriously and treated as a second class client. Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, observed: "As far as I am concerned, why should Saudi Arabia be the sole country to have conditions imposed on it? We are as much threatened as anyone".<sup>151</sup> The Saudi government got the support of the Congress for the purchase of the F-15s by agreeing to restrictions and conditions of use. However, the F-15s were also less advanced than the Israeli F-15s which placated the pro-Israel lobbyists in Congress.

After a few months, Gulf stability had begun to decline. In January 1979, the Shah of Iran went into exile and in February, a new regime came to govern Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. The government of Saudi Arabia was surprised by the fall of the Shah and also by the U.S. for not doing enough to help the Shah. It was then that the value of U.S. assurances of its commitment to support the regime came into open question by the Saudis.<sup>152</sup>

Due to the sudden dissolution of the two pillar policy in 1979, the administration gave more special attention to Saudi Arabia. In February 1979, Secretary Brown visited Saudi Arabia and promised a more active U.S. policy in the region. His offer of an explicit defence order was not accepted partly owing to Saudi demands about the need to first review the U.S. policy on Camp David.<sup>153</sup> But the U.S. did take on a somewhat expanded training and advisory function with the Saudi armed force, including field and combat manoeuvres.<sup>154</sup>

At about the same time, war between South Yemen (PDRY) and North Yemen in March 1979, caused concern in Riyadh and Washington. The Saudis argued that the South Yemen attack on North Yemen was a calculated attempt by the PDRY (with the Cuban-Soviet support) to overthrow the conservative government in North Yemen. The United States sent

a squadron of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, and aircraft carriers were deployed in the surrounding area as a show of force. In the meantime, the U.S. loaned Saudi Arabia two F-3A AWACS as well. It was also agreed to speed up arms transfers, including F-5 aircraft, to North Yemen, as part of a package financed in large part by Saudi Arabia.<sup>155</sup>

During this period, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (on December 27, 1979). In response to the deterioration of security in the region, the U.S. began to review what could be done in the Persian Gulf region. William Quandt, the principal of the National Security Council Staff with responsibility for the Middle East in 1977-79, described the impact of the Shah's fall as follows:

One lesson of Iran is likely to be that the United States can't depend on regional surrogates and will have to rely more heavily on its own forces, on its own diplomacy, and on its own economic relations to protect its vital interests.<sup>156</sup>

Therefore, on January 23, 1980, President Carter announced that "An attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force".<sup>157</sup>

That statement coupled to the adverse political reaction to the Camp David agreement, as well as the loss of U.S. power and influence made it practically impossible for most conservative Gulf states to allow the U.S. to base forces on their soil or even to be closely associated with it.<sup>158</sup> In addition, most conservative Gulf states did not trust American policy. They perceived America's intentions as wanting to control the oil in the Arabian Peninsula. Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, observed "Israeli aggression is not better than the Soviet aggression... if the United States desires to secure the stability and independence of the countries in the region, how could the U.S. allow Israel to keep the occupied lands of the Palestinians after the war of 1967".<sup>159</sup> The U.S. position led Saudi Arabia to re-evaluate its military relations with the U.S. in a way that saved its sovereignty and necessitated the search for immediate improvements in its collective security efforts with its southern Gulf neighbours.<sup>160</sup>



Due to the American hostage crisis in Iran, the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the opposition to the establishment of U.S. bases in Gulf states, the U.S. saw for the first time, the possible need for a rapid deployment of U.S. forces which could be sent to an area where the Soviet Union had major advantages.<sup>161</sup> In order to implement this policy, the U.S. undertook a number of actions. These included preserving a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean and developing its ability to send forces into the region establishing a "Rapid Deployment Force" (RDF) and by improving the ability of the U.S. airlift forces to move the RDF more rapidly. Furthermore, the U.S. searched for access to air and naval facilities in Oman - (Oman had not opposed the Camp David treaty) - Kenya, and Somalia and began to promote its facilities in Diego Garcia, in the mid-Indian Ocean, 2,500 miles from the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>162</sup> Bahrain was getting considerable support from the U.S. Middle East Force, although it was no longer officially headquartered in Bahrain, but continued to use the island's harbour facilities.<sup>163</sup> In addition, the U.S. continued to explore the possibility of achieving a permanent military presence in the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. This policy contained establishing local security ties, and, if possible, equipment dumps to be prepared for emergencies. In July 1979, the U.S. declared its purpose to seek Congressional approval for a \$1.2 billion sale for the continuation of the Saudi National Guard's modernisation programme. On December 12, Under Secretary of State, Lucy Benson, publicly stated the U.S. decision to sell F-15 armaments to Saudi Arabia, including Sidewinder and Maverick missiles, laser-guided bombs, and cluster bombs. She stated that the decision should be seen in the context of an "increasingly unstable" situation in the Gulf and that the State Department concurred with the Defense Department that the sale was militarily justifiable against a real threat.<sup>164</sup>

The Saudi reaction to the deteriorating situation was characteristically equivocal, made worse by strains over the Saudi rejection of the Camp David process. The circumstances had shaken Saudi confidence not only in the U.S. commitments to support the Kingdom but also in the credibility of U.S. deterrence, specifically in the wake of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>165</sup>

In February 1980, National Security Council Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, visited Riyadh to discuss the security situation with Crown Prince Fahd and to search for ways of improving closer military relations. The Saudis desired co-operation in facing the growing regional instability, but as a consequence to the general Arab opposition to the Camp David process, they could not admit to extensive direct co-operation with U.S. forces. The Saudis preferred that their support from the U.S. be over-the-horizon. In an effort to reassure Saudi public opinion of the U.S. commitment, and to prevent too close an involvement with the United States, the Saudi government responded to the Brzezinski-Christopher visit with a request for enhanced F-15s, and E-3A AWACS aircraft. This became the second round in the test of U.S.-Saudi friendship.<sup>166</sup>

In mid-1980, Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defence Minister, met with Secretary of Defense Brown in Geneva to press the case for some additional items of military equipment. The request for air defence enhancement package included multiple bomb ejection racks to increase the number of bombs that the F-15s could carry, sophisticated Sidewinder AIM 9-L air-to-air missile, extra fuel tanks for F-15s, tanker planes to allow refuelling of the F-15s and five AWACS aircraft.<sup>167</sup> Actually, part of the explanation for subsequent AWACS sale was to restore both U.S. credibility as a reliable security partner and Saudi confidence in U.S. commitment to regional security.<sup>168</sup>

When the Saudi's request for enhanced F-15s became public, the response was similar to 1978. Some Senators like Jackson, saw blackmail in the Saudi request. This expression was most commonly used by the pro-Israel lobby in the congress.<sup>169</sup> Jimmy Carter said "We will not agree to provide offensive capabilities for the planes that might be used against Israel and that obviously includes bomb racks". In July 1980, sixty eight senators opposed the sale.<sup>170</sup> By that time, it was clear that Saudi Arabia had decided not to press further for a decision for its package before the elections which were now imminent.<sup>171</sup>

In September 1980, the Iran-Iraq war broke out. At the same time, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, was visiting Saudi Arabia. Together with Ambassador John West, he offered the Saudis emergency assistance by offering to send on

loan four E-3A AWACS aircrafts to Saudi Arabia "within 24 hours". Ground radar, communications equipment and about one hundred U.S. support personnel were also despatched in order to fill gaps in the Saudi air defence in areas surrounding the oil fields. Naturally, the Saudis were pleased with the rapid U.S. response.<sup>172</sup>

On October 30, 1980, Saudi Ambassador, Faisal Alhegelan, released a statement stating that President Carter's refusal to consider his country's request had come as a surprise to Saudi Arabia, especially since it came at a time when the subject was under attention and being discussed between the two countries positively and constructively.<sup>173</sup> Also, he said that Saudi Arabia would wait until after the U.S. national elections in order to see what would be the final position of the U.S. government on the matter. Should the decision be negative, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would consider all other possible sources to acquire the necessary means to defend itself. Nobody had a monopoly on relations and friendship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the Saudi government message to Washington.<sup>174</sup>

It is necessary to understand from the beginning that both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were responding to a number of studies by the U.S. Department of Defense and its contractors on how Saudi Arabia could best improve its air defences and protect its oil fields. While these studies received little publicity during the Congressional discussion over the AWACS sale, they established a "logic of arms" that explained many of the events in the previous years. Even before the Shah's fall, Saudi Arabia had asked the U.S. to promote the Saudi air defence systems.<sup>175</sup>

As a result, the U.S. restructured its regular annual study to inspect how to carry out this duty and then widened it even further to deal with the military implications of the Shah's fall. The USAF produced an inclusive four-volume survey of Saudi requirements for improved ground-based command, control, and communications facilities that became known as "Peace Hawk VII". This study did not address the obligation for airborne radar platforms, or U.S. capability to transfer over-the-horizon reinforcements. It is clear that the study's analysis of the weaknesses in the Saudi radar system helped form the initial Saudi requests for the AWACS. Peace Hawk unavoidably raised the issue of how Saudi Arabia could make the

U.S.-recommended communications system work without an airborne sensor platform. As a result, the following Saudi-U.S. discussion of the study had the same practical impact as if the U.S. had recommended that Saudi Arabia buy AWACS. Furthermore, the scale of the recommended system raised the issue of the size and extent of U.S. reinforcements to Saudi Arabia and led to discussions that agreed that the Saudi system should be structured to permit U.S. reinforcement by about one wing of 70 U.S. fighters per base. Equally important, the Peace Hawk VII study was written and discussed in a context in which previous U.S. plans had led Saudi Arabia to make massive purchases of air munitions and aircraft parts and support equipment.<sup>176</sup>

The Saudi government believed that a change in its security environment required an acceleration of its military build-up. It expressly refused two types of connection in exchange for U.S. arms: first, the provision of military facilities to the Americans on Saudi soil and second, support for the Camp David peace process. The Saudi press agency pointed out that if Saudi Arabia did not get a positive reply from Washington, it would knock on all doors to acquire the necessary requirements to realise the defence of the homeland.<sup>177</sup>

The basis of Israeli objections to the AWACS sale, was the spectre of Saudi-controlled AWACS planes spying on Israel and co-ordinating F-15 attacks against its soil.<sup>178</sup> Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, spoke out against the sale and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee used a degree of energy opposing the sale.<sup>179</sup>

On November 1980, President Carter was defeated in the U.S. presidential elections by Ronald Reagan and Crown Prince Fahd expressed his hope that the new administration would be better able to bring about positive changes in the Middle Eastern situation.<sup>180</sup> Some promises had been made during the last month before Reagan took office in January 1981. After the November elections, the Carter administration had agreed to sell fuel tanks and AM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. They had also made a tentative offer to sell AWACS aircraft. However, the Reagan staff reported that they would have to review the matter on their own.<sup>181</sup> The Carter administration informed the Saudis that they would be hearing about the sale from the new administration.<sup>182</sup>

The Reagan administration inherited an unsettled mixture in the area of Saudi-U.S. relations. For the Reagan administration, Saudi Arabia appeared to be far too involved with what the U.S. considered a strategic side-show. The Reagan administration believed that Saudi Arabia should join the U.S. in an implicit "strategic consensus" with Israel and Egypt.

After the change of administration in Washington in January 1981, the Saudi Information Minister, Muhammad Abduh Yamani, emphasised that Saudi Arabia's policy would not allow the establishment of foreign bases on its territory and the United States should provide Saudi Arabia with the required weapons and equipment. He stated that Saudi Arabia required arms for defence, and that Saudi Arabia had no hostile intentions against anyone, in other words Israel.<sup>183</sup>

State Department Spokesman, William Dyess, asserted on February 23, 1981, that the new administration had reversed U.S. priorities in the Middle East: The chief priority would be that of supporting the declining position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the area, rather than pressing ahead for a resolution of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. This revised policy would be explained during the visit to the Middle East by Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, which began on April 4. Haig's trip to the Middle East which included Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, was reported to be an attempt to convince those governments to co-operate in its opposition to the Soviet Union.<sup>184</sup>

On March 6, 1981, the State Department announced that the Reagan administration would soon give notice to Congress of its intention to sell the missiles and the fuel tanks to Saudi Arabia.<sup>185</sup> However, the administration decided to link its decision to a broader Middle Eastern policy, a key element of which was the concept of "strategic consensus".<sup>186</sup>

The Saudis were pleased about the administration's positive responses to their arms request but not about the connection that was made between them and the concept of "strategic consensus". When Haig visited Saudi Arabia on April 7, 1981, the Saudis went out of their way to emphasise their dissociation from the concept of strategic consensus. The Saudis were

concerned about the Soviet threat but they were far more concerned about the threat from Israel. They went on to assert that the only threat to the area came from Israel.<sup>187</sup> The protective role of "strategic consensus" indicated the Reagan administration's willingness to approve the Saudi's request for arms. However, the concept of "strategic consensus" was to the Saudi perspective a negative one. The Saudis rejected the concept and asserted again and again that the main threat to the security of the region was Israel. They explained their interest in the long-term strategic consequences, as well as their hesitation to act jointly with the United States.

The United States-Saudi relationship would face another test over the sale of the F-15 related equipment and AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. From the beginning, the Saudis made it clear to Washington that the request would be an important test case of their relations.<sup>188</sup> Subsequently, on April 21, 1981, the White House announced that President Reagan had decided to sell five AWACS and seven KC-135 refuelling tanker aircraft, in addition to the fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles. This was justified on the basis that the United States had made a commitment to Saudi Arabia to move forward with the package of arms. White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, asserted that President Reagan had made his decision because "He believes this step is essential to protect our interests in the region".<sup>189</sup>

President Reagan managed to secure enough votes in the Congress by obtaining aid from other political figures, such as Henry Kissinger and former Presidents Nixon and Ford.<sup>190</sup> Just at the time of the Senate vote, the president sent a special letter to the Majority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, stating that prior to the transfer of the AWACS in 1985, he would certify to the Senate that he had obtained agreement from the Saudi government to prevent the possible use of the aircraft against Israel. Finally, in October 1981, the effort to block the sale in the Senate was defeated by 52-48 votes.<sup>191</sup> The \$8.51 billion arms package went ahead.<sup>192</sup>

Anthony H. Cordesman has stated that the Reagan administration's endorsement of the AWACS package had at least five major effects. First, it transformed the AWACS package into a tool for putting Saudi-U.S. military relations on a solid long-term basis. Second, it

provided a potential keystone on which to plan the upgrading of the Saudi military and help the U.S. defend its oil supplies. Third, it endorsed a substitute for a U.S. base or military presence in Saudi Arabia that met Saudi political needs. Fourth, it provided the groundwork for the first serious effort to directly defend the key oil fields in the southern Gulf and to give Saudi Arabia 360 degree protection against the threats building up on its borders. And fifth, it inevitably made the sale of the AWACS package a test of whether the U.S. would provide balanced military support to both Israel and Saudi Arabia.<sup>193</sup> In addition, it intended to build an infrastructure for a regional military partnership that would ease the pressure on U.S. forces in any intervention against the Soviet Union. Thus it was in the interest of both countries.

Since the United States attempted unsuccessfully to obtain bases in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia began to work out an over-the-horizon reinforcement arrangement that side stepped the problem of establishing U.S. military bases on Saudi soil.<sup>194</sup> During the AWACS debate in late February 1981, Colonel Fahd Ibn Abdullah, the Saudi in charge of air operations, and Major General Charles Donnelly, the Chief of the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, met in the U.S. to discuss and resolve the problems associated with preserving Saudi sovereignty and the U.S. control over Saudi use of the AWACS. The discussions led to an informal understanding relating to the Saudi readiness to provide emergency capability to base U.S. over-the-horizon reinforcements.

Saudi Arabia itself spent well over \$5 billion in incremental expenditures to develop a U.S. reinforcement capability.<sup>195</sup> Therefore, the Saudi air defence enhancement package was seen as a part of this new strategic consensus policy. The proposed AWACS and F-15 enhancement sale to Saudi Arabia, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1981, notes that some U.S. Air Force officers "Anticipated that the Saudis would go so far as to allow U.S. pilots to fly Saudi F-15s to meet a threat".<sup>196</sup>

Nevertheless, a significant American military presence in Saudi Arabia was established in connection with the loan of AWACS aircraft and their support teams, as well as in connection with the modernisation of Saudi air defence facilities.<sup>197</sup> This understanding was reached

verbally without the paperwork necessary to satisfy the U.S. Congress.<sup>198</sup> According to implied understandings, the U.S. strategy would allow the United States Rapid Deployment Force to move over-the-horizon to these forward bases and supplies if the Soviet Union or other hostile forces tried to capture the Persian Gulf oil fields.<sup>199</sup> In testifying in Congress on behalf of the AWACS sale on October 1, 1981, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley, underlined the fact that the AWACS were part of an ambitious strategy to protect the Gulf oil fields. He also emphasised that Saudi Arabia was the centrepiece of this strategy and that Saudi co-operation was crucial.<sup>200</sup>

In the course of the Senate debate, President Reagan made a statement regarding the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia, which was highly important. He countered an argument that advanced American arms might fall into enemy hands after a Saudi revolution by stating "We will not permit Saudi Arabia to become another Iran". Some observers insisted that Reagan's statement in effect extended the Carter doctrine to include internal threats or external attacks on established pro-Western regimes in the Gulf.<sup>201</sup>

In short, the Saudi Air Defense enhancement package represented a victory for the Saudis over pro-Israel pressures in Washington; it offered Saudi Arabia the capability to defend its oil facilities in the Gulf against long-range attacks from the Soviet Union, the Iran-Iraq war and attacks from South Yemen. It side stepped the issues of Saudi Arabian sovereignty that prevented Saudi Arabia from receiving U.S. forces or bases in peacetime, yet it allowed Saudi Arabia to make far better use of over-the-horizon U.S. reinforcements if these should become necessary. Indeed, the package connected both countries tightly in a interactive way and was a potential solution to the previous years of problems in creating an effective military relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.<sup>202</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi military relations,**

#### **1982-1986**

During the AWACS debates in October 1981, the U.S. re-declared its pledge to defend Saudi Arabia in a formal statement to the Joint Economic Committee. In addition, it sent Secretary



of State, Caspar Weinberger, to Saudi Arabia in January 1982, with detailed proposals to strengthen U.S. - Saudi defence co-operation, and to establish a joint committee for military projects under the chairmanship of Prince Sultan and Secretary Weinberger. This committee worked out a series of unofficial agreements that set the groundwork for closer strategic co-operation.<sup>203</sup>

At the same time, the U.S. improved its over-the-horizon presence, and the Reagan administration sought to upgrade the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force). This became visible in USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command).<sup>204</sup>

After the level of USCENTCOM forces improved sharply in 1981, Saudi Arabia raised serious questions about the Saudi attempt to find security initiatives that did not include U.S. participation, such as Gulf security arrangements centring on the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC).<sup>205</sup> The observations of Joseph Malone explained Gulf Arabs thoughts that the RDF were behind the perceived open-ended U.S. support for Israel. Joseph Malone observed that it was the Gulf Arabs' view that "Despite avowals of support for conservative, anti-Communist regimes, the United States - and therefore the RDF - arouses suspicions about their hidden agendas."<sup>206</sup>

In addition, the Iran-Iraq war and with the dangers of the Soviet Union's presence in South Yemen and the invasion of Afghanistan, brought the GCC states officially to establish the Gulf Co-operation Council in May 1981. In a separate final statement released at the end of the first GCC summit, the members established their organization's declaratory policy on military co-operation with external powers. The U.S. encouraged the Gulf states to make such a security tie to protect themselves.<sup>207</sup>

However, regional circumstances after 1981, created a series of crises in U.S.-Saudi relations. In June 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began a process of refocusing not only the concerns of U.S. Middle East policy but also the regional policies of the states within the region back on to the Arab-Israeli problem. This made the U.S. policy toward the Gulf, once again, less important.<sup>208</sup> The continuing crisis in Lebanon that evolved from Israel's invasion

involved the U.S. in complex diplomatic acts with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. The U.S. continuously threatened to connect itself to Israel in ways that could seriously damage U.S.-Saudi military relations.<sup>209</sup> For example: King Fahd contacted President Reagan to force Israel to quit its plan to enter Beirut.<sup>210</sup> President Reagan, in his memoirs, refers to King Fahd's telephone call, stating that immediately after the conversation he called Israeli Prime Minister Begin and asked him not to enter Beirut.<sup>211</sup> Israeli forces stopped on the heights overlooking Beirut. Moreover, the United States voted, on June 6, 1982, with all other members of the U.N. Security Council for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.<sup>212</sup>

At the end of 1982, Saudi Arabia made clear that it was actively interested in acquiring the M-1 tank and in standardising its forces with U.S. equipment. The U.S. - Saudi discussions came during a time when the U.S. was trying to convince Saudi Arabia to put pressure on King Hussein of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to support President Reagan's peace initiative.<sup>213</sup> The Reagan administration had to inform the Saudi government in early 1983, that it could not support any main new Saudi military modernisation efforts, because of its concern about pro-Israel lobbying in the Congress and the 1984 U.S. presidential elections.<sup>214</sup>

Saudi Arabia immediately responded by turning to Western Europe for equally effective arms. The Saudis continued to be interested in purchasing tanks, they were involved in discussions with West Germany over the possible purchase of Leopard II tanks and other weapons. At the same time, October 1983, it was announced that Spain would supply the Saudi military with some tugboats, armoured vehicles, and a number of CN-235 transport aircraft. In Paris, in January 1984, it was declared that France and Saudi Arabia had signed a \$4.5 billion agreement for a mobile anti-aircraft missile defence system to guard Saudi oil fields. Other countries which worked in Saudi Arabia on military contracts in 1984, included Italy, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).<sup>215</sup>

Shortly, after President Reagan was re-elected for the second time, both Saudi Arabia and the Reagan administration began to move towards a formal Saudi request for additional arms and toward dealing with the Congressional opposition.<sup>216</sup> The request involved a \$3,612

million deal which included the upgrading of Saudi Arabia's existing 60 F-15 C/Ds to more advanced versions of the aircraft, the purchase of 40 more F-15 C/D multi-stage improvement programme plus eight additional fighters to be kept in the U.S. as an attrition reserve. Saudi Arabia also sought 1,620 more AIM-9L/P air-to-air missiles, 800 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 100 Harpoon air-to-ship missiles and 12 unarmed Blackhawk UH-60 helicopters with an option to buy 12 more for the Saudi Army.<sup>217</sup>

Nevertheless, on January 31, 1985, the Reagan administration suspended all new arms sales to the Middle East while it reviewed the defence needs of Israel and the moderate Arab regimes. This announcement was made on January 31, 1985, by White House spokesman, Larry Speakes. Several Senate Republicans had asked Reagan to slow down on the deal, and on January 31, 1985, 35 Democratic and 16 Republican Senators sent Reagan a letter opposing the Saudi sale. But at the same time, Secretary of State, George Shultz, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated that sales to Saudi Arabia would eventually be resumed.<sup>218</sup>

The timing of the administration's announcement of the postponement in arms sales to Arab countries came just before King Fahd's visit to Washington in mid-February 1985. This almost led the King to cancel his visit, until he was quietly promised that Reagan would make a personal commitment to King Fahd to agree to the Saudi requests at a future date. The Saudis were confident enough in this promise that King Fahd visited the U.S. in February 1985.<sup>219</sup>

Indeed, selling U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia would improve and serve the U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf in general. Also the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia would enhance Saudi self-defence which would reduce the direct risk of U.S. military involvement to defend its interests in the area. The Middle East Arms Sale Study concluded in the winter of 1985, that Israel was so powerful militarily that it would not be endangered by such sales. It, thus, encouraged the resumption of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia. The study also said that while arms sales to Saudi Arabia could not guarantee the support of this country for American policies, a refusal to supply such arms could harm American interests in the area.

The study added that any large-scale American military operations in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, would likely depend on Saudi co-operation and support.<sup>220</sup> In addition, Saudi Arabia has never been a serious military threat to Israel and its role in the Arab-Israel conflict is limited to political and economic support of the Arab cause.<sup>221</sup>

Israel and its supporters in Congress had stated their objection to the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia in the absence of new peace negotiations. The White House wanted the study to show that such sales were vital to American security interests.<sup>222</sup> While Secretary of State, George Shultz, and Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, supported the sale and repeated pledges to Saudi Arabia, senior officials in the National Security Council and several of the president's senior domestic political advisors opposed the sale only because of their concern from a public debate that might produce enough hostile reaction from Israel's supporters to weaken Republican chances for control of the Senate in the 1986, elections.<sup>223</sup>

The Washington Post asserted on September 10, 1985, that the Reagan administration was expected to drop plans to include 40 additional F-15 combat aircraft in the new arms sales package for Saudi Arabia. The Saudis appeared to have concluded that they had no real hope of a future major U.S. sale until after the 1988 presidential elections, and then only after a new president had had time to settle into office. It practically forced Saudi Arabia to turn to another supplier. It was a further step in an extended U.S. history of disapproving or postponing Saudi arms requests that had already driven Saudi Arabia to turn to Europe for equipment and advice for its army and navy.<sup>224</sup> Therefore, the Saudi move to Europe for arms indicated the frustration felt by Saudi Arabia and its desire to assert independence from the United States, which could effect its interests in the area.

This long series of uncertain U.S. signals about the sale of equipment helped shape the Saudi decision to turn to the United Kingdom for military purchases. On September 26, 1985, Saudi Arabia signed a contract with the United Kingdom to supply Saudi Arabia with 48 Tornado aircraft worth \$8.5 billion. Saudi Arabia expanded its requirements in 1988, to include 50 air defence variants of the Tornado aircraft and mine vessels worth \$17 billion. In fact, after the Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia expanded the project for the third time in January

1993, with an estimated value of between \$5.7-7.2 billion. The latest order will bring total Saudi orders for Tornados to 120 and 65 advanced jet trainers.<sup>225</sup>

This factor explains the major shift of policy for the Saudi Air Force from dependence on the U.S. to more diverse sources of supplies from such European powers as the United Kingdom.<sup>226</sup> The Saudis decided not to wait any longer for the 48 American F-15 fighters that had been promised by Reagan. The deal with the United Kingdom was to underline the Saudi impatience with the U.S. Congressional obstruction and to send the message that they could get combat aircraft without any technical restrictions and about where to base them on their own soil.

The final stage in the arms sale crisis of 1985, was the Reagan administration's initiative to repair the damage caused by the failure of the F-15 arms package to its strategic relation with Saudi Arabia.<sup>227</sup> On March 11, 1986, the Reagan administration notified Congress that it intended to sell Saudi Arabia advanced missiles worth \$354 million.<sup>228</sup> In fact, this new arms package was part of the original F-15 package which included two different types of air-to-air Sidewinder missiles, valued at \$158 million; 200 shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles with 600 reload missiles, valued at \$89 million; and 100 air-to-ship Harpoon missiles, valued at \$107 million.<sup>229</sup> The administration used the excuse that there was a possibility of the Iran-Iraq conflict spilling over to Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries for this sale.<sup>230</sup>

At this stage, the Reagan administration adopted a strategy of supporting a high level of aid for Israel in return for limited opposition to the sale. Still, the administration faced a situation where 64 senators had signed a resolution against the sale and about 290 members of the House were ready to vote for it. There were enough votes in the Senate to stop the sale without a presidential veto and enough votes in the House to bypass the veto if the president made it.<sup>231</sup> Some supporters of Israel tried to block the sale because of the Saudi's financial support for the PLO and because of questions about the degree of Saudi support for U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East.<sup>232</sup>

President Reagan opened a personal campaign on May 13, 1986, to save his arms sale to Saudi Arabia. He told Congressional leaders that the credibility of the United States in the Middle East was at stake. The president also said "The consequence of our refusing this sale would, in my view, send a signal throughout the Middle East, to the clear detriment of our interests there for many years to come".<sup>233</sup> Some senators and House members said they voted against the arms deal only because the Stingers were included.<sup>234</sup> Thus, the Reagan administration was forced to drop the Stinger surface-to-air missile from the package.<sup>235</sup>

As a result, and through a combination of intense lobbying and the withdrawal of Stinger missiles, the Republican controlled Senate refused by a single vote on June 5, 1986, to back President Reagan's plan to sell \$265 million of Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles to Saudi Arabia.<sup>236</sup> The U.S. had reached a position where it was unable to maintain its strategic relations with Saudi Arabia.

Congress also raised the spectre of a vote against the transfer of the first AWACS which were due to be shipped on June 30, 1986, (Saudi Arabia had bought these on October 28, 1981). The Congress continued putting pressure on the Reagan administration to restrict arms sales to the Arab world. In July 1985, the Senate introduced legislation that forced the administration to report every major technical upgrade in the equipment it sold to foreign nations. This was clearly targeted towards Saudi Arabia since there had been some minor changes to the E-3A AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia.<sup>237</sup>

In the statement of certification to Congress, Reagan said a detailed plan for the security of all surveillance equipment had been agreed to by the United States and Saudi Arabia.<sup>238</sup> It included both on-site inspection by the United States and a pledge to share "continuously and completely" the information acquired by the AWACS planes.<sup>239</sup> In addition, there were prohibitions on the transfer of data to third countries, and limitation on its use in flights over Saudi territory.<sup>240</sup> At the same time, the opponents of the transfer acknowledged that they had no plans to introduce legislation to block the transfer - a move that would likely fail because the Saudis had already paid for the package.<sup>241</sup>

The Reagan administration had reached the state of trying to maintain military relations through "mini-packages". Since the major sale went to the United Kingdom, the U.S. contingency capabilities in the area were effected and, thus, reduced the U.S.' ability to use facilities in both political and military terms.<sup>242</sup> The U.S. had discovered the point beyond which it was unable to sustain full strategic relations with Saudi Arabia.<sup>243</sup>

**U.S. - Saudi military relations,**  
**1987 - August 1, 1990**

The Iran-Iraq war escalated during the spring and summer of 1987. The Iranians attacked a Saudi coast guard vessel that had been hit by a mine on August 13, 1987, and then on August 15, 1987, two massive explosions rocked an Aramco facility and fires were still burning twelve hours later.<sup>244</sup>

The Reagan administration responded on August 18, 1987, by announcing that it would agree an arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Once again, the Reagan administration found itself unable to win Congressional support. The lobbying against the sale won the support of many key members of Congress.<sup>245</sup>

In mid-September 1987, President Reagan received a draft letter from Congress that opposed the sale and claimed to have 64 signatures - enough to block the President. Several of the Senators involved attacked Saudi Arabia again for failing to support the U.S.' effort to seek peace with Israel. Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, attacked the sale in a speech on September 24, 1987, and by the end of September, some 217 members of the House had added their signatures to the 64 Senators. As a result, the Reagan administration started to work out a compromise whereby they dropped the request for 1,600 AGM-065D Maverick missiles from the sale, and informally promised not to sell Saudi Arabia the F-15Es at some later date. The Reagan administration's need to compromise again created political problems for the Kingdom. The U.S. president had been publicly forced to cut back on an arms sale because of pressure from Israel and the pro-Israel lobby.<sup>246</sup> Since there was no sign of an arms sale, Saudi Arabia was actively attempting to create a coalition with the Arab League


to tighten sanctions on Iran. However, at the Arab League's meeting in Amman on November 8, Saudi Arabia had faced opposition from Algeria, Syria and Libya.<sup>247</sup>

With the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, the tensions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were accompanied by another arms crisis. This time not because the Saudi request for arms had been denied by U.S. Congress but because Saudi Arabia had bought strategic surface-to-surface missiles from China. The Chinese C-SS-2 are long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The missile package provided an undisclosed number at a cost of between \$3 billion to \$3.5 billion. They have a maximum range of about 2,200 miles which means they could reach any target in the Middle East, including any part of Israel.<sup>248</sup> Saudi technicians had secretly been learning to operate the Chinese missiles for two years.<sup>249</sup>

China had agreed to sell the missiles in July 1985, when Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan had negotiated the deal in Beijing.<sup>250</sup> The first missiles reached Saudi Arabia in 1987, and the rest arrived at the beginning of 1988.<sup>251</sup> Saudi Arabia turned to Beijing after Congress had refused to supply Saudi Arabia with F-15s and short-range missiles. The missiles offered Saudi Arabia a way to strike back at any neighbouring state without having to fear loss of any military aircraft.<sup>252</sup>

Saudi Arabia had successfully hidden from U.S. intelligence agencies for more than two years its plans to acquire Chinese ballistic missiles. The U.S. did not directly confront the Saudi government with satellite evidence of the 66-foot-long missiles and their sites until March 6, 1988, when Assistant Secretary of State, Richard W. Murphy, met with the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar, and demanded to know whether Riyadh had obtained nuclear missiles from China.<sup>253</sup>

The United States asked Saudi Arabia about the Chinese missiles, since those deployed in China itself were all nuclear-armed missiles.<sup>254</sup> King Fahd sent a letter on March 12, to President Reagan assuring the administration that there were no nuclear warheads on the missiles, and he also reaffirmed the Saudi intention to acquire the most modern weapons necessary for its defence.<sup>255</sup>





U.S. intelligence sources had concluded that the Israeli air force's unusually intensive low-level bombing practice runs could be preparation for a strike on Saudi Arabia. Israel indicated that it might take action if the U.S. failed to deal with Saudi's new missiles. Reagan responded to the Israeli threat by warning Israel, on March 25, 1988, that the United States would be totally opposed to any Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia's new missiles.<sup>256</sup> The Reagan administration feared that if Israel attacked the missiles it would complicate U.S. - Saudi relations even further and destroy any chance for Arab acceptance of the United States' new Middle East peace initiative.<sup>257</sup> Saudi Arabia also sent a warning to Israel through the U.S. that it would retaliate with surviving missiles if Israel tried to bomb its missiles.<sup>258</sup>

Tensions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia increased when the U.S. had to recall its Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hume Horan, at the request of King Fahd. The King's request came during a meeting between King Fahd and Hume Horan, after Horan had requested to inspect the missile sites in Saudi Arabia.<sup>259</sup> King Fahd became angry and he said to the U.S. Ambassador, that when any country sold arms, they always demanded from the buyer that they would not allow any one country to inspect the arms. Saudi Arabia would keep its word.<sup>260</sup> Immediately, President Reagan called King Fahd to reduce the tensions and he sent his representative, Philip Habib, to Riyadh to persuade King Fahd to not ask Horan leave Saudi Arabia. However, King Fahd insisted that Horan leave, otherwise he would recall the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan. Consequently, the U.S. replaced Horan with Walter Cutler.<sup>261</sup> This was the first time an American Ambassador had been withdrawn at Saudi request since the countries established diplomatic relations in 1933.<sup>262</sup> The Saudis considered the U.S. request to inspect the missiles an intervention in their domestic affairs. In fact, the Saudis secret purchase of Chinese missiles showed the depth of their anger about U.S. policy. The Saudis thought the U.S. was responsible for the Saudi's purchase of arms from China, because they could not get them from the United States. The end result for U.S. - Saudi military relations was increased tension.

At the same time, the Reagan administration argued that the arms package, worth \$450 million, which included Bradley fighting vehicles, TOW missiles and ground-support

equipment for the Saudi AWACS was crucial for the protection of U.S. Naval forces in the Persian Gulf.<sup>263</sup> The growing U.S. presence in the Gulf was there to protect Saudi and Kuwaiti oil tankers from the escalating Iran-Iraq war, Washington argued.

The administration had planned to notify the Congress of the sale, but it decided to delay the sale because of a letter signed by 187 Representatives which called on the administration to halt the sale in light of Riyadh's secret purchase of the Chinese missiles.<sup>264</sup> Saudi Arabia tried to ease Congressional concerns, by announcing on April 25, 1988, that they would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Congress remained opposed to the Saudi purchase of the Chinese missiles.<sup>265</sup>

Since there was no move from the U.S. to finalise the sale, Saudi Arabia signed a contract again with the United Kingdom in July 1988. The contract included six mine vessels, 90 helicopters, and about 50 Tornado fighters at a cost of \$17 billion.<sup>266</sup> In Washington, the Reagan administration said that U.S. national interests had been damaged by the deal.<sup>267</sup> The deal was described as the largest defence export package in British history.<sup>268</sup>

In view of all this, the new Republican Bush administration decided to try and reach an understanding in principle with the Israelis so that they would not use their influence with Congress to try to block sales of arms to Saudi Arabia before the administration could take up the issue with Congress and give it the required legal notification. The Bush administration told the Israeli government, on September 28, 1989, that it intended to sell Saudi Arabia 315 U.S. army battlefield tanks at a cost of \$1 billion but it would also take steps to meet Israel's security concerns if Israel did not actively oppose the sale. In fact, Saudi Arabia had been considering buying M-1-A1 tanks, the main battlefield tank of the U.S. armed force, since the early 1980s.<sup>269</sup>

More than nine months later, the Pentagon announced on July 9, 1990, that Saudi Arabia had signed an agreement to purchase 315 of the U.S. Army's most advanced tanks in a deal worth more than \$3 billion and the tanks were scheduled for delivery from 1993 through 1995.<sup>270</sup>

In testifying to Congress in June 1990, Frederick Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East and South Asian Affairs, asserted that the hold-up in finalising the sale was caused by the price having to be re-negotiated. Originally, when this sale was discussed, the price that America had quoted to the Saudis was based on an expected U.S. purchase of approximately 2,000 of these tanks. However, the U.S. Army decided to buy only 62 of these tanks, and so the unit cost of each tank had been increased. This had caused the delay in discussions.<sup>271</sup>

The Bush administration argued that if the United States did not make the sale, then other countries would, for instance, the Chinese.<sup>272</sup> Equally important, the administration wanted to keep Saudi Arabia on a military par with Iraq.<sup>273</sup> When a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq was declared on August 2, 1988, Iraq emerged from the war with enormous self-confidence and power. The Iraqi president aspired to establish Iraq's hegemony in the Gulf, if not in the Arab world as a whole.<sup>274</sup>

The military relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia also developed over this period. During the meeting of June 19, 1990, of the Sub-committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science and Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it was recognised that the sales of arms to Saudi Arabia would yield substantial economic benefits. The cumulative value of the deal discussed on June 19, 1990, was approximately \$4 billion, of which more than \$3.1 billion would be spent in the U.S. The LAV (Light Armoured Vehicles) package would be assembled in Canada by GM of Canada. However, approximately 75% of the total package would be U.S. in content and would yield over 11,000 worker years of employment in at least 24 states. The AWACS modifications would generate additional employment in eight states. These were all cash sales that would involve no cost to the American taxpayer. The request consisted of three main elements.<sup>275</sup>

The first proposal related to the upgrade of the existing fleets of Saudi AWACS E-3 and KE-3 tanker aircraft at a cost of \$600 million. The second proposal was a request to purchase 1,117 light armoured vehicles, 2,000 TOW IIA anti-tank missiles, 116 TOW launchers and 27 M198

millimetre howitzers at a cost of \$3.4 billion. Finally, a request to purchase additional 12 M88A1 Recovery vehicles at a cost of \$26 million.<sup>276</sup>

In testifying to Congress on June 19, 1990, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Politico-military Affairs in the Department of Defense, William Rope, underscored the fact that the upgrade of the AWACS was essential to ensure the continued co-operation between U.S. and Saudi air forces. Co-operation was invaluable for the Americans during the Iran-Iraq war in their Persian Gulf operations in 1987, and 1988. It remains very important that Saudi aircraft be compatible with and able to operate with America aircraft. In addition, he added that sale would foster closer security relations with the Saudis, and enhance their ability to defend what amounted to one quarter of the world's proven oil reserves, a resource in which Americans will have a major interest for a long time to come.<sup>277</sup>

William Rope underscored in the Congress the fact that the Iraqi army was 1 million combat-trained, well-equipped troops and Saudi Arabia's total forces were approximately one-tenth of that figure.<sup>278</sup> He also concluded that Saudi Arabia had a legitimate need for equipment, that the sales would not have a negative impact on regional stability, that they will not present a risk to Israel's security, and that they will serve a number of important interests of the U.S.<sup>279</sup>

### **Summary**

U.S. economic and political relations with Saudi Arabia are a complete part of U.S. strategic policy in the area. The Saudi alliance was an important ingredient in American policy planning for several areas and issues: the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean and Soviet naval strategy east of the Suez, the Arab-Israeli threats. Saudi Arabia has been involved in these areas and is important to American foreign policy because of its oil, size, location and newly found economic power.

The Shah's fall has made Saudi Arabia the only major country with which the United States can frame a strategic partnership in the Gulf area. The United States military links to Saudi Arabia are only one of the areas where the links to Saudi Arabia has improved and stronger economic and political links are equally important. However, it is the military relations which are the keystone for U.S. policy in the area.

The diversification of sources of arms supply does not, and is not intended, to decrease the dependence of Saudi Arabia on the U.S. as an ultimate guarantor.<sup>280</sup> Issues and priorities have changed over the years, but more importantly, bilateral relations in specific areas have developed more or less independently of one another. The outcome has been that when two or more interests are concerned with a particular issue, policy decisions in one area are contradicted by decisions made in another area. For instance, the Saudi request for F-15s in 1978 and for AWACS in 1981, had a high political content reflecting on the growing role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially since 1973.<sup>281</sup>

Israel had become concerned at the potential for Saudi oil power to impel a wedge between the U.S. and Israel. This concern provided an impetus to the supporters of Israel in the U.S. to oppose the major arms requests to Saudi Arabia.<sup>282</sup> The task of demonstrating that the U.S. strategic connection with Saudi Arabia was compatible with U.S. ties to Israel has not been impossible when the White House has followed it with appropriate depth and consistency. The Saudis, on the other hand, were demanding independent military relations with the U.S. regardless of Israel.

Dr Ghazi Algosaibi, the current Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom and previously Minister of Industry and Minister of Health, presented the Saudi case for the sale of the F-15s to Congress and to American public opinion in 1978. He said in an interview with the author on November 29, 1994, that the pro-Israeli lobby had a weak position in opposing the Saudi arms requests because their purpose was to destroy the growing U.S. - Saudi relationship. Dr Algosaibi also stated that they had confirmed to the Americans that they (the Saudis) did not want to buy from the U.S. any more than was needed for purely defence purposes.

Following the energy crisis of 1973-74, the Saudis decided to enhance their defence by spending on military construction. The large figures began to draw U.S. Congressional criticism. This situation led to what were for the Saudis a series of crises of confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi were aware of the military logic of their requests, based as they were on U.S. surveys and recommendations. The Saudi suspicions of U.S. intentions were also based in part on continuity. The Saudis did not mind expressing their need for U.S. co-operation, but the problem was they perceived a U.S. unwillingness to express that it needed Saudi co-operation as well.<sup>283</sup>

The 1973-74 the Arab oil embargo, initiated and maintained by Saudi Arabia was essentially an economic response to a political issue. This reflected the growing economic strength of Saudi Arabia, and the willingness of an American president to give Saudis what they asked for, including arms.<sup>284</sup> In testimony before the House sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia in August 1974, Richard R. Violette, director for sales negotiations at the Defense Security Assistance Agency, stated that the American military programme in Saudi Arabia covered "a fairly broad range". The U.S. had agreed to provide services for Saudi Arabia which included the sale of F-15 fighter jets.<sup>285</sup> In addition, the threat of reduced levels of oil production was mentioned if the deal of F-15 in 1978, should fall through.<sup>286</sup> The linkage between the supply of oil and the F-15 deal raised considerable anxiety in the U.S. and renewed concern about Saudi blackmail.

But, in the mid 1980s, American defence planners admitted that the Saudis had failed to turn their international oil and political power into a strong and deterring armed force.<sup>287</sup> Despite the huge Saudi oil reserves, Saudi Arabia could not get the F-15s or other sophisticated weapons it needed in the mid-1980s. Saudi Arabia had not mentioned the oil threat as pressure since the RDF was founded. Saudi Arabia waited from the 1983 until 1986 to obtain approval from Congress about their arm requests. As we saw, when they knew that they would not get approval for their requests they turned to Europe, especially the United Kingdom to buy the Tornado. In fact, the European states were usually more forthcoming in providing sophisticated equipment and less inhibited by hostile domestic interest groups.<sup>288</sup>

The problem of the arms crisis between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia laid in the Reagan administration and in its initial neglect in not testing Congressional opinion and then its neglect in not attempting to seriously prepare the Congress for the sale. The White House failed because it decided it could wait until the last moment and then use the President's prestige to rush the sale through Congress. The administration did nothing effectively, which allowed the pro-Israel lobbying groups to be very effective.<sup>289</sup>

The administration did make one final attempt to get the sale to go through in May, 1986, however, this only made things worse. A senior administration official called Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., while he was in the United Kingdom negotiating to buy the Tornado with the Thatcher government. The U.S. official stated that the U.S. would send the F-15 package forward to the Congress if the Saudi government agreed to support the Jordanian peace initiative, to support a parallel U.S. arms sale to Jordan and pay for the arms sold to Jordan.<sup>290</sup> After consultation with King Fahd, the Saudis accepted the last two conditions. The first condition, threatened to pull the Saudis into the middle of political fighting between Jordan, the PLO, and Syria at a time when the Iran-Iraq war was escalating, and was therefore rejected.<sup>291</sup>

President Carter stated that the U.S. would not agree to provide Saudi Arabia with offensive capabilities that might be used against Israel. This included AWACS. But after Carter was defeated in the Presidential elections, he agreed to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The Times, on May 4, 1981, stated that "Carter waffled on the question of more arms for the Saudis until after he had been defeated. In Carter's last days in office his administration came down on the Saudi side and proposed to Reagan's transition team that the outgoing and incoming Presidents jointly announce a major arm sale".<sup>292</sup>

Another factor that created tensions in U.S.-Saudi relations was the "Iran-Contra" affair. The Reagan administration approved a secret arms sale to Iran in 1985, which broke U.S. constitutional principles.<sup>293</sup> This scandal required a series of investigations by the U.S. Congress and seriously embarrassed the U.S. in the Arab countries, particularly Saudi

Arabia.<sup>294</sup> This scandal cost the U.S. its credibility in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis felt that it had been betrayed by the United States. The arms sales to Iran warned the Saudis of the rising regional threat of the Iranian regime, which could encourage radicalism in the Middle East.<sup>295</sup> Thus, if the U.S. Congress had created the Saudi arms sale crisis of 1985-1986, it was the Reagan administration's by-passing of its own professionals that led to the Iran contra arms scandal.

Prior to 1973, U.S.-Saudi military relations were harmonious. The strain in the relationship occurred during the oil embargo of the U.S. for its support of Israel during the 1973 war. This made Saudi Arabia to steer a foreign policy course less closely bound to U.S. policy goals on arms sales.

As interdependence increased, levels of co-operation and conflict between the two nations increased and decreased. For instance, the events of 1978 relating to the sale of the F-15s. Since the 1970s, each Saudi request for arms resulted in increased strains within the relationship because of the efforts of the strong pro-Israeli lobby.<sup>296</sup> Congress perceives the granting or withholding of approval to sell arms to Saudi Arabia as part of a bargain on oil prices and production levels. It is seen as important to keep Saudi Arabia a moderate member on Arab - Israeli conflict. The U.S. also wanted to reduce Saudi Arabia's power to use oil to pressurise America for political ends.



## **Chapter Four**

### **U.S.- Saudi Political Relations until the 1990 Gulf Crisis**

Before talking about the U.S.-Saudi political relation, it will be important to understand the Saudi policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This eventually resulted as tension in political relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian question and the existence of Israel frequently strained their relationship, and led to the serious clash of views during the 1967 war, and 1973 war.

Since Saudi Arabia is of considerable importance to American long-term policy in the Middle East in general and America also supports Israel, it is necessary to consider Saudi-American relations throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict as the next subject, because the Palestinian-Israeli dispute is central to the politics of the Middle East.<sup>1</sup>

#### **The Arab -Israeli conflict and Saudi policy**

From the first meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt on February 12, 1945, King Abdulaziz took the opportunity to tell President Roosevelt his concern over Palestine. At the end of the meeting, Roosevelt gave King Abdulaziz his assurance that he would do nothing that might be hostile to the Arabs. The U.S. government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs. Immediately after Roosevelt's death, President Truman ignored these promises and the state of Israel was declared.<sup>2</sup>

Saudi Arabia did not send troops to participate in the Arab-Israel war in 1948, but co-operated in the boycott of Israel. King Abdullaziz became angered over the American recognition of Israel.

In 1956, when Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, Saudi Arabia ordered a general mobilisation and called on all Arabs to oppose the attack. Saudi Arabia also took a strong stand in favour of Arab nationalism and supported Egypt in her nationalisation of the Suez Canal.<sup>3</sup>

In the period following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Arab states that confronted Israel were defeated, and the Israelis occupied the Golan Heights, the Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza. The occupation included the Islamic shrines in East Jerusalem. The Saudis are guardians of Islam and the holy places in Mecca and Medina. The Saudis look to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem as the third most sacred place in Islam. Therefore, King Faisal insisted that Arab Jerusalem must be free of Israeli domination and his successors continue to focus on Jerusalem.<sup>4</sup>

Before 1967, the Saudis had not been deeply involved with the Palestinian movement, because the Palestinians were followers of Egypt's Nasser who was anti-Saudi. However, after the 1967 war, Nasser had dropped his regime's anti-Saudi rhetoric. At the Khartoum Arab conference in August 1967, King Faisal took the lead in organise financial support for Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO to increase the concern felt in the Muslim world over the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem; and to oppose pressures from Arab nationalists to adopt a radical attitude in its dealings with the West, especially with the United States. At the same time, Saudi Arabia supported the U.N. Security Council resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which demanded the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied during the war of 1967.<sup>5</sup>

The anti-Communist element in Saudi foreign policy affected Saudi relations with Egypt. King Faisal encouraged President Sadat in 1971-1972, to decrease his dependence on the Soviet Union. That was the first major effort by Saudi Arabia to encourage an Egyptian-United States dialogue. He explained that Egypt must deal with U.S. concerns about the Arab-Israeli conflict. This process was interrupted by the October 1973 war and the following oil embargo, however.<sup>6</sup>

Despite King Faisal's pro-American attitude, he took the lead in the use of the oil weapon to support President Sadat's war in 1973. The October war in 1973, brought Saudi Arabia directly into the conflict arena and was the first major confrontation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.<sup>7</sup>

An OPEC meeting on October 17, 1973, was designed to use the oil embargo to force Israel to withdraw from Arab occupied lands and to compel the U.S. to realise

the consequences of its unlimited support for Israel.<sup>8</sup> Emile Nakhleh has suggested that war and oil as tool of diplomacy achieved several goals: 1. it erased the humiliation of 1967 defeat; 2. it equalised the balance of power between Israel and the Arabs; 3. it increased the need for negotiations between Egypt and Israel; 4. it forced the U.S. to enter the negotiation process as a full partner.<sup>9</sup>

These new policies, which included strong efforts by the U.S., generated three disengagement agreements: two were in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt (January 15, 1974 and September 1, 1975) and one was on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria on May 31, 1974. Saudi Arabia played an active role in easing Kissinger's negotiations, and encouraging American initiative.<sup>10</sup>

Riyadh supported the elevation of the PLO during 1974-1977, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Saudis maintained that the Arab-Israel conflict was not just a conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people and any future peace negotiations must involve Palestinian representatives of a future Palestinian state. Thus, for the first time, the Palestinians would be recognised as a party to the conflict when they were invited to speak to the U.N. General Assembly on October 14, 1974.<sup>11</sup>

Syria was not pleased with the results of the Sinai II agreement which caused a break in the Arab ranks, placing Egypt and Syria at odds. The Syrians sought to bring the Saudis and other Arab parties against the agreement on the formal grounds that it violated the resolution of the Rabat Arab summit of October 1974. This resolution had enjoined the confronting countries against any separate political agreement and had called upon them to seek only a comprehensive settlement based on return of all the occupied Arab territories and satisfaction of the Palestinian's national rights.<sup>12</sup> President Sadat agreed to his participation in the Kissinger offer and called for a linking of any Egyptian-Israeli accord with a similar one between Syria and Israel.<sup>13</sup> However, Saudi Arabia failed to get the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and PLO to meet to coordinate policies.<sup>14</sup> In fact, the Saudis wanted to keep their connection at the policy level because they believed that this served their Arab policy better.<sup>15</sup> They possessed resources to deal with the other problems that they faced. The Saudis were not pleased with the result of Kissinger's efforts, particularly the Sinai II agreement of September 1975.

The agreement caused a gap in Arab ranks placing Egypt and Syria at odds with each other. To ease the differences between Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia invited President Sadat and President Assad to Riyadh in November 1976. Egypt and Syria called off their public dispute and agreed to co-operate in any new Middle East peace initiative. Arab ranks were to be closed in preparation for dealing with the newly elected Democratic administration of Jimmy Carter.<sup>16</sup>

The Carter administration responded positively to these Saudi moves. President Carter sent a personal friend, John West, former Governor of South Carolina, to Saudi Arabia as ambassador, to secure for the Saudis a direct line of access to the White House. During the early months of the Carter administration, the Saudis were consulted on and informed of the plan of working for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.<sup>17</sup>

In June 1977, the Saudis worked to get the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to moderate its views so that Palestinians could join in the negotiations of the peace process. In August of that year, Prince Fahd submitted to Secretary of State, Vance, in Riyadh his proposal for authorising the PLO to take part in the general peace negotiations. Prince Fahd could convince President Carter to recognise the PLO officially in exchange for the PLO's recognition of resolution 242.<sup>18</sup>

In August 1977, the United States agreed that they would begin official talks with PLO representatives, if the PLO accepted U.N. resolution 242. The Saudis were pleased at this point, but the PLO under massive Syrian pressure, was reluctant to accept U.N. resolution 242. Prince Fahd believed that the Palestinian leadership had lost an historic opportunity that would not be repeated.<sup>19</sup> Then, the U.S. initiative came to stop and the gap between the Syrians and the Egyptians grew fast. In November 1977, Sadat announced that he intended to visit Jerusalem to meet Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. This caught Saudi Arabia by surprise. Sadat had neither consulted nor even informed the Saudis of his intentions. From the Saudi perspective, a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement would again split Arab ranks and reduce the stability of the region. Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, caused the Saudis to retreat to the sidelines and they found themselves closer to the views of Syria, Jordan, and the PLO than to Egypt.<sup>20</sup>

The Saudi position toward Sadat's initiative was similar to the position they had taken toward his previous moves at Sinai II. The Saudis wanted a "just and lasting solution in the area". Any Middle East settlement must be based on the return of all Arab lands and fulfilment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the Saudi government issued a statement expressing their surprise at Sadat's move and stated that any Middle East peace initiative "Must emanate from a unified Arab stand".<sup>22</sup> Their primary fear was that Sadat had already recognised the existence of Israel he had nothing left with which to negotiate a significant settlement.<sup>23</sup> The Saudis felt that Sadat's move had shattered the Arab near-consensus. This had hardly been repaired when the events of Sinai II had smashed once again the consensus cultivated at the Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus meeting.

When Saudi Arabia was caught in the middle, the Saudis did not immediately join in with Sadat's critics which was composed of most of the Arab countries. Nor did Saudis attend the rejectionist Arab summit held in Libya on December 5, 1977, following Sadat's visit to Israel. The Saudis continued to hope that Sadat would turn his initiative back toward a comprehensive Middle East peace.<sup>24</sup> While the Saudis did not join in with Sadat's critics, they became less active in trying to form an Arab consensus.<sup>25</sup>

In September 1978, the Camp David summit meeting produced two unrelated agreements. One dealt with the Sinai and the other dealt in generalities with the Palestinian question.<sup>26</sup> It did not deal with the problems associated with attaining autonomy for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, nor for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.<sup>27</sup> No specific provisions were made for the Palestinian refugees still in camps.<sup>28</sup> As was to be expected, the Saudis were not pleased with the Camp David result and they expressed their disappointment in private.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, an Arab summit meeting was scheduled for Baghdad in November 1978. The official bulletin of the summit condemned Sadat, Carter, and Camp David. Prince Fahd did manage to prevent a complete Arab break of economic and diplomatic relations with Egypt, however.<sup>30</sup>

The Arab League states met again on March 27, 1979, to consider what actions to take against Egypt for its separate peace agreement with Israel. The summit members decided to expel Egypt from the Arab League and to move the headquarters of the Arab League from Egypt to Tunis. They also agreed to end diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt. But the Saudis did not agree to a total ban on contacts with Egypt. Nor did they cancel previous aid commitments. The Saudis did not expel Egyptian workers from Saudi Arabia or suspend airline services.<sup>31</sup>

The Saudis were willing to continue financing Egypt's purchase of fifty F-5E aircraft worth \$525 million to persuade Sadat to join the all Arab strategy.<sup>32</sup> However, on May 7, 1979, Sadat made a speech in which he attacked Saudi Arabia accusing it of trying to "Bribe [Egypt] with money"; this led the Saudis to cancel their financial aid.<sup>33</sup>

In an interview with The Washington Post on May 25, 1980, Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Abdullah, Chief of the Saudi National Guard, stated their willingness to accept the existence of Israel if it would end its occupation of the lands occupied since 1967 and recognise the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people.<sup>34</sup>

By early summer 1981, Saudi Arabia decided to offer its own peace proposal. It was the first major Saudi initiative following the Sadat initiative. On August 7, 1981, with no preceding consultation with the U.S., Crown Prince Fahd announced an eight-point plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. The points were:

1. Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem.
2. The removal of Israeli settlements on Arab land established after 1967.
3. Guaranteed freedom of worship for all religions in the Holy Places.
4. Affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and compensation to those who decided not to do so.
5. U.N. control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding a few months.

6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Affirmation of the right of all states in the region to live in peace.
8. The U.N. or some of its members to guarantee and implement these principles.<sup>35</sup>

The Saudi initiative was known as the Fahd plan. Prince Fahd had been careful to negotiate a consensus from the Arab countries, including the PLO which played a role in drafting the plan, before proposing the plan. After Prince Fahd made his statement, Yassir Arafat, confirmed his support for Fahd's plan to the New York Times. It was "a good beginning for a lasting peace in the Middle East".<sup>36</sup> Sadat rejected the plan. At about the same time, on October 6, 1981, President Sadat was assassinated and Egypt's new president, Hosni Mubarak, asserted a positive view of the plan, stating that it could be used as the basis of some future discussion. However, Mubarak did not reject the Camp David accords in favour of the Fahd plan. In contrast, Israel rejected the plan.<sup>37</sup> Prince Fahd stated that the plan was negotiable but that it was proposed as a rational and balanced alternative to the Camp David agreements.<sup>38</sup>

The Saudis declared their intention to put forward the Fahd plan for consideration at the Arab League summit, which was arranged for Fez, Morocco on November 25, 1981. Riyadh then set about winning Arab acceptance for the plan. Iraq and Syria, the two most hard-line amongst the Arabs, were heavily in Saudi Arabia's debt, politically as well as financially. Since Iraq depended on Saudi Arabia financially during its war with Iran, Saudi Arabia had hoped that this would mean that Iraq could be persuaded not to oppose the plan. However, at the presummit Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting on November 22, both Syria and Iraq came out against the plan. Syria also pushed the PLO to oppose the plan. At the Arab summit, King Hassan of Morocco, who was chairman, adjourned the meeting after four hours of discussion of the Fahd plan in order to prevent the breaking up of Arab ranks.<sup>39</sup>

At the same time, the Saudis were frustrated at Syria's inflexibility over Lebanon, as well as over its support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis tried to bring Syria back into the Arab consensus and did nothing further to separate Syria or to

push Syria closer to the Soviet Union. It was inevitable that Saudi Arabia took for itself the role of moderate Arab mediator.

A few days after President Reagan's statements the Arab League summit meeting in Fez, Morocco, November 25, 1981, an eight-point plan was adopted demanding:

1. Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including East Jerusalem.
2. Dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories.
3. Guarantees for freedom of worship for all religions.
4. Affirmation of Palestinian rights of self-determination and exercise of those rights under their sole representative the PLO.
5. A transition period of a few months for the West Bank and Gaza supervised by the U.N.
6. Establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Guarantee of the peace and security of all states in the region, including a Palestinian state, by the United Nations Security Council.
8. Guarantee of the implementation of these principles by the Security Council.<sup>40</sup>

The Fahd plan was the basis of the 1981 Fez proposal. It had Arab League consensus, including an indirect recognition of the existence of Israel in point seven. Therefore, the Saudis saw their efforts bear fruit albeit a year later than expected. Unfortunately, by that time the Lebanese crisis so occupied the Middle East security and political agenda that concentrated attention could not be given to the peace process. As the U.S. became more bogged down in Lebanon in 1983, communications with Syria became strained.

As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia maintained the consensus and joined an all Arab strategy. The Saudis used their oil as a political weapon during the 1973 war to pressure the U.S. into obtaining a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. However, the Saudis in the late 1970s were reluctant to use their oil as political weapon again. In particular, they would not put their national resource (oil) and the security of Saudi Arabia at risk just in the name of Arab strategy. President Sadat's unilateral initiative had destroyed the Saudi efforts using the oil embargo of 1973, to achieve a Middle East peace initiative from a unified Arab position.



Since there was no guarantee of maintaining a unified stand from the Arab front line states, the Saudis would not contemplate imposing an oil embargo again and face the negative consequence of an oil embargo alone.

Finally, for all its differences with the U.S. over American support for Israel, Saudi Arabia played an important role in convincing President Sadat to make his initial break with the Soviet Union and in giving Egypt the financial and military support it needed to reach the Sinai accords. In 1975, Saudi Arabia helped convince Syria to approve Egypt's second disengagement agreement with Israel by using Saudi aid to Syria as a bargaining chip.<sup>41</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi political relations**

The United States officially recognised the regime of King Abdulaziz in May 1931, when Charles R. Crane (an American minister) made the most important contract between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It was not until after this that Abdulaziz formally created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in September 1932.

Saudi Arabia is closer to the United States than with any other Western nation. The special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States commenced in the 1930s, and has been maintained with the freedom to follow policies not always compatible with each other's objectives.<sup>42</sup>

### **History of U.S. - Saudi relations**

American individuals have been dealing with Saudis since the 1890s. The story of Saudi relations with the United States is one of spreading contacts through private American individuals and companies. The oldest steady unofficial American contract with Arabia was in 1890, when the Dutch Reformed Church sponsored missionaries through the Persian Gulf. From their three centres at Kuwait, Muscat (in Oman) and Bahrain less than two dozen missionaries exerted an influence far beyond their numbers. Not that they made many converts, for their score approached zero, but through their social work they afforded the association of thousands of common folk and their rulers with Americans. The medical missionaries established relations with King Abdulaziz from their bases in

Bahrain. They visited Saudi Arabia frequently to treat the ailing King and other patients, but they were not allowed to continue their evangelistic operations.<sup>43</sup>

Following Abdulaziz's victories in the Arabian peninsula, he needed cash to maintain his hold over the tribes. Thus, he looked enthusiastically to discover oil. In 1922, Major Holmes, representing the Eastern and General Syndicate Companies, got the exploration rights for an area of more than 30,000 square miles of the Al-Hasa. Major Holmes failed to interest any British companies in undertaking the development of oil deposits and ceased exploration in 1925. The concession was officially announced void in 1928.<sup>44</sup> In fact, negotiations between the Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd and the U.S. with a view towards establishing diplomatic relations began in September 1928.

Harry St John Bridger Philby, a former official in the Indian Civil Service, had set himself up as a merchant in Jeddah and had attached himself to the King as sometimes adviser. Philby suggested Charles Crane, an American with deep interest in Arabia, who was sponsoring development projects in Yemen be given the exploration rights.

#### **U.S. - Saudi relations, 1931-1953**

On February 25, 1931, Crane arrived in Saudi Arabia to discuss economic co-operation with King Abdulaziz. Crane went back to the United States and sent Karl S. Twitchell, an American engineer. Twitchell's report on oil was optimistic. He returned to the United States for the purpose of promoting capital investments in Saudi Arabia. On May 31, 1932, Standard Oil of California made its oil discovery in Bahrain.<sup>45</sup>

Private American oil investments were the starting point of the modern Saudi-American relations, when Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) got the concession in May, 1933. Before the concession was signed, SOCAL had raised with the State Department the question of diplomatic representation. The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a provisional agreement on November 7, 1933, the first formal act of diplomatic relations in regard to diplomatic representation, judicial protection, commerce and navigation.<sup>46</sup>

In March 1938, test drillings in an area of the Al-Hasa confirmed the presence of oil in commercial quantities. In 1939, the first oil shipment left Saudi Arabia.<sup>47</sup> From here on the Kingdom's financial crisis had been overcome and \$3.2 million dollars in revenues was collected.<sup>48</sup> By the late 1930s, the oil industry in the Gulf was booming.

By late 1939, the United States had started to re-evaluate its position in Saudi Arabia. The Germans officially approved their envoy in Iraq to be a non-resident ambassador to Saudi Arabia.<sup>49</sup> Both Japan and Germany expressed their interest in an oil concession.<sup>50</sup> Eventually, the U.S. Minister to Egypt, Bert Fish, was confirmed as non-resident minister to Saudi Arabia on August 3, 1939.<sup>51</sup> He presented his credentials to King Abdulaziz on February 4, 1940.<sup>52</sup> Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia continued to develop during the World War II. The United States opened a legation in Jeddah on May 1, 1942.<sup>53</sup> The U.S. Minister to Egypt, Alexander Kirk, continued to be non-resident envoy to Saudi Arabia, and James Moose was appointed resident U.S. Minister in 1943.<sup>54</sup>

From May to December 1942, a U.S. agricultural mission journeyed more than ten thousand miles throughout the Kingdom providing an agricultural evaluation. Karl Twitchell, the engineer who had reported on Saudi water resources, as well as oil, in the 1930s, led the mission. The mission was an early instance of the growing American desire to be responsive to Abdulaziz who was the only independent ruler in the Middle East friendly to the allies. By accepting American financial assistance, Saudi Arabia compromised its neutrality and so had to turn increasingly to the United States for help in modernising the country. ARAMCO had carried out vast operations without direct official backing by the U.S. government. An ARAMCO representative met with President Roosevelt in April 1941, and tried to obtain his approval for a government loan to Saudi Arabia. The United States made funds available to Saudi Arabia.<sup>55</sup>

American oil men were concerned by the growing British presence in Riyadh. The Americans were concerned about the strategic significance of the Gulf and the importance of access to the oil in the Persian Gulf. The Roosevelt administration sought more active government involvement in the oil concessions, because of the direct competition between the United States and Britain to obtain the Saudi oil concessions. So, on February 18, 1943, President Roosevelt declared Saudi Arabia

eligible for direct lend-lease assistance, which amounted to \$17.5 million.<sup>56</sup> In addition, 22.3 million ounces of silver were lend-leased. These were needed to mint Riyal coins (the Saudi currency). The U.S. government's financial support made it possible for Saudi Arabia to avoid bankruptcy, which looked almost inevitable when the oil operations stopped during the World War II, and the war caused a sharp decline in the number of persons arriving for the Haj.<sup>57</sup>

Prince Faisal (later King Faisal) visited the U.S. in 1943, and again in 1944. He was received in a royal way to emphasise the growing importance of U.S. - Saudi relations.<sup>58</sup> The Americans approached the Saudis for approval to build an air base at Dhahran, on the Gulf coast. They struggled to capitalise the U.S.'s leading role in the progress of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia.<sup>59</sup> The British were also pursuing an agreement to build a base and made the most of their long established political position in the Peninsula.<sup>60</sup>

The United States and Great Britain were competing for rights concerning oil distribution. Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate who was serving as Lord Privy Seal, told Churchill: "Oil is the single greatest post-war asset remaining to us. We should refuse to divide our last asset with the Americans".<sup>61</sup> On February 18, 1944, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, debated with Under-Secretary of State, Summer Wells, on oil and how to proceed. Later, Halifax telegraphed London that "The Americans were treating us shockingly".<sup>62</sup> Next, Halifax asked for a personal meeting with the President. Roosevelt met Halifax, and showed the ambassador a rough summary of the plans that he had made for the Middle East.<sup>63</sup> The president told the ambassador "Persian oil is yours. We share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi Arabian oil, it is ours".<sup>64</sup>

On February 20, 1944, Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt in which he said that he had been watching "With increasing misgivings" the telegrams about oil.<sup>65</sup> "A wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves", he declared. "There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our Navy depends".<sup>66</sup> To put it bluntly, he said, some felt "That we are being hustled".<sup>67</sup> Roosevelt replied that he, in turn, had received reports that Great Britain was "Eyeing and trying to horn in on the American companies' concession

in Saudi Arabia".<sup>68</sup> In response to another sharp telegram from Churchill, Roosevelt added, "Please do accept my assurances that we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran". Churchill cabled back, "let me reciprocate by giving you fullest assurance that we have no thought on trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia".<sup>69</sup> But, while Britain did not seek territorial advantage, "She will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs".<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, the importance of the Saudi concession to the U.S. was enough reason to invite a U.S. move because the British already had a practical monopoly to exploit oil in Iran.<sup>71</sup>

During the final year of the World War II, the United States moved to secure its commercial and political influence in Saudi Arabia. President Roosevelt invited King Abdulaziz to a meeting on an American warship in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake. They met on February 12, 1945, Abdulaziz was frequently referred to by Roosevelt in terms of highest praise, and he was given as a gift a luxurious airplane. However, the genial relations were marred by one problem - The Palestinian's problem with the Jews. Roosevelt confirmed to Abdulaziz that the U.S. would never do anything that might prove hostile to the Arabs and that the U.S. would not act on the Palestine problem without consulting the Arabs and Jews.<sup>72</sup> This promise was given again in a letter to the King in April, one of the last letters Roosevelt ever wrote before he died in April 1945. Furthermore, Roosevelt's interests were in oil and the post-war configuration of the Middle East. Abdulaziz wanted to assure continuing American interest in Saudi Arabia after the war to counterbalance what had been for him a threat from British influence in the region.<sup>73</sup>

The strategic interests that had been the main determinants of political relations throughout World War II started to subside in the post-war period.<sup>74</sup> There were two developments that were to become the determinants of U.S.-Saudi political relations and the original cause of ambivalence in those relations. These were the Cold War and the existence of the State of Israel.<sup>75</sup>

The post-war Soviet threat in the Middle East generated a common U.S. - Saudi security concern and this has been the pillar of political relations for almost fifty

years. In March 1947, the Truman doctrine was formulated. This would be the basis through which the United States would maintain security in the Middle East.<sup>76</sup> The U.S. started a long-term world-wide policy to contain communism which had mostly coincided with Saudi security concerns.<sup>77</sup> These common security concerns allowed both countries to overcome dissimilarities and opposing interests and to preserve close relations over the years.<sup>78</sup>

The main differences at this time between the two states were over the Arab-Israeli conflict and problems associated with the creation of Israel in 1948.<sup>79</sup> Despite the fact that Roosevelt had promised to find a solution to the Palestine problem acceptable to the Arabs, President Truman took less account of Arab interests, "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents".<sup>80</sup>

The Saudis felt that President Truman had betrayed the pledges made to them by President Roosevelt, especially when the United States voted in the United Nations for partition of Palestine in 1947.<sup>81</sup> The Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal, felt specifically bitter, because he had been assured by the State Department during a visit to Washington in 1946, that Roosevelt's assurance was still in effect.<sup>82</sup> Later Faisal urged his father to stop relationships with the United States.<sup>83</sup> On December 3, 1947, Abdulaziz met with the American minister in Jeddah to express his view of the situation. Abdulaziz told the minister that the talk about cancelling the concession was an example of the increased pressure, which was being put on him in order to damage his relations with the United States.<sup>84</sup> The United States responded immediately that it was difficult to supply him with arms given the embargo.<sup>85</sup> Later in Abdulaziz's request for arms, he mentioned the danger of Communism.<sup>86</sup> In fact, the U.S. had been a strong external force for peace and security in the Middle East, so in addition to economic and political ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, a component of their relationship was military supply.

Despite Saudi bitterness over the U.S. role in the creation of Israel, U.S.- Saudi relations continued to develop. In 1948, the United States Navy entered the Persian Gulf for the first time and paid a courtesy call on Dammam.<sup>87</sup> In 1949, the United States legation at Jeddah was raised to embassy level.<sup>88</sup> The United States

and Saudi Arabia moved closer, on June 18, 1951, by signing a defence agreement under which Saudi Arabia extended American usage rights at the Dhahran air base for five years.<sup>89</sup> The Dhahran base later became an important link in the U.S. global network of strategic bases directed against the Soviet bloc.<sup>90</sup>

The U.S. not only helped militarily but was also important in the implementation of Abdulaziz's plans to develop Saudi Arabia domestically. Saudi Arabia's revenue increased to about \$90 million in 1950.<sup>91</sup> This revenue was used by Abdulaziz to develop Saudi Arabia. He put special stress on transportation, hospitals, education, communication, and water supplies. With American assistance, the Saudi government launched an irrigation network. Maky Corporation built a powerful radio station in Jeddah. Under a contract with Trans World Airlines (TWA), Saudi Arabian air service, linking the Red Sea with the Persian Gulf, was established. Huge piers were built in Jeddah and new piers were developed at Dammam and a rail link between Dammam with Riyadh was built. Roads were constructed between Jeddah, Mecca and Medina with American instruction.<sup>92</sup>

### U.S. - Saudi relations, 1953- 1973

After the death of King Abdulaziz in 1953, the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States became more complicated. From the beginning, Eisenhower's administration was involved more deeply with the Arab world affairs than his predecessors had been.<sup>93</sup> Eisenhower played a critical role in the creation of the Baghdad pact in 1955, during the mediation of the Suez crisis in 1956, and in formulating the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957.<sup>94</sup> This involvement, inspired a mixed reaction in the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. This was due to different concepts of mutual interests. Preventing communist expansion was the first U.S. political goal in the Middle East, and U.S. government's insensitivity to local and regional political issues was to complicate its relations with the Arab world.<sup>95</sup>

The United States was concerned with the communist threat, and so was seeking security arrangements in the Middle East including the use of Dhahran base.<sup>96</sup> The U.S. focused on the Northern Tier States: i.e. Turkey and Iran, especially, that part bordering the Soviet Union.<sup>97</sup> The United States wanted to secure the Arab states, together with the Northern Tier States, in a defence pact to be called the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO).<sup>98</sup> In December 1953, King Saud

expressed his opposition to MEDO and he went to Cairo in March 1954, to seek President Nasser's support.<sup>100</sup> They refused to become party to any agreement that by definition benefited Western interests.<sup>100</sup> The Americans dropped the proposal, but the British felt the need for a multilateral pact to replace their bilateral defence pact with Iraq.<sup>101</sup> On February 24, 1954, Turkey and Iraq signed a bilateral security agreement - the Baghdad pact.<sup>102</sup> Great Britain signed the pact in April 1954, Pakistan in September 1955, and Iran in October 1955.<sup>103</sup> The United States did not become a full member of the Baghdad pact, but played an important role, providing military assistance.<sup>104</sup> The Baghdad pact split the Arab world and threatened U.S. - Saudi political relations.<sup>105</sup> The United States, despite increased tensions in its relations with Saudi Arabia, still independently sought Saudi friendship.<sup>106</sup> On January 30, 1957, King Saud visited Washington and agreed to a five-year renewal of the air base agreement in exchange for continued U.S. arms.<sup>107</sup> The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, George Wadsworth, stated in support of the Eisenhower doctrine: "We are recognising that Saudi Arabia is a stabilizing force in the area, and we state in those terms for the first time to my knowledge that it is our policy to continue to contribute to the strengthening of the Kingdom; we want to build up something strong which will resist this nebulous force of aggression which we sense building up".<sup>108</sup> Eisenhower, himself, put emphasis on building up King Saud as a strong conservative counter to President Nasser and as a major figure in the Middle Eastern area.<sup>109</sup> But King Saud lost control of the government in 1960, Faisal became Prime Minister, ending any hopes the Eisenhower administration had for making Saud a champion of Arab conservatives.<sup>110</sup> In October 1962, Faisal gained total control of the government. In 1964, he became King when King Saud was forced to resign.<sup>111</sup>

The next development in Saudi Arabian policy came as a result of internal political change. Faisal was a strong and able administrator. He believed that the monotheistic West was a lesser threat to the Islamic World than he hoped to preserve than the atheistic Soviet bloc.

When the Yemeni civil war started in the fall of 1962, military and security matters became the major considerations in U.S.-Saudi relations.<sup>112</sup> Americans saw the Yemeni civil war as a threat to its relations with both Saudi Arabia, who supported the Yemeni loyalists, and the Egyptians, who supported the republicans.<sup>113</sup> The Egyptian air force bombed the Saudi border towns in December



1962, and in response to this bombing, King Faisal ordered a general mobilisation.<sup>114</sup> In response to the growing crisis, the United States sent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Saudi Arabia in March 1963, to try to negotiate a Saudi - United Arab Republic disengagement in Yemen.<sup>115</sup> (The UAR - was formed by the merger of Egypt and Syria in 1958). In April, Bunker reached an agreement with the UAR and Saudi Arabia.<sup>116</sup> The Bunker agreement provided a mission of United Nations observers which would be jointly funded by Saudi Arabia and the UAR.<sup>117</sup> The mission came to Yemen in July 1963, and stayed until September 1964.<sup>118</sup> At that time, with no UAR withdrawals and with continuing hostilities, Faisal repudiated the Bunker agreement.<sup>119</sup> The Saudi-Egyptian confrontation continued until Egypt was forced to pull out its military forces from Yemen as a consequence of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.<sup>120</sup>

Despite the failure of the Bunker agreement, U.S. responsiveness to Saudi military needs and restored Saudi internal stability following the accession of King Faisal led to a significant improvement in Saudi political relations with the U.S.<sup>121</sup> King Faisal visited Washington on June 21-23, 1966.<sup>122</sup> The U.S. announced its support for the integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Pentagon renewed its training of the Saudi armed forces.<sup>123</sup>

The United States considered Saudi Arabia a voice of moderation in the area. Thus, the United States wanted to protect the integrity of oil, and on the other hand, the Saudis expressed their willingness to base their relations with the United States on the need for U.S. technological and military assistance. Saudi concern was stimulated by the growing supply of Soviet arms to southern Yemen and Iraq. The United States was developing a modern air force and navy for Saudi Arabia, and indicated a willingness to assist with sales of equipment and private training programmes due to the apparent threats to Saudi security.

The years between 1967 and 1973, were politically a period of transition in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Nasserist threat ended completely with the settlement of the Yemeni civil war.<sup>124</sup> In May 1967, Nasser ordered the United Nations (U.N.) observers, who had been on duty since the end of the Suez crisis, out of Egypt. He started a blockade of Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, cutting off its southern port and threatening to interrupt the importation oil, and he sent Egyptian troops back to the Sinai.<sup>125</sup> On June 5, 1967, the third

Arab-Israeli war, the Six-Day War, had started.<sup>126</sup> The Egyptian forces in Sinai collapsed. By June 8, the Israeli troops had crossed the Sinai.<sup>127</sup> On June 6, Arab Oil Ministers formally called for an oil embargo against countries helping Israel.<sup>128</sup> Saudi Arabia associated itself with the Arab effort to withhold oil only after extensive pressure from Nasser, but lifted the embargo soon after its imposition.<sup>129</sup>

The 1967 war signalled a turning point in Saudi Arabia's position as well as in its relations with the United States. The war put the Soviets in a favourable position in the Arab region.<sup>130</sup> Nasser's partnership with the Soviets put Saudi Arabia in a bad light for maintaining close relations with the U.S., Israel's friend and protector.<sup>131</sup>

### The oil embargo of 1973

The period of transition from 1967 to 1973, came to an end in October 1973, with the Arab-Israeli war and Saudi Arabia's support of the Arab oil embargo.<sup>132</sup> Saudi Arabia's position on oil production placed Saudi Arabia in a good position to play a decisive role in the use of oil as a political weapon.<sup>133</sup> The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, however, catapulted the Kingdom to the centre of Arab political arena.<sup>134</sup> King Faisal had tried to notify the West, especially the United States, that the Arabs would have to use the oil weapon if the United States did not put more pressure on Israel to abandon the occupied Arab territories. The United States was the only country that could force Israel into the necessary concessions for a truly just peace settlement.<sup>135</sup> But Washington did not take Faisal's warnings seriously.<sup>136</sup>

On August 23, 1973, President Sadat of Egypt made an undeclared trip to Riyadh to meet King Faisal.<sup>137</sup> He told the King that he was considering going to war against Israel and he wanted Saudi Arabia's support and co-operation.<sup>138</sup> The consequence of Sadat's trip was quite evident. On August 27, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia, told an Aramco executive that the King had suddenly taken to asking for detailed and regular reports on Aramco's production, its expansion, and the result of shortening its production on consuming countries - in particular, on the United States.<sup>139</sup> In the U.S., there were doubts about Saudi intentions. For that reason, King Faisal had been giving interviews and making public statements designed to eliminate any mistrust that might arise. He was

interviewed on September 4, 1973, by the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, Newsweek, and NBC Television. His message was that "We have no wish to restrict our oil exports to the United States in any way, but America's complete support of Israel and stance against the Arabs make it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United States with oil, or even to remain friends with the United States".<sup>140</sup> The King himself met with Aramco executives and American oil men and told them that the United States should do something to change the direction of events taking place in the Middle East. The King told the oil men "Time is running out with respect to U.S. interests in Middle East, Saudi Arabia is in danger of being isolated among its Arab friends, because of the failure of the U.S. government to give Saudi Arabia positive support".<sup>141</sup> "You will lose everything" the King went on further.<sup>142</sup>

A week later, the Aramco executives were in Washington, at the White House and the Defense and State Departments. They requested urgent action.<sup>143</sup> Three of the companies - Texaco, Chevron and Mobil - all publicly asked for a balanced policy in the Middle East.<sup>144</sup> Even though, there were special and long-term ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia became dismayed by the American policy in the Middle East and seriously considered the imposition of restraints on its oil production.<sup>145</sup> Apparently, Saudi Arabia wanted to use oil as a weapon in the summer of 1973, to bring pressure on the United States to temper its policy in the Middle East.<sup>146</sup>

The preceding spring, there had been some worry in Washington about the possibility of warfare.<sup>147</sup> In late September, the National Security Agency reported that military signals suggested that war might be imminent in the Middle East.<sup>148</sup> The Soviets suddenly airlifted dependants out of Egypt and Syria.<sup>149</sup> On October 6, 1973, the Arab-Israeli war began when Syrian aircraft launched an attack on Israel's northern border and Egyptian guns opened fire along the entire front.<sup>150</sup> The war was the most intense of the Arab-Israeli wars. Arms and equipment on both sides had been supplied by the superpowers.<sup>151</sup> One of the most powerful weapons was unique to the Middle East. It was the oil weapon. In the words of the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, this weapon "Altered irrevocably the world as it had grown up in the post-war period".<sup>152</sup> The Israelis viewed Saudi oil power as potentially a greater threat than the combined capability of all the Arab armed forces.<sup>153</sup>

The Soviet Union began long-range redelivery of arms to Syria and Egypt.<sup>154</sup> The United States realised that the Israeli troops were in trouble and Israel could lose the war without resupply.<sup>155</sup> On October 19, 1973, President Nixon asked Congress to supply Israel with \$2.2 billion in military assistance.<sup>156</sup>

King Faisal was unwilling to take any action against the United States without greater contact with Washington. For this reason, he sent a letter to Nixon on October 16, warning that if American support for Israel continued, Saudi-American relations would become only lukewarm.<sup>157</sup> On October 17, four Arab Foreign Ministers led by the Saudi, Omar Saggaf, met Kissinger and Nixon.<sup>158</sup> Nixon had promised to try hard for a workable cease-fire within the structure of resolution 242, the United Nations resolution that would return Israel to its 1967 borders.<sup>159</sup> After the meeting, Kissinger told his staff that he was surprised that there had been no reference to the oil, and that it was unlikely that Arabs would use their oil weapon.<sup>160</sup> But in response to Nixon's proposal of a \$2.2 billion military aid package to Israel, Radio Riyadh announced on October 18, 1973, that King Faisal's decision to reduce oil production by 10 per cent.<sup>161</sup> The King later imposed a total embargo on the U.S. and reduced oil production by 26 per cent.<sup>162</sup> On October 20, Saudi Arabia cut off all shipments of oil to the United States until the Arab objectives were met.<sup>163</sup> The 1973 October war sparked a new development in the oil market. For the first time, oil was used as a political weapon. This embargo was an economic weapon used by the Arab oil producing states, to use oil against Israel.

The potentially dramatic effect of the oil embargo can be seen by the following statistics. In the fall, of 1973, the Arab countries were producing 19.1 million barrels of oil a day.<sup>164</sup> The United States consumed 17.2 million barrels a day, of which 1.8 million barrels a day or more than 10 per cent of its total consumption was imported from the Arab countries.<sup>165</sup> In Europe and Japan the situation was different. Western Europe received 65 per cent of its oil from Arab countries; Japan received 50 per cent of its oil needs from Arab countries.<sup>166</sup>

On October 22, 1973, a U.N. resolution called for a cease-fire that was acceptable to all parties.<sup>167</sup> However, Israel continued to attack the Egyptian Third Army, which was isolated in the Sinai. The Soviet Union would not allow the Third Army

to be destroyed.<sup>168</sup> The Soviet Union asked for joint American - Soviet action to separate the two sides.<sup>169</sup> The Soviet Union demanded American co-operation and stated that the Soviet Union would not intervene unilaterally.<sup>170</sup> The Soviet's threatened involvement was taken very seriously by the Americans.<sup>171</sup> It was known to the United States that Soviet forces were on the alert. On October 25, American military forces were put on a higher state of alert.<sup>172</sup> The Soviet Union and the United States were squaring off against each other.<sup>173</sup> Miscalculations could lead to a nuclear confrontation.<sup>174</sup> But the following day, the war was stopped and the representatives of both sides, the Egyptian and Israeli military, met for direct talks for the first time in a quarter of a century.<sup>175</sup> The victory of Egyptian and Syrian forces did much to remove the memory of the Arab's 1967 defeat.

While Secretary of State, Kissinger, was arranging an agreement between Egypt and Israel, he stopped in Riyadh on November 8, 1973, to meet with King Faisal.<sup>176</sup> Kissinger called on Faisal to remove the embargo, but King Faisal refused until he saw the beginning of actual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and that the national rights of the Palestinians were restored.<sup>177</sup>

On December 25, 1973, the Arab producers cancelled the scheduled 5 per cent reduction for January and pledged a 10 per cent increase in production.<sup>178</sup> The day before, the Gulf producers, including Iran, increased the oil price to \$11.65 per barrel starting on January 1, 1974.<sup>179</sup>

On January 7, 1974, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement mediated by Kissinger, that Israel would withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, and started an approach to peace.<sup>180</sup> The Syrian - Israeli agreement was completed in May, after Kissinger had mediated a settlement of introductory issues between both sides on February 27, 1974.<sup>181</sup> The Arab producers officially announced at a meeting in Vienna on March 18, that the oil embargo had been lifted.<sup>182</sup>

In fact, the international energy situation started to change quickly in the early 1970s. The combination of the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, and especially, in 1973, had a historical effect on the Saudi relationship with the United States.<sup>183</sup> For practically the first time, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia found themselves on opposite sides of a major international crisis.<sup>184</sup> For the U.S., the emergence of Saudi Arabia

as a major oil power in 1973, increased the importance of pursuing a special relationship.<sup>185</sup> After the October 1973 war and the oil embargo, the U.S. started to consider Saudi Arabia's crucial role in the Middle East.<sup>186</sup> The design of the U.S.-Saudi Economic Joint Commission in 1974, was expressive in itself (see chapter 2). The Economic Joint Commission sought to perform set goals that were in the interest of both countries rather than the more classical agreement of previous years when the U.S. had seen those who accepted its technology as clients.<sup>187</sup>

The Saudis also desired a special relationship, to alleviate their concern over their security. The two biggest external threats were communism and Zionism.<sup>188</sup> Communism was observed as an ideology that threatened the Muslim world, and Zionism as a threat in the midst of the Arab world.<sup>189</sup> The Saudis believed that the U.S. was the only country that could contain Soviet-supported and inspired radical expansionism; and could force Israel into peace settlement.<sup>190</sup>

### **Post-oil embargo relations**

#### **1974 - 1975**

The October war forced the United States to confront a new reality in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia felt that the United States was working for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied land and Saudi Arabia returned to its pre-1973 production of 7,334 million barrels a day, promising to meet America's oil needs.<sup>191</sup>

The Saudi-American relationship after the oil embargo transformed itself greatly, both in character and in the warmth of their relations. The earlier relationship gave way to a more complex relationship of interdependence, and involved shared as well as diverse interests between them. There was, therefore, a potential for antagonist bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism as well as co-operation.<sup>192</sup> The United States wanted Saudi co-operation with the supply of oil and the recycling of petrodollars.<sup>193</sup> The Saudis also turned to the United States for continuing assistance on security and the development of the country.<sup>194</sup>

On April 5, 1974, a few days after the lifting of the oil embargo, both governments held talks to enlarge economic and military relations.<sup>195</sup> On April 14, Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz, President of the National Guard, and U.S. Ambassador,

James Akins, signed an introductory agreement on a project to modernise the National Guard, at a cost of \$335 million.<sup>196</sup> The American Defense Department mission was in Saudi Arabia from April until June 1974, to study Saudi defence needs in order to make recommendations.<sup>197</sup>

Before President Nixon was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia, Saudi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Fahd Ibn Abdulaziz, (the present King) visited Washington on June 6, and on June 8, signed a wide-ranging agreement for American-Saudi military and economic co-operation.<sup>198</sup> The accord provided for the establishment of the Joint Economic Co-operation Commission and Joint Security Co-operation Commission.<sup>199</sup> As part of the initiative, the United States sold various squadrons of F-5E and F-5F jet fighters in a \$756 million package deal to Saudi Arabia, in exchange for Saudi co-operation in meeting the energy needs of the United States and its Western allies.<sup>200</sup> The agreement was signed from America by Secretary of State Kissinger and he described the agreement as "A milestone in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Arab countries in general".<sup>201</sup>

On June 14, and 15, 1974, President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia and said to King Faisal that "Our friendship now develops into an active partnership".<sup>202</sup> As part of this new partnership programme, the president promised to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia. The President said, "If Saudi Arabia is strong and secure ... it will enhance the chances for peace".<sup>203</sup>

The soaring price of oil remained a source of conflict between Saudi Arabia and the United States.<sup>204</sup> Saudi Arabia, who had initiated the oil embargo, now pressed other OPEC members to lower their oil prices.<sup>205</sup> King Faisal decided on September 9, 1974, to reduce oil prices.<sup>206</sup> But the decision was opposed by some Arab oil producers and Iran. President Ford stated on September 23, 1974, that "Continued high oil prices involved the risk of a world depression and breakdown of world order and safety".<sup>207</sup> Secretary of State, Kissinger, stated that the United States might be forced to change its policies of assisting the producers diversify their economies and channel their resources.<sup>208</sup> He also stated that they could not rule out completely the use of military force against oil producing countries if faced with "Some actual strangulation of the industrialized world".<sup>209</sup>

King Faisal was interviewed by Newsweek's Arnand de Borchgrave in September 1974: "We do not want to do anything that will hurt Americans. But if our new special relationship is to remain viable, the U.S. must not do anything that will hurt the Arab World".<sup>210</sup> King Faisal told Kissinger in Riyadh, that Saudi Arabia would continue the effort to push down the price of oil in concert with other petroleum exporting nations. King Faisal was worried that a world-wide depression might hurt American and Western economies, and which would improve the relative position of the largely oil self-sufficient communist nations. The Soviet Union welcomed the oil price increase.<sup>211</sup> On December 13, 1974, following Saudi Arabia's initiative, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirate joined Saudi's effort and OPEC reduced the oil price to \$10.12 per barrel for the next nine months, though, this was less than the reduction sought by the United States.<sup>212</sup> King Faisal even wrote a personal letter to the Shah of Iran to join Saudi Arabia in lowering oil prices, but the Shah refused.<sup>213</sup>

Thus, the United States signed a \$750 million contract with Saudi Arabia for the sale of 60F - 5E/F fighters.<sup>214</sup> On February 9, 1975, Vinnell Corporation of Los Angeles, made a contract worth about \$77 million that would employ 1,000 Vietnam War Veterans to train Saudi National Guard Forces.<sup>215</sup> In the same year, the United States concluded with Saudi Arabia military agreements estimated at \$1,993 million, more than with any other country except Iran.<sup>216</sup>

Saudi and U.S. interests recognised their mutual desire for a peace settlement.<sup>217</sup> U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in a spirit of friendship, kept the Saudis informed of the U.S. diplomatic contacts with Tel Aviv, Cairo and Damascus.<sup>218</sup> King Faisal set out to build a strong Arab opinion for peace. He believed that by agreeing with the Arabs, the front line states would enter a peace settlement and obtain recognition of Palestinian rights.<sup>219</sup> Kissinger had visited King Faisal on February 15, 1975, to discuss a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. This was to be his last meeting with King Faisal before the king was assassinated in March 1975.<sup>220</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi relations, 1975-1979**

After King Faisal was assassinated, King Khalid was pronounced King and Fahd (the present King) was pronounced Crown Prince. King Khalid delegated much of



his authority to Crown Prince Fahd, the acting Prime Minister, but the final authority remained in the hands of the King. Prince Fahd like King Faisal felt confident to pursue a special relationship with the United States.<sup>221</sup> Oil supply and the Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli negotiations, became significant concerns of Prince Fahd's government after the death of King Faisal.

With American help, the Saudis built up their defence capabilities through the construction of extensive military infrastructures, (which the United States used in 1990 during the Gulf crisis), the importation of weapons and the training of Saudi personnel. In 1976, the United States Army Corps of Engineers was contracted to plan and design military construction projects valued at about \$20 billion. U.S. technology had assisted in making the Saudi industrial revolution possible. Saudi Arabia's trade with the U.S. grew from \$2.6 billion in 1974 to \$8.6 billion in 1976, to \$10.2 billion in 1978.

Replacing the past client relationship, new roles and responsibilities were assumed by the Kingdom as a consequence of the transformation of its financial and strategic position. A situation full of possibilities for both antagonism and co-operation was generated.<sup>222</sup> The Saudis in the early 1970s, had stayed comparatively aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The October 1973 war brought the Saudis directly into the arena as they took the lead in the oil embargo. After that, the Saudis remained on the sidelines of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy". The Saudi aim was to sustain the peace process initiated by the United States.<sup>223</sup>

During the early months of the Carter administration, the Saudis were consulted and informed of the policy of working for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.<sup>224</sup> Crown Prince Fahd visited the United States in late May 1977. He discussed two major issues with President Carter: the supply of oil to the West and its price, and American policy towards a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>225</sup>

A serious setback to Prince Fahd's policy occurred when Sadat declared he would visit Jerusalem to discuss Middle East peace with Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. The Americans requested that the Saudis support Sadat's peace initiative.<sup>226</sup> The Crown Prince dissociated himself from Sadat's peace initiative and reduced the profile of Saudi relations with the United States. The Saudis saw a separate peace with Egypt as a ploy by Israel to split the Arab world and to deny

to the Arabs Egyptian military support, potentially the only significant military threat to Israel.<sup>227</sup>

However, they feared that under U.S. pressure and faced with Israel, Sadat would settle merely for the return of the Sinai. In the meantime American-Saudi relations worsened again and the Saudi order to buy sixty F-15 jet fighters was delayed.<sup>228</sup> Up to that time, the Carter administration had been committed to decreasing arms sales to non-allies, but Congress finally approved the sale in May 1978, in order to get political credit with Saudi Arabia.<sup>229</sup>

The Camp David Accords, signed on September, 17, 1978, confirmed the Saudi's worst fears.<sup>230</sup> Two unrelated agreements appeared: one dealt in detail with the Sinai. The other one dealt in generalities with the Palestinian question concerning a vaguely defined "autonomy" for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, not Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.<sup>231</sup>

It was commonly known that the Saudis expressed their disappointment in private and that they were caught between their friendship with Washington and their Arab commitments. Before the Arab summit meeting scheduled for Baghdad in November 1978, which was to discuss Camp David, the Americans expressed their desire to the Saudis that the Saudis prevent a denunciation of Sadat or the accords. These matters were sure to be raised at the meeting.<sup>232</sup> The Carter administration wanted Riyadh to support Camp David and use its influence to bring Jordan and the Palestinians into the peace process.<sup>233</sup> In fact, Dr Ghazi Algosaibi has confirmed that at this stage the Americans were very insistent that Saudi Arabia would accept the Camp David results, which was an initial step towards gaining a favourable response from the rest of the Arab states. For instance, on September 22-24, 1978, Secretary of State, Vance, visited Riyadh to seek Saudi support for the agreements.<sup>234</sup>

American officials were angry at the Saudis, when the consequences of the Baghdad summit became known.<sup>235</sup> The Baghdad summit condemned the accords and its architects, Presidents Carter and Sadat.<sup>236</sup> In their defence, the Saudis argued that the results of the Baghdad summit would have been much worse without Saudi influence and they could moderate but not oppose the Arab condemnation of the Camp David Accords.<sup>237</sup>

U.S. - Saudi relations went through a rough period between the Baghdad summit in November 1978, and the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in March 1979. This happened at the same time as the departure of the Shah from Iran on January 23, 1979, and the final collapse of his regime in February.<sup>238</sup> The Saudis believed that the United States would give help to the Shah. But President Carter shattered these hopes when he publicly stated his view that it might be too late for the Shah's regime. He then denied any American intention to interfere in the country's politics.<sup>239</sup> As the Saudis watched the United States do little to rescue the Shah, doubts were raised in Saudi minds about the value of their American connection.<sup>240</sup> In an effort to improve relations during this rough period, the United States invited Crown Prince Fahd to Washington.<sup>241</sup> The timing of the visit coincided with the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement on March 26, 1979, but Prince Fahd changed his mind about the visit, not wanting it to seem as an expression support for the agreement.<sup>242</sup> Thus, the U.S. - Saudi "special relationship" was in confusion.

The Camp David agreements were seen by the Saudis as not taking into account Saudi fundamental interests in the status of Jerusalem. Because of its status as a Guardian of Islam, the Saudi government could not afford to be seen by Arabs and Muslims to abandon the objective of restoring the third holiest shrine in Islam to Arab sovereignty. The Saudis contended that the Camp David framework was insufficiently specific with respect to such basic Arab positions as the complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian self-determination.

Saudi Arabia was also alarmed by developments further afield. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was very concerned with the communist threat to the Middle East. The collapse of the Shah's regime in 1979, increased the importance of U.S.- Saudi political relations as it concerned Saudi security. When the Shah's regime appeared to be losing control, on January 10, 1979, the U.S. announced that it would send F-15s to visit to Saudi Arabia.<sup>243</sup> The Saudis were looking for U.S. help and so they co-operated with the Americans on the subject of oil supply.<sup>244</sup> As Iranian oil production decreased, because of the destabilisation caused by the revolution, the Saudis increased their production

from 7.2 mbd in August, 1979, to 10.3 mbd in November and to 10.4 mbd in December.<sup>245</sup>

Saudi-American relations during this period, indicate displeasure with each other's policies and yet it was a time when co-operation was needed more than at any other time. President Carter announced on January 26, that Crown Prince Fahd would visit the United States on March 1. On February 10, Harold Brown, Defense Secretary of the U.S. came to Saudi Arabia to introduce American plans for security co-operation including American's creation of the Rapid Deployment Force and Fahd's arranged visit to Washington (see Chapter 3). The visit coincided with Khomeini's return to Iran. But Fahd's visit to Washington was postponed to give the two countries more time to make an inclusive study of the issues surrounding mutual co-operation. On March 5, 1979, President Carter allowed the sale of F-15s, this time armed and equipped, and two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to help monitor and defend Saudi airspace, especially in the area near the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) because of its strong ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>246</sup> The American moves were sought to influence the Saudis by showing its readiness to protect their security.<sup>247</sup>

The American moves were not only to show willingness to help the Saudis to protect their security, but also to get credit with the Saudis so that they would support the Egyptian-Israeli peace.<sup>248</sup> President Carter made a diplomatic shuttle between Egypt and Israel to reach an agreement on terms of a peace treaty.<sup>249</sup> On March 17 and 18, 1979, National Security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Riyadh to obtain the Saudi's support for the treaty or at least to test Saudi and Arab reactions.<sup>250</sup> The Saudis expressed to Brzezinski that they would not support damaging sanctions against Egypt if it signed the peace treaty with Israel.<sup>251</sup> The New York Times commented that the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed to keep their sharp differences over the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty from interfering with their close relations in other fields.

In July 1979, after the Saudi decision to increase oil production, the Carter administration increased indirect communications with the PLO with a view to getting agreement on a formula to amend resolution 242 and then open the road for the PLO to take part in the peace process.<sup>252</sup> In the previous June, Crown Prince Fahd had urged the United States to begin an immediate discussion with

the PLO. That discussion could guide the PLO to accept resolution 242, formally admit Israel's right to exist, and then open the track to peace talks on a broader basis than that provided by the Camp David agreements.<sup>255</sup> Prince Fahd added that, if Israel withdrew from the occupied lands and returned to its pre-1967 border, Saudi Arabia itself would be prepared to make peace with it.<sup>254</sup> But the American initiative was defeated by the combined Arab opposition and from the PLO itself. The spokesman of the Palestinian Central Council refused to accept any U.N. resolution that did not recognise the Palestinians' right to an independent state.<sup>255</sup>

In an interview published in the Washington Post on May 27, 1980, Crown Prince Fahd declared that:

We are trying to portray Saudi Arabia as a supporter of the negotiations of the current peace process or as if it were prepared to propose its own disguised initiatives in this matter. What is certain is that the attitude of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Middle East problem and the issue of Palestine is firm, clear and known. It derives from the Arab's unanimous attitude that the issue of Palestine is the core of the Middle East problem, and that a just and comprehensive solution can not be achieved unless Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including, first and foremost, Holy Jerusalem, to the Palestinian people's legitimate right to return and to self-determination, including the setting up of an independent state of their territory. In all this, Saudi Arabia pursues a unanimous Arab attitude, to which it is committed and which it supports.

The signing of the Camp David agreements made the U.S. place a massive premium on Saudi support.<sup>256</sup> The Saudis could not expect to preserve their lines of communication to both Egypt and Syria, as they had when Sadat made his connection with Sinai II.<sup>257</sup> What worried the Saudis most was that the Syrians and the Palestinians, left only with a military option for recovering Israeli-occupied territories, would become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union.<sup>258</sup> In addition, they could not show indifference to the Palestinian cause without being accused of collaborating with Israel's allies.<sup>259</sup> Furthermore, the troubles of the Shah's regime and the unsettled conditions in the Yemens made the American strategic connection more necessary.<sup>260</sup>

### U.S. - Saudi relations in the 1980s

When the war started between Iraq and Iran in 1980, Saudi Arabia received an American military presence. To this degree, Americans and Saudi relations

appeared to be cordial, despite their differences on the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. The American military supplies made Saudi Arabia a powerful balance to Iraq and Iran in regional defence matters. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the Soviet ties with South Yemen (PDY) provided threats to both American and Saudi interests. These factors made strategic co-operation between the two countries most important.

Relating to the events in the Middle East, the Saudis felt that it was vital to the United States and Saudi Arabia to co-operate on mutual political and economic interests as well as security interests. While Saudi Arabia looked to the United States for assistance in performing its domestic and foreign policy goals, the Saudi leadership felt that the United States had not been forceful enough with Israel to promote a resolution of the conflict. Therefore, Crown Prince Fahd began indicating, on August 7, 1981, how the co-operation should be consummated by announcing an eight-part plan for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. (see Arab-Israeli conflict until the 1990 Gulf crisis)

Prince Fahd stated that the plan was negotiable and was an alternative to the Camp David accords, which had reached a dead end.<sup>261</sup> On October 5, 1981, in an interview on Saudi radio, Prince Fahd stated that Saudi Arabia took his plan to be an Arab proposal based on U.N. resolutions and that the United States had responded favourably to the plan. He also stated that Saudi Arabia relied on American support to make the plan successful.<sup>262</sup>

The most controversial item was number seven, "affirmation of all states in the region to live in peace", which recognised the reality of Israel's existence. Israel and its supporters questioned why the Saudis refused to consider the recognition question explicitly. The Prime Minister of Israel denounced it as an attempt "to liquidate Israel in stages" and castigated the U.S. for its cautious interest in the Fahd plan. In a letter to President Reagan on October 30, Begin condemned the whole Fahd plan and warned that any U.S. expressions of interest in it would be seen by the Arabs as a weakening of U.S. support for the Camp David agreements, making it harder for Israel and Egypt to agree on Palestinian autonomy.<sup>263</sup>

The U.S. was caught in the middle. The Saudis had clearly lost hope that the Americans would put enough pressure on Israel for it to make the necessary

concessions for a settlement and had thus decided to seek a peace initiative on their own. Although, Washington remained committed to the Camp David Agreements, they did not want to discourage the Saudis completely. On October 29, 1981, President Reagan stated that the most significant point of the plan was the implicit Saudi recognition of the existence of "Israel as a nation to be negotiated with".<sup>264</sup> The same day, Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, remarked that there were some points of the plan which the U.S. found encouraging. On October 30, 1981, the State Department reflected the mixed feelings of the U.S. expressing that while it welcomed some aspect of the Fahd plan, "certain other points in the plan were better left to negotiations".<sup>265</sup>

Difficulties in the political relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were exacerbated by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 6, 1982. The Lebanese crisis occupied Middle East security and political life, so that little consideration could be given to the final settlement of the conflict.<sup>266</sup> Israel invaded Lebanon with the purpose of excluding the PLO as a political force, to install a friendly regime in Beirut and to smash Saudi Arabia's peace proposals of 1981 which was supported partly by the U.S.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon did have the effect of persuading the U.S. for the first time, to be more specific in its attitude to an overall Arab-Israeli settlement. On September 1, 1982, President Reagan stated that the U.S. had always sought to play the role of a mediator. He said "That some clearer sense of America's position on key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process". Reagan reasserted U.S. support for the five-year transition period outlined in the Camp David accords, "during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs". Also, he said, "The U.S. will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in those talks".<sup>267</sup>

President Reagan said that the U.S. would support neither the Israeli annexation nor the permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza nor a Palestinian state. "But it is the firm view of the U.S. that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a

durable, just and lasting peace". President Reagan also called for an undivided Jerusalem, the governance of which should be determined by negotiation. The Reagan plan was immediately rejected by Israeli Prime Minister, Begin, and was then rejected by the Knesset on September 8, 1982.<sup>268</sup>

Saudi Arabia had long been involved diplomatically in Lebanon. Saudi involvement in Lebanon brought Riyadh into conflict with all the parties involved in the peace process. Saudi anger with the PLO, the Lebanese, and the Syrians, however, did not neutralize its frustration with the United States. Frustrations increased when Israeli Prime Minister, Shamir, visited the U.S. in December 1983. U.S. policy changed from an effort to play a mediator's role to one of confrontation with Syria and closer support for Israel. Thus, the Saudis made their declaration to turn to the French for a \$4.5 billion purchase of air defence missiles, which was announced in January 1984. This was, at least in part, a message to the U.S. to change its policy towards Israel.<sup>269</sup>

While the Fez proposal (the Fahd plan) and the Reagan plan remained on the table, King Fahd urged President Reagan to make a new effort to bring peace to the Middle East by exerting pressure on Israel to compromise over the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia hoped that President Reagan's re-election date might give his administration more leverage. So, Saudi Arabia pressed for American recognition of Palestinian demands for self-determination.<sup>270</sup>

Therefore, King Fahd scheduled a visit to Washington to test the willingness of President Reagan to become more deeply involved in the drive for peace in the Middle East. Preparing for the visit, King Fahd met Yasser Arafat, and sent senior envoys to Syria, Jordan and other key Arab countries.<sup>271</sup>

King Fahd arrived in the U.S. on February 10, 1985. He told President Reagan upon his arrival at the White House that the Palestinian question was the single problem of paramount concern to the whole Arab nation and that it affected the relations of its people and states with the outside world.<sup>272</sup>

President Reagan responded to the King's concern by indicating that the U.S. would not push for a specific peace formula - even his own - before the Israelis and Arabs had entered direct negotiations based on the U.N. resolution 242, which



called for Arab recognition of Israel sovereignty in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories.<sup>273</sup>

In the final days of the Reagan presidency, Secretary of State, George Shultz tried but failed to get a two-stage negotiation going, based on interim self-rule for the Palestinians and an end to Israeli military occupation. President Bush appointed James Baker to succeed Shultz as Secretary of State. Baker attempted to clarify matters and started a U.S.-PLO dialogue, but the peace process was broken off many times. Israel's government was at odds with itself regarding who should make up the Palestinian delegation. The Palestinians themselves were split by a nationalist struggle. However, the peace process was totally broken off as a consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the PLO 's ambivalent position on the invasion.<sup>274</sup> (see Chapter Five).

The primary Saudi political need from the U.S. was to effect a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. Realistically, at that time, Saudi Arabia did not have much hope that the U.S. had the will to compel Israel into a just peace. It could be expected to accept whatever the parties agreed upon.<sup>275</sup> In the words of Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, the Saudi position, "Is based on the right of the Palestinians themselves to determine whether they want an independent state or an entity with links to another country, or another solution".<sup>276</sup>

William B. Quandt, the former National Security Council official in charge of the Middle East, stated "The Saudis very much want to be out of the position of being under pressure from the Arabs to use oil as a political weapon and under pressure from us not to do so. The only way out, as they see it, is for the Palestinian issue to be on its way to a resolution, even though they seem to be fairly realistic about how long that may take. What they can not tolerate over any long period of time is the impression that the U.S. has given up entirely on this issue. So some degree of credible movement toward a solution of that issue is important to them, at least as they see regional politics today".<sup>277</sup>

Saudi Arabia opposed the Camp David accords on the grounds that they made no proviso either for Palestinian sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza, or for the creation of a peace settlement that would support Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese

stability. Saudi Arabia has consistently pursued its own peace strategy ever since. It took a leading role in trying to bring peace to Lebanon after the Israeli invasion of June 1982, and operated closely with the U.S. when it was trying to reach a joint arrangement with Israel and Syria. It supported the agreement that the U.S. worked out between Israel and Lebanon in the Spring of 1983.<sup>278</sup>

Saudi Arabia supported President Reagan's peace proposal in September 1982. It supported the call for peace negotiations at the subsequent Arab summit meeting at Fez. However, Saudi Arabia disagreed with some aspects of the U.S. policy towards a peace settlement with Israel. Saudi Arabia could not formally connect itself to King Hussein's new peace initiative in 1985, because of the risk of triggering new radical pressure from Syria and from radical Palestinian elements in the Gulf.<sup>279</sup>

More generally, Saudi Arabia supported U.N. resolutions that recognised Israel's right to exist and the need for Arab peace negotiations with Israel. However, its objections to U.N. resolution 242 was that it treated the Palestinians exclusively as a "refugee problem" and not with its call for peace for all nations in the region.<sup>280</sup>

Aside from that security contacts between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were accelerated in 1981. The United States and Saudi Arabia consulted each other over other security matters, including the Afghan's war against the Soviet Union. Even though, the United States had had no direct involvement in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), since its creation in 1981, it recommended Saudi Arabia and the other members to expand security co-operation in response to the threats from the Iran-Iraq war, and Soviet presence in South Yemen.

In 1981, when Saudi Arabia requested that the United States sell it arms including AWACS, the developing "special relationship" between Saudi Arabia and the United States was described in a report prepared for the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs as follows:

The United States and Saudi Arabia have established a special relationship, which had its genesis in the major role of U.S. companies in the development of Saudi petroleum resources in the 1930s. More recently, the relationship has been fostered by government to government assistance and co-operation. It has become apparent that officials in the governments of both countries consider that the preservation and

enhancement of this relationship could provide a basis for resolving political, security, economic, and energy issues facing the United States and Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. perspective, decisions on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government potentially affect the U.S. balance of payments, the future of the dollar, the U.S. and world energy equation, the rate of world economic recovery, U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, and the objective of an overall resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>281</sup>

The deteriorating situation in the Gulf (caused by the Iran-Iraq war), made the Saudis concerned that the fighting would increase and eventually involve them. The Saudis sought American assistance in establishing a Gulf arms industry from Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who was visiting Saudi Arabia on February 5, 1982. This would help them develop the defence capabilities of the GCC.

At a press conference, President Reagan commented "There is no way that we could stand by and see Saudi Arabia taken over by anyone that would shut off the oil".<sup>282</sup> The United States made it clear to both Iran and Iraq that they must keep their fighting out of the Gulf countries and that the open flow of oil from the Gulf is very important to the whole international community and U.S. commitment to freedom of commerce and navigation in the international waters of the Gulf. Subsequent press conferences and interviews with administration officials made evident the Reagan administration's commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia, a pledge that became known as the Reagan corollary, to the Carter doctrine.<sup>283</sup> In the midst of the developments, King Khaled died (June 13, 1982) and Crown Prince Fahd was declared King.

In the meanwhile, the Iran-Iraq war began to intensify and there were strikes against the shipping of the Gulf Arab states. This development soon began to have an impact on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's shipping became the target of Iran's "retaliatory" attacks in May and July 1984. Iran asserted that Saudi Arabia was providing financial aid to Iraq.<sup>284</sup> The United States responded to the spillover of the war into the Persian Gulf and supported a United Nations Security Council resolution (552) condemning Iranian attacks on ships on June 1, 1984.<sup>285</sup>

Saudi Arabia rejected the presence of any superpower in the Persian Gulf, thus, avoiding confrontations with its neighbors. However, Saudi Arabia asked America to maintain a strong presence, over-the-horizon, in case of an emergency.<sup>286</sup> As a

result, Riyadh made some requests to United States to purchase arms to expand its defence capabilities.<sup>287</sup>

In July 1985, President Reagan's letter came, the President was against the sale because of pressure from Senior Republican members of the Senate, including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.<sup>288</sup> They were worried that any major sale to an Arab state would lead to a major fight with every supporter of Israel.<sup>289</sup>

Thus, the Saudi government started negotiating for alternative arms suppliers in July 1985, when the Saudis were confident that they would never get full U.S. support.<sup>290</sup> It was believed that a Saudi shift to another arms supplier would reduce the U.S.' ability to use Saudi facilities both politically and militarily.<sup>291</sup> Britain and France were the two major recipients of Saudi contracts for arms.

Saudi Arabia even sought supplies from further afield. The Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. visited Beijing and made a deal to purchase missiles in 1986.<sup>292</sup> In July 1987, Saudi Arabia bought missiles from the People's Republic of China (PRC). This was in response to the possible threat of Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia becoming steadily more real and to a desire to assert Saudi independence and decrease dependence on a single supplier.<sup>293</sup>

The crisis in U.S. and Saudi military relations was accompanied by the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war. 1986 was a critical year in the Gulf. As a result of the oil glut of the early and mid-1980s, Saudi oil revenues declined from 108 billion dollars in 1982 to 17.8 billion dollars in 1987. The Americans, at the same time, required high prices to defend their own oil industry. There then came the surprise Saudi-Iranian agreement on low production in August-September 1986, and the gradual rise to the eighteen-to-twenty dollar per barrel rate of 1987.<sup>294</sup> It became essential for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states to end the war as soon as possible.

The U.S. was less concerned to see the immediate ending of the Iran - Iraq war. Its main policy concern was with the GCC states. This policy represented the backbone of U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf region. The GCC states were major oil producers, and their oil production legitimised their extended and

advantageous dealings with private American businesses, including defence, oil and construction firms. The Reagan administration decided to safeguard the flow of oil by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers. Later, Washington was shocked to know that the Kuwaitis had asked Russia for protection against Iranian attacks. Moscow's involvement would have spread Soviet influence in the Gulf, something the Americans had prevented for more than four decades, and the British for no less than 165 years. That was part of the twin tracks of American policy. The second track was diplomatic. On June 30, 1987, the United States called on the United Nations to take action to force Iran and Iraq to agree to a cease-fire.<sup>296</sup> On July 20, the U.N. Security Council issued resolution 598 demanding that Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries without delay.<sup>296</sup>

The Reagan administration decided to accelerate the military build-up in the region. On August 21, 1987, the United States established a new command - Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME).<sup>297</sup> The Reagan administration also worked to get international support for the lately gained American role in the Persian Gulf.<sup>298</sup> Actually, all of the Gulf Arab states granted the United States temporary support. By the end of 1987, most Allied Ships (United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, France and West Germany) operated in the Gulf.<sup>299</sup> The capability to mobilise such international support could force Iraq and Iran to end the war.<sup>300</sup>

Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia deteriorated at the beginning of 1988, as a consequence of the U.S.' special relationship with Israel, (by allowing Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, to attack arms sales to Saudi Arabia in a speech on September 24, 1987) and the American refusal to sell Saudi Arabia additional F-15s and other sophisticated weapons.<sup>301</sup> Washington, at the same time, was angry about Saudi Arabia's purchase of missiles from China without consulting the U.S.

On another front, the presence of American ships in the Gulf led to a major confrontation with Iran. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. Navy cruiser Vincennes, engaged in an exchange with Iranian warships, mistakenly shot down an Iranian commercial airline believing it was a war plane and killed 290 passengers.<sup>302</sup> To the Iranian leadership, it was not a mistake, it was a sign that the United States

was preparing to engage with Iran in a military confrontation to destroy the regime in Tehran.<sup>303</sup>

Iran could no longer afford to go against the United States.<sup>304</sup> Tehran informed the United Nation Security General on 18 July, of its willingness to accept a cease-fire.<sup>305</sup> Another four weeks and much negotiation passed before Iraq agreed. Later, President Hussein agreed to the cease-fire.<sup>306</sup> Finally, a cease-fire was declared on August 20, 1988.<sup>307</sup>

Following the resolution of the Iran-Iraq war, the situation in the Gulf returned to normal. Still, co-operation rather than confrontation continued to dominate U.S.-Saudi relations.<sup>308</sup> Washington's quickly growing dependence on imported oil strengthened the U.S. policy of safeguarding the Gulf.<sup>309</sup> Moreover, with urgent need for oil beginning to rise and prices temporarily increasing, it emerged that Saudi Arabia was starting to move out of the sharp recession which had begun in the mid-1980s.

From the Saudi point of view, the problems of the Iran-Iraq war had been replaced by a more complex world in which possible threats to Saudi Arabia could come from several directions. When the Arab Co-operation Council was formed in February 1989, between Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen, Saudi Arabia was not pleased. King Fahd visited Egypt and Iraq and signed a "non-aggression pact" with Iraq. Relations between Tehran and Riyadh slowly improved and Iran was invited to attend an Islamic conference. The Saudis wanted to protect all their flanks. Equally important, King Fahd continued contacts with Washington and the West to obtain more sophisticated weapons.<sup>310</sup> For instance, some French companies which were widely reported in Defence News in June 1990, were involved in rebuilding the Saudi navy involving certain types of missiles and in the same month, Saudi Arabia asked to purchase and upgrade major defence equipment to a total value exceeding \$4 billion from the U.S. This request included orders for AWACS E-3s.<sup>311</sup>

Saudi Arabia decided to enhance its defence forces in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis were increasingly tending the connections with Beijing and Moscow, which had begun in 1990. The Saudis developed their network not only for their supply of arms but also their international ties as well. That has given

the Saudis a new independence of diplomatic initiatives and carries the message to Washington that Saudi political interests should not be ignored. However the United States and Saudi Arabia have had a 50 year-old security relationship. The United States has always continued to be the most supportive power of Saudi Arabia in the face of attacks as was shown during the 1990 Gulf crisis when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

### Summary

To conclude this chapter, it is important to mention that the United States occupies a crucial place in Saudi foreign policy. Certainly, the present Saudi government places a high premium on maintaining friendly relations with the United States as the source of military equipment and advice and as the ultimate guarantor of the Saudi polity against external and internal opposition. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has appeared as the most important foreign source of American petroleum. The vast petroleum reserves in Saudi Arabia have made the United States more dependent upon continued Saudi independence and upon good relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

This fact was reflected in President Reagan's declaration on October 1, 1981, that the United States would not permit Saudi Arabia to fall into the hand of any group, foreign or domestic, that would cut off the flow of Saudi oil to the West. In addition, the United States did not have many options in dealing with the complex mixture of strategic capabilities, and vulnerabilities in the Gulf. The Shah's fall had made Saudi Arabia the only major country with which the United States could build a strategic partnership in the Gulf area.<sup>312</sup> There was no other Gulf state that could sustain a military relationship with the United States without the implicit support of Saudi Arabia.<sup>313</sup>

The revolution in 1979, overthrew the Shah. This changed the strategic equation of the region. The real second pillar of U.S. strategy in the region was Israel, but Israel's political liabilities severely limited its usefulness in the Gulf. The Iranian revolution, coupled with crises such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, and the armed conflict between North and South Yemen, obliged

the United States to invent once again more costly strategies of direct U.S. military intervention. e.g. The Americans sought a base in the Gulf region.

The Carter administration reacted to the Shah's fall and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by attempting to build up new U.S. power projection capabilities that could offset the Soviet advantages in the region.<sup>314</sup> He sought to make a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that could deploy to the Gulf to prevent any Soviet aggression in the region.<sup>315</sup> The Reagan administration thereafter focused more on formal military ties and direct military intervention capabilities. It is significant that the U.S. military that has shown more sensitivity to the fact that it must work informally with its regional allies (see chapter 3).<sup>316</sup>

Although political and economic links between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are important, the most important area in which the United States seeks to enhance its ties to Saudi Arabia is in the military area. However, stronger political and economic links will be equally important. Military relations are a crucial area for U.S. policy. They are an area on which the United States can base its relations with Saudi Arabia on its unique ability to supply goods and services. American commitment to Saudi security will strengthen their political ties with Saudi Arabia, which will advance U.S. interests. The Saudis have helped shift the Arab consensus from the "reductionism" of the 1970s to a search for a "Just settlement" which included the recognition of "the right of all states in the region to live in peace" (outlined in the 1981 King Fahd plan). Saudi Arabia worked to achieve Egypt's return to the Arab ranks while maintaining its ties with Israel. Saudi Arabia played an important part in encouraging the PLO to make statements recognising Israel's right to exist whilst accepting United Nations resolutions 242 and 338.

The Pentagon searched for airfield, port, and support facilities to host a U.S. interventionary forces. Egypt, Oman, and Bahrain allowed U.S. air and naval forces limited use of military facilities. Other bases were more distant. The key was Saudi Arabia itself. The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and Saudi Arabian fears of an expanded war, gave the United States leverage to extract more intimate Saudi collaboration with U.S. military plans. The centrepiece of this effort was the sale of five AWACS planes and a system of bases with stocks of fuel, parts, and munitions. Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst, has argued that "No



conceivable improvement in U.S. aircraft or USAF rapid deployment and bare-basing capability could come close to giving the U.S. this rapid and effective reinforcement capability".<sup>317</sup> An additional advantage was that Saudi Arabia paid for it all.

The Saudi leadership considered that Saudi security presently needed the stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even at the cost of Arab concessions. The connection between the stability in the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli conflict remained as strong as ever. The U.S. continued to maintain the role of being the only mediator in the conflict who could apply pressure on the Israelis to make progress towards an overall settlement. What worried the Saudis most about the lack of progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was the possibility that the Soviets and other radical forces would be able to exploit the situation. The questions of U.S. credibility and Soviet influence in the Arab world would, to some extent, be affected by the positions taken by the United States in continuing the peace negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the stability in the Gulf region. The Reagan administration was worried by the U.S.S.R.'s promise to send Soviet forces to protect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from Iranian attacks. Saudi was contacted in 1987, and the Gulf states suggested that they might be willing to provide the Soviet Union with base rights under special circumstances. The Reagan administration's decision to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers and respond to regional provocation was stimulated by the perception that circumstances had been arranged by an aggressor, close to the Soviet Union.

Studying U.S.-Saudi relations has exposed the continuity that has characterised their relationship. Despite the Arab-Israeli conflict, a major cause of U.S. difficulties as it tried to balance its pledges to Israel with its promises to Saudi Arabia, U.S.-Saudi relations can be characterised as cooperative and tense. In contrast, co-operation to prevent potential military threats in the Gulf has been a vital interest to the United States. Specifically, the security threat made by the Iran-Iraq war has remained the prime motivation for continued close U.S.-Saudi co-operation. Despite this closeness, the United States and Saudi Arabia have both shown ambivalence in their bilateral relations because of Israel.

The two countries engage in increased co-operation despite the increase in tension over the issue of arms sales and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, the Arab-Israeli

conflict lay behind the arms tensions and the oil embargo of 1973. The Arab-Israeli conflict was able to use a certain amount of power against the harmonious relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia by reminding them that it might well be able to turn a dangerous situations against them.

The linkage of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict raised significant concerns in the U.S. about Arab blackmail. The sensitivity of the interdependence involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework: e.g. how quickly does change in one country bring change in another, and how costly are the effects? The way the United States was affected by the increased oil prices in 1973, and 1975.<sup>318</sup> The sensitivity of this economy during these times was a function of the greater costs of foreign oil and the amount of petroleum it imported.<sup>319</sup> The United States and Saudi Arabia shared diverse interests. The manoeuvring between the two sometimes took on an antagonistic character with attempts by both countries to gain the most advantageous terms. Saudi Arabia, for example, while using its central position in OPEC to restrain price increases, used its leverage to get arms and influence U.S. policy towards Israel.<sup>320</sup>

The relationship was also strained by Saudi irritation over the U.S.'s refusal to supply Saudi Arabia with arms. This made it inevitable that Saudi Arabia to turn to other arms suppliers. The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.<sup>321</sup> The Saudis are anxious to demonstrate a degree of independence from the United States in their dealing with other industrialised powers. The Europeans and Japanese have been anxious participants in the Saudi economic boom. In 1978, the European and Japanese share of Saudi imports amounted to nearly 60 per cent of the total, with the U.S. share remaining fairly steady at just over 20 per cent.<sup>322</sup>

European and Japanese competition in the Saudi commercial market explains the Saudi propensity, in the 1980s, to turn to European sources for arms. The French, for example, in 1980, provided tanks for two armoured brigades and some French companies, widely reported in Defence News in June 1990, were involved in rebuilding the Saudi navy and equipping it with certain types of missiles.

The Europeans and Japanese are generally predisposed to adopt a more pro-Arab position on the Palestinian question than Washington. It is not lost on the Saudi leaders that a large arms purchase from France will carry the message to Washington that Saudi political interests should not be ignored. However, the Saudis are specifically interested in American weaponry for several reasons. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a security relationship that is over 50 years old. The Saudis are interested in buying U.S. equipment because America not only produce the best equipment, but also American companies provide the best support and training for the arms buyers. So, Saudi Arabia, on June 5, 1990, requested United States companies to upgrade its major defence equipment. The total value of these sales exceeded \$4 billion, and included the AWACS E-3.<sup>323</sup>

The relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can be characterised by both increase co-operation and conflict as related to the increased interdependence between the countries. The issue which has affected their relationship most is the Arab-Israeli conflict.

## **Chapter Five**

### **The Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991**

During the summer of 1990, the world was still elated over the end of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> The East-West confrontation was over and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed.<sup>2</sup> Oil remained high on the agenda.<sup>3</sup> Some analysts declared in the spring of 1990, that there was no possibility of an oil crisis during the next few years.<sup>4</sup> However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the war which followed, threw the region and much of the world into the most intensive conflict since the latter stages of the World War II.<sup>5</sup> To understand the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, it is important to give an overview of Iraqi historical claims over Kuwait and their border dispute with the country.

#### **Historical overview**

Initially, the borders between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait were ratified and accepted by the three countries under the Al-Uqoir treaty of 1922. However, Iraq laid claim to Kuwait during the 1930s and periodically these claims were restated.<sup>6</sup>

Saddam Hussein's conviction was that many Iraqis believed Kuwait to be an integral part of Iraq, split from it by British imperialism.<sup>7</sup> However, the Al-Sabah family (the rulers) and Kuwait itself could trace their origins back to 1757 when it had been part of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup> This was well before Iraq became a unified political entity in 1920, comprising of the three provinces (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra) which had also been part of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>9</sup> The British-Kuwait agreement, concluded on January 23, 1899, made London responsible for Kuwait's defence and foreign affairs.<sup>10</sup> The Ottoman Sultan pronounced Kuwait part of the province of Basra and nominated the ruler of Kuwait as district officer.<sup>11</sup>

Since Iraq had become an independent state in 1932, Iraq had challenged the right to the sovereign existence of Kuwait.<sup>12</sup> To justify their demands, the Iraqis said that the British had drawn their border with Kuwait to deny the Iraqis access to the Gulf and access to its oil.<sup>13</sup> Kuwait has at least three times the length of coastline, (about 120 miles) than Iraq (about 35 miles). This angered the Iraqis and made them determined to alter this reality.<sup>14</sup> Actually, the border adopted at

the 1922 conference, deprived Kuwait of two-thirds of its previously held territory.<sup>15</sup> In addition, in 1922, experts held that there was no oil in Kuwait.<sup>16</sup>

The same demands were repeated, with greater intensity, by the radical ruler Abdul-Karim Qassem, who in July 1958, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy.<sup>17</sup> When, in June 1961, Kuwait declared its independence, Qassem claimed that Kuwait had always been part of Basra and threatened to take Kuwait by force.<sup>18</sup> The Kuwaitis rapidly asked the British for military support, which arrived on July 1, 1961.<sup>19</sup> Arab support followed in September 1961.<sup>20</sup> The Arab League agreed to a Kuwaiti request for assistance and sent a multinational force including troops from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Sudan.<sup>21</sup> Arab troops remained until February 1963, when Qassem was overthrown by the Ba'ath party, Iraq's current ruling party.<sup>22</sup> The regime recognised Kuwait's independence in October 1963, in return for a large payment from Kuwait to Iraq.<sup>23</sup>

In 1969, Iraq requested Kuwait for permission to station Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti side of their common border.<sup>24</sup> Iraq wanted to protect the Iraqi coastline against a possible attack from Iran.<sup>25</sup> Despite Kuwait's refusal, the Iraqis deployed troops along a narrow strip beside the border and Iraqi troops briefly occupied a Kuwaiti border post in 1973.<sup>26</sup> These troops remained on the Kuwaiti border for nearly a decade against Kuwait's wishes.<sup>27</sup> When Kuwait wanted to reach an agreement to end the situation on its border with Iraq, Iraq made it clear that it would recognise the original borders only if the islands of Warba and Bubiyan (see Map 4) were either included within Iraq or leased to it.<sup>28</sup> In its search for a sea port in the Gulf, Iraq had asked Kuwait in the early 1970s if it could take control of the two islands.<sup>29</sup> These two islands overlook Umm Qasr, one of Iraq's two ports on the Gulf.<sup>30</sup> The Kuwaitis refused the Iraqi requests because they were afraid that by granting the islands to Iraqi control they would encourage Iraqi demands for further territories.<sup>31</sup> If Kuwait's independent presence angered the Iraqis, Kuwait's independent foreign policy and its improved relations with both Iran and Syria, by the end of 1989 annoyed Saddam Hussein even further.<sup>32</sup> The Iraqis asked again for the two islands in February 1989, when the Kuwaiti Crown Prince visited Baghdad in the hope of resolving the border dispute. He had hoped that it would be settled out of gratitude for Kuwait's wartime support, but the Crown Prince perceived that Iraq still demanded the islands.<sup>33</sup>

### **After the Iran-Iraq war**

The eight year long Iran-Iraq war had undermined Iraq's resources. The Iraqi estimate cost of the war was \$208 billion.<sup>34</sup> At this time, Iraq was mainly motivated by regional concerns: Iraq needed oil exports which could be translated into money (power) and deep water access to the Gulf.<sup>35</sup> After Iraq liberated the Faw Peninsula in April 1988, and regained limited access to the Gulf, an Iraqi brigade invaded Bubiyan Island in October 1988.<sup>36</sup> This was achieved without publicity but they were removed just as quietly after Kuwaiti objections.<sup>37</sup> That was the time when Iraq began planning a limited invasion to get control of Kuwait's oil and deep water access to the Gulf.<sup>38</sup>

Iraq apparently emerged from the war against Iran a stronger military power in the region and sought the leadership of the Arab world.<sup>39</sup> The end of the Iran-Iraq war had the effect of increasing Iraq's power and changing the military balance of the Gulf region in favour of the Iraqi regime, due to the GCC assisting Iraq financially and transfer arms.<sup>40</sup> Iraq was well-equipped, and its troops had battle experience. Iraq's armed forces stood at 1.2 million in 1988 with 500 fighter planes and 4,500 tanks. It was the largest force in the Arab world and the fourth largest army in the world.<sup>41</sup>

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's regional and international status was reduced. Regionally, the war had stopped Saddam's aspirations of gaining control over the Gulf.<sup>42</sup> During the war, Iraq had become more reliant politically and economically on Saudi Arabia.<sup>43</sup> Internationally, Iraq failed to hold its leadership of the non-aligned movement.<sup>44</sup> The leadership shifted from Iraq to India.<sup>45</sup>

### **The formation of the Arab Co-operation Council**

The collapse of communism in 1989 ended the Soviet-American Cold War, and Saddam believed that the vacuum left by the Soviet Union's involvement in the region could be filled by Iraq itself, the only country with ambitions to lead the Arab world and a strong military.<sup>46</sup> Iraq became a founder member of the Arab

Co-operation Council (ACC) on February 16, 1989. The ACC was a regional alliance of Iraq, Jordan, Egypt to which North Yemen was added later.<sup>47</sup> In fact, the ACC had been formed late in 1988, but the leaders of ACC stressed that it was an economic grouping.<sup>48</sup>

It was clear that the ACC was to some extent competitive with the Saudi-led GCC.<sup>49</sup> It was also clear that the inclusion of Yemen was a purposeful snub to Saudi Arabia, which regularly left it out of any dealings concerning the Gulf region or the Arabian peninsula.<sup>50</sup> The ACC showed Iraq's new leading regional role and the Egyptian resignation to the status quo.<sup>51</sup>

Saudi Arabia gave the ACC the Kingdom's blessing as long as it did not dabble in military matters.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, Riyadh disliked the sense of being surrounded, geographically, by the members of a grouping to which it did not belong.<sup>53</sup> The general opinion of the GCC members about the ACC was that it was a blend of diverse elements that had no 'raison d'être'.<sup>54</sup> The GCC, for instance, had been established on the basis of geographical unity and similarities in political systems, customs and heritages.<sup>55</sup> Likewise, the Arab Maghreb Union had been created on the basis of a degree of social and geographical proximity.<sup>56</sup> In spite of Saudi Arabia's blessings on the ACC, Saudi Arabia was not pleased with the inclusion of its former regional rivals Iraq and North Yemen, who had a long series of border problems with Saudi Arabia.<sup>57</sup> Iraq and North Yemen were close allies, and the Iraqis would have been able to generate border incidents along the Yemeni border to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.<sup>58</sup>

Actually, the ACC was established without King Fahd being informed.<sup>59</sup> On the day before its establishment was declared, King Hussein of Jordan called on King Fahd in Dhahran, but King Hussein did not even mention the ACC before he went on to Baghdad.<sup>60</sup> On February 25, 1989, Taha Yassin Ramadhan, the first Deputy Premier, went to Saudi Arabia to explain to the King the idea and objectives of the ACC.<sup>61</sup>

On the level of broader regional politics, Iraq had hoped that the ACC would decrease Saudi regional influence, destabilise the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement, and isolate Syria politically.<sup>62</sup> True, Egypt returned to the Arab institutions, after the Arab League summit late in 1987.<sup>63</sup> Saudi-Egyptian

relations soon became close.<sup>64</sup> Syria had been relatively isolated in Arab politics due, in some degree, to its alliance with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. However, the Syrian government was becoming increasingly interested in co-operating with the key Arab states.<sup>65</sup> Syria was getting closer to Saudi Arabia and both countries were working to stop the civil war in Lebanon.<sup>66</sup> The Iraqi leaders tried to weaken the Taif agreement, a Saudi-sponsored peace plan addressed to Lebanese delegates who met in Taif in Saudi Arabia, in September and October 1989, to agree a new order for Lebanon.<sup>67</sup> Actually, Saudi Arabia was a member of the Arab League - and a member of the tripartite committee on Lebanon, which included Morocco and Algeria.<sup>68</sup> The Arab League tripartite committee and the Taif agreements recognised the special function of Syria and of the Syrian army in Lebanon.<sup>69</sup> The Iraqi regime intervened in Lebanon, delivering arms to Michel Awn's anti-Syrian Christian factions, which resisted the Taif agreement and challenged the President of Lebanon Ilias Hrawi.<sup>70</sup> The Iraqi purpose in Lebanon was not only to undermine the Saudi peace plan in Lebanon but also to punish Syria for its support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.<sup>71</sup>

On a more official level, Iraqi leaders tried to weaken the Saudi regional status by limiting the Saudis into a mutual security pact with the Iraqis.<sup>72</sup> During King Fahd's visit to Iraq at the end of March 1989, Saddam Hussein asked the King to sign a non-aggression pact.<sup>73</sup> This came as a surprise to the King, for he had imagined the relationship between the Kingdom and Iraq, and between himself and Saddam Hussein, went far beyond non-aggression.<sup>74</sup> However, the King found it very hard to reject his host's desire.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, believing that such a pact would increase security in the Gulf region, King Fahd signed a non-aggression pact with Iraq on March 27, 1989.<sup>76</sup> The agreement spelled out the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the two countries and the non-use of force between the two countries.<sup>77</sup> Iraq refused a Kuwait request for a similar non-aggression pact, however, arguing problems between them first had to be settled.<sup>78</sup>

After King Fahd visited Iraq, he paid a visit to Egypt.<sup>79</sup> He was encouraged by a desire to secure good relations with Cairo in an effort to cut across any covert ACC agenda.<sup>80</sup> As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia was still suspicious that there were other motives involved in the creation of the ACC.<sup>81</sup>



Certainly, Saudi concern about the ACC grew when Iraq attempted to promote military co-operation within the ACC.<sup>82</sup> The Yemeni military consisted of many Iraqi-trained officers; and several thousand Iraqi advisors were believed to be in Yemen.<sup>83</sup> Egypt, however, rejected as incompatible with Arab League commitments the calls for closer military co-operation.<sup>84</sup>

### **The Iraqi attack on the Gulf states**

Saddam Hussein's actions throughout the countdown to the crisis in 1990, clearly increased the threatening nature of the environment for the GCC.<sup>85</sup> At the summit meeting of the ACC in Amman in February 1990, which celebrated the organisation's first anniversary,<sup>86</sup> Saddam condemned the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf and he stated that the U.S. supported Israel and sought to weaken the Arabs.<sup>87</sup> He tried to represent Iraq as having hegemony in the region.<sup>88</sup> The most important event which happened at the summit meeting, was that Saddam asked King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to put pressure on the Gulf states not only to announce a moratorium on all wartime loan repayment plans to Iraq, but also to make an urgent grant of \$30 billion.<sup>89</sup> Saddam Hussein added "Let the Gulf states know that if they do not give this money to me, I would know how to get it".<sup>90</sup> This threat was accompanied by Iraqi military manoeuvres in the neutral zone of the Kuwait border.<sup>91</sup> Saddam's explanation as to why the Gulf states should give him the money was that the Iranians would have invaded the Gulf states if Iraq had fallen in the war.<sup>92</sup> Saddam's message was carried by the Jordanian King to Saudi Arabia.<sup>93</sup>

In response to Saddam's claim that he had protected the Gulf states against the Iranian threat, King Fahd said after the invasion of Kuwait <sup>94</sup> "In turn, we wish to ask you (Saddam) some questions. Who authorised you to involve the Iraqi army and people in a bloody and futile war with Iran? Who authorised you to put an end to the lives of a million Iraqi and Iranian Muslim citizens?"<sup>95</sup>


When the Iran-Iraq war started, the Gulf states found themselves in the same ditch as Iraq, and it became evident to them that the defeat of Iraq would mean Iranian hegemony over the Gulf, which would threaten all of the Gulf states.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, Saudi Arabia gave Iraq \$25 billion in financial assistance and a further \$10 billion was received from Kuwait, \$1 billion from Qatar and \$2-4 billion from the United Arab Emirates.<sup>97</sup> Iraq also received \$14 billion in oil.<sup>98</sup> Iraq's total debt to Saudi Arabia amounted to approximately \$34 billion, and to Kuwait about \$15 billion.<sup>99</sup> When the Iran-Iraq war stopped, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supplied more limited aid.<sup>100</sup> The Arab Monetary Fund agreed in December 1988, to give Iraq a \$112 million loan in January 1989. The Co-ordination Secretariat agreed to provide a loan for some \$1 billion over five years.<sup>101</sup> The Islamic Development Bank also gave further smaller loans.<sup>102</sup>

The Kingdom's support for Iraq during its war against Iran was never in doubt.<sup>103</sup> But after the war stopped, Saddam Hussein pointed out his disappointment that the assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had diminished.<sup>104</sup> Saudi Arabia made it plain to the Iraqis that it would not assist further Iraqi military purchases subsequent to the declaration of a cease-fire, because there had been a substantial drop in the oil production level and a decline in the price of oil.<sup>105</sup> However, Iraq wanted previous levels of aid to continue in view of the country's need to rebuild.<sup>106</sup>

At the same time, in February 1990, Iraq singled out Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for greater pressure, this time over the level of oil production. The Iraqi Oil Minister, Issam Abdulrahim Al-Shalabi, visited Kuwait and pressured Kuwait to stick by the new oil quota set by OPEC earlier in 1990.<sup>107</sup> The visit to Kuwait was en route to Saudi Arabia to deliver a personal message from Saddam Hussein to King Fahd.<sup>108</sup> The message was that the Saudis must persuade the rest of the GCC states not to go beyond their oil quotas.<sup>109</sup> The Iraqi justification was that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were exceeding their quotas, which forced the price of oil down as they flooded the market.<sup>110</sup> The Iraqis wanted to gain market share for their oil production and force the price of oil to rise.<sup>111</sup> Iraq concentrated its pressures on Kuwait. Saddam accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from the Rumaila oilfield, and asked for compensation of \$2.4 billion. The Rumaila oilfield straddles the Iraq-Kuwait border and mainly exists in Iraqi territory (see Map 4).<sup>112</sup> The Kuwaitis denied the Iraqi claims and refused to discuss oil production levels or to waive any wartime debts to Iraq.<sup>113</sup>

Meanwhile, Iraqi relations with the West were deteriorating. On March 15, 1990, the London Observer's journalist Farzad Bazoft, was sentenced to death in Iraq for spying.<sup>114</sup> He had made a report about an explosion at a secret military base at Hilleh (near Baghdad) for The Observer.<sup>115</sup> The West condemned the Iraqi trial and execution of Farzad Bazoft.<sup>116</sup> On March 26, 1990, Iraq condemned the

**Map 4**



Source: Frank Chawick, The Gulf Crisis, Desert Shield, 1991, p.6

protests over Bazoft's death as interference in Iraq's domestic affairs by Britain and other European Community countries.<sup>117</sup> At the same time, Dr Gerald Bull, a

Canadian scientist, had helped Iraq to develop its "supergun" which was capable of launching non-conventional weapons many thousands of miles.<sup>118</sup> Dr Bull was murdered in Brussels on March 22, 1990.<sup>119</sup> He had received death threats from the Israeli secret service, Mossad, because of his assistance to Iraq's military machine.<sup>120</sup> Soon, British Customs confiscated eight long steel tubes, which were intended to go to Iraq, and which were considered to be part of Bull's "supergun" project.<sup>121</sup> On March 29, 1990, Britain and the U.S. Customs found 40 electrical capacitors, used to trigger nuclear explosions.<sup>122</sup> Iraq declared that they had been imported legally from the U.S. in 1988, and that Iraq did not want to use the capacitors for nuclear purposes, only for scientific research.<sup>123</sup> Saddam explained that these disclosures were part of a public relations campaign against Iraq.<sup>124</sup>

On April 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein threatened "Let them (Western nations) cease their attempts to give Israel a pretext to strike ... I swear by God we will let out fire consume half of Israel if it tries any action against Iraq".<sup>125</sup> He made it clear that chemical weapons were available in Iraq.<sup>126</sup> He also compared the condemnation over the execution of Farzad Bazoft with the West's silence over the assassination of Gerald Bull.<sup>127</sup>

All of the statements were aimed at the Arab world which sided with Saddam.<sup>128</sup> King Hussein of Jordan and PLO leadership were enthusiastically in support of Saddam and encouraged him.<sup>129</sup> After a few days, Iraqi spokesman began to announce that Iraq would use "all its might" against Israel if it should attack any Arab state, not just Iraq.<sup>130</sup> In the middle of April 1990, Saddam also pledged Arafat that he would soon beat Israel and free Jerusalem.<sup>131</sup>

Both the U.S. and Israel appeared to take the threats by Saddam seriously. President George Bush publicly regretted Saddam's statement of April 2, and Israel implied that any Iraqi chemical strike would trigger an immediate and probably nuclear riposte.<sup>132</sup> However, Saddam had been attempting to distract public attention from troubles at home.<sup>133</sup> In a message that was delivered by a senior Arab official, Saddam Hussein declared that "Tell the United States that our statement was for internal consumption only".<sup>134</sup> Saddam received some Arab support mainly from the PLO and Jordan, and he was looking forward to the Arab summit in Baghdad at the end of May 1990.<sup>135</sup> Saddam needed the summit as an

all Arab recognition of Iraq's leadership which he could then turn into pressure on the GCC states, especially, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates.<sup>136</sup>

Meanwhile, most OPEC producers came to agree that some restrictions were needed in order to control over production. The Geneva agreement of May 3, 1990, compelled a three month reduction, which demanded that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates return to their 1.5 million b/d production level.<sup>137</sup> OPEC producers had agreed to limit production to 22 million b/d, but total production remained at about 24 million b/d.<sup>138</sup> Together Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates accounted for about 75 per cent of the overproduction.<sup>139</sup> Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates refused to follow the regulations and continued overproduction of their quota during that month, pumping over 2 million b/d, each.<sup>140</sup>

In Baghdad, at the Arab summit, Saddam addressed a closed session and he referred to the OPEC quotas. He told the conference that "For every dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil, Iraq's loss amounted to one billion dollars per year".<sup>141</sup> He also noted that:

I wish to tell our brothers who do not seek war, and those who do not intend to wage war on Iraq, that we can not tolerate this type of economic warfare... God willing, the situation will turn out well. But I say that we have reached a state of affairs where we can not take the pressure.<sup>142</sup>

According to Iraqi opposition sources, Saddam renewed his demands in which he asked the Arab summit to put pressure on the GCC states to waive its war debts and to provide Iraq with an additional \$30 billion.<sup>143</sup> He accused Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumaila oilfield and asked that Kuwait surrender the two strategic islands, Warbh and Bubiyan, to Iraqi authority or possession.<sup>144</sup> The summit resolutions also condemned the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and the campaign by the West to stop Iraq's technological development.<sup>145</sup>

The summit ended and Saddam Hussein was unable to direct the attention of the Kuwait Emir, Shaikh Jabber Al-Sabah, to the issue of borders and debts.<sup>146</sup> Desperate for income to reconstruct his war-destroyed economy, unable to increase revenue and burdened by billions of dollars in foreign loans. Saddam may have observed the drop of the oil price as leading him to demand an end to the OPEC overproduction, whilst demanding that Iraq be allowed to increase its oil



production and that the price rise to at least \$25 a barrel of oil.<sup>147</sup> Indeed, oil prices had dropped by some 30 per cent from \$21 a barrel in January 1990, to \$19.60 in February, \$15.60 in June and to \$14 a barrel just before the invasion.<sup>148</sup>

Thus, in the last week of June 1990, Saddam Hussein sent urgent messages to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.<sup>149</sup> Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Sa'doun Hammadi, who was delivering Saddam's messages, publicly criticised both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates by name for their overproduction and blamed them for the fall in the price of oil.<sup>150</sup> Sa'doun Hammadi met Skaikh Jabber in June 26, 1990, and repeated Iraq's demand that Kuwait reduce oil production, waive wartime debts to Iraq and donate \$10 billion to Iraq.<sup>151</sup> For the third demand, the Emir of Kuwait responded angrily "That is absurd. Kuwait does not have such a large amount available".<sup>152</sup> The Emir of Kuwait rejected Iraq's request to reduce oil production or waive Iraq's debts.<sup>153</sup> The Emir of Kuwait was ready to contribute \$500 million but he made it clear to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister that he might negotiate further. "Let us agree about our borders and then we can talk about other things".<sup>154</sup> Saddam Hussein refused to accept the Kuwaiti offer of \$500 million. He felt that it had been offered to humiliate him.<sup>155</sup> Saddam Hussein also attacked Kuwait as being in a "conspiracy against the region's economy which serves Israel directly".<sup>156</sup>

The increasing Iraqi attack on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates over oil was a challenge to the basis of the GCC states, which demanded that a Saudi diplomatic response was urgently required.<sup>157</sup> A formal meeting was held on July 10-11, 1990, in Jeddah between representatives of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>158</sup> Both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates pledged to abide by the OPEC quotas of 1.5 million b/d each.<sup>159</sup> King Fahd personally exercised extensive pressure to achieve this outcome.<sup>160</sup> In spite of the pledges by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Iraqi threats increased. On July 15, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent three divisions of the elite Republican Guards to the south-east of Iraq, just north of Kuwait.<sup>161</sup>

Along with military build-up, a parallel diplomatic offensive started.<sup>162</sup> On July 16, 1990, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister delivered a memorandum to the Secretary General of the Arab League in which Iraq made a list of indictments:

- Kuwait with the United Arab Emirates had glutted the oil market with an amount of oil that exceeded their OPEC quotas.<sup>163</sup> This had led to a decrease in oil prices between 1981 and 1990 and, therefore, a loss of \$500 billion by the Arab states, of which Iraq had suffered \$89 billion.<sup>164</sup>
- Kuwait had stolen from the Iraqi treasury \$2.4 billion by pumping oil from Iraqi Rumaila oilfield.<sup>165</sup>
- The Arab states of the Gulf had supported Iraq financially, but their loans to Iraq were not financed solely from their treasuries, but from the increase in their oil revenues which was a consequence of the decrease of Iraqi exports during the war years.<sup>166</sup> Iraq had also protected them from Iran.<sup>167</sup>
- While Iraq had been distracted by the war with Iran, Kuwait had advanced into Iraqi territory, and established police posts, oil installations and farms.<sup>168</sup>
- The Kuwaiti's had refused to settle the issue of the borders.<sup>169</sup>

The list of indictments were interpreted as "military aggression" by the Iraqis.<sup>170</sup> The memorandum finished with several demands: the increase of the price of oil to over \$25 a barrel; Kuwait to pay Iraq \$2.4 billion as compensation for Kuwait stealing oil from Iraqi's Rumaila oilfield; the creation of a plan similar to the Marshall Plan, to rebuild Iraq and recompense for some of its losses during the war.<sup>171</sup> The next day, July 17, 1990, Saddam Hussein addressed the nation on the twenty-second anniversary of the Ba'ath Revolution. He accused Kuwait and United Arab Emirates of co-operating with "world imperialism and Zionism" to damage Iraq through overproduction.<sup>172</sup> He also said that Iraq could not ignore such actions forever, and he warned of dire consequences unless the two states stopped. "If words fail to afford us protection, then we will have no choice but to take effective action to put things right and ensure the restitution of our rights".<sup>173</sup> Shortly afterwards, on July 18, 1990, 30,000 Iraqi troops were moved to the Kuwaiti border.<sup>174</sup>

Kuwait rejected the Iraqi indictments in a reply to the Secretary General of the Arab League on July 19, 1990, and expressed strong anger.<sup>175</sup> "This was not the way to treat a sister state".<sup>176</sup> Kuwait underlined the following items:

- The oil produced from the Rumaila field was from wells an adequate distance from the international boundary to conform with the international standards.<sup>177</sup>
- Kuwait had suffered economic and material harm during the war when it was exposed to attacks inside its territory.<sup>178</sup>

- Kuwait refused to take responsibility for the drop in oil consumption in both OPEC and non-OPEC countries.<sup>179</sup>
- Kuwait had been helpful to the Arab countries and Kuwait's assistance to Iraq was indubitable and documented.<sup>180</sup>
- Kuwait stated that it was Iraq who had avoided settling the issues over their common borders.<sup>181</sup>

Iraq's memorandum to the Arab League and Saddam's speech of July 17, caused the Kuwaitis to feel that it was Kuwait rather the United Arab Emirates which was Iraq's target.<sup>182</sup> The Kuwaiti leadership continued to be confident explaining Saddam's claims as being a bargaining position rather than implying a threat.<sup>183</sup> They thought that the Iraqis would not take military action but that even if they did it would be limited to disputed zones such as the Rumaila oilfield and the two islands, Warbah and Bubiyan.<sup>184</sup> Hence, Kuwaiti troops had been put on alert when the first Iraqi troops massed several miles north of the border with Kuwait.<sup>185</sup> The Emir of Kuwait ordered his troops back to their stations, on July 19, 1990, however, so as not to "provoke" Saddam. Certainly the Kuwaiti troops could not have prevented an invasion (Iraq's forces totalled more than one million against Kuwait's 17,000).<sup>186</sup> Therefore, the Kuwaiti leadership decided to seek help from their allies. The Kuwaiti's Foreign Minister started an emergency journey of GCC states, beginning in Riyadh.<sup>187</sup> In addition, Kuwait sent a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council and UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuelar. The Arab League selected Saudi Arabia and Egypt as mediators.<sup>188</sup>

This escalation was serious enough for the U.S. to issue a statement on July 18, 1990, reminding Iraq that the U.S. had to; secure the free move of oil through the Straits of Hormuz; protect the principle of freedom of navigation; and to "support the individual and collective self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and long-standing ties".<sup>189</sup> The U.S. also stressed "That disputes be settled peacefully and not by threats or intimidation".<sup>190</sup> These statements were issued against a background of reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which showed that Iraqi troop movements posed a serious threat to Kuwait.<sup>191</sup> On July 25, 1990, Saddam Hussein met with the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie.<sup>192</sup> Saddam gave her a message to deliver to President Bush. She was



then to return to Baghdad with the President's response.<sup>193</sup> Saddam's message went somewhat like this:

As you know, I successfully fought Iran, but, instead of rewarding me, the British and the Kuwaitis are driving me into a corner. Please note that my record on oil is absolutely clean. I have never acted irresponsibly over oil, and never will. I want our dialogue to continue. I am the man with who you should do business in this region.<sup>194</sup>

Saddam Hussein talked to her about Iraq-U.S. relations and the problems with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Among other things he said:

I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are mentioned in the memorandum, we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a month or after one year, but we will take it all. We are not the kind of people who will relinquish their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need for the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy, we too are needy. The U.S. must have a better understanding of the situation and declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But it should not make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. We clearly understand America's statement that it wants an easy flow of oil. We understand America saying that it seeks friendship with the states in the region and to encourage some parties to harm Iraq's interests. The U.S. wants to secure the flow of oil. This is understandable but it must not deploy methods which the U.S. says it disapproves, of flexing muscles and using pressure. If you use pressure, we will use pressure and deploy force.<sup>195</sup>

She told Saddam, among other things, "But we have no opinion on the Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait".<sup>196</sup> The text of that meeting was released by the Iraqi government.<sup>197</sup> At the same time the U.S. State Department described the transcript as "essentially correct".<sup>198</sup> Equally important, Saddam Hussein had met John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State, and exchanged views with him.<sup>199</sup> John Kelly later admitted that the U.S. had no defence treaties with the Gulf states.<sup>200</sup> He admitted that during a meeting of a U.S. House of Representatives Middle East subcommittee, which the BBC World Service reported on July 31, 1990.<sup>201</sup>

Since Saddam Hussein had escalated the situation, the joint U.S.-United Arab Emirates naval exercises were announced in July 24, 1990.<sup>202</sup> The United Arab Emirates asked the U.S. for some practical support.<sup>203</sup> The United Arab Emirates had gained experience of Iraq's tactics during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1986, Saddam believed that he was not receiving enough financial support for fighting against Iran, hence, he sent his aircraft over 600 miles to bomb two of the United Arab Emirates' oil wells.<sup>204</sup> The United Arab Emirates were consequently looking out for

a repeat bombing.<sup>206</sup> Immediately, Iraq complained about the United Arab Emirates for asking the U.S. for practical support and about Kuwait for contacting the U.N. Baghdad accused them of seeking to internationalise the dispute by inviting foreign troops into the Gulf. Saddam threatened with the words:

Foreigners will not be able to protect those who conspire against the Arab nation and undermine its fundamental interests. The Arab people know how to deal with that kind of case. Everybody knows very well its destiny.<sup>206</sup>

Thus, King Fahd contacted Saddam and received personal assurances from Saddam that he would not take any military action against Kuwait.<sup>207</sup> King Fahd sent a letter to the Emir of Kuwait in the hope of persuading him to be more compromising in the forthcoming negotiations.<sup>208</sup>

OPEC Oil Ministers met in Geneva on 26-27 July, 1990.<sup>209</sup> They decided that the price of oil would be increased from \$18 to \$21 a barrel until the end of 1990, and they set a new production level of 22.491 million barrels a day for OPEC members.<sup>210</sup> Iraq had argued for a price of \$25 a barrel, while Iran had wanted the price to be \$23, but Saudi Arabia had persuaded the members to adopt the price of \$21 a barrel.<sup>211</sup> Iraq's Oil Minister, Issam Al-Shalabi, said that he was happy with the agreement, however, there was one country exceeding its agreed OPEC limit.<sup>212</sup> That country was Iraq starting from the middle of July 1990.<sup>213</sup>

Meanwhile, the number of Iraqi troops on the north of the Kuwaiti border reached 100,000.<sup>214</sup> Moreover, on July 28, 1990, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that Iraqi military in the south had been mobilised and that Saddam "intends to use it".<sup>215</sup> King Fahd and President Mubarak also asked Washington to adopt a low profile so as not to jeopardise the expected successful result of the Jeddah meeting between Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>216</sup> On July 31, 1990, the two delegations met at Jeddah.<sup>217</sup> Izzat Ibrahim, the Vice President of Iraq, read all the charges against Kuwait.<sup>218</sup> The Iraqis asked for \$10 billion in compensation for the use of the Rumaila oilfield, possession of some disputed territories, the rights for Iraq to pump oil from inside Kuwait, and waiving of the Iraqi debt incurred during Iran-Iraq war.<sup>219</sup> The Kuwaitis refused to accept these demands, and argued that they did not have such huge amounts of money at present, but they agreed to write off debts in return for the settlement of the border dispute.<sup>220</sup> The Iraqis did not like the Kuwaitis reply, and Izzat Ibrahim finished the meeting

saying they should continue in Baghdad on August 4, 1990.<sup>221</sup> On August 1, the Iraqi government announced that:

Further progress in the negotiation will not proceed until Kuwait accedes to Iraq's demands and rights and until the Kuwaitis admit the Iraqi charges against them.<sup>222</sup>

Then, the three Iraqi armoured divisions near Kuwait moved closer to the Kuwaiti's border, just three miles away.<sup>223</sup> The tanks and artillery took up offensive positions and along with some eighty helicopters.<sup>224</sup> In response to a Kuwaiti request for information on the Iraqi mobilisation, the U.S. sent a briefcase of top-secret photos.<sup>225</sup> On the afternoon of July 31, 1990, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and other American agencies informed Washington that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq had appeared to have taken place.<sup>226</sup> In fact, the apparent invasion was Iraqi troops mobilising.<sup>227</sup> The U.S. State Department held meetings to follow events in Iraq and to assess U.S. options.<sup>228</sup> Much of the meeting looked at Saddam's likely action if he crossed the border of Kuwait. Would he aim only to take the disputed northern border with Kuwait as well as the two islands? This would not present a threat to the U.S. and the Western world.<sup>229</sup>

### **The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.' response**

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the border of Kuwait at 2 am local time and rapidly took control of the whole country. They reached the capital at 7am.<sup>230</sup> The Emir of Kuwait and most of his family escaped to Saudi Arabia.<sup>231</sup> As soon as the Iraqis crossed the Kuwaiti border, Crown Prince, Sa'd Al-sabah made a request for aid from the American embassy.<sup>232</sup> However, there were no military options available to the U.S. It was too late for the Kuwaitis to ask for effective military assistance.<sup>233</sup> Casualties during the fighting were estimated between 200 and 1000 killed.<sup>234</sup> 40 Kuwaiti aircraft, some coastal vessels and an army brigade withdrew to Saudi Arabia.<sup>235</sup> Iraq claimed that it had been invited to help Kuwaiti revolutionaries attempt to overthrow the Emir.<sup>236</sup>

Saddam was persuaded at this time that there was no purpose in merely seizing two islands and the oilfields.<sup>237</sup> If the Kuwaiti ruling family remained in power they could turn Kuwait into an American military base.<sup>238</sup> Without the Al-Sabah family, there would be no one who could demand loyalty or be a symbol of the state's legitimacy.<sup>239</sup> Saddam believed that if he wanted to take Kuwait he had to

get rid of the ruling family.<sup>240</sup> Saddam intended to kill or capture the Al-Sabah family, but the Emir of Kuwait and most of his family escaped before the Iraqi forces surrounded the Emir's palace in Kuwait city.<sup>241</sup> In fact, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had less to do with legal or historical claims than with the wealth of Kuwait.<sup>242</sup> The Iraqi demands were illegitimate and unacceptable by the standards of international law.<sup>243</sup> If Kuwait had completely agreed to the Iraqi demands on July 31, 1990, Saddam might have found it hard to justify the invasion of Kuwait, but he would still have found an excuse to invade Kuwait.<sup>244</sup> Saddam Hussein thought that in case of invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. would limit signs of disapproval to a boycott or at most send warships to the area. He also thought that King Fahd would not allow the U.S. to use Saudi bases as he had always rejected an American military presence in his country.<sup>245</sup>

As soon as Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwait, the National Security Council's Situation Room in the White House and the Crisis Situation Room in the Pentagon became active.<sup>246</sup> At 5 am on August 2, 1990, President Bush instructed his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to make sure that Arab countries would condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>247</sup> Later that morning, President Bush condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as "naked aggression" and signed an order to freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and banning all commerce with Iraq including the 588,000 barrels of Iraqi oil purchased daily by the United States.<sup>248</sup> President Bush was concerned about the impact of the invasion on U.S. oil supplies, noting that 50 per cent of American energy demands came from the Middle East, about 3.5 per cent from Iraq.<sup>249</sup> It was also noted, that President Saddam Hussein had already won his goal of pushing up the price of oil.<sup>250</sup> Holding on to Kuwait, Saddam would control 20 per cent of OPEC production and 20 per cent of world oil reserves (10 per cent from Kuwait).<sup>251</sup> Iraq and Kuwait produced about 4.5 million barrels of oil a day, which would increase Iraq's annual revenue from oil exports - enough to build an empire in the Gulf.<sup>252</sup> The U.S. imported more than \$3 billion annually from Iraq; 97 per cent of the total was oil.<sup>253</sup> The U.S. exported, mainly agricultural merchandise to Iraq, totalling \$1.17 billion in 1989.<sup>254</sup>

The U.S. National Security Council met on the morning of August 2, 1990, and the options that could be taken against Iraq were discussed with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). He defined two

military options: the first, to strike against Iraqi targets, using U.S. naval aircraft; and the second, operating plan 90-1002, to defend Saudi Arabia.<sup>255</sup> On the same day, President Bush called King Fahd, assuring him of American support. President Bush agreed that the invasion of Kuwait was definitely unacceptable, but no firm plans were made between the two leaders.<sup>256</sup>

The response of the international community was uncommonly fast and decisive.<sup>257</sup>

Only hours after invasion, at 4 am on August 2, 1990, an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council had passed resolution 660.<sup>258</sup> The resolution condemned Iraq's invasion and demanded that it "withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1992".<sup>259</sup> The resolution was adopted by 14 countries, only Yemen abstained.<sup>260</sup> The end of East-West Cold War had generated more co-operation.<sup>261</sup> Secretary of State, James Baker, along with his Soviet counterpart, Edward Shevardnadze, issued an unusual joint U.S.-Soviet statement in which they condemned the Iraqi invasion and asked for a stop to arms deliveries to Iraq.<sup>262</sup>

In military terms, on August 2, 1990, the U.S. had to move one carrier task force; led by USS Eisenhower, to the Eastern Mediterranean, while another, led by USS Independence, was moved from the Indian Ocean to the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>263</sup> In the Gulf itself an eight-ship battle fleet had already been deployed.<sup>264</sup> The U.S. also alerted NATO in Brussels that it was to put together the task force to respond if Iraqi troops drove further Kuwaiti territory.<sup>265</sup> House Speaker, Thomas Foley, said to NBC "If there is an intention on the part of Iraq to overrun Saudi Arabia, then I think this would call for a direct military response by the United States, Western Europe, and maybe even the Soviet Union".<sup>266</sup> President Bush stated on August 2, 1992, "We remain committed to take whatever actions are necessary to defend our long-standing, vital interests in the Persian Gulf".<sup>267</sup>

### **The impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations**

In Saudi Arabia, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait took Riyadh totally by surprise, especially as Iraq's delegates had started discussions with the Kuwaitis in Jeddah a day earlier.<sup>268</sup> They were also shocked because Saddam Hussein had given his word to the King that he would not invade Kuwait.<sup>269</sup> King Fahd did not believe that the Iraqis had invaded Kuwait when he was first told about it at 2 am on

August 2, 1990.<sup>270</sup> Reports came in confirming the invasion, but King Fahd remained incredulous.<sup>271</sup> Eventually, King Fahd put through a call to Saddam Hussein.<sup>272</sup> King Fahd asked Saddam Hussein about the report.<sup>273</sup> Saddam Hussein told King Fahd that he was going to send Izzat Ibrahim to explain everything.<sup>274</sup> On August 3, 1990, Izzat Ibrahim arrived in Jeddah.<sup>275</sup> King Fahd was extremely angry and surprised when Izzat Ibrahim merely relayed Saddam's assurance that Saudi Arabia was safe and had nothing to fear from Iraq.<sup>276</sup> King Fahd told him that he wanted to discuss Kuwait not the security of Saudi Arabia.<sup>277</sup> Izzat Ibrahim replied that there was no way to turn back the clock and that Kuwait was past history.<sup>278</sup>

Up to this time, the Saudis were persuaded that an Arab solution to the problem was the best option.<sup>279</sup> An emergency meeting of the Arab League was held in Cairo on August 3, 1990.<sup>280</sup> The meeting concluded with fourteen of the twenty-one Arab members present.<sup>281</sup> The meeting issues a resolution demanding that the Iraqi troops be withdrawn from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally.<sup>282</sup> The Saudis still wanted to give an Arab solution a chance, and that as soon as Iraqi troops withdrew, Kuwait could be squeezed for more concessions.<sup>283</sup> Saudi leaders worked with other Arab countries to persuade the Iraqi leader to attend a mini-summit in Jeddah on August 5, sponsored by Saudi-Egyptian leadership.<sup>284</sup> Saddam replied that he would not have the Al-Sabah family attend the proposed summit.<sup>285</sup> This attitude was unacceptable to the Arab leaders. If Saddam's conditions were agreed to, it would show a Saudi approval of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and a denial the legitimacy of Kuwait's government.<sup>286</sup>

President Bush became convinced that Saudi Arabia was vulnerable.<sup>287</sup> In the long term, an Iraqi threat to the whole region appeared almost unavoidable, since Iraq was close to the Saudi oilfields and a conflict with Israel was a strong possibility.<sup>288</sup>

By August 3, 1990, the Bush administration had decided to reverse the Iraqi invasion.<sup>289</sup> However, the first block to that goal was Saudi Arabia, without whose assistance the task would be difficult.<sup>290</sup> Bush set about persuading Saudi Arabia that it should host American troops before it was late.<sup>291</sup> Therefore, the Bush administration accused Iraq of planning to invade Saudi Arabia.<sup>292</sup> The U.S. National Security Council decided at their meeting of August 2, to support Operation Plan 90-1002, which involved sending troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>293</sup>

William Crowe, the retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told ABC on August 2, 1990, that the U.S. military could not play a significant role unless invited by Saudi Arabia and given access to Saudi military facilities.<sup>294</sup> The Saudi Arabian military was generally well equipped, but lacked battle experience and was extremely small compared to Iraqi forces. The ratio of Saudi forces to Iraqi forces was one to fifteen; while the ratio of all GCC forces to Iraqi forces was one to seven, (see Table 10).<sup>295</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia could not defeat Iraqi aggression without the help of the U.S. and the U.S. could not easily take steps to defend its interests in Saudi Arabia and the gulf without the public acceptance of the Saudis.<sup>296</sup>

President Bush talked about maintaining the American way of life which meant he had to fight to protect the oil reserves and the price of the oil,<sup>297</sup> "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world (would) all suffer if control of the World's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein".<sup>298</sup>

Therefore, the top officials of the Bush administration concentrated on persuading the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, that Iraq planned to invade Saudi Arabia and that the U.S. would do what was necessary to defend Saudi Arabia.<sup>299</sup> President Bush met with Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan on August 3, 1990. The Saudis were still reluctant to accept America's help.<sup>300</sup>

To show that the U.S. was serious, Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showed top secret satellite photographs to Bandar Ibn Sultan to convince him that one of the three Iraqi armoured divisions was moving through Kuwait to the Saudi border.<sup>301</sup> They then indicated to him that operation plan 90-1002, rested on sending American troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>302</sup> When Bandar Ibn Sultan asked what this would mean in numbers, they told him about 100,000-200,000 men. The Ambassador expressed his opinion that this did indeed demonstrate seriousness.<sup>303</sup> Bandar Ibn Sultan called King Fahd on the evening of August 3, and told him about his meeting and the satellite pictures.<sup>304</sup>

**Table 10**  
**Iraqi forces compared with GCC forces, 1990-1991**

Weapons	Iraq	Bahrain	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Saudi Arabia	
						Armed Forces	National Guard
Total Armed Forces	ACTIVE 1,000,000 RESERVE 850,000	6,000	29,500	7,500	44,000	67,500	55,000
Main Battle Tanks (MBT)	5,500	54	39	24	131	550	
Light Tanks	100		36		76		
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AFV)	1,500		2	30	30	500	
Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)	6,000	103	6	160	510	1,100	1,100
Self-propelled Artillery (SP)	500		12	6	20	275	
Towed Artillery	3,000	14	63	8	77	200	68
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL)	200	24	57	18	58	14	
Combat Aircraft (CBT AC)	689	12		20	91	189	
Attack Helicopter (AH)	159				19		

Source: Khaled Bin Sultan. Desert Warrior, 1995, Harper Collins publishers, p. 20, from The Military Balance 1990-1991, IISS.

For the Saudis to invite American troops into Saudi Arabia was a big step. The government of Saudi Arabia was doubtful about the Americans seriousness. They worried that the Americans might send over some aircraft, as a gesture, but not follow it through, leaving Saudi Arabia to face the outcome alone.<sup>305</sup> Also, since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have never been colonised by foreign power, there was commonly held fear that foreign troops once established would never leave, a common enough occurrence in Middle Eastern history.<sup>306</sup>

On August 4, 1990, President Bush met his advisors at Camp David to review military options.<sup>307</sup> General Norman Schwarzkopf introduced Operation Plan 90-1002 in two parts; defensive and offensive.<sup>308</sup> To implement the complete plan would involve 200,000-250,000 men and would take four months.<sup>309</sup> With the U.S. navy in the region, along with the size of ground force in Saudi Arabia close to Kuwait access to Saudi bases was needed.<sup>310</sup> When the discussion turned to using



only air power, Powell and Cheney argued that air attacks from their aircraft carriers were not enough to do the work, and that the ground forces were the key to success in the operation.<sup>311</sup> They stressed that there was no choice to having U.S. troops based on Saudi territory.<sup>312</sup> Powell worried that even if the Iraqis pulled back from Kuwait, it would not be the same situation and the region would have changed irreversibly.<sup>313</sup> President Bush concluded "That is why our defence of Saudi Arabia has to be our focus".<sup>314</sup>

Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said "The Saudis are key to the whole thing".<sup>315</sup> For the American, Saudi Arabia, which held large supplies of Americans military equipment and through which Iraqi oil flowed via a pipeline across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, was the key to any U.S. military action against Iraq.<sup>316</sup> Therefore, to encourage King Fahd to ask for help, President Bush stated publicly on August 4, 1990, "I would be inclined to help in any way we possibly can, if the Saudis requested U.S. assistance".<sup>317</sup> Senior Bush administration officials described that as "Making clear publicly that Saudi Arabia is prepared to call for outside help if threatened".<sup>318</sup>

On August 4, 1990, the CIA's spy-satellite took some photographs of Iraqi troops in the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone.<sup>319</sup> President Bush called King Fahd and told him that the Iraqi troops were massing along the Saudi border and that he should accept American help.<sup>320</sup> Bandar had suggested that King Fahd should have an American briefing team.<sup>321</sup> Thus, King Fahd told President Bush that he would like this briefing first.<sup>322</sup> Presently, the credibility of President Bush was dependent on these spy-satellite photographs.<sup>323</sup> At the same time, the Saudi defence military had sent army scouts to discover if there were any Iraqi troops in the Neutral Zone or if any Iraqi troops were heading towards Saudi territory. The scouts did not find any Iraqi troops and they did not see any evidence of the imminent invasion of Saudi Arabia.<sup>324</sup> Other satellite photographs produced photographs which were less convincing.<sup>325</sup> However, it appeared unlikely that Iraq had an imminent plan to invade Saudi Arabia since the Iraqis had not developed the political pretext for an invasion of Saudi Arabia.<sup>326</sup> During this tension, the Saudis used the hotline between Riyadh and Baghdad and the Iraqi Chief of staff said that it had been a mistake and that he would cut off the arm of any Iraqi soldier who put his finger over the Saudi border. In the first days after the invasion, the Iraqis treated Saudis in Kuwait with great respect.<sup>327</sup> The Iraqi

Ambassador to the U.S. claimed that Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia. However, the next day the Saudi government mobilised the National Guard.<sup>328</sup>

Douglas Kelner, the author of the book The Persian Gulf: TV War, stressed that the U.S. had exaggerated the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia in an attempt to legitimise a U.S. military intervention in the Gulf.<sup>329</sup> He singled out the American's claim that Iraq was preparing to invade Saudi Arabia which served to frighten the Saudis into permitting U.S. troop deployment on the Saudi territory and to convince the world at large that serious interests like the flow of oil were being threatened.<sup>330</sup> Dilip Hiro, asserted in his book, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, that the U.S. satellite pictures merely showed an Iraqi patrol accidentally straying into the Kuwaiti-Saudi Neutral Zone, which President Bush used as evidence of Saddam's plan to invade Saudi Arabia.<sup>331</sup>

The Saudis could not know Saddam's plans in detail, but what he had done was threatening enough.<sup>332</sup> Iraq was led by an unpredictable leader who had demonstrated that he did not keep his word.<sup>333</sup> The Saudis saw the invasion of Kuwait as a declaration of war against all the GCC countries.<sup>334</sup> As a leading member of this alliance, Saudi Arabia was pledged to defend Kuwait's legitimate government.<sup>335</sup> Saudi Arabia sought to resolve the invasion diplomatically within an Arab framework, however, this was interpreted by Baghdad as a sign of weakness.<sup>336</sup> Even resolutions by the Arab League and the UN failed to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>337</sup> Therefore, King Fahd decided to go for military action against Iraq as this was the only option left.<sup>338</sup> King Fahd believed that at this time an Arab solution could not be counted on.<sup>339</sup> Thus, King Fahd, perceived that he had no option but to accept the American offer.<sup>340</sup> In addition to the achieving the liberation of Kuwait, a war against Iraq would bring a number of benefits to Saudi Arabia: (1) it would improve the security of Saudi Arabia; (2) it would eliminate the Iraqi military and assure a stable Persian Gulf; (3) it would correct the military imbalance between Iraq and Saudi Arabia; and (4) it would increase Saudi Arabia's regional influence in the Gulf area and inside OPEC.<sup>341</sup> King Fahd decided to invite in the American troops.<sup>342</sup> The King's decision was an outcome of an agreement between members of the royal family, which had been arrived at reinforced over the years, that if their security and the integrity of their territory was threatened, then they would not hesitate to ask for aid from any

friendly nation with which they had common interests, including the United States.<sup>343</sup> However, before taking his decision to invite in the American troops, King Fahd had to be confident that he could count on the U.S. and also on Britain.<sup>344</sup> That is why the King spent several hours in the early days of the invasion talking on the phone to President Bush and Mrs Thatcher.<sup>345</sup> The Lieutenant General Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, the Saudi Commander of the Coalition Forces during the Gulf war, stated in his book, Desert Warrior, that King Fahd had for many years seen that there was no need for a formal alliance with the United States.<sup>346</sup> King Fahd frequently expressed his view that, if at any time Saudi Arabia faced a problem that formed a threat to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S., Saudis and Americans would fight together without a formal alliance.<sup>347</sup> However, if American interests were not risked, no formal alliance would oblige them to help Saudi Arabia.<sup>348</sup>

Sensibly, King Fahd had already defined what kind of action would take place before the American briefing mission arrived in Saudi Arabia.<sup>349</sup> King Fahd declared that:

How can we believe that Saddam Hussein does not plan an aggression against the Kingdom when he has already invaded Kuwait despite guarantees and promises made to me.<sup>350</sup>

Thus, the action planned required the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. On August 6, 1990, the American briefing team arrived in Jeddah led by Richard Cheney.<sup>351</sup> They met King Fahd that evening.<sup>352</sup> Cheney's team included Schwarzkopf, Robert Gates of the National Security Council, Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman<sup>353</sup>. King Fahd attended with him, Crown Prince, Abdullah, Prince Abdulbraman, the Deputy of Defense Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister and Bandar Ibn Sultan, translated for the King.<sup>354</sup> The Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan was abroad recovering from surgery, but he was consulted by phone at every stage of the crisis, and he flew back to Saudi Arabia as soon as Cheney's team arrived and met with Cheney the next day.<sup>355</sup>

General Schwarzkopf highlighted how crucial the Kingdom was to any U.S. military options in the Kuwaiti crisis.<sup>356</sup> He displayed pictures of Iraqi troops and tanks at the border and said that it was unclear whether or not Iraq would invade

Saudi Arabia.<sup>357</sup> He then summarised the steps the American troops would take to defend Saudi Arabia.<sup>358</sup> Next, a personal message from President Bush was relayed by Cheyney:

We are prepared to deploy these forces to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. If you ask us, we will come. We will seek no permanent bases. And when you ask us to go home we will leave.<sup>359</sup>

Immediately, King Fahd responded "OK".<sup>360</sup> In fact, the Cheyney team did not believe that King Fahd would make a decision while they were meeting him,<sup>361</sup> or that he would give them an immediate answer.<sup>362</sup> The King's decision changed the Saudi foreign policy.<sup>363</sup> The decision was as courageous as Schwarzkopf described it.<sup>364</sup> It was made without the support of the Arab League.<sup>365</sup>

Cheyney called President Bush at 10 pm local time (2 pm in Washington) on August 6, 1990, from Jeddah to say that he had obtained the Saudi invitation for U.S. forces to be stationed on Saudi territory, but on three conditions: 1. that the U.S. forces would withdraw at the King's request; 2. the U.S. forces would acquire Saudi permission before launching any offensive military action against Iraq; and 3. Washington would not make the invitation public until the first U.S. troops were landed on Saudi territory.<sup>366</sup> Two hours later, President Bush ordered direct military assistance to Saudi Arabia which was later called "Operation Desert Shield".<sup>367</sup> On the same day, August 6, 1990, the UN Security Council issued resolution 661. 13 member countries were in favour, to none against, but Yemen and Cuba abstained.<sup>368</sup> The resolution called for economic sanctions to be imposed on Iraq.<sup>369</sup> As a result, Saudi Arabia closed down the Iraqi pipeline as 15,000 U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990.<sup>370</sup> The pipeline crossed Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port at Yanbu, and could carry 800,000 bpd.<sup>371</sup> Turkey also closed down the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. Both pipelines shipped 90 per cent of Iraqi oil each year.<sup>372</sup>

President Bush began to feel more secure that the political, economic and military phases of his plan were beginning to gel.<sup>373</sup> In contrast, Saddam Hussein began to be concerned at the Americans response to the invasion. On August 6, 1990, Saddam Hussein called Joseph Wilson, the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, to meet him in his office and to take an urgent letter to President Bush.<sup>374</sup> In his letter, Saddam made three points. 1. "Kuwait was a state without borders, and

whatever happened with the entry of the Iraqi forces can not be measured in the framework of the relationship between the states in the Arab world".<sup>375</sup> 2. Saddam Hussein was worried that his relationship with Saudi Arabia was being damaged. Iraq had "an excellent relationship" with Saudi Arabia since 1975, and he mentioned Iraq's non-aggression pact with Saudi Arabia in 1989.<sup>376</sup> Saddam Hussein said "We do not understand the meaning of your (Bush's) declarations that you are afraid of Iraq's intentions with respect to Saudi Arabia and that after Kuwait will come Saudi Arabia".<sup>377</sup> He also said "Your worries are unfounded, but if you are merely pretending that worry in order to make Saudi Arabia worry, that is something else... we are ready to give them (our Saudi brothers) any guarantees they want, to remove that worry".<sup>378</sup> The third and final point dealt with Saddam Hussein's pledge to some Arab leaders that he would not use force against Kuwait. Saddam Hussein claimed that he had not given that promise to any Arab.<sup>379</sup> Saddam Hussein stated that, "What happened is that some Arab leaders were talking to me about the massing of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border, and they were telling me that the Kuwaitis were afraid and worried. I told them that I promised that I would not take any military action before the meeting in Jeddah that we had agreed upon. There was no military action before the (Jeddah) meeting. We were waiting for the return of the Vice President, Izzat Ibrahim from Jeddah to take a decision".<sup>380</sup> Saddam Hussein justified the speed of the invasion with the words "The possibility arose before the Jeddah meeting, and in accordance with the first patriotic movement in Kuwait. But it was not the first priority on the list. We were putting more effort into asserting our rights through negotiations."<sup>381</sup> The Iraqi president then addressed the general issue of Baghdad-Washington relations.<sup>382</sup> He asked, "Why do you want to be our enemies? In our view, you could look after your interests better through building a relationship with a strong nationalistic and realistic regime in the area like Iraq rather than through the Saudis".<sup>383</sup>

American aircraft started arriving at the military air bases in Saudi Arabia on August 18, 1990.<sup>384</sup> The army units sent to Saudi Arabia, were the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions and the 24th Infantry Mechanised Division.<sup>385</sup> On the first day of deployment, at least 5,000 ground troops were sent.<sup>386</sup> Another 4,000 Marines were deployed near the Saudi-Kuwait border.<sup>387</sup> As Saudi Arabia's oil fields were along the Gulf coast and within two hundred miles of Kuwait, precedence was to be given to fighter aircraft to be based at the military air base at Dhahran where the

oilfields are concentrated.<sup>388</sup> 122 F-15s and F-16s were dispatched in a week.<sup>389</sup> The build up was by CENTCOM following the plan 90-1002, which ordered 250,000 troops to Saudi Arabia by December 1, 1990.<sup>390</sup> In addition, Saudi Arabia allowed access to its impressive network of air bases, posts and army facilities to the U.S. and other foreign forces.<sup>391</sup> It also allowed them to use the huge airfields and their vast underground hangers at Dhahran and Riyadh, as well as the heavily fortified base at King Khalid Military City in the north of Saudi Arabia.<sup>392</sup>

The American and allied deployment in Saudi Arabia went smoothly. This was helped by the fact that the Saudi military had been equipped by Western powers and Western advisers had designed and constructed a military organisation for Saudi Arabia. American officials commented on the Saudi military construction as Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense during Carter's Presidency, said in late 1979 "A number of countries in the area can maintain bases which, in an emergency in which they asked our help, we could then come in and use".<sup>393</sup> Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense during Reagan's Presidency, made evident in his classified 1984-1988 Defense Guidance report that U.S. and not Saudi Forces, would be the first line forces in any crisis.<sup>394</sup> He said, "Whatever the circumstances, we should be prepared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear that the security of access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened".<sup>395</sup> A classified State Department Study prepared for Congressional leaders by Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State, was leaked to The New York Times on September 5, 1985.<sup>396</sup> In it was stated that, "Although the Saudis have steadfastly resisted formal access agreements", they have also indicated that "Access will be forthcoming for United States forces as necessary to counter Soviet aggression or in regional crises they can not manage on their own".<sup>397</sup>

On August 8, 1990, Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, reminded reporters of the political ties between the U.S. and King Fahd and his country.<sup>398</sup> He explained that Iraq's naked aggression, linked with Bush's personal diplomacy and Saudi Arabia's historic ties to the United States, had persuaded King Fahd to ask for U.S. military assistance.<sup>399</sup> Cheney described the discussion with King Fahd as a significant moment and the U.S. deployment as a major commitment of U.S. forces.<sup>400</sup> He also said "We do not know how events will unfold over the next few months, but obviously, the President has made it very clear... this is a part of the world that is of absolute strategic significance to the United States and we are

prepared to use U.S. military force, if necessary, to protect our interests and those of our friends in the area".<sup>401</sup> In addition, the Pentagon told the reporters that the U.S. rapid deployment was a message to deter further aggression by Iraqis.<sup>402</sup>

The Bush administration perceived that it would not be possible to carry on a war in the Gulf without the consent, if not the support, of the American people. Therefore, on August 8, 1990, President Bush addressed Americans on television.<sup>403</sup> He explained, "At my direction, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia".<sup>404</sup> President Bush declared four principle objectives of U.S. policy: "First, Iraq's immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal from Kuwait. Second, achieving the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Third, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. And fourth, the safeguarding of American lives".<sup>405</sup> He said "Iraq has amassed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparations... The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the U.S."<sup>406</sup> President Bush said that "U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter aggression by Iraq".<sup>407</sup> He made clear that "The mission of our troops is wholly defensive". Equally important, he said, "Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence".<sup>408</sup> Most interesting of all in this context was the oil issue. This was a main element of prospective danger for the administration in this particular conflict and one to which the President Bush was especially sensitive. In fact, President Bush was linked in the public mind with two things: Arabs and oil as an oil man for several years.<sup>409</sup> Ironically, he had worked for the first American company to have drilled wells in Kuwait. President Bush could not tolerate the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>410</sup> Undoubtedly, President Bush observed that basic American interests at stake. He went to the Gulf crisis with his own experiences and concerns. Iraq's control over a substantial part of the world's oil reserves could have threatened America's standard of living and the economy, due to U.S. dependence on foreign oil. It was a confrontation which the U.S. could not afford to lose.

American military deployment terrified Saddam Hussein.<sup>411</sup> On August 9, 1990, Saddam started deploying a number of anti-air craft guns, artillery and

rocket-launchers in Kuwait City and along the coast.<sup>412</sup> He ordered the borders of Iraq and Kuwait closed, trapping thousands of Westerners and other foreigners.<sup>413</sup> He also ordered all foreign embassies in Kuwait to cease functioning within two weeks. Since the state of Kuwait has been the 19th province of Iraq by Saddam's decree of August 8, 1990, he expected all matters of foreign relations to be carried out by embassies in Baghdad.<sup>414</sup>

On August 7, 1990, to counter the Iraqi invasion, a special meeting of the GCC issued a strongly-worded resolution, condemning Iraq and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.<sup>415</sup> On August 9, 1990, King Fahd addressed his country, his most important speech since the invasion.<sup>416</sup> King Fahd described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as "The most horrible aggression the Arab nation has known in its recent history".<sup>417</sup> He articulated the Saudi policy to contain the problem between Iraq and Kuwait.<sup>418</sup> He reasserted the Kingdom's demand that things return to the situation that was in existence before the Iraqi invasion and for the return of the Kuwaiti ruling family under Shaikh Jabir Al-Sabah.<sup>419</sup> King Fahd explained the aim of the government's decision to invite foreign troops into Saudi Arabia. He stated that the presence of these troops in Saudi Arabia would be temporary and that they would leave when requested to do so.<sup>420</sup> He also informed the Saudi people that the policy that he had taken was defensive and not directed against anyone.<sup>421</sup>

In the aftermath of this regrettable event, Iraq massed huge forces on the borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the view of these bitter realities and of the eagerness of the Kingdom to safeguard its territory and to protect its vital interests and its economic potentials, and its wish to bolster its defence capability and to raise the level of training of its armed force - in addition to the keenness of the government of the Kingdom to resort to peace and non-recourse to force to solve disputes - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed its wish for the participation of fraternal Arab forces and other friendly forces.<sup>422</sup>

King Fahd's speech was reinforced by a fatwa from Saudi Ulema.<sup>423</sup> The conservative religious elite in Saudi society was sensitive to the West. The elite disapproved of Western lifestyles behaviour and the very presence of Westerners in the Kingdom.<sup>424</sup> The Saudi government also understood the sensitivity of Arab world toward a western, especially, American presence in the region.<sup>425</sup> Therefore, the Saudi government searched for the approval of the leading jurists on this subject.<sup>426</sup> The Saudi Ulema approved the Western presence stating that "Fighting



an aggressor who is engaged in the killing of Muslims and the destruction of their possessions is a religious duty and must be battled and deterred by any means including asking the help of the people of the book, until he (the aggressor) adheres to the principles of Islam".<sup>427</sup>

On August 10, 1990, one day after King Fahd had delivered the speech, he went to Cairo to attend an emergency Arab summit.<sup>428</sup> The Arab summit would prove decisive for Saudi Arabia, because it was the last chance for the Saudis to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>429</sup> In addition, King Fahd gave his permission for the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia before he went to the Arab summit. He wanted to have a bargaining card to put pressure on Arabs to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and to reinforce the Saudi stand against Iraqi invasion. In fact, the summit had been scheduled to meet on August 9, 1990, but had been delayed to give Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to withdraw from Kuwait, or if not, withdraw them, to give some time to persuade Saddam to attend the summit.<sup>430</sup> However, Saddam Hussein again refused to attend as long as the Emir of Kuwait was present.<sup>431</sup> Iraq was represented by its First Deputy Premier, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and its Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, but they did not sit at the same table as the Kuwaiti rulers, since they regarded Kuwait as being an integral part of Iraq.<sup>432</sup> At the summit, the Arab League supported Saudi Arabia's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter giving approval for Western military intervention.<sup>433</sup> The summit rejected Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, supported UN sanctions and called on Iraq to withdraw immediately.<sup>434</sup> The Arab League also called for Arab countries to send troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>435</sup> The resolutions were passed by only twelve of the twenty countries represented, Tunisia's representative did not arrive, Iraq and Libya voted against the resolutions and the PLO, Yemen, and Algeria abstained.<sup>436</sup> Sudan, Jordan and Mauritania all expressed reservations while voting for the resolutions.<sup>437</sup> The Saudis viewed the abstentions, reservations and absences as canting fence-sitting which did nothing to end the hostility.<sup>438</sup> Immediately after the summit, troops from Egypt, Syria and Morocco were committed to the multinational force.<sup>439</sup>

Arab support for the U.S. actions became public, the principle of committing troops to safeguard Saudi Arabia had been agreed and an anti-Iraq Arab coalition was started.<sup>440</sup> In fact, the U.S. put pressure on Egypt, the most powerful military state

in the Arab world, to take a strong stand on the Iraqi invasion.<sup>441</sup> An urgent message from Washington to the Egyptian Foreign Minister on August 3, 1990, warned him that if they did not take a strong position on the Iraqi invasion they would no longer be able to count on further supplies of U.S. military hardware.<sup>442</sup> Following a pledge from President Bush to write off its \$6.75 billion military loans to Egypt, and to continue providing more than \$2 billion a year in aid, Egypt agreed to the U.S. requests.<sup>443</sup> Therefore, President Mubarak reversed his joint decision he had taken with King Hussein of Jordan to refrain from an immediate condemnation of Iraq. This came as a bitter disappointment to Saddam.<sup>444</sup> The American pressure made him agree to lobby the meeting of the Arab League on August 3, and the Arab summit on August 10, 1990, to pass a resolution against Iraq, and to send his troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>445</sup> Saudi Arabia also cancelled \$4.2 billion worth of debts to Egypt and provided further aid worth some \$4.5 billion.<sup>446</sup> For Syria, the advantage of participating in the coalition against Iraq was to defeat its long-standing historical rival, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime. This would increase Syria's position in the Arab world.<sup>447</sup> Syria also looked to Saudi Arabia to provide more financial aid.<sup>448</sup> Therefore, the Syrian President was given immediately aid worth \$500 million by Saudi Arabia, with a pledge of a further \$500 million, if he sent his troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>449</sup> In addition, Syria received a total of \$5 billion in grants from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone during the Gulf crisis.<sup>450</sup>

Certainly, Iraq's invasion showed Saudi Arabia who were their friends and who were their enemies.<sup>451</sup> The Saudis believed that Jordan, the PLO and Yemen had arranged to take control of the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia.<sup>452</sup> The Saudis believed that these countries shared a common displeasure with the GCC states for having oil while they had none.<sup>453</sup> Saddam Hussein was supported by them in exchange for a share of the booty.<sup>454</sup> The Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, claimed that he had evidence suggesting that Iraq had intended to extend "The circle of aggression to include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states".<sup>455</sup> Further evidence is given by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf that an Iraqi defector escaped to Egypt carrying a blueprint for an invasion into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>456</sup> According to the Saudi press, the invasion of Saudi Arabia would be achieved by Iraqi troops advancing from the North and Yemeni forces invading from the south of Saudi Arabia.<sup>457</sup> The Eastern province of Saudi Arabia would be under Iraqi control, the Western province would be granted to Jordan, and the Southern Province to Yemen.<sup>458</sup> Another important piece of

evidence is that after the May 1990, union of the two Yemens into the Republic of Yemen, an official Yemeni newspaper issued a map showing Yemeni territory extending far into the Hijazi province of Saudi Arabia.<sup>459</sup> For the Palestinians, since they were present in Kuwait in large numbers, they would establish a temporary homeland there under Saddam's sponsorship.<sup>460</sup>

Both Jordan and Yemen received large amounts of Saudi foreign aid.<sup>461</sup> However, the people in Jordan saw only a little portion of the Saudi aid as the political elite used most of this aid for its own interests.<sup>462</sup> Yemen enjoyed extensive Saudi support politically, economically and militarily.<sup>463</sup> But, the border problems between Yemen and Saudi Arabia were given inflated importance by the Yemenis.<sup>464</sup> The Saudi government could not understand the Yemeni attitude, and their refusal to recognise the borders that had been agreed officially in the Ta'if treaty signed between the two countries in 1934.<sup>465</sup>

As the Gulf crisis continued the Saudi foreign policy grew stronger.<sup>466</sup> On September 19, 1990, Saudi Arabia expelled Jordanian, Palestinian, Yemeni and Iraqi diplomats, charging them with activities "incompatible with their status which had endangered security".<sup>467</sup> The same day Saudi Arabia cut all oil supplies to Jordan (33,000 bd worth \$1 million), referring to non-payment of bills and also Saudi Arabia cut off all imports of Jordanian produce.<sup>468</sup> Jordanian losses in the first year of the crisis have been estimated at some 50 percent of GDP.<sup>469</sup> In addition, Saudi Arabia declared new visa regulations for the Yemenis (more than 1.5 million), which compelled them to leave Saudi Arabia.<sup>470</sup>

Given the situation, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein felt that he was isolated from the key Arab countries. He decided to try to split the Arab coalition by appealing to the Arab people. During the Arab summit on August 10, 1990, he asked all Arabs to: "Save Mecca and the tomb of the prophet Mohammed in Medina from occupation... this is the day for you to stand up to defend Mecca, which is captive of the spears of the Americans and Zionists... imperialism attended to its interests in oil... when it established these dwarf oil states. Thus, it prevented the majority of sons of the people and the Arab nation from benefiting from their own wealth".<sup>471</sup>

In response to Saddam's call to protect the Islamic holy places from occupation by Americans, the Muslim World League, based in Mecca, made it clear that the conflict zone was far away from the two holy places and that the military forces were located along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border more than 900 miles away.<sup>472</sup> In several interviews with American television networks on August 10, 1990, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., stated that the holy places are in safe hands.<sup>473</sup> He commented on the American deployment with the words "These forces are in place because of the crisis which has resulted from Iraqi aggression".<sup>474</sup> The Prince commented on the Iraqi President's attack on Saudi Arabia over the fact that it was seeking the assistance of the United States. He contrasted it with the Iraqi position during the Iran-Iraq war, when Saddam Hussein had asked for Saudi support to get help from the U.S.<sup>475</sup> At this time, Saddam considered seeking U.S. support a patriotic act.<sup>476</sup> Prince Bandar stated that Saddam Hussein had often received help from the U.S. but only now Saddam talked of American assistance as coming from "imperialists".<sup>477</sup> In general, Prince Bandar described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as "Very serious and resulting purely from the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait".<sup>478</sup>

Thereafter, Saddam Hussein recognised that he was still on the defensive.<sup>479</sup> Therefore, he tried another manoeuvre.<sup>480</sup> On August 12, 1990, Saddam Hussein presented a three point initiative as a pre-condition to the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. First, an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories in West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, and also a similar withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon.<sup>481</sup> Second, an immediate withdrawal of American troops and other forces from Saudi Arabia. These forces would be replaced by Arab troops whose size, nationality, duty and deployment would be defined by the UN Security Council.<sup>482</sup> Third, all boycott and siege decisions against Iraq should be frozen immediately.<sup>483</sup>

Throughout the crisis by linking Kuwait to the Palestinian question, Saddam Hussein desired to represent himself as the champion of the Arab cause and the winner of the majority of the Arab people.<sup>484</sup> Immediately, Saddam Hussein's linkage was welcomed by Palestinians and the Jordanian press. People on the streets of Jordan, mounted pro-Saddam demonstrations.<sup>485</sup> There was an absolute consensus among these people that Saddam had made the right links.<sup>486</sup> The

response to Saddam's proposal, by the Arab members of the coalition and the U.S. was to reject it and not even discuss it (see Chapter six).<sup>487</sup>

Saddam Hussein recognised that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were preparing for war more rapidly and with far greater resolve than he had expected.<sup>488</sup> Thus, on August 15, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent a letter to the Iranian President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, suggesting a peace with Iran.<sup>489</sup> The Iraqi leader agreed to share sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, one of the main causes of the eight year war with Iran.<sup>490</sup> Saddam Hussein also pledged a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from all remaining areas of Iran which had been occupied during the war, as well as exchange of prisoners of war.<sup>491</sup> In short, this meant a return to the situation that existed before the Iran-Iraq war, which was based on the 1975 Algiers agreement.<sup>492</sup> The Iraqi letter took the Iranian leadership by complete surprise, but it became obvious within the next day that Iraq no longer wished to concern itself over Iran on its eastern side.<sup>493</sup> However, Iran was concerned over the occupation of Kuwait, and publicly declared support for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.<sup>494</sup> Actually, the Iranian leadership described the American deployment as a "safeguard to Saudi Arabia in the face of Iraqi threats".<sup>495</sup>

On the international level, the strongest support for the U.S. was from Britain.<sup>496</sup> Having been in the U.S. when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was closely associated with the development of the American strategy from the beginning.<sup>497</sup> Britain sent to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, strike aircraft interceptors, naval forces and an armoured brigade. It was third only to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the number of forces in the area.<sup>498</sup>

By now, the Gulf crisis had moved into a dramatic struggle between two opponents, George Bush and Saddam Hussein.<sup>499</sup> The Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk, described the situation in the Gulf as a battle shaping up between Iraq and the United States over Saudi Arabia.<sup>500</sup> While, Galen Carpenter, Foreign Policy Director of the Cato Institute, said "As Washington rushed into the conflict it seemed almost grateful for the opportunity to demonstrate America's continuing global leadership in a post-Cold War setting".<sup>501</sup> Indeed, President Bush talked to the Pentagon staff on August 15, 1990, which he stressed that there was "No substitute for American leadership, which could not be effective in the absence of American strength".<sup>502</sup> He repeated

the American objectives in the Gulf with the words "The free flow of oil, was necessary to protect our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world, which would all suffer if control of the world's oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein".<sup>503</sup>

President Bush's speech to the American nation and to the Pentagon staff declared that the U.S. must make a stand not simply to protect resources, but to protect the freedom of nations.<sup>504</sup> President Bush said the defence of Saudi Arabia was of "vital interest" to the United States, which explained his decision to send U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>505</sup> But President Bush's top objective did not clarify how the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait touched the lives of Americans or affected their future.<sup>506</sup> For many Americans, the connection was not clear.<sup>507</sup> The rapid increase in oil prices, from \$16 barrel to \$30 on August 18, led many Americans to wonder "why should we be involved? We could get oil from Mexico".<sup>508</sup> Even former U.S. President Carter said "It would be a mistake to send U.S. troops to the Middle East unless Iraq also invades Saudi Arabia".<sup>509</sup>

Thomas L. Friedman explained that the reason that the Bush administration did not clearly articulate what was at stake was that the true political and economic interests involved were not as morally superior as some of the principles used by President Bush to justify the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>510</sup> Friedman stressed that the United States did not send troops to help Saudi Arabia to resist Iraqi aggression from Kuwait.<sup>511</sup> It was about oil, supporting the OPEC countries that were more likely to supply Washington's interests and punishing those that are not, and about who will set the price of oil.<sup>512</sup>

In other words, the interests of the Bush administration could be divided into three categories: (1) the price of oil, (2) who controls the oil, and (3) the requirement to defend the integrity of national boundaries.<sup>513</sup> The oil price debate goes as follows: if Iraq was able to get away with the annexation of Kuwait, Iraq would control 20 per cent of the world's oil reserves.<sup>514</sup> If Iraq could then intimidate or invade Saudi Arabia, the Iraqis would have authority over 45 per cent of the world's oil reserves.<sup>515</sup> Undoubtedly, this would be unsatisfactory for the U.S., because Iraq would be able to control the oil price set by OPEC.<sup>516</sup> In the OPEC meeting before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was pressing OPEC countries to increase the oil price from about \$15 a barrel to \$25.<sup>517</sup> As has been noted, Saudi Arabia convinced

Iraq and other members of OPEC to adopt the price of \$21 a barrel.<sup>518</sup> The difference for Americans between \$21 a barrel and \$25 a barrel was about 5 cents a gallon at the gas station pump.<sup>519</sup> In the other words, according to the price argument, one reason that the Bush administration rushed into Saudi Arabia was to get petrol 5 cents a gallon cheaper than it would otherwise.<sup>520</sup> But some American officials argued that there was more at stake than a 5 cent increase at the gasoline station pump.<sup>521</sup> They said, Saddam Hussein was only asking for \$25 a barrel because at that time, he did not control OPEC enough to ask more.<sup>522</sup> If Iraq could, directly or indirectly dominate 45 per cent of the world's oil reserves, American officials argued, who knows what price Saddam would seek; \$40 a barrel or maybe \$50 a barrel.<sup>523</sup> That would force all Western economies into recession.<sup>524</sup> On the other hand, it was not all clear that Saddam Hussein would have any more interest in increasing oil prices to \$50 a barrel than Saudi Arabia did when it controlled OPEC.<sup>525</sup> The U.S. with 2 per cent of the world's population and about 4 per cent of its oil reserves, consumes a quarter of the world's oil, but only produces about one-seventh of the world's supply.<sup>526</sup> The U.S. is in fact, the world's largest oil importer.<sup>527</sup>

The second category is who controls the oil. The debate goes, that it is in the U.S. interest that the control of oil be divided among many countries, but that the greatest influence to be in Saudi hands.<sup>528</sup> The reason is that, unlike Iraq, Saudi Arabia had been historically more responsive to U.S. interests since it was anti-Soviet Union.<sup>529</sup> In the past, when the U.S. was opposing the Soviet Union and contesting with Moscow for influence in the Middle East, whose allies dominated the oil reserves had a military and strategic dimension.<sup>530</sup> Yet, with the Soviet Union's co-operation during the Gulf crisis, that debate has to be dismissed.<sup>531</sup>

The third category is the requirement to defend the integrity of national boundaries so that dictatorial regional powers would not easily invade their neighbours.<sup>532</sup> American officials discussed the stability of the post-Cold War world.<sup>533</sup> Surely, they argued, it is necessary for future world security that the U.S. and the Soviet Union steadfastly and together present a clear sign that the Iraqi invasion and others of that type would not be accepted.<sup>534</sup> The sovereignty of nations must be supported as Secretary of State, James Baker, said in a speech to NATO in the first week of the Iraqi invasion, "If might is to make right, then the world will be plunged into a new dark age".<sup>535</sup>

Undoubtedly, the vital interests to which President Bush referred are both genuine and important, given the U.S. great dependence on imported oil.<sup>536</sup> The Bush administration had a complete set of assumptions about the significance of the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia.<sup>537</sup> However, it did not always spell out effectively to the American public what was at stake.<sup>538</sup> In the second week of the Iraqi invasion, General Colin Powell said to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf "I don't see us going to war over Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, yes, if we had to; but not Kuwait".<sup>539</sup> The failure of the American people to understand the justification of their troops deployment in Saudi Arabia can be understood because of the failure of President Bush and his staff to explain their foreign policy about the Gulf crisis to the American people in terms they could understand.<sup>540</sup>

The American people could not be blamed for not understanding their government's foreign policy. However, the same can not be said for American officials and members of the press, since they lived in world of the U.S. foreign policy and they should have understood the factors necessitating sending U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. For instance, Representative Robert Dornan, a conservative Republican from California, said with heavy sarcasm "American don't die for Princes, Sultans and Emirs".<sup>541</sup> Each day the questioning about whether American blood was worth shedding for cheap oil grew louder.<sup>542</sup> Even the New York Times wrote on its front page during the first month of the Iraqi invasion, "Surely, it is not American policy to make the world safe for federalism".<sup>543</sup> If not, then why was the U.S. government so concerned about the Iraqi occupation?

### **The 1990 oil crisis**

Equally important, one significant question stood out, since the price of oil had nearly doubled from \$16 a barrel pre- the Iraqi invasion to \$30 a barrel by August 8, 1990.<sup>544</sup> Would the U.S. use its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), to protect the economies of oil consuming nations? The SPR was established in the middle 1970s and was now holding more than 600 million barrels of oil in reserve.<sup>545</sup> The SPR was accumulated to prevent economic disruption caused by increases in the price of oil.<sup>546</sup> From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, there was an important argument.<sup>547</sup> Was the SPR to be used only in the event of an oil shortage caused by the Iraqi invasion and the UN sanctions against Iraq, or was it also to be used to prevent a major oil price that would greatly hurt the U.S. economy?<sup>548</sup> Some



analysts pointed out that a doubling of the oil price would deal a massive blow to the entire economy.<sup>549</sup> In the event of a crisis, the rule of "early release" had been advanced by the Reagan administration, and the SPR might well have been used to flood the oil market, thus, stopping a major oil price rise, which had happened in 1973 and 1979 to such a disastrous effect.<sup>550</sup>

On August 19, 1990, after the price of oil had risen to \$30 a barrel, Saudi Arabia announced that it was willing to increase its own oil production to fill the gap in world oil production of some 3 million b/d. The shortfall was caused by the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil supplies.<sup>551</sup> King Fahd stated that "Saudi Arabia wishes there to be sufficient oil supplies available on the world market at normal prices, so that no countries, be they developing or developed, are harmed as a result of the Iraqi aggression".<sup>552</sup> This has been described, as one of Saudi Arabia's most important economic contributions to the stability of the oil market during the Gulf crisis and significantly moderated its global effects.<sup>553</sup> At the end of August 1990, Saudi production had been increased by 2 million b/d, to 7.4 million b/d. It reached over 8 million b/d by November 1990, and the American debate over SPR was settled.<sup>554</sup>

In spite of the rise in oil production, oil price did not stop increasing, but the pressure on the price of oil was moderated.<sup>555</sup> From nearly \$40 per barrel in early October 1990, prices fell to below \$30 per barrel later in that month and to \$20 in December.<sup>556</sup> By the end of 1990, the oil supply requirement was improved, as the U.S. and other countries headed into economic recession.<sup>557</sup>

Furthermore, in the middle of August 1990, there was no evidence of any oil producers preparing to meet the oil gap left by Iraq and Kuwait.<sup>558</sup> Saudi Arabia alone could fill about two-thirds of the oil gap, as long as its security was guaranteed.<sup>559</sup> Since, the U.S. had committed itself to help Saudi Arabia and to protect the country from Iraq, then Saudi Arabia was obligated to moderate the effects of the crisis on the world markets. Therefore, on August 19, 1990, the Saudi Oil Minister, Hisham Nazar, announced that his country would increase production by 2 million b/d. However, within two days at an emergency meeting of OPEC to authorise the increases in production, some of the other OPEC members did not agree.<sup>560</sup> Not surprisingly, Iraq declared any such increase in production would be an "act of aggression". Iraq was still hoping that oil pressures would

undermine the bond of the coalition.<sup>561</sup> Libya supported Iraq.<sup>562</sup> Iran was pleased at the general direction of the price of oil.<sup>563</sup> These three countries argued that there was already sufficient oil to meet demand without new efforts.<sup>564</sup> Others, including Indonesia, Algeria and Nigeria's supported a modest rise.<sup>565</sup> They did not see it as the Cartel's mission to save the West from its economic crisis.<sup>566</sup> They believed if the matters were that serious then the West should free some of its strategic reserves.<sup>567</sup> In contrast, the countries who sided with Saudi Arabia were the UAE, Venezuela, Kuwait and Qatar.<sup>568</sup>

In the end, the majority of OPEC were still convinced that the Saudi direction had to be followed if OPEC itself was to have any hope of surviving the crisis.<sup>569</sup> On August 28, 1990, an agreement was reached which called for a temporary suspension of OPEC quotas to allow for higher oil production.<sup>570</sup> It called also for a return to the regular OPEC quotas when the oil crisis was considered to be over.<sup>571</sup> To pass this resolution, the OPEC Ministers went into formal sessions, and issued invitations to the Iraqis and the Libyans to attend before they did so.<sup>572</sup> The two did not come, but with ten of the OPEC's thirteen members supporting the resolution to suspend quotas the resolution was passed.<sup>573</sup> As a result, Venezuela and the UAE filled the rest of the oil gap, as well as, to a lesser extent, Nigeria.<sup>574</sup>

As a result of the rise in the price of oil and their increase in oil production, Saudi Arabia made \$13 billion in oil revenues by the end of 1990.<sup>575</sup> But the costs to Saudi Arabia of the Kuwait crisis were great and they were growing.<sup>576</sup> Saudi Arabia had to pay Saudi hotels and homes for the accommodation, of 360,000 Kuwaitis who had escaped the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>577</sup> In addition, in early September 1990, King Fahd ordered that U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia would be supplied with all food, fuel, water, accommodation, local transport and other facilities that they needed at Saudi expense.<sup>578</sup> Saudi Arabia also paid over \$5.5 billion as aid to poor Asian and African countries that were affected by the crisis.<sup>579</sup>

Even the Soviet Union prepared itself to ask for money, despite the extra \$2 billion which Moscow had gained from the increase in oil prices.<sup>580</sup> The Soviet Union claimed to be a super power with its own viewpoint and the option to support Iraq.<sup>581</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia paid Moscow \$4 billion to ensure its loyalty.<sup>582</sup> In general, Saudi Arabia's estimated expenditure directly related to the Kuwait crisis was about \$64 billion and the U.S. got alone more than £13.5 billion.<sup>583</sup>

Bangladesh and Pakistan were the only two Muslim countries in Asia to agree to send troops to Saudi Arabia, in the hope of receiving aid.<sup>584</sup> Pakistan sent 5,000 men and asked initially that Saudi Arabia pay \$1 billion to compensate its economy for losses caused by the crisis.<sup>585</sup> Malaysia and Indonesia declined to send troops, despite the aid which they had received from Saudi Arabia for many years.<sup>586</sup> For instance, Indonesia received more than \$234 million and had more than 300,000 males and females working in Saudi Arabia.<sup>587</sup>

Undoubtedly, the strongest help apart from that received from the U.S. and the U.K. came to Saudi Arabia from the Western countries; France, Belgium, Australia, Canada and others.<sup>588</sup> With all these countries coming to assist, President Bush wanted time to integrate the coalition, build up military strength in Saudi Arabia and to allow the economic sanctions to work.<sup>589</sup> If President Bush had moved quickly to take early and risky action it might have failed and left Saddam with permanent profits, from his original aggression.<sup>590</sup> Thus, President Bush continued his efforts to obtain a U.N. resolution on the implementation of the anti-Iraq embargo by military means. UN resolution 665 called on the states co-operating with the government of Kuwait, to stop all navigational shipping to or from Iraq by force if necessary.<sup>591</sup> The resolution was passed on August 25, 1995, by 13 to 0 with Yemen and Cuba abstaining.<sup>592</sup> The resolution was the first in the crisis to sanction the option of force.<sup>593</sup> It also displayed that the initiative still lay with the U.S. and its allies.<sup>594</sup>

On August 30, 1990, the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration had put together an economic action plan to cover the cost of the deployment of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and to aid the countries harmed by the trade embargo against Iraq.<sup>595</sup> Of the \$25 billion to be collected, half would go to funding "Desert Shield", it was estimated, which would cost \$6 billion through to the end of 1990 and a further \$1 billion a month after that on average.<sup>596</sup> Saudi Arabia would pay \$4 billion immediately and another \$500 million a month to cover food, water and transportation and other costs for the foreign troops on Saudi territory; Kuwait \$5 billion and another \$400 million every month; and the UAE \$1 billion and another \$100 million a month.<sup>597</sup> This presented a total from the three GCC states of \$10 billion immediately and \$1 billion each month.<sup>598</sup> Other contributions came from Japan \$4 billion; the European Community; and West Germany \$1.8 billion.<sup>599</sup>

### Arab efforts to find a solution

Some Arab leaders sided with Iraq and called for an alternative "Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis. For instance, on August 28, 1990, King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat suggested that: 1) the joint withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and foreign troops from Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi troops in Kuwait to be replaced by an Arab peacekeeping force; 2) an election in Kuwait to choose a new Kuwaiti government and a new parliament, with the new government signing an agreement giving Iraq certain rights over Kuwait.<sup>600</sup> The idea was to turn Kuwait into another Monaco, independent in name but in reality dependent on its neighbour.<sup>601</sup>

Other Arab leaders supported Saudi Arabia's call for an "Arab solution". On November 13, 1990, King Hassan II of Morocco called for an emergency Arab summit to work out an Arab solution to the Gulf crisis and avoid war over Iraq's refusal to quit Kuwait.<sup>602</sup> Actually, King Hassan's proposal came after Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, returned to Baghdad after a meeting with King Hassan.<sup>603</sup> The official Iraqi News Agency said President Saddam would consider attending the Arab summit if he was consulted on the time and the place and if the Palestinian problem was on the agenda.<sup>604</sup> Ramadan also said that an Arab summit should "Erase the infamous Cairo summit resolution, which created divisions in the Arab stance toward the dangers (facing it) and the collusion against the Arab nation created by its enemies, led by the U.S. and its allies".<sup>605</sup>

Saudi Arabia for its part rejected all the Arab proposals including King Hassan's proposal. The government of Saudi Arabia said that it would not take part in any proposed Arab summit until Iraq promised to pull out of Kuwait.<sup>606</sup> The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, said that any Arab meetings will bear no fruit or results unless Iraq promises to follow the resolutions of the emergency Arab summit and of the United Nations.<sup>607</sup> Therefore, Saddam Hussein tried to meet with King Fahd personally.<sup>608</sup> All of the messages sent by Saddam Hussein to King Fahd through indirect channels stressed that the crisis would be resolved if

this meeting took place.<sup>609</sup> But, King Fahd always rejected to meet with him unless Saddam Hussein officially announced his resolution to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>610</sup>

### **The U.S.-Saudi offensive option**

Iraq had no choice but to endure the impact of the UN embargo on its economy. Saddam Hussein thought that the longer the crisis went on, the greater the chances were that Iraq would be able to claim a victory.<sup>611</sup> The economic embargo caused Iraq to lose about \$80 million in oil revenue alone.<sup>612</sup> By December 1990, it has been reported that the embargo had produced a 50 per cent drop in Iraq's GNP.<sup>613</sup> However, the Iraqi people could live with the embargo because Iraq had already had been through an economic recession during its eight-year war with Iran.<sup>614</sup> During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein had asked Iraqi women to feed their families half their usual food.<sup>615</sup> Thus, it was not hard for the Iraqis to manage with the new sanctions. Despite the fact that Jordan and Yemen helped to break the sanctions, the sanctions placed on Iraq were still effective.<sup>616</sup>

In fact, sanctions alone did not force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.<sup>617</sup> The United Nations Security Council had already determined that sanctions alone would simply not be enough.<sup>618</sup> What was suggested was that an embargo should be implemented for a period of time, alongside the build-up of a military force. The force would be used when the embargo was considered to be failing to achieve Washington's and Riyadh's goals.<sup>619</sup>

Saudi Arabia was convinced that sanctions and the requests of the international community would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>620</sup> Once the Saudis had reached that conclusion, they had no choice other than to prepare for war. To the Saudis it seemed that war was the only way to reach a satisfactory end to the Kuwait crisis and the way that would bring the most benefit to Saudi Arabia and create the most secure situation in the Gulf.<sup>621</sup> King Fahd stated that Saudi's aim in the war was to force Iraq to withdraw to within its borders and to restore the rule of Al-Sabah family in Kuwait and to remove the threat to the Kingdom's security.<sup>622</sup> The Saudis had no dispute with the Iraqi people.<sup>623</sup> The problem was not just Iraq's power, but Saddam's ambition.<sup>624</sup> That ambition, expressed in

repeated aggression, must be defeated decisively to bring the situation to a conclusion as quickly as possible.<sup>625</sup> Because of regional and domestic consideration, the government of Saudi Arabia did not want the break-up of Iraq.<sup>626</sup> At the same time, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would still continue to need Iraq as a regional counterbalance to Iran.<sup>627</sup> For this purpose, it was adequate to silence Saddam and to destroy his capability to command a force against the alliance troops in Saudi Arabia.<sup>628</sup> Therefore, to destroy Iraq's chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction were at the top of the list of alliance objectives.<sup>629</sup> The CIA issued a report that Iraq was only two years away from making nuclear weapon.<sup>630</sup>

Nevertheless, when the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed that the U.S. would deploy troops in Saudi Arabia, there were no formal instruments and detailed guidelines laid down.<sup>631</sup> Thus, in early September 1990, strains appeared between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The strain was related to the control of the military command of the coalition and who controlled decisions about offensive operations. The Saudi Commander, Lieutenant General Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, argued that American troops could not serve under Saudi command; and likewise, Saudi and other Arab troops could not serve under American command.<sup>632</sup>

Lieutenant General Khaled Bin Sultan also stressed that it was necessary for Saudi Arabia to exercise control over the foreign troops on its territory.<sup>633</sup> From the start of the Gulf crisis, on August 10, 1990, King Fahd had appointed Lt. General Khaled Bin Sultan as a Joint Forces Commander with wide responsibilities for the defence of Saudi Arabia.<sup>634</sup> In addition, from the beginning, King Fahd, Crown Prince Abdullah and the Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan were agreed that Saudi troops were not to serve under any command but their own.<sup>635</sup> The need to defend the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia was of vital importance, so it was determined that the Saudis must stay in the front of the American, and that if the Iraqis attacked, the Saudis would be the first to shed blood.<sup>636</sup> Therefore, the Saudis pushed their troops all the way up to the border of Kuwait.<sup>637</sup>

The second strain in U.S.-Saudi military relations was over who controlled the decision to conduct offensive operations. On August 28, 1990, Lt. Gen. Khaled Bin Sultan said to the journalists that any action from Saudi Arabia would have to be discussed between King Fahd and President Bush.<sup>638</sup> The U.S. Military

Commander in Saudi Arabia, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, objected strongly to the Saudi position and sent his objections to the White House.<sup>639</sup> Gen. Schwarzkopf wanted a totally free hand for the U.S. in military matters.<sup>640</sup> He stated in his book "I would need fifty percent of the Iraqi occupying forces destroyed before launching whatever ground offensive we might eventually plan".<sup>641</sup> On August 28, 1990, Gen. Schwarzkopf said to the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, "If Saddam attacks, I promise you he will suffer the greatest losses in the history of warfare".<sup>642</sup>

But Prince Sultan replied "That is not what I want to see. I have no wish to damage Iraq. But if Saddam persists in being stubborn, if he persists in being a disgrace to Islam, then we will do everything in our power to stop him".<sup>643</sup> Prince Sultan further stated at a news conference on September 1, 1990, that the U.S. troops would not be allowed to launch hostage rescue operations from Saudi territory, and that "Our Kingdom will not serve as a theatre for action that is not defensive".<sup>644</sup>

To reach agreement about who would decide when to take and whether to take offensive action, took quite a time. President Bush met with the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan and explained his fears that the Saudi condition that prior permission be obtained from King Fahd before the Saudi-based American force could mount any operations against Iraq could leave U.S. troops "hamstrung in certain situations".<sup>645</sup> Prince Bandar replied that U.S. forces had been invited to Saudi Arabia on the clear understanding that their role was to be defensive.<sup>646</sup> He stressed that the original agreement between King Fahd and U.S. Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, was that "U.S. forces were invited into the Kingdom to defend it from attack from Iraq and by implication, would need Saudi permission for anything but defensive operations".<sup>647</sup> In other words, any use of Saudi bases to launch a strike against Iraq, which might draw retaliation against Saudi Arabia must not be made without King Fahd's approval.<sup>648</sup> The issue was left unresolved, until one month later, Washington accepted Riyadh's point of view.<sup>649</sup> On November 5, 1990, the Saudi-American understanding on command and control was finally reached during a long talk between King Fahd, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saudi Al-Faisal, and Secretary of State, James Baker.<sup>650</sup> The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement that formally established for the first time in history of the Saudi-American relations, a U.S.-Saudi joint military command.<sup>651</sup> The two sides agreed that any offensive action taken against Iraqi troops in Kuwait or against Iraq and begun from Saudi territory, would be

undertaken only after President Bush and King Fahd had both given their permission.<sup>652</sup>

Undoubtedly, the U.S.-Saudi joint military command enhanced the credibility of the mounting threat of force that Washington and Riyadh had been making to convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.<sup>653</sup> Secretary of State, James Baker, told the reporters "This crisis is entering a new phase".<sup>654</sup> He also said that Washington and Riyadh still wanted to try to work through the United Nations.<sup>655</sup> He said that both countries agreed in principle to work together in the near future to attempt to convince the Security Council to adopt a resolution permitting the use of force if it is considered to be the only way to move Iraq from Kuwait.<sup>656</sup>


In September, on the ground there were two Saudi armoured brigades, one mechanized brigade and one airborne brigade, camped near Hafar Al Batin (north of Saudi Arabia) and at Al Khafji. This formed the first line of defence.<sup>657</sup> Two mechanized brigades of the GCC Rapid Deployment Force, one brigade of Egyptians, 3000 Syrian Commandos, 2000 Pakistani infantrymen, and 1200 Bangladeshi soldiers together composed the second line of defence.<sup>658</sup> Then, a 100 miles south of Kuwait border, a third line of defence in the shape of an arc, consisting of 70,000 Americans, (including 40,000 American marines), British troops and other friendly forces was deployed.<sup>659</sup> The final defence plan was formed at the end of September 1990 (see Map 5).<sup>660</sup> In addition, Saudi Arabia deployed two mechanized brigades an infantry brigade along the coastline of the Gulf leading to Al Jubayl, and another brigade was created, mostly of fighting units from other GCC countries, along the way to King Khaled Military City, near Hafar Al Batin.<sup>661</sup> These forces had been ordered to defend their position to the death. Gen. Schwarzkopf told his staff that in any ground war against Iraq, "Arab forces must be the ones to liberate Kuwait City".<sup>662</sup>

The political, military and economic motivations to remain inside the coalition were just too strong for Iraq to break and key coalition members, especially the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, worked hard to keep it that way.<sup>663</sup> Thus, on September 23, 1990, Iraq declared that it was Iraqi policy to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia in the event of war.<sup>664</sup> Somewhere, there would be an opportunity to play the "Israel Card", and so put pressure on Arab countries to leave the coalition.<sup>665</sup> If Iraq attacked Israel



and the Israelis retaliated this would test the unity of the coalition.<sup>666</sup> The Iraqi regime believed that the coalition could not survive the political impact of a widened war.<sup>667</sup> Egypt expressed hostility to Israeli involvement. President Mubarak said, "We do not and would not allow Israel to intervene... We do not accept Israel's military interference in the Gulf crisis. Should this happen, we would have to take a different stand".<sup>668</sup> Syria said that if Israel responds and sent missiles and planes over Syria to attack Iraq, Syria would consider it an act of war against Syria.<sup>669</sup> The Saudis were concerned with the necessity to protect Saudi Arabia and preserve the coalition. King Fahd told James Baker that it would be better for everyone if Israel stayed out and that under no circumstances would Arab forces allow themselves to be perceived as allied with Israelis.<sup>670</sup>

**Map 5**



Saudi Arabian National Guard battalions (SANG), Saudi Arabia (SA), Kuwait (KU), Egyptian (EG), Syrian (SY), French (FR), British (BR) brigades; and U.S. Marine (USMC) and Army (24, 82 and 101 divisions).

Source: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, 1992, Bantam Books p.433.

President Bush had to reach a strategic agreement with Israel which would mean that the Israelis would not strike against Iraq.<sup>671</sup> The U.S. pressured Israel to adopt this policy of restriction to permit the coalition to continue.<sup>672</sup> The Israelis

recognised that the U.S. might destroy or at least weaken a dangerous enemy.<sup>673</sup> So, Israel agreed to the extremely reasonable role of staying out of the Gulf crisis and contributed directly to the unity of the Gulf multinational coalition.<sup>674</sup> Israel's determination not to retaliate against Iraqi attacks helped maintain the unity of the Arab countries within the coalition structure.<sup>675</sup>

President Bush saw that the longer the crisis went on without resolution, the more the pressure inside the coalition would increase.<sup>676</sup> After the first batch of American forces, 200,000 men, were in place, President Bush planned to double the U.S. deployment and move from a defensive to an offensive game plan.<sup>677</sup> On November 5, 1990, Secretary of State, James Baker, got King Fahd's permission to increase the number of American forces in Saudi Arabia.<sup>678</sup> King Fahd said to the Secretary of State, James Baker, "I have never set a limit on troop strength".<sup>679</sup> He also said "While we all still want peace, if we must go to war, Saudi Arabia's armed forces will fight side by side with yours".<sup>680</sup> King Fahd's objectives moved from defensive to offensive goals to roll back Iraqi might, remove the threat to Saudi security, and to restore the status quo in Kuwait and the Gulf.<sup>681</sup> King Fahd wanted to ensure that the coalition had enough offensive military capability and intended to ensure that the war against Iraq would be short and complete and guaranteed by large numbers of troops. Thus, on November 8, 1990, President Bush announced the doubling of the U.S. force in Saudi Arabia by sending another 230,000 men.<sup>682</sup> Then, President Bush began to clear the way diplomatically for a new UN Security Council resolution, authorising military action to free Kuwait if Iraq did not withdraw.<sup>683</sup> On November 29, 1990, UN Security Council resolution 678 gave Iraq a chance to pull out of Kuwait before January 15, 1990.<sup>684</sup> After the deadline, the resolution authorised the allies to use all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>685</sup> Twelve members of the Security Council voted in favour, two (Yemen and Cuba) voted against, and one (China) abstained.<sup>686</sup>

On the contrary, the U.S. military action objectives, in the Saudis' view, were to defend U.S. access to Arabian oil; protect Israel's security; remove Saddam's threat to the political order in the Gulf; and affirm America as a global superpower.<sup>687</sup> Alexander Haig, U.S. former Secretary of State, testified to the Committee that he supported President Bush's stated position: no negotiation, no conditions, no reward.<sup>688</sup> He said "Surely we did not undertake this costly mission simply to split the differences".<sup>689</sup> Mr Haig also stated that American forces would simply not

make Saddam a peacemaker or a force for Middle East stability nor should they give Iraq a seat at the table to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>690</sup>

Secretary of State, James Baker, testified on December 5, 1990, that if there was a withdrawal from Kuwait, then the U.S. had no further argument with the Iraqi regime.<sup>691</sup> He also stressed that there were significant costs if the U.S. waited too long.<sup>692</sup> On November 13, 1990, Mr Baker said:

The economic lifeline of the industrial world runs from the Gulf and we can not permit a dictator such as this to sit astride that economic lifeline. To bring it down to the level of the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs. If you want to sum it up in one word, it is jobs.<sup>693</sup>

Surely, another economic and military reason for the war was to advance U.S. arms sales to the region.<sup>694</sup> One of the U.S. defence department's first acts during the first month of the invasion was to secure a multi-million dollar arms contract with Saudi Arabia.<sup>695</sup> Saudi Arabia submitted an arms shopping list worth \$21 billion to the U.S. administration.<sup>696</sup> However, reacting to pressure from the U.S. Congress as well as the Israeli government, the White House reduced the sale down to \$6.7 billion, with a promise to Riyadh to complete the rest of the sale in January 1991.<sup>697</sup> A 1991 Congressional report asserted that U.S. weapons sales to the Third World, more than doubled in 1990, reaching \$18 billion. This included \$14.5 billion in sales to Saudi Arabia.<sup>698</sup>

In addition, there were other economic reasons for a U.S. military intervention in the Gulf related with the control and price of oil.<sup>699</sup> A U.S. military presence in the Gulf would let the U.S. influence the price of oil and production quotas. It would, therefore, increase the U.S.'s leverage over its Japanese and European competitors who were more dependent on the Gulf oil.<sup>700</sup> Furthermore, it would give the U.S. increased authority over Japan and Western Europe, whose economies were doing much better than that of the U.S. and would thus reverse the U.S. economic decline.<sup>701</sup> As a matter of fact, some economists were postulating that a successful war could move the U.S. out of recession, improve the budget deficit as well as improve the country's economic position in comparison with Japan and Western Europe.<sup>702</sup>

Another motivational factor for the U.S. intervention in the Gulf and later war was that staff of the Bush administration wanted to affirm the U.S. as the number one superpower after the collapse of the Soviet empire.<sup>703</sup> This affirmation proved the ability use of U.S. military power to effectively defend "national interests".<sup>704</sup> As Gabriele Kola commented, since the end of World War II, the U.S. military had been extremely concerned with its "credibility".<sup>705</sup> The U.S. evidently wanted its "enemies" to accept that it would use military power when U.S. interests were at stake and feared that its defeat in Vietnam had given the impression that the U.S. was unable to use its military power effectively.<sup>706</sup>

In testifying to Congress on January 8, 1991, Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State, stated his belief that Iraq would possess a nuclear weapons within two years (The CIA had also put out a report that Iraq was only two years from having a nuclear weapon). Such an assessment should be looked at carefully because U.S. assessments in 1981 were that Iraq was about 2 years away from achieving an independent nuclear weapon just as the Israelis took action.<sup>707</sup> At that time, Mr Haig asserted that Israel had done the right thing and not something which they had to be condemned for.<sup>708</sup> On November 15, 1990, President Bush said that in addition to forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S. wanted to get rid of Iraq's arsenal.<sup>709</sup> On December 10, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, went somewhat further in saying that even a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis would be pursued by continued pressure on Iraq to restrain its military power.<sup>710</sup> At the same time, Senator Sam Nun, Chair of Senate Armed Services Committee, asked in the four-day televised hearings on November 27, 1990, whether the destruction of Iraq's military capability been added to the original list of the U.S. objectives?<sup>711</sup> Public opinion polls displayed a drop in confidence over President Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis.<sup>712</sup> The polls also pointed out that many Americans assumed that their troops were supposed to be protecting oilfields rather than America's friends.<sup>713</sup> The public's responses as to what might be a good enough reason to go to war were instructive.<sup>714</sup> They showed that the Americans were unimpressed by arguments of economics and principle, but they could well understand an argument grounded on the threat of an Iraqi nuclear capability, which could be turned into a threat to their safety.<sup>715</sup> This perception was soon followed by a campaign to emphasise the nuclear risk.<sup>716</sup> In a statement to U.S.



forces in Dhahran on November 22, 1990, President Bush concluded the speech with a reference to the nuclear threat from Iraq:

Every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one day closer to his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that is another reason, frankly, why more and more our mission is marked by a real sense of urgency... He has never possessed a weapon that he has not used.<sup>717</sup>

Still, many Democrats, and some Republican, lawmakers were unhappy at the way President Bush was dealing with the Gulf crisis.<sup>718</sup> To them, President Bush was driving the U.S. towards a war with Iraq without seeking permission for war from Congress.<sup>719</sup> Consequently, President Bush surprised the world on November 30, 1990, by his unexpected change of direction.<sup>720</sup> He announced that he would go an "extra mile for peace" and proposed direct talks between the U.S. and Iraq on a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis.<sup>721</sup> President Bush suggested sending Secretary Baker to Baghdad and to admit Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to Washington, to meet himself and representatives of the international coalition.<sup>722</sup> The whole operation was created largely to reassure the Americans and the Congress that no ways were being left unexplored.<sup>723</sup> As Baker said "If force ends up being used we owe it to the American people and to others to show that we left no stone unturned in the search for peace".<sup>724</sup> However, President Bush emphasised that the U.S. would reject anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of all hostages.<sup>725</sup>

The U.S. proposal for talks, made Saddam excited. From the very beginning of the Gulf crisis he had pushed for direct dialogue with the United States.<sup>726</sup> Now possibilities opened up for Saddam if the Americans would only sit down with the Iraqis. In the past all such proposals had been refused.<sup>727</sup> Still trying to put themselves as equal partners of the United States in managing the crisis, the Iraqis did their best to avoid accidental air and navy clashes that might spark off the war.<sup>728</sup>

When Saddam's position was at its weakest, the U.S. suddenly expressed a wish to negotiate.<sup>729</sup> Saddam explained the Bush proposal as the beginning of his fall - caused by his clear troubles at home.<sup>730</sup> Possibly, Saddam convinced himself the U.S. did not have "the stomach" for a costly war.<sup>731</sup> Certainly, he gave that

impression to Ambassador Glaspie, during their conversation in July 1990. Maybe, the U.S. would wish to reach a compromise that would let him save face over the crisis and ensure his political survival.<sup>732</sup> The BBC's John Simpson reported from Baghdad, "There is no mistaking the feeling here that President Saddam Hussein has got the Americans on the run".<sup>733</sup>

On December 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein was interviewed by a French television.<sup>734</sup> He put the chances of war and peace at fifty-fifty, pointing out that this would depend on whether the U.S.-Iraq meeting was to be "a real dialogue" or only:

a formal session to give the American Congress, the American people, and international public opinion a good conscience and to allow them to say they tried to talk with Iraq and that Iraq refused to give up its position, then in that case we are closer to war.<sup>735</sup>

However, the Bush initiative caused the Saudis to react strongly.<sup>736</sup> President Bush had failed to inform King Fahd and the other key Arab in the coalition.<sup>737</sup> They were upset about being ignored on such a basic matter.<sup>738</sup> President Bush had gone beyond the UN Security Council resolutions and increased Saddam Hussein's popularity in the Arab world which was going to weaken the coalition.<sup>739</sup> King Fahd and the other key Arab in the coalition thought that President Bush had lost his desire to fight.<sup>740</sup> Therefore, King Fahd responded positively to the Arab heads of states who were engaged in consultations to end the crisis.<sup>741</sup> In early December 1990, President Chadil Ben Jadid of Algeria arrived in Baghdad to lay the ground for an Arab summit and finalise an agreement between Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>742</sup> He found the Iraqis in a good mood, (due to President Bush's proposal of talks), however, they were unwilling to move on the question of Kuwait.<sup>743</sup> The Iraqi Minister of Information had moved fast to prevent any ideas of Iraqi concessions "Kuwait is Iraqi - past, present and future - and not an inch of it will be given up".<sup>744</sup> In Jordan and Oman, the Algerian initiatives were warmly accepted, but there was little excitement in either Syria and Egypt.<sup>745</sup> President Ben Jadid never made it to Saudi Arabia because in these circumstances, President Bush had to move fast to the region to control the crisis.<sup>746</sup> He wanted to prevent any movement with a series of countries, opening up negotiations with Iraq and dividing the coalition.<sup>747</sup> In a phone conversation with King Fahd, President Bush promised that there would be no concession to Saddam.<sup>748</sup> President Bush had yet

to set the dates for Mr Baker and Mr Aziz to meet to prove to King Fahd and others his lack of interest in serious negotiation with Iraq.<sup>749</sup>

After Bush's "extra mile" speech, Saddam Hussein announced the release of all foreign hostages on December 6, 1990.<sup>750</sup> The release of the foreign hostages started on December 9, 1990, and by December 13, all the American hostages had gone.<sup>751</sup> At that time, there were in Iraq and Kuwait more than 2,700 Western and Japanese hostages, including approximately 500 at strategic sites. 1168, more than a third of the total hostages were British and about 700 were American!.<sup>752</sup> As they finally got out of the country, President Bush noted that he now had one less thing to worry about.<sup>753</sup> Saddam Hussein, thought that this move would tip balance in favour of the "peace camp".<sup>754</sup> He wanted to show goodwill to convince the American people that being flexible on the hostages suggested that he could be flexible on Kuwait as well.<sup>755</sup>

The Iraqis noted that President Bush had suggested a willingness to invite some of the coalition ambassadors to Washington to attend the talks with Mr Aziz.<sup>756</sup> Saddam Hussein then suggested that would invite a PLO delegation to his meeting with Mr Baker in Baghdad.<sup>757</sup> The Iraqis wanted to talk about Saddam's peace initiative of August 12. The Americans had no plan to discuss the Palestinian question and wanted to avoid its linkage with the Gulf crisis.<sup>758</sup> Aziz also wanted to meet Congressional leaders.<sup>759</sup> Therefore, President Bush dropped the idea of receiving foreign ministers.<sup>760</sup> On January 3, 1991, President Bush proposed a talk between Baker and Aziz in Geneva between January 7 and 9.<sup>761</sup> Then President Bush briefed Congressional leaders on January 3, 1991, telling them that this was the last set of initiatives he would make.<sup>762</sup> In turn, they accepted that no resolution would be sent to Congress before the Baker and Aziz meeting.<sup>763</sup>

The Arab members of the coalition warned the White House against reaching "Any settlement based on a partial withdrawal from Kuwait or on rewarding an aggression in the forthcoming meeting in Geneva".<sup>764</sup> President Bush quickly reassured them that he had no intention of letting Saddam off the hook.<sup>765</sup> The only design of the Geneva meeting, he asserted, was to insure that the Iraqis understood the peril of their situation, and that overwhelming force might be used against them if necessary.<sup>766</sup> The White House decided to send Saddam Hussein a letter from President Bush.<sup>767</sup> The purpose was to carry a severe but not hostile

message, in straightforward and simple language to exclude doubts that the Americans were not serious.<sup>768</sup> The whole line of argumentation in the letter followed a familiar standard: the only way to prevent a fight was to follow resolution 678, and this reflected the view of the complete international community and not just that of the United States.<sup>769</sup> There could be no reward for aggression for negotiations over possible withdrawal.<sup>770</sup> The benefits to Iraq after obeying the UN resolutions, were that it would be given the "opportunity to rejoin the international community" and for "the Iraqi military establishment" to escape destruction; the disadvantages accompanying rejection would involve much more than the loss of Kuwait.<sup>771</sup> Thus, the first item on the agenda of the Geneva meeting was Bush's letter, which Baker wished to deliver to Saddam Hussein.<sup>772</sup>

Secretary of State, James Baker, met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on January 9, 1991.<sup>773</sup> Mr Aziz refused to accept the letter, because it was "Full of threats and it has a language which is not normally used in dialogue between heads of states".<sup>774</sup> In the meeting, Baker did not move beyond the UN resolutions and Aziz remained consistent with Saddam's statement of August 12, 1990.<sup>775</sup> Mr Baker promised that Iraq would not be attacked if there was a positive response to the Security of Council resolutions.<sup>776</sup> He stated that the U.S. had no intention of maintaining its present level of military force once Iraqi forces had withdrawn, especially those equipped with offensive capabilities, and that the U.S. supported the idea of settling differences between Iraq and Kuwait peacefully as provided for by resolution 660.<sup>777</sup> Mr Baker reminded Mr Aziz that Iraq had miscalculated the international response to the invasion.<sup>778</sup> He hoped that Iraq would not miscalculate again.<sup>779</sup> He asserted that the coalition had deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the UN Security Council resolutions and they had both the might and the will to throw Iraq out of Kuwait.<sup>780</sup>

Mr Aziz replied that if the war broke out, Iraq would win.<sup>781</sup> There was no fear in Iraq of the imminent war.<sup>782</sup> He pointed out that Iraq came out of the war with Iran "With huge military power".<sup>783</sup> Therefore, the Geneva meeting failed after six hours of talks between Baker and Aziz.<sup>784</sup> James Baker reported that he heard nothing which indicated any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever.<sup>785</sup> He said "The conclusion is clear, Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution".<sup>786</sup>



make".<sup>801</sup> Thus, when he met Saddam Hussein he could not go beyond the mandate of the UN resolutions.<sup>802</sup> Saddam Hussein stated his conviction that there was an American-Israeli conspiracy to destroy Iraq as a powerful military force in the region.<sup>803</sup> He mistrusted the American promise that the withdrawing Iraqis would not be attacked.<sup>804</sup> Nevertheless, the Secretary-general reassured him that the U.S. would not attack Iraq or its armed forces if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait and the situation was returned to what it had been prior to August 2, 1990.<sup>805</sup> Furthermore, as reported by an Iraqi source, the Secretary-general promised that, if Iraq withdrew, the UN would prevent any violation of Iraqi soil by placing its own troops in the area.<sup>806</sup> He also promised to work toward the elimination of Israel's weapons of mass destruction.<sup>807</sup> Indeed, if Saddam really was ready to de-escalate the crisis, he would have found it easier to do so with the UN's Secretary-general than the United States.<sup>808</sup> However, Saddam presented him with a tough line in which he asserted that Kuwait was seen by all as Iraq's nineteenth province; Iraq would never withdraw in the face of threats, and thus, there would be no withdrawal.<sup>809</sup>

Clearly, Saddam Hussein's moves were based on a massive miscalculation.<sup>810</sup> It seemed to Saddam that President Bush had suggested the Geneva meeting as a result of Congressional pressure, and that he would offer Iraq nothing more than an unconditional withdrawal.<sup>811</sup> Saddam Hussein was convinced that the U.S. did not have the power to prevent him continuing his occupation of Kuwait.<sup>812</sup> Ironically, many top U.S. military personnel shared his conviction.<sup>813</sup> Saddam Hussein believed that the U.S. could not afford the heavy casualties that they suffered during the Vietnam war.<sup>814</sup> As he asserted to the American Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, at the end of July 1990, "Yours is a society which can not accept 10,000 dead in one battle".<sup>815</sup> On another occasion, Saddam Hussein said in early September 1990, "The Vietnamese people were the last to confront this (American) sophisticated capability (and to withstand it)".<sup>816</sup>

The Iraqis did not completely understand the massive qualitative gap between their field commanders, tank crews and tanks and those of the Allied forces.<sup>817</sup> Saddam Hussein and his generals failed to recognise the differences between air superiority over the Vietnamese jungles and the Gulf desert.<sup>818</sup> They did not predict that in the Gulf desert the U.S. could make such an effective air campaign that avoided the high casualties which the Iraqis had assumed.<sup>819</sup> Furthermore,

the Iraqis believed, that as a result of Vietnam, the American public would avoid deaths in a long war.<sup>820</sup>

If Saddam withdrew from Kuwait, then other actors in the area-including Kuwait would require a remaining Western presence and he would set himself to be at continual risk.<sup>821</sup> A strategy of concentrated defence, was Saddam's best tactic to perform his political objective of holding on to as much of Kuwait as possible.<sup>822</sup> Following the invasion, the Iraqi people were confident that the West had a secret agenda: they were not actually interested in freeing Kuwait, they wanted to destroy Iraq.<sup>823</sup> This propaganda prepared the Iraqis to see even a withdrawal from Kuwait as a qualified victory for the Iraqi regime, as long as the latter hold on to power in Iraq.<sup>824</sup>

As well as strengthening their forward defence, the Iraqis moved major units of mobile reserve armour, including four divisions of the elite Republican Guard, to Southern Iraq close to the Kuwaiti border.<sup>825</sup> According to the Pentagon, Baghdad had deployed 590,000 troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq; and the total Iraqi hardware amounted to 700 warplanes, 5,750 tanks, 3,100 pieces of artillery and 15 warships.<sup>826</sup> They were facing total allied forces over 750,000; and their military hardware amounted to 1,746 warplanes, 3,673 tanks and 149 warships.<sup>827</sup>

The new American strategy was to assure victory by applying heavy, overwhelming combat power against Iraq, in the air, at sea and on the ground, at night and during the day.<sup>828</sup> President Bush was urged to pay attention to what the military considered to be the main lesson of Vietnam: do not apply military force in a slow increasing manner, but use it to perform the highest impact so as to disable the enemy and catch him off balance.<sup>829</sup> Air power was the only certain advantage that was available to the allies, to deal with Iraq's massive land army and tank forces, and the only way to avoid a drawn out ground war that would likely destroy Kuwait and cause more casualties.<sup>830</sup> General Colin Powell pointed out that the war would begin with a decisive air campaign and that the land war would not be simultaneous but would follow the air campaign.<sup>831</sup> The U.S. had to prove both its resolve to fight and its capability to wreak horrible damage on the Iraqi armed forces.<sup>832</sup>

In spite of that, no one thought that victory over Iraq would be easy to achieve.<sup>833</sup> There was always the fear that Saddam, if defeated, would use chemical and biological weapons and cause large numbers of casualties.<sup>834</sup> In fact, Iraq prepared 190 biological weapons, ready to use in case of war.<sup>835</sup> 25 cruise missiles had biological warheads and they were aimed at Saudi Arabia, 165 biological weapons were fitted into sky bombs.<sup>836</sup> In addition, since Iraq was only two years away from making its own nuclear weapons, Baghdad could advance its nuclear weapons programmes and in just six months it would be able to manufacture nuclear weapons.<sup>837</sup> However, President Bush warned Baghdad not to use weapons of mass destruction because the U.S. response would be definitely overwhelming and devastating.<sup>838</sup> Later, the Iraqis interpreted President Bush's warning as a nuclear threats.<sup>839</sup>

After all this, Saudi Arabia still continued its search for a peaceful end to the Gulf crisis. King Fahd issued a last-minute, emotional appeal to Saddam:

The proof that we seek and whole world demands and requires that you declare your immediate withdrawal from Kuwait in word and deed... I renew and confirm our just demand that you take the bold decision and prove to the whole world that you are up to the level of responsibility you shoulder in governing Iraq. By doing so you will have made an eternal stand which history will record for you as you will spare bloodshed, preserve innocent lives, conserve the fortunes of the Arab and Islamic nations and fulfil all their hopes.<sup>840</sup>

Saddam Hussein did not respond, just as he did not respond to the French efforts to make a last-minute initiative on January 15-16, 1991.<sup>841</sup> Therefore, Iraqi warmongers cleared the way for an outbreak of war.<sup>842</sup>

### **War in the Gulf**

On January 15, 1991, President Bush signed a national security decree giving Defense Secretary, Cheney, an executive order to start the war.<sup>843</sup> Operation Desert Storm began the day after the deadline passed, at 18.39 Washington time on January 16, and at 03.39 Riyadh time on January 17, 1991.<sup>844</sup> Desert Storm began with air and missile attacks from the coalition forces against Iraqi military target in Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>845</sup> Within just one day of the start of the war, Washington reported that Iraqi military capabilities were being destroyed.<sup>846</sup>

On the second day of the war, the Iraqis responded to the air attacks by launching their Soviet Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia.<sup>847</sup> The Iraqis hoped that an attack on Israel would provoke Israel into a response. This would divide the Arab members of the coalition and create an indefensible situations for Saudi Arabia.<sup>848</sup> Forty missiles were fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa, while forty six were fired at Riyadh and Dhahran.<sup>849</sup> The casualties in Saudi Arabia included twenty-eight dead, unfortunately all of them Americans (see Table 11 and 13).<sup>850</sup> In fact, on February 25, 1991, an Iraqi missile hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran.<sup>851</sup> It injured 100 Americans which was the heaviest blow Iraq managed to inflict on the coalition during the whole conflict.<sup>852</sup>

In addition to eliminating Iraqi Scud missiles, the U.S. Patriot air defence missiles blocked and destroyed more than 95 per cent of the Scud missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel before they reached the ground.<sup>853</sup> Not surprisingly, the Iraqi Scud missiles made the Saudis think of deterring further Iraqi Scud attacks by using their strategic missile force, which Saudi Arabia had bought them in the late 1980s.<sup>854</sup> For the Saudis, Desert Storm was the right time to launch the Chinese-built surface-to-surface missiles.<sup>855</sup> Prince Sultan, Saudi Defense Minister, consulted King Fahd and sought an order to fire them.<sup>856</sup> However, King Fahd decided not to escalate the war and to reserve the missiles as a weapon of last resource.<sup>857</sup>

Moreover, Scud attacks from Iraq made Israel reconsider its policy of restraint. On January 19, 1991, Israel expressed its willingness to launch their own massive counter-strike into Iraq.<sup>858</sup> Later General Colin Powell reported that Prince Bandar, at Washington's request, had called for the Israeli strike.<sup>859</sup> However, King Fahd had rapidly replied "No way".<sup>860</sup> President Bush argued with his staff that the continuing allied attack had more aircraft and more firepower than the Israelis could muster.<sup>861</sup> General Norman Schwarzkopf cogently asked, "How can anybody think the Israelis have better target information than our Air Force"?<sup>862</sup> Nevertheless, President Bush agreed before the start of Desert Storm to share U.S. intelligence summaries with Israel. They installed a hot line, code named "Hammer Rick", between the Pentagon's Crisis Situation Room and the Israeli Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv. This enabled the Pentagon to send instantaneous warnings to Israel of any Iraqi missile launch monitored by U.S. satellites.<sup>863</sup>

**Table 11**  
**Iraqi Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia, January/February 1991**

	Hits	Misses*	Inter- cepted	Un- known	Total	Dead	Injured
Missiles fired against Israel	10	16	13	1	40	4	185
Missiles fired against Saudi Arabia	3	12	24	7	46	28	100
Total	13	28	37	8	86	32	285
* A miss is defined as a missile doing neither injury nor damage							

Source: John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed*, p. 176, adopted from a U.S. briefing graphic from Bruce Waston (ed), *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*, Greenhill Book, London, 1991 p. 224-5, see also Khaled Bin Sultan, p. 352.

To deter further Iraqi Scud attacks, the U.S. deployed some of its forces in Israel with two Patriot air defence missiles.<sup>864</sup> The announcement of the deployment was made on January 19, 1991, and four Patriot batteries rapidly arrived in Israel from Europe.<sup>865</sup> The U.S. forces fell under the operational responsibility of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and not CENTCOM.<sup>866</sup> The U.S. continued quietly urging Israel to stay out of war while promising to give "full consideration" to its request for an additional \$13 billion in aid, \$3 billion in compensation for war damages and \$10 billion to help resettle immigrant Soviet Jews. The U.S. also reassured Israel that it would continue to maintain its military dominance in the region; as well as that the Arab-Israel peace process would be strengthened once the Gulf crisis was over.<sup>867</sup> During the war, General Colin Powell claimed that the Iraqi air defence radar was 95 per cent destroyed and all but five of the 66 air bases were badly damaged, although only 41 planes were confirmed destroyed.<sup>868</sup> On January 24, 1991, three Iraqi Mirage F-1 strike aircraft loaded with Exocet anti-ship missiles, headed north along the Saudi coast.<sup>869</sup> The three Iraqi jets were attempting to launch an attack on coalition shipping in the northern Gulf.<sup>870</sup> The three jets were intercepted and two were shot down within less than one minute in a single engagement by one of the Saudi F-15s.<sup>871</sup> The third jet escaped and landed harmlessly in the sea.<sup>872</sup>

To protect the rest of the Iraqi aircraft, Saddam Hussein surprised the coalition by sending 135 aircraft to Iran.<sup>873</sup> About 80 aircraft were sent on January 26, 1991, and over the next three days. This was followed by another exodus between February 6, and 10, 1991.<sup>874</sup> After the war, Tehran made it clear to Baghdad that Iran had no intention of returning the aircraft.<sup>875</sup>

On January 29, 1991, an Iraqi battle group occupied the undefended small coastal town of Al-Khafji, some eight miles inside Saudi Arabia.<sup>876</sup> The residents of Al-Khafji had been evacuated before Desert Storm had started, because of its vulnerability to Iraqi artillery.<sup>877</sup> Al-Khafji was retaken on February 2, after heavy fighting.<sup>878</sup> Saudi armed forces, supported by Qatari and U.S. forces freed the town after the loss of 12 U.S. marines, 15 Saudi troops and 30 Iraqi soldiers.<sup>879</sup> Up to 500 Iraqi soldiers were captured and fifteen Iraqi tanks were blown up.<sup>880</sup> On January 30, 1991, during the liberation of Al-Khafji, General Schwarzkopf stated, that the air attack had cut off 90 per cent of the supplies to the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.<sup>881</sup> American, British, French, Kuwaiti and Saudi air forces participated in the air attack as well as other countries in the coalition. Table 12 illustrates how the coalition countries shared in the air attack. Of the 108,043 sorties flown during Desert Storm, 83.6 per cent were flown by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps; 6.5 per cent by the Royal Saudi Air Force; 5.1 per cent by Britain's Royal Air Force; 2.1 per cent by French.<sup>882</sup> Several other countries contributed in one way or another to the campaign.<sup>883</sup>

At sea, there were a number of small naval actions, mostly involving coalition planes and attack helicopter against Iraqi patrols.<sup>884</sup> By early February 1991, almost all the Iraqi navy units had been destroyed.<sup>885</sup> Coalition warships continued to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles in the latter stages of the air campaign.<sup>886</sup> The coalition reported that 750 tanks, 600 armoured vehicles and 650 artillery pieces were destroyed.<sup>887</sup> On February 10, 1991, Secretary of Defense, Cheney, and General Powell arrived in Saudi Arabia on behalf of President Bush to discuss with the Saudi government the timing of the launch of the ground war.<sup>888</sup> On the eastern end of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, the U.S. Marines and Saudis were looking for orders to attack the Iraqis. However, Secretary of Defence, Cheney, and General Powell advised President Bush on February 11, that their attack should wait.<sup>889</sup>

**Table 12**

Countries Sharing in Air Campaign	Air to Air	Air to Ground	Dual	Attack Helicopter	Support	Totals	Accumulated Missions
Bahrain	0	0	24	0	16	40	294
Canada	0	0	24	0	0	24	1,308
France	12	24	18	60	83	197	2,326
Italy	0	0	9	0	0	9	240
Kuwait	0	24	15	12	16	67	802
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	2	2	32
Qatar	0	9	12	0	29	50	63
Saudi Arabia	106	54	87	9	187	443	7,018
UAE	14	51	25	0	97	187	102
UK	18	48	0	0	31	97	5,546
USA	196	500	423	385	2,134	3,637	90,312
<b>Totals</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>466</b>	<b>2,595</b>	<b>4,753</b>	<b>108,043</b>

Source: General Khaled Bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, 1995, Harper Collins Publishers, London, p. 337.

By February 23, 1991, the coalition air forces had directed 94,000 sorties and about 39 per cent of the Iraqi's tanks, 32 per cent of its armoured vehicles and 48 per cent of artillery had been destroyed.<sup>890</sup> Therefore, a ground attack into Kuwait appeared to be the right option take place.<sup>891</sup>

There were still some attempts to avoid a costly ground war between Iraq and the coalition.<sup>892</sup> President Gorbachev announced a new initiative on February 9, 1991, and sent a personal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov to Iraq.<sup>893</sup> On February 15, 1991, Iraq offered to withdraw, but on condition that the coalition forces withdrew from the region within one month and that Israel withdraw from West Bank and Gaza; this was entirely unacceptable to Washington and Riyadh.<sup>894</sup> Riyadh went further than just rejecting the proposal, by describing not only Saddam's latest move but also Saddam's allies King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat of PLO:

The crocodile tears shed by the lackeys of the Iraqi tyrant are in fact tears of panic... After they stood by the defeated tyrant and tied their destiny to his success... they realised too late they stood in the wrong place. (And yet), instead of returning to the right path, forgiveness and the forgiveness of those who they have

wronged, these minute and negligible people stagger in the sea of their mistakes, and continue to swim against the current.<sup>895</sup>

Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, went to Moscow on February 21, 1991, and Iraq then agreed to a Soviet peace plan but not all, UN requirements.<sup>896</sup> Washington reacted on February 22, demanding immediate Iraqi withdrawal starting by noon New York time (8.00pm Riyadh time).<sup>897</sup> On February 23, President Bush said a cease-fire could only be considered after Iraq made a declaration of withdrawal and informed Iraq that if it failed to demonstrate an intent to obey with Security Council resolution 660, a ground war would begin.<sup>898</sup> On February 23, Iraqi soldiers began burning Kuwait's oil wells. They set fire to 735 of Kuwait's 950 oil wells in a "scorched-earth" policy.<sup>899</sup> The deadline passed and the coalition forces started ground offensive.<sup>900</sup> During the air war, Saddam Hussein promised that "The mother of all battles" would start with the opening of hostilities on the ground.<sup>901</sup> However, when the ground war started, the promised "mother of all battles" turned into a disastrous defeat for the Iraqis.<sup>902</sup> The U.S. 18th Corps, together with French Units, moved deep into Iraq from the west of Kuwait. They established a forward air base near the Euphrates river and then to cut the main road supply connecting Baghdad and Kuwait near Nasiriyah on the Euphrates river.<sup>903</sup> At the same time, U.S. 7th Corps along with the UK 1st Armoured Division, crossed the Iraqi border from west of Kuwait and moved rapidly north to surround Iraqi forces in Kuwait and attack the Republican Guard division north-west of Kuwait (see Map 6).<sup>904</sup> By the day's end, February 24, 1991, the coalition reported holding outer edges of Kuwait City.<sup>905</sup> Saudi and other Arab forces, together with the U.S. Marines, breached the Iraqi defence lines along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and moved towards Kuwait City.<sup>906</sup> Meanwhile, a majority of U.N. Security Council members demanded that Baghdad accept all 12 resolutions before a cease-fire could begin, not just resolution 660 which called on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.<sup>907</sup> The next day, February 27, 1991, at 1.30 GMT the Pentagon announced that American, Kuwaiti and Saudi troops had liberated Kuwait City and the operation to free Kuwait was in its final stages.<sup>908</sup> Later that day at 19.30 GMT, President Bush received secret briefings from Dick Cheney and General Powell that all military objectives had been achieved. He announced a temporary cease-fire to start at midnight New York time (8.00 am Saudi time) on February 28, 1991.<sup>909</sup> That same evening, Iraq informed the UN that it accepted all 12 UN resolutions and agreed to send its



military commanders to meet their coalition counterparts within 48 hours.<sup>910</sup> On March 3, 1991, General Schwarzkopf and General Khaled Bin Sultan met with two

Iraqi generals at Safwan, an Iraqi airstrip.<sup>911</sup> They agreed to meet the conditions for a permanent cease-fire.<sup>912</sup> On the same day, the Iraqi government announced that it had agreed to; (1) release all prisoners of war and Kuwaiti civilians; (2) provide information showing the location of all mines; (3) avoid further skirmishes; (4) pay the Kuwait government for war damages; and (5) comply with all UN resolutions.<sup>913</sup>


### Peace in the Gulf

In just the 100 hours of the ground war, coalition forces captured over 73,700 square kilometres of territory (250km inside Iraq).<sup>914</sup> Fifteen per cent of Iraq was under coalition control (see Map 7).<sup>915</sup> The Iraqi forces had been cut to pieces. Just seven of the original forty-three Iraqi divisions were capable of operations.<sup>916</sup> Coalition casualties were notably low, almost as much harm had been done by a friendly fire as by Iraqi fire (138 were killed and 2,978 injured outside of battle).<sup>917</sup> Approximately quarter of the American deaths and more than half the British fatalities had been due to friendly fire.<sup>918</sup> A study in November 1990, by the Centre for Defense Information, Washington DC, estimated that: (1) the war would last three months; (2) the U.S. could expect about 45,000 casualties, including 10,000 fatalities and around 1,000 missing in action; (3) the Iraqi forces would suffer about 150,000 casualties, of which 35,000 would be killed.<sup>919</sup> In fact, the war lasted only 43 days.<sup>920</sup> Nevertheless, after the predictions of thousands of casualties on the allies side, the total was very small. The U.S. casualties were 484, of which 146 were killed in action, 338 wounded in action, and 24 missing in action. The Saudi casualties numbered were 213, of which 38 were killed in action, and 175 wounded in action (see Table 13).<sup>921</sup> There were also 183 non-combat deaths of which 78 deaths occurred during and after the war and 105 deaths during Operation Desert Shield. In addition, Iraq held prisoners of war (17 Americans, 12 British, 9 Saudis, 2 Italians and 1 Kuwaiti).<sup>922</sup>

Coalition material losses in combat included 27 U.S. aircraft and one helicopter; and 9 aircraft from Allied forces.<sup>923</sup> Non-combat losses included 8 U.S. aircraft and 16 helicopters; Britain lost one aircraft; as did Saudi Arabia.<sup>924</sup> Civilian casualties


in Kuwait were estimated by resident forces to number one thousand, although several hundred Kuwaitis died during the period of the Iraqi occupation in addition to 5,000 Kuwaitis who were taken from Kuwait to Iraq.<sup>925</sup>

Map 6



Source: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It doesn't Take a Hero*, 1992, Bantam Books, UK, p. 562

Map 7



Source: as map 6, p. 563.

**Table 13**

**Countries participating in Desert Shield/Desert Storm by country, command and casualties (March 6, 1991).**

Country	Air	Ground	Naval	Joint Forces Command	U.S. Command	Killed in Action	Wounded in action
Afghanistan		*		308			
Argentina			*		450		
Australia			*		1,622		
Bahrain	*	*		223			2
Bangladesh		*		2,231			
Belgium			*		600		
Canada	*		*		2,275		
Czechoslovakia		*		198			
Denmark			*		100		
Egypt		*		33,677		11	84
France	*	*	*	14,600		2	34
Greece			*		200		
Hungary (M)		*		38			
Italy	*		*		1,950		
Kuwait	*	*		9,643		1	7
Morocco		*		1,327			
Netherlands			*		132		
New Zealand	*						
Nigeria		*		481			1
Norway			*	227	106		
Oman	*	*		957			1
Pakistan		*		6,406			
Philippines (M)		*		156			
Poland (M)		*	*	488			
Qatar	*	*		1,581			2
Romania (M)		*		384			
Saudi Arabia	*	*	*	95,400		38	175
Senegal		*		496			8
Sierra Leone		*		24			
Singapore (M)		*		30			
South Korea (M)		*		154			
Spain			*		1,956		
Sweden (M)		*		525			
Syria		*		14,300		3	
UAE	*	*		1,497		5	
UK	*	*	*		45,300	17	45
U.S.A.	*	*	*		540,331	146	338
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>185,351</b>	<b>595,022</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>697</b>

M= medical unit/personnel (military and/or civilian)

Source: General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, 1995. Harper Collins Publishers, London. p. 420.

Iraqi casualties were estimated by Saudi Arabia to be between 100,000 to 200,000 killed and wounded.<sup>926</sup> A few weeks later General Schwarzkopf estimated as many as 150,000 Iraqi casualties.<sup>927</sup> However, four months after the end of the war, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency disclosed that the estimates were that Iraq's casualties were somewhere in the order of 100,000 killed and 300,000 wounded.<sup>928</sup> Iraqi civilian casualties during the war were reported to be about 7,000 by early February 1991, with no reliable estimates as to final numbers.<sup>929</sup> Refugee reports from Basra and other parts of southern Iraq suggested casualties later in war of about 10,000 civilian dead.<sup>930</sup> Iraqi prisoners totalled about 111,000 (64,000 were taken by the U.S., 25,000 by Saudi troops, 17,000 by the Arab forces and 5,000 by the British).<sup>931</sup> The government of Saudi Arabia built camps to house more than 100,000 men.<sup>932</sup> All of three camps were located at the north of Saudi Arabia which were under the Saudi command.<sup>933</sup> Once the prisoners of war (POW) had settled and the total reduced to 35,000 people (10,000 military prisoners and 25,000 civilians) 14,000 indicated that they had no wish to return home at that time or emigrate to other countries.<sup>934</sup> Therefore, the government of Saudi Arabia started in the end of 1991, to build a model city that should provide better conditions.<sup>935</sup> The city is linked to Rafha.<sup>936</sup> The city included schools, a hospital, clinics, libraries and sports fields and many other facilities.<sup>937</sup> Rafha residents can make short occasional trips into town and each year and still (1996) the Saudi government arranges for large numbers of the resident to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>938</sup> U.S. government officials as well as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officers visited the camp regularly and discuss camp conditions with the refugees.<sup>939</sup> The UNHCR and ICRC have established a 24 hour presence in the city.<sup>940</sup> As a result, they consider the facility to be among the best in the world, offering comfortable accommodation and monthly salaries of \$10 per person, all paid for by the Saudi government.<sup>941</sup> It is the only refugee operation in the world financed by the host country.<sup>942</sup> The ICRC stated that the amount the Saudis have spent on the Iraqi refugees amounted to 30 per cent of the sum which the UN refugee agency's entire yearly budget for 18 million refugees world-wide.<sup>943</sup>

Iraq's material losses were estimated to number 476 combat aircraft out of a total of 689, with 141 aircraft destroyed in the air or on the ground and 200 in damaged shelters, with the addition of the 135 aircraft which had been moved to Iran and

which will never be returned to Iraq.<sup>944</sup> Iraq lost 3,700 tanks, 2,400 armoured vehicles and 2,600 artillery pieces (see Table 14).<sup>945</sup>

**Table 14**

Estimated damage to Iraq's military capabilities

Type	Pre-War	Destroyed or Captured	Remaining
Combat Aircraft	689	476	213
Tanks	4,280	3,700	580
Armoured Vehicles	2,870	2,400	470
Artillery	3,110	2,600	510

Source: "The War in Numbers, from War in the Gulf", The Baltimore Sun, March 10, 1991, p7E, adapted from, Central Command of the Coalition and U.S. Defense Department. See also Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando, A Violent Pace, p. 121, and see also Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, p. 20, 357.

The war cost between \$58 billion and \$77 billion of which the U.S. anted \$15 billion.<sup>946</sup> (The U.S. administration's estimates were made in late March 1991). The Arab Economic Report, an annual study by the Arab Monetary Fund, stated that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E. made \$84 billion in direct payments to the U.S., Britain and France for military expenses of which \$45 billion were from Saudi Arabia.<sup>947</sup> The destruction of oil wells, pipelines, telecommunication, infrastructure, roads, buildings and factories cost Kuwait \$160 billion and Iraq \$190 billion.<sup>948</sup> The hurriedly built military facilities, airstrips and camps, cost another \$51 billion.<sup>949</sup> The war contributed to a drop in gross national product for the region which has been estimated at 1.2 per cent for 1990 and 7 per cent for 1991. The \$45 billion contribution paid by Saudi Arabia to the allied enterprise, amounting to 57.3 per cent of its annual gross domestic product.<sup>950</sup> The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and resulting Gulf war have cost the region an estimated \$620 billion.<sup>951</sup>

Saudi Arabia has also spent \$28 billion on military construction, equipment and ordnance, including the supply of fuel, water, food, housing, transportation and other necessities at no cost to more than 685,000 foreign troops.<sup>962</sup> American forces alone were supplied with two million gallons of drinking water each day.<sup>953</sup> The

fuel consumption of the two American Corps was about 4.5 million gallons, that was about 880 truckloads each day.<sup>964</sup> A statement of the study mission to Saudi Arabia, which was in Saudi Arabia from November 25-30, 1990, and was submitted by Representative Robert Lagomarsino to House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, asserted that "The Saudis are contributing far more to this operation than is generally perceived".<sup>965</sup> He also stated that Saudi Arabia would have a deficit of about \$10 billion on its GNP for 1990, despite the huge jump in the oil prices.<sup>966</sup> On January 8, 1991, Claiborn Pell, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, again raised the question of the Saudi contribution, "My understanding is that the increase in the price of oil has resulted in the Saudi receiving a windfall of about the same amount of money that it would take to keep all our troops in that part of the world".<sup>967</sup> Testifying in Congress, Alexander Haig, former Secretary of States replied to the Chairman's question:

I am very sceptical of some of the references to this windfall that Saudi Arabia is allegedly accruing. I don't think anyone knows. I think that they have been generous. They are providing all of the oil. They are providing all of the facilities... and they have also given a supplementary stipend to the U.S. to ameliorate our operational cost... But I am going to suggest that they are going to demonstrate far more generosity on the part of the kingdom than we are giving them credit for today.<sup>968</sup>

One who participated in the Desert Storm Operations, Lt Gen. William Pagonis, asserted that "We would have been in a very difficult situation if our host nation had been either poor, hostile or both".<sup>969</sup> The government of Saudi Arabia also spent more than \$1 billion to help resettle Kuwaiti refugees and refugees from other nations who fled the invasion.<sup>960</sup> Holding the largest financial burden of the cost of both "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm", Saudi Arabia took important steps to reduce the negative impact of the Gulf crisis on the stability of the international economy.<sup>961</sup>

These two most important factors that brought success to the Desert Storm operations against Iraq were 1: the readiness of the Saudi military infrastructure and 2: the superior technology of the American military and the huge military capability of the coalition, especially the U.S., Britain and France.<sup>962</sup> The Saudi military infrastructures enabled Saudi Arabia to provide logistical support to coalition troops.<sup>963</sup> On the other hand, the correct guidance systems of U.S. troops to find identify strikes against Iraqi military and strategic target, and the effective

U.S. command, control, communication and intelligence capabilities were crucial in achieving the coalition's military objectives against Iraq effectively with the fewest possible casualties.<sup>964</sup>

After Iraq was defeated and had withdrawn its forces from Kuwait, the Security Council adopted resolution 687, (April 3, 1991).<sup>965</sup> It demanded that Iraq eliminate all its weapons of mass destruction and present the U.N. with full disclosure about all its chemical and biological weapons and facilities and all nuclear materials, and then co-operate in their destruction.<sup>966</sup> It agreed that Iraq should compensate Kuwait and other foreign nationals and companies which had suffered as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>967</sup> All sanctions continued in place for anything other than medicines and health supplies.<sup>968</sup> In addition, Iraq should accept the boundary with Kuwait.<sup>969</sup>

Iraq had moved much of the crucial nuclear material to protect it from the coalition's bombing so that the bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities simply risked an environmental holocaust with little advantage.<sup>970</sup> Clearly, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are dangerous, but it is possible that the issue could be better dealt with through negotiations calling for the dismantling of unconventional weapons programs and through U.N. imposed restrictions on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons production throughout the world.<sup>971</sup> The United Nations were to review the situation every sixty days, and Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions would be studied as a key element of any decision to reduce or lift sanctions.<sup>972</sup> However, the lifting of the sanctions was tied to the elimination of Iraq's non-conventional weapons, and the set of processes for Iraq to compensate those who had suffered from its actions.<sup>973</sup> The Iraqis did not co-operate with the U.N. to give them full information about the non-conventional weapons or to destroy them, so the U.N. sanctions remains in place up to the time of writing (1996).

### **In retrospect**

The United States' intervention in the Gulf crisis was motivated by a number of reasons. These involved: (1) an attempt to consolidate its declining power in the global economy; (2) an effort to preserve access to the Gulf's oil reserves; (3) to



protect the integrity of its alliance structure in the Gulf states; and (4) to send a message to the Gulf countries that they must not challenge the U.S. dominance in the region.<sup>974</sup> The American involvement was supposed to strengthen the U.S. position in the Gulf and in the Middle East in general.<sup>975</sup> However, rather than reduce instability, the Gulf crisis might have increased the possibility that the U.S. will be involved in more crises in the region.<sup>976</sup>

Its political purpose as home was it to make Americans feel more optimistic about their political and economic future.<sup>977</sup> The Gulf war confirmed the U.S. as the dominant military power in the new world order.<sup>978</sup> Dick Cheney praised the leadership of the U.S. in his speech on February 27, 1991, with the words:

The bottom line is that this whole effort has been put together and held together by the leadership of the U.S.... This was one of the most successful achievements, not only from a military but also from a diplomatic and political standpoint, that this country has ever seen.<sup>979</sup>

For President Bush, the victory in the Gulf war was that it would once and for all allow the U.S. to defeat the "Vietnam Syndrome".<sup>980</sup> On February 17, 1991, about a week before the ground war, President Bush stated that the coming U.S. victory in the Gulf war would defeat the Vietnam syndrome.<sup>981</sup> In one of his first speeches after the war he said "By God, we have kicked this Vietnam Syndrome forever".<sup>982</sup>

The Gulf war was the perfect war for the U.S. It had the perfect enemy in the Iraqi president who was the perfect "evil dictator" whom the propaganda could demonise.<sup>983</sup> Iraq possessed a Third World army that emerged threatening the region.<sup>984</sup> To make this dramatic, Iraq had to be presented as dangerous enemy and then destroyed.<sup>985</sup> Successful achievement would set the U.S. as the most powerful military force in the world and would demonstrate the U.S.' military power to resolve political conflicts and to establish U.S. political hegemony.<sup>986</sup>

The Gulf war appeared at the same time to be a short-term solution to the political problems of President Bush and the U.S. military and affected no significant change in U.S. society, which had over a decade of economic problems.<sup>987</sup> The new financial world created by the oil crisis of the 1970s made Congressmen ask what policies their government were developing to deal with this new financial environment and how were they going to recycle petrodollars (see Chapter four).<sup>988</sup>



Because of the special prestige achieved in the Gulf war, the U.S. government received 70 per cent of the initial contracts for U.S. companies to rebuild Kuwait. (The cost of rebuilding Kuwait is estimated to be \$160 billion).<sup>989</sup> The rest of the contracts went to the rest of the Western Countries.<sup>990</sup> In addition, Kuwait would finance its rebuilding by taking loans from Western Banks, and not by withdrawing from its capital reserve in the Western Banks, estimated at more than \$120 billion.<sup>991</sup> Although, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the U.S. and Western economies, Iraq invested its wealth in other projects and areas; taking Kuwait petrodollars out of the U.S. bond market. This might have threatened U.S. economic stability, and if Saudi Arabia was also taken over by Iraq and its petrodollars were spent elsewhere, disaster could follow.<sup>992</sup> In fact, in a speech at a meeting of the Arab Co-operation Council in Jordan, on February 24, 1990, Saddam Hussein told the members not to invest its money in the U.S. anymore but to invest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union instead.<sup>993</sup> In this, the Gulf war served as a handy replacement for the collapse of the Soviet Empire, turning over a new target for domestic fears.<sup>994</sup>

The Gulf war was also an appropriate war to test the Pentagon's weapons and strategies; to use up their overstocked supply of weapons and to create new ones. The arms environment needs a major war every twenty years or so to test their new weapons systems.<sup>995</sup> Saddam Hussein remains in power after the Gulf war generated a dangerous environment, thus, securing further U.S. arms sales and military intervention in Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. tried to base on Saudi soil for many years ago.<sup>996</sup> The Gulf war also helped to increase the prestige of the military, thus, helping its fight against future budget cuts; to advance the vocations of officers; and to promote the fortunes of the war team.<sup>997</sup> The Gulf war delivered the first major demonstration of the weapons technology which had been under development since the Vietnam period.<sup>998</sup> In planning and fighting the war to some degree showed how well this largely untried technology would function.<sup>999</sup> The Gulf war was the first U.S. attempt to fight a large-scale conventional manoeuvre war since the Korean war.<sup>1000</sup> Indeed, President Bush was urged to choose and send a U.S. combat reserve unit to Saudi Arabia to test, for the first time in a situation of potential war, a new plan in which civilian military reservists would join professional troops.<sup>1001</sup>

From the point of view of the U.S. defence industry, Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait could not have come at a better time; just as Congress was debating a plan to cut \$24 billion from President Bush's proposed \$307 billion defence budget for 1991.<sup>1002</sup> The Iraqi invasion rescued some U.S. local defence companies such as Douglas Aircraft, which employed about 8,000 workers in building the C-17 cargo plane.<sup>1003</sup> Both houses of Congress have voted to limit spending on the C-17 until the plane was certified for flight, but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed that decision.<sup>1004</sup> After years of slow performance, eight of the main U.S. arms contractors noticed their stock value increase by \$5.3 billion in the month after the Gulf war started.<sup>1005</sup> Senator Bob Dole commented on that, "Saddam Hussein, for all the bad things he did, may have done us a favour, he sort of woke us up in America and woke us up in Congress".<sup>1006</sup>

During the height of the Cold War, much attention was given to arms transfers to developing countries.<sup>1007</sup> These countries were frequently the focal point of conflicts and competition for influence between the West and the Communist bloc countries.<sup>1008</sup> The new political and economic environment generated internationally by the end of the Cold War had a dramatic effect on the world-wide conventional arms marketplace as well as on arms transfers to the developing countries.<sup>1009</sup> Post-Cold War reductions in national defence spending by most major arms exporting countries placed continuing pressures on the arms industries to search for foreign weapons contracts to restore declining domestic orders. The impact of the end of the Iran-Iraq war also detrimentally affected the arms industry.<sup>1010</sup> In the extremely competitive international foreign arms markets, the U.S. has proven to be especially successful, while other traditional arms suppliers have had great difficulty securing new contracts.<sup>1011</sup> U.S. arms sales have been considerably assisted by its reputation its arms gained as a result of their effective use during the Gulf war.<sup>1012</sup> The U.S. has come to dominate in supplying arms to many of the developing countries.<sup>1013</sup> From 1990-1993, the U.S. made \$59.8 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing countries or 52.2 per cent of all such agreements.<sup>1014</sup> In the earlier period before the Cold War had ended (1986-1989), the Soviet Union was the single leading supplier, making \$77.3 billion in arms transfer agreements with the developing countries.<sup>1015</sup>

Russia has been especially hard hit by the dramatically changing international political and economic order.<sup>1016</sup> Russia recently has had few arms clients in the

developing countries.<sup>1017</sup> Between 1990 and 1993, that figure fell to \$20,100 billion.<sup>1018</sup> These arms transfer agreements with developing countries amounted to 19.4 per cent of all such agreements. Testifying in Congress on behalf of the Bush administration about the \$4,026 million arms sale to Saudi Arabia on June 19, 1990, Mr Levine said "We should keep the kingdom (Saudi Arabia) on a military par with Iraq, for us to participate in such an enormous escalation of the arms competition in the region".<sup>1019</sup>

The leading arms suppliers are probably only willing to supply loans to those developing countries most capable of repaying them.<sup>1020</sup> Other suppliers may well choose to not make such loans in the first place.<sup>1021</sup> In the case of the Gulf states, they are capable of paying and this reflects the particular importance of this region as a leading international arms market.<sup>1022</sup> For the U.S., to supply the huge demand for arms to the Gulf countries would make them flood the oil markets to purchase weapons which could lead, in the final stage, to the decline of oil prices. That was one of the U.S.'s policies after the oil crisis of 1973-1974, which made Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, to ask in the mid 1970s "How the U.S. was trying to bring the oil prices down" (see chapter four).<sup>1023</sup> The U.S. ranking in arms transfer agreements with the developing countries in 1993, was directly attributable to costly new orders from Saudi Arabia \$9.5 billion and \$2.2 billion from Kuwait.<sup>1024</sup>

Therefore, the Gulf crisis was no longer just about oil, but the way that oil would be translated into money and power: political, economic, and military.<sup>1025</sup> Saddam Hussein warned the U.S. that the oil weapon could well be applied again.<sup>1026</sup> Oil played a significant role in the conflict.<sup>1027</sup> Had it not been for oil, Kuwait might not have been invaded in the first place and Iraq would not have been capable to afford the military power to do so and then challenge the U.S. in the Gulf.<sup>1028</sup> The U.S. policy in the Gulf is to secure access to those oil supplies which will continue to be essential in spite of U.S.' energy conservation efforts.<sup>1029</sup> Access to the Gulf implies the availability of oil imports in quantities adequate to meet U.S. domestic demand.<sup>1030</sup> For the U.S., these supplies must be continuous and they must be available at prices which do as little damage to the U.S. economy as possible.<sup>1031</sup> These three: adequacy, continuity and "reasonable" prices form part of the definition of access.<sup>1032</sup> Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait would have performed his stated goal of dramatically increasing the price of oil on the world

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market.<sup>1033</sup> If he pursued the standards of the past, his greatly increased oil revenues would have gone to strengthen his already strong (relative to other Arab countries) military forces and to expand his developing and existing nuclear, biological and chemical arsenals.<sup>1034</sup> It was clear that this could have threatened the future of Israel.<sup>1035</sup> General Khaled Bin Sultan stated:

To see the war only in terms of Western interest in the defence of oil or the protection of Israel obscures the true nature of the crisis by overlooking the impact of Saddam's move on regional politics and on the interests of regional players.<sup>1036</sup>

The clearest statement of U.S. policy came in a speech by Secretary of State, James Baker, titled, "Why America is in the Gulf", delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on October 29, 1990.<sup>1037</sup> James Baker indicated three reasons for the U.S. involvement in the Gulf: (1) Saddam Hussein's aggression shattered the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War; (2) Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge which could prevent the resolution of other problems in the region; (3) Iraq's aggression challenged the global economy, because the health of the global economy would depend for the foreseeable future on secure access to the energy resources of the Gulf states.<sup>1038</sup>

In December 1977, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources asserted in a Congressional report, that it would not take overt military action to secure access to oil supplies, except perhaps as a last resort.<sup>1039</sup> Thus, an invitation from Saudi Arabia, particularly to the U.S. and the granting of such rights, given its political consequence, could only come after a serious crisis had become evident.<sup>1040</sup> The U.S. could not play a significant military role without access to land bases on the Arabian peninsula.<sup>1041</sup> Therefore, the U.S. had not sent definite signs to Iraq preceding the invasion that it would counter Iraqi actions along the border with Kuwait.<sup>1042</sup>

According to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, she emphasised in her meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1990, that Bush desired Iraq's friendship, and she noted that the U.S. did not take a position on the border dispute between the two countries. The U.S. considered this a continuing problem bilateral issue between the two countries.<sup>1043</sup> In addition, on July 24, 1990, State Department Spokesperson, Margaret Tutwiler said much the same publicly and

added that the U.S. had no defence treaties with Kuwait.<sup>1044</sup> As Robert Gate commented on the Glaspie testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, on March 21, 1991, "The idea that Saddam Hussein goes into a meeting with April Glaspie, and because she doesn't tell him that we are going to send 500,000 troops to the middle of the desert if he moves in Kuwait, he leaves the meeting and says 'God darn it, now I can do it', well, that is simply ludicrous".<sup>1045</sup> The Iraqis interpreted Glaspie's comments as showing a lack of interest in their invasion.<sup>1046</sup> Surely, the U.S. could not say aloud to Saddam go and take Kuwait. That led Saddam Hussein not just to seize the disputed Rumaila oilfield and Bubiyan Island, but to seize the whole country. Besides, CENTCOM notified Washington on July 31, 1990, that an Iraqi invasion appeared imminent.<sup>1047</sup> Instead of the administration warning Iraq, they started to discuss what kind of action that should take in case of invasion.<sup>1048</sup> Definitely, Saddam's move was based on a clear calculation. However, the U.S. trapped him by sending signals about how important to the U.S. he was, and how having lost the Shah of Iran to police American interests in the Gulf, the U.S. might make Saddam Hussein occupy the role.<sup>1049</sup> For instance, when the Iran-Iraq war started the U.S. adopted a neutral position in the hope of seeing the two potential regional powers destroy one another.<sup>1050</sup> As Henry Kissinger put it clearly in 1981, "The ultimate American interest was that both sides lose", the total cost of the war was \$452.6 billion to Iraq and \$644.3 billion to Iran.<sup>1051</sup> However, when it became evident in 1982 that Iraq might lose the war, American policy changed and the U.S. actively followed a policy designed to save Iraq from being militarily defeated by Iran.<sup>1052</sup> The U.S. purposes were to prevent the spread of the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil producing states of the Gulf region.<sup>1053</sup>

The U.S. assisted Iraq by: (1) in February 1982, Iraq was removed from the State Department's list of terrorist countries; (2) the U.S. started to allow Iraq to buy American technology and military equipment; (3) Iraq was given access to trade with the U.S; (4) in 1984, Iraq and the U.S. returned to full diplomatic relations, which had been cut off during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This gave the Iraq benefit of sharing U.S. intelligence data and satellite data showing Iranian troop strength and movements; and (5) with the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the U.S., France, and other Western countries presented Iraq with commercial and agricultural credits.<sup>1054</sup>

In 1992, a House Committee investigated U.S. policy towards Iraq, and was led by Chair Henry Gonzalez. Documents released by the committee revealed that at critical moments, Bush intervened on Iraq's behalf during and after the Iran-Iraq war.<sup>1065</sup> The committee started investigating U.S. policy toward Iraq after U.S. authorities raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian-based Banca Nazionale de Lavarò (BNL) in 1989.<sup>1066</sup> This BNL branch was key to a secret Iraqi arms technology acquirement network in the United States.<sup>1067</sup> A federal grand jury in Atlanta charged three BNL-Atlanta officials in February 1991, of providing more than \$4 billion in unauthorised loans to Iraq from 1985-1989.<sup>1068</sup> The committee also revealed evidence that the Bush administration continued to share U.S. intelligence with Iraq until May 29, 1990, just two months before Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait.<sup>1069</sup> The Committee released an "Options Paper on Iraq" dated May 16, 1990, marked "Secret", which contained a part on the pros and cons of U.S. intelligence co-operation with Iraq.<sup>1060</sup> Intelligence exchanges had dropped since the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, but still provided Iraq with limited information on Iranian military activity.<sup>1061</sup> On March 9, 1992, Gonzalez asked in a speech on the House floor. "Did the continuation of intelligence sharing well into 1990 enable the Iraqis to learn how to hide their military activities to escape U.S. bombing?"<sup>1062</sup> The investigation dramatically demonstrated that Bush was one of Saddam Hussein's best allies in Washington right up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>1063</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S. sold the latest and most advanced technology to Iraq in 1988, when the Commerce Department permitted a U.S. company to sell models of two computers used in U.S. missile-tracking systems to the Iraqi missile-research centre.<sup>1064</sup> Thus, unlike Adolf Hitler (President Bush has repeatedly compared Saddam with Hitler), Iraq imported its chemical weapons plants, warplanes, and missiles which it had purchased abroad, unlike Hitler's Germany (1932-1945) which was the second most powerful industrial country in the world and self reliant for arms.<sup>1065</sup> In one of Saddam's defensive speeches on April 20, 1990, he claimed that the Western nations and the U.S. in particular, had been trying to sell him uranium for years, and now, after the seizure of U.S.-made nuclear triggers at Heathrow airport in London in March 1990, they were trying to frame him for the crime of developing a nuclear weapon.<sup>1066</sup>

After the Iraqis spent billions of dollars with Western help to develop a nuclear weapon, Israel bombed Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981, just two years away from making a nuclear weapon.<sup>1067</sup> Ironically, at the same time as the invasion of Kuwait in the middle of August 1990, the CIA put out a report that Iraq was once again only two years away from making a nuclear weapon.<sup>1068</sup> It might be argued that the invasion of Kuwait introduced the U.S. with the perfect favourable time to destroy Saddam's military capability, especially his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.<sup>1069</sup> The evidence suggests that the Bush administration was more eager to get involved in the crisis than the Saudis were to have the U.S.' help, including U.S. troops on Saudi soil.<sup>1070</sup>

### **Future Prospects**

The Gulf war reinforced the important growth in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Americans and Saudis found themselves in a new and deep relationship than previously. The Americans and Saudi Commanders worked side by side in Saudi Military Centre planning joint military operations. That experience was the true guide to enhance the relationship.

The 1991 Gulf war, had a significant impact on the Middle East. The "new world order" supported by President Bush's visions, and a strong Saudi role is considered integral by the U.S. in order to deliver stability in the Middle East.<sup>1071</sup> The U.S. and Saudi Arabia were rapidly able to call a coalition of more than thirty five countries. The U.S. commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia was first tested during the Gulf war and indicates that the U.S.-Saudi relationship would remain close at least in the near future. The U.S. force could effectively provide for the security of Saudi Arabia, which indicates the continuing need for the U.S. assistance and protection of Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi's debt to the U.S. for its assistance during the Gulf war may restrict Saudi capability to pressure the U.S. in any side, for instance over the Arab-Israeli dialogue. This may be compensated by the U.S. desire to see Saudi Arabia preserve its position as a dominant vice in the region's politics and preserve its status as the largest trading partner of the U.S. in the Middle East.<sup>1072</sup>



## **Chapter Six**

### **Arab-Israeli Conflict Since the Gulf Crisis and Saudi Policy**

The 1990 Gulf crisis produced one of the many unpleasant setbacks for the Palestinians in recent times.<sup>1</sup> The Palestinians' position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulted in the PLO's international reputation rapidly deteriorating.<sup>2</sup> The financial and diplomatic support from the Gulf Arab states, that had preserved the PLO for more than two decades, was withdrawn.<sup>3</sup> Arafat himself was not granted permission to enter any GCC states, and yet these states were the PLO's most important source of funds.<sup>4</sup> This chapter will focus on how the Iraqi invasion affected the Saudi position towards the PLO. The chapter will discuss the major developments on the Arab-Israeli peace process after the Gulf war and the impact of the peace process on U.S.-Saudi relations.

#### **The impact of the PLO position on the Iraqi invasion on Saudi-Palestinian relations**

On August 2, 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 660 condemning Iraq's aggression and demanding an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait's territory.<sup>5</sup> An emergency summit meeting of Arab states was called on August 10, 1990, in Cairo.<sup>6</sup> The Arab summit condemned the Iraqi aggression, and called for immediate Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the legal government of Kuwait. Twelve out of the twenty-one members voted for the resolution. The PLO - along with Iraq and Libya - voted against the resolution. Jordan, Mauritania, and Sudan approved the resolution with reservation, while Algeria and Yemen abstained; Tunisia did not attend which the other Arab countries interpreted as siding with Iraq.<sup>7</sup>

The PLO's reluctance to condemn the invasion of Kuwait at the August 10, meeting of Arab states and Arafat's subsequent visits to Iraq, created considerable displeasure. Criticism by Arab states developed into an anti-Iraq coalition which imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions. These resulted in the direct suffering

for Palestinian communities, and seemed to involve long-term implications for their political future.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast to the general Arab, American and Western countries' support for Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and the PLO publicly condemned the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia, on August 8, 1990. They considered this more unfavourably than the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Jordan and the PLO called for an "Arab solution" to the problem.<sup>9</sup>

Saudi Arabia became unwilling to support any of the pro-Iraq elements in other Arab countries. From the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through to the Gulf war and after, the Saudi media agencies directed a bitter campaign against Jordan's King Hussein and the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, for what the Saudis perceived as shameless support for Iraq. Saudi annual aid to Jordan of \$48 million and the PLO about \$72 million was completely cut off.<sup>10</sup> Saudi Arabia closed its borders with Jordan preventing trade between Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the GCC states.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, on August 7, 1990, Arafat was warned about his attitude towards the crisis by King Fahd.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the PLO's international standing deteriorated rapidly. The PLO's policies resulted in hostility from Gulf states rulers and estrangement from international society.<sup>13</sup>

As the PLO became more isolated, they decided to support the Iraqi offer of August 12, 1990, which linked Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait with Israel's withdrawal from Palestine, including Jerusalem, the Golan heights, and southern Lebanon, as well as Syria's withdrawal from the Lebanon.<sup>14</sup>

Arafat had established a temporary strategic arrangement, both diplomatic and military, with Iraq preceding the Kuwait invasion. Since the U.S.' inability or unwillingness to influence Israel, and the deficiency of PLO diplomacy from 1988 until suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue in June 1990, the PLO was persuaded that only Iraq had the requisite diplomatic leverage and military power to persuade Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza Strip or at least to force Israel to come to the negotiating table. When the crisis started, Arafat reported that the United States would not fight battle-tested Iraq, and that if there was a war Iraq would either win or the United States would get bogged down in the desert.

Therefore, Arafat said just days before operation Desert Storm started, that if the United States and its allies wanted to fight "Then we say welcome, welcome, welcome to war. Iraq and Palestine will be together, side by side".<sup>15</sup> The link between the invasion of Kuwait with the Palestine problem was not created in the Iraqi leader's mind until ten days after the invasion. Arafat believed that he was working for the Palestinian people by supporting Iraq. However, the Gulf Arab states lost all sympathy for the Palestinian leadership in the light of the PLO's attitude.<sup>16</sup>

We must understand the reasons that induced some of the Arab countries to support the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The widespread theory is that the invasion plan was organized in advance between the Iraqi president and his allies, who sustained him in exchange for a share of the booty. Ghazi Algosaibi, asserted that some Arab officials stated that the oil in the Arabian Peninsula was just a "geological coincidence" which did not give the people of Peninsula any more right than other Arabs to the oil. Algosaibi provides an interesting defence of the people of the Peninsula who believed that the discovery of oil in their peninsula was not a coincidence. Before the discovery of the oil the people of Peninsula had endured throughout their history many hardships and they had often died of hunger. They viewed the discovery of oil as a blessing bestowed by God, who provides a means of subsistence to whomever he pleases. Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese or Egyptians who had previously worked for the government of Saudi Arabia teaching the people and giving them lessons in how to invest their money, now came to the peninsula to ask for work.<sup>17</sup> Arab states were unhappy as the centre of gravity for financial and political power shifted from the metropolis (Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut) to the desert.

However, in an article written by an Arab journalist, Mohammed Heikal, in the London Times of September 12, 1990, he states "The struggle for independence and the ownership of the oil was waged from the cities of Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut". In his view, these cities represented the political centre of gravity and should have been the financial centre as well. He adds "However, ultimately, it was the tribal leaders who obtained the oil and denied the cities the fruit of their labours".<sup>18</sup>

After the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein asked King Fahd to sign a "non-aggression" pact on April 1989, between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The request sounded very strange to the King, who imagined that the political relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the personal relationship between himself and the Iraqi president was almost an alliance. Nevertheless, King Fahd found it hard to reject Saddam's request and agreed to the pact. Saddam Hussein was confident that Saudi Arabia would not permit its territory to be used in a military campaign against Iraq. In contrast, Iraq refused a Kuwaiti request for a similar non-aggression pact, arguing that, bilateral problems between Iraq and Kuwait had to be resolved first.<sup>19</sup>

Many Palestinians supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Abu Al-Abbas, leader of Palestine Liberation Front, sent 400 members to help the Iraqi army and the Ba'ath-sponsored Arab Liberation Front sent a further 300 Palestinians to Kuwait.<sup>20</sup> Many of these Palestinians worked on roadblocks. This placed them in confrontation with the local population. Some other Palestinians helped the Iraqis in interrogation and torture centres.<sup>21</sup> Before the invasion, about 400,000 Palestinians lived in Kuwait and Yassir Arafat himself had been an engineer in Kuwait and the Fatah had been started in Kuwait.<sup>22</sup> The Gulf Arab states provided regular annual financial support to the PLO which exceeded \$72 million from Saudi Arabia, and \$24 million from Kuwait.<sup>23</sup>

The PLO's position generated deep divisions throughout the large Palestinian community. There was an economic cost of war which was sustained in the occupied territories, a shadow was cast over the future of the Palestinians of Kuwait.<sup>24</sup> Most of the direct effect has been the damage to people's livelihoods. Thousands of Palestinians working in Kuwait lost their jobs. Thousands in other Gulf states came under suspicion as possible members of Iraqi support groups and in some cases they were deported.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Middle East peace process**

The appearance of a powerful American-Arab alliance against Iraq allowed America an opportunity to carry out a general house clearing in the Middle East. They nevertheless avoided any linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israel

dispute. Thus, President Bush told the U.N. General Assembly on October 1, 1990, that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would ease the solution of additional problems in the Middle East.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, on January 29, 1991, during the Gulf war, Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister met in Washington and "agreed that without a meaningful peace process - one which promotes a just peace, security and real conciliation for Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians - it will not be possible to deal with the sources of conflict and instability in the region".<sup>27</sup>

After the U.S. led coalition's military victory against Iraq, President Bush ordered Secretary Baker to the Middle East once again to find new flexibility for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In view of Israel's restraint and the Palestinian position in the Gulf war, Baker believed that Arab states should now be more willing to negotiate directly with Israel.<sup>28</sup>

In a statement issued in Riyadh by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Syria, the Arab allies expressed their appreciation for President Bush's speech on March 6, 1991, which dealt positively with the security of this region and the Palestinian question. In his speeches, President Bush had said that "A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nation Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian rights".<sup>29</sup>

On March 10, 1991, Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Saudi Arabia and told reporters on his way to Cairo and Israel that he had been exploring with the Arab coalition partners what steps they might be able to take to signal their commitment to peace and reconciliation with Israel.<sup>30</sup> While in Israel, James Baker also met with a delegation of Palestinians. He found willingness on their part to consider new formulas toward making the peace process work.<sup>31</sup> Syria, however, insisted that Israel first agree to relinquish Arab lands in accordance with the U.N. resolutions.<sup>32</sup> The Saudis felt that they should not be represented in the process, because the only parties to peace were the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Jordanians and the Syrians. They, therefore refused to join the dialogue.<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, Secretary of State, James Baker met Palestinian representatives in Israel at a session sanctioned by the PLO.<sup>34</sup> Baker insisted that Bush

administration was not negotiating with Arafat's organization.<sup>36</sup> The decision of the PLO chief Yasser Arafat to side himself with Saddam Hussein forced the U.S. to get rid of the notion that he must be the spokesman for Palestinians in any future negotiations with Israel.<sup>36</sup>

In February 1991, a report carried by London-based Mideast Mirror, quoted the leader of the PLO as saying that the U.S. had pushed Saudi Arabia into abandoning the organization's peace plan. This provoked an official Saudi source to condemn the involvement of the newspaper in publishing totally baseless claims. In a statement to the Saudi Press Agency, the Saudi source noted that Saudi Arabia had supported the Palestinian cause ever since the first days of the disastrous events that had befallen the Palestinian people. This support would continue for what was a basic and vital cause of the Islamic and Arab nations.<sup>37</sup>

Similarly, reacting to a Reuters analysis which had said that Saudi Arabia was planning to support alternatives to Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO, and that Saudi Arabia was withholding its financial support to the PLO, an official Saudi source stated that this was a baseless claim. A similar response was brought by an item quoting Salim Al-Zanoun, Vice-President of the Palestine National Council, which said that Saudi Arabia had told a PLO envoy to repay its financial assistance.<sup>38</sup>

Official Saudi sources, however, did avoid mentioning the PLO as an organization, or supporting it politically. The Saudis did not have second thoughts about the Palestinian cause, however. In fact, Saudi Arabia had always agreed with the Palestinians relating to their liberation until they considered new formulas toward making the peace process work after the Gulf crisis.<sup>39</sup> In the words of Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, the Saudi position "Is based on the right of the Palestinians themselves to determine whether they want an independent state, or an entity with links to another country, or another solution".<sup>40</sup>

Saudi Arabia considered participation in the conference unnecessary since Saudi Arabia had no territorial dispute with Israel and the Palestinians were going to negotiate their question face to face with the Israeli delegation.<sup>41</sup> By implication, Saudis found it hard for them to sit with the Palestinian representatives who had

been against the Saudis during the Gulf crisis. The Saudis tried to find any excuse to prevent their participation in the peace conference which reflected the Saudis real anger at the Palestinian representatives.

The U.S.-Saudi honeymoon during the Gulf war seemed to be coming to an end with a letter sent to King Fahd in April 1991, by 64 American senators.<sup>42</sup> The letter urged him to rethink Saudi Arabia's decision to skip the Middle East peace conference.<sup>43</sup> Senator Bob Packwood said, "This move by Saudi Arabia is a slap in our face."<sup>44</sup> Senator Frank Lautenberg reacted to the Saudi's decision in this fashion: "We risked and lost American lives to assist Saudi Arabia. Now, when we ask them to help us achieve peace and stability in the Middle East, they say, 'no thanks'."<sup>45</sup>

As guardian of Islam's holiest shrines, Saudi Arabia's position is different from any other Arab country, however.<sup>46</sup> The Americans had a strong belief that Saudi Arabia's participation in the conference with Israel was essential for any genuine peace process to succeed.<sup>47</sup> The Americans also believed that Saudi Arabia had in the past joined in the combined Arab war efforts against Israel, and that Saudi Arabia should now join in combined efforts with the United States and with others to bring peace to the Middle East.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, the U.S. administration believed that Saudi moderation and influence would be a significant contribution to the peace process between Israel and Arab countries.<sup>49</sup> Thus, a State Department source told the Associated Press that Saudi Arabia had led Secretary of State to expect their participation.<sup>50</sup>

The Saudi Council of Ministers on May 6, 1991, condemned some hostile reports published by some Western media on Saudi Arabia's stand.<sup>51</sup> The council restated its support for all efforts leading to the resolution of the Palestinian cause.<sup>52</sup> In this respect, the council expressed the Saudi government's welcome for the initiative taken by the U.S., as it rested on international legitimacy and followed the concepts of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.<sup>53</sup>

Later, strong pressure was placed on the Saudis by the Bush administration.<sup>54</sup> Following this, the GCC states, led by Saudi Arabia, announced on May 11, 1991, that they would attend the peace conference as observers to deal directly with

Israel on such regional issues as the environment, water and arms control.<sup>55</sup> This decision was described as promoting the Middle East peace process.<sup>56</sup>

U.S. officials believed the new decision by Saudi Arabia to attend the conference would encourage Israel to reduce its difficult pre-conditions for entering the peace conference.<sup>57</sup> Saudi Arabia's earlier refusal gave Israel further reason not to cooperate in the U.S. efforts and angered many members of Congress.<sup>58</sup> Besides, U.S. officials also believed that the decision might also entice Syria into compromise by showing that other Arab countries were ready to talk to Israel. This increased the possibility that Syria could not be left behind.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, Jordan's role in any forthcoming discussion remained unclear, even though, the U.S. had accepted Jordan back into the peace process.<sup>60</sup>

Secretary of State, James Baker, had visions of a peace negotiation on two levels, the main one being a conference that would lead to direct talks involving Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians.<sup>61</sup> The point of those talks was to implement U.N. resolutions calling on Israel to trade territory for peace.<sup>62</sup> The second level of the conference would deal with the region-wide issues of arms proliferation, shrinking water resources and other problems that threatened the area.<sup>63</sup> Secretary Baker told the reporters that the Gulf Arab states' action meant that Saudi Arabia and the five other states would be sitting down face to face with Israel in direct talks.<sup>64</sup> The U.S. put forward a compromise solution that there be a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.<sup>65</sup>

A great advance in encouraging the peace process, was Saudi Arabia's announcement of July 20, 1991, that it would join Egypt's offer to end the 43-year-old Arab boycott of Israel if the Jewish state would halt construction of settlements in the occupied territories.<sup>66</sup> The Saudis have been described as perhaps the most influential participants in the boycott. This action was clearly taking a certain political risk both at home and abroad. The offer was made during a visit to Saudi Arabia by Secretary Baker.<sup>67</sup> The government of Saudi Arabia issued a formal statement, after talks with Baker, saying "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has closely followed both the positive position adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic under the leadership of President Hafez Assad to promote the peace process by agreeing to participate in the forthcoming peace conference, as well as



the statements made by his Excellency Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, indicating that Israel should suspend the building of settlements, and in such a case it would be possible for the Arab countries to take an appropriate step by suspending the Arab boycott of Israel".<sup>68</sup>

The Saudi decision was of major importance to the U.S. As Mr. Baker said, "We are pleased to see this step by the Saudi government because it indicates a willingness to take concrete steps toward Israel, if Israel is willing to reciprocate. A suspension of the boycott, of course, would signal for one thing a willingness to reconcile with Israel, and clearly reciprocal confidence-building moves of this nature have got to improve the climate for peace. Hopefully, they will make the possibility of progress towards peace much greater".<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, Lebanon announced earlier in the day of July 20, 1991, that it would join Syria in supporting the U.S. - designed peace conference. Undoubtedly, the Saudi and Lebanese moves were designed by the United States and were proposed to increase pressure on Israel to formally acknowledge that it would attend the peace conference on the eve of Secretary of State's visit in Israel on July 21, 1991.<sup>70</sup>

A senior Saudi official commented briefly on July 21, 1991, after the Saudi announcement about the suspension of the Arab boycott of Israel that it was "too early" to say whether the proposed suspension of the boycott would apply to both the primary and the secondary boycotts. The Saudi officials also acknowledged that it was still not clear how many other Arab states would be ready to join in this proposal and particularly whether Syria would join, since the Arab League boycott office was located in Damascus the Syrian capital.<sup>71</sup>

Indeed, it was clear from Saudi sources that the whole plan had not been completely thought out by either the Arabs or the U.S. and that it had been created more for its political effect than its direct applicability.<sup>72</sup> Again, Saudi Arabia was engaging in a role behind the scenes to encourage other Arab states and the Palestinians to accept President Bush's proposal for an Arab-Israeli peace conference.<sup>73</sup>

Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, perceiving the changed circumstances, conditionally agreed to attend the conference.<sup>74</sup> He would go if Palestinian representation could be satisfactorily resolved.<sup>75</sup> Thus, during the conclusion of the summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to sign a START Treaty, the leaders declared that they would issue invitations for a Middle East peace conference for October 1991.<sup>76</sup> Israel accepted the invitation provided that the PLO and Palestinians from East Jerusalem would not be among the attendants.<sup>77</sup> Secretary of State, James Baker, agreed to the Israeli demand.<sup>78</sup> The Israeli cabinet might also be willing to negotiate with new Palestinians that were not actively involved with the PLO.<sup>79</sup>

U.S. and Saudi Arabian interests harmonized when Saudi Arabia cut off aid to the PLO, which had alienated the Gulf states with its support for Iraq.<sup>80</sup> The Gulf states helped sideline the PLO leadership, supporting the U.S. in their efforts to build a public relationship with moderate and respected West Bank leaders, less objectionable to Israel.<sup>81</sup>

In fact, Mr James Baker asked Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., to attend the conference.<sup>82</sup> King Fahd approved and Prince Bandar led the Saudi delegation to the Madrid conference on October 31, 1991.<sup>83</sup> During the conference, Secretary of States, James Baker, showed his appreciation of "King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who demonstrated by word and deed that new opportunities for Arab-Israeli peace existed after the Gulf war and who personified this new approach in the Arab World".<sup>84</sup> In another comment during the conference, Mr Baker said that more confidence-building measures were required from the Arabs and the Israelis, but his warm approval appeared to excuse Saudi Arabia.<sup>85</sup>

The Saudis' symbolic weight was expected to be a major motivation for the Arab states to cooperate in planned actions on regional issues.<sup>86</sup> The Saudis wanted to see steps taken by Israel, particularly progress in negotiations, before making concessions.<sup>87</sup> The Bush administration realised that since the Gulf war, the Saudis had been able to accept that things had changed and that they were willing to see things in a new light.<sup>88</sup>

Actually, the Gulf crisis had a fundamental impact on the Saudi foreign policy and its regional orientation. The Gulf war have weakened the radical Arabs and provided the Saudis with the confidence to participate with Israelis in the Middle East peace process without fearing regional radicalism.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's post-war foreign policy has become more active and more open toward Israel. The Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. made public contact with representatives from the American Jewish community and major Jewish organizations who shared the Saudi's vision of the Iraqi regional threat.<sup>90</sup>

Again, Arabs saw Israel in the conference hardening its position during the bilateral discussions about the Middle East. Syria and Israel were locked in argument over whether to hold a first meeting simply on procedural issues. This led the Syrian Foreign Minister to announce his intention to return to Syria, leaving the prospect of direct Israeli-Syrian talks in doubt.<sup>91</sup> However, Mr Mubarak and King Fahd put pressure on the Syrian President, who then ordered his Foreign Minister to remain at the Madrid peace talks.<sup>92</sup>

King Fahd believed that Arab moderates must make the task easier by avoiding inflexibility on their part. More confidence-building measures were required from the Arabs and the Israelis. King Fahd did not want the Arabs to lose this opportunity for face-to-face talks with the Israelis which points as a step toward a comprehensive peace. King Fahd had been waiting for these negotiations for many years. The conference reflected his plan of 1981, which was to implement U.N. resolutions and for Israel to trade land for peace.

Consequently, during the Madrid peace conference, the U.S. was forced to step in after the participants were unable to agree on any point.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the U.S. invited Israel and the Arabs to talks in Washington.<sup>94</sup> In fact, the Madrid peace conference was a good start. It reflects the changed environment in the Middle East and the significance of it lies in the fact that Israel was sitting down to negotiate directly with each of its Arab neighbours and with the Palestinians.<sup>95</sup>

The new Washington talks included negotiations on territory, mutual security and peace between Israel and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and the prospect of limited autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.<sup>96</sup> The talks

launched the actual bargaining between the Israelis and the Palestinians and between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries aimed at producing a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict.<sup>97</sup> Saudi Arabia kept itself aloof from the peace talks in Washington.<sup>98</sup> After all, it was unlikely that Saudi Arabia would be as enthusiastic in the support for either Arafat or King Hussein of Jordan.<sup>99</sup>

The Madrid conference launched a series of bilateral and multilateral talks until President Bill Clinton came to office in early 1993.<sup>100</sup> A progression of talks with regional leaders, including the Palestinians, over the previous two years had satisfied the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, that they all remained committed to the peace process.<sup>101</sup>

In April, 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks had arrived at a crucial phase. Essential to the success of the peace negotiations was some sign of the narrow differences between Israel and the PLO.<sup>102</sup> Although, Saudi Arabia remained aloof from the peace process, Saudi Arabia promised to increase its financial support for pro-PLO institutions in the occupied territories. The Palestinians had asked for the support from Saudi Arabia as a condition of continued participation in the talks.<sup>103</sup>

As a matter of fact, the negotiations between Israel and the PLO meant that the agreement between Israel and the PLO could almost be signed. The Western media disclosed the joint declaration of principles negotiated by Israel and the PLO. This marked the first step in what could become a comprehensive peace between the Jewish state and all its close neighbours.<sup>104</sup>

The Israeli-PLO negotiations represented a breakthrough in this crucial sense; the two parties made clear that they really wanted a deal and that they were prepared to take risks to achieve it.<sup>105</sup> The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was disappointed over the Palestinian inability to decide and annoyed by Palestinian violence. The moment for a deal came when the PLO seemed in extreme need of a lifeline.<sup>106</sup> The turn in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1992 and the 1990 Gulf war, when Saudi Arabia and other GCC states cut off millions of dollars in subsidies to the PLO.<sup>107</sup> With its

infrastructure and fighting power weakened in the occupied territories and around the world, the PLO agreed to U.S. efforts to upgrade leaders from inside the West Bank and Gaza as Israeli's negotiating partners.<sup>108</sup>

As to the deal itself, some of the risks are reflected in the outline of the deal, which is limited to a five-year period and does not address the final status of the territories.<sup>109</sup> The PLO has agreed to much of Israel's concept of self-government: Jerusalem is left out; Israel's settlers are left out; and Israel keeps control of security.<sup>110</sup> The PLO would have to cease both terrorism and the intifada (uprising).<sup>111</sup>

The countdown to peace was as follows:

- September 13, 1993: Declaration of Principles which was signed in Washington.
- October 13, 1993: Declaration of Principles comes into effect. The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee formed to implement the Declaration of Principles.
- December 13, 1993: Israel and the Palestinians agree the protocol on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Israel immediately begins accelerated military withdrawal.
- April 13, 1994: Israel completes military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Israel immediately transfers powers to nominated Palestinian authorities. The countdown of the five-year period of interim self-government towards a permanent settlement begins.
- July 13, 1994: Palestinian elections, which are to be followed by inauguration of a Palestinian Council and the dissolution of Israeli military-run civil administration in the occupied territories.
- February 13, 1996: Israel and Palestinians start negotiations on structure of permanent settlement.
- February 13, 1999: permanent settlement due to come into effect.<sup>112</sup>

Therefore, Israel makes Mr Arafat legitimate.<sup>113</sup> He would gain control of territory in both Gaza and Jericho, and limited autonomy for the rest of the West Bank, which was the land lost to Israel in 1967.<sup>114</sup> It has been described as "peace by

piece".<sup>115</sup> Mr Arafat turned to Israel to be rescued.<sup>116</sup> Their proposed plan of Palestinian self-government reflected Mr Arafat's weakness and what seemed to be limited risks by Israel.<sup>117</sup> The PLO then used its newly-found legitimacy to spread its demands.<sup>118</sup> Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., Itamar Rabinovitch, said in September 1993 "Our choices were to completely try to vanquish the other side or to strike a good deal with the other", and he said also "And if we had vanquished the other side, we would have ended with excellent terms but with no one to complete them with. Right now we have a good agreement on our hands and possibly a partner to complete it with".<sup>119</sup>

The peace agreement was signed on September 13, 1993 at the White House. It was dependent on the results of continuing dialogue on several different questions such as the future status of Jerusalem.<sup>120</sup> President Clinton told a meeting of Jewish and Arab Americans after signing the agreement "A lot of the complicated details are left... Everyone must understand that this agreement now has to be implemented".<sup>121</sup> All the parties agreed that the White House ceremony witnessed by PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, marked the first step toward reconciling a generation full of hatred and violence.<sup>122</sup>

The U.S. led the way in trying to arrange funds for the Palestinians to promote the infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>123</sup> More than 40 countries agreed to contribute billions of dollars over five years to help the Palestinians.<sup>124</sup> The U.S. made a five-year pledge of \$500 million.<sup>125</sup> On September 11, 1993, President Clinton asked King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to give his support. Clinton received assurances from the King that his government would contribute.<sup>126</sup> So, despite the Saudi disappointment with the PLO over its allegiance with Iraq during the Kuwait crisis, Saudi Arabia assured the U.S. officials on October 1, 1993, that it would give \$1 billion over 10 years (The Saudi contribution up until 1995, has amounted to \$300 million).<sup>127</sup>

To smooth the path of the peace process, it was well known that the U.S. has asked Saudi Arabia to receive Mr Arafat on a visit to Saudi Arabia. Three years after the Gulf war, and due to the Saudi support for the Middle East peace process, the Saudi government accepted a written apology from Mr Arafat.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, on July 9, 1994, Mr Arafat visited King Fahd in Saudi Arabia.<sup>129</sup> This was the first

visit by Arafat since August 1990.<sup>130</sup> The PLO adviser, Nabil Shaath, announced after the visit that King Fahd had agreed to "Support the political and economic position of the Palestinian National Authority".<sup>131</sup>

Saudi Arabia welcomed the peace agreement signed by the PLO and Israel. The Saudi view of the Declaration of Principles was based on the right of the Palestinians themselves to determine what is best for them. Since the PLO was satisfied with the peace agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia would not reject it.<sup>132</sup> The Saudi government wanted to see great progress towards a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.<sup>133</sup> Jordan's King Hussein and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, signed a peace agreement on July 25, 1994, in Washington. The two leaders ended the hostility and talked on the issues still dividing them e.g. border problems, water and security.<sup>134</sup> Syria and Lebanon were still negotiating with Israel.<sup>135</sup> It is clear to observers that the Syrian delegation combined both its own views and those of the Lebanese in negotiations with the Israelis.<sup>136</sup> Syria insisted that they would never accept any peace agreement without a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Israel refused point blank to give back any of the captured land unless Israel knew what benefits it would get in return.<sup>137</sup>

Another step in the peace process was taken by the Saudi government and other GCC governments when they ended the secondary boycott of Israel in late September 1994.<sup>138</sup> President Clinton expressed appreciation during a visit to Saudi Arabia on October 25, 1994, for the role played by King Fahd in contributing to the peace process by ending the secondary boycott of Israel.<sup>139</sup> In return, King Fahd expressed his support for all the peace treaties.<sup>140</sup> In addition they expressed their commitment to continuing efforts to make real progress on the Israeli-Syrian and the Israeli-Lebanese treaty which would be based on U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.<sup>141</sup>

### **Major factors influencing the peace process**

Later, the Israeli-Palestinians talks turned back to this central issue: land and peace.<sup>142</sup> The Palestinians need land, the Israelis need security. The September 1993 Declaration of Principles was designed to satisfy these desires; definitely, it

has not.<sup>143</sup> Instead, continued expansion of Israeli settlements had generated hostility in the Palestinians and have been repeatedly attacked.<sup>144</sup> Israel did agree to freeze settlement buildings, a pledge which it had first made in 1992 and on which a controversial \$10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees remained.<sup>145</sup> In spite of that, the settler population had increased since September 1993, when Israel announced its plan. On May 7, 1995, Israel announced its intention to confiscate 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem for Jewish housing.<sup>146</sup> More than 70 per cent of the confiscated land belonged to Palestinians.<sup>147</sup>

Consequently, public opinion throughout the Arab world seemed to become increasingly doubtful about the opportunity of the process achieving a comprehensive peace and it became increasingly critical of the PLO leaders who had signed up to a deal which appeared heavily weighted in favour of Israel. Much of the opposition of the peace talks came from Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups.<sup>148</sup>

Therefore, Arab Foreign Ministers agreed to seek an urgent U.N. Security Council meeting to stop Israel confiscating Palestinian land in East Jerusalem.<sup>149</sup> In a speech, the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, told the Arab Foreign Ministers that the situation of slowly progressing peace talks with Israel could not continue. He said also "Israel's practices in Jerusalem and the whole policy of settlements.... strike at the credibility of the peace process, raise questions about its value and undermine any prospect that it will continue, make progress or be comprehensive".<sup>150</sup> Mr Arafat stressed the land confiscation endangered the peace process, which had made little progress since the autonomous Palestinian Authority took over Gaza and Jericho at the beginning of July 1994.<sup>151</sup>

The Arab League confirmed that Israel's confiscation of land violated the Security Council resolution which called for Israel to not confiscate lands in Jerusalem it captured in 1967.<sup>152</sup> Israel also violated the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of 1993 which left the negotiations about the Jerusalem for the second phase of the peace process.<sup>153</sup> Hence, Arab League Secretary-General, Esmat Abdel Meguid, called in May 15, 1995, for a special Arab summit on Israel's plans to seize Palestinian land to build homes for Jews in East Jerusalem.<sup>154</sup> He also announced clearly "That the Arabs have a right to Jerusalem and that they will never sell it off".<sup>155</sup> In addition,



Abdel Meguid told reporters on May 15, 1995, that European countries were supporting the Palestine position and Israel could not take the land and the peace.<sup>156</sup>

At a Security Council meeting on May 17, 1995, the U.S. alone used its veto to block a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on Israel to cancel their decision to confiscate Palestinian land in East Jerusalem.<sup>157</sup> The rest of the Security Council, (14 countries), voted in favour of the Palestinians to ensure that the Middle East peace process could continue.<sup>158</sup> The U.S. used the excuse that the issue of the confiscated Palestinian land should be discussed between Israel and the PLO and not in the United Nations.<sup>159</sup>

Arab reaction was against the U.S. after Washington used its veto. Israeli officials said relations with the Arab world had dropped to its lowest point since the 1980s.<sup>160</sup> The PLO said that the move had caused the Palestinians to "lose faith in the U.S. at a time when the peace process was already close to collapsing".<sup>161</sup> Public opinion in Gaza and the West Bank was not surprised by the American veto. They would have been surprised if the U.S. had voted against Israel's plan to seize land in East Jerusalem.<sup>162</sup> In Jordan, the Government of King Hussein was coming under increasing parliamentary pressure to withdraw its new ambassador from Israel and to freeze the treaty.<sup>163</sup> Therefore, Jordan told the U.S. Ambassador in Amman that the American move, generally prompted by domestic American politics, had been both "immoral and hypocritical".<sup>164</sup> Israel Radio reported that news of the American veto had brought about the failure of peace negotiations.<sup>165</sup>

The Arab anger against the U.S. veto was coupled with anger at a report on May 8, 1995, that U.S. Senate majority Republican leader, Bob Dole, had ordered Clinton's Democratic administration to start projecting a new embassy site in Jerusalem before the end of 1996. This would move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.<sup>166</sup> At the same time, House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, called for the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.<sup>167</sup> The Arab media responded angrily and asserted that Dole's proposal was against all the Security Council resolutions, such as resolution number 478 (1980) which called for Israel to cancel its plan to connect East and West Jerusalem in one state and call it the capital of Israel.<sup>168</sup> The proposal came before the final talks about the status of Jerusalem

under the Israel and PLO agreement in 1993. It would kill the peace process.<sup>169</sup> In addition, they affirmed that Dole's proposal was designed to please the Jewish lobby for supporting him financially in his presidential campaign for election to the White House at the end of 1996.<sup>170</sup> For this reason, Arab diplomats became afraid that the American presidential elections would increase Israel's power to do as it pleased in Jerusalem and the Arab lands and that the Palestinians would pay the price for the personal benefits of American politicians as the Palestinians had done in the past.<sup>171</sup>

On May 18, 1995, Mr Gaffer Allgani, 1995 Saudi's representative to the U.N. Security Council openly criticised the Israeli plan to seize land in Eastern Jerusalem. The Saudi representative condemned Israel's confiscation of Palestinian lands. He asserted that although the peace process had brought hope for the world community and the world wanted to achieve a comprehensive settlement based on UN resolutions number 242 and 338, the Israeli plans would generate violence between Arabs and Jews.<sup>172</sup> He also emphasised that when Saudi Arabia participated in the Middle East peace conference in Madrid and supported the peace process this was to allow the Palestinian authorities to reinforce their political base and generate public opinion towards a peace process. The U.S. should, therefore, persuade Israel to reverse its decision about the confiscation of Arab lands in Jerusalem.<sup>173</sup> As a result, Saudi Arabia agreed to attend the Arab mini summit on May 27, 1995, in Morocco which would address the recent land confiscation in East Jerusalem and the extension of Jewish settlements in the holy city.<sup>174</sup> In addition, the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference would join the Arab mini summit. These states include Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Senegal.<sup>175</sup>

After the Arab countries took serious posture against Israel and the United States. The PLO called for negotiation with Israel to stop unless Israel cancelled its plans.<sup>176</sup> In Egypt, the Arab League received a message that Egypt was ready to stop its procedural normalization with Israel and that Egypt would support any resolution from the Arab League to dissuade other Arab countries from initiating any relations with Israel.<sup>177</sup> The Arab countries had strong doubts about the American position and its role in the peace process. This led the Arab League to call an all Arab countries to put pressure on the U.S. to change its attitude.<sup>178</sup> The

Arab League described the American attitude as a dangerous precedent. The U.S. had previously used to abstain on any resolution relating to Jerusalem or vote for Palestinian control of East Jerusalem.<sup>179</sup> In fact, on May 22, 1995, Israel announced the suspension of its plan to confiscate 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem which was welcomed by the United States.<sup>180</sup> Hence, the mini Arab summit suspended their meeting and called on Israel to review the peace process with the PLO.<sup>181</sup>

After Israel decided to confiscate 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem and the U.S. supported Israel by vetoing a proposed U.N. Security Council condemnation of Israel's actions, Israeli officials saw the mini Arab summit as an important reflection of a return of Arab solidarity to oppose future challenges.<sup>182</sup> The Palestinians were willing to make peace but Israel, with U.S. support, demonstrated something different. The Palestinians, after fighting for statehood for 40 years, had now found themselves being presented with a maximum of 10 per cent of their land on which they may live.<sup>183</sup> Therefore, Palestinian officials and public opinion throughout the Arab world has grown increasingly doubtful about the chances of the process achieving a comprehensive peace since the U.S. is so influenced by Israel. This is the reason they demanded mediators from European countries and Asia.<sup>184</sup>

Israel could display to the world its influence within the American political parties but at the same time it revealed some weaknesses of the U.S. as a superpower.<sup>185</sup> The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin's decision on May 22, 1995, to suspend the seizure of 53 hectares of the land in East Jerusalem was in response to the threat that his government would fall due to two motions of no-confidence in the Knessat over the planned land confiscation.<sup>186</sup> The U.S. had vetoed a proposed UN Security Council condemnation of Israel's seizure of land in East Jerusalem.<sup>187</sup> Israel's decision to suspend the seizure of 53 hectares allowed them to contain Arab anger but made the U.S. lose its status as an honest intermediary in the peace process.<sup>188</sup> The interests game between Israel and the U.S. must not continue to influence the Middle East problem, as it has done since the Middle East problem started.<sup>189</sup> For instance, before the Camp David agreement, President Carter told President Sadat that it would help him to be re-elected if President Sadat signed the agreement. In his second term President Carter would play a major part in the

solution of the Palestinian question and force Israel to renounce the policy of settling on the West Bank.<sup>190</sup> However, President Carter's campaign failed, because of the pro-Reagan Israeli counter campaign.<sup>191</sup>

At the present, Arab countries are not dependent on Israel, but it will not stay like this for ever.<sup>192</sup> King Fahd made a statement when he was Crown Prince and Deputy Premier on August 13, 1980, in answer to a question concerning Israel's declaration that the whole of Jerusalem was its capital. He said: "Will the world blame us if we take matters into our own hands and defend our holiest of the holy places against this Zionist, religious and military campaign. Words are no longer of any benefit. Statements are useless at these precise and critical moments. The Arab and Islamic nations are facing a unique challenge, a challenge supported by the strongest military power in the world, as far as we are concerned, the question is to be or not to be".<sup>193</sup> At the end of the statement, the Crown Prince asserted that "I would like to say that quickly putting the Arab house back in order has become a pressing and urgent demand heading our list of priorities.... to bring all the Arabs together so that we can all stand together, this is inevitable, in one battle not matter how long this may take and how costly it may be, a battle in which we shall place all our belief, determination, energy and means regardless of the cost. We shall not rest until our Arab territories are liberated and the fraternal Palestinian people return proudly to their homeland to establish their independent state and its capital of Arab Jerusalem, God willing".<sup>194</sup>

### **The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Arab-Israeli peace process**

Besides the confrontation between the Arab countries and Israel supported by the U.S. over the confiscation of land in East Jerusalem and Dole's proposal to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Arab countries found themselves in another confrontation with Israel again supported by the U.S. This confrontation was over the rejection by the Arab states to renew their signatures on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in view of the Israeli refusal to join the treaty.<sup>195</sup> The 1970 NPT had only a 25-year guaranteed term, which expired in April 1995. The NPT stipulated that the members would have to decide how to extend the treaty - for a fixed period or periods, or indefinitely.<sup>196</sup>

The pre-emptive strike on the Osiraq Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and its stance over the NPT, proved Israel's decision to maintain its nuclear monopoly.<sup>197</sup> Israel is not a signatory of the NPT and has developed nuclear weapons to gain an ultimate deterrent that could persuade Arab countries that no military invasion could ever be successful because of Israel's capability to destroy the forces and the population centres of the Arab countries.<sup>198</sup> Israel saw the nuclear option not only as the ultimate means of guaranteeing Israel's security and survival, but also as a means of forcing the Arabs to come to terms with Israel and its existence.<sup>199</sup> A Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (RFIS) report, released early in 1993, confirmed the open secret that Israel had a large stockpile of 100 to 200 weapons.<sup>200</sup> The RFIS also disclosed that Israel had been producing chemical weapons since the mid-1960s.<sup>201</sup> This disclosure was embarrassing for Israel, which had been pressuring Arab countries to renounce their chemical weapons programmes and which in January 1993, had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a treaty preventing the production, stockpiling and use of poison gas.<sup>202</sup>

The RFIS report also confirmed that the Israelis would have no difficulty in launching non-conventional warheads over long distances.<sup>203</sup> Israel had stockpiled the most modern missiles in the Middle East region.<sup>204</sup> They include the 480 kilometre (km) range Jericho 1, which was first deployed about 20 years ago, and the 750 km range Jericho II, of which over 100 were deployed in the 1977-1981 period.<sup>205</sup> The 1,300 km range Jericho IIB had been successfully tested and "as a result Israel's missile potential fully covered the regional boundaries".<sup>206</sup>

The Russian report stated that Israel had successfully launched a satellite in 1989-1992, using its own Shavit rocket.<sup>207</sup> The Shavit could also deliver a small nuclear warhead a distance of over 4500 kms, and the original design of the Shavit allowed it to develop its range to 7,000 kms.<sup>208</sup> Israel also developed its own sea launched cruise missile.<sup>209</sup> The American Tomahawk sea launched cruise missiles, increased the capability of the Israeli navy in the Eastern Mediterranean to a level approaching the level of armament of certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.<sup>210</sup>

The Russian report stated that it has no direct evidence of an independent Israeli biological weapons programme.<sup>211</sup> It marked, however, Israel's cooperation in a programme of biological research with top American military laboratories within the framework of the U.S. Defense Department programme for protection against biological weapons.<sup>212</sup>

The chemical weapons convention provided significant leverage against Israel. Arab efforts, led by Egypt, lobbied for a linkage between Arab acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty and Israel's refusal to adhere to the NPT.<sup>213</sup> With the exception of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan, the rest of the Arab countries signed the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty.<sup>214</sup> Most Arab countries argued that they should not limit their military options as long as Israel had atomic weapons and refused to sign the NPT treaty.<sup>215</sup> Egypt had taken the lead by stressing that all regional countries should adhere to the existing treaties on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and should be subject to international inspection and verification.<sup>216</sup>

The imminent renewal and extension of the NPT conference forced a sense of urgency into the nuclear debate. Egypt sought to gain from the U.S. administration a decision to secure an indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty and frequently raised the nuclear question with Israeli leaders.<sup>217</sup> As the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Musa, recalled at the UN General Assembly in September 1994, without Israel any extension of the NPT will generate a "Bizarre situation" since Israel was the only country in the Middle East who had refused to sign the NPT.<sup>218</sup> The Arab League Secretary-General Assistant, Adnan Omaran, cited on April 17, 1995, that when Arab countries had signed the NPT more than 25 years previously, they had received pledges from Western nuclear countries, that they (the Western countries) would convince Israel to join the NPT.<sup>219</sup> He continued by saying that instead of convincing Israel to join the NPT, they had assisted Israel to become a nuclear country with approximately 200 nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles that could attack any Arab capital. He called for a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone. He also expressed concern about the U.S. using its financial support as pressure to force some countries to sign the NPT.<sup>220</sup> He confirmed that the position of the Arab countries was clear with regard to the NPT and that they would not be deceived again.<sup>221</sup>

Since there was pressure on Arab countries to sign the NPT but none on Israel, the Arab media began to debate the Arab response to Israeli nuclear reactors. Most of them called for Arab countries to build their own reactors to counter the Israelis. For instance, Dr Azat Abdulaziz, a UN Consultant for Nuclear Affairs and previous Egyptian President of the Atomic Energy Agency, called on the Arab countries to move fast to gain atomic experience from the Central Asian republics resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>222</sup> He called on Arab states to integrate their atomic potential, to counter the subsequent restrictions of Western countries on the atomic technology.<sup>223</sup> He also said that as all Arab countries were members of the NPT treaty they had a right to consult any country to develop their own civilian use reactors, since these reactors were always under international inspection.<sup>224</sup> He stressed that it was a strange situation for the world community to decide to decrease their nuclear weapons, while they ignored Israel's nuclear capability which was primarily a threat to Arab countries.<sup>225</sup> He encouraged the Arab countries to exchange their nuclear experience and to develop their own nuclear reactors.

Again, the peace process implied a comprehensive peace in the region which had a nuclear dimension that included the "deterrence of Dimona", the site of Israel's nuclear reactor.<sup>226</sup> Israel declared that the nuclear question should be discussed after a comprehensive settlement including peace and normal relations with all Arab countries, Iran, the ex-Soviet Muslim republics and even Pakistan.<sup>227</sup> However, the Arab countries perceived that Israel's concern with non Arab countries was an excuse for not joining the NPT. The Arab countries did not have authority over non- Arab countries to make them form a relationship with Israel or not.<sup>228</sup>

In Saudi Arabia's speech before the U.N. on April 24, 1995, regarding the review and extension of the NPT, Saudi Arabia's delegation led by Mr Muhammad Manoun Kordy, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic and Cultural Affairs, stressed that Israel had been continuing its nuclear programme without accepting international discipline and refusing to join the NPT treaty. He continued that this created a threat to regional security and affected the credibility and universality of the NPT.<sup>229</sup> He accused the NPT treaty of being ineffective as it did

not succeed in its purpose. He continued that when the treaty was first signed more than 25 years ago there were five nuclear countries but now there were more and even the number of nuclear weapons held by each nuclear country had increased.<sup>230</sup> He stressed that Saudi Arabia had complained about some members of the NPT who had refused to sign the treaty and had developed their nuclear military abilities in the absence of international monitoring. He explained that this displayed a dangerous omission in the investigation system of the International Energy Agency.<sup>231</sup> Thus, he advised the NPT conference to solve these problems and institute a satisfactory monitoring programme.<sup>232</sup> When monitoring nuclear programmes, Mr Kordy suggested to the conference that they learn some lessons from the committee for monitoring of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.<sup>233</sup> Finally, he called all the countries of the region, especially Israel (as the only one in the region which possesses nuclear weapons) to join the treaty and get rid of its nuclear stock and free the Middle East from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.<sup>234</sup>

Since the NPT conference started on April 17, 1995, Israel was confident that the U.S. would maintain its conventional position towards its nuclear programme rather than yield to Arab pressure led by America's ally, Egypt.<sup>235</sup> For its part, the U.S. has not frustrated Israeli hopes.<sup>236</sup> The U.S. had put pressure on Egypt by threatening to reduce its economic support to Egypt if it did not sign the treaty or insist that Israel should join the NPT.<sup>237</sup> The U.S. lobbied hard for indefinite extension throughout the conference, and won support from 103 countries out of the total 178 signatory countries on the NPT.<sup>238</sup> The counter proposal, called for rolling extensions automatically renewed every 25 years unless treaty members determined otherwise.<sup>239</sup> The indefinite extension, favoured by the U.S., would recognize the permanence of the existence of the nations with nuclear weapons.<sup>240</sup> For the Arab part, Egypt introduced a proposal that called for the extension of the NPT treaty for five years. This protected the Arab national security, especially from Israel.<sup>241</sup>

As has been noted, the U.S., and the other treaty sponsors, had hoped to avoid a separate vote.<sup>242</sup> The nuclear powers are pledged to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms and they are committed to accomplish negotiations in good faith leading towards complete nuclear disarmament.<sup>243</sup> Also, the nuclear powers are



committed to pursue a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996, and begin discussions to stop production of the fissile material required to produce weapons.<sup>244</sup> In exchange, the nuclear powers pledged to share nuclear technology with non-nuclear countries for peaceful purposes.<sup>245</sup> However, in an official action, the Security Council resolution approved on April 11, 1995, pledged security guarantees obtained by the non-nuclear countries.<sup>246</sup> Security Council resolution 984 stated that no nuclear power will use atomic weapons against a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT and provides that the Security Council will immediately consider any nuclear attack against a country lacking nuclear weapons.<sup>247</sup> The second part of the resolution is addressed particularly at the de facto nuclear powers, none of which has signed the NPT treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan.<sup>248</sup> The resolution, still, did little to pacify the majority of non-nuclear countries signatory to the NPT, which perceived it as weak and insufficient protection against nuclear aggression.<sup>249</sup>

The issue of whether to vote over the extension of the treaty had annoyed the U.S. and its allies from the beginning of the conference.<sup>250</sup> They argued for reaching a consensus but rejected a ballot because it appeared that such a vote might not be enough to win an indefinite extension of the NPT. A vote would have required a simple majority of the treaty's 178 signatories.<sup>251</sup> Therefore, the conference was expected to determine in favour of extending the treaty indefinitely with no legally binding conditions.<sup>252</sup> Thus, Arab and U.S. delegates worked out a substitute compromise resolution, which they adopted in the final hour before the conference had to make its decision public. It did not single out Israel by name but called on all states in the region that had not signed the treaty to do so.<sup>253</sup>

Later, after 24 days of intense negotiations, the conference President pronounced the decision on May 11, 1995, to extend the NPT indefinitely.<sup>254</sup> The extension was not approved by a vote, but by an accord of opinion. Thus, the nuclear nations avoided the opposition of non-nuclear nations.<sup>255</sup> The decision for the indefinite extension came after President Clinton personally campaigned for the indefinite extension.<sup>256</sup> According to the New York Times, in the 48 hours prior the final decision, President Clinton wrote "tough messages" to Egypt and Mexico stressing the significance of the issue to the U.S.<sup>257</sup> President Clinton made clear that the

U.S. would find it hard to understand why friendly nations that had received help from the U.S. were not more cooperative.<sup>258</sup>

Similarly, to pacify the Arab countries, the conference called upon all countries in the region (Israel's name was eliminated by American representatives) to take practical steps for the establishment of an effective verifiable Middle East zone, free of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>259</sup> This clause, which has been described as obligatory, is not very different from resolutions which the General Assembly has been adopting for more than 20 years without bringing Israel any closer to the NPT.<sup>260</sup>

The U.S. secured the permanent extension of the NPT it had fought for.<sup>261</sup> Arab threats to withhold support for the indefinite renewal without Israel's signature on the NPT fizzled out on the last day of the conference when they joined the other countries, without a vote, to extend the treaty permanently.<sup>262</sup> In the meantime, Israel thanked the U.S. for pressing the Egyptian Arab attempts to force it to join the treaty and, thereby, bring its nuclear programme under international scrutiny.<sup>263</sup> Egypt pledged on May 12, 1995, to continue pressing the Jewish state and work for a nuclear-free Middle East.<sup>264</sup> Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, was disappointed by the American position over Israel and at the same time he said that he was disappointed by the international decision to extend the treaty indefinitely without Israel but he took some comfort from the attention focused on the problem.<sup>265</sup> He also said "I can not describe the results of the New York conference as a victory but it is another step forward in the difficult process to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons and, most importantly, the Israeli nuclear programme".<sup>266</sup> He continued "The end of the NPT conference does not mean that the problem created by the existence of an Israeli nuclear programme has ended, because this problem still exists".<sup>267</sup> The Egyptian Foreign Minister did not mention how Egypt would continue to press Israel, but he confirmed that Egypt would "Continue to respect the NPT as it was renewed".<sup>268</sup> He insisted that the treaty would only be credible when Israel joined it and stressed that Egypt's position "Reflected a common Arab stance".<sup>269</sup>

During their periodic meeting on June 12, 1995, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal joined with the rest of GCC Foreign Minister and welcomed the U.N.

Conference's decision that called for the establishment of a Middle East zone, free of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>270</sup> The GCC's Foreign Ministers called on Israel to allow its nuclear reactors to come under international scrutiny.<sup>271</sup>

Israel's exclusion from the NPT caused condemnation from Arab countries. For instance, Syria's delegate to the NPT conference, Taher Hosami, said his country "Has respected the NPT's obligations since it became a member 25 years ago, but it can not accept that Israel does not become a member; Israel has a nuclear arsenal and continues to occupy a large part of its neighbours' territories, putting itself above international law".<sup>272</sup> Jordanian Foreign Minister, AbdulKarim Kabariti, said "There should be no exceptions in the NPT".<sup>273</sup> PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat said "The U.S. forced 170 countries across the world to sign something they are not convinced of".<sup>274</sup> He also accused the U.S. of forcing through the permanent renewal of the NPT against Arab wishes.<sup>275</sup>

Since the decision on May 11, 1995, to extend the NPT indefinitely without Israel, Arab experts agreed that there has been manoeuvring to prevent Arab countries from possessing nuclear reactors for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes.<sup>276</sup> They asserted that a nuclear ban on trade with Arab countries was not a principle but there was a nuclear technological monopoly by the Western countries and they were reluctant to help.<sup>277</sup> Dr Azat Abdulaziz, a U.N. Consultant for Nuclear Affairs and previously Egyptian President for Atomic Energy Agency, asserted that the nuclear monopoly hindered the development of the nuclear programmes in Arab countries.<sup>278</sup> He gave Egypt as example. He stated that the Egyptian nuclear programme had been started at the same time as the Indian nuclear programme during the mid 1950s, but the Egyptian nuclear programme had almost been stopped because of American pressure in the 1980s.<sup>279</sup> India, however, was now considered to be a nuclear power in possession of nuclear weapons.<sup>280</sup>

The previous Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amoran Al-Shafei, commented on the permanent extension of the NPT as unbalanced and offered no choice for the Arab countries, but to coordinate the development of their nuclear capacities, since they already had the financial resources and the nuclear experts.<sup>281</sup> In an interview on May 18, 1995, in the Egyptian daily newspaper Alahram, Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, warned that even if Israel did not intend to attack Egypt

now, there was no guarantee that after twenty years, for instance, they would not, since Israel had nuclear weapons and there was no deterrent nuclear weapon on the other side.<sup>282</sup> He confirmed that Egypt would develop its peaceful nuclear programme and he advised Israel that they should not deride the potential Egyptian nuclear programme.<sup>283</sup> He also asserted that Israel's refusal to join the NPT and the Israeli insistence on keeping their nuclear arsenal unmonitored by international inspectors threatened to open the door for nuclear competition in the Middle East.<sup>284</sup> In addition, he warned that if there was no solution to the Israeli nuclear programme, it would prevent any progress towards cooperation in the region with Israel.<sup>285</sup>

### **Future prospects**

The PLO's absence from the rank of Saudi support after the Gulf war was noticed by observers as a positive factor in the U.S.-Saudi relations. Before the Gulf crisis, the Palestinian problem used to be almost the only factor that strained U.S.-Saudi relations. However, after the Gulf war the Palestinian issue would not necessarily be the most important problem in U.S.-Saudi relations, however, it could be ignored only at a significant risk. The occupation of Kuwait had become a problem with Palestinian issue taking a back seat. A conflict that primarily appeared to have mainly negative consequences for the Palestinians, and the PLO may have produced pressure toward a peaceful resolution of their conflict with Israel. In whatever manner, the Arab states will press the U.S. more than ever before on the issue of the Palestinians. Saudi will not take the lead in negotiations with Israel, however, they may work in the right context to support Palestinians who are ready for peace with Israel. Thus, there is no logical explanation to argue that Saudi Arabia may use its military force against Israel. The Saudis would increase their military force because there are other threats appearing in the region against Saudi Arabia which are more dangerous than Israel or communism.<sup>286</sup> For that reason, Saudi Arabia should not have a problem with the U.S. supplying arms in the future.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **U.S.-Saudi Security and Military Relations Since the Gulf Crisis of 1990**

In the period 1989-1992, the context for U.S. military planning changed dramatically.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Communist threat to U.S. interests, in Europe and elsewhere, disappeared.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the U.S. military would oppose many threats, oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent armed attacks upon U.S. friends or allies in developing countries where its interests were located.<sup>3</sup> This policy considered the major threats to U.S. interests as arising out of regional instability or from aggressive regional leaders such as Iraq.<sup>4</sup> Arising from opportunities from its role in the Gulf crisis, the U.S. is in a singular position to frame the new international system.<sup>5</sup> On September 23, 1991, President Bush addressed the U.N. and assured his audience that, "The U.S. has no intention of striving for a pax Americana. However, we will remain engaged, we will not retreat and pull back into isolationism. We will offer friendship and leadership and, in short, we seek a Pax Universalism, built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations".<sup>6</sup> In the president's statement was a lesson extracted from the Gulf war, that important American foreign policy interests can not be protected by unilateral U.S. accomplishments but will demand multilateral, co-operative arrangements with other states.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast, there was a physical difference in U.S. foreign policy when a draft "Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999", was released in early March 1992, to the press by an unnamed official. This document made the case that the U.S. should work to shape a world order dominated by one superpower. The U.S. should seek to make its leadership position permanent through a dual policy of constructive conduct and adequate military power to prevent any group or nation from challenging American primacy.<sup>8</sup> The Defense Planning Guidance was much more definite than the concept of a new world order indicated by President Bush. Its concept favoured a view of a pax Americana much more than it did the pax Universalism cited by the president in his UN address.<sup>9</sup> Obviously, the Defense Planning Guidance presented a traditional concept of security based on the balance of power rather than the collective security.<sup>10</sup> In this, it stated that the U.S. should "endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global

power... we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role".<sup>11</sup>

Because the U.S. is heavily dependent on oil from the Gulf, access to those resources is a key strategic interest for the U.S.<sup>12</sup> American interests require access to the plentiful energy resources of the Gulf not only for the U.S. but even more so for its allies.<sup>13</sup> This concern of U.S. foreign policy, which demands the protection of that access from any external threat, has not diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> The using up of oil resources in the industrialised world and increasing U.S. dependence on imported oil truly are increasing the importance of Gulf security to the United States.<sup>15</sup>

### U.S.-Saudi security relations

The Gulf war led to the deepening of the special relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which was primarily conditioned by concerns about oil.<sup>16</sup> For many years, the security of the oil exported to the West and the succession of upheavals in the region persuaded the U.S. military planners of the importance of building sufficient friendly forces in the Gulf area.<sup>17</sup> After the Gulf war, U.S. officials desired that the war which was caused by Iraqi aggression would end the old assumptions about regional security and open up new opportunities for U.S. military co-operation with the GCC countries.<sup>18</sup> An American official said "...One sees the Saudis as the key to future security arrangements".<sup>19</sup>

In fact, since Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration had started indicating that the future of Gulf security would be connected to American forces laying down groundwork for security arrangement with the GCC states. Defense Secretary, Cheney, said to the reporters on August 19, 1990, that the U.S. presence in the Gulf could last for years.<sup>20</sup> Differences between Washington and Riyadh on the aims of U.S. forces arose when James Baker appeared before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in early September 1990.<sup>21</sup> The U.S. Secretary of State said that the administration was planning a long-term military presence in the Gulf even if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.<sup>22</sup> He summarised the new regional security policy as being possible to oppose the future military threat from Iraq, describing that such an arrangement would include an international arms boycott of Iraq, the future arming of Iraq's Arab neighbours, and a U.S. naval or

ground force in the region.<sup>23</sup> He said the resulting organisation would be something equivalent to NATO.<sup>24</sup>

However, the Saudis reminded Mr Baker that a regional security structure already existed, and it was called the Gulf Cooperation Council.<sup>25</sup> Mr Baker modified his statement the next day, saying that the Bush administration had just started its thinking about its new long term security arrangements, and that his earlier views should not be equated with the concept that somehow the administration was calling for a NATO - type organisation in the Middle East. This should not cause any worries in Riyadh, or Moscow or among other capitals, he said.<sup>26</sup>

As a result, Saudi Arabia wanted to limit the public profile of its U.S. security connection.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, in a statement to the press immediately after the Gulf war, Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, referred to a commitment on the part of the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia once their mission was completed.<sup>28</sup> Saudi Arabia also refused formal and more intensive defence ties with the U.S. including a proposed pre-positioning of two divisions and ground combat equipment in Saudi Arabia, and the free use of Saudi military facilities.<sup>29</sup> In addition, Saudi Arabia refused to sign a status of force agreement that would have set the terms for American access to Saudi facilities.<sup>30</sup> This matter was the main reason for the tension in U.S.-Saudi relations reported in mid - 1991.<sup>31</sup>

The Saudi government has always been cautious of linking its foreign policy with the U.S. for two reasons. First, Saudi Arabia is sensitive to the political undesirability of a more closer Western alliance.<sup>32</sup> Permanent military bases or free access to Saudi military facilities raised questions about the political independence of Saudi Arabia.<sup>33</sup> Second, the Saudi government was under domestic pressure, especially, from conservative religious groups, to avoid the presence of any foreign forces on Saudi soil and to avoid also any foreign alliances that could contradict its Islamic legitimacy.<sup>34</sup> The Saudi government was sensitive to the problems that the links with the U.S. aroused.<sup>35</sup> It was this pressure that led King Fahd, in a speech to his country in late November 1990, to deny that Saudi Arabia had made any agreements for the permanent stationing of foreign forces in Saudi Arabia.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, in September 1991, during one of the U.S. confrontations with Iraq over the application of U.N. policies, Prince Sultan expressed his concern that the U.S. was using Saudi Arabia as a military staging

area against Iraq. He urged Washington to spread out deployments of forces as far as Kuwait and even to use an airfield in Iraq itself.<sup>37</sup> The Saudis insisted that the strength of Saudi armed forces be increased to 200,000 and that they be provided with appropriate weapons and equipment. In addition, the Saudis wanted to build on their forces' experience and achievements in the Gulf war, and transform their defensive army into a highly sophisticated mobile offensive force modelled on the American armed forces.<sup>38</sup> Apprehensive of the consequence of creating such a force in Saudi Arabia, Washington refused the Saudi proposal.<sup>39</sup>

After the Gulf war, American military personnel started to withdraw from Saudi territory. However, the last ground troops left Saudi Arabia in December 1991.<sup>40</sup> In April 1992, the American army finished its task of shipping home millions of tons of equipment that had been sent to Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm.<sup>41</sup> However, some U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia remained there to operate Patriot missiles and combat aircraft.<sup>42</sup> Thus, in April 1992, Mr Cheney ordered the assignment of ground support equipment for 400 aircraft to be located in Southwest Asia.<sup>43</sup> The Pentagon order for 1992 also assigned 200 battle tanks and 200 APCs to be stored in the region.<sup>44</sup> In the Gulf region, the pentagon had about 25,000 military personnel, manning a naval and marine task force and a powerful air arm of nearly 300 combat aircraft.<sup>45</sup>

Nevertheless, the continuing military co-operation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. is based on a 1977 strategic co-operation agreement which included the sharing of military intelligence from the AWACS planes that were stationed in Riyadh.<sup>46</sup> The Saudis chose to continue their informal understanding with Washington.<sup>47</sup>

These are the differences between the U.S. and the Saudi concepts of deterrence, which have been confronted in their negotiations on access and pre-positioning. According to the U.S., the deterrent effect of the U.S. pre-positioning would be lost strength if it could not facilitate the effective intervention of U.S. forces in an emergency, e.g. the rapid deployment of Iraqi forces to the Kuwaiti border in 1990, their immediate advance into Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia.<sup>48</sup>

From the Saudi perspective, deterrence appears to be more existential in nature.<sup>49</sup> The U.S. commitment to Gulf security, demonstrated by Desert Storm, and the



remaining presence of a small amount of material combined to admit doubt into the calculations of a potential aggressor and, thus, to deter attack.<sup>50</sup> The success of Desert Storm without question supports this view, despite the fact that this success was due to a host of factors that might not come into play in a future crisis.<sup>51</sup>

With the Gulf war over, Saudi Arabia returned to its usual connections with the U.S.<sup>52</sup> Some American officials believed that they may have overrated the Gulf war's effect on Saudi sensibilities about remaining closely connected to the U.S.<sup>53</sup> One U.S. administration official said "Most people thought that you can not go through this experience without thinking you have got to do it differently next time".<sup>54</sup> Thus, the Clinton administration, which came to power in 1993, has been running into difficulties trying to convince the Saudi government to accept an expanded U.S. security umbrella to guard against a similar crisis. The new Defense Secretary, William Perry, travelled to Saudi Arabia in March 1995, to persuade the Saudis of the advantages of the new American strategy of "dual containment of both Iraq and Iran".<sup>55</sup> Perry's visit proposed that Saudi Arabia allow the U.S. to preposition equipment for a "rapid reaction" armoured brigade.<sup>56</sup> As the Bush administration had done during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. Defense Secretary showed King Fahd and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, satellite photos to demonstrate that Iraq had rebuilt its military facilities destroyed by allied bombing during the Gulf war, including plants related to artillery production, chemical warfare and the manufacture of rocket engines.<sup>57</sup> Mr Perry asserted this as proof of the immediate threat Iraq posed to its Gulf neighbours. He also asserted the importance of Saudi Arabia continuing to provide facilities for use by U.S. warplanes and naval vessels as Kuwait had done before.<sup>58</sup> Although Saudi Arabia did not agree to base on its land equipment to supply a U.S. armoured brigade for use in an emergency. However, Mr Perry said that Riyadh agreed in principle that material for such a brigade must be pre-positioned somewhere in the Gulf region, though not in Saudi Arabia.<sup>59</sup>

Observers in the region had two perceptions of the situation. There is a large group amongst Arab public opinion which expresses itself in press commentaries, which suggests that the U.S. was purposely playing up the supposed threat presented by Iraq and Iran just to frighten the GCC countries into providing the U.S. with bases and buying more American weapons.<sup>60</sup> The second perception was

that Washington could be preparing the groundwork for a military action against Iraq or Iran.<sup>61</sup>

Another U.S. effort came in October 1995, when Saudi Defence Minister attended the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations. On October 25, 1995, he said to the Secretary William Perry that Desert Storm had proved its strength. Saudi Arabia had modern arms technology which allowed Saudi Arabia to rely on these arms to hold off any attackers long enough to get American assistance.<sup>62</sup> On the same occasion, President Clinton stated (on October 28, 1995), that American forces in the region assisted in the stability of the Gulf security and that the Gulf was secure and stable because of the presence of the U.S. forces in the Gulf. This had been proven by the American forces' support of Kuwait in October 1994, when Iraq threatened Kuwait with invasion again.<sup>63</sup>

After the Gulf war, Washington found itself even closer to Riyadh. It still wanted to establish a permanent land base on Saudi soil, a goal that the U.S. had been looking forward to for many years. The Americans were convinced that in the future there was no way the U.S. could repeat a major military operation in the Gulf region without access to some or all of Saudi Arabia's facilities.<sup>64</sup> Since the U.S. was unsuccessful in getting the Saudis to accept pre-positioned equipment, Michael MacMurray represented in mid 1995, that in the view of the Pentagon the U.S. defence focus should be on improving the Saudi's capability to defend itself.<sup>65</sup> He asserted that Saudi Arabia and its neighbours could defend themselves without outside help against a threat such as that posed by Iraq and Iran; until a point when the Saudis would have to call for U.S. assistance.<sup>66</sup> The U.S. is still trying to develop greater strategic co-operation with Saudi Arabia through joint planning, training, exercises, coalition warfare exercises and pre-positioning.<sup>67</sup> The U.S. also attempted to promote the ability for the U.S. military forces and those of the Saudis to work together through the sale of advanced equipment and weaponry.<sup>68</sup> In short, there is a combined solution which involves improving the Saudi capabilities and improving American ability to assist the Saudis.<sup>69</sup>

However, some American military strategists are uncomfortable with the arrangement, which appears to pressure the U.S. to respond to threats to Saudi sovereignty without preset plans in place.<sup>70</sup> The U.S. seems to be committed to diplomatic, economic, and even military responses.<sup>71</sup> Dr Jamil Merdad, who works

in the Saudi Foreign Ministry, explained that Saudi Arabia was concerned that it was in trapped by regional threats that the U.S. had created. He asserted that if the U.S. removed the source of the regional threats, the U.S. would lose its role and its presence in the Gulf region.<sup>72</sup> The U.S. administration has been criticised by some members of Congress and some military analysts who say that the White House still needs to define U.S. interests and assess the potential threats before deciding what is required for an adequate regional defence.<sup>73</sup> Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, has said that American forces should be small in number, remain primarily naval and over-the-horizon.<sup>74</sup> He preferred that the major peacekeeping roles be met by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the United Nations.<sup>75</sup>

### **Gulf security and its effect on the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia**

#### **The "Damascus Declaration"**

Immediately after the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC members saw the continuation of the Arab forces in the Gulf region as the key to a joint peacekeeping force which would maintain post-war security in the Gulf and contain Iraq.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, Foreign Ministers of the GCC states, Egypt and Syria issued the Damascus Declaration.<sup>77</sup> They agreed to co-operate over regional security. Egyptian and Syrian forces would be stationed in the region and would be available for rapid deployment along with the other GCC forces supported by the U.S. Navy in the Gulf.<sup>78</sup> The charter of the Damascus Declaration stressed that its signatories would co-ordinate and co-operate its policies in political, security, economic and cultural areas.<sup>79</sup>

On March 10, 1991, the Foreign Ministers who had signed the Damascus Declaration met in Riyadh with Secretary of State James Baker.<sup>80</sup> Mr Baker expressed the U.S.' support for the Damascus Declaration.<sup>81</sup> The groundwork had evidently been laid for an Egyptian, Syrian and GCC military alliance, under an umbrella of U.S. support.<sup>82</sup>

From the U.S. view, Egyptian and Syrian participation in a security arrangement for the Gulf would advance deterrence in the short term and provide a lasting political context for Western involvement. It would also support political stability in Egypt and Syria by supplying financial aid to their economies from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.<sup>83</sup> The Damascus Declaration had been designed to contain Syria within a moderate Arab party far from Iran and at the same time to exclude Iran.<sup>84</sup> Syria was drawn into active involvement in the peace process with Israel.

In February 6, 1991, Secretary of State, James Baker, admitted before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that economic elements, especially some Arab resentment that oil was not more equally distributed, had played a role in leading to the Gulf war and would continue to be one of the basic sources of conflict in the region.<sup>85</sup> To ease these stresses, Mr Baker suggested the creation of an economic organisation through which the oil states could fund the reconstruction and development of their neighbours without oil.<sup>86</sup> Thus, in February 7, 1991, Mr Baker favoured the creation of a multinational "Middle East Development Bank" to achieve these goals.<sup>87</sup>

Mr Baker's proposals were among several ambitious projects for economic reconstruction following Desert Storm.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, in the meetings leading up to the Damascus Declaration, Egyptian delegates appeared with their own plan for the oil-Gulf states to contribute \$15 billion annually to their neighbours.<sup>89</sup> In late March 1991, GCC ministers decided to provide Egypt and Syria with financial aid of \$5 billion to integrate them into the recently declared "new Arab border".<sup>90</sup> This was in addition to the GCC grants to Egypt and Syria for their troops presence in the region of 35,000 and 20,000 soldiers respectively.<sup>91</sup>

Almost immediately, however, Saudi Arabia and the rest of GCC states started to back away from Damascus Declaration.<sup>92</sup> There are four possible reasons for the Saudi Arabia and the GCC states reassessment and distancing from the Damascus Declaration. First, the Saudi and Kuwaiti treasuries had reached their limits during the Gulf war. This open-ended commitment to Egypt and Syria, along with the financial compensation for their troops presence in the region, was too much.<sup>93</sup> Second, there were fears that the GCC relations with Egypt and Syria might change in the long term because of changes in domestic politics in Syria and Egypt. Both Syria and Egypt are influenced by their past historical, ideological and

political differences from the monarchic Arab countries. The GCC states did not want to see Egypt and Syria declare themselves as protectors of the GCC.<sup>94</sup> Third, the presence of the troops in the Gulf would become at the very least an annoyance, and they could be a threat to the Gulf monarchies.<sup>95</sup> Fourth, the GCC states feared that the Damascus Declaration and the presence of forces would cause Iran to react very negatively which would cause a deterioration in GCC-Iranian relations.<sup>96</sup> The Iranian government condemned the Damascus Declaration which it saw as an effort to isolate Iran from the Gulf, and asserted that Gulf security was a responsibility restricted to the states in the Gulf itself.<sup>97</sup> Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia saw the end of the Gulf war as an occasion to improve relations with Iran, since Iran had acted responsibly during the Kuwaiti crisis.<sup>98</sup>

When the GCC Foreign Ministers met in Kuwait on May 5, 1991, to discuss security issues in the region, they announced that they were having intensive communication with Iran over Gulf security matters. This went down painfully with Egypt, which wanted to maintain Gulf security as an entirely Arab affair.<sup>99</sup> Therefore, the displeasure of Egypt and Syria with the reluctance of their GCC states to follow through with practical implementation of the Damascus Declaration became visible.<sup>100</sup> On May 8, 1991, Egypt ordered the withdrawal of its troops from the region.<sup>101</sup> Syria also began the withdrawal of its troops from the GCC states in June 1991.<sup>102</sup>

The indecisive rounds of discussions that followed illustrated that it was going to be significantly harder to produce such a security agreement than may have been imagined in the days following the liberation of Kuwait.<sup>103</sup> To propose practical measures to enhance Gulf security, the Damascus Declaration states met again in May 1991.<sup>104</sup> This meeting was unable to resolve the differences that separated the GCC from Egypt and Syria.<sup>105</sup> By the end of June, there were reports that the GCC states were requiring amendments to the Damascus Declaration about dropping plans for a permanent Arab force.<sup>106</sup> Later, Egypt proposed a plan which would deploy 30,000 troops supplied equally from between Egypt and Syria.<sup>107</sup> The GCC states agreed only to deploy 6,000 troops, but, later the GCC states pointed out that they would prefer not to have any troops on their soil.<sup>108</sup> The Damascus Declaration Foreign Ministers met again on July 15-16, 1991.<sup>109</sup> The final statement of the meeting enclosed no reference to a permanent presence of Egyptian-Syrian troops in the Gulf.<sup>110</sup> By the end of July 1991, all Egyptian and

Syrian troops had left Saudi Arabia and the GCC region.<sup>111</sup> At a summit meeting between Egypt's President Mubarak and Syria's President Assad on July 18, 1991, Assad told the reporters "A permanent presence is not requested, and we will not impose ourselves, but we are ready to participate in defensive operations if that is requested of us at any time".<sup>112</sup>

In addition, when the states of the Damascus Declaration met in November 1991, they could not come up with any consensus on producing integrated joint forces or plan for Gulf security.<sup>113</sup> The GCC states refused to allow Egyptian and Syrian troops to be stationed in their region.<sup>114</sup> Egypt and Syria were only seeking to claim what they could in the way of the GCC financial aid as compensation for their deployment of troops in the region.<sup>115</sup> However, the GCC states only agreed to Saudi and Kuwaiti bilateral aid payments to Egypt and Syria.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, by the summer of 1991, it had become evident to all members that the Damascus Declaration was an agreement on security co-operation rather than an actual military alliance. In fact the GCC states wanted to see it that way.<sup>117</sup>

The Saudis perceived the structure conceived by the Damascus Declaration as a forum within which consultations about future security arrangements with Egypt and Syria could take place. If a crisis required the presence of Egyptian and Syrian troops in Saudi Arabia, as was necessary after the invasion of Kuwait, the groundwork had already been laid.<sup>118</sup> On the security question, the Damascus Declaration appears to be little more than a framework for natural bilateral consultation and limited co-operation. This might take place among any Arab states within the Arab League. The League itself was supposed to be have been founded for that purpose.<sup>119</sup> However, the Arab League was in disorder, and needed to reassert its principles. Some of its key members established the foundation for a new start.<sup>120</sup> These key members set out the Damascus Declaration's charter which affirmed their intention to breathe a new spirit into joint Arab action and promote brotherly co-operation among the members of the Arab family.<sup>121</sup>

However, when relations had been established, between Iran and the GCC states, Saudi Arabia was forced back to the Damascus Declaration.<sup>122</sup> In April 1992, Iranian authorities on Abu Musa island, expelled about 80 Indian workers. Iran jointly administers the island with Sharja (a state of the U.A.E.). The reason for

the expulsion was the failure of the workers to get Iranian visas, even though the workers were employed by UAE agencies.<sup>123</sup> In August 1992, Iran turned away a group of mostly Egyptian teachers, who worked on the island for the UAE government.<sup>124</sup> The Iranian Foreign Ministry asserted that continued foreign involvement in the Gulf made it necessary for Iran to strengthen its position on the island.<sup>125</sup>

The GCC states reacted to the Iranian actions on Abu Musa by returning to the Damascus Declaration for a discussion.<sup>126</sup> Egypt had been pressuring the GCC states to implement the decisions of the Damascus Declaration, but the GCC suspended the Foreign Ministers meeting until May 1992.<sup>127</sup> However, after the second Iranian action, the members of the Damascus Declaration met on September 10, 1992, and agreed to support the UAE in its position on the island and two other Tunbs islands, which were occupied by the Shah of Iran in 1971.<sup>128</sup> They also agreed to keep in regular contact with each other.<sup>129</sup>

The GCC states have regularly met with their Arab partners in the Damascus Declaration.<sup>130</sup> However, they have not actually done anything to implement the proposals even when threatened.<sup>131</sup> For instance, on October 7, 1994, Iraq started a threatening military movement on the Kuwaiti border.<sup>132</sup> The U.S. immediately sent soldiers and aircraft carriers.<sup>133</sup> The presence of the American forces was enough to get the situation under control.<sup>134</sup> However, Kuwait's attitude of reliance on the U.S. has brought criticism from Egypt and Syria.<sup>135</sup> At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Damascus Declaration on October 19, 1994, the Egyptian Foreign Minister accused Kuwait of relying more on the military capabilities of the U.S. and other Western countries and ignoring the importance of Arab forces.<sup>136</sup> For GCC states, defence against decisive aggressors will still require a U.S. or Western military protection.<sup>137</sup> The Egyptians and Syrians are lacking the ability of rapid deployment and it would take weeks and maybe months for Arab forces from outside the Gulf to deploy for war against a threat from a country such as Iraq.<sup>138</sup>

The high dependence the GCC states place on their bilateral relationships with the U.S. will ensure that the Damascus Declaration for all practical purposes remains dormant.<sup>139</sup> However, a renewal of interest in it will eventually be based on the reassessment by the Saudis and the Kuwaitis of their long-term security

strategy.<sup>140</sup> At this time, the U.S. commitment to the GCC states remains strong and it is likely to continue so in the foreseeable future.<sup>141</sup>

Apart from sharing the commitment to counter Iraq, the economic and financial aid priorities of Egypt and Syria are distant from the security objectives of the GCC states.<sup>142</sup> Egypt desired that its contribution to Gulf security would attract in return economic investments by the GCC states and that it would extend their labour markets for Egyptian workers.<sup>143</sup> In fact, the number of Egyptian workers had increased in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf war to about 1.2 million. This provides more complications than security.<sup>144</sup> Moreover, Egypt had been disappointed by the Kuwaiti decision to limit the number of Egyptians to be allowed back to work after the liberation.<sup>145</sup> Egypt also lacked a positive commitment to counter Iraq. For instance, General Norman Schwarzkopf stated in his memoirs before Operation Desert Storm that he and Mr Cheney told President Mubarak that the U.S. might use Egypt as a base for military aircraft.<sup>146</sup>

President Mubarak reacted angrily because he was not threatened by Iraq's aggression and he was not ready to allow the allies to operate from his territory.<sup>147</sup>

President Mubarak said to them "I don't think we need to decide that right now".<sup>148</sup>

Syria, on the other hand, searched for a role to play in promoting Gulf security to increase the foreign aid of the GCC to offset the aid that it had lost as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>149</sup> In December 1992, the GCC summit put forward May 1993, as a date for the founding of the Arab development fund pledged in the Damascus Declaration.<sup>150</sup> \$6.5 billion of the pledged \$10 billion had been committed by GCC members at the end of 1992, though the plans were to be completed by the fall of 1993.<sup>151</sup>

The Damascus Declaration group appeared under unusual conditions.<sup>152</sup> It was a reaction against the temporary events imposed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>153</sup> It also advocated a greater degree of investment in aid to Egypt and Syria by the GCC states and thus has given it the appearance of economic rather than security co-operation.<sup>154</sup> However, the cordial attitude of GCC states towards Egypt and Syria is the result of the liberation of Kuwait.<sup>155</sup> This cordiality has evidently been inadequate in binding them to a formal collective security arrangement.<sup>156</sup> As the former Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdullah Bishara, said the trust between the GCC states on one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other hand, is the most important element in the co-operation among them. Their relations must be based



on trust and confidence.<sup>157</sup> He noted also "There is no such thing as free Arab money or open borders. We do not accept this. We are countries in every sense of the word".<sup>158</sup>

Up to the present time, 1996, the members of the Damascus Declaration have regularly met and proclaimed their allegiance to the Damascus Declaration.<sup>159</sup> A communiqué issued by their meeting in December 1995, for instance, repeated their demand for Iraq's full compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and held the Iraqi regime responsible for the sufferings of the Iraqi people.<sup>160</sup> In addition, they renewed their support of the UAE in its dispute with Iran over the sovereignty of the islands of Abu Masa and two Tunbs.<sup>161</sup> Now Iraq is contained and Iran makes GCC states only a little upset without being seriously hostile. Several GCC states have important relations with Iran.<sup>162</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia and the GCC are following their own security agenda.<sup>163</sup>

The Saudi Arabian security policy during the post-war years has remained in flux.<sup>164</sup> That flux is caused by Saudi Arabia's desire to preserve a balance among its relationships and not to depend on any one pillar to assure its security.<sup>165</sup> Self-reliance is better than the presence of foreign troops, but not enough for real defence.<sup>166</sup> Saudi planners believe that the U.S. connection is significant and must be improved on but still kept at arm's length.<sup>167</sup> Saudi maintains relations with the Damascus Declaration and Iran but without selecting one over the other. This policy allows the Kingdom to keep its options open.<sup>168</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi security relations and the GCC**

The Gulf war has left the U.S. with the problems of how best to protect its security interests in the Gulf in the long term.<sup>169</sup> These interests include the continued supply of oil at a reasonable price, the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the prevention of any one power from obtaining control over the Gulf oil reserves.<sup>170</sup> An official text from the Department of State, seeks to lay out the principal elements of U.S. policy in the Gulf.<sup>171</sup> The text was addressed to the National Security Industrial Association on March 22, 1994, by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Toni G. Verstanding.<sup>172</sup> He said that the greatest danger to regional security in the Gulf "Lies in the threats which may come from either Iran or Iraq".<sup>173</sup> Mr Verstanding asserted that the strategic

principle for the U.S. in the Gulf is to protect American interests in two areas: the security of U.S. allies and in the free flow of oil at stable prices.<sup>174</sup> In seeking that balance, the U.S. focuses on two sets of key objectives: (1) limiting the ability of either Iran or Iraq to threaten regional stability; (2) supporting the defensive capabilities of U.S. friends in the region, individually; in tandem with their regional partners; and in arrangement with the U.S. and other friendly outside powers.<sup>175</sup>

Since the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia has become the key to any attempt to create strategic stability in the Gulf.<sup>176</sup> As Saudi Arabia demonstrated during the Gulf war, it could co-operate closely with the U.S. and the West in checking Iraq or Iran.<sup>177</sup> However, Saudi Arabia lacks the manpower and skills to make military forces large enough to defend its territory.<sup>178</sup> For the U.S., Saudi Arabia is not capable of being a proxy for Western military forces or as a pillar of Western security.<sup>179</sup> It has many of the vulnerabilities of its smaller neighbours, and it can only achieve security through a combination of co-operative defence efforts with members of the GCC states and the United States.<sup>180</sup> On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has the resources and the population to act as the core of the GCC's efforts to build regional security.<sup>181</sup>

The U.S. government believes that one of the clear lessons of the past decade has been that containment of regional threats by itself is not adequate.<sup>182</sup> The U.S. also acts to work with the GCC in the region to develop a powerful regional deterrent to those who would threaten its security or stability.<sup>183</sup> To support the security of the U.S. allies in the Gulf region, the U.S. is:

- Encouraging the members of the GCC to work more closely together on collective defence and security arrangements;
- Assisting individual GCC countries to meet their legitimate defence requirements, including arms sales that increase their abilities to manage co-ordinated operations with the U.S. and other GCC forces;
- Working to strengthen American capability to act rapidly in the area by maintaining a strong force there, and by pre-positioning vital equipment and material, and by concluding a defence access agreement with the GCC states.<sup>184</sup>

Therefore, the U.S. objective is to increase regional stability, deter threats, increase the level of threat at which direct U.S. military action would be needed, and to decrease the probability that the U.S. and GCC would have to fight to drive away all aggression.<sup>185</sup>

As a consequence of the Gulf war, the Secretary of State, James Baker, advised the GCC states that they should build a security system based on three steps.<sup>186</sup> First, the GCC states should co-ordinate their forces more effectively using the mechanism of the Gulf Cooperation Council to produce a multinational GCC peninsula force; second, the U.S. should strengthen its military ties with the GCC states and preserve a limited military presence within the GCC states, (This presence would take the shape of pre-positioned equipment, training missions, periodic deployments of air and naval units for joint exercises); third, the U.S. should work with the GCC in developing a greater role for regional and extra-regional players, principally Egypt, Syria, Britain and France.<sup>187</sup>

However, the GCC sees its defence strategy in terms of a series of circles. The former GCC Secretary - General Abdullah Bishara, on occasion of five years of liberty of Kuwait from Iraqi invasion, described them thus: The first circle is made up of the six partners of the GCC and form the main defence of their states; the second circle, is the "Damascus Declaration"; and the third, is the U.S. and the Western countries, notably Britain and France.<sup>188</sup>

Undoubtedly, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a severe shock to the GCC states, and they resolved that they would be ready to face any future aggression.<sup>189</sup> After the Gulf war, the possibility of establishing a purely GCC-based force was investigated. By October 1991, Sultan Qabus of Oman presented a proposal to build a joint force of 100,000 men (The GCC had already a joint force for some years called, Peninsula Shield, but it was small only 10,000 men).<sup>190</sup> The Omani proposal was welcomed by the GCC states' rulers.<sup>191</sup> However, the proposal for a 100,000 troops was not implemented.<sup>192</sup> The main reason was due to the decrease in the oil revenues of the GCC states after the Gulf war.<sup>193</sup> Therefore, the GCC states decided initially that each member of the GCC states must start to build its own independent force as well as reinforcing their existing troops within the GCC joint force, the Peninsula Shield. This lets the GCC states determine in the future the number of the unified forces.<sup>194</sup> In response to reporters in November 1994, the

Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, dismissed any prospect of differences between the GCC states about the proposal for a 100,000 man GCC force and stated that the plan for the force was still alive and that it was going to exist.<sup>196</sup>

At the same time, since the strategy of defence was inadequate, the GCC sought assistance from outside sources.<sup>196</sup> The "Damascus Declaration" delivered a possible option for security within a pan-Arab framework, however, it could not rely fully on future support from Egypt and Syria.<sup>197</sup> By the end of 1991, this policy had been revised by the GCC states, who explicitly stated that they would support future assistance from Western forces, most notably the United States.<sup>198</sup> This was emphasised by Kuwait in September 1991, when the Kuwaitis signed a 10 year defence agreement with the United States.<sup>199</sup> This agreement did not provide permanent bases in Kuwait for the U.S., but did provide permanent access and the positioning of American weapons and equipment in Kuwait, periodic joint exercises and training of Kuwaiti forces by the United States.<sup>200</sup> This agreement signalled the collapse of efforts from the U.S. to shape a defence agreement with the GCC and the beginning of an attempt to replace it with bilateral agreements with each GCC state.<sup>201</sup>

There is no doubt that after the Gulf war, the GCC states looked to the U.S. as their initial security ally.<sup>202</sup> The GCC states wanted protection and the U.S. wanted to protect them.<sup>203</sup> The GCC arms purchases were arranged as much to maintain the political relationship with the U.S. as to provide self defence.<sup>204</sup> The U.S. thought that by selling arms to all GCC states it would be easier to intervene in the future, and to operate or co-operate with local forces if they had standard equipment.<sup>205</sup>

More important, in view of Kuwait's experiences, as the Minister of Defence said, the principle of Arab solidarity and respect for each others' sovereignty had been torn apart by Iraq.<sup>206</sup> When Kuwait signed the defence agreement with the U.S., it declared that its purpose was "To maintain the country's security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of its borders against the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime".<sup>207</sup> The Islamic Constitutional Movement, the political grouping of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, publicly supported the defence agreement with the United States.<sup>208</sup> While worrying about American cultural influences in

the state, they perceived no alternative to a strong connection to the United States.<sup>209</sup> A poll commissioned by the Kuwaiti News Agency in early 1993, found that 72 per cent of respondents supported the defence agreements with Western countries, though only 43 per cent were in favour of a permanent American force in the country, with more Kuwaitis desiring an international force stationed in Kuwait.<sup>210</sup> In the meantime, Kuwait had been expanding its military co-operation with other Western countries, like the United Kingdom.<sup>211</sup> In February 1992, Kuwait and the United Kingdom signed a memorandum on security co-operation in the defence of Kuwait, as well as providing training and joint exercises.<sup>212</sup> The agreement was to run for ten years, but unlike the U.S.-Kuwaiti agreement, there was no pre-positioning of military equipment in Kuwait.<sup>213</sup> Since 1991, the U.S. had signed a security agreement with everyone of the six Gulf Cooperation Council except Saudi Arabia.<sup>214</sup>

The U.S. renewed its commitment to the GCC states when Iraq moved forces toward the Kuwait border in the middle of 1992. The U.S. responded with the heavy deployment of force.<sup>215</sup> Again, the U.S. commitment was demonstrated on October 7, 1994, when the U.S. deployed its forces to Kuwait in response to what was believed to be threatening signs by Iraq.<sup>216</sup> The Foreign Ministers of the six members of the GCC, joined by the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher and the U.K. Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, met in Kuwait on October 12, 1994, in order to review the threat to peace and regional security presented by Iraq's recent provocative actions.<sup>217</sup> The ministers agreed that mobilisation of resources and deployment of forces should continue until they were assured that Iraq no longer presented an immediate threat.<sup>218</sup> The coalition-GCC forces should remain at the highest degree of readiness so long as the threat to Kuwait existed.<sup>219</sup> They agreed about the importance of further enhancement of the coalition - through the improvement of GCC military co-ordination of the continuing deployments and joint activities in the region.<sup>220</sup>

Compared with the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. now has better bilateral arrangements with the GCC. It has signed access agreements and defence co-operation agreements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE.<sup>221</sup> It has also strengthened its co-operation with Saudi Arabia.<sup>222</sup> The U.S. Defense Department estimates that in 1980 it would have needed three months to deploy one division to the Gulf.<sup>223</sup> By 1990, the primary deployment for Desert

Shield was completed within three weeks.<sup>224</sup> Defence agreements concluded after the Gulf war have shortened the time plan even further.<sup>225</sup> When Iraq again threatened Kuwait in October 1994, the U.S. moved heavy units from Georgia to Kuwait in just three days.<sup>226</sup>

The U.S. has adequate equipment in Kuwait for a brigade.<sup>227</sup> This includes air force and navy equipment stored throughout the region.<sup>228</sup> With 20 U.S. warships patrolling the Gulf and military access agreements signed with most of the GCC states, the U.S. obviously has the objective of enlarging its presence in the Gulf. President Bill Clinton finally presented his strategy in February 1995, to protect American interests in the new world order.<sup>229</sup> The plan is called "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement".<sup>230</sup> The Pentagon was then able to make up its regional strategies in terms of the President's strategic vision.<sup>231</sup> In May 1995, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, disclosed the new "United States Security Strategy for the Middle East".<sup>232</sup> The Pentagon admits that the U.S. will be even more dependent on Gulf oil early in the next century than it is at present.<sup>233</sup> Therefore, both documents stress the importance of "maintaining the unhindered flow of oil from the Gulf to world markets at stable prices".<sup>234</sup> The White House used the phrase, "at reasonable prices". The GCC states could see the implication that as they were dependent on the U.S. for regional security they should sell their oil at an affordable price.<sup>235</sup>

While the GCC states are interested in military co-operation with the U.S., they are generally concerned about U.S. domination, especially small states like Bahrain.<sup>236</sup> Bahrain and the other small states are so tiny that any U.S. influence is felt strongly.<sup>237</sup> However, in Saudi Arabia, an American presence can be less obtrusive because of their huge territory compared to other GCC states.<sup>238</sup>

In addition, despite the fact that the U.S. drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, there is a strong sense among GCC states that the U.S. is guilty of "overkill" and conspired with the Iraqi regime to invade Kuwait.<sup>239</sup> For instance, the Al Riyadh newspaper, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait, stated that Saddam Hussein was implementing a foreign conspiracy to continue his presidency of Iraq.<sup>240</sup> The newspaper accused the U.S. of advising Iraq to launch a war against Iran in 1980, when Saddam Hussein and Henry Kissinger, met in one of the U.S. military bases in Turkey. It is alleged that they agreed on the definite

time to start the war against Iran.<sup>241</sup> The newspaper continued that the U.S. has planned from the late 1970s to allow Iraq to invade Kuwait to achieve U.S. objectives directed at Gulf oil. The newspaper called this the big camouflage.<sup>242</sup> More recently, the failure of the U.S. to respond to Serbian aggression against Bosnia from 1992 until mid 1995, has increased cynicism over the U.S. motives in liberating Kuwait.<sup>243</sup> The American government know that the American public will support a war for oil or to save Israel, but little else.<sup>244</sup> The GCC states know this, and many still feel bitter.<sup>245</sup> It is obviously that a U.S. presence will be accepted only as long as a foreign military presence is going to protect them from aggression.<sup>246</sup>

There is another important threat to the GCC stability and that is possible conflicts among the GCC states themselves. This could stop oil shipments and deliver opportunities to Iraq and Iran to spread their influence.<sup>247</sup> The GCC states do not want either Iraqi or Iranian hegemony over the Gulf region.<sup>248</sup> The fact remains that although the GCC states are linked by similar political systems and have many shared interests towards the outside world, they realise their interests differently on a number of questions.<sup>249</sup> They work together in a crisis, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war that gave birth to the organisation in 1981, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.<sup>250</sup> However, when the crisis is over, the differing objectives and arguments are moved into the forefront.<sup>251</sup> Since Saudi Arabia carries most of the burden of defending the GCC states, the post-war political impression of Saudi Arabia has become a source of strain within the GCC.<sup>252</sup> Qatar and Oman fear Saudi domination.<sup>253</sup> They perceive Saudi leadership within the GCC coalition as decreasing their own position, which they have always been keen to show as being independent.<sup>254</sup>

In spite of the present violations of the U.N. resolutions on the Gulf war by Iraq, Qatar defected from the United stand of the GCC coalition and sought a co-operative relationship with the Iraqi regime. Qatar returned its ambassador to Baghdad in late October 1992.<sup>255</sup> That happened shortly after a serious clash between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a dispute over their common frontier on September 30, 1992.<sup>256</sup> Two Qataris and one Saudi were killed.<sup>257</sup> The Qatari side responded angrily and in October, 1992, the Qatari government suspended its 1965 border agreement with Saudi Arabia.<sup>258</sup> The Defence Minister of Qatar provoked Saudi Arabia when he called for Iranian protection against Saudi

Arabia.<sup>259</sup> Saudi officials accused Qatar of moving border posts into Saudi territory during the Gulf war, while the world's attention was focused on the liberation of Kuwait.<sup>260</sup> However, in December 1992, Qatar agreed to reaffirm the 1965 agreement and the two sides accepted a one year deadline for a final demarcation of their border according to that agreement.<sup>261</sup>

There are differences among the GCC states themselves on how to deal with neighbouring states, notably Iraq and Iran. The meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council heads of states in Riyadh in December 1994, has underlined the differences of approach members take towards Iraq and Iran.<sup>262</sup> Officially, the summit stuck to the previous resolutions of the council.<sup>263</sup> The final communiqué of the summit condemned Iraq in strong terms, accusing it of violating UN resolutions and threatening Kuwait.<sup>264</sup> On Iran, the GCC supported any peaceful measures that the UAE might take to regain Abu Musa and the Tunbs, and served notice that Tehran had to respect all GCC state's sovereignty and stop meddling in their affairs if it wanted a better relationship with its GCC neighbours.<sup>265</sup>

The Omanis sent their naval commander to Tehran and hosted an Iraqi cultural festival shortly before the summit.<sup>266</sup> The Omani view was that it was the GCC's interest to adopt a more conciliatory approach to both the big powers rather than follow the doubtful logic of "dual containment".<sup>267</sup> Omanis believe that it is useless for the GCC to base its policy on Iraq in the hope that there might be a change of regime in Baghdad. The Omanis are persuaded that Saddam Hussein could survive indefinitely, and that the GCC states should try to allow him back into the fold of Arab nations.<sup>268</sup> The Omanis also believe that the GCC states can influence Iraq instead of leaving Iraq in the lurch when Western countries are seeking retribution from Iraq.<sup>269</sup> As for Iran, Omanis are asking the GCC for trade and economic co-operation with Iran. The GCC states can develop shared interests with Iran and that will neutralise its disruptive potential and lessen its fears of being victimised by the West and its Arab allies.<sup>270</sup>

Qatar sent a military delegation to Iraq in December 1993.<sup>271</sup> When the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, raised the U.S.' concern toward Qatar's rapprochement with Iraq and Iran, Qatar's Foreign Minister responded "Qatar lives in the middle of neighbours whom it is difficult to deal with. Accordingly, maintaining good relations with Iraq and Iran is essential for our interest".<sup>272</sup> The



GCC summit held in Oman in December 1995, was tough on Iraq. It underlined the threat presented by Iraq's weapons programme and supported the maintenance of sanctions. While expressing sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people, it blamed Saddam Hussein's regime for not following the UN resolutions.<sup>273</sup> This was in spite of two messages that were sent to the GCC summit from Saddam (carried through the Omanis and Qataris) calling for a reconciliation.<sup>274</sup> In fact, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman have all indirectly suggested that they wanted to see sanctions eased and process of repair initiated.<sup>275</sup> However, the summit failed to reflect their desires.<sup>276</sup> The summit also urged Iran to refer the dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunbs to the International Court of Justice.<sup>277</sup>

In addition, Oman and Qatar follow different paths in foreign relations from the rest of the GCC states, in particular with Israel. Oman has become the first Gulf state to establish trade links with Israel.<sup>278</sup> The decision by Oman and Israel to exchange trade was taken during a meeting at the U.N. on September 30, 1995, between Oman's Foreign Minister and the Israel's Foreign Minister.<sup>279</sup> However, in December 1994, the Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin visited Oman for talks with Sultan Qabus. This is the highest public contact between one of the GCC states and Israel to date.<sup>280</sup>

Qatar has also held public meetings with Israeli officials related to trade co-operation and hosted a round of Middle East multilateral peace talks.<sup>281</sup> There was no immediate reaction from the other GCC states, but implicitly it was seen as being definitely unacceptable.<sup>282</sup>

These differences were highlighted at the final communiqué of the GCC leaders summit held in Muscat on December 6, 1995.<sup>283</sup> This resulted in the new Emir of Qatar, Sheik Hamad Al-Thani, walking-out of the closing ceremony. This has created the most public split within the GCC since its beginning in May 1981.<sup>284</sup> The row was about who to appoint as the next GCC secretary-general to replace the UAE's Fahim Al-Qasimi.<sup>285</sup> Saudi Arabia nominated its former Ambassador to France, Jameel Al-Hujeilan. Qatar nominated its Under-Secretary, at the Qatari Foreign Ministry, Abdulrahman Al-Atiya.<sup>286</sup> Before the closing ceremony of the summit, the matter was put to a vote which resulted in a 5-1, victory for the Saudi nominee Jameel Al-Hujeilan.<sup>287</sup>

The identity of the secretary-general was not the real issue.<sup>288</sup> The Qataris felt embarrassed when all the other members of the GCC supported the appointment of the Saudi nominee. Qatar expressed its embarrassment through its boycott of the final session.<sup>289</sup> The Qataris were adamant on their stand even though all the others supported the Saudi nominee. They felt purposely ignored by the Saudis.<sup>290</sup> Qatar's border dispute with Saudi Arabia was at the source of this matter and it has made Qatar court Iraq as counterweight to Saudi dominance and it has even courted Israel to win favour with the United States.<sup>291</sup> Eventually, during a meeting for the GCC Foreign Ministers on March 17, 1996, Qatar agreed to the Saudi nominee Mr Al-Hujeilan.<sup>292</sup>

These events are all the more disappointing because the Gulf war was perceived by many in the region as a historical turning point that could speed up the process of GCC integration.<sup>293</sup> A strategy of self-reliance in defence and security is inadequate.<sup>294</sup> Self-reliance is politically difficult and militarily ineffective.<sup>295</sup> The inadequacy of self-reliance is to some degree a simple matter of numbers.<sup>296</sup> The GCC states plan to spend up to \$10 billion a year on arms purchases until the end of the century, but their small armies might find it difficult to absorb the advanced arms.<sup>297</sup> Purchasing weapons is unlikely to make a difference in the defence of a state without proper training and better morale.<sup>298</sup> Kuwait's enormous supply of weapons did not make much impression on Saddam Hussein in 1990.<sup>299</sup> Even so, the combined population of the GCC states is close to that of Iraq's, but no one in 1990 suggested that the GCC states could, by themselves, handle the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>300</sup> The mobilisation of citizen manpower into armed forces would require obligatory military service, which is a real demand of the state over its citizens.<sup>301</sup> The population growth rate in the GCC states is among the highest in the world.<sup>302</sup> According to the 1993 census, the total population of the six member states is 23,767,388. The population is expected to reach 32,000,000 by the year 2000.<sup>303</sup> Another major block to effective self-defence is their inability to adopt a unified defence policy is the political context of the states.<sup>304</sup> A demand for military service by the state over its citizenry is avoided by the United States.<sup>305</sup> It is also avoided by the GCC states because such a demand could bring forward pressure for citizens to have a say in state policy.<sup>306</sup> Today's regional allies could prove costly to keep friendly.<sup>307</sup> In other words, the GCC states rely on the U.S., but the GCC states need to be aware that the U.S. may not be available next time, unless it is obviously in their self-interest.<sup>308</sup>

As a result, the GCC states can be expected to continue to rely on a mix of these three security elements: self-reliance, regional balancing, and their Western connection in the foreseeable future.<sup>309</sup> For some time to come, the "new world order" indicates that the GCC states will continue to suffer from a status quo guaranteed by the West, along with its concomitant economic disparities.<sup>310</sup> The American led war against Iraq has played a significant role guaranteeing billions of dollars in potential weapons sales to the GCC states.<sup>311</sup> It also guaranteed the GCC states' need for U.S. protection. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states pay the major cost to the U.S. for the Gulf security under the policy of "dual containment" against Iran and Iraq.<sup>312</sup>

### **U.S. - Saudi security relations in the context of the U.S.' "dual containment" strategy**

When President Bill Clinton came into office in early 1993, he inherited from President George Bush a foreign policy towards the destroyed Iraq and less isolated Iran.<sup>313</sup> The Gulf war of 1990-91, had overturned some of the results of the Iran-Iraq war.<sup>314</sup> By rehabilitating Iran and weakening Iraq, Iran assumed an increasing importance in Gulf security.<sup>315</sup> The U.S. had shown a renewed interest in supporting the defence of the regional states by encouraging a collective security arrangement in the Gulf.<sup>316</sup> It was not in the U.S.' interest or the interest of the GCC states to be dominated by Iran or Iraq.<sup>317</sup> Thus, the initial long-term U.S. and allied objective was to prevent such a development.<sup>318</sup> The U.S. and its allies followed this objective by balancing Iran and Iraq's power against each other.<sup>319</sup>

On February 24, 1994, Martin Indyk, then special assistant to President Clinton on Middle Eastern affairs, attended a symposium in Washington DC where he explained U.S. strategy in the Gulf.<sup>320</sup> He said "The end of the Cold War and the elimination of the Soviet empire also eliminated a major strategic consideration from our calculus in the Gulf".<sup>321</sup> He contended "We no longer have to worry that actions would generate Soviet actions in support of our adversaries in the region".<sup>322</sup> In addition, he stated "As a result of the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war, a regional balance of power between both countries has been established at a much lower level of military capability. This makes it easier to balance the power of both of them".<sup>323</sup> "We came into office in a favourable strategic position in the

Gulf that made it possible for us to reject a policy for building up one of these powers against the other in favour of continuing the hostile policies".<sup>324</sup> The U.S. strategists had given birth to a new policy called "dual containment", which strives to keep the balance of power between Iran and Iraq at a militarily low level so they can not threaten American interests in the Gulf region.<sup>325</sup>

President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, one of the authors of the dual containment policy, called the Middle East, "A region of vital interest to the United States".<sup>326</sup> On May 16, 1994, Mr Anthony Lake outlined U.S. interests in the region, in which, he included the flow of oil, the stability of friendly Arab nations, a secure and lasting peace between Israel and her neighbours, and the containment of Iraq, Iran and Libya.<sup>327</sup> To explain "dual containment" he cited Iran's calls for the destruction of the "Zionist entity" and Saddam Hussein's plans to mobilise the Arab world against Israel.<sup>328</sup> He, therefore, asserted that the U.S. would dramatically reinforce its efforts to isolate and contain the threats from Iran and Iraq.<sup>329</sup>

Since Iraq is already constrained by international sanctions the focus is on constraining Iran.<sup>330</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Toni G. Verstanding, outlined on March 22, 1994, the U.S.' concerns about Iran's behaviour in five areas:

- its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the means for their delivery;
- the continued involvement of the Iranian government in terrorism and assassination world-wide;
- its support for violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process;
- Iran's threats and subversive activities against its neighbours; and
- its dismal human rights record at home.<sup>331</sup>

In fact, Iran got arms from the former Eastern bloc (Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) and from North Korean and China.<sup>332</sup> Iran bought, in 1992, three Russian built attack submarines.<sup>333</sup> It acquired advanced conventional missiles and a large number of long-range anti-ship missiles.<sup>334</sup> Iran has also been able to go on with the production of chemical weapons and acquire biological weapons.<sup>335</sup> Iran has started a major programme to rebuild its armed forces after its massive

losses during the Iran-Iraq war, and it is searching to re-establish itself as a power in the Gulf.<sup>336</sup> Iranian nationalists believe that Iran's history, location and the size of its territory and population give it the right to play such a role.<sup>337</sup> The Iranians were shocked by the amount of destruction against Iraq during Desert Storm and decided that only the possession of nuclear weapons could protect them.<sup>338</sup> These weapons would prevent the U.S. and its allies from intervening to oppose them and make it cautious in how it directed a war against them.<sup>339</sup> Some believe that the U.S. would not have launched a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait if Iraq had had nuclear weapons.<sup>340</sup> Therefore, a very important step was taken by Iran when it made an \$800 million deal with Russia, in January 1995, to complete the construction of two reactors at Bushehr which had been started in 1974, but had been abandoned after the Iranian revolution.<sup>341</sup>

Iran's alleged decision to possess nuclear weapons is said to date back to the last stages of the Iran-Iraq war. Iran was worried because of the Iraqi use of chemical weapons and its nuclear programme.<sup>342</sup> Iranian efforts were motivated not only to deter possible Iraqi action, but also Israeli or American actions.<sup>343</sup> The weapons of mass destruction would compensate for the Iranian military's weakness in conventional arms.<sup>344</sup>

For the U.S. and its allies, Iran's conventional build-up could be justified for legitimate self-defence.<sup>345</sup> However, with the delivery of equipment from Russia and elsewhere, the balance of power will start to tilt in Iran's favour.<sup>346</sup> Some of the equipment, such as weapons of mass destruction, missiles and submarines, not only increase the possibility that Iranian efforts could be not only for self-defence, but also to further ambitions for regional hegemony.<sup>347</sup>

Russia has been pursuing its policy with no attention to the U.S.' "dual containment" strategy.<sup>348</sup> The U.S. failed to break the Russia-Iran deal relating to the nuclear reactor at Bushehr.<sup>349</sup> Russians have argued that as NATO expands into East and Central Europe, one of the possible Russian responses could be to increase strategic co-operation with Iran.<sup>350</sup> The Russian government official reported that Russia and Iran in many cases share the same political goals, "Iran is a southern neighbour and it is impossible for us not to deal with it".<sup>351</sup> In addition, the Russian Minister of Energy made it clear to the Middle East

Television Broadcast Centre that Russia felt free to assist Iran with its nuclear programmes as long as the U.S. is assisting Israel with its nuclear reactors.<sup>362</sup>

In fact, American officials have no doubt that Iran will become a nuclear power in the future. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said in September 1994, that Iran could produce a significant number of nuclear weapons within eight to ten years and Iran is trying to purchase ready made Russian nuclear bombs.<sup>363</sup> That makes the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons a serious risk in the American view.<sup>364</sup> Therefore, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, made three criteria for deciding whether a threat affects U.S. vital interests.<sup>365</sup> The first, if it threatens the survival of the U.S. or its key allies.<sup>366</sup> The second, if it threatens critical U.S. economic interests.<sup>367</sup> The third, if a threat poses the danger of a future nuclear threat.<sup>368</sup>

American concerns toward Iran have risen since early March 1995, when Iran installed anti-ship missiles and coastal artillery on two of the three islands that both Iran and U.A.E. claim.<sup>369</sup> The U.S. explained the Iranian actions as being part of Iran's plan to control oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>370</sup> The fact remains that if Iran acquired arms or acted, the U.S. could not ignore the Iranians.<sup>371</sup> For the U.S., it is Iran's capabilities and not its intentions, at least for the foreseeable future, that is the issue.<sup>372</sup>

Under pressure from the Republican dominated Congress and Israel, the Clinton administration announced a total trade embargo on Iran on April 30, 1995.<sup>373</sup> The U.S. has been determined to limit exports of dual technologies and financial assistance and credits from Western nations in order to put pressure on Iranian policies and to limit its future military capability, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction.<sup>374</sup> The Washington Post reported that reasons for imposing the embargo on Iran were, as Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, stated, "That Iran's behaviour - what Washington's views as its support for terrorism and quest for nuclear weapons - is not only outside the bounds of acceptability but also a direct threat to many vital interests of the United States and its allies".<sup>375</sup> Mr Christopher perceived not a diplomatic abstraction but a living threat, a terrorist country that if left to its own devices would shortly have nuclear weapons and use them to intimidate its neighbours, undermine Israel and control oil transport lines.<sup>376</sup> The U.S. did not succeed in organising joint economic

sanctions on Iran from European countries and its Asian trading partners.<sup>367</sup> Meanwhile, Middle Eastern commentators did not miss the opportunity to indicate that the regional state most comprehensively armed with non-conventional weapons was Washington's closest foreign ally, Israel, and that the White House's fear of nuclear weapons did not spread out to the estimated 220 bombs in the Israeli arsenal.<sup>368</sup> Many criticised the U.S. trade embargo on Iran which they said would solve nothing.<sup>369</sup> Iran would find other buyers for the 650,000 barrels of oil which it was selling per day before the U.S. boycott, just as Libya had found other buyers for the oil which it had been unable to send to the U.S. since the Reagan administration imposed a boycott in 1986.<sup>370</sup> Unilateral U.S. steps with only limited international support are unlikely to have significant effect on Iran.<sup>371</sup> The U.S. intended its strategy to isolate Iran from Syria because of its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and then the U.S. could dictate Gulf policy without interference.<sup>372</sup>

The Fourth Annual U.S. Middle East Policymakers Conference held at Virginia Military Institute on September 17-18, 1995, examined the peace process and Gulf security.<sup>373</sup> At the conference, Dr Shaul Bakhash criticised the current U.S. methods facilitating change in Iran and urged the U.S. to realise Iran's legitimate national security worries when formulating U.S. policy in the Gulf region.<sup>374</sup> Mr Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of the Greater Middle East Study Centre, perceived another problem with the "dual containment" strategy in that it might generate expanded co-operation between Iran and Iraq.<sup>375</sup> Indeed, an Iranian delegation led by Ali Khorram, senior adviser to the Foreign Minister, had visited Baghdad in May 1995.<sup>376</sup> In return, Baghdad promised they would send an Iraqi delegation to visit Tehran in the near future.<sup>377</sup> The Iranian media observed the need to oppose what they called, the common enemy, the U.S., and its policy of "dual containment".<sup>378</sup> The Iranian Foreign Minister said that both countries were now determined "To end their frozen bilateral relations and push actively towards normalisation".<sup>379</sup>

The Clinton administration hopes that the mutual mistrust of Iran and Iraq will prevent or limit their co-operation in spite of their common hostility to the U.S. and its strategy of "dual containment".<sup>380</sup> For Iran, the U.S. is unlikely to allow the Iranian nuclear programme to become too advanced.<sup>381</sup> As Mr Zalmay Khalilzad believes that the U.S. is determined to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme

by its "dual containment" strategy. This strategy could be "vital as it can provide the time to develop appropriate response capabilities and doctrines".<sup>382</sup> Iraq, already restrained by sanctions, is no immediate threat to regional security.<sup>383</sup> Iraq has not complied with the UN resolutions, and the U.S. might have to use force to make Iraq abide by all the terms of its cease-fire agreement with the United Nations. There are particular problems associated with the "no-fly" zones over the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and in the Shi'ite south.<sup>384</sup> However, the U.S. fears the alternatives open to Saddam Hussein. He has more than 7,000 experts and engineers in nuclear technology. Iraq could rebuild its nuclear reactors and possess a nuclear weapon relatively rapidly.<sup>385</sup> Therefore, the U.S. will treat both Iran and Iraq as outcasts so long as they continue their current policies.<sup>386</sup> American officials stated that even though the Iranian revolution happened more than 17 years ago and that Saddam was defeated more than 5 years ago, but the U.S. could not moderate their policies.<sup>387</sup> They made this statement when the CIA was asking for more financial support for its secret operations related to "dual containment" strategy.<sup>388</sup>

Furthermore, it is in the U.S.' interest for the GCC states to develop better defensive abilities and co-operate among themselves.<sup>389</sup> For that reason, the U.S. especially welcomed the determination at the GCC summit meeting in Riyadh, in 1993, to approve a number of recommendations made by the GCC Defence Ministers to enhance GCC co-operation and co-ordination.<sup>390</sup> These included joint efforts in the subject of air defence command and control.<sup>391</sup> Such a development would decrease the U.S. burden, and must be pressed for much harder than in the past.<sup>392</sup>

In fact, the GCC states share the U.S. concerns about the revitalisation of Iran over time, with the present weakening Iraq.<sup>393</sup> They have shared with the U.S. their concerns about the Iran's growing military capabilities and ambitions and how they will affect the stability of the Gulf.<sup>394</sup> However, the ideological tone that characterised relations during the Iran-Iraq war has since been replaced by more normal diplomatic exchanges.<sup>395</sup> Meetings between the GCC states and Iran are part of the regular diplomatic routine in the region.<sup>396</sup> Saudi Arabia perceived the end of the Gulf war as being an opportunity to improve relations with Iran.<sup>397</sup> In Saudi opinion, Iran had acted responsibly during the Kuwaiti crisis.<sup>398</sup> In addition, since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran had moderated its desire to spread its



ideological message across the Gulf.<sup>399</sup> The improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations extended across the GCC states contacts.<sup>400</sup> In August 1991, Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati, said in an interview that the GCC states "Have invited us to reassess the status of the members of the Council... They have somehow come to the conclusion that they must seek Iran's co-operation, or else it will be impossible to defend regional security".<sup>401</sup>

The GCC Foreign Ministers and GCC Security General, Abdullah Bishara, met with Velayati in New York in late September 1991, during the U.N. General Assembly meeting.<sup>402</sup> They issued a statement laying out the principles over which their relations would be founded, including an agreement of respect recognised international boundaries, never to resort to force or the threat of force to resolve differences, and non-interference in internal matters.<sup>403</sup> In November 1991, the GCC Secretary-General announced that "Iran is an essential participant with the GCC states in the security of the waters of the Gulf. It is impossible to guarantee that security without an understanding with Iran".<sup>404</sup>

Iran exploited its close relations with the GCC states to undermine the American position in Gulf defence plans. The GCC states confirmed their belief in the need to depend on outside powers, for security, and so Velayati explained that the strategic reasons why the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasised co-operation with GCC states was to weaken the foreign presence.<sup>405</sup> Tehran's increasing military might, on the one hand, and the Iranian moves in April, 1992, on Abu Musa island, on the other hand, confirmed to the GCC the need for the U.S. role in Gulf defence.<sup>406</sup> Iranian Foreign Ministry sources were quoted as saying that continued foreign involvement in the Gulf made it essential for Iran to reinforce its position on the island.<sup>407</sup>

The U.A.E. raised the issue of Iran's role, on Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands (Great and Lesser Tunb) occupied by the Shah in 1971, at the GCC.<sup>408</sup> The GCC summit in December 1992, expressed its strong support for the U.A.E., accusing Iran of occupying Arab land and stating that improved relations with Tehran depended on "a strengthening of trust".<sup>409</sup> The following annual meeting of the Supreme Council of the GCC was used to study the developments in the relationship between the GCC and Iran. The Supreme Council deplored Iran's

failure to respond to the U.A.E.'s calls to reach a peaceful solution to the issue.<sup>410</sup> And it called on Iran to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.<sup>411</sup>

However, Iran agreed to negotiate with the U.A.E. They met in Qatar in November 1995, but the meeting failed to solve the dispute.<sup>412</sup> Thus, the U.A.E. insisted that Iran agree to go to the International Court of Justice to solve the dispute.<sup>413</sup> The U.A.E. explained that Iran had rejected this solution because Iran did not hold any documents that justified its possession of the three islands.<sup>414</sup> Furthermore, the tension over the islands rose when Iran installed, on March 1, 1995, anti-ship missiles and coastal artillery on the three islands.<sup>415</sup> The GCC saw the military installation as an attempt to threaten oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz and provoke the GCC states in general.<sup>416</sup>

The GCC states concerns about Iran's geopolitical ambitions increased as a major Iranian rearmament programme began to build up a conventional and non-conventional weapons industry.<sup>417</sup> The Saudis' view of Iran's increasing military might was that it could be explained by the following reasons:

- Iran's concerns about Iraqi power in the future;
- Iran's intentions in Iraq, and possible invasion of Iraq or part of it;
- Iran fears of the U.S. presence in the Gulf;
- Iran's legitimate desire to play a role in Gulf and restore its military power;
- Iran's intentions to export its ideology to other Muslim countries; and
- Iranians believe that the American presence in the Gulf would not remain that long and Iran with its military might could impose its policy on the GCC states, especially on the oil strategy.<sup>418</sup>

The Saudis base their explanations of Iranian intentions towards the GCC states on the following evidence:

- Some Iranian political leaders are calling to export their revolution to the GCC states and challenge them to establish the extreme of principles of the Islamic revolution;
- Many Iranian leaders charge the GCC states with the responsibility for causing Iran's defeat during Iran-Iraq war;

- Iran's government charges the GCC states with the responsibility for the U.S. presence in the Gulf which poses a direct threat to Iranian interests and limits its military role in the Gulf;
- Some Iranian leaders believe that Iranian economic problems are caused by the oil strategy of the GCC states;
- Some Iranian religious leaders have some hostility against the GCC states which is encouraged by Persian nationalism;
- Some Iranian leaders have hostility against the GCC states because of the Sunni-Shi'ite ideological conflict; and
- Iran thinks that it can rely on the Shi'ite minority in the GCC states to support Iran.<sup>419</sup>

The Saudis justified their support for Iraq, both financial and moral, that came after the third year of Iran-Iraq war when the balance of the war collapsed in favour of Iran and the Iraqi territory threatened to collapse.<sup>420</sup> The GCC states tried to persuade Iran to end the war by peace, but Iran rejected the (GCC states and the world community's) call for an end to the war.<sup>421</sup> Iran insisted on getting revenge on Saddam Hussein and on invading Iraq.<sup>422</sup> The Saudis felt threatened not only by the ideological threat of the Iranian revolution which it continued to wage against the GCC states, but also by its military power which threatened Iraqi territory. The Saudis had no other alternative but to support Iraq to counter balance the expansion of Iranian ideological and military threat.<sup>423</sup> The Saudis perceived that the ideological threat from Iran was a more immediate danger than the long term threat of Iraqi hegemony in the region.<sup>424</sup> The long-term threat could be dealt with by a military build up to improve Saudi Arabia's deterrence.<sup>425</sup>

Iran and Iraq have a relationship in which a permanent balance of power is hard to preserve.<sup>426</sup> The stronger power appears from these conflicts not only to want to dominate its competitor, but to expand its influence to the GCC states as well.<sup>427</sup> The GCC states have been too weak to maintain this balance between Iran and Iraq.<sup>428</sup> The Saudis understood that some risk was involved in maintaining Iraqi power against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.<sup>429</sup> The Saudis and Kuwaitis paid the price when Iraq used the same military might to invade Kuwait in 1990, and threatened Saudi security.<sup>430</sup> As the Saudi newspaper *Al Riyadh* commented, the GCC states had been trapped into supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, which only

served the ambitions of the instigators of the war. The GCC states would not be forced again into paying for another war.<sup>431</sup>

Therefore, the GCC states view Iran and Iraq as imminent threats which necessitate the presence of the U.S. in the Gulf to offer any significant security for the GCC states.<sup>432</sup> The GCC states explained the American presence in the Gulf as being necessitated by the Cold War, when the Soviet Union threatened the Gulf region through its allies Iraq and south Yemen. Iran used to be an important strategic location for the NATO against the Soviet Union.<sup>433</sup> The GCC states also blamed the presence of U.S. troops in the region after the Gulf war in 1991, on Iran as it possesses the largest regional navy in the Gulf.<sup>434</sup> Iran has missiles, mines, anti-ship missile and has acquired three submarines.<sup>435</sup> The GCC states concluded that the cause of the U.S. presence in the Gulf, was Iran's occupation of Abu Musa island.<sup>436</sup>

Equally importantly, the Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in an interview on March 27, 1996, that some GCC states were keeping foreign troops on their territory, because of Iran's behaviour. The GCC states did not desire the presence of foreign troops but needed them to maintain peace in the region.<sup>437</sup> Similarly, after the Gulf war, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, and other senior Saudi government officials stated that Saudi Arabia did not want to have any foreign troops or a large quantity of Western military equipment stationed on its soil, but at the same time they needed to provide the country with some guarantee against a future Iraqi (or Iranian) attack.<sup>438</sup>

Furthermore, the Saudi's viewed Iranian economic problems as being caused by Iran's huge purchases of weapons and its spending on activities to export the Iranian revolution.<sup>439</sup> The economic problems also connected to the U.S. boycott of Iran.<sup>440</sup> On the oil strategy, the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and U.A.E. hold the largest quantity of oil reserves in the world, and this gives them the right to follow a moderate policy of oil production and oil prices.<sup>441</sup> The GCC states justified their policy as maintaining the stability of the oil market, particularly, when the oil production from non-OPEC countries exceeds the production of OPEC countries.<sup>442</sup>

The Saudis believe that Iran is planning to dominate the GCC states, or some of them to increase its control over the oil reserves and expand its authority. They believe that Iran has the intention and the ability.<sup>443</sup> Saudi Arabia was especially concerned at the expansion of Iranian influence in Qatar, observing it as part of an Iranian plan to divide the GCC.<sup>444</sup> Saudi Arabia was also suspicious that Iran may have been, at least in part, behind the domestic disturbances in Bahrain in 1995, and in early 1996.<sup>445</sup> Thus, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia asserted to his nation on February 7, 1995, that Saudi Arabia was well connected with the GCC states and that Saudi Arabia would not allow anyone to come between the GCC states.<sup>446</sup>

The Saudis explain Iran's opposition to the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and the GCC security ties with the U.S. because it prevents Iran from attaining its regional objectives.<sup>447</sup> Iran has been pressing for regional security arrangements that include Iran and exclude the U.S.<sup>448</sup> This is something the GCC states reject unless Iran holds back its WMD and missile programmes and agrees to the new order in the Gulf.<sup>449</sup> As for religious ties, the Sunni-Shi'ite ideological conflict has meant there is little improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations.<sup>450</sup> However, with Iran's revolutionary orientation, it is difficult for Saudi Arabia to predict any way in which Iran could be involved in Gulf security arrangement.<sup>451</sup> Although, Iran's current policies are more agreeable to the GCC states, its main points remain unclear.<sup>452</sup> The Saudi government is cautious and believes that the responsibility is on Iran to demonstrate its role as a power for peace and stability rather than agitation.<sup>453</sup>

The view from other states of the GCC was expressed by the Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusif bin Alawi, in January 1993.<sup>454</sup> He responded to the question about the threat presented by Iranian rearmament thus: "The size of Iran's armament is not new... I do not believe that things will develop to a point where anyone could imagine that Iran would launch a military attack on the Gulf region... what is said about this possibility is nothing but political propaganda".<sup>455</sup> Furthermore, Anthony Cordesman, a military expert, said "Iran's land forces can not easily cross the Gulf. They are not a direct threat to the southern Gulf states, but Iran is a power that is rebuilding serious military capabilities".<sup>456</sup> However, it is unlikely that Iran could ever use such weapons without being subject to international military response and even the threat of it would cause an

international outrage.<sup>457</sup> In addition Iran, unlike Iraq, is not seeking revenge against the GCC states.<sup>458</sup>

Equally important, Iranian officials responded to such accusations by saying that the GCC states serve only the interests of American arms manufacturers and the acceleration of the arms race in the region.<sup>459</sup> In the Gulf region an arms build-up by one country has implications for others.<sup>460</sup> The Saudi insecurity and nervousness at Iran's arms build-up started in the 1970s.<sup>461</sup> The Saudis saw the Shah as a potential dominator of the region.<sup>462</sup> The situation has not improved.<sup>463</sup> An arranged Saudi arms build-up in the 1980s was seen by the Iranian as a challenge to its role in the Gulf.<sup>464</sup> Likewise, Iran's military programme of 1990s is perceived as a reason for the Saudis to need more arms.<sup>465</sup> The result is an arms race in the Gulf in which mainly the U.S. supplies Saudi Arabia and Russia supplies Iran.<sup>466</sup> The U.S. and Russia are the world's biggest arms merchants. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the world's two biggest arms purchasers.<sup>467</sup>

A closed conference was held by the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies in Abu Dhabi early 1995, about the relationship between Iran and the GCC states.<sup>468</sup> The conference concluded that the arms race in the Gulf region would continue as long as there was a lack of confidence and Iran might push the region into a nuclear arms race if Iran possessed nuclear weapons.<sup>469</sup> The conference also concluded that there would be no improvement in the relationship between Iran and the GCC states so long as Iran does not resolve its dispute with the United Arab Emirates.<sup>470</sup> This interpretation has been confirmed by the Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz. An interviewer from the BBC asked him on March 27, 1996, to comment on the declaration of the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which Iran stated that it wanted good relations with the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia.<sup>471</sup> He said that Saudi Arabia had a similar desire to Iran for a good relationship, but there were some problems with Arab countries such as the U.A.E. which had to be resolved or they had to agree to go to the international court.<sup>472</sup> Actually, the Saudis believe that Iran seems to want to normalise relations with the GCC states, but without sacrificing its principles.<sup>473</sup> Despite differences on some issues like Abu Musa and the other Gulf islands, the GCC states and Iran kept their trade and economic links open to co-operate on questions of the environment and possibly to consult with one another within the structure of OPEC.<sup>474</sup> The Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusif bin Alawi, has

said "There remains the firm truth that there are common interests between Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf".<sup>475</sup>

The uncertainty of Iraqi's future adds many security concerns for Saudi Arabia.<sup>476</sup> With Saddam still in power, Saudi Arabia can not approve Iraq joining in any security arrangement in the Gulf.<sup>477</sup> The Saudis are anxious to see Saddam Hussein replaced.<sup>478</sup> The dilemma with Saddam, is that the devil you know is better than the one you don't.<sup>479</sup> If Saddam fell, Saudi Arabia would likely become more vulnerable.<sup>480</sup> A successor regime might try to get revenge or if Iraq was broken into parts it could cause a power struggle between Syria and Iran for control of Iraq, and possibly lead to a pro-Iranian Shi'ite state located in southern Iraq, next to the Saudi border.<sup>481</sup> In addition, at the end of 1995, King Hussein of Jordan called for a federation with Iraq.<sup>482</sup> Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would see an Iraq-Jordan confederation as a threat to their countries.<sup>483</sup>

In late 1991, the Saudi government decided to adopt an assertive policy concerning Iraq.<sup>484</sup> By then it was evident that Saddam's regime was not likely to fall because of economic sanctions and that Saddam, who was challenging the U.N. inspectors, had decided to rebuild his military power.<sup>485</sup> The important security question facing the Saudi government in the immediate future, was whether Saddam Hussein could survive long enough, and with sufficient capability, to threaten Saudi Arabia again.<sup>486</sup> At that time, the Saudis started publicly to support a group of exiled Iraqi opponents of Saddam's regime called the Free Iraq Council.<sup>487</sup> Also the Saudi government gave its blessing to a congress of Iraqi opposition movements, including Shi'ites, Kurds and other organisations, which met in Damascus in January 1992.<sup>488</sup> The Saudi government met the leaders of this coalition in February 1992, which included Ayatollah Muhammad Baker Al-Hakim, the head of the Tehran-based Iraqi Shi'ite leaders.<sup>489</sup> However, the Saudis still worried about its connections with Tehran.<sup>490</sup>

Many observed that any system to ensure the stability of Gulf security must include all eight Gulf countries (the GCC states, Iraq and Iran).<sup>491</sup> However, the preconditions for the development of collective security as an instrument of ensuring regional order have not yet been met.<sup>492</sup> Trust between the Gulf countries which is required for co-operation over security arrangements in the Gulf simply does not exist and there is little prospect of it being established.<sup>493</sup>

Iran and Iraq are unlikely to challenge the U.S. directly as long as they perceive that it has the capability and will to prevent the domination of the region by a hostile power.<sup>494</sup> Both are likely to test the U.S. and its allies on occasions as Saddam Hussein did in October 1994, when he moved his troops, including Republican Guard units, to the Kuwaiti border withdrawing them after the U.S. sent more troops to the region.<sup>495</sup>

With the continuing U.N. enforced arms sanctions against Iraq, the greater the prospects are that the balance of power in the Gulf will be weakened.<sup>496</sup> The build-up of Iranian military forces is likely to tilt the balance of power in favour of Iran. This greatly increases the chances of a third conflict in the Gulf region unless the threat of direct U.S. intervention in the Gulf maintains a regional balance of power.<sup>497</sup> The U.S. is still willing to fight as the Americans believe that oil is threatened by Iraq and Iran.<sup>498</sup> The U.S. Secretary of Defence, William Perry, assured the Saudis during his visit in January 1996, that the U.S. was ready to fight if there was a reason to protect the region.<sup>499</sup>

### **U.S.-Saudi military relations**

Since the Iraqi take-over of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the threat that the Iraqi military might move against Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration was to try to complete the delivery of a \$4,026 million arms package that Saudi Arabia had requested in June 1990. In the latter part of 1990, the U.S. delivered many of the 1,177 armoured vehicles and 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles for the Saudis, which it earlier had scheduled for delivery in 1992, or 1993.<sup>500</sup> The rest of the package was approved in late 1990 and 1991 (see Table 15).

In addition, Bush sent Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, to Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1990, in the hope of obtaining approval to send U.S. armed forces to prevent an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia should the need arise. Cheney carried a large amount of intelligence (see Chapter 5) to show the Saudis the full extent of the potential Iraqi threat and to persuade the Saudis to allow the U.S. to use Saudi airstrips and naval installations to respond to Iraq's military manoeuvre. If Saudi Arabia refused Cheney's request it might then be impossible for Washington to force Iraq out of Kuwait.<sup>501</sup>



Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. troops to land on its territory on August 7, 1990.<sup>502</sup> On the same day, squadrons of U.S. air force F-15 and F-16 aircraft departed for Saudi Arabia, together with the 82nd Airborne Division as well as the U.S. 24th Infantry Division.<sup>503</sup> Ironically, the Division had been part of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) which Saudi Arabia had refused to allow to come close to their border since the early 1980s. Even the USCENTCOM participated in the U.S. deployment force in Saudi Arabia.<sup>504</sup>

The Bush administration waived a Congressional limit on the number of U.S.-made F-15 aircraft for Saudi Arabia, allowing 24 more planes to be sent in addition to the 60 planes, which were originally sold in 1978. During this crisis, Congress provided President Bush with whatever he believed to be necessary to protect American interests.<sup>505</sup> The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the occasion of emergency sales to the Saudis. Up to this time, these sales would not normally have been viable. Saudi Arabia got all the arms that it had requested since 1985, and without Congressional opposition.

The Kuwait crisis also provided the basis for the president's waiver of Congressional bans on legislation concerning the sales of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and the sales of 105mm depleted uranium anti-tank shells. After exercising the special waiver authorities available to him in U.S. law, in August 1990, President Bush ordered that 200 Stinger missiles and 50 Stinger launchers, as well as 15,000 depleted uranium shells for M-60 tanks, be sold immediately to Saudi Arabia. The president further ordered the emergency sale of 150 M-60A-3 tanks to Saudi Arabia. In these cases, the U.S. arms export law would normally demand the president to give Congress 30 calendar days to review an individual sale proposal. The president used the powers available to him to waive this review period.<sup>506</sup>

In August 1990, the estimated total value of the emergency arms sales package for Saudi Arabia was \$2.231 billion. The estimated sales price of the 24 F-15 aircraft and the AIM-9L Sidewinder and AIM-7F missiles was \$2 billion. The 150 M60A-3 tanks had an estimated sales price of \$206 million. The 200 Stinger missiles and 50 Stinger launchers were sold for an estimated price of \$12 million, and the 15,000 105 mm depleted uranium anti-tank shells were sold for an estimated \$13

million. In light of the crisis, those in Congress and others who would have likely opposed significant Saudi arms sales such as these withheld major criticism of them.<sup>507</sup>

Shortly, after the emergency arms transfers of August 1990, the Bush administration started to design additional arms sales to Saudi Arabia based on the new military threat presented by Iraq. Therefore, the White House announced that the U.S. would sell \$21 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia and that the package would be presented to Congress in phases.<sup>508</sup> During the executive branch consultations with Congress, it became clear that many lawmakers believed that such a heavy package should undergo careful review by Congress and not be approved quickly before the Congress recessed in 1990. The executive branch decided to submit for Congressional review a large Saudi arms package in late September 1990. Included in that review were those items considered most urgent for Saudi requirements. Final decisions on other major items that might be sold to the Saudis were postponed until early 1991. Due in part to this approach by the executive branch, no full-scale effort to block the first phase of the sale package was made before the 101st Congress ended.<sup>509</sup>

Congress received formal notification of the major Saudi arms package on September 27, 1990. This \$7.3 billion package cleared the law review period 30 days later. Its principal elements were as follows:

- An Armoured vehicle package, including 150 M1A2 tanks; 200 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) missile launchers, and 1,750 TOWIIA anti-tank missiles; 207 M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers; 50 M548 Cargo Carriers; 17 M88A1 Recovery Vehicles; 43 M578 Recovery Vehicles (cost: \$3.135 billion);
- 150 Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) IIA missile launchers, night vision sights and support equipment, spares and parts (cost: \$33 million);
- 9 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), including vehicle mounted rocket launchers, 2,880 tactical rockets, 50 practice rocket pods, 9 M755A2 command post carriers, training and training equipment, 20 AN/VRC-46 radio sets (cost: \$64 million);
- 6 Patriot fire units, 384 Patriot long-range air defence missiles, six AN/MPQ-53 radar sets, six engagement control stations, 48 launcher stations (cost: \$984 million).

- 12 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, 155 HELLFIRE missiles, 24 HELLFIRE spare missile launchers, six spare engines, and associated equipment (cost: \$300 million);
- 8 UH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters, six spare T700-GE701C turbine helicopter engines (cost: \$121 million);
- Upgrade of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Command, Control and Communications (C3) system (cost: \$307 million);
- 10,000 wheeled vehicles, including 1,200 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (cost: \$1.8 billion).
- 7 KC-130H Hercules tanker aircraft (cost: \$252 million); and
- 8 C-130H and 2 C130H-30 transport aircraft (\$320 million).<sup>510</sup>

Saudi Arabia accepted splitting the arms package into two parts and promised the U.S. that it would cover all of the hundreds of millions of dollars of the operating costs of the U.S. forces based in Saudi Arabia. Also Riyadh promised to cover the extra costs of all of the U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia including fuel, water, transportation and other expenses as well. The aid commitments by the U.S. and its allies to the anti-Iraq, Gulf effort totalled \$20 billion at the end of 1990, of which \$12 billion came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>511</sup>

Bush administration officials testified in October 1990, that the Saudi arms package was an essential part of a comprehensive approach to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Persian Gulf states and to improve their security. If deterrence failed, then it would be expected that the Saudi military would slow, if not stop, the attacking forces until outside reinforcements could arrive. The basis of this strategy was the strong defence ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states.<sup>512</sup> For the Saudis, the availability of American troops and arms sales provided the crucial difference between Bush and the previous American presidents. In the Saudis' view, President Carter's measures would not have gone beyond a boycott against Iraq while President Reagan's measures would not have gone beyond the dispatch of warships or air raids.<sup>513</sup> In fact, after the invasion, President Carter said "It would be a mistake to send U.S. troops to the Middle East unless Iraq also invades Saudi Arabia".<sup>514</sup> President Carter believed that President Bush had taken the right economic and political steps to address the invasion in its first few days. However, President

Bush's opposition to the Iraqi move developed and gained an unprecedented unanimity in the international community. President Bush made use of his personal connections with other leaders which he had developed over twenty years. He had known King Fahd for fifteen years, for instance. President Bush used his experience as an oil man and fully understood what the Iraqi invasion meant (see Chapter 5). The Bush administration argued that the threat presented by Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the GCC states was clear, by comparing their military forces. For instance, Saudi Arabia was outnumbered 10-to-1 by Iraq in main battle tanks, 4-to-1 in combat aircraft, and more than 8-to-1 in artillery. The military forces of all six GCC countries combined were less than half of those of Iraq, Iran, Syria or Egypt.<sup>515</sup> (see Table 10 in Chapter 5).

The September 1990, arms package fitted into this larger strategy by addressing the deficiencies in the Saudi force structure. Up to the time of the invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis had not taken the threat of a land invasion seriously. Now they needed to deal with that threat and were committed to build sufficient land forces to deter Iraq.<sup>516</sup>

Opposition to the arms sales by those generally concerned with Israel's security were not voiced, in the face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the very real threat to Saudi Arabia.<sup>517</sup> These arms sales appeared appropriate for American interests and equipped sufficient forces to deter the Iraqis who were trying to create a linkage between a solution to the Kuwaiti crisis and the Palestinian problem.<sup>518</sup> This obviously effected Israel and, thus, the lobbyists were silenced. Israel, on the other hand, expressed concern about the U.S. decision to provide Saudi Arabia with sophisticated new weapons. In response, the U.S. promised to provide Israel with a number of F-15 fighters, helicopters and Patriot anti-missile systems. However, Israel fought the proposed sale unless it got \$1 billion in emergency U.S. aid to counter the Saudi sale.<sup>519</sup>

The Bush administration testified in October 1990, that any additional arms package would focus on a further effort to improve Saudi and GCC abilities to defend themselves against Iraq or other aggressor states' threats. Thus, on July 29, 1991, the administration proposed the sale of a \$365 million package of bombs, air-to-air missiles, spare parts, and logistic support for Saudi Arabia.<sup>520</sup> In

addition, the Bush administration notified Congress of the latest in a growing list of U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia which was worth about \$4.2 billion.<sup>521</sup>

On December 5, 1991, the Bush administration formally notified Congress of its plan to sell 14 Patriot missile fire units, 758 Patriot missiles, including equipment, spare parts, and support to the value of \$3.3 billion. The Bush administration justified the arms sale as being totally defensive equipment, but some key House members responsible for foreign policy issues, including Representative Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Lee Hamilton, ranking majority member of that Committee, and Representative David Obey, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, criticised the proposal. They asserted that such a massive arms sale to the Middle East would imply that the U.S. was not serious about implementing initiatives to control Middle East arms sales.<sup>522</sup> It is noteworthy that in London on October 18, 1991, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council had stated that their aim was to obtain compliance to the guidelines concerning major arms sales to the Middle East with the objective of reducing arms sale to states in that region. Representative Mel Levine of the Foreign Affairs Committee further opposed the timing of the Saudi notification, which was being made in December 1991, during Congressional adjournment, thus, preventing a vote which might have blocked the sale.<sup>523</sup>

Others, including Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Sen. Jesse Helms, its ranking minority member, agreed to the timing of the notification, remarking that the Patriot missile was a defensive weapons system which did not raise major concerns as might other arms sales. Finally, in January 1992, after the 30-day arms sales notification period had ended, the Patriot sale was cleared for executive branch implementation.<sup>524</sup>

Other sales were also made to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1992. The Bush administration notified Congress on June 10, 1992, of its plan to sell \$1.881 billion of weapons, maintenance and support services to Saudi Arabia, including 8UH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters, 362 HELLFIRE missiles, 3,500 HYDRA-70 rockets, 40 HMMWV vehicles, and maintenance and support for Saudi F-15, F-5 aircraft and Apache helicopters.<sup>525</sup>

Since the F-15 aircraft did an excellent job in air-to-air combat against the most advanced aircraft in the service of potential enemy nations during the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia requested the U.S. for more F-15s to fulfil the air defence role until after the year 2000.<sup>526</sup> Therefore, on September 11, 1992, President Bush announced his decision to sell 72 F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia worth \$9.2 billion.<sup>527</sup>

On September 14, 1992, President Bush formally notified Congress of his intention to sell the 72 F-15XP fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, along with 24 aircraft designed to perform defensive air-to-air combat missions.<sup>528</sup> The sale also included 900 AGM-65DIG Maverick missiles, 300 AIM-95 and 300 AIM-7M missiles, 600 CBU-87 bombs, 700 GBU-10-12 bombs and technical support and spare parts.<sup>529</sup> In fact, before President Bush notified the Congress about the F-15 sales, he formally submitted \$10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel to pre-empt Israel and its U.S. supporters from mounting a major campaign to persuade Congress to stop the sale from going through.<sup>530</sup>

In testifying to Congress on September 23, 1992, on behalf of the F-15 sale, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, Frank Wisner, underscored the fact that this sale of F-15s was important to American military interests and that they would increase the Saudi ability to operate jointly with U.S. forces, using Saudi infrastructure, should American forces have to return to the region during another major crisis. He also stated that the Middle East today had changed from that in which the Carter administration had consulted with Congress on the first F-15 sales in 1978, or in which the Reagan administration had obtained approval for the AWACS sale in 1981. According to Wisner, Saudi Arabia had observed the understandings on which those earlier sales were based and served as a reliable security partner with the U.S. in different circumstances.<sup>531</sup> At the Madrid Conference, Wisner stated, Saudi Arabia had played a critical role in the wake of the Gulf war, in assisting to form what will be a new, more constructive, and more secure Middle East reality for their American friends in the region. He emphasised that strong U.S.-Saudi security relationship was the best way to ensure there was no contradiction in the United States' support for Saudi Arabia and Israel.<sup>532</sup> Finally, about the impact of this F-15 sale on Israel, he said; "The Middle East remains a dangerous neighbourhood, but the dynamics of the region have changed radically in the past two years. The notion of a unified Arab Camp motivated by

its most radical elements to confront Israel's military was dealt a serious blow by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and defeat in the Gulf war".<sup>533</sup>

Nevertheless, when America sold Saudi Arabia its first 60 F-15s in 1978, certain assurances had been given to the United States by the government of Saudi Arabia about specific restriction. These assurances had been lived up to, and they still remained valid. Particularly, in regard to the security of Israel, America confirmed that the Saudi government still considered itself bound by these same assurances with regard to the additional new 72 F-15. Therefore, the American were confident that Saudi Arabia would live up to its assurances and only use these aircraft, as it had used all the other weapons that America had sold them, for purposes of self-defence and advance regional stability.<sup>534</sup>

In the case of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981, the American Government Accounting Office confirmed that in 1988, the assurances were being lived up to. The AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia enabled America to observe the Iran-Iraq war and monitor threats to Saudi Arabia from the war.<sup>535</sup>

The F-15s sale was seen by the Bush administration as an important signal of the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia and as a warning to any potential aggressor.<sup>536</sup> The sale promotes vital U.S. foreign policy and security interests in the Middle East and the Gulf regions. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia would have to take concrete steps to:

- help build an increased capability to deter and defend against future aggression;
- buy more time, in the event that deterrence fails, to mobilise support from the Saudi government;
- develop the interoperability that will allow the U.S. to reinforce Saudi Arabia more effectively; and
- help contribute to stronger and more stable post-crisis security arrangements, regardless of the end of Saddam Hussein.<sup>537</sup>

Thus, when the 30-day Congressional review period had expired, President Bush had the authority to proceed with the Saudi F-15 sale. As events developed, the Saudi government signed the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) on May 5, 1993, and signed the agreement with the U.S. on January 29, 1994.<sup>538</sup>

Members of Congress heard testimony requesting support for the sale of F-15 to Saudi Arabia and arguing that without the sale, more than 10,000 American jobs might be lost in Missouri. The Bush administration urged the sale, pointing out that European and other aircraft manufacturers were eager to take America's place as the principal supplier to the Saudi military, a position that had already occurred in the previous decade. Also, the administration argued that maintaining the U.S. aerospace industrial base through arms sale enabled America to continue producing the best defence items in the world.<sup>539</sup>

Advanced weapons sales to Saudi Arabia usually drew opposition from pro-Israeli force. But this request was especially controversial because it included 48 F-15 ground attack aircraft.<sup>540</sup> Frank Wisner testified to Congress that the air-to-ground aircraft could provide Saudi Arabia with an offensive air force that could deter threats from neighbouring states. It would not alter the essential fact; that Saudi forces were for defence and they were needed because they lacked manpower and had vast borders. According to Wisner, Israel's security would be unimpaired by this sale and America would continue to consult with Israel to ensure its security was maintained.<sup>541</sup>

As a result, to compensate for the Saudi F-15XP aircraft, Israel reached agreement with the U.S. on January 28, 1994, to purchase 20 F-15I fighter-bombers, one of the U.S.' most sophisticated weapons. The value of the contract was estimated at \$2 billion and the aircraft were due to arrive in Israel in late 1997. The agreement included an option for Israel to purchase five more F-15Is at a later time.<sup>542</sup>

Israel has had 51 older-model F-15s since 1976, but the newest planes would enable Israel to reach its distant potential enemies. The F-15I is a specialised long-range version of the F-15 that has been sold only to Israel. In addition, the F-15I is capable of carrying more weaponry than its predecessors and has better night-vision. It also has air-to-air and air-to-ground missile systems. In contrast, Saudi F-15s do not have the sophisticated radar and other systems that would be included in the aircraft sold to Israel.<sup>543</sup>

Table 15 shows that the military sales to Saudi Arabia from 1965 to 1994, amounted to over \$52 billion. In fact, during the period from the Gulf crisis until the end of 1994, Saudi Arabia purchased from the U.S. more than \$25 billion,



which was almost equal to the previous years. Chart 1 provides a picture of arms sales agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia which rose dramatically from 1986-1989 period to the 1990-1994 period (Chart 2). Agreements with Saudi Arabia rose from \$4.1 billion in the earlier period to \$25,722 in the later period, over a 6 fold increase.

**Table 15**


**U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia in \$U.S. 1965 -1994**  
**Construction and training programmes not included**

Date	Cost	Weapon System/Service
1965-1970	\$370,500	
1971-1972	\$320,600	
1973-1980	\$15,869,600	
1981-1985	\$6,400,000	
1986-1989	\$4,100,000	
31-8-90	\$2.0 billion	24 F-15C and D aircraft with AIM-9L Sidewinder and AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air missiles.
31-8-90	\$206 million	150 M-60A3 main battle tanks.
31-8-90	\$13 million	15,000 rounds of M-833 105mm depleted Uranium antitank ammunition for M-60A3 tanks.
31-8-90	\$12 million	50 stinger ground-to-air missile launch tubes and 200 stinger missiles.
27-9-90	\$33 million	150 TOW II anti-armour missile launchers with night vision sights.
27-9-90	\$307 million	Engineering, technical, and logistic services for upgrade, refurbishment, operation, and maintenance programme for Royal Saudi Naval Force.
27-9-90	\$300 million	12 AH-64 Apache helicopters; 155 Hellfire missiles; and 24 Hellfire launchers.
27-9-90	\$1.8 billion	10,000 tactical wheeled vehicles.
27-9-90	\$984 million	6 patriot missile batteries, with 48 launchers; and 384 missiles.
27-9-90	\$121 million	8 UH-60 Medevac helicopters and spare engines.
27-9-90	\$64 million	9 Multiple Launch Rocket systems (MLRS) and 2,880 MLRS rockets.
27-9-90	\$3.14 billion	150 M-1A2 main battle tanks; 200 M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles; 1,750 TOW ILA antitank missiles; 207 M-133 armoured personnel carriers; 50 M-458 cargo carriers; 9 M-567 A2 armoured command posts; 17 M-88A1 recovery vehicles; and 43 M-578 recovery vehicles.
27-9-90	\$572 million	7 KC-130H tanker aircraft and 10 C-130H transport aircraft.
22-3-91	\$158 million	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers services for Saudi Arabia's Army Ordnance Corps.
22-3-91	\$300 million	Spare parts and maintenance services for Saudi Air Force.
22-3-91	\$461 million	Spare and repair parts related to Operation Desert Storm.
10-7-91	\$123 million	2,300 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).
14-7-91	\$350 million	"Contractor support" for E-3 AWACS surveillance and battle management aircraft and KE-3 tanker planes.
24-7-91	\$365 million	2,000 Mk-84 2,000-pound general purpose bombs; 2,100 BY-87 antitank and antipersonnel cluster bombs; 700 AIM-7M air-to-air missiles, unspecified number of laser-guided bomb components; "miscellaneous munitions components;" and spare and repair parts.
5-12-91	\$3.3 billion	12 Patriot missile batteries, with 758 missiles, one training unit, and one maintenance float fire unit; 14 AN/MPQ-53 radar sets; 14 engagement control stations; 75 launching stations; and support equipment and training.
1-6-92	\$157 million	Contractor maintenance, training, and support for F-5 aircraft.
1-6-92	\$495 million	Contractor maintenance, training, and technical services for F-15 aircraft.
1-6-92	\$400 million	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers support and modernisation of Saudi Arabia Ordnance Corps' logistic system.
1-6-92	\$223 million	8 UH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters; 4 spare engines with spare and repair parts; design and construction to repair facilities.
1-6-92	\$606 million	362 Hellfire missiles; 3,000 Hydra-70 rockets; 40 HMMWV vehicles; construction of support facilities for Apache helicopters including firing ranges, hangars, simulators and spare parts.
29-1-94	\$9,200 billion	72 F-15XP aircraft, including 48 ground-attack and 24 air-defence versions; 24 spare engines; 48 sets of navigation and targeting pods; 900 AGM-65D/G Maverick missiles; 300 AIM-9S and 300 AIM-7M air-to-air missiles, 600CBU-87 bombs; 700 GBU-10/12 bombs, spare and repair parts; support and training.
1990-1994	\$25,722,000	
Total	\$52,782,700	

Sources: Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability*, 1984, p. 254, from years 1965-1980. Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and The West*, 1988, p. 64, from year 1981-1985. Richard F. Grummitt, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the third World 1986-1993*, Congressional Research Service, July 1994, p. 59 from years 1986-1989. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub committee on Europe and the Middle East and on Arms Control, International security and science, September 23, 1992, p. 86 from years 1990-1994.

**Chart 1**


**Arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia, 1986-1989**  
**supplier percentage of value**



Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, July 29, 1994, p. 33.

**Chart 2**

**Arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia, 1990-1993**



Source: as chart 1.

## Security and military relations prospects

U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia have always had a symbolic significance. They are an indication not only of the U.S.' concern for Saudi-U.S. political-military ties but also has implications for Israeli security. Securing the compatibility between strengthening the Saudi military ability and preserving Israeli security has been a point of controversy that continually faces American policy makers in evaluating the merits of any prospective sale of sophisticated military equipment to Saudi Arabia.<sup>544</sup>

Additional to this, was the Saudi's need for extensive new American arms. Saudi Arabia's defence build-up in the wake of the Gulf crisis has been recognised by the U.S. Congress as being in response to actual threats to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the congress recognises that these arms will probably not be turned against Israel. On the other hand, when U.S. interests were threatened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia got most of the sophisticated weapons including F-15s without Congressional opposition. President Bush exercised his special waiver authorities available to him under U.S. law to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia.<sup>545</sup> The arms sales were seen as a reassurance that the U.S. considered Saudi Arabia as an accountable partner. The arms sales after the Gulf crisis of 1990 evidenced that the Israeli lobby could no longer exert an absolute rejection of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The Arab-Israeli conflict does obstruct co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf crisis has narrowed their differences about the Arab-Israeli conflict which resulted in the aloofness of Saudi Arabia from the PLO and the involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since the Gulf crisis, U.S.-Saudi relations can be characterised as co-operative. The analysis of the U.S.-Saudi co-operation over the Gulf crisis revealed that U.S.-Saudi co-operation was associated with increase interdependence. Nevertheless, security relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have not been without tension. The appropriate response over a long - term U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia finds the two countries at odds. In fact the tension over security between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has decreased since the Gulf crisis because the U.S. has now managed to negotiate defence agreements with all the GCC states except Saudi Arabia. In addition, now that the Soviet threat has disappeared,

regional threats seem comparatively easy to contain. The defence agreements with the rest of the GCC countries and Desert Storm have shortened the time and increased the access to Saudi Military facilities in case Saudi Arabia had to call for U.S. assistance. Therefore, U.S.-Saudi security relations has been characterised by co-operation rather than conflict since the U.S. has shown its commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia and the co-operation between the two states during Desert Storm.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **U.S.-Saudi Economic and Political Relations Since the Gulf Crisis of 1990**

#### **U.S.-Saudi economic relations**

To understand U.S.-Saudi economic relations after the Gulf crisis, it will first be useful to write about the Saudi economy after the Gulf crisis if we are to have a complete picture about U.S.-Saudi economic relations.

#### **Saudi Arabia's economy**

The Kuwait crisis in 1990, turned the Saudi government's finances upside down for the first time. The government announced that the crisis cost \$55,000 million, including transfers to the U.S. and other members of the anti-Iraq coalition.<sup>1</sup>

The decrease in oil prices in 1993, combined with the Kuwait crisis, made the 1994 budget smaller than the budget of 1993. In the budget of January 1, 1994, King Fahd announced a 19 per cent cut in government spending. The budget had a total expenditure and revenue of SR 160,000 million (about \$42.666 million), implying the goal of a balanced budget for the first time since 1982.<sup>2</sup> Table 16 shows this clearly with the budgeted government revenue and expenditure for 1993 and 1994. The 1994 target was SR 160 billion for both revenue and expenditure whereas in 1993, the planned expenditure and revenue was SR 197 billion and SR 169 billion, respectively.

The Kingdom has acted to enhance national and regional security. It is pressing ahead with an inclusive plan to advance its security against all possible threats. The government's budget for 1994 has a reduction in the allocation for defence and security. Defence has accounted for about 30 per cent of total budget expenditure since the end of the Gulf war. The Kingdom's financial pressures came to light at the beginning of January 1994, when the Washington Post reported that Saudi Arabia was asking to reschedule payments due for arms sales from U.S. companies at a cost of \$9.2 billion. First reported in Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1994, it was signed in Riyadh by Saudi officials and representatives of McDonnell Douglas Corp, General Dynamics Corp, Hughes Aircraft Co., FMC Corp, and Raytheon Co.

Representing the U.S. government was a delegation led by Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Rhame, who heads the Pentagon's foreign military sales programme.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 16**

**Budgeted government revenue and expenditure  
(SR billion)**

	1993	1994
<b>Revenue</b>	<b>169.2</b>	<b>160.0</b>
of which:		
oil	134.3	n/a
domestic	26.5	n/a
investment	8.4	n/a
<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>197.0</b>	<b>160.0</b>
of which:		
projects, operations, maintenance	53.0	43.0
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>-27.8</b>	<b>0.0</b>

Sources: Saudi Arabia, Country Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1st Quarter 1994, P.11.

Under the new payment plan, Saudi Arabia paid \$1.5 billion in 1994-1995; the remaining \$6.2 billion will be paid by international lending institutions. The Saudis will guarantee repayment of the loans and will pay the interest.<sup>4</sup>

But the government of Saudi Arabia was looking forward with confidence to the budgets of the future. Finance and National Minister, Mohammed Ali Abalkhail, sought to allay fears about the Kingdom's liquid reserves and other financial matters in a letter to the New York Times in August 1993. He said "The Saudi currency is covered by a special reserve of hard currencies that exceeds \$20,000 million". However, I argue here that the Saudi government does not have to convince the world about its liquid reserves of hard currencies, because its real reserve is oil, of which the largest quantity is still under Saudi soil.

**U.S.-Saudi economic relations**

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia maintained strong and strategic commercial relations during the 1990s. For example, the Washington Post reported that Saudi Arabia

had reached an agreement with the United States and five of the biggest defence contractors on plans to restructure \$9.2 billion in purchases of American arms over the next two years.<sup>5</sup> After just two weeks, on February 16, 1994, M.B.C. television in London (Middle East Broadcast Centre) announced the sale of U.S. commercial airliners to Saudi Airlines worth a total of \$6.2 billion.

In 1993, the government of Saudi Arabia decided to purchase replacement aircraft for its commercial airline, Saudi Airlines. After intense competition between American and European firms, a telephone call that President Bill Clinton made to King Fahd finalised the agreement.<sup>6</sup> The President of the United States announced, on February 16, 1994, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia intends to purchase the entire replacement fleet from U.S. companies, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. The agreement was signed by the American Secretary of Commerce and the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington. The order for 60 or more aircraft to renew and expand Saudi's fleet.<sup>7</sup>

A fact sheet released from the White House on February 16, 1994, pertaining to the announced sale of U.S. - commercial airlines to Saudi Airlines stated: "The sale will support 100,000 of jobs for about 10 years not only in California and Washington where the planes will be built, but in Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Utah and elsewhere, where Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have extensive operations. In addition, major subcontractors, including United General Electric in Ohio, will benefit significantly from this order. This purchase continues the strong commercial relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, particularly in the field civil aviation. It complements the important political and strategic relationship."

As a result of these economic ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Americans and Saudis created in Riyadh a permanent Saudi-American Council of Businessmen on April 4, 1994. The Saudi Finance and National Economy Minister, Mohammed Abalkhail, stated at the opening of the Council on April 4, 1994, that Saudi Arabia hosts more than 1,300 joint ventures. The United States is the biggest investor in Saudi Arabia. It holds 209 joint ventures, amounting to \$11.5 billion.<sup>8</sup> Table 17 shows the levels of trade of Saudi Arabia with its major trading partners. As is clear, the U.S. dominates Saudi Arabia's imports and exports. Table 18 shows the main destinations of Saudi Arabian exports in 1992, in



percentage terms. Table 19 shows the main Saudi Arabian imports in 1992. The U.S. is clearly the most important trading partner for both Saudi Arabian exports and imports. Table 20 shows U.S. trade with the Near East and North African countries in 1992, 1993 and 1994. Saudi Arabia dominated the U.S. export market and at the same time dominated the U.S. import market.

**Table 17**

**Trade of Saudi Arabia with major trading partners  
(\$000; monthly average).**

	USA		Japan		France		Italy		UK	
<b>Imports</b>	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Sep 1992	Jan-Sep 1993	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993
Crude Petroleum	1,005,944	940,476	828,057	778,252	269,191	233,140	193,567	174,088	141,783	159,525
	USA		Japan		UK		GER		ITALY	
<b>Exports fob incl goods shipping to foreign oil companies</b>	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992
	536,778	585,305	324,430	404,167	289,511	228,573	190,834	226,030	141,386	166,905

Source: Saudi Arabia, Country Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1st quarter 1994, p.23.

**Table 18**

**Main destinations of export 1992, % of total**

USA	20.2
Japan	18.4
South Korea	5.3
France	5.0
Singapore	4.7
Netherlands	4.2

Source: As table 17



**Table 19**

**Main origins of imports 1992, per cent of total**

USA	20.9
Japan	14.2
UK	10.6
Germany	8.1
Italy	5.9
France	5.3

Source: as table 17

More than 70,000 Americans live and work in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. "They are the biggest civilian community in the Kingdom", the Saudi Deputy Minister of Commerce, Dr Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil, said in an interview.<sup>9</sup> Dr Al-Zamil has been described by Richard H. Curtis, a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer and at present the executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, as "The man who introduces Saudi Arabia and Arabs to Americans".<sup>10</sup>

Dr Al-Zamil stated that the strong commercial connection between the United States and Saudi Arabia go back for many years when King Faisal sent thousands of Saudis to the United States in 1962, to study and train. When the Saudi human resources returned from the United States, they became an active part in the U.S. - Saudi economic and commercial relations. Thus, the Americans had the opportunity to build the bridge to Saudi Arabia and formulate the commercial and industrial policies of Saudi Arabia.

"Why is the United States the first country to have permanent joint ventures with Saudi Arabia", Dr. Al-Zamil asked himself. The answer is because the Saudis generally like doing business with Americans, who have obtained a reputation in Saudi Arabia as straightforward, dependable people who would deliver what they promised to their clients.

Dr Al-Zamil continued by saying that there is another perceptual factor which strengthens U.S. - Saudi commercial relations. Saudis are convinced that U.S. businessmen would deliver the merchandise more speedily than the businessmen of Europe and the Japanese, because European and Japanese governments were often involved in the their negotiations. However, I believe that the strong

commercial relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had a strong basis in the earliest stages of their relationship. The Americans assisted the development of the Kingdom by supplying the transportation infrastructure, the hospitals, the education institutions and the communication and water networks. This allowed the Saudis to test American material and skills. The Saudis became confident of American technology and skills and so continued to import it.

**Table 20**

**U.S. trade with Near East/North African countries  
1992, 1993, January-June 1993, 1994  
(In millions of dollars)**

<u>U.S. General Exports</u>					<u>U.S. General Imports</u>			
	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>Jan-June 1993</u>	<u>Jan-June 1994</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>Jan-June 1993</u>	<u>Jan-June 1994</u>
<b>Total Area</b>	<b>21,339.9</b>	<b>21,346.3</b>	<b>11,032.9</b>	<b>10,115.1</b>	<b>19,270.4</b>	<b>19,145.6</b>	<b>9,896.6</b>	<b>8,855.3</b>
% of U.S. Total	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.1	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.8
<b>Arab Countries</b>								
<b>Near East</b>	<b>12,028.6</b>	<b>11,814.4</b>	<b>5,981.6</b>	<b>5,142.8</b>	<b>12,961.3</b>	<b>11,999.2</b>	<b>6,541.9</b>	<b>4,986.8</b>
Bahrain	488.7	653.1	330.2	310.2	71.2	109.4	51.9	70.0
Iraq	.5	.4	.7	.8	--	--	--	--
Jordan	249.9	362.7	196.0	137.7	18.6	20.1	7.4	14.8
Kuwait	1,326.9	1,009.0	514.0	498.5	310.0	2,003.4	730.2	822.4
Lebanon	310.8	376.5	182.9	201.1	28.5	27.9	14.0	12.7
Oman	257.4	265.3	105.4	134.4	207.3	305.0	91.9	173.5
Qatar	189.1	166.3	80.6	77.8	76.0	72.3	36.3	44.3
Saudi Arabia	7,163.3	6,665.6	3,444.1	2,859.9	11,285.7	8,431.5	5,047.2	3,504.9
Syria	168.3	185.8	105.4	97.6	45.0	144.7	64.0	48.4
UAE	1,552.4	1,811.4	827.3	748.6	871.9	774.5	441.8	231.1
Yemen	321.2	318.3	195.0	66.7	46.3	110.4	57.2	64.0
Gaza	*	*	*	1.2	*	*	*	*
West Bank	.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<b>Arab Countries</b>	<b>4,489.6</b>	<b>4,495.0</b>	<b>2,399.6</b>	<b>2,437.7</b>	<b>2,405.6</b>	<b>2,619.1</b>	<b>1,184.9</b>	<b>1,304.2</b>
<b>North Africa</b>								
Algeria	676.6	898.0	452.6	631.2	1,693.8	1,710.8	849.8	875.3
Morocco	493.2	602.1	371.4	243.2	194.8	201.1	95.1	98.9
Libya	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Tunisia	232.5	232.3	154.4	155.0	51.4	43.4	25.7	32.1
Egypt	3,087.3	2,762.6	1,421.2	1,408.3	465.6	663.8	214.3	297.9
<b>Non-Arab</b>	<b>4,821.7</b>	<b>5,036.9</b>	<b>2,651.7</b>	<b>2,534.6</b>	<b>3,903.5</b>	<b>4,527.3</b>	<b>2,140.8</b>	<b>2,564.3</b>
<b>Countries</b>								
<b>Near East</b>								
Iran	747.5	616.2	413.3	127.7	.8	.2	.1	.5
Israel	4,074.2	4,420.2	2,238.4	2,408.9	3,902.7	4,527.1	2,140.7	2,563.8

Including Special Category Commodities  
Exports - f.a.s.; Imports - c.i.f.  
N/A - Not available; \* - less than \$100,000

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Compiled by: Office of the Near East, August 22, 1994.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia plays an important role as a major U.S. trading partner and market for U.S. goods and services. The U.S. Department of Commerce confirmed that at any given time throughout the 1980s, more than a million Americans owed their jobs directly to the long-standing Saudi preference for American technology, military hardware, and commercial exports. The U.S. Department of Commerce confirmed that in 1991 every one billion-dollars Saudi Arabia spent on American goods created 40,000 more jobs for Americans.<sup>11</sup> Excluding the number of dollars Saudi Arabia spent on American goods, according to the American Businessmen Group of Riyadh, studies indicated that on the average, one American employee in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia generates more than thirteen additional jobs in the United States.<sup>12</sup>

### **The position of oil in U.S. - Saudi relations**

It has long been a standard declaration of the U.S. government to say that one of its main policy interests in the Gulf is to "secure access to oil at reasonable prices".<sup>13</sup> American motorists are paying less for gasoline now than they have at any time since World War II.<sup>14</sup> However, oil remains, as was demonstrated in the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, an essential element in national power, a main factor in the world economy, a critical focus for war and conflict, and a decisive force in international affairs.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. oil imports are at the highest level ever, and are still growing rapidly.<sup>16</sup> In 1994, the U.S. started to import more than half of the oil it consumes.<sup>17</sup> The U.S. produced 6.6 million bpd and imported 8.9 million bpd.<sup>18</sup> The total oil reserves of the U.S. (34.1 billion barrels) will be exhausted by the year 2000.<sup>19</sup> It is estimated that 97 per cent of the world's oil is found outside the United States.<sup>20</sup> The GCC states account for 46.3 per cent of the proven world oil reserves; add Iran and Iraq, and the Gulf has 65.6 per cent of the world's oil reserves.<sup>21</sup> Together the Gulf states have proven oil reserves of 655.5 billion barrels out of the global total of 1,012 billion barrels.<sup>22</sup> At least 60 per cent of the world's oil comes from the eight Gulf states.<sup>23</sup> The GCC states account for 464.54 billion barrels, which priced at \$20 a barrel is worth \$9,290.8 billion.<sup>24</sup> Saudi Arabia itself possesses proven oil reserves 261.2 billion barrels, about 56.2 per cent of the GCC proven oil reserves, 32.8 per cent of OPEC and about 25.6 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves.<sup>25</sup>

Saudi Arabia produced 8.4 million pbd, 14.1 per cent of the world total, and is the largest producer of oil in the world.<sup>26</sup> It has 61 oil and gas fields, only 23 of which have ever been drilled; one field alone contains more oil than the U.S., Canada and Europe combined.<sup>27</sup> One third of U.S. oil imports come from the Gulf.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, U.S. dependence on Gulf oil would certainly rise to a very significant level in the future.<sup>29</sup> As long as U.S. involvement in the Gulf assists the deterrence of short-term disruptions of oil, continued involvement in the Gulf remains in the best interest of America.<sup>30</sup> Short-term disruption in Gulf oil production could have a destructive effect on the U.S. economy and also the world economy.<sup>31</sup> In 1972-1973, during the oil crisis, the U.S. economy had shrunk by more than 5 per cent a year. It was driven into a recession from which it did not recover until 1976.<sup>32</sup> Inflation jumped to the 9 per cent range.<sup>33</sup> Western industrial countries as a group suffered about 2 to 3 per cent loss in economic output in 1974 because of the Arab oil embargo against the U.S. and Netherlands.<sup>34</sup>

The U.S. benefits from its continued American control of "petro dollars".<sup>35</sup> Many of the assets of the GCC states and their citizens are invested in Wall Street and U.S. Treasury bills.<sup>36</sup> "Recycling" these vast sums into U.S. dollars has been a major source of profits for American banks.<sup>37</sup> A meeting in Washington in April 1993, of the American-Gulf Chamber of Commerce, reported that direct Gulf investment in the U.S. totalled \$407 billion as of the beginning of 1992.<sup>38</sup> This in turn, permitted the U.S. government to run large external deficits in financing the defence of its empire.<sup>39</sup> In the early 1990s, the combined annual GNP of the GCC states exceeded \$130 billion, of which the U.S. annually gained the single largest share in terms of the sales of goods and services to GCC countries.<sup>40</sup> U.S. trade with the GCC countries has frequently yielded a surplus in favour of the United States.<sup>41</sup> In the mid 1990s, the U.S. exported \$25 billion (excluding arms deals) per year in goods and imported about \$13 billion.<sup>42</sup> These exports support more than 650,000 U.S. jobs and are the main source of livelihood for nearly 2.4 million Americans.<sup>43</sup> More than 700 U.S. branch companies operate in the GCC states and employ 16,000 Americans who are the direct means of support for more than 50,000 American dependants in the GCC region.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S. enjoys significant financial benefits from its involvement in the Gulf region.<sup>45</sup> What would be immediately damaging to the U.S. economy

would be any effort to denominate the world price of oil in anything but dollars.<sup>46</sup> As the world oil price is now set in dollars, the U.S. is protected from the effects of currency fluctuations on its energy imports<sup>47</sup>. When the dollar fell in relation to other major currencies, in the mid 1970s, there were many complaints from the Gulf region and suggestions that the price of oil be changed from the dollar to a basket of currencies.<sup>48</sup> However, the Iranian Revolution stopped such complaints by underlining the dependence of the GCC states on the United States for security.<sup>49</sup> The decline of the dollar since the Kuwait crisis has not caused the same complaints to be repeated.<sup>50</sup> This continued dependence of the GCC states on the U.S. for security after the Gulf war, has enabled the U.S. to ensure the flow of Gulf oil to the market at a "reasonable price".<sup>51</sup>

Another aim of American strategy in the Gulf was to keep the Soviet Union out of the Gulf and to destroy the Soviet Union's military power through an oil price war. In the mid 1980s, the Soviets generated about \$25 billion a year from their exports of oil, natural gas and gold.<sup>52</sup> This represented about 90 per cent of their income from exports (Oil: 70 per cent; natural gas and gold: 20 per cent).<sup>53</sup> Thus, low oil prices threatened the Soviet military machine while high oil prices could pay for expansion, oil being a major source of foreign exchange for the Soviets.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, low oil prices, reduced inflation and stimulated the American economy.<sup>55</sup> In the mid 1980s, the price of oil fell by \$3 a barrel, and the inflation rate in the U.S. dropped by 1 per cent.<sup>56</sup> If the oil producers sold barrels of oil at 1978 prices (\$15), it has been calculated that, real interest rates would drop to 3 per cent, inflation would be removed, employment would rise and the standard of living of average-income Americans would be driven upwards.<sup>57</sup>

The decline of Soviet military power was the only way to reduce the increase in American military spending.<sup>58</sup> A defence analyst, Earl Revenal, has estimated that the U.S. commitments to the defence of Europe alone is nearly equal to the federal deficit.<sup>59</sup> The fastest way to reduce the federal deficit and end the largest single long-term danger to the American economy is to break OPEC and reduce oil prices.<sup>60</sup> As George McFadden said "if you were secretary of defence the best place to spend your time would not be on weapons procurement but on breaking the price of oil".<sup>61</sup> Since Saudi Arabia dominates OPEC, he observed that the Western economies would find it advantageous to see Saudi Arabia blow up.<sup>62</sup> In his view the U.S. would not get much of an advantage through weapons procurement, the

critical factor is in the price of oil. Bring oil prices down and the U.S. economy takes off. When the oil prices go down more oil is produced. The glut of oil would keep the price of oil down.

After the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia fulfilled its obligation to the U.S., its protector, to maintain the flow of Gulf oil to the market at a "reasonable price". By mid 1991, oil was \$16.5 a barrel; a price lower than in 1974.<sup>63</sup> In January 1992, Henson Moore, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy, said that the U.S. appreciated the Saudi position to "resist calls to raise prices".<sup>64</sup> Higher oil prices add about \$3 billion to the U.S. trade deficit for each dollar a barrel price increase.<sup>65</sup>

As a matter of fact, the reduction of the American consumption of imported oil, using taxes to reduce oil prices, has been a determined aim since the oil crisis of 1973-1974.<sup>66</sup> In the second half of the 1970s, the traditional U.S. response to higher oil import dependence was a plan to increase domestic oil production and decrease oil consumption. This could save the U.S., Western Europe and Japan about 6.5 million barrels of oil each day.<sup>67</sup> In a Congressional report in December 1977, the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources, asserted that:

The action that the U.S. takes domestically to reduce its dependence on oil imports will be an essential factor in determining access to those supplies which remain crucial; with reduced U.S. oil-import demand, the oil supply/demand situation would less clearly favour the oil producers (in the absence of an OPEC production programming scheme) and the question of access to oil for Western Europe and Japan might be considerably eased with a reduction in U.S. import demand freeing quantities of oil for sale elsewhere. Access to those supplies still needed may be easier to the extent that the need for access is reduced by U.S. domestic energy efforts.<sup>68</sup>

For the Americans, the alliance system could not remain untouched by the economic and political consequences of the oil supply disruption. Oil shortages or price rises that resulted in a shortage of oil in Western Europe and Japan were unacceptable.<sup>69</sup> U.S. access to oil includes an adequacy and continuous of supply of oil "at reasonable prices" not just for the U.S. but for Western Europe and Japan whose future will affect the United States.<sup>70</sup>

During the 1980s, because of both falling oil prices and falling production, Saudi revenues fell sharply from \$102.2 billion in 1980 to \$28.5 billion in 1986.<sup>71</sup> Even though, it became evident in 1986, that the U.S. oil import dependence would increase, the oil security policy relied almost entirely on the strategic petroleum reserve, 650 million barrels.<sup>72</sup> In addition, the U.S. has several strategies on oil security policy which are under discussion.<sup>73</sup> For instance, the U.S. Department of Energy is studying the possibility of building up the SPR more quickly by leasing oil from export countries and negotiations took place with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries in the early 1990s.<sup>74</sup> The U.S. and European Union are playing a role in controlling the demand for oil in the 1990s.<sup>75</sup> Governments have imposed defensive tax increases to keep down oil demand growth.<sup>76</sup>

The Americans proposed an energy tax in 1993. (Each cent per gallon of tax imposed would raise \$1 billion per year in U.S. tax revenues).<sup>77</sup> The Gulf Oil Ministers, complained that it was directed entirely at oil imports.<sup>78</sup> Ali Ahmed Baghli, the Oil Minister of Kuwait said "Saudi Arabia and us, we were the cause of putting prices down. Iran and Libya and those revolutionary countries, they were asking for higher prices. And now, instead of saying thank you, you are treating us this way, it is not fair".<sup>79</sup> Taxes would reduce global demand and sharply cut the revenues of the oil-producing countries.<sup>80</sup> While the GCC states have not yet responded harshly to the proposed Clinton energy tax, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister has noted that they could in the worst case increase the cost of oil and reduce their development programmes.<sup>81</sup> They could also reduce their contributions to social welfare programmes throughout the Gulf, potentially adding to instability in the Gulf region.<sup>82</sup>

Many in the GCC states are afraid that the proposed energy tax foreshadows policies that may erode the reserves of friendship won by the coalition during the liberation of Kuwait.<sup>83</sup> Saudi Arabia is still hard pressed for cash to speed up its payments for war debts and economic development.<sup>84</sup> In fact, it has been reported in 1994, that a higher oil prices of \$1 a barrel would add \$2.3 billion to the Saudi annual oil revenue.<sup>85</sup> The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, criticised the energy tax in his speech in the General Assembly of the U.N. on October 5, 1994.<sup>86</sup> He stated Saudi concerns about the oil tax, which and how it effected its main export.<sup>87</sup> He said that although Europe and the U.S. imposed more tax on oil, there were continuing government subsidies for other energy sources which

contained much higher levels of carbon, such as coals.<sup>88</sup> The Saudi government believed that the tax proposed did not arise out of concern for the environment and violated the principles of international trade which is based on the law of supply and demand.<sup>89</sup>

The European Union, on the other hand, has imposed the highest energy tax in the world "carbon tax".<sup>90</sup> European countries gain from the tax on oil more than \$90 a barrel, while the oil producers sell each barrel of oil for \$15 (1995).<sup>91</sup> European treaties gain six times the revenue from a barrel of oil than the oil producers themselves.<sup>92</sup> In addition, the European Union's trade with the GCC countries has frequently yielded a surplus in favour of the E.U. This surplus amounted to \$9.4 billion in 1995.<sup>93</sup>

The U.S. has imposed tax on oil because it is cheap. If the oil prices were raised, the U.S. government would not increase the tax. The U.S. administration often states its need to get oil from the Gulf "at a reasonable price", but none of the administrations defined the phrase "reasonable price". Logically, at a "reasonable price" would mean the consumer price i.e. after the government had imposed its tax. Governments used to subsidise coal to make its price "reasonable" and available for anyone. How would the U.S. and the European Union react if Saudi Arabia decided to share their concern about protecting the environment from carbon by increasing the price of oil and by reducing its oil productions?

Although, Saudi Arabia will not resist higher oil prices,<sup>94</sup> Saudi Arabia would probably be anxious to accommodate the U.S. and other major consumers in trying to moderate oil prices, run up by the Gulf war.<sup>95</sup> In March 1994, Iran and others in the 12-nation OPEC had wanted, 1 million barrels per day taken off the oil market to raise oil prices and support their debt-laden economies.<sup>96</sup> Former Saudi Oil Minister, Hisham Nazer, said that other members were welcome to cut production, but that Saudi Arabia would not do so.<sup>97</sup> OPEC delegates commented that without the co-operation of Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil producer, a supply cut would be ineffective.<sup>98</sup> This perspective alarmed the U.S. in particular and the U.S. insisted that Saudi Arabia adopt a low oil price.<sup>99</sup> The Saudis believe that regional security is threatened when the gap between the demand and the supply of oil shrinks. This makes the market more sensitive to conflict and



accidents which effect Saudi security as a whole.<sup>100</sup> For Saudi security, it is best to keep the production of oil higher than the demand to maintain a moderate price.

However, in the long term, a young and more self-assured Saudi leadership is not likely to be quite so responsive to the desire of the U.S. in its oil policies.<sup>101</sup> In addition, the Saudis put many hopes about the new world market which is going to be located in Asia, especially China and Japan.<sup>102</sup> According to some reports, in the next century China and Japan will depend more on Gulf oil, which allow the Saudis to state that where there is the foreign investments good foreign relations would follow.<sup>103</sup> In spite of that, Saudi experts predict that they will maintain good relations with the U.S., but it would not be as special as relations at present.<sup>104</sup> Thus, the oil market realities in the early part of the next century would be important in determining Saudi political policies as well as its relations with the United States.<sup>105</sup>

At present, it appears there is a balance in the oil relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Access to the world's biggest reserves and supplies are important to the U.S.; access to the world's biggest oil-consuming market is important to Saudi Arabia.<sup>106</sup> The U.S. policy can successfully safeguard American interests in the region, and supply oil at "reasonable prices". (An increase in the price of oil is unlikely in the next few years).<sup>107</sup> The suggestion made in the mid 1970s by former Oil Minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, has come to completion: the U.S. guarantees Saudi security in return for cheap oil.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, for the U.S. the politics of the Gulf remain tied to the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The mix of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict could blow up in America's face as it did in 1973.<sup>109</sup> To the extent, that U.S. involvement in the Gulf prevents this linkage, such involvement serves American interests.<sup>110</sup>

### **U.S.-Saudi political relations**

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Persian Gulf once again became the centre point of American Middle Eastern policy and enhanced the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. announced its willingness to protect its interests in the region. Therefore President Bush sent his Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, to Saudi Arabia on

August 5, to convince King Fahd that his Kingdom was at risk and that the United States was committed to protecting Saudi Arabia.<sup>111</sup> Saudi Arabia agreed to apply to the U.S. for protection on August 7.<sup>112</sup> Washington immediately sent aircraft and additional naval forces to Saudi Arabia and to the Persian Gulf.<sup>113</sup> (See Chapter 3)

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 condemning Baghdad's aggression and demanded an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait's territory.<sup>114</sup> The Soviet Union co-operated with the United States throughout the crisis to great effect. Several European countries provided international cover for American operations and were led by the United Kingdom and France.<sup>115</sup>

For domestic reasons (see chapter 5), King Fahd wanted to have not only U.S. troops on Saudi soil but also support from other Arab countries to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression. An Arab League emergency summit meeting was called on August 10, in Egypt.<sup>116</sup> 12 out of the 20 members present voted to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.<sup>117</sup>

President Bush strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion and called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal.<sup>118</sup> With the Iraqi troops moving toward the Saudi border, Bush warned Iraq not to invade Saudi Arabia. President Bush stated that "The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the long standing friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia".<sup>119</sup> The Bush administration was clearly the leading actor in this rush of events.

The Gulf crisis also allowed huge American arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Bush used his emergency authority to put through a \$2.3 billion sale of 24 F-15 C/D air superiority fighters, 200 Stinger missiles, 50 Stinger launchers, 150m-6-A-3 main battle tanks and 15,000 rounds of depleted uranium anti-armour shells.<sup>120</sup> The administration made clear its intention to inform Congress about an unprecedented \$23 billion sale to Saudi Arabia.<sup>121</sup> The United States planned that the security arrangements for the region would depend on the significant expansion of the military abilities of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states.<sup>122</sup>

Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, explained that the administration's reasoning was as follows: "We seek through this sale to help build an increased capability to deter and defend against potential aggressors in the area, to buy more time in the event of deterrence failure, for mobilisation of support from friendly governments, to enhance inter-operability that will allow the U.S. and other friendly forces to reinforce the Saudis".<sup>123</sup>

On September 2, 1990, King Fahd received a U.S. delegation.<sup>124</sup> He mentioned the Kingdom's "Strong warm and long relationship with the United States, and that this closeness had never been a secret".<sup>125</sup> Moreover, he wished that there would be enough oil available on the world markets at regular prices, and that, therefore, no countries were hurt as a result of Iraqi aggression.<sup>126</sup> The British Energy Secretary, John Wakeham, hailed the role of Saudi Arabia as being an excellent way by which Saudi Arabia has shown its great capabilities.<sup>127</sup> He noted that this action had saved the world from an economic crisis.<sup>128</sup>

On November 1, 1990, King Fahd met, in Jeddah, with U.S. President George Bush.<sup>129</sup> Both leaders agreed to double American troops in Saudi Arabia in accordance with General Norman Schwarzkopf's recommendations. They confirmed that the friendly forces would immediately withdraw when the crisis was over or when the government of Saudi Arabia asked them to.<sup>130</sup>

Washington had built up a strong force in Saudi Arabia. By November, U.S. ground and air force units were spread to the threatened areas of Saudi Arabia. The forces included more than 430,000 army personnel and marines and more than 1,500 combat aircraft.<sup>131</sup> A central command forward headquarters was also established in Saudi Arabia.<sup>132</sup>

The economic noose around Iraq was further tightened when the Security Council passed another resolution, ordering universal economic sanctions. On November 29, 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 678, giving Iraq until January 15, 1991, to comply with resolution 600 and withdraw from Kuwait and authorised the use of force to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait.<sup>133</sup>

The deadline, January 15, came and went. Saddam continued to strengthen his defences in Kuwait. On Thursday, January 17, 1991, 26 hours after the expiry of the U.N. deadline, the sirens of Iraq went off as the coalition aircraft launched an attack on Iraq.<sup>134</sup>

On Sunday, February 24, the day the ground war began.<sup>135</sup> Within less than forty-eight hours of fighting, the backbone of the Iraqi army had been broken.<sup>136</sup> On February 26, Iraq announced a speedy withdrawal from Kuwait.<sup>137</sup>

The scale of the United States military deployment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - half of all U.S. combat forces world-wide - was a shock even to the American people.<sup>138</sup> But the principle of U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia should come as no surprise. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in 1943, "The defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States".<sup>139</sup> Similarly, President Bush's address on August 8, 1990, recounting the historical ties between the two countries said "My administration, as has been the case with every president from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the Congress and leadership, grows out of the long standing friendship and the security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia".<sup>140</sup> All the subsequent presidential doctrines of intervention have had the Persian Gulf and its oil at the centre of their sights.

Deployment of upwards of the 525,000 American military personnel to Saudi Arabia was possible because the Soviet threat and the need for a large U.S. troop presence in Europe had evaporated.<sup>141</sup> The Bush administration intervened militarily in order to offset Iraq's capability to control the Gulf politically following the successful and unchallenged conquest of Kuwait.<sup>142</sup>

When the war ended, the United States would act as "peacemaker" when President Bush announced on February 27, 1991, that Secretary of State, James Baker would be touring the Middle East and the Soviet Union in March, for consultation on the future of the region.<sup>143</sup> The United States analysts argued that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was possible. They noted that the Gulf war had hardened the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.<sup>144</sup> This initiative came

when the PLO itself was pilloried in the Gulf states for supporting Iraq during the Gulf war. On October 29, 1990, the New York Times reported that Saudi leaders had had "second thoughts" about their rather confrontational attitude towards the PLO leaders. Saudi Arabia confirmed the Kingdom's continued support to the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to achieve their just demands for return of their homeland and the establishment of an independent state.

On May 6, 1991, the Saudi's Council of Ministers renewed its support and continuous backing of all the efforts leading to the resolution of the Palestinian question which was the major issue at all international levels.<sup>145</sup> The council expressed the Saudi government's welcome for the initiative taken by the United States, shouldered by U.S. Secretary of State and directed and followed up by President George Bush.<sup>146</sup> King Fahd repeatedly expressed the firmness of the Kingdom's stand on the Palestinian cause as the basic and vital cause of Islamic and Arab nations. (See Chapter 6)

### **Economic and political prospects**

The Gulf crisis made the American-Saudi relations stronger than ever before. Saudi forces worked closely with the U.S. during the Gulf war and this was a unique moment in the history of the two countries. The Gulf crisis has bound the two countries together at the very highest levels. The acquisition of U.S. arms and the co-ordination of joint logistical planning made the Saudi's base their defence policy on a guaranteed U.S. intervention if necessary.<sup>147</sup> The planning of this policy was effective in creating a joint U.S.-Saudi military command during the Gulf war. Saudi Arabia sought to develop its relationship with the U.S. because of its leading position in providing advanced military know how and technology.<sup>148</sup> In exchange, the Saudis would guarantee a stable supply of Saudi oil to the industrialised world.<sup>149</sup> The U.S. commitment to Saudi security was first tested during the Gulf crisis.<sup>150</sup> Despite the difference over methods and policy objectives and despite tensions over oil and Camp David Accords, the U.S. - Saudi alliance continued to remain a special case for co-operation.<sup>151</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. has increased its military and political superiority in the Gulf. The U.S. is speeding up the progress towards a regional security system. The overall goal is to secure a

permanent security structure for all the GCC states, particularly the central regional actor Saudi Arabia. Thus, the U.S., would gain an unchallenged military position as well as considerable political control in the region. (See Chapter 7).

Since the Gulf war ended, the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been more harmonious than ever before. This is due mainly to the Saudi's aloofness from the PLO. The Saudis support for the PLO leadership has cooled since the PLO supported Saddam Hussein during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Added to that now that the PLO have signed a peace agreement with Israel (in September 1993), the PLO is now able to address its problems with Israel directly. This has lessened the need for Saudi Arabia to become involved in Palestinian issues. This new situation has removed the major point of contention between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. (See chapter 6).

The Arab-Israeli problem does obstruct co-operation between them, but the Gulf crisis has narrowed their differences about the Arab-Israeli problem. In February and March 1991, senior Saudi spokesmen informed American officials of their willingness to move in the direction of normalised relations with Israel, as long as a settlement acceptable to the Palestinians was attained.<sup>152</sup> The issue which has affected the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia the most is the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, after the Gulf war of 1991, their relationships associated with increased bilateral interdependence contributing to increased co-operation.

Nevertheless, the co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis has tied Saudi Arabia politically to the U.S. in the period after the Gulf crisis. The U.S. used the political strength that derived from its military success in the Gulf war to influence Saudi Arabia on the economic issue. Saudi Arabia has made a commitment to buy new civilian aeroplanes and military hardware from the U.S. . This was pushed for by President Clinton in spite of Saudi Arabia's announcements of budget cuts due to the cost of paying for the Gulf war. In addition, the U.S. has increased the tax on oil which has forced oil prices and production to decrease. Saudi Arabia will have to use its important position in OPEC to restrain oil price increases to support the U.S. because the U.S. guarantees Saudi security.

The U.S. used its forces to gain political influence. The U.S. has the military capability to keep Iraq's threats in check after the Gulf war. The U.S.'s ability to deter Iraq serves as an indirect protective role, which it can use in bargaining on other issues with Saudi Arabia. This bargaining tool is important for the U.S., whose ally, Saudi Arabia, is concerned about potential Iraqi threats. Thus the U.S. has the advantage of Saudi Arabia's desire for protection which it can link to the issue of economics. Saudi Arabia has long attempted to use its oil wealth as a foreign policy tool to buy off threats to its security when victory could not be determined by military means. The Saudis recognise this reality. That is why the Saudi government welcomed the arrival of half a million American troops onto Saudi soil after August 2, 1990. Political researchers believe that international hostilities can be reduced by involving hostile nations in interactions that benefit them.<sup>153</sup>

To conclude; the political analysis of international interdependence can be made by thinking of asymmetrical interdependencies as a source of power among countries.<sup>154</sup> Different types of interdependence lead to potential political influence.<sup>155</sup> A less dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource.<sup>156</sup> Asymmetries in dependence provides sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another.<sup>157</sup> Less dependent actors can often use their interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue to effect other issues.<sup>158</sup>

## Conclusion

Since World War II Saudi Arabia has been an important ally of the U.S. in the Gulf region. However, U.S. policy is motivated by a consideration of Israel.<sup>1</sup> Of all the U.S. alliances in the Middle East, none is important as that between the U.S. and Israel.<sup>2</sup> The alliance with Saudi Arabia is a "special relationship" but secondary to that with Israel, which stands at the top of the U.S. alliance structure in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. gave Israel economic aid during the Gulf crisis, and in the Saudi case, the U.S. gave it military protection which the Saudis paid for under the Operation Desert Shield.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, asserted to the Israelis in 1994,

I want to make clear to you in unmistakable terms that the U.S. will continue to stand with Israel. For more than four decades the U.S. has stood by Israel. It reflects our ideals and reinforces our interests. This country believes in you. We believe in the idea of Israel, and we have an unshakeable commitment to your security and well being.<sup>5</sup>

The Saudi media believe that Israeli and U.S. interests will, in future, oppose Saudi interests. For instance, Al Riyadh newspaper stated on May 24, 1995, that the Israeli attitude displayed the difficulty of achieving a stable peace with Israel.<sup>6</sup> It continued by saying that the problem was not just a problem of land - but that Israel's source of power (with U.S. support) could dominate the region.<sup>7</sup> The U.S. gives the Saudis what it wants, denies them what it does not want them to have, exploits them in times of trouble and bargains with them during times of disaster.<sup>8</sup> A world with only one superpower could present a threat to Saudi interests in the region, particularly if the U.S. were to continue to support Israel's interests to dominate the region.<sup>9</sup> For example, many Arabs are uneasy about watching the further punishment of Iraqi people in the name of the U.N., while Israel's latest bombing raids of the areas surrounding Beirut (in April 1996) killed more than 160 persons and has not been punished.<sup>10</sup>

Because of regional instability, the Saudis follow a very cautious foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Saudi Arabia has tried to maintain its links with its Arab wartime allies, without permitting that link to become a real military alliance.<sup>12</sup> Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, who together had spent billions of dollars supporting such pan-Arab causes as the recovery of Israeli occupied Palestinian lands and had put its own security at risk during the oil embargo of 1973 and during Saddam's war against Iran.<sup>13</sup> Maybe even more shocking to




Saudi Arabia was the stand initially taken by some Arab governments in support of the Iraqis.<sup>14</sup> The Saudis blamed these Arab governments and their people because they supported Saddam Hussein freely while Iraqi people were forced to follow Saddam's orders. For the Saudis before the Kuwaiti crisis, it was an Arab national obligation to support Arabs. After the crisis, the Saudis and other GCC states drew their own conclusions about the meaning of Arabianism.<sup>15</sup> This appears to suggest that Arab world will never be the same after the Gulf war.<sup>16</sup> This crisis has shaken Saudi Arabia, which led a senior Saudi official to say "We do not give a damn anymore about Arab unity, which never existed anyway. You are going to see us defend ourselves".<sup>17</sup>

The Gulf war led Saudi Arabia to the re-evaluation of its previous policy, especially in the security context.<sup>18</sup> Since the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia has decided to double its armed forces to 200,000 troops over the next five to seven years.<sup>19</sup> It could not aspire to match the far higher military power of its larger neighbours.<sup>20</sup> The Saudi population in 1992 was about 10 million of which 60 per cent of Saudis were under 21.<sup>21</sup> The Saudi armed forces including the National Guard totalled 111,500.<sup>22</sup> Iraq, with less than double the Saudi population, had a military force at least eight times as large as Saudi Arabia in 1990.<sup>23</sup> Syria, with a population only two million greater than Saudi Arabia had armed forces of more than 400,000 in 1991.<sup>24</sup> Jordan, with less than half of the Saudi population, had armed forces of 101,000 in 1991.<sup>25</sup> Israel, also with less than half of the Saudi population, had armed forces of 141,000 and a reserve force of over 500,000 in 1991.<sup>26</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia had the human resources of power, but its military manpower, was well below the neighbours. In fact, during the Gulf crisis Saudi Arabia organised, for the first time in its history, military training for 170,000 Saudi volunteers.<sup>27</sup>

The Saudi government argued that they must use superior technology sophisticated military equipment to compensate for limited manpower.<sup>28</sup> However, what could the sophisticated weapons do for Saudi Arabia when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.


**Chart 3**



Source: Proposed sales and upgrades of major defence equipment to Saudi Arabia, House of Representative, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on Europe and the Middle East, June 19, 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p. 28.

Chart 3 illustrates the military expenditures in Saudi Arabia per soldier in the 1980s was \$223,592.<sup>29</sup> Iran with all of its significant acquisition of weapons and its war with Iraq was \$5,974 per person, Iraq was \$7,000; and in the U.S. it was \$66,000.<sup>30</sup> The other chart (No. 4) explains the idea of a per capita expenditure for the total people in the country. In 1990 in Iran it was \$113, in Iraq it was \$730, and in Saudi Arabia it was \$1,100. This compares to the U.S. expenditure of only \$1,415.<sup>31</sup> After the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia bought just from the U.S., sophisticated weapons worth more than \$25 billion.<sup>32</sup> Can the Saudis absorb the major new weapons?<sup>33</sup> In this case, military analysts pointed out that the Saudi armed forces need better educated manpower to have professional armed forces.<sup>34</sup> If Saudi Arabia had a strong army, Saddam Hussein would not think of invading Kuwait, whether the U.S. sent wrong signals to Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait or not.

**Chart 4**  
**Military expenditures per capita**



Source: as chart 3

After five years, the Gulf crisis is unfinished. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein has survived and the Iraqi armed force is still superior to Saudi Arabia's and the rest of GCC states in terms of the size of its military manpower.<sup>35</sup> In spite of the impact of the Gulf war, the real problem is still to be faced.<sup>36</sup> This is when the impact of Iran's nuclear programme has reached the point where it becomes a significant threat to Israel and U.S. interests in the region.<sup>37</sup> There is no way that the U.S. could repeat a major military operation in the Gulf region without access to some or all of Saudi Arabia's facilities.<sup>38</sup> Maybe, the U.S. administration could ensure that the Saudis finance the biggest share of any future military operation by bullying Saudi Arabia into the future crisis, as they did during the Gulf war. By shouldering the biggest financial burden of the cost of the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia has made important moves to decrease the negative impact of the Iraqi invasion on the stability of the international economy.<sup>39</sup>

Future U.S. policy will be based on asserting military and political power over economic power in the Gulf region.<sup>40</sup> It is naive to think that U.S. forces will withdraw from the Gulf region in the near future.<sup>41</sup> The Gulf war can be seen by the U.S. as the achievement

of all its Cold War goals: the Soviet threat was ended, the Arab-Israeli peace process got underway and the flow of oil was secured in the medium term.<sup>42</sup>

The military intervention in the Gulf is a signal that the U.S. is not sure about its world role.<sup>43</sup> Many analysts have argued that once the European Common Market becomes a unified currency zone, the U.S.'s competitive position within the global economy will be weakened.<sup>44</sup> Through a military presence in the Gulf, the U.S. would enjoy closer economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states, while strengthening its competitive position against Europe.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the U.S. sought, in the Gulf war, to perform militarily what it could not perform economically.<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S. looks to Saudi Arabia to finance its interests in the Middle East.<sup>47</sup> The distribution of wealth in the region could shrink American financial assistance to some countries in the Middle East. On February 6, 1991, Secretary of State, James Baker, admitted before the House Foreign Affairs Committee the creation of an economic organisation through which the GCC states could fund the reconstruction and development of their poorer neighbours.<sup>48</sup> Next day, Mr Baker recommended the creation of a multinational "Middle East Development Bank" to achieve these objectives which was founded in 1995.<sup>49</sup> In spite of the Saudi financial situation after the Gulf war and the fact that Jordan had sided with Iraq during the Gulf war, the U.S. proposed that it would assist Jordan to restore its relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states and would insist that they provide Jordan with the 75,000 barrels of oil daily free of charge.<sup>50</sup> All the U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to help Jordan financially was motivated by the peace agreement that Jordan signed with Israel. Shortly, on January 15, 1996, Saudi Arabia expressed its readiness to supply Jordan with all the oil it needs.<sup>51</sup> Thus, the U.S. military intervention in the Gulf bases U.S. policy on asserting its political power over the economic power of the GCC states.

The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is mainly conditioned by concerns for oil.<sup>52</sup> The U.S. has a direct and continuing interest in the petroleum resources of Saudi Arabia.<sup>53</sup> For the indefinite future, the U.S. and its allies simply can not do without adequate supplies of oil from Saudi Arabia.<sup>54</sup> If Saudi oil exports were to be stopped, the effect on the world economy would be similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s.<sup>55</sup> The U.S., therefore, will continue to look to Saudi Arabia to use their oil production at a reasonable price and to help meet emergency shortfalls in supply.<sup>56</sup> Oil will be essential

until the world finds an attractive alternative to it, and also finds substitutes for petrochemical products.<sup>57</sup>

On the other hand, one of the most striking economic realities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is that oil prices and revenues have been lower than they were in 1974.<sup>58</sup> At the same time Saudi Arabia's population doubles every 12-13 years.<sup>59</sup> In another 12 years coping with this kind of change will be a problem for Saudi Arabia and for strategic partnership.<sup>60</sup> It is an economic reality that will be much more enduring than the temporary cash problems arriving from the Gulf war or depressed oil prices.<sup>61</sup> The Saudis' American friends make things no easier for their partnership.<sup>62</sup> The Saudis perceive the important role played by the U.S. in improving Saudi security.<sup>63</sup> But the Saudis do not believe that this is the U.S. contribution for which the Saudis should be expected to pay such a high price.<sup>64</sup> Morally and politically, American analysts are urged to avoid creating more damage than necessary to achieve their military objectives. This could have negative consequences in the long term relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States.<sup>65</sup> The coming decade will show whether actions taken in the aftermath of the Gulf war have set in motion forces that could upset the domestic stability of these countries and threaten Saudi relations with the U.S.

Saudi Arabia is not seen as a strong friend of the United States because of memories of the oil embargo, oil price increases and hostility towards Israel.<sup>66</sup> There is no strong pro-Saudi lobby in the United States compared to the Israeli lobby, and an administration that seeks to sell arms to Saudi Arabia will always have to defeat the concern of the friends of Israel in Congress.<sup>67</sup> In fact, Israel appears to always have a strong say on the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.<sup>68</sup>

Some will go so far as to point that all the problems in the region will clear once the Palestinians have been given a state of their own.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, the American victory in the Gulf has not yet been won; only a permanent peace can be considered true victory.<sup>70</sup> As Michael Hudson, a Professor of Arab Studies at Georgetown University, said that a permanent solution will only occur if a peace agreement is reached or there is "such a bad economic turndown that even the oil countries could not afford jets and missiles".<sup>71</sup> Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, challenges and threatens U.S. interests in the region will be regional, rather than global.<sup>72</sup> Other threats to U.S. interests may include conflicts between Israel and Arabs. Since the politics of the Gulf remain tied to the politics of the

Arab-Israeli conflict, the most evident and long standing concern has been the difficulty of continuing American support for Israel while maintaining and developing relations with the GCC states.<sup>73</sup>

The translation of their relationship into a natural *modus operandi* involves manoeuvring and bargaining by each side to obtain the most advantageous terms. This is due to their diverse interests. Saudi Arabia has attempted to use its oil as a tool of foreign policy to press the U.S. about its policy toward Israel. The U.S. for its part, has supplied Saudi Arabia with the military assistance while seeking in return to affect Saudi Arabia's oil production and price decisions. This connection gave way to more complex relationship of interdependence, involving shared as well as divergent interests and, therefore, increased the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism as well as co-operation. Saudi Arabia's strategic, political and economic significance has increased with the growing dependence of the U.S. on imported oil.<sup>74</sup> Despite the various changes in East-West relations, U.S. - Saudi relations has been characterised by a degree of continuity.<sup>75</sup> The U.S. and the Saudis have shared interests and shared concerns in the following areas: oil (flow and price), military security, economic and commercial concerns, and politics.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, arms and oil compose the backbone of the U.S. - Saudi relations.<sup>77</sup> The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have both preserved a degree of ambivalence, toward their mutual relations almost from the very beginning of their relationship.<sup>78</sup> Their increased bilateral interdependence generated increased co-operation but also differences.<sup>79</sup> Prior to the Desert Storm, there was increased bilateral co-operation as in 1974 Joint Economic Commission; and there was increased bilateral conflict concerning oil, arms, the Israeli and Palestinian issues, and a suitable response to the Soviet Union's challenge in the Gulf region.<sup>80</sup> Motives are continuously being examined on both sides.<sup>81</sup> Some analysts such as Keohane and Nye define world interdependence as "A state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces", therefore, interdependence simply means mutual dependence.<sup>82</sup> They argue that interdependence in world politics refers to "Situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries".<sup>83</sup>

Linkages of the component sets of the U.S.-Saudi relations have always existed, e.g. oil, military security, economic and commercial concerns and politics.<sup>84</sup> In times of differences these linkage have tended to become more explicit.<sup>85</sup> For instance, the oil weapon was used by Saudi Arabia against the U.S. in 1973. This connected oil and politics.<sup>86</sup> The

different positions taken by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is affected by the fact that the United States' is the world's largest oil consumer and Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of oil.<sup>87</sup>

Shared oil and regional security interests have demanded continuity in U.S. - Saudi relations from the beginning.<sup>88</sup> In the beginning, the U.S. government preserved a non-interventionist stance on oil policy, leaving its oil companies in Saudi Arabia to determine the oil price and the level of production.<sup>89</sup> When control over price and the production rate transferred from the oil companies to OPEC members, Saudi Arabia started to direct oil operations as a matter of government policy.<sup>90</sup> Since then, Saudi oil policy has reflected the Saudis' desire to see higher oil prices, but it has also reflected its interest in preserving market stability.<sup>91</sup> It is not the Saudi economy which is based on oil, so much as the economy of the U.S. which is tightly connected to the price of oil.<sup>92</sup> Saudi Arabia, as a leading OPEC member has played a much larger role in controlling oil matters than the United States.<sup>93</sup>

When control over the price and the levels of production was transferred from the oil companies to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. was forced to make a government-to-government relationship with Saudi Arabia on the question on oil.<sup>94</sup> In the first place, the U.S. was concerned about the flow of oil, and negotiated for a time to buy equity in Aramco.<sup>95</sup> These government-to-government relations are still a vital and integral part of U.S. oil policy.<sup>96</sup> However, the Arab oil embargo on the U.S., operated mainly by Saudi Arabia, must have made it clear that the U.S. could not control the oil in such a way.<sup>97</sup> It has been far more the case that where oil and politics are connected, the connection is negative and works against U.S. interests.<sup>98</sup>

The threat to use force, as the U.S. did in 1975, when faced with the possibility of a future oil embargo, is so costly, it is difficult to make credible. A military action is an act of desperation.<sup>99</sup> The complex layers of political and economic interdependence overcomes, the need for military force which is irrelevant when resolving disagreements on economic issues among countries.<sup>100</sup>

There is likely to be a greater connection between oil and politics in the more positive context of the pursuit of extending U.S. co-operation in areas of interest to the Saudis.<sup>101</sup> Saudi Arabia would go beyond what its narrow oil interests might dictate, in moderating

oil prices, to develop mutual trust and co-operation in pursuit of Saudi political interests.<sup>102</sup> The agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for a Joint Economic Commission, in the mid 1970s, to co-ordinate and bilateral trade relations is an example.<sup>103</sup> This level of co-operation corresponds to the increase in the level of interdependence between the two countries - this is shown by the total amount of trade between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.<sup>104</sup>

The connection between oil and security has always been close.<sup>105</sup> As Saudi Arabia has become the world's leading oil exporter, the U.S. concern for securing the flow of Saudi oil has increased. This has meant that its concern for oil field security and regional political stability has increased.<sup>106</sup> This connection has established a mutuality of interests in military and security operation that has made the U.S. - Saudi military relations continuous over these years and has overcome the crises that have confronted the relationship.<sup>107</sup>

The U.S. has pushed the selling of arms to Saudi Arabia in recognition of Saudi moderation over the control of oil prices.<sup>108</sup> In other words, security assistance is a trade-off for price concessions.<sup>109</sup> The mutual interdependence, sought by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia does not stop the parties from trying to acquire the most advantageous terms possible.<sup>110</sup> An example of this is that while using its important position in OPEC to restrain oil price increases, Saudi Arabia, in return, used its leverage to secure American military assistance and to influence U.S. policy in different issues, particularly, the U.S. policy toward Israel.<sup>111</sup> The former Saudi Oil Minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, asserted in July 1979, that if the U.S. could not compel Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, it "must be prepared to face the consequences... you can not expect Arabs to co-operate on oil unless there are positive incentives on the political front".<sup>112</sup>

Economic and commercial relations have expanded independently of the other areas of interests.<sup>113</sup> For the most part, U.S. policies appear to recognise these mutual interests, and future policies of the U.S. requires it to support the Saudis in ways which influence its decisions over the disposal of its wealth.<sup>114</sup> U.S. - Saudi trade has grown over the past years in parallel. In 1979 American companies signed non-military contracts in Saudi Arabia worth nearly \$6 billion. Actual exports from the United States to Saudi Arabia in 1980 amounted to \$5.8 billion; U.S. purchases from Saudi Arabia were more than double that amount. While the overall level of Saudi-purchases from the United States are likely



to remain at a high level - but the level of non military trade will always be imbalanced in favour of Saudi Arabia. The U.S. desires to ease its balance of payments problem by drawing oil revenues back into the U.S. economy.<sup>115</sup> In fact, military sales have increased most rapidly as a proportion of the total U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia. This further ties the U.S. to Saudi Arabia.<sup>116</sup>

The United States, inspires general ambivalence even though it achieved superpower status after World War II.<sup>117</sup> It has many competing interests, not only with Saudis and in the Middle East generally but also globally.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, U.S. diplomacy seeks to balance these contesting interests through trade-offs and compromises.<sup>119</sup> The U.S. position towards Saudi Arabia has primarily been concerned with not meeting Saudi Arabian demands which could commit the U.S. to a deepening relationship.<sup>120</sup> Particularly, after the creation of Israel in 1948, the Arab-Israeli problem has been a main difficulty for the U.S., as the White House has sought to avoid clashes between its commitments to Israel and those to Saudi Arabia.<sup>121</sup>

Another major factor has been imposed by the nature of U.S. interests after the Cold War.<sup>122</sup> The absence of a global competitor, like the USSR, has enhanced the global security environment for the United States.<sup>123</sup> U.S. leaders do not want their own unilateral acts based on the national interest to be restrained and want to instigate multilateral operations like the Gulf war.<sup>124</sup> The disappearance of the Soviet threat has not changed the fundamental orientation of U.S. interests.<sup>125</sup>

The U.S. has kept in mind that Saudi Arabia and other oil producers are pursuing their own self-interests at present by supporting moderate price growth aimed at increasing both world-wide oil demand and OPEC's share of the world oil.<sup>126</sup> The U.S. can not assume that this unprecedented convergence of interests will always exist- the short term political or economic pressures within the Gulf region will not arise again to allow OPEC to use a strategy of high prices.<sup>127</sup>

It is clear that having won the war of 1991, the U.S. will increase its ties to the GCC, especially to Saudi Arabia.<sup>128</sup> These ties help increase the chances of price stability and put constraints on tendencies to disrupt oil supplies or to use oil as a political weapon.<sup>129</sup> The U.S. has reduced its vulnerability, and made its sensitivity less serious politically.<sup>130</sup> Power is seen as the "Ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise

would not do".<sup>131</sup> If one side seeks to upset the status quo, then it gains at the expense of the other.<sup>132</sup> Military power dominates economic power in the sense of that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force.<sup>133</sup> Keohane and Nye asserted against defining interdependence in terms of situations of "evenly balanced mutual dependence".<sup>134</sup> They stated that asymmetric interdependence is a power resource in situations of complex interdependence, which often provides influence for those dealing with others.<sup>135</sup> Those who are less dependent are often able to use the interdependent relationship to gain bargaining power and influence other issues.<sup>136</sup> Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do and it can also be conceived in terms of control and outcomes.<sup>137</sup> The traditional view of power was that military power dominated other forms. But military force supported by economic and other resources would clearly be the dominant source of power.<sup>138</sup> In the United States - Saudi Arabia relationship, the fact that Saudi Arabia has a modest military force which we can not compare with the United States' shows that it is, therefore, not a major factor in the bargaining process. However, the Saudis can take advantage of their superior position on economic power, such as oil. Nevertheless, the absence of force lays down the concept of complex interdependence.<sup>139</sup>

The Gulf war and its accomplishments had consequences which have put in motion forces that could upset the domestic stability of GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia. These forces could threaten Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States.<sup>140</sup> The U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia accounted for 6,000 soldiers in 1996.<sup>141</sup> The Saudi people rejected the presence of American troops on their soil. For the Saudi people, it is unjustifiable for the U.S. after the Gulf war to ignore their demands since the situation in the Gulf region is under control, Saudi people thought the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia was to seize the oil fields, not protect Saudi Arabia. Those who see greater interconnection not in terms of benefits, but rather as presenting threats to national, ethnic, language and most importantly religious identity. The risks of interdependence is that it will overturn the balance in favour of the United States. The U.S. must struggle to preserve the peace that has followed.<sup>142</sup> Balancing various interests and goals would present the real challenge to the U.S. in the coming decade.<sup>143</sup> Meeting this challenge will become urgent for the U.S. because its interdependence with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf economies are counted upon to grow in the source of the decade.<sup>144</sup>

Distorting interdependence would bring regional charges that Saudi Arabia is a subordinate country to the United States and that the U.S. security umbrella is extended to assure cheap oil for the U.S. and its allies at the expense of the Gulf countries.<sup>145</sup> To some degree, however, this order was financed by the capability of the U.S. to tax Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states.<sup>146</sup> In addition, the U.S. has increased the tax on oil because it is cheap. The U.S. administration often states its need to get oil from the Gulf at a "reasonable price". The Clinton administration now relies on access to cheap Saudi oil, Saudi political assistance in the Arab world, and financial support for U.S. strategic and economic objectives world-wide.<sup>147</sup> An agreement was reached, for example, to increase repayment terms for the Saudis to pay for U.S. weapons and to seek commercial bank loans to finance some of the more costly deals.<sup>148</sup> In the case of commercial relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. before the Gulf war, commercial relations have generally been free of government interference by either country.<sup>149</sup> However, in early 1994, a telephone call that President Bill Clinton made to the Saudi government promoting the sale of \$6.2 billion worth of U.S. - made air transports, which represented a fundamental change in the U.S. government's attitude towards Saudi Arabia.<sup>150</sup> In fact the U.S. used its political strength with Saudi Arabia that derived from U.S. military success in the Gulf war of 1991 to influence Saudi Arabia on economic issues.<sup>151</sup> The American deterrence capability serves an indirect protective role which it can use in bargaining on other issues, such as trade, with Saudi Arabia. As Keohane and Nye asserted, military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force.<sup>152</sup>

Unprecedented financial and economic disorder in Saudi Arabia came with growing world-wide competition and pressure from the industrialised countries to continue large military and industrial purchases.<sup>153</sup> Saudi Arabia in return has suffered heightened concern about national defence.<sup>154</sup> Saudi Arabia's multi-billion dollar commitments to buy new civilian and military hardware from the U.S., coming after its budget cut announcements, are a good illustration of both the pressure and the concern.<sup>155</sup> In fact, exploiting the Saudi economy is big business.<sup>156</sup> The U.S.' obsession in protecting their interests in Saudi Arabia threatens the Saudi economy and presents risks to the continued flow of oil.<sup>157</sup> It could even push their relationship to breaking point. The problem has been expressed thus; Saudi Arabia is a developing country is pursuing justice while the U.S. is an industrial country and is trying to maintain the existing order.<sup>158</sup>

An additional, major challenge to U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia is neither Saddam Hussein nor Iran.<sup>157</sup> Rather, it is the slow but sure growth in opposition to the United States from inside Saudi Arabia.<sup>158</sup> On November 13, 1995, a new source of inconsistency appeared on the scene when four Saudis planted a huge bomb which blew up a U.S. operating military centre in Riyadh.<sup>159</sup> The bomb killed six people including one member of the U.S. military force, four U.S. civilians and 60 others were injured including 30 U.S. citizens.<sup>160</sup> The U.S. embassy in Riyadh received a statement in early 1995, saying that foreign forces in the Arabian Peninsula must be pulled out by the end of June, or they would become a legitimate target.<sup>161</sup> This is a means of expressing their disaffection with the status quo.

The U.S. can do little to influence this change.<sup>162</sup> It also realises the limits of its capability to help the Saudi government and so is cautious of performing assistance that could be counterproductive.<sup>163</sup> In addition, the U.S. is practically powerless to respond in cases of internal insecurity.<sup>164</sup> It is an era in which the U.S. will probably continue to feel their way warily for the foreseeable future. This will pose the real threat to oil access and price stability.<sup>165</sup> The U.S. will continue to be dependent on Saudi oil and therefore vulnerable if Saudi Arabia goes the way of Iran.<sup>166</sup> Despite the U.S. remains the world's most powerful country, this does not mean that the U.S. is able to obtain its own way on every issue.<sup>167</sup>

I argue here, that since the Gulf war, asymmetrical interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has become weighted in favour of the U.S. Unless the balance of power is equalised willingly by the U.S., internal Saudi opposition to the U.S. within Saudi Arabia will try to equalise it. This has been shown by the fact that a Saudi opposition group blew up the American centre in Riyadh. If the U.S. wants a stable status quo, the U.S. can, jointly with Saudi Arabia, gain by establishing a balance of military power and economic power between them.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have respective primary interests in common, which could expand their awareness of these mutual interests. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia need to perceive that their mutual interests can be better achieved once they have defined their areas of common interest.<sup>168</sup> The lack of balance has resulted in bad faith.<sup>169</sup> In attempting to preserve U.S. interests and continued ties with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. will have to be increasingly sensitive to expressions of anti-American feelings and charges of

U.S. neo-colonialist ambitions.<sup>172</sup> Therefore, less military visibility may once again be the better stance to take.<sup>173</sup>

The U.S. must turn back to the policy of fostering interdependency between consumers and producers.<sup>174</sup> Harming relations with long-term energy suppliers, would in turn harm U.S. economic growth.<sup>175</sup> Stability and growth promote each other, the greater the stability the more investment results.<sup>176</sup> This lead to higher growth, which in its turn contributes to stability, mainly by enabling all to get a share of the growing number of advantages.<sup>177</sup> In the opposite way growing instability prevents economic activity.<sup>178</sup> Growth decline adds further stress upon the instability. Most economic interdependence involves the potential of joint profits or joint losses. Mutual realisation of possible gains and losses and the risk of worsening each state's position through overly strict rules over the distribution of profits can limit the use of asymmetrical interdependence.<sup>179</sup> Saudis are investing heavily in the U.S., tying their economy more closely to the United States.<sup>180</sup> On the other hand, the flow of investment capital to the U.S., generated by oil resources will be required to reduce the national deficit and to stimulate a slow-growth economy.<sup>181</sup> The U.S. must carefully maintain bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and keep the doors open to future Saudis' investments.<sup>182</sup> The cost of not maintaining balanced relations with Saudi Arabia would be to destroy the future economic growth of the United States. Saudis that take part in domestic politics would not look favourably on American companies if U.S. policy were unfair.<sup>183</sup> It has become obvious that, in the near future, only a few oil exporters and newly industrialised countries will be able to join the major industrial countries in having the ability to effect global economic conditions.<sup>184</sup> Therefore, a harmony with Saudi Arabia, because of its important position within OPEC, appears to be increasingly important to the U.S. Oil exporting countries are becoming ever more important as markets. In fact, some argue, that economic ties provide an opportunity to conduct war by other means.<sup>185</sup> Asymmetry, in the benefits associated with economic interdependence, is perceived as directing greater conflict reduction on the part of the participant that benefits most.<sup>186</sup>

The conclusion of this study, is that increased interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can be characterised, until the 1990 Gulf crisis, by both increased conflict as well as co-operation. The increased conflict was in such areas as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the oil embargo, arms sales and the appropriate response to Soviet threats. The increased co-operation was in such areas as the Joint Economic Commission in 1974 and

co-operation over dealing with the threats posed by the Iran-Iraq war. Accordingly, conflict and co-operation can be seen as consequences of interdependence. While interdependence leads to increased conflict, it can have beneficial phases that bring greater co-operation.<sup>187</sup>

The increase in interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can be characterised since the Gulf crisis of 1990, as increased co-operation e.g. the co-operation over the Gulf war of 1991, arms sales and the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Therefore, increased co-operation can be seen as the absence of high levels of conflict. Increased interdependence is coupled with decreased conflict. This is due to the fact that a reduction in threats is a consequence of one country being especially sensitive or vulnerable to another's actions which in turn can interfere with the anticipated benefits of interaction.<sup>188</sup> Thus, the costly aspects of interdependence appear to generate conflict, the beneficial aspects of interdependence appear to reduce conflict.<sup>189</sup>

## Footnotes

### Introduction

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### Chapter One

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